Add a way to set the network type on windows + tests (#1710)
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This commit is contained in:
Nate Brown
2026-05-07 20:17:38 -05:00
committed by GitHub
parent c82db210ef
commit 696903d6d9
15 changed files with 1349 additions and 20 deletions

View File

@@ -81,3 +81,52 @@ jobs:
run: make smoke-vagrant/linux-386
timeout-minutes: 30
smoke-windows:
if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/master' || contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'smoke-test-extra')
name: Run windows smoke test
runs-on: windows-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
go-version: '1.25'
check-latest: true
# WSL2 + Ubuntu so the smoke can run a real linux peer with its own
# netns. iputils-ping is needed for the in-WSL ping check. WSL1 has no
# real kernel and would lack /dev/net/tun, so we have to force WSL2.
- uses: Vampire/setup-wsl@v3
with:
distribution: Ubuntu-24.04
additional-packages: iputils-ping iproute2
# Vampire/setup-wsl provisions WSL1 even when the WSL2 platform is present.
# Convert the distro to WSL2 explicitly before we try to use /dev/net/tun.
- name: convert distro to WSL2
shell: pwsh
run: |
wsl --set-version Ubuntu-24.04 2
wsl --shutdown
wsl --list --verbose
- name: build windows nebula
run: make bin-windows
- name: build linux nebula for WSL
shell: bash
env:
GOOS: linux
GOARCH: amd64
run: |
mkdir -p build/linux-amd64
go build -o build/linux-amd64/nebula ./cmd/nebula
- name: run smoke-windows
shell: pwsh
working-directory: ./.github/workflows/smoke
run: ./smoke-windows.ps1
timeout-minutes: 15

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,272 @@
#!/usr/bin/env pwsh
# Windows smoke test for the nebula tun + UDP + NLM code paths.
#
# Topology:
# - lighthouse runs natively on the Windows host (wintun + windows UDP)
# - peer runs inside WSL2 (Linux build of nebula, /dev/net/tun)
#
# WSL2 gives us a real netns boundary so the loopback fast-path on Windows
# does not short-circuit the overlay -- when WSL pings the lighthouse VPN IP,
# Linux has no idea that IP is local to the Windows host, so the packet is
# forced through nebula. Same in reverse.
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
# wsl.exe emits UTF-16 LE by default which PowerShell reads as bytes, mangling
# every captured string. WSL_UTF8 makes wsl.exe emit UTF-8 instead.
$env:WSL_UTF8 = '1'
$RepoRoot = Resolve-Path "$PSScriptRoot\..\..\.."
$Nebula = Join-Path $RepoRoot 'nebula.exe'
$NebulaCert = Join-Path $RepoRoot 'nebula-cert.exe'
$NebulaLinux = Join-Path $RepoRoot 'build\linux-amd64\nebula'
if (-not (Test-Path $Nebula)) { throw "missing $Nebula; run 'make bin-windows' first" }
if (-not (Test-Path $NebulaCert)) { throw "missing $NebulaCert; run 'make bin-windows' first" }
if (-not (Test-Path $NebulaLinux)) { throw "missing $NebulaLinux; build the linux nebula first" }
# Matches the distro installed by Vampire/setup-wsl in smoke-extra.yml.
$Distro = 'Ubuntu-24.04'
$listed = (wsl --list --quiet 2>$null) -join "`n"
if ($listed -notmatch [regex]::Escape($Distro)) {
throw "WSL distro $Distro not registered. Got: $listed"
}
Write-Host "Using WSL distro: $Distro"
# Windows host as seen from inside WSL: WSL's default-route gateway. We extract
# it with a regex rather than awk fields so PowerShell does not eat any '$N'
# tokens, and tabs/double-spaces in `ip route` output do not confuse a cut.
$ipCmd = 'ip route show default | grep -oE "([0-9]+\.){3}[0-9]+" | head -1'
$WindowsIp = (wsl -d $Distro -- bash -c $ipCmd).Trim()
if (-not $WindowsIp) { throw "could not determine Windows host IP from WSL" }
Write-Host "Windows host IP from WSL: $WindowsIp"
$WorkDir = Join-Path $env:TEMP 'nebula-smoke-windows'
if (Test-Path $WorkDir) { Remove-Item -Recurse -Force $WorkDir }
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $WorkDir | Out-Null
$WslDir = '/tmp/nebula-smoke'
wsl -d $Distro -- bash -c "rm -rf $WslDir && mkdir -p $WslDir" | Out-Null
$DevName = 'nebula-smoke'
$Ip1 = '192.168.241.1'
$Ip2 = '192.168.241.2'
$Port = 4242
& $NebulaCert ca -name 'smoke-ca' -out-crt "$WorkDir\ca.crt" -out-key "$WorkDir\ca.key"
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "nebula-cert ca failed (exit $LASTEXITCODE)" }
& $NebulaCert sign -name 'lighthouse' -networks "$Ip1/24" -ca-crt "$WorkDir\ca.crt" -ca-key "$WorkDir\ca.key" -out-crt "$WorkDir\lighthouse.crt" -out-key "$WorkDir\lighthouse.key"
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "nebula-cert sign lighthouse failed (exit $LASTEXITCODE)" }
& $NebulaCert sign -name 'peer' -networks "$Ip2/24" -ca-crt "$WorkDir\ca.crt" -ca-key "$WorkDir\ca.key" -out-crt "$WorkDir\peer.crt" -out-key "$WorkDir\peer.key"
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "nebula-cert sign peer failed (exit $LASTEXITCODE)" }
# Windows lighthouse config.
@"
pki:
ca: $WorkDir\ca.crt
cert: $WorkDir\lighthouse.crt
key: $WorkDir\lighthouse.key
static_host_map: {}
lighthouse:
am_lighthouse: true
interval: 60
hosts: []
listen:
host: 0.0.0.0
port: $Port
tun:
disabled: false
dev: $DevName
drop_local_broadcast: false
drop_multicast: false
tx_queue: 500
mtu: 1300
network_category: private
logging:
level: info
format: text
firewall:
outbound_action: drop
inbound_action: drop
conntrack:
tcp_timeout: 12m
udp_timeout: 3m
default_timeout: 10m
outbound:
- port: any
proto: any
host: any
inbound:
- port: any
proto: any
host: any
"@ | Out-File -FilePath "$WorkDir\lighthouse.yml" -Encoding utf8
# WSL peer config (paths are POSIX, deliberately).
@"
pki:
ca: $WslDir/ca.crt
cert: $WslDir/peer.crt
key: $WslDir/peer.key
static_host_map:
"${Ip1}": ["${WindowsIp}:$Port"]
lighthouse:
am_lighthouse: false
interval: 60
hosts:
- "${Ip1}"
listen:
host: 0.0.0.0
port: 0
tun:
disabled: false
dev: nebula1
drop_local_broadcast: false
drop_multicast: false
tx_queue: 500
mtu: 1300
logging:
level: info
format: text
firewall:
outbound_action: drop
inbound_action: drop
conntrack:
tcp_timeout: 12m
udp_timeout: 3m
default_timeout: 10m
outbound:
- port: any
proto: any
host: any
inbound:
- port: any
proto: any
host: any
"@ | Out-File -FilePath "$WorkDir\peer.yml" -Encoding utf8
# Stage WSL artifacts. Convert Windows paths to WSL paths ourselves rather than
# calling `wslpath`, because PowerShell's argument-passing to external EXEs
# strips backslashes from path arguments in ways that are hard to escape around.
function ConvertTo-WslPath {
param([string]$WindowsPath)
if ($WindowsPath -notmatch '^([A-Za-z]):\\(.*)$') {
throw "cannot convert path to WSL: $WindowsPath"
}
return "/mnt/$($matches[1].ToLower())/$($matches[2].Replace('\','/'))"
}
$WslWorkDir = ConvertTo-WslPath $WorkDir
$WslNebulaPath = ConvertTo-WslPath $NebulaLinux
wsl -d $Distro -- bash -c "cp '$WslWorkDir/ca.crt' '$WslWorkDir/peer.crt' '$WslWorkDir/peer.key' '$WslWorkDir/peer.yml' $WslDir/ && cp '$WslNebulaPath' $WslDir/nebula && chmod +x $WslDir/nebula"
# Make sure WSL has tun support and /dev/net/tun is usable before starting
# nebula. Diagnostics first so a fail here points at the real problem (e.g.
# WSL1 distros do not have a real kernel and will not have tun).
Write-Host '=== WSL diagnostic ==='
wsl --version 2>&1 | Out-Host
wsl --list --verbose 2>&1 | Out-Host
wsl -d $Distro -u root -- uname -a | Out-Host
wsl -d $Distro -u root -- bash -c "modprobe tun 2>&1 || true; mkdir -p /dev/net; [ -c /dev/net/tun ] || mknod /dev/net/tun c 10 200; chmod 600 /dev/net/tun; ls -l /dev/net/tun"
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "failed to prepare /dev/net/tun in WSL (TUN support missing?)" }
# Deliberately no New-NetFirewallRule calls here -- nebula's windows_bypass_wdf
# feature is supposed to install WFP permit filters that let inbound traffic
# through Windows Defender Firewall on its own. If this smoke regresses, that
# feature regressed.
$lhOut = Join-Path $WorkDir 'lighthouse.out.log'
$lhErr = Join-Path $WorkDir 'lighthouse.err.log'
$lhProc = Start-Process -FilePath $Nebula -ArgumentList @('-config', "$WorkDir\lighthouse.yml") `
-PassThru -NoNewWindow `
-RedirectStandardOutput $lhOut `
-RedirectStandardError $lhErr
# Run nebula in WSL as root with no sudo + no shell wrapper. PowerShell's
# Start-Process arg quoting mangles `bash -c "..."` strings that contain
# spaces/redirections, so we skip bash entirely and let Start-Process do the
# stdout/stderr capture itself.
$peerOut = Join-Path $WorkDir 'peer.out.log'
$peerErr = Join-Path $WorkDir 'peer.err.log'
$peerProc = Start-Process -FilePath 'wsl' `
-ArgumentList @('-d', $Distro, '-u', 'root', '--', "$WslDir/nebula", '-config', "$WslDir/peer.yml") `
-PassThru -NoNewWindow `
-RedirectStandardOutput $peerOut `
-RedirectStandardError $peerErr
function Wait-Until {
param([scriptblock]$Predicate, [int]$TimeoutSec, [string]$What)
$deadline = (Get-Date).AddSeconds($TimeoutSec)
while ((Get-Date) -lt $deadline) {
if (& $Predicate) { return }
Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500
}
throw "timed out waiting for: $What"
}
try {
Wait-Until -TimeoutSec 30 -What "windows wintun adapter $DevName with NetworkCategory=Private" -Predicate {
if ($lhProc.HasExited) { throw "lighthouse exited (code $($lhProc.ExitCode)) before tun was ready" }
$p = Get-NetConnectionProfile -InterfaceAlias $DevName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$p -and ("$($p.NetworkCategory)" -ieq 'Private')
}
Write-Host "OK: $DevName NetworkCategory=Private"
Wait-Until -TimeoutSec 30 -What "WSL nebula1 with $Ip2" -Predicate {
if ($peerProc.HasExited) { throw "peer exited (code $($peerProc.ExitCode)) before tun was ready" }
$r = wsl -d $Distro -u root -- bash -c "ip -o addr show nebula1 2>/dev/null | grep -q 'inet $Ip2' && echo yes"
("$r").Trim() -eq 'yes'
}
Write-Host "OK: WSL nebula1 has $Ip2"
Wait-Until -TimeoutSec 30 -What "ping from WSL peer to windows lighthouse ($Ip1)" -Predicate {
if ($peerProc.HasExited) { throw "peer exited (code $($peerProc.ExitCode)) before ping succeeded" }
$r = wsl -d $Distro -u root -- bash -c "ping -c1 -W1 $Ip1 >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo OK"
("$r").Trim() -eq 'OK'
}
Write-Host "OK: WSL peer -> windows lighthouse"
Wait-Until -TimeoutSec 30 -What "ping from windows lighthouse to WSL peer ($Ip2)" -Predicate {
$null = & ping.exe -n 1 -w 1000 $Ip2
$LASTEXITCODE -eq 0
}
Write-Host "OK: windows lighthouse -> WSL peer"
Write-Host ''
Write-Host 'All smoke checks passed.'
}
catch {
Write-Host ''
Write-Host '=== lighthouse stdout ==='
Get-Content $lhOut -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Host
Write-Host '=== lighthouse stderr ==='
Get-Content $lhErr -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Host
Write-Host '=== peer stdout ==='
Get-Content $peerOut -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Host
Write-Host '=== peer stderr ==='
Get-Content $peerErr -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Host
Write-Host '=== nebula WFP filters ==='
# Dump nebula-installed filters so we can verify they got registered with
# the conditions we expect.
$wfpDump = Join-Path $WorkDir 'wfp.xml'
netsh wfp show filters file=$wfpDump 2>&1 | Out-Null
if (Test-Path $wfpDump) {
Select-String -Path $wfpDump -Pattern 'Nebula' -Context 0,80 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Host
}
throw
}
finally {
if (-not $lhProc.HasExited) {
Stop-Process -Id $lhProc.Id -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$lhProc.WaitForExit(5000) | Out-Null
}
wsl -d $Distro -u root -- bash -c "pkill -f $WslDir/nebula 2>/dev/null; true" | Out-Null
# pkill returns 1 when no match and wsl propagates that; the smoke is done
# so we don't want it to leak into the script's exit code.
$global:LASTEXITCODE = 0
if ($peerProc -and -not $peerProc.HasExited) {
Stop-Process -Id $peerProc.Id -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
}
}

View File

@@ -138,6 +138,14 @@ listen:
# max, net.core.rmem_max and net.core.wmem_max
#read_buffer: 10485760
#write_buffer: 10485760
# On Windows only
# When true, Nebula installs a WFP (Windows Filtering Platform) PERMIT filter scoped to UDP at the listener port.
# WFP sits below Windows Defender Firewall, so this lets peer handshakes reach Nebula's outside socket regardless
# of WDF's inbound rules.
# Default true; set to false to leave WDF in charge of inbound decisions on the listener port. Not reloadable.
#windows_bypass_wdf: true
# By default, Nebula replies to packets it has no tunnel for with a "recv_error" packet. This packet helps speed up reconnection
# in the case that Nebula on either side did not shut down cleanly. This response can be abused as a way to discover if Nebula is running
# on a host though. This option lets you configure if you want to send "recv_error" packets always, never, or only to private network remotes.
@@ -286,6 +294,24 @@ tun:
# metric: 100
# install: true
# On Windows only, sets the network category of the nebula interface. Without this, Windows often
# leaves the network as "Unidentified" and treats it as Public, which makes the host firewall more
# restrictive than you usually want for an overlay between trusted peers. Valid values:
# private - treat the nebula network as a private/trusted network (default)
# public - treat it as a public/untrusted network
# domain - treat it as a domain-authenticated network
# unset - leave whatever Windows decided alone
# Not reloadable.
#network_category: private
# On Windows only
# When true, Nebula installs a WFP (Windows Filtering Platform) PERMIT filter scoped to the nebula adapter LUID.
# WFP sits below Windows Defender Firewall, so this lets inbound traffic through regardless of WDF rules.
# Filters are auto-removed when the adapter goes away.
# See listen.windows_bypass_wdf for the matching control over inbound to nebula's outside UDP listener.
# Default true; set to false to leave WDF in charge of inbound decisions on the nebula interface. Not reloadable.
#windows_bypass_wdf: true
# On linux only, set to true to manage unsafe routes directly on the system route table with gateway routes instead of
# in nebula configuration files. Default false, not reloadable.
#use_system_route_table: false

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@@ -0,0 +1,358 @@
//go:build !e2e_testing
// +build !e2e_testing
package overlay
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"runtime"
"strings"
"syscall"
"time"
"unsafe"
"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
)
// networkCategory mirrors NLM_NETWORK_CATEGORY from netlistmgr.h.
type networkCategory int32
const (
networkCategoryPublic networkCategory = 0
networkCategoryPrivate networkCategory = 1
networkCategoryDomainAuthenticated networkCategory = 2
)
func (c networkCategory) String() string {
switch c {
case networkCategoryPublic:
return "public"
case networkCategoryPrivate:
return "private"
case networkCategoryDomainAuthenticated:
return "domain"
}
return fmt.Sprintf("unknown(%d)", c)
}
// parseNetworkCategory accepts the user-supplied tun.network_category. A
// second return of false means "leave the category alone".
func parseNetworkCategory(s string) (networkCategory, bool, error) {
switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(s)) {
case "", "unset":
return 0, false, nil
case "public":
return networkCategoryPublic, true, nil
case "private":
return networkCategoryPrivate, true, nil
case "domain", "domainauthenticated":
return networkCategoryDomainAuthenticated, true, nil
}
return 0, false, fmt.Errorf("unknown tun.network_category %q (expected public, private, domain, or unset)", s)
}
// CLSID_NetworkListManager {DCB00C01-570F-4A9B-8D69-199FDBA5723B}
var clsidNetworkListManager = windows.GUID{
Data1: 0xDCB00C01, Data2: 0x570F, Data3: 0x4A9B,
Data4: [8]byte{0x8D, 0x69, 0x19, 0x9F, 0xDB, 0xA5, 0x72, 0x3B},
}
// IID_INetworkListManager {DCB00000-570F-4A9B-8D69-199FDBA5723B}
var iidINetworkListManager = windows.GUID{
Data1: 0xDCB00000, Data2: 0x570F, Data3: 0x4A9B,
Data4: [8]byte{0x8D, 0x69, 0x19, 0x9F, 0xDB, 0xA5, 0x72, 0x3B},
}
// x/sys/windows doesn't expose CoCreateInstance, so we bind it ourselves.
var procCoCreateInstance = windows.NewLazySystemDLL("ole32.dll").NewProc("CoCreateInstance")
const clsCtxAll = windows.CLSCTX_INPROC_SERVER | windows.CLSCTX_INPROC_HANDLER |
windows.CLSCTX_LOCAL_SERVER | windows.CLSCTX_REMOTE_SERVER
const (
hrSFALSE = 0x00000001
hrRPCEChangedMode = 0x80010106
)
type hresult uint32
func (h hresult) failed() bool { return int32(h) < 0 }
func (h hresult) String() string {
return fmt.Sprintf("HRESULT 0x%08x", uint32(h))
}
var errAdapterNotFound = errors.New("adapter not present in network connections enumeration")
// Vtable layouts. Slot order must match the declaration order in netlistmgr.h.
// All NLM interfaces here derive from IDispatch, which derives from IUnknown.
type iUnknownVtbl struct {
QueryInterface uintptr
AddRef uintptr
Release uintptr
}
type iDispatchVtbl struct {
iUnknownVtbl
GetTypeInfoCount uintptr
GetTypeInfo uintptr
GetIDsOfNames uintptr
Invoke uintptr
}
type iNetworkListManagerVtbl struct {
iDispatchVtbl
GetNetworks uintptr
GetNetwork uintptr
GetNetworkConnections uintptr
GetNetworkConnection uintptr
IsConnectedToInternet uintptr
IsConnected uintptr
GetConnectivity uintptr
}
type iNetworkListManager struct{ Vtbl *iNetworkListManagerVtbl }
func (n *iNetworkListManager) Release() {
syscall.SyscallN(n.Vtbl.Release, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(n)))
}
func (n *iNetworkListManager) GetNetworkConnections() (*iEnumNetworkConnections, error) {
var enum *iEnumNetworkConnections
r1, _, _ := syscall.SyscallN(n.Vtbl.GetNetworkConnections,
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(n)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&enum)),
)
if hr := hresult(r1); hr.failed() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("INetworkListManager.GetNetworkConnections: %s", hr)
}
return enum, nil
}
type iEnumNetworkConnectionsVtbl struct {
iDispatchVtbl
NewEnum uintptr
Next uintptr
Skip uintptr
Reset uintptr
Clone uintptr
}
type iEnumNetworkConnections struct{ Vtbl *iEnumNetworkConnectionsVtbl }
func (e *iEnumNetworkConnections) Release() {
syscall.SyscallN(e.Vtbl.Release, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(e)))
}
// Next returns the next connection, or (nil, nil) at the end of the enumeration.
func (e *iEnumNetworkConnections) Next() (*iNetworkConnection, error) {
var conn *iNetworkConnection
var fetched uint32
r1, _, _ := syscall.SyscallN(e.Vtbl.Next,
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(e)), 1,
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&conn)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&fetched)),
)
if hr := hresult(r1); hr.failed() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("IEnumNetworkConnections.Next: %s", hr)
}
if fetched == 0 {
return nil, nil
}
return conn, nil
}
type iNetworkConnectionVtbl struct {
iDispatchVtbl
GetNetwork uintptr
IsConnectedToInternet uintptr
IsConnected uintptr
GetConnectivity uintptr
GetConnectionId uintptr
GetAdapterId uintptr
GetDomainType uintptr
}
type iNetworkConnection struct{ Vtbl *iNetworkConnectionVtbl }
func (c *iNetworkConnection) Release() {
syscall.SyscallN(c.Vtbl.Release, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(c)))
}
func (c *iNetworkConnection) GetAdapterId() (windows.GUID, error) {
var g windows.GUID
r1, _, _ := syscall.SyscallN(c.Vtbl.GetAdapterId,
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(c)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&g)),
)
if hr := hresult(r1); hr.failed() {
return windows.GUID{}, fmt.Errorf("INetworkConnection.GetAdapterId: %s", hr)
}
return g, nil
}
func (c *iNetworkConnection) GetNetwork() (*iNetwork, error) {
var net *iNetwork
r1, _, _ := syscall.SyscallN(c.Vtbl.GetNetwork,
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(c)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&net)),
)
if hr := hresult(r1); hr.failed() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("INetworkConnection.GetNetwork: %s", hr)
}
return net, nil
}
type iNetworkVtbl struct {
iDispatchVtbl
GetName uintptr
SetName uintptr
GetDescription uintptr
SetDescription uintptr
GetNetworkId uintptr
GetDomainType uintptr
GetNetworkConnections uintptr
GetTimeCreatedAndConnected uintptr
IsConnectedToInternet uintptr
IsConnected uintptr
GetConnectivity uintptr
GetCategory uintptr
SetCategory uintptr
}
type iNetwork struct{ Vtbl *iNetworkVtbl }
func (n *iNetwork) Release() {
syscall.SyscallN(n.Vtbl.Release, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(n)))
}
func (n *iNetwork) GetCategory() (networkCategory, error) {
var c networkCategory
r1, _, _ := syscall.SyscallN(n.Vtbl.GetCategory,
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(n)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&c)),
)
if hr := hresult(r1); hr.failed() {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("INetwork.GetCategory: %s", hr)
}
return c, nil
}
func (n *iNetwork) SetCategory(c networkCategory) error {
r1, _, _ := syscall.SyscallN(n.Vtbl.SetCategory,
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(n)), uintptr(int32(c)),
)
if hr := hresult(r1); hr.failed() {
return fmt.Errorf("INetwork.SetCategory: %s", hr)
}
return nil
}
// coInit initializes COM for the current OS thread. The returned function must
// be deferred to balance a successful init. RPC_E_CHANGED_MODE means COM is
// already initialized in a different mode on this thread, which is still fine
// for our calls but we must not Uninitialize in that case.
func coInit() (func(), error) {
err := windows.CoInitializeEx(0, windows.COINIT_MULTITHREADED)
if err == nil {
return windows.CoUninitialize, nil
}
if e, ok := err.(syscall.Errno); ok {
switch uint32(e) {
case hrSFALSE:
return windows.CoUninitialize, nil
case hrRPCEChangedMode:
return func() {}, nil
}
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("CoInitializeEx: %w", err)
}
func createNetworkListManager() (*iNetworkListManager, error) {
var nlm *iNetworkListManager
r1, _, _ := procCoCreateInstance.Call(
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&clsidNetworkListManager)),
0,
uintptr(clsCtxAll),
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&iidINetworkListManager)),
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&nlm)),
)
if hr := hresult(r1); hr.failed() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("CoCreateInstance(NetworkListManager): %s", hr)
}
return nlm, nil
}
// setNetworkCategory locates the network connection bound to adapterGUID and
// sets the category of its parent network. Returns errAdapterNotFound if the
// adapter is not yet visible in the NLM enumeration.
func setNetworkCategory(adapterGUID windows.GUID, cat networkCategory) error {
deinit, err := coInit()
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer deinit()
nlm, err := createNetworkListManager()
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer nlm.Release()
enum, err := nlm.GetNetworkConnections()
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer enum.Release()
for {
conn, err := enum.Next()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if conn == nil {
return errAdapterNotFound
}
guid, err := conn.GetAdapterId()
if err != nil || guid != adapterGUID {
conn.Release()
continue
}
net, err := conn.GetNetwork()
conn.Release()
if err != nil {
return err
}
err = net.SetCategory(cat)
net.Release()
return err
}
}
// applyNetworkCategory polls until the wintun adapter shows up in the NLM
// enumeration, then sets the category. Intended to run in its own goroutine.
func applyNetworkCategory(l *slog.Logger, adapterGUID windows.GUID, cat networkCategory) {
// COM Init/Uninit must be paired on the same OS thread.
runtime.LockOSThread()
defer runtime.UnlockOSThread()
const (
attempts = 30
interval = 500 * time.Millisecond
)
for i := 0; i < attempts; i++ {
err := setNetworkCategory(adapterGUID, cat)
if err == nil {
l.Info("Set Windows network category", "category", cat.String())
return
}
if !errors.Is(err, errAdapterNotFound) {
l.Warn("Failed to set Windows network category", "error", err, "category", cat.String())
return
}
time.Sleep(interval)
}
l.Warn("Gave up waiting for adapter to appear in NLM enumeration; network category not set",
"category", cat.String(),
"waited", time.Duration(attempts)*interval,
)
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
//go:build !e2e_testing
// +build !e2e_testing
package overlay
import (
"testing"
)
func Test_parseNetworkCategory(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
in string
wantCat networkCategory
wantApply bool
wantErr bool
}{
{"", 0, false, false},
{"unset", 0, false, false},
{" UNSET ", 0, false, false},
{"private", networkCategoryPrivate, true, false},
{"Private", networkCategoryPrivate, true, false},
{" PRIVATE ", networkCategoryPrivate, true, false},
{"public", networkCategoryPublic, true, false},
{"PUBLIC", networkCategoryPublic, true, false},
{"domain", networkCategoryDomainAuthenticated, true, false},
{"DomainAuthenticated", networkCategoryDomainAuthenticated, true, false},
{"garbage", 0, false, true},
{"privates", 0, false, true},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
cat, apply, err := parseNetworkCategory(tc.in)
if (err != nil) != tc.wantErr {
t.Errorf("parseNetworkCategory(%q) err=%v, wantErr=%v", tc.in, err, tc.wantErr)
continue
}
if cat != tc.wantCat || apply != tc.wantApply {
t.Errorf("parseNetworkCategory(%q) = (%v, %v), want (%v, %v)", tc.in, cat, apply, tc.wantCat, tc.wantApply)
}
}
}
// Test_NLM_round_trip exercises every COM call path used by setNetworkCategory
// without mutating the host's network state. It validates the CLSID/IID
// constants and every vtable index by enumerating connections, fetching the
// adapter id and parent network, reading the current category, and writing it
// back unchanged.
//
// Requires Windows but does not require admin or the wintun driver. Skips if
// no network connections are available (unlikely outside of an isolated
// container).
func Test_NLM_round_trip(t *testing.T) {
deinit, err := coInit()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("coInit: %v", err)
}
defer deinit()
nlm, err := createNetworkListManager()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("createNetworkListManager: %v", err)
}
defer nlm.Release()
enum, err := nlm.GetNetworkConnections()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GetNetworkConnections: %v", err)
}
defer enum.Release()
saw := 0
for {
conn, err := enum.Next()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("EnumNetworkConnections.Next: %v", err)
}
if conn == nil {
break
}
saw++
if _, err := conn.GetAdapterId(); err != nil {
conn.Release()
t.Fatalf("INetworkConnection.GetAdapterId: %v", err)
}
net, err := conn.GetNetwork()
conn.Release()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("INetworkConnection.GetNetwork: %v", err)
}
cat, err := net.GetCategory()
if err != nil {
net.Release()
t.Fatalf("INetwork.GetCategory: %v", err)
}
// Set to the current value so the host's NLM state is unchanged but
// SetCategory's vtable slot is still validated end-to-end.
if err := net.SetCategory(cat); err != nil {
net.Release()
t.Fatalf("INetwork.SetCategory(%v): %v", cat, err)
}
net.Release()
}
if saw == 0 {
t.Skip("no NLM network connections available; skipping round-trip")
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
//go:build (amd64 || arm64) && !e2e_testing
// +build amd64 arm64
// +build !e2e_testing
package overlay
import (
"log/slog"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/wfp"
)
// installInterfaceBypass installs a WFP PERMIT filter scoped to the wintun interface LUID so inbound traffic on the
// nebula adapter bypasses Windows Defender Firewall.
func installInterfaceBypass(l *slog.Logger, luid uint64) closer {
s, err := wfp.PermitInterface(luid)
if err != nil {
l.Warn("Failed to install WFP bypass filters on nebula interface", "error", err)
return nil
}
l.Info("Installed WFP filters bypassing Windows Defender Firewall on nebula interface")
return s
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
//go:build !e2e_testing
// +build !e2e_testing
package overlay
import "log/slog"
// installInterfaceBypass is a no-op on windows-386 because we don't currently build for it.
func installInterfaceBypass(_ *slog.Logger, _ uint64) closer {
return nil
}

View File

@@ -25,6 +25,10 @@ import (
"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/windows/tunnel/winipcfg"
)
type closer interface {
Close()
}
const tunGUIDLabel = "Fixed Nebula Windows GUID v1"
type winTun struct {
@@ -33,6 +37,11 @@ type winTun struct {
MTU int
Routes atomic.Pointer[[]Route]
routeTree atomic.Pointer[bart.Table[routing.Gateways]]
guid windows.GUID
networkCategory networkCategory
setCategory bool
bypassWDF bool
wdfBypass closer
l *slog.Logger
tun *wintun.NativeTun
@@ -54,10 +63,19 @@ func newTun(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, _ bool) (*w
return nil, fmt.Errorf("generate GUID failed: %w", err)
}
cat, setCat, err := parseNetworkCategory(c.GetString("tun.network_category", "private"))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
t := &winTun{
Device: deviceName,
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
MTU: c.GetInt("tun.mtu", DefaultMTU),
guid: *guid,
networkCategory: cat,
setCategory: setCat,
bypassWDF: c.GetBool("tun.windows_bypass_wdf", true),
l: l,
}
@@ -142,6 +160,17 @@ func (t *winTun) Activate() error {
return err
}
if t.setCategory {
// The wintun adapter takes a moment to register with the Network List
// Manager, so we apply the category in the background and retry until
// it shows up.
go applyNetworkCategory(t.l, t.guid, t.networkCategory)
}
if t.bypassWDF {
t.wdfBypass = installInterfaceBypass(t.l, uint64(t.tun.LUID()))
}
return nil
}
@@ -255,6 +284,11 @@ func (t *winTun) Close() error {
_ = luid.FlushDNS(windows.AF_INET)
_ = luid.FlushDNS(windows.AF_INET6)
if t.wdfBypass != nil {
t.wdfBypass.Close()
t.wdfBypass = nil
}
return t.tun.Close()
}

View File

@@ -5,12 +5,11 @@ package udp
import (
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/netip"
"syscall"
"log/slog"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)

View File

@@ -8,12 +8,11 @@ package udp
import (
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/netip"
"syscall"
"log/slog"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)

57
udp/udp_bypass_windows.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
//go:build (amd64 || arm64) && !e2e_testing
// +build amd64 arm64
// +build !e2e_testing
package udp
import (
"log/slog"
"sync"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/wfp"
)
// wrapWithWDFBypass wraps a Conn so that the first ReloadConfig consults listen.windows_bypass_wdf
// and installs a WFP PERMIT filter for the listener's bound UDP port. The session is released when Close runs.
func wrapWithWDFBypass(l *slog.Logger, conn Conn) Conn {
return &bypassConn{Conn: conn, l: l}
}
type bypassConn struct {
Conn
l *slog.Logger
installOnce sync.Once
session *wfp.Session
}
func (b *bypassConn) ReloadConfig(c *config.C) {
b.installOnce.Do(func() {
if !c.GetBool("listen.windows_bypass_wdf", true) {
return
}
addr, err := b.Conn.LocalAddr()
if err != nil {
b.l.Warn("Failed to query listener port for WFP bypass", "error", err)
return
}
s, err := wfp.PermitUDPPort(addr.Port())
if err != nil {
b.l.Warn("Failed to install WFP bypass filters for listener", "error", err)
return
}
b.l.Info("Installed WFP filters bypassing Windows Defender Firewall on UDP listener port",
"port", addr.Port())
b.session = s
})
b.Conn.ReloadConfig(c)
}
func (b *bypassConn) Close() error {
if b.session != nil {
b.session.Close()
b.session = nil
}
return b.Conn.Close()
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
//go:build !e2e_testing
// +build !e2e_testing
package udp
import "log/slog"
// wrapWithWDFBypass is a no-op on windows-386 since we don't currently build for it.
func wrapWithWDFBypass(_ *slog.Logger, conn Conn) Conn {
return conn
}

View File

@@ -7,12 +7,11 @@ package udp
import (
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/netip"
"syscall"
"log/slog"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)

View File

@@ -19,13 +19,18 @@ func NewListener(l *slog.Logger, ip netip.Addr, port int, multi bool, batch int)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("multiple udp listeners not supported on windows")
}
var conn Conn
rc, err := NewRIOListener(l, ip, port)
if err == nil {
return rc, nil
}
conn = rc
} else {
l.Error("Falling back to standard udp sockets", "error", err)
return NewGenericListener(l, ip, port, multi, batch)
conn, err = NewGenericListener(l, ip, port, multi, batch)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
return wrapWithWDFBypass(l, conn), nil
}
func NewListenConfig(multi bool) net.ListenConfig {

377
wfp/wfp_windows.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,377 @@
//go:build (amd64 || arm64) && !e2e_testing
// +build amd64 arm64
// +build !e2e_testing
// Package wfp installs Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) PERMIT filters in a dynamic, session-scoped sublayer.
// Because WFP sits below Windows Defender Firewall, a high-weight permit at FWPM_LAYER_ALE_AUTH_RECV_ACCEPT_V4/V6 lets
// the matching inbound traffic through regardless of WDF rules.
//
// Each Session owns its own engine handle. When the handle closes, every dynamic object added during the session
// is auto-deleted by Windows, so there are no orphaned filters.
//
// Type definitions and constants are derived from the wireguard-windows firewall package (MIT).
// Only the subset we exercise is reproduced.
package wfp
import (
"fmt"
"unsafe"
"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
)
// FWPM layer GUIDs (fwpmu.h).
//
// FWPM_LAYER_ALE_AUTH_RECV_ACCEPT_V4 = e1cd9fe7-f4b5-4273-96c0-592e487b8650
// FWPM_LAYER_ALE_AUTH_RECV_ACCEPT_V6 = a3b42c97-9f04-4672-b87e-cee9c483257f
var (
fwpmLayerAleAuthRecvAcceptV4 = windows.GUID{
Data1: 0xe1cd9fe7, Data2: 0xf4b5, Data3: 0x4273,
Data4: [8]byte{0x96, 0xc0, 0x59, 0x2e, 0x48, 0x7b, 0x86, 0x50},
}
fwpmLayerAleAuthRecvAcceptV6 = windows.GUID{
Data1: 0xa3b42c97, Data2: 0x9f04, Data3: 0x4672,
Data4: [8]byte{0xb8, 0x7e, 0xce, 0xe9, 0xc4, 0x83, 0x25, 0x7f},
}
)
// FWPM_CONDITION_IP_LOCAL_INTERFACE = 4cd62a49-59c3-4969-b7f3-bda5d32890a4
var fwpmConditionIPLocalInterface = windows.GUID{
Data1: 0x4cd62a49, Data2: 0x59c3, Data3: 0x4969,
Data4: [8]byte{0xb7, 0xf3, 0xbd, 0xa5, 0xd3, 0x28, 0x90, 0xa4},
}
// FWPM_CONDITION_IP_PROTOCOL = 3971ef2b-623e-4f9a-8cb1-6e79b806b9a7
var fwpmConditionIPProtocol = windows.GUID{
Data1: 0x3971ef2b, Data2: 0x623e, Data3: 0x4f9a,
Data4: [8]byte{0x8c, 0xb1, 0x6e, 0x79, 0xb8, 0x06, 0xb9, 0xa7},
}
// FWPM_CONDITION_IP_LOCAL_PORT = 0c1ba1af-5765-453f-af22-a8f791ac775b
var fwpmConditionIPLocalPort = windows.GUID{
Data1: 0x0c1ba1af, Data2: 0x5765, Data3: 0x453f,
Data4: [8]byte{0xaf, 0x22, 0xa8, 0xf7, 0x91, 0xac, 0x77, 0x5b},
}
// IPPROTO_UDP from in.h.
const ipprotoUDP uint8 = 17
// FWP_ACTION_TYPE values (fwptypes.h). PERMIT is terminating.
const fwpActionPermit uint32 = 0x00001002 // 0x2 | FWP_ACTION_FLAG_TERMINATING(0x1000)
// FWP_DATA_TYPE values we use.
const (
fwpEmpty uint32 = 0
fwpUint8 uint32 = 1
fwpUint16 uint32 = 2
fwpUint64 uint32 = 4
)
// FWP_MATCH_TYPE values.
const fwpMatchEqual uint32 = 0
// FWPM_SESSION flags.
const fwpmSessionFlagDynamic uint32 = 0x1
// FWPM_FILTER_FLAG_CLEAR_ACTION_RIGHT prevents lower-priority filters in other sublayers,
// notably Windows Defender Firewall's MPSSVC_WF sublayer, which shares our 0xFFFF weight from overriding this PERMIT.
// Without it, a default WDF block at the same sublayer weight can still win arbitration.
const fwpmFilterFlagClearActionRight uint32 = 0x8
// RPC authentication.
// RPC_C_AUTHN_WINNT works on workgroup machines with no domain context
// RPC_C_AUTHN_DEFAULT falls back through a chain that can land on something WFP doesn't accept on a fresh box.
const rpcCAuthnWinNT uint32 = 10
// fwpByteBlob (FWP_BYTE_BLOB). 16 bytes on 64-bit.
type fwpByteBlob struct {
size uint32
_ uint32 // padding
data *uint8
}
// fwpValue0 / FWP_CONDITION_VALUE0 layout. 16 bytes on 64-bit.
// The union is pointer-sized; types <= 32 bits (UINT8/16/32, INT8/16/32, float) live inline in the low bytes
// of `value`, while UINT64/INT64/double and aggregate types are stored *by pointer*, even on 64-bit, where the
// union member is declared as UINT64*. So when populating an FWP_UINT64 condition, pass
// uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&luidVar)) instead of the LUID inline.
type fwpValue0 struct {
type_ uint32
_ uint32 // padding before union to 8-byte alignment
value uintptr
}
// fwpmDisplayData0 / FWPM_DISPLAY_DATA0. 16 bytes on 64-bit.
type fwpmDisplayData0 struct {
name *uint16
description *uint16
}
// fwpmAction0 / FWPM_ACTION0. 20 bytes; no leading padding because actionType
// is uint32 and GUID's first field is uint32.
type fwpmAction0 struct {
actionType uint32
filterType windows.GUID
}
// fwpmFilterCondition0. 40 bytes on 64-bit.
type fwpmFilterCondition0 struct {
fieldKey windows.GUID // 16
matchType uint32 // 4
_ uint32 // 4 padding
conditionValue fwpValue0 // 16
}
// fwpmFilter0. 200 bytes on 64-bit.
type fwpmFilter0 struct {
filterKey windows.GUID
displayData fwpmDisplayData0
flags uint32
_ uint32 // padding before *GUID
providerKey *windows.GUID
providerData fwpByteBlob
layerKey windows.GUID
subLayerKey windows.GUID
weight fwpValue0
numFilterConditions uint32
_ uint32 // padding before pointer
filterCondition *fwpmFilterCondition0
action fwpmAction0
_ [4]byte // layout correction
providerContextKey windows.GUID
reserved *windows.GUID
filterID uint64
effectiveWeight fwpValue0
}
// fwpmSublayer0. 72 bytes on 64-bit.
type fwpmSublayer0 struct {
subLayerKey windows.GUID
displayData fwpmDisplayData0
flags uint32
_ uint32 // padding before *GUID
providerKey *windows.GUID
providerData fwpByteBlob
weight uint16
_ [6]byte // padding to 72 bytes
}
// fwpmSession0. 72 bytes on 64-bit.
type fwpmSession0 struct {
sessionKey windows.GUID
displayData fwpmDisplayData0
flags uint32
txnWaitTimeoutInMSec uint32
processId uint32
_ uint32 // padding before *SID
sid *windows.SID
username *uint16
kernelMode uint8
_ [7]byte // tail padding
}
// fwpuclnt.dll bindings. Only the calls we use.
var (
modFwpuclnt = windows.NewLazySystemDLL("fwpuclnt.dll")
procFwpmEngineOpen0 = modFwpuclnt.NewProc("FwpmEngineOpen0")
procFwpmEngineClose0 = modFwpuclnt.NewProc("FwpmEngineClose0")
procFwpmSubLayerAdd0 = modFwpuclnt.NewProc("FwpmSubLayerAdd0")
procFwpmFilterAdd0 = modFwpuclnt.NewProc("FwpmFilterAdd0")
)
// Session holds the WFP engine handle for a single bypass operation. The handle owns a dynamic session:
// when it is closed, every WFP object added during the session (sublayer + filters) is automatically deleted by
// Windows. That gives us correct cleanup even if the host process is killed hard between Permit* and Close.
type Session struct {
engine uintptr
}
// Close releases the engine handle. Windows deletes every dynamic object (sublayer + filters) the session installed.
// Safe to call on a nil receiver.
func (s *Session) Close() {
if s == nil || s.engine == 0 {
return
}
procFwpmEngineClose0.Call(s.engine)
s.engine = 0
}
// PermitInterface installs PERMIT filters at FWPM_LAYER_ALE_AUTH_RECV_ACCEPT_V4 and _V6 scoped to the given network
// interface LUID. Inbound traffic on that interface bypasses Windows Defender Firewall.
func PermitInterface(luid uint64) (*Session, error) {
s, sublayerKey, err := newSession()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := addInterfaceFilter(s.engine, sublayerKey, fwpmLayerAleAuthRecvAcceptV4, luid); err != nil {
s.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("add v4 filter: %w", err)
}
if err := addInterfaceFilter(s.engine, sublayerKey, fwpmLayerAleAuthRecvAcceptV6, luid); err != nil {
s.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("add v6 filter: %w", err)
}
return s, nil
}
// PermitUDPPort installs PERMIT filters at FWPM_LAYER_ALE_AUTH_RECV_ACCEPT_V4 and _V6 scoped to UDP traffic with the
// given local port. Inbound UDP to that port on any interface bypasses Windows Defender Firewall.
func PermitUDPPort(port uint16) (*Session, error) {
s, sublayerKey, err := newSession()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := addUDPPortFilter(s.engine, sublayerKey, fwpmLayerAleAuthRecvAcceptV4, port); err != nil {
s.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("add v4 filter: %w", err)
}
if err := addUDPPortFilter(s.engine, sublayerKey, fwpmLayerAleAuthRecvAcceptV6, port); err != nil {
s.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("add v6 filter: %w", err)
}
return s, nil
}
func newSession() (*Session, windows.GUID, error) {
engine, err := openDynamicEngine()
if err != nil {
return nil, windows.GUID{}, err
}
sublayerKey, err := registerSublayer(engine)
if err != nil {
procFwpmEngineClose0.Call(engine)
return nil, windows.GUID{}, err
}
return &Session{engine: engine}, sublayerKey, nil
}
func openDynamicEngine() (uintptr, error) {
session := fwpmSession0{flags: fwpmSessionFlagDynamic}
var engine uintptr
r1, _, _ := procFwpmEngineOpen0.Call(
0, // serverName == NULL (local)
uintptr(rpcCAuthnWinNT),
0, // authIdentity == NULL
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&session)),
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&engine)),
)
if r1 != 0 {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("FwpmEngineOpen0: 0x%x", r1)
}
return engine, nil
}
// registerSublayer adds a session-scoped sublayer with a freshly generated GUID, weight 0xFFFF so its filters arbitrate
// above WDF's default sublayer. The sublayer is dynamic (no PERSISTENT flag) and goes away when the engine handle closes.
func registerSublayer(engine uintptr) (windows.GUID, error) {
key, err := windows.GenerateGUID()
if err != nil {
return windows.GUID{}, fmt.Errorf("GenerateGUID for sublayer: %w", err)
}
name, _ := windows.UTF16PtrFromString("Nebula WDF bypass sublayer")
desc, _ := windows.UTF16PtrFromString("Permit filters bypassing Windows Defender Firewall")
sl := fwpmSublayer0{
subLayerKey: key,
displayData: fwpmDisplayData0{name: name, description: desc},
weight: 0xFFFF,
}
r1, _, _ := procFwpmSubLayerAdd0.Call(
engine,
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&sl)),
0, // sd == NULL
)
if r1 != 0 {
return windows.GUID{}, fmt.Errorf("FwpmSubLayerAdd0: 0x%x", r1)
}
return key, nil
}
func addInterfaceFilter(engine uintptr, sublayerKey, layer windows.GUID, luid uint64) error {
name, _ := windows.UTF16PtrFromString("Nebula allow interface inbound")
desc, _ := windows.UTF16PtrFromString("Permits inbound traffic on a nebula interface")
// luid must remain addressable through the syscall -- FWP_UINT64 is stored
// by pointer in the FWP_VALUE0 union.
cond := fwpmFilterCondition0{
fieldKey: fwpmConditionIPLocalInterface,
matchType: fwpMatchEqual,
conditionValue: fwpValue0{
type_: fwpUint64,
value: uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&luid)),
},
}
filter := fwpmFilter0{
// filterKey left zero: WFP assigns one when the filter is added.
displayData: fwpmDisplayData0{name: name, description: desc},
flags: fwpmFilterFlagClearActionRight,
layerKey: layer,
subLayerKey: sublayerKey,
weight: fwpValue0{type_: fwpUint8, value: uintptr(15)},
numFilterConditions: 1,
filterCondition: &cond,
action: fwpmAction0{actionType: fwpActionPermit},
}
r1, _, _ := procFwpmFilterAdd0.Call(
engine,
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&filter)),
0, // sd == NULL
0, // id == NULL
)
if r1 != 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("FwpmFilterAdd0: 0x%x", r1)
}
return nil
}
// addUDPPortFilter installs a PERMIT filter that matches (IP_PROTOCOL == UDP) AND (IP_LOCAL_PORT == port).
// FWP_UINT8 and FWP_UINT16 are <= 32 bits so they live inline in the FWP_VALUE0 union.
func addUDPPortFilter(engine uintptr, sublayerKey, layer windows.GUID, port uint16) error {
name, _ := windows.UTF16PtrFromString("Nebula allow UDP port inbound")
desc, _ := windows.UTF16PtrFromString("Permits inbound UDP to a nebula listener port")
conds := [2]fwpmFilterCondition0{
{
fieldKey: fwpmConditionIPProtocol,
matchType: fwpMatchEqual,
conditionValue: fwpValue0{
type_: fwpUint8,
value: uintptr(ipprotoUDP),
},
},
{
fieldKey: fwpmConditionIPLocalPort,
matchType: fwpMatchEqual,
conditionValue: fwpValue0{
type_: fwpUint16,
value: uintptr(port),
},
},
}
filter := fwpmFilter0{
displayData: fwpmDisplayData0{name: name, description: desc},
flags: fwpmFilterFlagClearActionRight,
layerKey: layer,
subLayerKey: sublayerKey,
weight: fwpValue0{type_: fwpUint8, value: uintptr(15)},
numFilterConditions: 2,
filterCondition: &conds[0],
action: fwpmAction0{actionType: fwpActionPermit},
}
r1, _, _ := procFwpmFilterAdd0.Call(
engine,
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&filter)),
0,
0,
)
if r1 != 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("FwpmFilterAdd0: 0x%x", r1)
}
return nil
}