multiport: derive lane sessions on demand, install once authenticated

How many lanes a tunnel has is partly the peer's call: it advertises how many it
sends on and we have to be able to receive all of them, up to the header's 256.
Deriving them all when the handshake completes meant a peer advertising a large
count cost us a replay window and two cipher states per lane, per tunnel, for
lanes it may never send on.

Derive each session on the first packet that needs it instead. The TX side asks
through laneSet.session, which installs on the spot — we only ask for lanes we
chose to send on. The RX side can't do that: anyone who can spoof a tunnel's
local index can name any lane, and installing on sight would hand them the same
allocation for free. So laneSession hands back a session without publishing it
and reports that it did; outside.go installs it only once the packet has
decrypted, which is the first moment the lane is known to be real. A spoofer
gets an HKDF per packet and nothing retained.

Only the session table is sized by the peer's advert now. txAddr, demand and
probe are sized by the lanes we will actually send on, so the peer can no longer
size our per-lane tx state either.

Also refuse relayed lane packets before the session lookup rather than after,
so a junk relay packet can't reach the derivation path at all.
This commit is contained in:
Wade Simmons committed 2026-09-02 14:48:17 -04:00
1 parent fb20de39b2
commit 8c5c740571
6 files changed
+288 -103

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+26 -11
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@@ -111,10 +111,28 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, packet []byte, rxc *rxCont
// is the base tunnel; a higher lane is one of the sessions derived from it.
ci := hostinfo.ConnectionState
lane := h.Lane()
laneCached := true
if lane != 0 {
ci = hostinfo.laneSession(lane)
if isMessageRelay {
// A relay carrier is always the base tunnel, so lane ciphertext can
// never legitimately arrive wrapped in one. Checked before the lookup
// below so a junk relay packet can't make us derive a session.
f.messageMetrics.RxInvalid(1)
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("Refusing relayed multiport lane packet", "from", via, "header", h)
}
return
}
var err error
ci, laneCached, err = hostinfo.laneSession(lane)
if err != nil {
f.messageMetrics.RxInvalid(1)
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to derive multiport lane session", "error", err, "lane", lane)
return
}
if ci == nil {
// A lane we have no session for: a stale lane from a tunnel that has
// A lane this tunnel doesn't have: a stale lane from a tunnel that has
// since rolled, or a peer sending above what it advertised. Dropping
// silently is right for both — a recv_error would tear down a
// perfectly good base tunnel on the strength of one odd packet.
@@ -124,15 +142,6 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, packet []byte, rxc *rxCont
}
return
}
if isMessageRelay {
// A relay carrier is always the base tunnel, so lane ciphertext can
// never legitimately arrive wrapped in one.
f.messageMetrics.RxInvalid(1)
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("Refusing relayed multiport lane packet", "from", via, "header", h)
}
return
}
}
if len(packet) < header.Len+ci.dKey.Overhead() {
@@ -165,6 +174,12 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, packet []byte, rxc *rxCont
return
}
if !laneCached {
// The packet decrypted, so the peer really is using this lane and the
// session we derived for it is worth keeping.
hostinfo.lanes.installSession(lane, ci)
}
// Roam before we respond, but only on the base tunnel: a lane's source
// address is a per-lane 4-tuple, not the tunnel's remote, and letting it
// roam the hostinfo would point every non-lane packet at a lane port.