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datapath: fix 12 correctness findings from tun/UDP offload review
Multi-disciplinary correctness review of the batched tun / GSO-GRO / sendmmsg rework. Each fix has a regression test; the merged tree builds on linux/darwin/openbsd/windows/freebsd/netbsd, vets clean, passes the unit and e2e suites, and is -race clean. Critical: - C1 zero-length inner UDP datagram no longer panics the process (remote DoS): the UDP coalescer routes payLen==0 to passthrough instead of seeding a GSO slot, and WriteGSO skips empty payload iovecs as defense in depth. - C2 segmenter no longer corrupts inner headers when gsoSize < headerLen: the L3+L4 header is snapshotted once and each segment stamped from the copy, replacing the destructive overlapping in-place slide (SegmentTCP + SegmentUDP). High: - H1 applyOuterECN updates the IPv4 header checksum (RFC 1624 incremental) when folding outer CE into the inner ToS, so passthrough packets are no longer dropped by the peer stack. - H2 the GRO reject path caps the borrowed RX segment ([:n:n]) so a reject can no longer overrun into the next coalesced segment's Nebula header. Note: oversized ICMPv6 rejects that need >16B beyond the segment are now refused rather than sent under GRO (safe; see TOFIX.md for the scratch-buffer follow-up). - H3 WriteBatch falls back to per-packet WriteTo for a chunk when writeSockaddr fails, so one bad-family destination costs only its own packet, not the batch. - H4 UserDevice.Readers returns N distinct queue wrappers with private buffers (sharing the pipes) so concurrent readers no longer race/overwrite borrowed packet bytes. - H5 Poll.Close / Offload.Close no longer null t.fd (matching master's tunFile.Close), removing the data race with a concurrent readOne load. Medium/Low: - M1 the UDP GSO 127-segment gate moved from kernel >=5.5 to >=6.9 (the real UDP_MAX_SEGMENTS 64->128 threshold), avoiding EINVAL + per-packet fallback on 5.5-6.8 kernels. - M2 NewMultiQueueReader replays the offload mask newTun actually negotiated instead of the TSO-only mask, so adding a queue no longer disables USO device-wide; the advertised USO capability derives from the same mask. - M3 the shutdown eventfd is closed in pollQueueSet.Close / offloadQueueSet.Close (double-close guarded), fixing the per-lifecycle fd leak. - M4 dual-stack ECN selects the cmsg by address family, not socket family: RX parseRecvCmsg reads both IP_TOS and IPV6_TCLASS; TX writeEntryCmsg stamps IP_TOS for v4/v4-mapped dests and IPV6_TCLASS for v6 (on-host verified). - L1 newPoll no longer closes the fd on failure (matching newOffload), removing the double-close on QueueSet.Add error.
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@@ -522,7 +522,23 @@ func applyOuterECN(pkt []byte, outerECN byte, hostinfo *HostInfo, l *slog.Logger
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case ecnCE:
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// Already CE.
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default:
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// Rewriting the ToS byte invalidates the IPv4 header checksum, so
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// patch it incrementally per RFC 1624 (HC' = ~(~HC + ~m + m')). The
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// ToS is the low byte of the 16-bit word at pkt[0:2]; the header
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// checksum lives at pkt[10:12]. A header too short to carry a
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// checksum can't be fixed up here, so leave it for newPacket to
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// reject rather than emit a mangled packet.
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if len(pkt) < ipv4.HeaderLen {
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return
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}
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m := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[0:2])
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pkt[1] = (pkt[1] &^ 0x03) | ecnCE
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mNew := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[0:2])
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sum := uint32(^binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[10:12])) + uint32(^m) + uint32(mNew)
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for sum > 0xffff {
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sum = (sum >> 16) + (sum & 0xffff)
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}
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binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[10:12], ^uint16(sum))
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}
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case 6:
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switch (pkt[1] >> 4) & 0x03 {
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@@ -558,8 +574,10 @@ func (f *Interface) handleOutsideMessagePacket(hostinfo *HostInfo, out []byte, p
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dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(*fwPacket, true, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), localCache)
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if dropReason != nil {
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// NOTE: We give `packet` as the `out` here since we already decrypted from it and we don't need it anymore
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// This gives us a buffer to build the reject packet in
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f.rejectOutside(out, hostinfo.ConnectionState, hostinfo, nb, packet, q)
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// This gives us a buffer to build the reject packet in. With UDP GRO this is a single segment of a shared
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// recvmmsg row whose capacity runs to the end of the whole row, so cap it to its own length (cap==len) to
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// keep the reject builder from writing past this segment into the next, not-yet-processed coalesced segment.
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f.rejectOutside(out, hostinfo.ConnectionState, hostinfo, nb, packet[:len(packet):len(packet)], q)
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if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
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hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("dropping inbound packet",
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"fwPacket", fwPacket,
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