add locks around replay window updates (#1802)

This commit is contained in:
Jack Doan
2026-07-20 10:28:53 -05:00
committed by GitHub
parent 147c202c27
commit 3615a79b8b
2 changed files with 76 additions and 52 deletions
+52
View File
@@ -2,11 +2,13 @@ package nebula
import ( import (
"encoding/json" "encoding/json"
"log/slog"
"sync" "sync"
"sync/atomic" "sync/atomic"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert" "github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake" "github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/noiseutil" "github.com/slackhq/nebula/noiseutil"
) )
@@ -20,6 +22,7 @@ type ConnectionState struct {
initiator bool initiator bool
messageCounter atomic.Uint64 messageCounter atomic.Uint64
window *Bits window *Bits
decryptLock sync.Mutex
writeLock sync.Mutex writeLock sync.Mutex
} }
@@ -54,3 +57,52 @@ func (cs *ConnectionState) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
func (cs *ConnectionState) Curve() cert.Curve { func (cs *ConnectionState) Curve() cert.Curve {
return cs.myCert.Curve() return cs.myCert.Curve()
} }
func (cs *ConnectionState) Decrypt(l *slog.Logger, messageCounter uint64, out []byte, packet []byte, nb []byte) ([]byte, error) {
var err error
cs.decryptLock.Lock()
result := cs.window.Check(l, messageCounter)
cs.decryptLock.Unlock()
if !result {
return nil, ErrAlreadySeen
}
out, err = cs.dKey.DecryptDanger(out, packet[:header.Len], packet[header.Len:], messageCounter, nb)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
cs.decryptLock.Lock()
result = cs.window.Update(l, messageCounter)
cs.decryptLock.Unlock()
if !result {
return nil, ErrAlreadySeen
}
return out, nil
}
// VerifyRelay verifies AEAD protected (but not encrypted) relay frames. packet must be length-checked by the caller.
func (cs *ConnectionState) VerifyRelay(l *slog.Logger, messageCounter uint64, packet []byte, nb []byte) error {
cs.decryptLock.Lock()
result := cs.window.Check(l, messageCounter)
cs.decryptLock.Unlock()
if !result {
return ErrAlreadySeen
}
signedPayload := packet[:len(packet)-cs.dKey.Overhead()]
signatureValue := packet[len(packet)-cs.dKey.Overhead():]
_, err := cs.dKey.DecryptDanger(nil, signedPayload, signatureValue, messageCounter, nb)
if err != nil {
return err
}
cs.decryptLock.Lock()
result = cs.window.Update(l, messageCounter)
cs.decryptLock.Unlock()
if !result {
return ErrAlreadySeen
}
return nil
}
+24 -52
View File
@@ -102,27 +102,31 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte,
return return
} }
if len(packet) < header.Len+hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead() {
f.messageMetrics.RxInvalid(1)
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
f.l.Debug("packet too small", "from", via, "length", len(packet))
}
return
}
// All remaining packets are encrypted // All remaining packets are encrypted
ci := hostinfo.ConnectionState
if !ci.window.Check(f.l, h.MessageCounter) {
return
}
// Relay packets are special
if isMessageRelay { if isMessageRelay {
// Relay packets are special, this branch should always early-return
if err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.VerifyRelay(f.l, h.MessageCounter, packet, nb); err != nil {
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("Failed to verify relay packet", "error", err, "from", via, "header", h)
}
return
}
f.handleOutsideRelayPacket(hostinfo, via, out, packet, h, fwPacket, lhf, nb, q, localCache) f.handleOutsideRelayPacket(hostinfo, via, out, packet, h, fwPacket, lhf, nb, q, localCache)
return return
} }
out, err = f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out, packet, h, nb) out, err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.Decrypt(f.l, h.MessageCounter, out, packet, nb)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) { if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("Failed to decrypt packet", hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("Failed to decrypt packet", "error", err, "from", via, "header", h)
"error", err,
"from", via,
"header", h,
)
} }
return return
} }
@@ -151,7 +155,7 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte,
// No-op, useful for the Roaming and connectionManager side-effects above // No-op, useful for the Roaming and connectionManager side-effects above
case header.TestRequest: case header.TestRequest:
//recycle the input packet ciphertext as our output buffer //recycle the input packet ciphertext as our output buffer
f.send(header.Test, header.TestReply, ci, hostinfo, out, nb, packet) f.send(header.Test, header.TestReply, hostinfo.ConnectionState, hostinfo, out, nb, packet)
default: default:
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("IsValidSubType was true, but unexpected test subtype seen", "from", via, "header", h) hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("IsValidSubType was true, but unexpected test subtype seen", "from", via, "header", h)
return return
@@ -170,27 +174,8 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte,
} }
func (f *Interface) handleOutsideRelayPacket(hostinfo *HostInfo, via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte, h *header.H, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, lhf *LightHouseHandler, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) { func (f *Interface) handleOutsideRelayPacket(hostinfo *HostInfo, via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte, h *header.H, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, lhf *LightHouseHandler, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
// The entire body is sent as AD, not encrypted. // Successfully validated the thing. Get rid of the Relay header and the AEAD tag
// The packet consists of a 16-byte parsed Nebula header, Associated Data-protected payload, and a trailing 16-byte AEAD signature value. signedPayload := packet[header.Len : len(packet)-hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead()]
// The packet is guaranteed to be at least 16 bytes at this point, b/c it got past the h.Parse() call above. If it's
// otherwise malformed (meaning, there is no trailing 16 byte AEAD value), then this will result in at worst a 0-length slice
// which will gracefully fail in the DecryptDanger call.
signedPayload := packet[:len(packet)-hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead()]
signatureValue := packet[len(packet)-hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead():]
var err error
out, err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.DecryptDanger(out, signedPayload, signatureValue, h.MessageCounter, nb)
if err != nil {
return
}
// Advance the replay window now that the frame is authenticated
if !hostinfo.ConnectionState.window.Update(f.l, h.MessageCounter) {
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("dropping out of window relay packet", "header", h)
}
return
}
// Successfully validated the thing. Get rid of the Relay header.
signedPayload = signedPayload[header.Len:]
// Pull the Roaming parts up here, and return in all call paths. // Pull the Roaming parts up here, and return in all call paths.
f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, via) f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, via)
// Track usage of both the HostInfo and the Relay for the received & authenticated packet // Track usage of both the HostInfo and the Relay for the received & authenticated packet
@@ -234,9 +219,10 @@ func (f *Interface) handleOutsideRelayPacket(hostinfo *HostInfo, via ViaSender,
if targetRelay.State == Established { if targetRelay.State == Established {
switch targetRelay.Type { switch targetRelay.Type {
case ForwardingType: case ForwardingType:
// Forward this packet through the relay tunnel // Forward this packet through the relay tunnel, rebuilding it in place.
// Find the target HostInfo // Encode overwrites the old outer header, and the new AEAD tag lands where the old one was
f.SendVia(targetHI, targetRelay, signedPayload, nb, out, false) fwdBuf := packet[:0:len(packet)] // Cap to len(packet) to protect memory from a larger parent buffer
f.SendVia(targetHI, targetRelay, signedPayload, nb, fwdBuf, true)
case TerminalType: case TerminalType:
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Unexpected Relay Type of Terminal") hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Unexpected Relay Type of Terminal")
return return
@@ -503,20 +489,6 @@ func parseV4(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.Packet) error {
return nil return nil
} }
func (f *Interface) decrypt(hostinfo *HostInfo, mc uint64, out []byte, packet []byte, h *header.H, nb []byte) ([]byte, error) {
var err error
out, err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.DecryptDanger(out, packet[:header.Len], packet[header.Len:], mc, nb)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if !hostinfo.ConnectionState.window.Update(f.l, mc) {
return nil, ErrOutOfWindow
}
return out, nil
}
func (f *Interface) handleOutsideMessagePacket(hostinfo *HostInfo, out []byte, packet []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) { func (f *Interface) handleOutsideMessagePacket(hostinfo *HostInfo, out []byte, packet []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
err := newPacket(out, true, fwPacket) err := newPacket(out, true, fwPacket)
if err != nil { if err != nil {