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fix firewall port/proto bypass in parseV6 from uint8 extension-header length overflow (#1789)
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@@ -640,3 +640,38 @@ func serializeAH(ah *layers.IPSecAH) []byte {
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return buf.Bytes()
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}
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// Test_newPacket_v6ExtHeaderOverflow is a regression test for the IPv6 extension-header
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// length uint8 overflow in parseV6. A Destination-Options header with HdrExtLen=255 spans
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// (255+1)*8 = 2048 bytes, so the real transport header sits at offset 2088. Before the fix
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// the advance was computed in uint8 and wrapped to 0 (then clamped to 8), so the firewall
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// read the transport header ~2KB too early from attacker-controlled option bytes while the
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// host OS parses the real header, a firewall port/proto bypass. The fix makes parseV6 land
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// on the same offset the host does.
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func Test_newPacket_v6ExtHeaderOverflow(t *testing.T) {
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p := &firewall.Packet{}
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const (
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hdrLen = 40 // IPv6 header
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extLen = 2048 // (255+1)*8, the true Destination-Options header size
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realTCPAt = hdrLen + extLen // 2088, where the host reads the transport header
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forgedTCPAt = hdrLen + 8 // 48, where the pre-fix wrapped+clamped walk landed
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)
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pkt := make([]byte, realTCPAt+4)
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pkt[0] = 0x60 // version 6
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pkt[6] = byte(layers.IPProtocolIPv6Destination) // NextHeader -> Destination Options
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pkt[40] = byte(firewall.ProtoTCP) // Dest-Options NextHeader -> TCP
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pkt[41] = 255 // HdrExtLen = 255
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// Forged transport header at the pre-fix (wrong) offset: dst port 443.
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binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[forgedTCPAt+2:forgedTCPAt+4], 443)
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// Real transport header at the offset the host actually uses: dst port 22.
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binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[realTCPAt+2:realTCPAt+4], 22)
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require.NoError(t, newPacket(pkt, true, p))
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assert.Equal(t, uint8(firewall.ProtoTCP), p.Protocol)
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// LocalPort is the destination port for incoming traffic. It must be the real port (22)
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// the host delivers to, not the forged 443 at the overflowed offset.
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assert.Equal(t, uint16(22), p.LocalPort, "firewall must parse the real transport header, not the overflowed offset")
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}
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