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https://github.com/slackhq/nebula.git
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hmm
This commit is contained in:
79
outside.go
79
outside.go
@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ const (
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minFwPacketLen = 4
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)
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func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte, h *header.H, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, lhf *LightHouseHandler, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache, now time.Time) {
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func (f *Interface) readOutsidePacketFromRelay(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte, h *header.H, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, lhf *LightHouseHandler, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache, now time.Time) {
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//todo this is way too similar to readOutsidePacketsMany, find a way to eliminate
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err := h.Parse(packet)
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if err != nil {
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// Hole punch packets are 0 or 1 byte big, so lets ignore printing those errors
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@@ -65,70 +66,11 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte,
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return
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}
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case header.MessageRelay:
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// The entire body is sent as AD, not encrypted.
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// The packet consists of a 16-byte parsed Nebula header, Associated Data-protected payload, and a trailing 16-byte AEAD signature value.
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// The packet is guaranteed to be at least 16 bytes at this point, b/c it got past the h.Parse() call above. If it's
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// otherwise malformed (meaning, there is no trailing 16 byte AEAD value), then this will result in at worst a 0-length slice
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// which will gracefully fail in the DecryptDanger call.
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signedPayload := packet[:len(packet)-hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead()]
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signatureValue := packet[len(packet)-hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead():]
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out, err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.DecryptDanger(out, signedPayload, signatureValue, h.MessageCounter, nb)
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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// Successfully validated the thing. Get rid of the Relay header.
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signedPayload = signedPayload[header.Len:]
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// Pull the Roaming parts up here, and return in all call paths.
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f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, via)
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// Track usage of both the HostInfo and the Relay for the received & authenticated packet
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f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo)
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f.connectionManager.RelayUsed(h.RemoteIndex)
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relay, ok := hostinfo.relayState.QueryRelayForByIdx(h.RemoteIndex)
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if !ok {
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// The only way this happens is if hostmap has an index to the correct HostInfo, but the HostInfo is missing
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// its internal mapping. This should never happen.
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hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithFields(logrus.Fields{"vpnAddrs": hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "remoteIndex": h.RemoteIndex}).Error("HostInfo missing remote relay index")
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return
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}
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switch relay.Type {
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case TerminalType:
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// If I am the target of this relay, process the unwrapped packet
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// From this recursive point, all these variables are 'burned'. We shouldn't rely on them again.
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via = ViaSender{
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UdpAddr: via.UdpAddr,
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relayHI: hostinfo,
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remoteIdx: relay.RemoteIndex,
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relay: relay,
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IsRelayed: true,
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}
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f.readOutsidePackets(via, out[:0], signedPayload, h, fwPacket, lhf, nb, q, localCache, now)
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return
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case ForwardingType:
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// Find the target HostInfo relay object
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targetHI, targetRelay, err := f.hostMap.QueryVpnAddrsRelayFor(hostinfo.vpnAddrs, relay.PeerAddr)
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if err != nil {
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hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("relayTo", relay.PeerAddr).WithError(err).WithField("hostinfo.vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs).Info("Failed to find target host info by ip")
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return
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}
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// If that relay is Established, forward the payload through it
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if targetRelay.State == Established {
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switch targetRelay.Type {
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case ForwardingType:
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// Forward this packet through the relay tunnel
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// Find the target HostInfo
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f.SendVia(targetHI, targetRelay, signedPayload, nb, out, false)
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return
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case TerminalType:
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hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Unexpected Relay Type of Terminal")
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}
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} else {
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hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithFields(logrus.Fields{"relayTo": relay.PeerAddr, "relayFrom": hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0], "targetRelayState": targetRelay.State}).Info("Unexpected target relay state")
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return
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}
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//this packet already came to us via a relay
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if f.l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
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f.l.WithField("from", via).Debug("Refusing to process double relayed packet")
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}
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return
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}
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case header.LightHouse:
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@@ -308,7 +250,14 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePacketsMany(packets []*packet.Packet, out []*pack
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case TerminalType:
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// If I am the target of this relay, process the unwrapped packet
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// From this recursive point, all these variables are 'burned'. We shouldn't rely on them again.
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f.readOutsidePackets(ViaSender{relayHI: hostinfo, remoteIdx: relay.RemoteIndex, relay: relay}, out[i].Scratch[:0], signedPayload, h, fwPacket, lhf, nb, q, localCache, now)
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via = ViaSender{
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UdpAddr: via.UdpAddr,
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relayHI: hostinfo,
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remoteIdx: relay.RemoteIndex,
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relay: relay,
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IsRelayed: true,
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}
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f.readOutsidePacketFromRelay(via, out[i].Scratch[:0], signedPayload, h, fwPacket, lhf, nb, q, localCache, now)
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return
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case ForwardingType:
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// Find the target HostInfo relay object
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