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Speak post-quantum handshakes over fragments, alternating with classical until one answers
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# Post-quantum handshakes
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Status: draft. Decisions below were made on 2026-10-13; open items are listed at the end.
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Phase 1 is implemented (see [Implementation](#implementation-phase-1)).
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## Goals
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1. **Confidentiality against harvest-now-decrypt-later.** Traffic recorded today must stay
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secret after a cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists. This needs a
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post-quantum key exchange now.
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2. **Post-quantum authentication, later.** Needs certificates whose CA signature and host
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keys are post-quantum. This requires reissuing certificates, so it ships second.
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3. **Never rely on IP fragmentation.** ML-KEM and ML-DSA do not fit in one packet, so the
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handshake must carry messages larger than the path MTU itself.
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Non-goals: identity hiding beyond what IX offers today, and signatures at handshake time.
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The only signature in the system stays the CA signature inside the certificate.
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## Primitives and sizes
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| Primitive | Size |
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|---|---|
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| ML-KEM-1024 encapsulation key | 1568 B |
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| ML-KEM-1024 ciphertext | 1568 B |
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| ML-DSA-87 public key / signature | 2592 B / 4627 B |
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| Today's IX msg1 / msg2 (v2 cert, 151 B) | 252 B / 287 B |
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`crypto/mlkem` is available in Go 1.26 (the current `go.mod`); `crypto/mldsa` arrives in
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Go 1.27 and is only needed for phase 2.
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## Phase 1: ephemeral ML-KEM on today's certificates
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A new handshake subtype, `ix_psk2_mlkem1024` (2), IX-shaped (2 messages; the responder
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completes on msg1 as today), using the flynn/noise `psk2` modifier. The Noise protocol name
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becomes `Noise_IXpsk2_...`, which separates it from the classical subtype.
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- **msg1**: the initiator generates a fresh ML-KEM-1024 key pair and places the
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encapsulation key in `NebulaHandshakeDetails.KEMKey` (field 9). msg1's payload is mixed
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into the Noise transcript, so it cannot be stripped or replaced without msg2 failing.
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With the psk modifier Noise also mixes `e` into the cipher key, so msg1's static key and
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payload are encrypted, though only under a key derived from the public ephemeral.
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- **Responder**: after `ReadMessage(msg1)` it encapsulates to that key, obtaining
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`(ct, ss)`, and calls `HandshakeState.SetPresharedKey(psk)` before writing msg2, with
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`psk = HKDF-Extract(SHA-256, salt = "nebula ix_psk2_mlkem1024 v1", ikm = ss || ct)`.
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The ciphertext is bound in because, unlike the encapsulation key, it is not part of the
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Noise transcript.
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- **msg2** on the wire is `ct || noise_msg2`. The ciphertext travels outside the Noise
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message because the initiator needs `ss` before processing msg2's `psk` token. Any change
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to `ct` yields a different `ss` (ML-KEM implicit rejection) and the handshake fails.
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Transport keys depend on both the X25519 DH outputs and the ML-KEM shared secret.
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Authentication is unchanged and classical. With a minimal v2 certificate msg1 and msg2 are
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about 1.84 KB each, so each travels as 2 data and 2 repair fragments of about 936 bytes.
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A KEM key on the classical subtype, or a missing or malformed one on this subtype, is a fatal
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protocol error; a forged ciphertext only fails that packet.
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## Phase 2: pqIX hybrid with certificate v3
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Certificate v3 is hybrid: the classical static key and CA signature plus a static
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ML-KEM-1024 key and an ML-DSA-87 CA signature. Host authentication is by KEM rather than by
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signature, following PQNoise's pqIX, while keeping the classical DH tokens:
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- **msg1** (I to R): `e, s`, ephemeral ML-KEM key, initiator cert.
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- **msg2** (R to I): `e, s`, ciphertext to I's ephemeral KEM key, ciphertext to I's static
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KEM key, responder cert.
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- **msg3** (I to R): ciphertext to R's static KEM key, plus first data. R authenticates I
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when msg3 decrypts; I authenticates R implicitly when R's first reply decrypts.
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The initiator never caches the responder's certificate, so every handshake has three
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messages and carries both full certificates. With ML-DSA-87:
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| Message | Size | Data fragments (k) |
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|---|---|---|
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| msg1 | ~8.2 KB | 7 |
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| msg2 | ~9.8 KB | 9 |
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| msg3 | ~1.6 KB | 2 |
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flynn/noise cannot mix multiple KEM secrets into the chaining key, so phase 2 needs a
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KEM-aware Noise symmetric state written in this repository. Both subtypes coexist.
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Cryptographic review of the hybrid composition will be done by in-house cryptographers.
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## Fragment transport
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### Requirements
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- No IP fragmentation: every datagram's UDP payload is at most 1232 bytes **after** relay
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wrapping (16 B header + 16 B tag), the IPv6 minimum MTU budget also used by DNS Flag Day
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2020 and Solana's Turbine.
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- Every fragment of a handshake uses the same 5-tuple.
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- Bounded pre-authentication state, bounded amplification, selective loss recovery,
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tolerance of reordering and duplication, and a strictly validated, fuzzable parser.
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### Wire format
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Every packet of a fragmented handshake subtype is:
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```
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Nebula header (16) Version | Type=Handshake | Subtype | Reserved=0 | RemoteIndex | Counter
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Fragment header (8) FragID u32 | MsgLen u16 | Index u8 | Flags u8
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Symbol SymbolSize bytes
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```
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- `Counter` is the Noise message number (1, 2, 3). `RemoteIndex` is 0 for msg1, as today.
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- `FragID` is the sender's local index (random, non-zero).
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- `MsgLen` is the length of the whole message. Both ends derive the layout from it:
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`K = ceil(MsgLen / 1176)`, `SymbolSize = ceil(MsgLen / K)`. Every symbol has the same
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size, so a packet is at most 16 + 8 + 1176 = 1200 bytes.
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- `Index < K` is a data symbol (a slice of the message, the last one zero padded);
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`Index >= K` is a repair symbol.
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- `Flags` is reserved for a cookie extension and must be zero.
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### Forward error correction
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Messages are protected with a systematic Reed-Solomon code over GF(2^8), implemented in
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`handshake/fec`:
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- The repair rows form a Cauchy matrix, `coefficient(row, col) = 1 / (row XOR col)` with
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`row >= K > col`, so every square submatrix is invertible and **any K distinct symbols
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reconstruct the message**. Naive identity-over-Vandermonde constructions are not MDS
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(the PAR1 flaw and the 1997 Plank tutorial erratum).
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- A repair row depends only on its index, so repair symbols are generated on demand and
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their indexes never need to be agreed in advance. Up to 256 symbols exist per message.
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- Known-answer vectors in `fec_test.go` pin the encoding and were cross-checked against an
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independent implementation; changing them is a wire format change.
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- Cost for a 9.8 KB message (k=9): about 13 µs for three repair symbols, about 19 µs to
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decode with three data symbols missing.
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**The sender chooses m**, the number of repair symbols per attempt. The receiver only needs
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any K symbols, so this is policy and can change without a protocol change. The starting
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rule is `m = max(2, ceil(K/3))`.
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**Retries send fresh symbols.** Attempt 0 sends indexes `0 .. K+m-1`; each retry sends
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the next `K+m` unused indexes. The receiver merges all distinct symbols across attempts,
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so no received fragment is wasted. Indexes are a deterministic function of the message,
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so retransmits stay idempotent: the responder caches msg2 itself and regenerates any
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symbol.
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**Repair symbols trail the data.** Data symbols go out back to back; repair symbols follow
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after a short delay, so a queue tail-drop at the end of the data run does not also take the
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repair. In simulation this lifts small messages substantially (k=2 at 10% loss, burst 8:
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91.4% to 98.2% first-attempt success). Pacing every fragment was also evaluated; it gains
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about 5 more points for k=7..9 on bursty paths, which is not worth the extra machinery,
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and the retry with fresh symbols covers the remainder.
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### Receiver rules
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Implemented in `handshake/fragment` (`Sender`, `Assembly`, and the capped `Table`).
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- Fragments are stored individually as they arrive and charged against a memory cap.
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Nothing is allocated from a claimed size alone (FragmentSmack, game-engine "fragment
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bombs").
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- `MsgLen` must be identical for every fragment of a `FragID`; a mismatch drops the whole
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entry. msg1 is capped at `MsgLen <= 16384` (K <= 14).
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- The decoder keeps at most K distinct symbols, so an entry never exceeds about MsgLen bytes
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however many repair symbols arrive.
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- When K symbols are present the message is decoded and handed to the handshake `Machine`
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as a synthetic `[header | message]`. The Machine never sees fragments.
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- A completed entry is forgotten immediately. A late duplicate fragment starts a new entry
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and, once enough arrive, reconstructs the same message again; the handshake layer's
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duplicate detection recognises it.
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- If Noise rejects a decoded message, the entry is discarded and the next attempt
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supplies fresh symbols. (Possible refinement: keep a few spare symbols so an injected
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bad symbol can be identified by re-encoding instead of waiting for a retry.)
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- Pre-authentication msg1 entries live in a table keyed by (source address or relay index,
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FragID) with a total memory cap, per-source quotas (/32 for IPv4, /64 for IPv6), a
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sliding TTL of about 2 s refreshed by progress, and random eviction under pressure.
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msg2 and msg3 reassembly attaches to the existing pending handshake found by RemoteIndex.
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### Retransmission and amplification
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- Only timers cause transmission. Reactive resends (the responder resending its cached
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msg2 when a duplicate msg1 completes) are rate limited to one per handshake per retry
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interval, to avoid TFTP's Sorcerer's Apprentice amplification.
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- Duplicate msg1 detection compares the decoded message to the cached one **before**
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running Noise or certificate verification.
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- Before an address is validated, a responder sends at most 3x the bytes it received from
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it (QUIC's rule). Normal handshakes sit near 1.1-1.2x.
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- In phase 2 the initiator retransmits msg3 until any authenticated packet arrives from
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the responder; the responder sends a small confirmation on completion and holds tunnel
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traffic until msg3 verifies.
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### Denial of service
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The responder can no longer complete statelessly on msg1, since msg1 arrives in pieces.
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Defenses are the capped table above plus a **cookie under load**: when the table is under
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pressure, a fragment from an unvalidated address is answered with a stateless cookie
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(a MAC over source address, FragID and a time bucket), and the initiator resends with the
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cookie. This costs a round trip only while under attack, in the style of WireGuard's
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mac2, QUIC Retry and the SCTP state cookie. A CA-keyed pre-filter MAC was considered and
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rejected: networks commonly trust many CAs.
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## Rollout
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- Separate settings for initiating and accepting PQ handshakes, both off by default:
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`handshakes.pq.initiate`, `handshakes.pq.accept`. `handshakes.pq.repair_delay` (default
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10ms) sets how long repair fragments trail the data fragments.
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- Old nodes silently drop unknown subtypes, so discovery is speculative: an initiator with
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`initiate` enabled alternates PQ and classical attempts on successive retries, keeping
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both pending, and the first to complete wins.
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- `handshakes.pq.sticky` (default off): once a peer has completed a PQ handshake, never fall
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back to classical for it again during this process lifetime. This resists active
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downgrade after first contact.
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- No lighthouse capability advertisement.
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## Simulation results
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Gilbert-Elliott channel (bad state drops everything), losses expressed as average rate and
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mean burst length in packets. First-attempt success for the whole handshake with
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`m = max(2, ceil(K/3))` and repair delayed 16 packet slots, compared with no FEC:
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| Handshake | Loss | Burst 1 | Burst 2 | Burst 4 | Burst 8 |
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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| phase 1 (2, 2) no FEC | 5% | 81.4% | 85.6% | 87.9% | 89.0% |
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| phase 1 (2, 2) FEC | 5% | 99.9% | 99.4% | 99.3% | 98.6% |
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| phase 1 (2, 2) FEC | 10% | 99.3% | 97.5% | 97.4% | 96.3% |
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| phase 2 (7, 9, 2) no FEC | 5% | 39.8% | 57.5% | 70.4% | 77.7% |
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| phase 2 (7, 9, 2) FEC | 5% | 99.6% | 94.2% | 90.4% | 88.8% |
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| phase 2 (7, 9, 2) FEC | 10% | 95.9% | 84.6% | 79.0% | 77.3% |
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With fresh repair symbols, phase 2 completes within two attempts at least 99.1% of the time
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in every scenario above, and within three at least 99.99%.
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## Prior art
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- **WireGuard / Rosenpass**: fit every message in one packet; cookies and biscuits for
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statelessness. Not possible at our sizes.
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- **IKEv2**: RFC 7383 fragments only after keys exist, with each fragment authenticated;
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RFC 9242/9370 move PQ key exchange into intermediate exchanges for that reason.
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- **QUIC / DTLS 1.3**: offset-based reassembly with ACKs; QUIC's 3x amplification limit and
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1200-byte floor.
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- **Solana Turbine**: Reed-Solomon over 1232-byte UDP packets through untrusted relays;
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moved to Merkle-authenticated shreds after unauthenticated repair symbols enabled
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poisoning.
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- **kcp-go, UDPspeeder, CM256**: RS FEC over UDP; parity must scale up for small groups.
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- **gQUIC FEC (removed)**: FEC does not pay for bulk transfer under bursty loss; it does
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for short, latency-critical transfers such as handshakes.
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- **TFTP, NFS duplicate request cache, memcached UDP, IP reassembly bugs**: retransmit
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storms, ID-wrap misassembly, reflection amplification, and allocation from claimed sizes.
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## Implementation (phase 1)
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- `handshake`: the `ix_psk2_mlkem1024` subtype (`patterns.go`, `kem.go`), the `KEMKey`
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payload field, and the psk2 plumbing in `Machine`.
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- `handshake/fec`, `handshake/fragment`: the code and the fragment transport.
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- `handshake_manager_pq.go` and the manager:
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- **Initiator.** Attempts alternate PQ and classical, starting with PQ (sticky peers get
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only PQ). The PQ attempt has its own local index registered alongside the classical
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one; whichever response completes first wins, and the other index is released
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(`settleIndex`). A timed out or deleted pending handshake releases both.
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- **Responder.** msg1 fragments go into the capped pre-authentication table. A decoded
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msg1 is looked up by hash among recently answered ones before any Noise, KEM or
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certificate work: the trailing repair fragments of an attempt rebuild a msg1 its data
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fragments already completed, and a retrying initiator offers fresh symbols for the
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same msg1. A repeat goes straight to the cached-response resend, which offers fresh
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msg2 symbols, is rate limited to one per retry interval and is held to the 3x
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amplification budget.
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- **Relays** carry fragments unchanged; repair fragments trail via a timer.
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- The pre-authentication table is capped at 4 MiB, 1024 entries, 4 per source (IPv4 /32,
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IPv6 /64, or relay channel), 16 KiB messages and a 3 s idle timeout.
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- Tests: Noise-level KEM tests, codec and fragment tests and fuzzers, manager unit tests
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for the response budget and rate limit, and e2e tests for a clean handshake, loss of
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data fragments in both directions, fallback to a peer that does not accept PQ, a lost
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msg2 recovered by fresh symbols, sticky mode under an attacker dropping PQ packets,
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relays, and index cleanup on completion, fallback and timeout. ML-KEM and HKDF also
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pass under `GOEXPERIMENT=boringcrypto` and `GODEBUG=fips140=on`.
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## Open items
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1. Cookie wire format and the load threshold that triggers it.
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2. Whether the decoder keeps spare symbols to identify injected symbols.
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3. msg3 confirmation message format (phase 2).
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4. Configuration reload: the `handshakes.pq` settings are read at startup only, like the
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rest of the `handshakes` section.
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@@ -0,0 +1,351 @@
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//go:build e2e_testing
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package e2e
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import (
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"net/netip"
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"sync"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/slackhq/nebula"
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"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
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"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
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"github.com/slackhq/nebula/e2e/router"
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"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake/fragment"
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"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
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"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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)
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func pqConfig(initiate, accept, sticky bool) m {
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return m{"handshakes": m{"pq": m{
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"initiate": initiate,
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"accept": accept,
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"sticky": sticky,
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"repair_delay": "0s",
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}}}
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}
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||||||
|
// handshakeOf returns the handshake header p carries, looking inside relay
|
||||||
|
// wrapping, plus the fragment header when the handshake is fragmented.
|
||||||
|
func handshakeOf(p *udp.Packet) (*header.H, *fragment.Header) {
|
||||||
|
b := p.Data
|
||||||
|
h := &header.H{}
|
||||||
|
if h.Parse(b) != nil {
|
||||||
|
return nil, nil
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if h.Type == header.Message && h.Subtype == header.MessageRelay {
|
||||||
|
// Relays authenticate but do not encrypt the inner packet.
|
||||||
|
b = b[header.Len:]
|
||||||
|
if h.Parse(b) != nil {
|
||||||
|
return nil, nil
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if h.Type != header.Handshake {
|
||||||
|
return nil, nil
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if !header.IsFragmented(h.Subtype) {
|
||||||
|
return h, nil
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
// A relayed packet still has the relay's AEAD tag on the end.
|
||||||
|
for _, tag := range []int{0, 16} {
|
||||||
|
if len(b) < header.Len+tag {
|
||||||
|
break
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if fh, _, err := fragment.Parse(b[header.Len : len(b)-tag]); err == nil {
|
||||||
|
return h, &fh
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return h, nil
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// handshakeTally counts handshake packets by style as the router moves them.
|
||||||
|
type handshakeTally struct {
|
||||||
|
sync.Mutex
|
||||||
|
pq, classical int
|
||||||
|
maxPQLen int
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func (ht *handshakeTally) observe(p *udp.Packet) {
|
||||||
|
h, _ := handshakeOf(p)
|
||||||
|
if h == nil {
|
||||||
|
return
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
ht.Lock()
|
||||||
|
defer ht.Unlock()
|
||||||
|
if h.Subtype == header.HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024 {
|
||||||
|
ht.pq++
|
||||||
|
ht.maxPQLen = max(ht.maxPQLen, len(p.Data))
|
||||||
|
} else {
|
||||||
|
ht.classical++
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// isTunnelData reports whether p is ordinary tunnel traffic headed for to,
|
||||||
|
// directly or as the last hop of a relay.
|
||||||
|
func isTunnelData(p *udp.Packet, receiver, to *nebula.Control) bool {
|
||||||
|
h := &header.H{}
|
||||||
|
if receiver != to || h.Parse(p.Data) != nil || h.Type != header.Message {
|
||||||
|
return false
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if h.Subtype == header.MessageRelay {
|
||||||
|
if h.Parse(p.Data[header.Len:]) != nil {
|
||||||
|
return false
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return h.Type == header.Message && h.Subtype == header.MessageNone
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func newPQPair(t *testing.T, mine, theirs m) (myControl, theirControl *nebula.Control, myVpn, theirVpn []netip.Prefix, myUdp, theirUdp netip.AddrPort, r *router.R) {
|
||||||
|
t.Helper()
|
||||||
|
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
|
||||||
|
myControl, myVpn, myUdp, _ = newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "me", "10.128.0.1/24", mine)
|
||||||
|
theirControl, theirVpn, theirUdp, _ = newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "them", "10.128.0.2/24", theirs)
|
||||||
|
myControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(theirVpn[0].Addr(), theirUdp)
|
||||||
|
r = router.NewR(t, myControl, theirControl)
|
||||||
|
myControl.Start()
|
||||||
|
theirControl.Start()
|
||||||
|
return
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func TestPQHandshake(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
t.Parallel()
|
||||||
|
// They only accept, which is all a PQ initiator needs.
|
||||||
|
myControl, theirControl, myVpn, theirVpn, myUdp, theirUdp, r := newPQPair(t, pqConfig(true, true, false), pqConfig(false, true, false))
|
||||||
|
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
var tally handshakeTally
|
||||||
|
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, myVpn[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
|
||||||
|
require.True(t, r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(5*time.Second, func(p *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
||||||
|
tally.observe(p)
|
||||||
|
if isTunnelData(p, receiver, theirControl) {
|
||||||
|
return router.RouteAndExit
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return router.KeepRouting
|
||||||
|
}), "tunnel never came up")
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me"), theirControl.GetFromTun(true), myVpn[0].Addr(), theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
|
||||||
|
assert.Zero(t, tally.classical, "no classical handshake should be needed")
|
||||||
|
assert.GreaterOrEqual(t, tally.pq, 4, "both messages travel as several fragments")
|
||||||
|
assert.LessOrEqual(t, tally.maxPQLen, fragment.MaxPacketLen)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
assertHostInfoPair(t, myUdp, theirUdp, myVpn, theirVpn, myControl, theirControl)
|
||||||
|
assertTunnel(t, myVpn[0].Addr(), theirVpn[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
|
||||||
|
assert.Empty(t, myControl.ListHostmapIndexes(true), "no pending index may outlive the handshake")
|
||||||
|
assert.Empty(t, theirControl.ListHostmapIndexes(true))
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
myControl.Stop()
|
||||||
|
theirControl.Stop()
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// TestPQHandshakeLoss drops data fragments of both messages; the repair
|
||||||
|
// fragments must carry the handshake without a retry.
|
||||||
|
func TestPQHandshakeLoss(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
t.Parallel()
|
||||||
|
myControl, theirControl, myVpn, theirVpn, _, _, r := newPQPair(t, pqConfig(true, true, false), pqConfig(false, true, false))
|
||||||
|
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
var tally handshakeTally
|
||||||
|
dropped := 0
|
||||||
|
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, myVpn[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
|
||||||
|
require.True(t, r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(5*time.Second, func(p *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
||||||
|
if h, fh := handshakeOf(p); fh != nil {
|
||||||
|
// Every data fragment of msg1, and the first of msg2.
|
||||||
|
if (h.MessageCounter == 1 && int(fh.Index) < 2) || (h.MessageCounter == 2 && fh.Index == 0) {
|
||||||
|
dropped++
|
||||||
|
return router.Drop
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
tally.observe(p)
|
||||||
|
if isTunnelData(p, receiver, theirControl) {
|
||||||
|
return router.RouteAndExit
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return router.KeepRouting
|
||||||
|
}), "tunnel never came up")
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me"), theirControl.GetFromTun(true), myVpn[0].Addr(), theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
|
||||||
|
assert.Equal(t, 3, dropped)
|
||||||
|
assert.Zero(t, tally.classical, "the first attempt should succeed from repair fragments")
|
||||||
|
assertTunnel(t, myVpn[0].Addr(), theirVpn[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
myControl.Stop()
|
||||||
|
theirControl.Stop()
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// TestPQFallback has a peer that does not accept PQ handshakes. The initiator's
|
||||||
|
// next attempt is classical and the tunnel comes up anyway.
|
||||||
|
func TestPQFallback(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
t.Parallel()
|
||||||
|
myControl, theirControl, myVpn, theirVpn, myUdp, theirUdp, r := newPQPair(t, pqConfig(true, true, false), nil)
|
||||||
|
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
var tally handshakeTally
|
||||||
|
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, myVpn[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
|
||||||
|
require.True(t, r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(5*time.Second, func(p *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
||||||
|
tally.observe(p)
|
||||||
|
if isTunnelData(p, receiver, theirControl) {
|
||||||
|
return router.RouteAndExit
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return router.KeepRouting
|
||||||
|
}), "tunnel never came up")
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me"), theirControl.GetFromTun(true), myVpn[0].Addr(), theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
|
||||||
|
assert.Positive(t, tally.pq, "a PQ attempt comes first")
|
||||||
|
assert.Positive(t, tally.classical, "then a classical one")
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
assertHostInfoPair(t, myUdp, theirUdp, myVpn, theirVpn, myControl, theirControl)
|
||||||
|
assertTunnel(t, myVpn[0].Addr(), theirVpn[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
|
||||||
|
assert.Empty(t, myControl.ListHostmapIndexes(true), "the losing PQ attempt's index must be released")
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
myControl.Stop()
|
||||||
|
theirControl.Stop()
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// TestPQResendFreshSymbols loses the responder's whole first msg2. The
|
||||||
|
// initiator's next PQ attempt offers fresh msg1 symbols, the responder
|
||||||
|
// recognises the repeat and resends msg2 with symbols it has not sent before.
|
||||||
|
func TestPQResendFreshSymbols(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
t.Parallel()
|
||||||
|
myControl, theirControl, myVpn, theirVpn, _, _, r := newPQPair(t, pqConfig(true, true, false), pqConfig(false, true, false))
|
||||||
|
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
var firstMsg2, freshMsg2, freshMsg1 int
|
||||||
|
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, myVpn[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
|
||||||
|
require.True(t, r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(10*time.Second, func(p *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
||||||
|
h, fh := handshakeOf(p)
|
||||||
|
switch {
|
||||||
|
case h != nil && fh == nil:
|
||||||
|
// Keep the classical fallback out of the way.
|
||||||
|
return router.Drop
|
||||||
|
case fh != nil && h.MessageCounter == 2 && fh.Index < 4:
|
||||||
|
firstMsg2++
|
||||||
|
return router.Drop
|
||||||
|
case fh != nil && h.MessageCounter == 2:
|
||||||
|
freshMsg2++
|
||||||
|
case fh != nil && h.MessageCounter == 1 && fh.Index >= 4:
|
||||||
|
freshMsg1++
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if isTunnelData(p, receiver, theirControl) {
|
||||||
|
return router.RouteAndExit
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return router.KeepRouting
|
||||||
|
}), "tunnel never came up")
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me"), theirControl.GetFromTun(true), myVpn[0].Addr(), theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
|
||||||
|
assert.Equal(t, 4, firstMsg2, "the first msg2 is 2 data and 2 repair fragments")
|
||||||
|
assert.Positive(t, freshMsg1, "the retry offers fresh msg1 symbols")
|
||||||
|
assert.Positive(t, freshMsg2, "the resend offers fresh msg2 symbols")
|
||||||
|
assertTunnel(t, myVpn[0].Addr(), theirVpn[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
myControl.Stop()
|
||||||
|
theirControl.Stop()
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// TestPQSticky checks a sticky initiator never offers a classical handshake to a
|
||||||
|
// peer it has already completed a PQ handshake with.
|
||||||
|
func TestPQSticky(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
t.Parallel()
|
||||||
|
myControl, theirControl, myVpn, theirVpn, _, _, r := newPQPair(t, pqConfig(true, true, true), pqConfig(false, true, false))
|
||||||
|
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, myVpn[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
|
||||||
|
require.True(t, r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(5*time.Second, func(p *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
||||||
|
if isTunnelData(p, receiver, theirControl) {
|
||||||
|
return router.RouteAndExit
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return router.KeepRouting
|
||||||
|
}), "tunnel never came up")
|
||||||
|
theirControl.GetFromTun(true)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
t.Log("Rehandshake while an attacker drops every PQ packet")
|
||||||
|
var tally handshakeTally
|
||||||
|
myControl.ReHandshake(theirVpn[0].Addr())
|
||||||
|
r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(time.Second, func(p *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
||||||
|
tally.observe(p)
|
||||||
|
if h, _ := handshakeOf(p); h != nil && h.Subtype == header.HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024 {
|
||||||
|
return router.Drop
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return router.KeepRouting
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
assert.Positive(t, tally.pq, "PQ attempts keep being made")
|
||||||
|
assert.Zero(t, tally.classical, "sticky must never fall back")
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
myControl.Stop()
|
||||||
|
theirControl.Stop()
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func TestPQRelays(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
t.Parallel()
|
||||||
|
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
|
||||||
|
useRelays := pqConfig(true, true, false)
|
||||||
|
useRelays["relay"] = m{"use_relays": true}
|
||||||
|
amRelay := pqConfig(true, true, false)
|
||||||
|
amRelay["relay"] = m{"am_relay": true}
|
||||||
|
myControl, myVpnIpNet, _, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me ", "10.128.0.1/24", useRelays)
|
||||||
|
relayControl, relayVpnIpNet, relayUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "relay ", "10.128.0.128/24", amRelay)
|
||||||
|
theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "them ", "10.128.0.2/24", useRelays)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
myControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(relayVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), relayUdpAddr)
|
||||||
|
myControl.InjectRelays(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), []netip.Addr{relayVpnIpNet[0].Addr()})
|
||||||
|
relayControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirUdpAddr)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
r := router.NewR(t, myControl, relayControl, theirControl)
|
||||||
|
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
myControl.Start()
|
||||||
|
relayControl.Start()
|
||||||
|
theirControl.Start()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
var tally handshakeTally
|
||||||
|
var relayedPQ int
|
||||||
|
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
|
||||||
|
require.True(t, r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(10*time.Second, func(p *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
||||||
|
tally.observe(p)
|
||||||
|
outer := &header.H{}
|
||||||
|
if outer.Parse(p.Data) == nil && outer.Type == header.Message && outer.Subtype == header.MessageRelay {
|
||||||
|
if h, fh := handshakeOf(p); h != nil && fh != nil {
|
||||||
|
relayedPQ++
|
||||||
|
assert.LessOrEqual(t, len(p.Data), fragment.MaxPacketLen+32, "a relayed fragment fits the IPv6 minimum MTU")
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if isTunnelData(p, receiver, theirControl) {
|
||||||
|
return router.RouteAndExit
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return router.KeepRouting
|
||||||
|
}), "tunnel never came up")
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me"), theirControl.GetFromTun(true), myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
|
||||||
|
assert.Positive(t, relayedPQ, "the end to end handshake is PQ through the relay")
|
||||||
|
r.RenderHostmaps("Final hostmaps", myControl, relayControl, theirControl)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
myControl.Stop()
|
||||||
|
relayControl.Stop()
|
||||||
|
theirControl.Stop()
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// TestPQTimeoutReleasesIndexes lets a handshake with both a PQ and a classical
|
||||||
|
// attempt pending time out, and checks neither index is left behind.
|
||||||
|
func TestPQTimeoutReleasesIndexes(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
t.Parallel()
|
||||||
|
mine := pqConfig(true, true, false)
|
||||||
|
mine["handshakes"].(m)["retries"] = 2
|
||||||
|
myControl, theirControl, myVpn, theirVpn, _, _, r := newPQPair(t, mine, pqConfig(false, true, false))
|
||||||
|
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
var tally handshakeTally
|
||||||
|
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, myVpn[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
|
||||||
|
r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(1500*time.Millisecond, func(p *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
||||||
|
tally.observe(p)
|
||||||
|
return router.Drop
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
assert.Positive(t, tally.pq)
|
||||||
|
assert.Positive(t, tally.classical)
|
||||||
|
assert.Nil(t, myControl.GetHostInfoByVpnAddr(theirVpn[0].Addr(), true), "the handshake should have timed out")
|
||||||
|
assert.Empty(t, myControl.ListHostmapIndexes(true))
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
myControl.Stop()
|
||||||
|
theirControl.Stop()
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -418,6 +418,21 @@ logging:
|
|||||||
# after receiving the response for lighthouse queries
|
# after receiving the response for lighthouse queries
|
||||||
#trigger_buffer: 64
|
#trigger_buffer: 64
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# pq enables handshakes that mix an ephemeral ML-KEM-1024 key exchange into the session keys, protecting
|
||||||
|
# recorded traffic against a future quantum computer. Authentication is unchanged. These handshakes are too
|
||||||
|
# large for one packet and travel as fragments with forward error correction.
|
||||||
|
#pq:
|
||||||
|
# initiate starts post-quantum handshakes. Attempts alternate between post-quantum and classical until one is
|
||||||
|
# answered, so peers that do not support them still connect.
|
||||||
|
#initiate: false
|
||||||
|
# accept answers post-quantum handshakes from peers.
|
||||||
|
#accept: false
|
||||||
|
# sticky never falls back to a classical handshake with a peer that has completed a post-quantum one since
|
||||||
|
# nebula started, which defeats an attacker who drops post-quantum handshakes to force a downgrade.
|
||||||
|
#sticky: false
|
||||||
|
# repair_delay is how long the forward error correction fragments trail the rest of a handshake message.
|
||||||
|
#repair_delay: 10ms
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Tunnel manager settings
|
# Tunnel manager settings
|
||||||
#tunnels:
|
#tunnels:
|
||||||
# drop_inactive controls whether inactive tunnels are maintained or dropped after the inactive_timeout period has
|
# drop_inactive controls whether inactive tunnels are maintained or dropped after the inactive_timeout period has
|
||||||
|
|||||||
+130
-45
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import (
|
|||||||
"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
|
"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
|
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake"
|
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake"
|
||||||
|
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake/fragment"
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
|
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
|
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
|
||||||
)
|
)
|
||||||
@@ -49,6 +50,7 @@ type HandshakeConfig struct {
|
|||||||
tryInterval time.Duration
|
tryInterval time.Duration
|
||||||
retries int64
|
retries int64
|
||||||
triggerBuffer int
|
triggerBuffer int
|
||||||
|
pq pqHandshakeConfig
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
messageMetrics *MessageMetrics
|
messageMetrics *MessageMetrics
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -74,6 +76,13 @@ type HandshakeManager struct {
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
// can be used to trigger outbound handshake for the given vpnIp
|
// can be used to trigger outbound handshake for the given vpnIp
|
||||||
trigger chan netip.Addr
|
trigger chan netip.Addr
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// pqTable reassembles post-quantum msg1s from senders that have not authenticated yet.
|
||||||
|
pqTable *fragment.Table[pqFragKey, pqFragSource]
|
||||||
|
// pqPeers holds vpn addresses that completed a post-quantum handshake, for sticky mode.
|
||||||
|
pqPeers sync.Map
|
||||||
|
// pqAnswered recognises repeats of post-quantum msg1s already answered.
|
||||||
|
pqAnswered *pqAnswered
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
type HandshakeHostInfo struct {
|
type HandshakeHostInfo struct {
|
||||||
@@ -89,6 +98,7 @@ type HandshakeHostInfo struct {
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
hostinfo *HostInfo
|
hostinfo *HostInfo
|
||||||
machine *handshake.Machine // The handshake state machine, set during stage 0 (initiator) or beginHandshake (responder multi-message)
|
machine *handshake.Machine // The handshake state machine, set during stage 0 (initiator) or beginHandshake (responder multi-message)
|
||||||
|
pq *pqAttempt // The initiator's post-quantum attempt, pending alongside the classical one
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func (hh *HandshakeHostInfo) cachePacket(l *slog.Logger, t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, packet []byte, f packetCallback, m *cachedPacketMetrics) {
|
func (hh *HandshakeHostInfo) cachePacket(l *slog.Logger, t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, packet []byte, f packetCallback, m *cachedPacketMetrics) {
|
||||||
@@ -130,6 +140,8 @@ func NewHandshakeManager(l *slog.Logger, mainHostMap *HostMap, lightHouse *Light
|
|||||||
metricInitiated: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("handshake_manager.initiated", nil),
|
metricInitiated: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("handshake_manager.initiated", nil),
|
||||||
metricTimedOut: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("handshake_manager.timed_out", nil),
|
metricTimedOut: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("handshake_manager.timed_out", nil),
|
||||||
l: l,
|
l: l,
|
||||||
|
pqTable: fragment.NewTable[pqFragKey, pqFragSource](pqTableConfig),
|
||||||
|
pqAnswered: newPQAnswered(hsTimeout(config.retries, config.tryInterval)),
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -145,6 +157,8 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) Run(ctx context.Context) {
|
|||||||
hm.handleOutbound(vpnIP, true)
|
hm.handleOutbound(vpnIP, true)
|
||||||
case now := <-clockSource.C:
|
case now := <-clockSource.C:
|
||||||
hm.NextOutboundHandshakeTimerTick(now)
|
hm.NextOutboundHandshakeTimerTick(now)
|
||||||
|
hm.pqTable.Expire(now)
|
||||||
|
hm.pqAnswered.expire(now)
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -154,7 +168,7 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) HandleIncoming(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *head
|
|||||||
// don't yet support) are dropped here rather than silently routed through
|
// don't yet support) are dropped here rather than silently routed through
|
||||||
// the IX path. Add a case when introducing a new pattern.
|
// the IX path. Add a case when introducing a new pattern.
|
||||||
switch h.Subtype {
|
switch h.Subtype {
|
||||||
case header.HandshakeIXPSK0:
|
case header.HandshakeIXPSK0, pqSubtype:
|
||||||
// supported
|
// supported
|
||||||
default:
|
default:
|
||||||
hm.l.Debug("dropping handshake with unsupported subtype",
|
hm.l.Debug("dropping handshake with unsupported subtype",
|
||||||
@@ -170,6 +184,11 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) HandleIncoming(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *head
|
|||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if header.IsFragmented(h.Subtype) {
|
||||||
|
hm.handleFragment(via, packet, h)
|
||||||
|
return
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// First message of a new handshake. The wire format requires RemoteIndex
|
// First message of a new handshake. The wire format requires RemoteIndex
|
||||||
// to be zero here (the initiator has no responder index to fill in yet),
|
// to be zero here (the initiator has no responder index to fill in yet),
|
||||||
// and generateIndex never allocates 0, so any non-zero RemoteIndex on a
|
// and generateIndex never allocates 0, so any non-zero RemoteIndex on a
|
||||||
@@ -181,7 +200,7 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) HandleIncoming(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *head
|
|||||||
"from", via, "remoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex)
|
"from", via, "remoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex)
|
||||||
return
|
return
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
hm.beginHandshake(via, packet, h)
|
hm.beginHandshake(via, packet, h, 0)
|
||||||
return
|
return
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -230,6 +249,9 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleOutbound(vpnIp netip.Addr, lighthouseTriggered
|
|||||||
"style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, hh.machine.Subtype()),
|
"style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, hh.machine.Subtype()),
|
||||||
})
|
})
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
if hh.pq != nil {
|
||||||
|
fields = append(fields, "pqInitiatorIndex", hh.pq.index)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
hh.hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Info("Handshake timed out", fields...)
|
hh.hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Info("Handshake timed out", fields...)
|
||||||
hm.metricTimedOut.Inc(1)
|
hm.metricTimedOut.Inc(1)
|
||||||
hm.DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo)
|
hm.DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo)
|
||||||
@@ -239,25 +261,44 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleOutbound(vpnIp netip.Addr, lighthouseTriggered
|
|||||||
// Increment the counter to increase our delay, linear backoff
|
// Increment the counter to increase our delay, linear backoff
|
||||||
hh.counter++
|
hh.counter++
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Check if we have a handshake packet to transmit yet
|
// Pick this attempt's style and make sure its first message exists. A PQ
|
||||||
if !hh.ready {
|
// attempt sends msg1 as fragments: now goes out immediately, later after the
|
||||||
if !hm.buildStage0Packet(hh) {
|
// repair delay, and every attempt offers fresh repair symbols.
|
||||||
|
var now, later [][]byte
|
||||||
|
var machine *handshake.Machine
|
||||||
|
if hm.usePQ(hh, vpnIp) {
|
||||||
|
if hh.pq == nil && !hm.buildPQAttempt(hh) {
|
||||||
hm.OutboundHandshakeTimer.Add(vpnIp, hm.config.tryInterval*time.Duration(hh.counter))
|
hm.OutboundHandshakeTimer.Add(vpnIp, hm.config.tryInterval*time.Duration(hh.counter))
|
||||||
return
|
return
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
var err error
|
||||||
|
now, later, err = hh.pq.sender.Attempt(fragment.DefaultRepair(hh.pq.sender.Layout().K))
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Error("Failed to fragment handshake", "error", err)
|
||||||
|
hm.OutboundHandshakeTimer.Add(vpnIp, hm.config.tryInterval*time.Duration(hh.counter))
|
||||||
|
return
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
machine = hh.pq.machine
|
||||||
|
} else {
|
||||||
|
if !hh.ready {
|
||||||
|
if !hm.buildStage0Packet(hh) {
|
||||||
|
hm.OutboundHandshakeTimer.Add(vpnIp, hm.config.tryInterval*time.Duration(hh.counter))
|
||||||
|
return
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
// TODO: this hardcodes "always retransmit stage 0", which is correct for
|
||||||
|
// IX (the initiator only ever sends one packet, msg1) but wrong the
|
||||||
|
// moment a 3+ message pattern lands. The retry loop should resend the
|
||||||
|
// most recent outgoing message, not always stage 0. That implies
|
||||||
|
// HandshakeHostInfo tracking a single "currentOutbound" packet (bytes +
|
||||||
|
// header metadata) that gets replaced as the handshake progresses,
|
||||||
|
// instead of indexing into HandshakePacket.
|
||||||
|
now = [][]byte{hostinfo.HandshakePacket[handshakePacketStage0]}
|
||||||
|
machine = hh.machine
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// TODO: this hardcodes "always retransmit stage 0", which is correct for
|
|
||||||
// IX (the initiator only ever sends one packet, msg1) but wrong the
|
|
||||||
// moment a 3+ message pattern lands. The retry loop should resend the
|
|
||||||
// most recent outgoing message, not always stage 0. That implies
|
|
||||||
// HandshakeHostInfo tracking a single "currentOutbound" packet (bytes +
|
|
||||||
// header metadata) that gets replaced as the handshake progresses,
|
|
||||||
// instead of indexing into HandshakePacket.
|
|
||||||
stage0 := hostinfo.HandshakePacket[handshakePacketStage0]
|
|
||||||
hsFields := m{
|
hsFields := m{
|
||||||
"stage": uint64(hh.machine.MessageIndex()),
|
"stage": uint64(machine.MessageIndex()),
|
||||||
"style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, hh.machine.Subtype()),
|
"style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, machine.Subtype()),
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
remotes := hostinfo.remotes.CopyAddrs(hm.mainHostMap.GetPreferredRanges())
|
remotes := hostinfo.remotes.CopyAddrs(hm.mainHostMap.GetPreferredRanges())
|
||||||
@@ -285,8 +326,10 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleOutbound(vpnIp netip.Addr, lighthouseTriggered
|
|||||||
// Send the handshake to all known ips, stage 2 takes care of assigning the hostinfo.remote based on the first to reply
|
// Send the handshake to all known ips, stage 2 takes care of assigning the hostinfo.remote based on the first to reply
|
||||||
var sentTo []netip.AddrPort
|
var sentTo []netip.AddrPort
|
||||||
hostinfo.remotes.ForEach(hm.mainHostMap.GetPreferredRanges(), func(addr netip.AddrPort, _ bool) {
|
hostinfo.remotes.ForEach(hm.mainHostMap.GetPreferredRanges(), func(addr netip.AddrPort, _ bool) {
|
||||||
hm.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Handshake, hh.machine.Subtype(), 1)
|
hm.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Handshake, machine.Subtype(), int64(len(now)+len(later)))
|
||||||
err := hm.outside.WriteTo(stage0, addr)
|
err := hm.sendFragmented(now, later, func(p []byte) error {
|
||||||
|
return hm.outside.WriteTo(p, addr)
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
// These repeat every attempt, so match the success log below and only shout when the remotes changed
|
// These repeat every attempt, so match the success log below and only shout when the remotes changed
|
||||||
level := slog.LevelDebug
|
level := slog.LevelDebug
|
||||||
@@ -322,7 +365,7 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleOutbound(vpnIp netip.Addr, lighthouseTriggered
|
|||||||
)
|
)
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
hm.f.relayManager.StartRelays(hm.f, vpnIp, hh, stage0)
|
hm.f.relayManager.StartRelays(hm.f, vpnIp, hh, now, later)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// If a lighthouse triggered this attempt then we are still in the timer wheel and do not need to re-add
|
// If a lighthouse triggered this attempt then we are still in the timer wheel and do not need to re-add
|
||||||
if !lighthouseTriggered {
|
if !lighthouseTriggered {
|
||||||
@@ -532,6 +575,10 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo *HostInfo) {
|
|||||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) unlockedDeleteHostInfo(hostinfo *HostInfo) {
|
func (hm *HandshakeManager) unlockedDeleteHostInfo(hostinfo *HostInfo) {
|
||||||
for _, addr := range hostinfo.vpnAddrs {
|
for _, addr := range hostinfo.vpnAddrs {
|
||||||
if cur, ok := hm.vpnIps[addr]; ok && cur.hostinfo == hostinfo {
|
if cur, ok := hm.vpnIps[addr]; ok && cur.hostinfo == hostinfo {
|
||||||
|
// A PQ attempt holds its own index alongside the hostinfo's.
|
||||||
|
if idx := cur.pqIndex(); idx != 0 && hm.indexes[idx] == cur {
|
||||||
|
delete(hm.indexes, idx)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
delete(hm.vpnIps, addr)
|
delete(hm.vpnIps, addr)
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -642,9 +689,8 @@ func hsTimeout(tries int64, interval time.Duration) time.Duration {
|
|||||||
return time.Duration(tries / 2 * ((2 * int64(interval)) + (tries-1)*int64(interval)))
|
return time.Duration(tries / 2 * ((2 * int64(interval)) + (tries-1)*int64(interval)))
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// buildStage0Packet creates the initial handshake packet for the initiator.
|
// initiatingVersion picks the certificate version to initiate a handshake with.
|
||||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) buildStage0Packet(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) bool {
|
func (hm *HandshakeManager) initiatingVersion(hh *HandshakeHostInfo, cs *CertState) cert.Version {
|
||||||
cs := hm.f.pki.getCertState()
|
|
||||||
v := cs.DefaultVersion()
|
v := cs.DefaultVersion()
|
||||||
if hh.initiatingVersionOverride != cert.VersionPre1 {
|
if hh.initiatingVersionOverride != cert.VersionPre1 {
|
||||||
v = hh.initiatingVersionOverride
|
v = hh.initiatingVersionOverride
|
||||||
@@ -656,6 +702,13 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) buildStage0Packet(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) bool {
|
|||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
return v
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// buildStage0Packet creates the initial handshake packet for the initiator.
|
||||||
|
func (hm *HandshakeManager) buildStage0Packet(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) bool {
|
||||||
|
cs := hm.f.pki.getCertState()
|
||||||
|
v := hm.initiatingVersion(hh, cs)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
cred := cs.GetCredential(v)
|
cred := cs.GetCredential(v)
|
||||||
if cred == nil {
|
if cred == nil {
|
||||||
@@ -694,7 +747,10 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) buildStage0Packet(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) bool {
|
|||||||
// beginHandshake handles an incoming handshake packet that doesn't match any
|
// beginHandshake handles an incoming handshake packet that doesn't match any
|
||||||
// existing pending handshake. It creates a new responder Machine and processes
|
// existing pending handshake. It creates a new responder Machine and processes
|
||||||
// the first message.
|
// the first message.
|
||||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) beginHandshake(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H) {
|
//
|
||||||
|
// received is the number of bytes a fragmented msg1 arrived in, which bounds the
|
||||||
|
// response sent back before the address is validated; 0 for unfragmented ones.
|
||||||
|
func (hm *HandshakeManager) beginHandshake(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H, received int) {
|
||||||
f := hm.f
|
f := hm.f
|
||||||
cs := f.pki.getCertState()
|
cs := f.pki.getCertState()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -708,7 +764,7 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) beginHandshake(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *head
|
|||||||
machine, err := handshake.NewMachine(
|
machine, err := handshake.NewMachine(
|
||||||
v, cs.GetCredential,
|
v, cs.GetCredential,
|
||||||
hm.certVerifier(), func() (uint32, error) { return generateIndex(f.l) },
|
hm.certVerifier(), func() (uint32, error) { return generateIndex(f.l) },
|
||||||
false, header.HandshakeIXPSK0,
|
false, h.Subtype,
|
||||||
)
|
)
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
f.l.Error("Failed to create handshake machine", "from", via, "error", err)
|
f.l.Error("Failed to create handshake machine", "from", via, "error", err)
|
||||||
@@ -798,11 +854,15 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) beginHandshake(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *head
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
existing, err := hm.CheckAndComplete(hostinfo, handshakePacketStage0, f)
|
existing, err := hm.CheckAndComplete(hostinfo, handshakePacketStage0, f)
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
hm.handleCheckAndCompleteError(err, existing, hostinfo, via)
|
hm.handleCheckAndCompleteError(err, existing, hostinfo, via, machine.Subtype(), received)
|
||||||
return
|
return
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
hm.sendHandshakeResponse(via, response, hostinfo, false)
|
hm.sendHandshakeResponse(via, response, hostinfo, false, received)
|
||||||
|
if header.IsFragmented(machine.Subtype()) {
|
||||||
|
hm.pqAnswered.add(packet[header.Len:], hostinfo, time.Now())
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
hm.notePQPeer(machine.Subtype(), vpnAddrs)
|
||||||
hostinfo.remotes.RefreshFromHandshake(vpnAddrs)
|
hostinfo.remotes.RefreshFromHandshake(vpnAddrs)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Don't wait for UpdateWorker
|
// Don't wait for UpdateWorker
|
||||||
@@ -813,23 +873,32 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) beginHandshake(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *head
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
// continueHandshake feeds an incoming packet to an existing pending handshake Machine.
|
// continueHandshake feeds an incoming packet to an existing pending handshake Machine.
|
||||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) continueHandshake(via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostInfo, packet []byte) {
|
func (hm *HandshakeManager) continueHandshake(via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostInfo, packet []byte) {
|
||||||
f := hm.f
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
hh.Lock()
|
hh.Lock()
|
||||||
defer hh.Unlock()
|
defer hh.Unlock()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Re-verify hh is still tracked. Between queryIndex returning and us taking
|
if !hm.stillPending(hh, hh.hostinfo.localIndexId) {
|
||||||
// hh.Lock, handleOutbound may have timed out and deleted it. Once we hold
|
|
||||||
// hh.Lock no other deleter can race our index: handleOutbound also takes
|
|
||||||
// hh.Lock first, and handleRecvError targets a main-hostmap entry with a
|
|
||||||
// different localIndexId.
|
|
||||||
hm.RLock()
|
|
||||||
cur, ok := hm.indexes[hh.hostinfo.localIndexId]
|
|
||||||
hm.RUnlock()
|
|
||||||
if !ok || cur != hh {
|
|
||||||
return
|
return
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
hm.processResponse(via, hh, hh.machine, packet)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// stillPending re-verifies hh is still tracked under index. Between queryIndex
|
||||||
|
// returning and the caller taking hh.Lock, handleOutbound may have timed out and
|
||||||
|
// deleted it. Once hh.Lock is held no other deleter can race the index:
|
||||||
|
// handleOutbound also takes hh.Lock first, and handleRecvError targets a
|
||||||
|
// main-hostmap entry with a different localIndexId. The caller must hold hh.Lock.
|
||||||
|
func (hm *HandshakeManager) stillPending(hh *HandshakeHostInfo, index uint32) bool {
|
||||||
|
hm.RLock()
|
||||||
|
defer hm.RUnlock()
|
||||||
|
cur, ok := hm.indexes[index]
|
||||||
|
return ok && cur == hh
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// processResponse runs a responder's message through one of the initiator's
|
||||||
|
// pending attempts and completes the tunnel when the handshake finishes. The
|
||||||
|
// caller must hold hh.Lock.
|
||||||
|
func (hm *HandshakeManager) processResponse(via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostInfo, machine *handshake.Machine, packet []byte) {
|
||||||
|
f := hm.f
|
||||||
hostinfo := hh.hostinfo
|
hostinfo := hh.hostinfo
|
||||||
if !via.IsRelayed {
|
if !via.IsRelayed {
|
||||||
if !f.lightHouse.GetRemoteAllowList().AllowAll(hostinfo.vpnAddrs, via.UdpAddr.Addr()) {
|
if !f.lightHouse.GetRemoteAllowList().AllowAll(hostinfo.vpnAddrs, via.UdpAddr.Addr()) {
|
||||||
@@ -839,7 +908,6 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) continueHandshake(via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostIn
|
|||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
machine := hh.machine
|
|
||||||
if machine == nil {
|
if machine == nil {
|
||||||
f.l.Error("No handshake machine available for continuation",
|
f.l.Error("No handshake machine available for continuation",
|
||||||
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "from", via)
|
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "from", via)
|
||||||
@@ -862,7 +930,7 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) continueHandshake(via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostIn
|
|||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if response != nil {
|
if response != nil {
|
||||||
hm.sendHandshakeResponse(via, response, hostinfo, false)
|
hm.sendHandshakeResponse(via, response, hostinfo, false, 0)
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if result == nil {
|
if result == nil {
|
||||||
@@ -975,7 +1043,10 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) continueHandshake(via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostIn
|
|||||||
hostinfo.vpnAddrs = vpnAddrs
|
hostinfo.vpnAddrs = vpnAddrs
|
||||||
hostinfo.buildNetworks(f.myVpnNetworksTable, remoteCert.Certificate)
|
hostinfo.buildNetworks(f.myVpnNetworksTable, remoteCert.Certificate)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// The classical and PQ attempts each hold an index; keep the one that won.
|
||||||
|
hm.settleIndex(hh, result.LocalIndex)
|
||||||
hm.Complete(hostinfo, f)
|
hm.Complete(hostinfo, f)
|
||||||
|
hm.notePQPeer(machine.Subtype(), vpnAddrs)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if len(hh.packetStore) > 0 {
|
if len(hh.packetStore) > 0 {
|
||||||
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
|
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
|
||||||
@@ -1054,20 +1125,23 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) validatePeerCert(via ViaSender, remoteCert *cert.Cac
|
|||||||
// cached is true when msg is a stored response being retransmitted because
|
// cached is true when msg is a stored response being retransmitted because
|
||||||
// the peer's stage-1 retransmit landed (the ErrAlreadySeen path); false on a
|
// the peer's stage-1 retransmit landed (the ErrAlreadySeen path); false on a
|
||||||
// fresh response.
|
// fresh response.
|
||||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) sendHandshakeResponse(via ViaSender, msg []byte, hostinfo *HostInfo, cached bool) {
|
//
|
||||||
|
// received is the number of bytes a fragmented msg1 arrived in; it bounds what a
|
||||||
|
// fragmented response may send back. It is ignored for unfragmented subtypes.
|
||||||
|
func (hm *HandshakeManager) sendHandshakeResponse(via ViaSender, msg []byte, hostinfo *HostInfo, cached bool, received int) {
|
||||||
if msg == nil {
|
if msg == nil {
|
||||||
return
|
return
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
f := hm.f
|
f := hm.f
|
||||||
f.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Handshake, header.MessageSubType(msg[1]), 1)
|
subtype := header.MessageSubType(msg[1])
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Common log fields. peerCert may be nil during intermediate
|
// Common log fields. peerCert may be nil during intermediate
|
||||||
// multi-message flows (handshake hasn't completed yet); skip the cert
|
// multi-message flows (handshake hasn't completed yet); skip the cert
|
||||||
// block if so.
|
// block if so.
|
||||||
logFields := []any{
|
logFields := []any{
|
||||||
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
|
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
|
||||||
"handshake", m{"stage": uint64(2), "style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, header.HandshakeIXPSK0)},
|
"handshake", m{"stage": uint64(2), "style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, subtype)},
|
||||||
"cached", cached,
|
"cached", cached,
|
||||||
"initiatorIndex", hostinfo.remoteIndexId,
|
"initiatorIndex", hostinfo.remoteIndexId,
|
||||||
"responderIndex", hostinfo.localIndexId,
|
"responderIndex", hostinfo.localIndexId,
|
||||||
@@ -1081,6 +1155,17 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) sendHandshakeResponse(via ViaSender, msg []byte, hos
|
|||||||
)
|
)
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if header.IsFragmented(subtype) {
|
||||||
|
fields := append(logFields, "from", via)
|
||||||
|
if err := hm.sendFragmentedResponse(via, msg, hostinfo, cached, received); err != nil {
|
||||||
|
f.l.Debug("Did not send handshake message", append(fields, "error", err)...)
|
||||||
|
} else {
|
||||||
|
f.l.Info("Handshake message sent", fields...)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
f.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Handshake, subtype, 1)
|
||||||
if !via.IsRelayed {
|
if !via.IsRelayed {
|
||||||
fields := append(logFields, "from", via)
|
fields := append(logFields, "from", via)
|
||||||
err := f.outside.WriteTo(msg, via.UdpAddr)
|
err := f.outside.WriteTo(msg, via.UdpAddr)
|
||||||
@@ -1107,10 +1192,10 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) sendHandshakeResponse(via ViaSender, msg []byte, hos
|
|||||||
// This only fires from the responder-side beginHandshake path, after the
|
// This only fires from the responder-side beginHandshake path, after the
|
||||||
// peer cert has been validated and ConnectionState populated, so peerCert
|
// peer cert has been validated and ConnectionState populated, so peerCert
|
||||||
// is always non-nil for the cases that log it.
|
// is always non-nil for the cases that log it.
|
||||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleCheckAndCompleteError(err error, existing, hostinfo *HostInfo, via ViaSender) {
|
func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleCheckAndCompleteError(err error, existing, hostinfo *HostInfo, via ViaSender, subtype header.MessageSubType, received int) {
|
||||||
f := hm.f
|
f := hm.f
|
||||||
peerCert := hostinfo.ConnectionState.peerCert
|
peerCert := hostinfo.ConnectionState.peerCert
|
||||||
hsFields := m{"stage": uint64(1), "style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, header.HandshakeIXPSK0)}
|
hsFields := m{"stage": uint64(1), "style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, subtype)}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
switch err {
|
switch err {
|
||||||
case ErrAlreadySeen:
|
case ErrAlreadySeen:
|
||||||
@@ -1121,7 +1206,7 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleCheckAndCompleteError(err error, existing, hos
|
|||||||
// ephemeral keys; a freshly-built one would have different keys and break
|
// ephemeral keys; a freshly-built one would have different keys and break
|
||||||
// the tunnel even though both sides "completed" the handshake.
|
// the tunnel even though both sides "completed" the handshake.
|
||||||
if msg := existing.HandshakePacket[handshakePacketStage2]; msg != nil {
|
if msg := existing.HandshakePacket[handshakePacketStage2]; msg != nil {
|
||||||
hm.sendHandshakeResponse(via, msg, existing, true)
|
hm.sendHandshakeResponse(via, msg, existing, true, received)
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
case ErrExistingHostInfo:
|
case ErrExistingHostInfo:
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,446 @@
|
|||||||
|
package nebula
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
import (
|
||||||
|
"context"
|
||||||
|
"crypto/sha256"
|
||||||
|
"errors"
|
||||||
|
"log/slog"
|
||||||
|
"net/netip"
|
||||||
|
"sync"
|
||||||
|
"time"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake"
|
||||||
|
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake/fragment"
|
||||||
|
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const (
|
||||||
|
// pqSubtype is the post-quantum handshake this node speaks.
|
||||||
|
pqSubtype = header.HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// DefaultPQRepairDelay is how long repair fragments trail the data fragments.
|
||||||
|
DefaultPQRepairDelay = 10 * time.Millisecond
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// pqAmplification bounds what a responder sends in reply to an unvalidated
|
||||||
|
// address, as a multiple of what it received from it.
|
||||||
|
pqAmplification = 3
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// pqTableConfig bounds the responder's reassembly of msg1 fragments from senders
|
||||||
|
// that have not authenticated yet.
|
||||||
|
var pqTableConfig = fragment.TableConfig{
|
||||||
|
MaxBytes: 4 << 20,
|
||||||
|
MaxEntries: 1024,
|
||||||
|
MaxPerSource: 4,
|
||||||
|
MaxMsgLen: 16384,
|
||||||
|
TTL: 3 * time.Second,
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
type pqHandshakeConfig struct {
|
||||||
|
initiate bool // start PQ handshakes
|
||||||
|
accept bool // answer PQ handshakes
|
||||||
|
sticky bool // never fall back to classical for a peer that completed PQ
|
||||||
|
repairDelay time.Duration // delay between data and repair fragments
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// pqAttempt is the initiator's post-quantum attempt for a pending handshake. It
|
||||||
|
// lives alongside the classical attempt in HandshakeHostInfo and has its own
|
||||||
|
// local index, so whichever answer arrives first wins.
|
||||||
|
type pqAttempt struct {
|
||||||
|
machine *handshake.Machine
|
||||||
|
index uint32
|
||||||
|
sender *fragment.Sender
|
||||||
|
msg2 *fragment.Assembly
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// pqFragKey identifies one msg1 being reassembled.
|
||||||
|
type pqFragKey struct {
|
||||||
|
addr netip.AddrPort
|
||||||
|
relay uint32
|
||||||
|
fragID uint32
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// pqFragSource groups msg1 reassemblies for the per-source quota: an IPv4 /32,
|
||||||
|
// an IPv6 /64, or one relay channel.
|
||||||
|
type pqFragSource struct {
|
||||||
|
prefix netip.Prefix
|
||||||
|
relay uint32
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func pqFragKeyFor(via ViaSender, fragID uint32) (pqFragKey, pqFragSource) {
|
||||||
|
if via.IsRelayed {
|
||||||
|
return pqFragKey{relay: via.relay.LocalIndex, fragID: fragID},
|
||||||
|
pqFragSource{relay: via.relay.LocalIndex}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
addr := via.UdpAddr.Addr().Unmap()
|
||||||
|
bits := 64
|
||||||
|
if addr.Is4() {
|
||||||
|
bits = 32
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
prefix, _ := addr.Prefix(bits)
|
||||||
|
return pqFragKey{addr: via.UdpAddr, fragID: fragID}, pqFragSource{prefix: prefix}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// reassembled rebuilds the packet the handshake Machine expects from the header
|
||||||
|
// of a fragment and the decoded message.
|
||||||
|
func reassembled(h *header.H, msg []byte) []byte {
|
||||||
|
p := make([]byte, header.Len, header.Len+len(msg))
|
||||||
|
header.Encode(p, header.Version, header.Handshake, h.Subtype, h.RemoteIndex, h.MessageCounter)
|
||||||
|
return append(p, msg...)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// usePQ decides whether this outbound attempt is post-quantum. Attempts
|
||||||
|
// alternate, starting with PQ, because a peer that does not speak PQ silently
|
||||||
|
// drops it. A peer that already completed a PQ handshake never gets a classical
|
||||||
|
// attempt when sticky is on.
|
||||||
|
func (hm *HandshakeManager) usePQ(hh *HandshakeHostInfo, vpnIp netip.Addr) bool {
|
||||||
|
if !hm.config.pq.initiate {
|
||||||
|
return false
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if hm.config.pq.sticky {
|
||||||
|
if _, ok := hm.pqPeers.Load(vpnIp); ok {
|
||||||
|
return true
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return hh.counter%2 == 1
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// buildPQAttempt creates the initiator's PQ Machine and msg1 sender.
|
||||||
|
func (hm *HandshakeManager) buildPQAttempt(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) bool {
|
||||||
|
cs := hm.f.pki.getCertState()
|
||||||
|
v := hm.initiatingVersion(hh, cs)
|
||||||
|
if cs.GetCredential(v) == nil {
|
||||||
|
hm.f.l.Error("Unable to handshake with host because no certificate is available",
|
||||||
|
"vpnAddrs", hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "certVersion", v)
|
||||||
|
return false
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
pq := &pqAttempt{}
|
||||||
|
machine, err := handshake.NewMachine(
|
||||||
|
v, cs.GetCredential,
|
||||||
|
hm.certVerifier(), func() (uint32, error) { return hm.allocatePQIndex(hh, pq) },
|
||||||
|
true, pqSubtype,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
hm.f.l.Error("Failed to create handshake machine",
|
||||||
|
"vpnAddrs", hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "error", err)
|
||||||
|
return false
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
msg, err := machine.Initiate(nil)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
hm.f.l.Error("Failed to initiate handshake",
|
||||||
|
"vpnAddrs", hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "error", err)
|
||||||
|
hm.releasePQIndex(hh, pq)
|
||||||
|
return false
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
sender, err := fragment.NewSender(msg[header.Len:], pqSubtype, 0, 1, pq.index)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
hm.f.l.Error("Failed to fragment handshake",
|
||||||
|
"vpnAddrs", hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "error", err)
|
||||||
|
hm.releasePQIndex(hh, pq)
|
||||||
|
return false
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
pq.machine = machine
|
||||||
|
pq.sender = sender
|
||||||
|
hh.pq = pq
|
||||||
|
return true
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// allocatePQIndex registers a local index for the PQ attempt. Unlike
|
||||||
|
// allocateIndex it leaves hostinfo.localIndexId alone; that is settled when one
|
||||||
|
// of the attempts completes.
|
||||||
|
func (hm *HandshakeManager) allocatePQIndex(hh *HandshakeHostInfo, pq *pqAttempt) (uint32, error) {
|
||||||
|
hm.mainHostMap.RLock()
|
||||||
|
defer hm.mainHostMap.RUnlock()
|
||||||
|
hm.Lock()
|
||||||
|
defer hm.Unlock()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
for range 32 {
|
||||||
|
index, err := generateIndex(hm.l)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return 0, err
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_, inPending := hm.indexes[index]
|
||||||
|
_, inMain := hm.mainHostMap.Indexes[index]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if !inMain && !inPending {
|
||||||
|
pq.index = index
|
||||||
|
hm.indexes[index] = hh
|
||||||
|
return index, nil
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
return 0, errors.New("failed to generate unique localIndexId")
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func (hm *HandshakeManager) releasePQIndex(hh *HandshakeHostInfo, pq *pqAttempt) {
|
||||||
|
hm.Lock()
|
||||||
|
defer hm.Unlock()
|
||||||
|
if pq.index != 0 && hm.indexes[pq.index] == hh {
|
||||||
|
delete(hm.indexes, pq.index)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// settleIndex makes winner the hostinfo's local index and releases the index of
|
||||||
|
// the attempt that lost.
|
||||||
|
func (hm *HandshakeManager) settleIndex(hh *HandshakeHostInfo, winner uint32) {
|
||||||
|
hm.Lock()
|
||||||
|
defer hm.Unlock()
|
||||||
|
for _, idx := range []uint32{hh.hostinfo.localIndexId, hh.pqIndex()} {
|
||||||
|
if idx != 0 && idx != winner && hm.indexes[idx] == hh {
|
||||||
|
delete(hm.indexes, idx)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
hh.hostinfo.localIndexId = winner
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func (hh *HandshakeHostInfo) pqIndex() uint32 {
|
||||||
|
if hh.pq == nil {
|
||||||
|
return 0
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return hh.pq.index
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// handleFragment routes one fragment of a PQ handshake message.
|
||||||
|
func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleFragment(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H) {
|
||||||
|
fh, sym, err := fragment.Parse(packet[header.Len:])
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
hm.l.Debug("dropping malformed handshake fragment", "from", via, "error", err)
|
||||||
|
return
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
switch h.MessageCounter {
|
||||||
|
case 1:
|
||||||
|
if !hm.config.pq.accept {
|
||||||
|
hm.l.Debug("dropping post-quantum handshake, not accepting them", "from", via)
|
||||||
|
return
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if h.RemoteIndex != 0 {
|
||||||
|
hm.l.Debug("dropping stage-1 handshake with non-zero RemoteIndex",
|
||||||
|
"from", via, "remoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex)
|
||||||
|
return
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
key, src := pqFragKeyFor(via, fh.FragID)
|
||||||
|
res, err := hm.pqTable.Add(key, src, time.Now(), fh, sym)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
hm.l.Debug("dropping handshake fragment", "from", via, "error", err)
|
||||||
|
return
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if res == nil {
|
||||||
|
return
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if existing := hm.pqAnswered.lookup(res.Msg, time.Now()); existing != nil {
|
||||||
|
// Already answered: resend, rate limited, with fresh symbols.
|
||||||
|
if msg := existing.HandshakePacket[handshakePacketStage2]; msg != nil {
|
||||||
|
hm.sendHandshakeResponse(via, msg, existing, true, res.Received)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
hm.beginHandshake(via, reassembled(h, res.Msg), h, res.Received)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
case 2:
|
||||||
|
if hh := hm.queryIndex(h.RemoteIndex); hh != nil {
|
||||||
|
hm.continuePQ(via, hh, h, fh, sym)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// continuePQ collects msg2 fragments for the initiator's PQ attempt.
|
||||||
|
func (hm *HandshakeManager) continuePQ(via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostInfo, h *header.H, fh fragment.Header, sym []byte) {
|
||||||
|
hh.Lock()
|
||||||
|
defer hh.Unlock()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
pq := hh.pq
|
||||||
|
if pq == nil || pq.index != h.RemoteIndex || !hm.stillPending(hh, pq.index) {
|
||||||
|
return
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if pq.msg2 == nil {
|
||||||
|
a, err := fragment.NewAssembly(fh)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
pq.msg2 = a
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
ready, err := pq.msg2.Add(fh, sym)
|
||||||
|
if errors.Is(err, fragment.ErrMismatch) {
|
||||||
|
// The responder's FragID and MsgLen never change, so this is a stray or a
|
||||||
|
// forgery. Start over from this fragment rather than wedge.
|
||||||
|
pq.msg2 = nil
|
||||||
|
return
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if err != nil || !ready {
|
||||||
|
return
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
msg, err := pq.msg2.Decode()
|
||||||
|
pq.msg2 = nil
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
hm.l.Debug("failed to decode handshake fragments", "from", via, "error", err)
|
||||||
|
return
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
hm.processResponse(via, hh, pq.machine, reassembled(h, msg))
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// sendFragmented sends packets to a peer: now immediately and later after the
|
||||||
|
// repair delay. It returns the first error from the immediate sends; errors from
|
||||||
|
// delayed sends are only logged.
|
||||||
|
func (hm *HandshakeManager) sendFragmented(now, later [][]byte, send func([]byte) error) error {
|
||||||
|
var first error
|
||||||
|
for _, p := range now {
|
||||||
|
if err := send(p); err != nil && first == nil {
|
||||||
|
first = err
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
sendLater := func() {
|
||||||
|
for _, p := range later {
|
||||||
|
if err := send(p); err != nil {
|
||||||
|
hm.l.Debug("Failed to send handshake repair fragment", "error", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
switch {
|
||||||
|
case len(later) == 0:
|
||||||
|
case hm.config.pq.repairDelay <= 0:
|
||||||
|
sendLater()
|
||||||
|
default:
|
||||||
|
time.AfterFunc(hm.config.pq.repairDelay, sendLater)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return first
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// sendFragmentedResponse sends the responder's msg2 as fragments. A resend of a
|
||||||
|
// cached response (cached) offers fresh symbols and is rate limited to one per
|
||||||
|
// retry interval. received is how many bytes the triggering msg1 took, which
|
||||||
|
// bounds what may be sent back before the address is validated.
|
||||||
|
func (hm *HandshakeManager) sendFragmentedResponse(via ViaSender, msg []byte, hostinfo *HostInfo, cached bool, received int) error {
|
||||||
|
now := time.Now()
|
||||||
|
if cached {
|
||||||
|
last := hostinfo.handshakeResendAt.Load()
|
||||||
|
if now.UnixNano()-last < int64(hm.config.tryInterval) ||
|
||||||
|
!hostinfo.handshakeResendAt.CompareAndSwap(last, now.UnixNano()) {
|
||||||
|
return errors.New("handshake response resend rate limited")
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
} else {
|
||||||
|
hostinfo.handshakeResendAt.Store(now.UnixNano())
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
var h header.H
|
||||||
|
if err := h.Parse(msg); err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return err
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
s, err := fragment.NewSender(msg[header.Len:], h.Subtype, h.RemoteIndex, h.MessageCounter, hostinfo.localIndexId)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return err
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
l := s.Layout()
|
||||||
|
repair := fragment.DefaultRepair(l.K)
|
||||||
|
if received > 0 {
|
||||||
|
pktLen := header.Len + fragment.HeaderLen + l.SymbolSize
|
||||||
|
budget := pqAmplification * received / pktLen
|
||||||
|
if budget < l.K {
|
||||||
|
return errors.New("handshake response exceeds the amplification budget")
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
repair = min(repair, budget-l.K)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
n := uint32(l.K + repair)
|
||||||
|
s.SetNext(int(hostinfo.handshakeNextSymbol.Add(n) - n))
|
||||||
|
pkts, later, err := s.Attempt(repair)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
return err
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
f := hm.f
|
||||||
|
var send func([]byte) error
|
||||||
|
if !via.IsRelayed {
|
||||||
|
send = func(p []byte) error {
|
||||||
|
return f.outside.WriteTo(p, via.UdpAddr)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
} else {
|
||||||
|
if via.relay == nil {
|
||||||
|
return errors.New("both addr and via.relay are nil")
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
hostinfo.relayState.InsertRelayTo(via.relayHI.vpnAddrs[0])
|
||||||
|
via.relayHI.relayState.UpdateRelayForByIdxState(via.relay.LocalIndex, Established)
|
||||||
|
send = func(p []byte) error {
|
||||||
|
f.SendVia(via.relayHI, via.relay, p, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu), false, 0)
|
||||||
|
return nil
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
f.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Handshake, h.Subtype, int64(len(pkts)+len(later)))
|
||||||
|
return hm.sendFragmented(pkts, later, send)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// notePQPeer remembers peers that completed a PQ handshake, for sticky mode.
|
||||||
|
func (hm *HandshakeManager) notePQPeer(subtype header.MessageSubType, vpnAddrs []netip.Addr) {
|
||||||
|
if !hm.config.pq.sticky || subtype != pqSubtype {
|
||||||
|
return
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
for _, a := range vpnAddrs {
|
||||||
|
hm.pqPeers.Store(a, struct{}{})
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if hm.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
|
||||||
|
hm.l.Debug("Remembering post-quantum peer", "vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// pqAnswered remembers the msg1s a responder recently answered, keyed by hash,
|
||||||
|
// so a repeat is recognised before any noise, KEM or certificate work. Repeats
|
||||||
|
// are routine: the trailing repair fragments of an attempt rebuild a msg1 that
|
||||||
|
// its data fragments already completed, and a retrying initiator offers fresh
|
||||||
|
// symbols for the same msg1. Entries only exist for completed handshakes, which
|
||||||
|
// need a valid certificate, and live as long as an initiator keeps retrying.
|
||||||
|
type pqAnswered struct {
|
||||||
|
sync.Mutex
|
||||||
|
ttl time.Duration
|
||||||
|
entries map[[sha256.Size]byte]pqAnsweredEntry
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
type pqAnsweredEntry struct {
|
||||||
|
hostinfo *HostInfo
|
||||||
|
at time.Time
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const pqAnsweredMax = 4096
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func newPQAnswered(ttl time.Duration) *pqAnswered {
|
||||||
|
return &pqAnswered{ttl: ttl, entries: map[[sha256.Size]byte]pqAnsweredEntry{}}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func (a *pqAnswered) add(msg1 []byte, hostinfo *HostInfo, now time.Time) {
|
||||||
|
a.Lock()
|
||||||
|
defer a.Unlock()
|
||||||
|
if len(a.entries) >= pqAnsweredMax {
|
||||||
|
for k := range a.entries {
|
||||||
|
delete(a.entries, k)
|
||||||
|
break
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
a.entries[sha256.Sum256(msg1)] = pqAnsweredEntry{hostinfo: hostinfo, at: now}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func (a *pqAnswered) lookup(msg1 []byte, now time.Time) *HostInfo {
|
||||||
|
a.Lock()
|
||||||
|
defer a.Unlock()
|
||||||
|
e, ok := a.entries[sha256.Sum256(msg1)]
|
||||||
|
if !ok || now.Sub(e.at) > a.ttl {
|
||||||
|
return nil
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return e.hostinfo
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func (a *pqAnswered) expire(now time.Time) {
|
||||||
|
a.Lock()
|
||||||
|
defer a.Unlock()
|
||||||
|
for k, e := range a.entries {
|
||||||
|
if now.Sub(e.at) > a.ttl {
|
||||||
|
delete(a.entries, k)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
|
|||||||
|
package nebula
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
import (
|
||||||
|
"math/rand/v2"
|
||||||
|
"net/netip"
|
||||||
|
"sync"
|
||||||
|
"testing"
|
||||||
|
"time"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake/fragment"
|
||||||
|
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
|
||||||
|
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
|
||||||
|
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
|
||||||
|
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
|
||||||
|
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// recordingConn captures what is written to it.
|
||||||
|
type recordingConn struct {
|
||||||
|
udp.NoopConn
|
||||||
|
sync.Mutex
|
||||||
|
sent [][]byte
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func (c *recordingConn) WriteTo(b []byte, _ netip.AddrPort) error {
|
||||||
|
c.Lock()
|
||||||
|
defer c.Unlock()
|
||||||
|
c.sent = append(c.sent, append([]byte(nil), b...))
|
||||||
|
return nil
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func (c *recordingConn) take() [][]byte {
|
||||||
|
c.Lock()
|
||||||
|
defer c.Unlock()
|
||||||
|
s := c.sent
|
||||||
|
c.sent = nil
|
||||||
|
return s
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func newPQTestManager(t *testing.T) (*HandshakeManager, *recordingConn) {
|
||||||
|
l := test.NewLogger()
|
||||||
|
conn := &recordingConn{}
|
||||||
|
cfg := defaultHandshakeConfig
|
||||||
|
cfg.pq = pqHandshakeConfig{initiate: true, accept: true}
|
||||||
|
hm := NewHandshakeManager(l, newHostMap(l), newTestLighthouse(), conn, cfg)
|
||||||
|
hm.f = &Interface{
|
||||||
|
handshakeManager: hm,
|
||||||
|
outside: conn,
|
||||||
|
messageMetrics: newMessageMetricsOnlyRecvError(),
|
||||||
|
l: l,
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return hm, conn
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// fragmentIndexes checks every packet is a fragment of the expected response and
|
||||||
|
// returns their symbol indexes.
|
||||||
|
func fragmentIndexes(t *testing.T, pkts [][]byte, fragID, remoteIndex uint32) []int {
|
||||||
|
t.Helper()
|
||||||
|
var out []int
|
||||||
|
for _, p := range pkts {
|
||||||
|
require.LessOrEqual(t, len(p), fragment.MaxPacketLen)
|
||||||
|
var h header.H
|
||||||
|
require.NoError(t, h.Parse(p))
|
||||||
|
assert.Equal(t, pqSubtype, h.Subtype)
|
||||||
|
assert.Equal(t, remoteIndex, h.RemoteIndex)
|
||||||
|
assert.Equal(t, uint64(2), h.MessageCounter)
|
||||||
|
fh, _, err := fragment.Parse(p[header.Len:])
|
||||||
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||||
|
assert.Equal(t, fragID, fh.FragID)
|
||||||
|
out = append(out, int(fh.Index))
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return out
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func TestSendFragmentedResponse(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
hm, conn := newPQTestManager(t)
|
||||||
|
via := ViaSender{UdpAddr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.1:4242")}
|
||||||
|
hostinfo := &HostInfo{localIndexId: 77}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// A 2000 byte message is 2 symbols of 1000, so packets of 1024 bytes.
|
||||||
|
msg := make([]byte, header.Len, header.Len+2000)
|
||||||
|
header.Encode(msg, header.Version, header.Handshake, pqSubtype, 5, 2)
|
||||||
|
r := rand.New(rand.NewPCG(1, 1))
|
||||||
|
for range 2000 {
|
||||||
|
msg = append(msg, byte(r.Uint32()))
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
const pktLen = header.Len + fragment.HeaderLen + 1000
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
t.Run("first send", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
require.NoError(t, hm.sendFragmentedResponse(via, msg, hostinfo, false, 0))
|
||||||
|
assert.Equal(t, []int{0, 1, 2, 3}, fragmentIndexes(t, conn.take(), 77, 5))
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
t.Run("resends are rate limited", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
require.Error(t, hm.sendFragmentedResponse(via, msg, hostinfo, true, 10*pktLen))
|
||||||
|
assert.Empty(t, conn.take())
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
allowResend := func() {
|
||||||
|
hostinfo.handshakeResendAt.Store(time.Now().Add(-time.Second).UnixNano())
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
t.Run("resend offers fresh symbols", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
allowResend()
|
||||||
|
require.NoError(t, hm.sendFragmentedResponse(via, msg, hostinfo, true, 10*pktLen))
|
||||||
|
assert.Equal(t, []int{4, 5, 6, 7}, fragmentIndexes(t, conn.take(), 77, 5))
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
t.Run("amplification budget trims repair", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
allowResend()
|
||||||
|
// 3x of a little over one packet allows 3 packets: both data and 1 repair.
|
||||||
|
require.NoError(t, hm.sendFragmentedResponse(via, msg, hostinfo, true, pktLen+10))
|
||||||
|
assert.Equal(t, []int{8, 9, 10}, fragmentIndexes(t, conn.take(), 77, 5))
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
t.Run("amplification budget below the data refuses", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
allowResend()
|
||||||
|
require.Error(t, hm.sendFragmentedResponse(via, msg, hostinfo, true, pktLen/2))
|
||||||
|
assert.Empty(t, conn.take())
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func TestPQAnswered(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
now := time.Unix(1000, 0)
|
||||||
|
a := newPQAnswered(5 * time.Second)
|
||||||
|
hi := &HostInfo{}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
assert.Nil(t, a.lookup([]byte("msg1"), now))
|
||||||
|
a.add([]byte("msg1"), hi, now)
|
||||||
|
assert.Same(t, hi, a.lookup([]byte("msg1"), now.Add(time.Second)))
|
||||||
|
assert.Nil(t, a.lookup([]byte("other"), now))
|
||||||
|
assert.Nil(t, a.lookup([]byte("msg1"), now.Add(6*time.Second)), "stale entries are not answered")
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
a.expire(now.Add(6 * time.Second))
|
||||||
|
assert.Empty(t, a.entries)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
for i := range pqAnsweredMax + 10 {
|
||||||
|
a.add([]byte{byte(i), byte(i >> 8)}, hi, now)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
assert.Len(t, a.entries, pqAnsweredMax)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func TestPQFragKeyFor(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
|
k1, s1 := pqFragKeyFor(ViaSender{UdpAddr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.1:4242")}, 9)
|
||||||
|
k2, s2 := pqFragKeyFor(ViaSender{UdpAddr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.1:4243")}, 9)
|
||||||
|
assert.NotEqual(t, k1, k2, "different ports are different messages")
|
||||||
|
assert.Equal(t, s1, s2, "but share an IPv4 /32 quota")
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_, s3 := pqFragKeyFor(ViaSender{UdpAddr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("[2001:db8::1]:1")}, 9)
|
||||||
|
_, s4 := pqFragKeyFor(ViaSender{UdpAddr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("[2001:db8::ffff]:1")}, 9)
|
||||||
|
assert.Equal(t, s3, s4, "an IPv6 /64 shares a quota")
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_, s5 := pqFragKeyFor(ViaSender{UdpAddr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("[::ffff:192.0.2.1]:1")}, 9)
|
||||||
|
assert.Equal(t, s1, s5, "v4-mapped addresses count as IPv4")
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -260,6 +260,11 @@ type HostInfo struct {
|
|||||||
// We need these to avoid replayed handshake packets creating new hostinfos which causes churn
|
// We need these to avoid replayed handshake packets creating new hostinfos which causes churn
|
||||||
HandshakePacket map[uint8][]byte
|
HandshakePacket map[uint8][]byte
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// A responder resending a fragmented handshake response offers symbols it has
|
||||||
|
// not sent before, at most once per retry interval.
|
||||||
|
handshakeResendAt atomic.Int64 // unix nanos of the last send
|
||||||
|
handshakeNextSymbol atomic.Uint32 // next fragment symbol index to offer
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// nextLHQuery is the earliest we can ask the lighthouse for new information.
|
// nextLHQuery is the earliest we can ask the lighthouse for new information.
|
||||||
// This is used to limit lighthouse re-queries in chatty clients
|
// This is used to limit lighthouse re-queries in chatty clients
|
||||||
nextLHQuery atomic.Int64
|
nextLHQuery atomic.Int64
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -232,6 +232,12 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
|
|||||||
retries: int64(c.GetInt("handshakes.retries", DefaultHandshakeRetries)),
|
retries: int64(c.GetInt("handshakes.retries", DefaultHandshakeRetries)),
|
||||||
triggerBuffer: c.GetInt("handshakes.trigger_buffer", DefaultHandshakeTriggerBuffer),
|
triggerBuffer: c.GetInt("handshakes.trigger_buffer", DefaultHandshakeTriggerBuffer),
|
||||||
messageMetrics: messageMetrics,
|
messageMetrics: messageMetrics,
|
||||||
|
pq: pqHandshakeConfig{
|
||||||
|
initiate: c.GetBool("handshakes.pq.initiate", false),
|
||||||
|
accept: c.GetBool("handshakes.pq.accept", false),
|
||||||
|
sticky: c.GetBool("handshakes.pq.sticky", false),
|
||||||
|
repairDelay: c.GetDuration("handshakes.pq.repair_delay", DefaultPQRepairDelay),
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
handshakeManager := NewHandshakeManager(l, hostMap, lightHouse, udpConns[0], handshakeConfig)
|
handshakeManager := NewHandshakeManager(l, hostMap, lightHouse, udpConns[0], handshakeConfig)
|
||||||
|
|||||||
+7
-3
@@ -57,8 +57,9 @@ func (rm *relayManager) GetUseRelays() bool {
|
|||||||
// StartRelays drives the relay-establishment side of an outbound handshake attempt.
|
// StartRelays drives the relay-establishment side of an outbound handshake attempt.
|
||||||
// For each candidate relay it either kicks off a handshake to the relay, sends a CreateRelayRequest, retransmits
|
// For each candidate relay it either kicks off a handshake to the relay, sends a CreateRelayRequest, retransmits
|
||||||
// one that may have been lost, or, once the relay is Established, forwards the in-progress
|
// one that may have been lost, or, once the relay is Established, forwards the in-progress
|
||||||
// stage 0 handshake packet for vpnIp through it.
|
// stage 0 handshake packets for vpnIp through it: now immediately and later after the
|
||||||
func (rm *relayManager) StartRelays(f *Interface, vpnIp netip.Addr, hh *HandshakeHostInfo, stage0 []byte) {
|
// handshake repair delay.
|
||||||
|
func (rm *relayManager) StartRelays(f *Interface, vpnIp netip.Addr, hh *HandshakeHostInfo, now, later [][]byte) {
|
||||||
hostinfo := hh.hostinfo
|
hostinfo := hh.hostinfo
|
||||||
if !rm.GetUseRelays() || len(hostinfo.remotes.relays) == 0 {
|
if !rm.GetUseRelays() || len(hostinfo.remotes.relays) == 0 {
|
||||||
hh.lastRelays = nil
|
hh.lastRelays = nil
|
||||||
@@ -161,7 +162,10 @@ func (rm *relayManager) StartRelays(f *Interface, vpnIp netip.Addr, hh *Handshak
|
|||||||
switch existingRelay.State {
|
switch existingRelay.State {
|
||||||
case Established:
|
case Established:
|
||||||
hl.Log(context.Background(), level, "Send handshake via relay", "relay", relay.String())
|
hl.Log(context.Background(), level, "Send handshake via relay", "relay", relay.String())
|
||||||
f.SendVia(relayHostInfo, existingRelay, stage0, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu), false, 0)
|
_ = f.handshakeManager.sendFragmented(now, later, func(p []byte) error {
|
||||||
|
f.SendVia(relayHostInfo, existingRelay, p, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu), false, 0)
|
||||||
|
return nil
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
case Disestablished:
|
case Disestablished:
|
||||||
// Mark this relay as 'requested'
|
// Mark this relay as 'requested'
|
||||||
relayHostInfo.relayState.UpdateRelayForByIpState(vpnIp, Requested)
|
relayHostInfo.relayState.UpdateRelayForByIpState(vpnIp, Requested)
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ func TestStartRelaysLogDedupe(t *testing.T) {
|
|||||||
var buf bytes.Buffer
|
var buf bytes.Buffer
|
||||||
rm := newRM(&buf)
|
rm := newRM(&buf)
|
||||||
hh := newHH()
|
hh := newHH()
|
||||||
rm.StartRelays(f, vpnIp, hh, nil)
|
rm.StartRelays(f, vpnIp, hh, nil, nil)
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, []netip.Addr{vpnIp}, hh.lastRelays, "lastRelays should record the relay set we just attempted")
|
assert.Equal(t, []netip.Addr{vpnIp}, hh.lastRelays, "lastRelays should record the relay set we just attempted")
|
||||||
assert.Contains(t, buf.String(), "level=INFO "+msg, "expected Info level on first attempt")
|
assert.Contains(t, buf.String(), "level=INFO "+msg, "expected Info level on first attempt")
|
||||||
})
|
})
|
||||||
@@ -59,10 +59,10 @@ func TestStartRelaysLogDedupe(t *testing.T) {
|
|||||||
var buf bytes.Buffer
|
var buf bytes.Buffer
|
||||||
rm := newRM(&buf)
|
rm := newRM(&buf)
|
||||||
hh := newHH()
|
hh := newHH()
|
||||||
rm.StartRelays(f, vpnIp, hh, nil)
|
rm.StartRelays(f, vpnIp, hh, nil, nil)
|
||||||
first := append([]netip.Addr(nil), hh.lastRelays...)
|
first := append([]netip.Addr(nil), hh.lastRelays...)
|
||||||
buf.Reset()
|
buf.Reset()
|
||||||
rm.StartRelays(f, vpnIp, hh, nil)
|
rm.StartRelays(f, vpnIp, hh, nil, nil)
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, first, hh.lastRelays)
|
assert.Equal(t, first, hh.lastRelays)
|
||||||
assert.Contains(t, buf.String(), "level=DEBUG "+msg, "expected Debug level on identical retry")
|
assert.Contains(t, buf.String(), "level=DEBUG "+msg, "expected Debug level on identical retry")
|
||||||
assert.NotContains(t, buf.String(), "level=INFO "+msg, "Info should not fire on identical retry")
|
assert.NotContains(t, buf.String(), "level=INFO "+msg, "Info should not fire on identical retry")
|
||||||
@@ -72,13 +72,13 @@ func TestStartRelaysLogDedupe(t *testing.T) {
|
|||||||
var buf bytes.Buffer
|
var buf bytes.Buffer
|
||||||
rm := newRM(&buf)
|
rm := newRM(&buf)
|
||||||
hh := newHH()
|
hh := newHH()
|
||||||
rm.StartRelays(f, vpnIp, hh, nil)
|
rm.StartRelays(f, vpnIp, hh, nil, nil)
|
||||||
buf.Reset()
|
buf.Reset()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// The lighthouse handed us a new set this round.
|
// The lighthouse handed us a new set this round.
|
||||||
hh.hostinfo.remotes.relays = []netip.Addr{vpnIp, otherRelay}
|
hh.hostinfo.remotes.relays = []netip.Addr{vpnIp, otherRelay}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
rm.StartRelays(f, vpnIp, hh, nil)
|
rm.StartRelays(f, vpnIp, hh, nil, nil)
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, []netip.Addr{vpnIp, otherRelay}, hh.lastRelays)
|
assert.Equal(t, []netip.Addr{vpnIp, otherRelay}, hh.lastRelays)
|
||||||
assert.Contains(t, buf.String(), "level=INFO "+msg, "expected Info when the relay list changes")
|
assert.Contains(t, buf.String(), "level=INFO "+msg, "expected Info when the relay list changes")
|
||||||
})
|
})
|
||||||
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ func TestStartRelaysLogDedupe(t *testing.T) {
|
|||||||
hh := newHH()
|
hh := newHH()
|
||||||
hh.lastRelays = []netip.Addr{vpnIp}
|
hh.lastRelays = []netip.Addr{vpnIp}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
rm.StartRelays(f, vpnIp, hh, nil)
|
rm.StartRelays(f, vpnIp, hh, nil, nil)
|
||||||
assert.Nil(t, hh.lastRelays, "with relays disabled lastRelays should be cleared")
|
assert.Nil(t, hh.lastRelays, "with relays disabled lastRelays should be cleared")
|
||||||
assert.NotContains(t, buf.String(), msg, "should not log when we shortcut out")
|
assert.NotContains(t, buf.String(), msg, "should not log when we shortcut out")
|
||||||
})
|
})
|
||||||
|
|||||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user