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Author SHA1 Message Date
Nate Brown 86cef88744 Experimenting 2026-05-11 11:51:46 -05:00
131 changed files with 2190 additions and 13138 deletions
-113
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@@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
name: Code-sign Windows binaries
description: >
Sign every .exe under a given path in place via the DefinedNet code-signer
Lambda. If `role` or `bucket` is empty, logs a notice and skips signing so
forks and dev branches without AWS access still produce usable builds.
inputs:
path:
description: "Directory whose .exe files should be signed in place"
required: true
role:
description: "IAM role ARN to assume via OIDC; empty disables signing"
required: false
default: ""
bucket:
description: "S3 staging bucket the code-signer Lambda reads from; empty disables signing"
required: false
default: ""
region:
description: "AWS region for the role and Lambda"
required: false
default: "us-east-2"
function-name:
description: "Code-signer Lambda function name"
required: false
default: "code-signer"
key-prefix:
description: "S3 key prefix the caller is authorized to write under"
required: false
default: "code-signing/slackhq/nebula"
runs:
using: composite
steps:
- name: Skip notice
if: inputs.role == '' || inputs.bucket == ''
shell: sh
run: echo "::notice::code-signer role or bucket not set; skipping code signing."
- name: Configure AWS credentials
if: inputs.role != '' && inputs.bucket != ''
uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v6
with:
role-to-assume: ${{ inputs.role }}
aws-region: ${{ inputs.region }}
# Default is 12 retries to ride out IAM trust-policy propagation; once
# the role is stable we want a real misconfiguration to fail fast.
retry-max-attempts: 5
- name: Sign .exe files
if: inputs.role != '' && inputs.bucket != ''
shell: sh
env:
SIGN_PATH: ${{ inputs.path }}
BUCKET: ${{ inputs.bucket }}
FUNCTION_NAME: ${{ inputs.function-name }}
KEY_PREFIX: ${{ inputs.key-prefix }}
run: |
set -eu
RUN="${GITHUB_RUN_ID}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT}"
find "$SIGN_PATH" -name '*.exe' -print | while read -r path
do
rel=${path#"$SIGN_PATH"/}
file=$(basename "$path")
name=${file%.exe}
prefix="${KEY_PREFIX}/${RUN}"
src="${prefix}/unsigned/${rel}"
dst="${prefix}/signed/${rel}"
echo "::group::Sign ${rel}"
echo "Uploading unsigned to s3://${BUCKET}/${src}"
aws s3 cp --no-progress "$path" "s3://${BUCKET}/${src}" >/dev/null
echo "Invoking ${FUNCTION_NAME} Lambda"
payload=$(jq -nc \
--arg s "$src" \
--arg d "$dst" \
--arg p "$name" \
'{source_key: $s, dest_key: $d, program_name: $p}')
meta=$(aws lambda invoke \
--function-name "$FUNCTION_NAME" \
--cli-binary-format raw-in-base64-out \
--payload "$payload" \
--output json \
/tmp/sign-resp.json)
if echo "$meta" | jq -e '.FunctionError != null' >/dev/null
then
echo "::endgroup::"
echo "::error::code-signer Lambda failed for ${rel}"
cat /tmp/sign-resp.json >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "Downloading signed back to ${path}"
aws s3 cp --no-progress "s3://${BUCKET}/${dst}" "$path" >/dev/null
aws s3 rm "s3://${BUCKET}/${src}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
aws s3 rm "s3://${BUCKET}/${dst}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
# Sanity-check the bytes we got back actually carry an Authenticode
# signature that this machine can validate end to end.
status=$(powershell -NoProfile -Command "(Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath '$path').Status" | tr -d '\r')
if [ "$status" != "Valid" ]
then
echo "::endgroup::"
echo "::error::${rel} signature status: ${status} (expected Valid)"
exit 1
fi
echo "Signed ${rel} (sha256=$(jq -r '.sha256' /tmp/sign-resp.json), status=${status})"
echo "::endgroup::"
done
+8 -18
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@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ jobs:
mv build/*.tar.gz release
- name: Upload artifacts
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
with:
name: linux-latest
path: release
@@ -32,9 +32,6 @@ jobs:
build-windows:
name: Build Windows
runs-on: windows-latest
permissions:
id-token: write
contents: read
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
@@ -57,15 +54,8 @@ jobs:
mkdir build\dist\windows
mv dist\windows\wintun build\dist\windows\
- name: Code-sign
uses: ./.github/actions/code-sign
with:
path: build
role: ${{ secrets.DEFINED_CODE_SIGNER_ROLE }}
bucket: ${{ secrets.DEFINED_CODE_SIGNER_BUCKET }}
- name: Upload artifacts
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
with:
name: windows-latest
path: build
@@ -85,7 +75,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Import certificates
if: env.HAS_SIGNING_CREDS == 'true'
uses: Apple-Actions/import-codesign-certs@v7
uses: Apple-Actions/import-codesign-certs@v6
with:
p12-file-base64: ${{ secrets.APPLE_DEVELOPER_CERTIFICATE_P12_BASE64 }}
p12-password: ${{ secrets.APPLE_DEVELOPER_CERTIFICATE_PASSWORD }}
@@ -114,7 +104,7 @@ jobs:
fi
- name: Upload artifacts
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
with:
name: darwin-latest
path: ./release/*
@@ -138,21 +128,21 @@ jobs:
- name: Download artifacts
if: ${{ env.HAS_DOCKER_CREDS == 'true' }}
uses: actions/download-artifact@v8
uses: actions/download-artifact@v7
with:
name: linux-latest
path: artifacts
- name: Login to Docker Hub
if: ${{ env.HAS_DOCKER_CREDS == 'true' }}
uses: docker/login-action@v4
uses: docker/login-action@v3
with:
username: ${{ vars.DOCKERHUB_USERNAME }}
password: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Set up Docker Buildx
if: ${{ env.HAS_DOCKER_CREDS == 'true' }}
uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v4
uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3
- name: Build and push images
if: ${{ env.HAS_DOCKER_CREDS == 'true' }}
@@ -173,7 +163,7 @@ jobs:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- name: Download artifacts
uses: actions/download-artifact@v8
uses: actions/download-artifact@v7
with:
path: artifacts
+16 -81
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@@ -14,18 +14,10 @@ on:
- 'go.sum'
jobs:
smoke-extra-libvirt:
smoke-extra:
if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/master' || contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'smoke-test-extra')
name: ${{ matrix.target }}
name: Run extra smoke tests
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
target:
- freebsd-amd64
- openbsd-amd64
- netbsd-amd64
- linux-amd64-ipv6disable
env:
VAGRANT_DEFAULT_PROVIDER: libvirt
steps:
@@ -48,85 +40,28 @@ jobs:
sudo chmod 666 /var/run/libvirt/libvirt-sock
vagrant plugin install vagrant-libvirt
- name: ${{ matrix.target }}
run: make smoke-vagrant/${{ matrix.target }}
- name: freebsd-amd64
run: make smoke-vagrant/freebsd-amd64
timeout-minutes: 30
- name: openbsd-amd64
run: make smoke-vagrant/openbsd-amd64
# linux-386 needs VirtualBox, which conflicts with KVM/libvirt -- isolated job.
smoke-extra-virtualbox:
if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/master' || contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'smoke-test-extra')
name: linux-386
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
env:
VAGRANT_DEFAULT_PROVIDER: virtualbox
steps:
- name: netbsd-amd64
run: make smoke-vagrant/netbsd-amd64
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- name: linux-amd64-ipv6disable
run: make smoke-vagrant/linux-amd64-ipv6disable
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
go-version: '1.25'
check-latest: true
- name: add hashicorp source
run: wget -O- https://apt.releases.hashicorp.com/gpg | gpg --dearmor | sudo tee /usr/share/keyrings/hashicorp-archive-keyring.gpg && echo "deb [signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/hashicorp-archive-keyring.gpg] https://apt.releases.hashicorp.com $(lsb_release -cs) main" | sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/hashicorp.list
- name: install vagrant and virtualbox
# linux-386 runs last because it requires disabling KVM to use VirtualBox,
# which prevents libvirt (used by the other tests) from working after this point.
- name: install virtualbox for i386 test
run: |
sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y vagrant virtualbox
sudo apt-get install -y virtualbox
sudo rmmod kvm_amd kvm_intel kvm 2>/dev/null || true
- name: linux-386
env:
VAGRANT_DEFAULT_PROVIDER: virtualbox
run: make smoke-vagrant/linux-386
timeout-minutes: 30
smoke-windows:
if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/master' || contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'smoke-test-extra')
name: Run windows smoke test
runs-on: windows-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
go-version: '1.25'
check-latest: true
# WSL2 + Ubuntu so the smoke can run a real linux peer with its own
# netns. iputils-ping is needed for the in-WSL ping check. WSL1 has no
# real kernel and would lack /dev/net/tun, so we have to force WSL2.
- uses: Vampire/setup-wsl@v3
with:
distribution: Ubuntu-24.04
additional-packages: iputils-ping iproute2
# Vampire/setup-wsl provisions WSL1 even when the WSL2 platform is present.
# Convert the distro to WSL2 explicitly before we try to use /dev/net/tun.
- name: convert distro to WSL2
shell: pwsh
run: |
wsl --set-version Ubuntu-24.04 2
wsl --shutdown
wsl --list --verbose
- name: build windows nebula
run: make bin-windows
- name: build linux nebula for WSL
shell: bash
env:
GOOS: linux
GOARCH: amd64
run: |
mkdir -p build/linux-amd64
go build -o build/linux-amd64/nebula ./cmd/nebula
- name: run smoke-windows
shell: pwsh
working-directory: ./.github/workflows/smoke
run: ./smoke-windows.ps1
timeout-minutes: 15
-272
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@@ -1,272 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env pwsh
# Windows smoke test for the nebula tun + UDP + NLM code paths.
#
# Topology:
# - lighthouse runs natively on the Windows host (wintun + windows UDP)
# - peer runs inside WSL2 (Linux build of nebula, /dev/net/tun)
#
# WSL2 gives us a real netns boundary so the loopback fast-path on Windows
# does not short-circuit the overlay -- when WSL pings the lighthouse VPN IP,
# Linux has no idea that IP is local to the Windows host, so the packet is
# forced through nebula. Same in reverse.
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
# wsl.exe emits UTF-16 LE by default which PowerShell reads as bytes, mangling
# every captured string. WSL_UTF8 makes wsl.exe emit UTF-8 instead.
$env:WSL_UTF8 = '1'
$RepoRoot = Resolve-Path "$PSScriptRoot\..\..\.."
$Nebula = Join-Path $RepoRoot 'nebula.exe'
$NebulaCert = Join-Path $RepoRoot 'nebula-cert.exe'
$NebulaLinux = Join-Path $RepoRoot 'build\linux-amd64\nebula'
if (-not (Test-Path $Nebula)) { throw "missing $Nebula; run 'make bin-windows' first" }
if (-not (Test-Path $NebulaCert)) { throw "missing $NebulaCert; run 'make bin-windows' first" }
if (-not (Test-Path $NebulaLinux)) { throw "missing $NebulaLinux; build the linux nebula first" }
# Matches the distro installed by Vampire/setup-wsl in smoke-extra.yml.
$Distro = 'Ubuntu-24.04'
$listed = (wsl --list --quiet 2>$null) -join "`n"
if ($listed -notmatch [regex]::Escape($Distro)) {
throw "WSL distro $Distro not registered. Got: $listed"
}
Write-Host "Using WSL distro: $Distro"
# Windows host as seen from inside WSL: WSL's default-route gateway. We extract
# it with a regex rather than awk fields so PowerShell does not eat any '$N'
# tokens, and tabs/double-spaces in `ip route` output do not confuse a cut.
$ipCmd = 'ip route show default | grep -oE "([0-9]+\.){3}[0-9]+" | head -1'
$WindowsIp = (wsl -d $Distro -- bash -c $ipCmd).Trim()
if (-not $WindowsIp) { throw "could not determine Windows host IP from WSL" }
Write-Host "Windows host IP from WSL: $WindowsIp"
$WorkDir = Join-Path $env:TEMP 'nebula-smoke-windows'
if (Test-Path $WorkDir) { Remove-Item -Recurse -Force $WorkDir }
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $WorkDir | Out-Null
$WslDir = '/tmp/nebula-smoke'
wsl -d $Distro -- bash -c "rm -rf $WslDir && mkdir -p $WslDir" | Out-Null
$DevName = 'nebula-smoke'
$Ip1 = '192.168.241.1'
$Ip2 = '192.168.241.2'
$Port = 4242
& $NebulaCert ca -name 'smoke-ca' -out-crt "$WorkDir\ca.crt" -out-key "$WorkDir\ca.key"
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "nebula-cert ca failed (exit $LASTEXITCODE)" }
& $NebulaCert sign -name 'lighthouse' -networks "$Ip1/24" -ca-crt "$WorkDir\ca.crt" -ca-key "$WorkDir\ca.key" -out-crt "$WorkDir\lighthouse.crt" -out-key "$WorkDir\lighthouse.key"
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "nebula-cert sign lighthouse failed (exit $LASTEXITCODE)" }
& $NebulaCert sign -name 'peer' -networks "$Ip2/24" -ca-crt "$WorkDir\ca.crt" -ca-key "$WorkDir\ca.key" -out-crt "$WorkDir\peer.crt" -out-key "$WorkDir\peer.key"
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "nebula-cert sign peer failed (exit $LASTEXITCODE)" }
# Windows lighthouse config.
@"
pki:
ca: $WorkDir\ca.crt
cert: $WorkDir\lighthouse.crt
key: $WorkDir\lighthouse.key
static_host_map: {}
lighthouse:
am_lighthouse: true
interval: 60
hosts: []
listen:
host: 0.0.0.0
port: $Port
tun:
disabled: false
dev: $DevName
drop_local_broadcast: false
drop_multicast: false
tx_queue: 500
mtu: 1300
network_category: private
logging:
level: info
format: text
firewall:
outbound_action: drop
inbound_action: drop
conntrack:
tcp_timeout: 12m
udp_timeout: 3m
default_timeout: 10m
outbound:
- port: any
proto: any
host: any
inbound:
- port: any
proto: any
host: any
"@ | Out-File -FilePath "$WorkDir\lighthouse.yml" -Encoding utf8
# WSL peer config (paths are POSIX, deliberately).
@"
pki:
ca: $WslDir/ca.crt
cert: $WslDir/peer.crt
key: $WslDir/peer.key
static_host_map:
"${Ip1}": ["${WindowsIp}:$Port"]
lighthouse:
am_lighthouse: false
interval: 60
hosts:
- "${Ip1}"
listen:
host: 0.0.0.0
port: 0
tun:
disabled: false
dev: nebula1
drop_local_broadcast: false
drop_multicast: false
tx_queue: 500
mtu: 1300
logging:
level: info
format: text
firewall:
outbound_action: drop
inbound_action: drop
conntrack:
tcp_timeout: 12m
udp_timeout: 3m
default_timeout: 10m
outbound:
- port: any
proto: any
host: any
inbound:
- port: any
proto: any
host: any
"@ | Out-File -FilePath "$WorkDir\peer.yml" -Encoding utf8
# Stage WSL artifacts. Convert Windows paths to WSL paths ourselves rather than
# calling `wslpath`, because PowerShell's argument-passing to external EXEs
# strips backslashes from path arguments in ways that are hard to escape around.
function ConvertTo-WslPath {
param([string]$WindowsPath)
if ($WindowsPath -notmatch '^([A-Za-z]):\\(.*)$') {
throw "cannot convert path to WSL: $WindowsPath"
}
return "/mnt/$($matches[1].ToLower())/$($matches[2].Replace('\','/'))"
}
$WslWorkDir = ConvertTo-WslPath $WorkDir
$WslNebulaPath = ConvertTo-WslPath $NebulaLinux
wsl -d $Distro -- bash -c "cp '$WslWorkDir/ca.crt' '$WslWorkDir/peer.crt' '$WslWorkDir/peer.key' '$WslWorkDir/peer.yml' $WslDir/ && cp '$WslNebulaPath' $WslDir/nebula && chmod +x $WslDir/nebula"
# Make sure WSL has tun support and /dev/net/tun is usable before starting
# nebula. Diagnostics first so a fail here points at the real problem (e.g.
# WSL1 distros do not have a real kernel and will not have tun).
Write-Host '=== WSL diagnostic ==='
wsl --version 2>&1 | Out-Host
wsl --list --verbose 2>&1 | Out-Host
wsl -d $Distro -u root -- uname -a | Out-Host
wsl -d $Distro -u root -- bash -c "modprobe tun 2>&1 || true; mkdir -p /dev/net; [ -c /dev/net/tun ] || mknod /dev/net/tun c 10 200; chmod 600 /dev/net/tun; ls -l /dev/net/tun"
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "failed to prepare /dev/net/tun in WSL (TUN support missing?)" }
# Deliberately no New-NetFirewallRule calls here -- nebula's windows_bypass_wdf
# feature is supposed to install WFP permit filters that let inbound traffic
# through Windows Defender Firewall on its own. If this smoke regresses, that
# feature regressed.
$lhOut = Join-Path $WorkDir 'lighthouse.out.log'
$lhErr = Join-Path $WorkDir 'lighthouse.err.log'
$lhProc = Start-Process -FilePath $Nebula -ArgumentList @('-config', "$WorkDir\lighthouse.yml") `
-PassThru -NoNewWindow `
-RedirectStandardOutput $lhOut `
-RedirectStandardError $lhErr
# Run nebula in WSL as root with no sudo + no shell wrapper. PowerShell's
# Start-Process arg quoting mangles `bash -c "..."` strings that contain
# spaces/redirections, so we skip bash entirely and let Start-Process do the
# stdout/stderr capture itself.
$peerOut = Join-Path $WorkDir 'peer.out.log'
$peerErr = Join-Path $WorkDir 'peer.err.log'
$peerProc = Start-Process -FilePath 'wsl' `
-ArgumentList @('-d', $Distro, '-u', 'root', '--', "$WslDir/nebula", '-config', "$WslDir/peer.yml") `
-PassThru -NoNewWindow `
-RedirectStandardOutput $peerOut `
-RedirectStandardError $peerErr
function Wait-Until {
param([scriptblock]$Predicate, [int]$TimeoutSec, [string]$What)
$deadline = (Get-Date).AddSeconds($TimeoutSec)
while ((Get-Date) -lt $deadline) {
if (& $Predicate) { return }
Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500
}
throw "timed out waiting for: $What"
}
try {
Wait-Until -TimeoutSec 30 -What "windows wintun adapter $DevName with NetworkCategory=Private" -Predicate {
if ($lhProc.HasExited) { throw "lighthouse exited (code $($lhProc.ExitCode)) before tun was ready" }
$p = Get-NetConnectionProfile -InterfaceAlias $DevName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$p -and ("$($p.NetworkCategory)" -ieq 'Private')
}
Write-Host "OK: $DevName NetworkCategory=Private"
Wait-Until -TimeoutSec 30 -What "WSL nebula1 with $Ip2" -Predicate {
if ($peerProc.HasExited) { throw "peer exited (code $($peerProc.ExitCode)) before tun was ready" }
$r = wsl -d $Distro -u root -- bash -c "ip -o addr show nebula1 2>/dev/null | grep -q 'inet $Ip2' && echo yes"
("$r").Trim() -eq 'yes'
}
Write-Host "OK: WSL nebula1 has $Ip2"
Wait-Until -TimeoutSec 30 -What "ping from WSL peer to windows lighthouse ($Ip1)" -Predicate {
if ($peerProc.HasExited) { throw "peer exited (code $($peerProc.ExitCode)) before ping succeeded" }
$r = wsl -d $Distro -u root -- bash -c "ping -c1 -W1 $Ip1 >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo OK"
("$r").Trim() -eq 'OK'
}
Write-Host "OK: WSL peer -> windows lighthouse"
Wait-Until -TimeoutSec 30 -What "ping from windows lighthouse to WSL peer ($Ip2)" -Predicate {
$null = & ping.exe -n 1 -w 1000 $Ip2
$LASTEXITCODE -eq 0
}
Write-Host "OK: windows lighthouse -> WSL peer"
Write-Host ''
Write-Host 'All smoke checks passed.'
}
catch {
Write-Host ''
Write-Host '=== lighthouse stdout ==='
Get-Content $lhOut -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Host
Write-Host '=== lighthouse stderr ==='
Get-Content $lhErr -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Host
Write-Host '=== peer stdout ==='
Get-Content $peerOut -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Host
Write-Host '=== peer stderr ==='
Get-Content $peerErr -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Host
Write-Host '=== nebula WFP filters ==='
# Dump nebula-installed filters so we can verify they got registered with
# the conditions we expect.
$wfpDump = Join-Path $WorkDir 'wfp.xml'
netsh wfp show filters file=$wfpDump 2>&1 | Out-Null
if (Test-Path $wfpDump) {
Select-String -Path $wfpDump -Pattern 'Nebula' -Context 0,80 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Host
}
throw
}
finally {
if (-not $lhProc.HasExited) {
Stop-Process -Id $lhProc.Id -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$lhProc.WaitForExit(5000) | Out-Null
}
wsl -d $Distro -u root -- bash -c "pkill -f $WslDir/nebula 2>/dev/null; true" | Out-Null
# pkill returns 1 when no match and wsl propagates that; the smoke is done
# so we don't want it to leak into the script's exit code.
$global:LASTEXITCODE = 0
if ($peerProc -and -not $peerProc.HasExited) {
Stop-Process -Id $peerProc.Id -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
}
}
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# -*- mode: ruby -*-
# vi: set ft=ruby :
Vagrant.configure("2") do |config|
config.vm.box = "DefinedNet/netbsd10"
config.vm.box = "generic/netbsd9"
config.vm.synced_folder "../build", "/nebula", type: "rsync"
end
+2 -2
View File
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Build test mobile
run: make build-test-mobile
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
with:
name: e2e packet flow linux-latest
path: e2e/mermaid/linux-latest
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ jobs:
- name: End 2 end
run: make e2evv
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
with:
name: e2e packet flow ${{ matrix.os }}
path: e2e/mermaid/${{ matrix.os }}
+34 -175
View File
@@ -2,42 +2,24 @@ package nebula
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"math"
mathbits "math/bits"
"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
)
const bitsPerWord = 64
// Bits is a sliding-window anti-replay tracker. The window is stored as a
// circular bitmap packed into uint64 words (8x denser than a []bool), so a
// length-N window costs N/8 bytes. length must be a power of two.
type Bits struct {
length uint64
lengthMask uint64
current uint64
bits []uint64
bits []bool
lostCounter metrics.Counter
dupeCounter metrics.Counter
outOfWindowCounter metrics.Counter
}
func NewBits(length uint64) *Bits {
if length == 0 || length&(length-1) != 0 {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("Bits length must be a power of two, got %d", length))
}
nWords := length / bitsPerWord
if nWords == 0 {
nWords = 1
}
func NewBits(bits uint64) *Bits {
b := &Bits{
length: length,
lengthMask: length - 1,
bits: make([]uint64, nWords),
length: bits,
bits: make([]bool, bits, bits),
current: 0,
lostCounter: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("network.packets.lost", nil),
dupeCounter: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("network.packets.duplicate", nil),
@@ -45,194 +27,71 @@ func NewBits(length uint64) *Bits {
}
// There is no counter value 0, mark it to avoid counting a lost packet later.
b.bits[0] = 1
b.bits[0] = true
b.current = 0
return b
}
func (b *Bits) get(i uint64) bool {
pos := i & b.lengthMask
//bit-shifting by 6 because i is a bit index, not a u64 index, and we need to find the u64 without bit in it
return b.bits[pos>>6]&(uint64(1)<<(pos&63)) != 0
}
func (b *Bits) set(i uint64) {
pos := i & b.lengthMask
b.bits[pos>>6] |= uint64(1) << (pos & 63)
}
// clearRange clears `count` bits starting at circular position `startPos`
// (already masked to [0, length)) and returns how many of them were set
// before the clear. count must be in [1, length].
func (b *Bits) clearRange(startPos, count uint64) uint64 {
wasSet := uint64(0)
if count >= b.length {
for _, w := range b.bits {
wasSet += uint64(mathbits.OnesCount64(w))
}
clear(b.bits)
return wasSet
}
pos := startPos
remaining := count
// handle the potential partial word before pos becomes u64 aligned
word := pos >> 6
bit := pos & 63
take := uint64(64) - bit
if take > remaining {
take = remaining
}
if take > b.length-pos {
take = b.length - pos
}
var mask uint64
if take == 64 {
mask = math.MaxUint64
} else {
mask = ((uint64(1) << take) - 1) << bit
}
wasSet += uint64(mathbits.OnesCount64(b.bits[word] & mask))
b.bits[word] &^= mask
remaining -= take
pos = (pos + take) & b.lengthMask
// Clear whole words, keeping track of the number of set bits
for remaining >= 64 {
word = pos >> 6
wasSet += uint64(mathbits.OnesCount64(b.bits[word]))
b.bits[word] = 0
remaining -= 64
pos = (pos + 64) & b.lengthMask
}
// Clear the remaining partial word
if remaining > 0 {
word = pos >> 6
mask = (uint64(1) << remaining) - 1
wasSet += uint64(mathbits.OnesCount64(b.bits[word] & mask))
b.bits[word] &^= mask
}
return wasSet
}
func (b *Bits) strictlyWithinWindow(i uint64) bool {
// Handle the case where the window hasn't slid yet. This avoids u64 underflow.
inWarmup := b.current < b.length
if i < b.length && inWarmup {
return true
}
// Next, if the packet is in-window, see if we've seen it before
if i > b.current-b.length {
return true
}
return false //not within window!
}
// Check returns true if i is within (or way out in front of) the window, and not a replay
func (b *Bits) Check(l *slog.Logger, i uint64) bool {
// If i is the next number, return true.
if i > b.current {
return true
}
if b.strictlyWithinWindow(i) {
return !b.get(i)
// If i is within the window, check if it's been set already.
if i > b.current-b.length || i < b.length && b.current < b.length {
return !b.bits[i%b.length]
}
// Not within the window
if l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
l.Debug("rejected a packet (top)", "current", b.current, "incoming", i)
l.Debug("rejected a packet (top)",
"current", b.current,
"incoming", i,
)
}
return false
}
// Update has three branches:
// - i == b.current+1: fast path; advance the cursor by one and lose-count
// the slot we just stomped (only past warmup; see the i > b.length guard
// below).
// - i > b.current+1: jump path; clear all slots between current and i
// (or up to a full window's worth, whichever is smaller) via clearRange,
// then mark i. Two arms here: a warmup arm that handles the very first
// window before the cursor has slid, and a steady-state arm that treats
// every cleared empty slot as a lost packet.
// - i <= b.current: in-window check for duplicates; out-of-window otherwise.
//
// NewBits seeds bits[0]=1 so counter 0 looks "received" — Update never
// clears that marker during warmup (clearRange skips position 0 when
// startPos=1), and once b.current >= b.length the marker is no longer
// consulted. The marker prevents a fictitious "lost" hit on the first real
// counter.
func (b *Bits) Update(l *slog.Logger, i uint64) bool {
// Fast path: i is the next expected counter. Split out so the function
// stays small and avoids paying for the slow paths' slog argument-build
// stack frame on every call. The bit read/test/write is inlined to
// touch the backing word once.
// If i is the next number, return true and update current.
if i == b.current+1 {
pos := i & b.lengthMask
word := pos >> 6
mask := uint64(1) << (pos & 63)
w := b.bits[word]
if i > b.length && w&mask == 0 {
// Check if the oldest bit was lost since we are shifting the window by 1 and occupying it with this counter
// The very first window can only be tracked as lost once we are on the 2nd window or greater
if b.bits[i%b.length] == false && i > b.length {
b.lostCounter.Inc(1)
}
b.bits[word] = w | mask
b.bits[i%b.length] = true
b.current = i
return true
}
return b.updateSlow(l, i)
}
// updateSlow handles jumps, in-window backfill, dupes, and out-of-window.
func (b *Bits) updateSlow(l *slog.Logger, i uint64) bool {
// If i is a jump, adjust the window, record lost, update current, and return true
if i > b.current {
end := i
if end > b.current+b.length {
end = b.current + b.length
}
count := end - b.current
startPos := (b.current + 1) & b.lengthMask
var lost int64
if b.current >= b.length {
// Steady state: every cleared slot is past warmup, so any unset
// bit we evict is a lost packet from the previous cycle.
wasSet := b.clearRange(startPos, count)
lost = int64(count) - int64(wasSet)
} else {
// Warmup (the very first window). Some cleared slots represent
// packets <= length where eviction is not "lost" in the usual
// sense. This branch is taken at most once per connection so we
// don't bother optimizing it.
for n := b.current + 1; n <= end; n++ {
if !b.get(n) && n > b.length {
lost++
}
lost := int64(0)
// Zero out the bits between the current and the new counter value, limited by the window size,
// since the window is shifting
for n := b.current + 1; n <= min(i, b.current+b.length); n++ {
if b.bits[n%b.length] == false && n > b.length {
lost++
}
b.clearRange(startPos, count)
b.bits[n%b.length] = false
}
// Anything past the new window can never be backfilled, so it's lost.
if i > b.current+b.length {
lost += int64(i - b.current - b.length)
}
// Only record any skipped packets as a result of the window moving further than the window length
// Any loss within the new window will be accounted for in future calls
lost += max(0, int64(i-b.current-b.length))
b.lostCounter.Inc(lost)
b.set(i)
b.bits[i%b.length] = true
b.current = i
return true
}
// If i is within the current window but below the current counter, check to see if it's a duplicate
if b.strictlyWithinWindow(i) {
pos := i & b.lengthMask
word := pos >> 6
mask := uint64(1) << (pos & 63)
w := b.bits[word]
if b.current == i || w&mask != 0 {
// If i is within the current window but below the current counter,
// Check to see if it's a duplicate
if i > b.current-b.length || i < b.length && b.current < b.length {
if b.current == i || b.bits[i%b.length] == true {
if l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
l.Debug("Receive window",
"accepted", false,
@@ -245,7 +104,7 @@ func (b *Bits) updateSlow(l *slog.Logger, i uint64) bool {
return false
}
b.bits[word] = w | mask
b.bits[i%b.length] = true
return true
}
+129 -276
View File
@@ -7,79 +7,61 @@ import (
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
)
// snapshot returns the bitmap as a []bool of length b.length, for readable
// test assertions against the now-packed []uint64 storage.
func (b *Bits) snapshot() []bool {
out := make([]bool, b.length)
for i := uint64(0); i < b.length; i++ {
out[i] = b.get(i)
}
return out
}
func TestBitsRequiresPowerOfTwo(t *testing.T) {
assert.Panics(t, func() { NewBits(10) })
assert.Panics(t, func() { NewBits(0) })
assert.NotPanics(t, func() { NewBits(1) })
assert.NotPanics(t, func() { NewBits(16) })
assert.NotPanics(t, func() { NewBits(1024) })
assert.NotPanics(t, func() { NewBits(16384) })
}
func TestBits(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
b := NewBits(16)
assert.EqualValues(t, 16, b.length)
b := NewBits(10)
// make sure it is the right size
assert.Len(t, b.bits, 10)
// This is initialized to zero - receive one. This should work.
assert.True(t, b.Check(l, 1))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 1))
assert.EqualValues(t, 1, b.current)
g := []bool{true, true, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false}
assert.Equal(t, g, b.snapshot())
g := []bool{true, true, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false}
assert.Equal(t, g, b.bits)
// Receive two
assert.True(t, b.Check(l, 2))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 2))
assert.EqualValues(t, 2, b.current)
g = []bool{true, true, true, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false}
assert.Equal(t, g, b.snapshot())
g = []bool{true, true, true, false, false, false, false, false, false, false}
assert.Equal(t, g, b.bits)
// Receive two again - it will fail
assert.False(t, b.Check(l, 2))
assert.False(t, b.Update(l, 2))
assert.EqualValues(t, 2, b.current)
// Jump ahead to 25, which clears the window and sets slot 25%16 = 9.
assert.True(t, b.Check(l, 25))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 25))
assert.EqualValues(t, 25, b.current)
g = []bool{false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, true, false, false, false, false, false, false}
assert.Equal(t, g, b.snapshot())
// Jump ahead to 15, which should clear everything and set the 6th element
assert.True(t, b.Check(l, 15))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 15))
assert.EqualValues(t, 15, b.current)
g = []bool{false, false, false, false, false, true, false, false, false, false}
assert.Equal(t, g, b.bits)
// Mark 24, which is in window (current 25, length 16, window covers [10,25]).
assert.True(t, b.Check(l, 24))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 24))
assert.EqualValues(t, 25, b.current)
g = []bool{false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, true, true, false, false, false, false, false, false}
assert.Equal(t, g, b.snapshot())
// Mark 14, which is allowed because it is in the window
assert.True(t, b.Check(l, 14))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 14))
assert.EqualValues(t, 15, b.current)
g = []bool{false, false, false, false, true, true, false, false, false, false}
assert.Equal(t, g, b.bits)
// Mark 5, not allowed because 5 <= current-length (25-16=9).
// Mark 5, which is not allowed because it is not in the window
assert.False(t, b.Check(l, 5))
assert.False(t, b.Update(l, 5))
assert.EqualValues(t, 25, b.current)
g = []bool{false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, true, true, false, false, false, false, false, false}
assert.Equal(t, g, b.snapshot())
assert.EqualValues(t, 15, b.current)
g = []bool{false, false, false, false, true, true, false, false, false, false}
assert.Equal(t, g, b.bits)
// Make sure we handle wrapping around once to the same slot. With
// length=16, packets 1 and 17 share slot 1.
b = NewBits(16)
// make sure we handle wrapping around once to the current position
b = NewBits(10)
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 1))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 17))
assert.Equal(t, []bool{false, true, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false}, b.snapshot())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 11))
assert.Equal(t, []bool{false, true, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false}, b.bits)
// Walk through a few windows in order
b = NewBits(16)
b = NewBits(10)
for i := uint64(1); i <= 100; i++ {
assert.True(t, b.Check(l, i), "Error while checking %v", i)
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, i), "Error while updating %v", i)
@@ -90,31 +72,24 @@ func TestBits(t *testing.T) {
func TestBitsLargeJumps(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
// length=16. Update(55) from current=0:
// warmup, per-bit loop sees no n>16 with unset bits (slot 0 was set by
// NewBits and gets re-evaluated when n=16; n=16 is not strictly > 16),
// so the loop contributes 0. The jump exceeds the window so we record
// 55 - 0 - 16 = 39 packets fell out the back.
b := NewBits(16)
b := NewBits(10)
b.lostCounter.Clear()
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 55))
assert.Equal(t, int64(39), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Update(100): clears 16 slots starting at slot 56%16=8. Only slot 7 (for
// packet 55) was set, so 16 - 1 = 15 evicted slots had unset bits.
// Plus 100 - 55 - 16 = 29 packets fell past the window. Total 44.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 100))
assert.Equal(t, int64(39+44), b.lostCounter.Count())
b = NewBits(10)
b.lostCounter.Clear()
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 55)) // We saw packet 55 and can still track 45,46,47,48,49,50,51,52,53,54
assert.Equal(t, int64(45), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Update(200): same shape: 16 - 1 = 15 evicted unset, plus 200 - 100 - 16 = 84 past window. Total 99.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 200))
assert.Equal(t, int64(39+44+99), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 100)) // We saw packet 55 and 100 and can still track 90,91,92,93,94,95,96,97,98,99
assert.Equal(t, int64(89), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 200)) // We saw packet 55, 100, and 200 and can still track 190,191,192,193,194,195,196,197,198,199
assert.Equal(t, int64(188), b.lostCounter.Count())
}
func TestBitsDupeCounter(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
b := NewBits(16)
b := NewBits(10)
b.lostCounter.Clear()
b.dupeCounter.Clear()
b.outOfWindowCounter.Clear()
@@ -139,117 +114,120 @@ func TestBitsDupeCounter(t *testing.T) {
func TestBitsOutOfWindowCounter(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
b := NewBits(16)
b := NewBits(10)
b.lostCounter.Clear()
b.dupeCounter.Clear()
b.outOfWindowCounter.Clear()
// Jump to 20 (warmup branch + 4 past-window packets).
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 20))
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.outOfWindowCounter.Count())
// 9 single-step advances, each evicts a slot whose bit was cleared during
// the jump above and whose value was never seen, so each contributes 1
// to lostCounter.
for n := uint64(21); n <= 29; n++ {
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, n))
}
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 21))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 22))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 23))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 24))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 25))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 26))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 27))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 28))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 29))
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.outOfWindowCounter.Count())
// 0 is below current-length (29-16=13) so it falls outside the window.
assert.False(t, b.Update(l, 0))
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.outOfWindowCounter.Count())
// 4 from the Update(20) jump + 9 from 21..29.
assert.Equal(t, int64(13), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.Equal(t, int64(19), b.lostCounter.Count()) // packet 0 wasn't lost
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.dupeCounter.Count())
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.outOfWindowCounter.Count())
}
func TestBitsLostCounter(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
b := NewBits(16)
b := NewBits(10)
b.lostCounter.Clear()
b.dupeCounter.Clear()
b.outOfWindowCounter.Clear()
// Walk 20..29 like the original, just with a bigger window. Same
// reasoning as TestBitsOutOfWindowCounter: 4 past-window from Update(20),
// then 9 more from the unit advances.
for n := uint64(20); n <= 29; n++ {
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, n))
}
assert.Equal(t, int64(13), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 20))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 21))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 22))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 23))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 24))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 25))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 26))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 27))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 28))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 29))
assert.Equal(t, int64(19), b.lostCounter.Count()) // packet 0 wasn't lost
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.dupeCounter.Count())
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.outOfWindowCounter.Count())
b = NewBits(16)
b = NewBits(10)
b.lostCounter.Clear()
b.dupeCounter.Clear()
b.outOfWindowCounter.Clear()
// Update(15) clears the warmup window (no lost), sets slot 15.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 15))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 9))
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Update(16): slot 0 was already set (NewBits seeded it), and 16 is not
// strictly > length, so nothing is recorded as lost.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 16))
// 10 will set 0 index, 0 was already set, no lost packets
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 10))
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Update(17): we jumped straight from 0 to 15, so slot 1 was cleared
// (and never re-set). 17 > 16 is past warmup, so packet 1 is recorded lost.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 17))
// 11 will set 1 index, 1 was missed, we should see 1 packet lost
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 11))
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Now let's fill in the window, should end up with 8 lost packets
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 12))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 13))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 14))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 15))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 16))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 17))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 18))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 19))
assert.Equal(t, int64(8), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Fill in 18..30 in single steps. Each i evicts slot i%16. Slots 2..14
// were all cleared during Update(15), and we never re-set any of them,
// so each i in 18..30 is a fresh lost packet — 13 more.
for n := uint64(18); n <= 30; n++ {
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, n))
}
assert.Equal(t, int64(14), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Jump ahead by a window size
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 29))
assert.Equal(t, int64(8), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Now lets walk ahead normally through the window, the missed packets should fill in
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 30))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 31))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 32))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 33))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 34))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 35))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 36))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 37))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 38))
// 39 packets tracked, 22 seen, 17 lost
assert.Equal(t, int64(17), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Jump ahead by exactly one window size.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 46))
// end = min(46, 30+16) = 46, count = 16, all slots cleared. Before the
// jump every slot 0..15 had been set (Update(15), (16), (17), 18..30),
// so wasSet=16 and 46 == current+length means no past-window slack:
// lost contribution = 0.
assert.Equal(t, int64(14), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Walk 47..55. The Update(46) jump cleared every slot, so only slot 14
// (for packet 46) is set when we start. Each subsequent unit step lands
// on a slot that was cleared and is past warmup, so it counts as lost.
// 9 more = 23.
for n := uint64(47); n <= 55; n++ {
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, n))
}
assert.Equal(t, int64(23), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Jump ahead by two windows: clears the window plus past-window loss.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 87))
// current=55, length=16. end = min(87, 71) = 71. count=16, all slots
// cleared. Slots set before the clear are slots 14,15,0..7 (10 total).
// Lost from clear = 16 - 10 = 6. Past window: 87 - 55 - 16 = 16. +22.
assert.Equal(t, int64(45), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Jump ahead by 2 windows, should have recording 1 full window missing
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 58))
assert.Equal(t, int64(27), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Now lets walk ahead normally through the window, the missed packets should fill in from this window
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 59))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 60))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 61))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 62))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 63))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 64))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 65))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 66))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 67))
// 68 packets tracked, 32 seen, 36 missed
assert.Equal(t, int64(36), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.dupeCounter.Count())
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.outOfWindowCounter.Count())
}
func TestBitsLostCounterIssue1(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
b := NewBits(16)
b := NewBits(10)
b.lostCounter.Clear()
b.dupeCounter.Clear()
b.outOfWindowCounter.Clear()
// Receive 4, backfill 1, then 9, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 (skip 8), 10, 11, 14.
// Then jump to 25 — slot 25%16=9 is being evicted, but it had been set
// (we received packet 9), so no spurious lost increment. The original
// regression was about double-counting a missing packet when its slot
// got cleared on a jump. With the jump path now using clearRange's
// word-level wasSet count, the same semantics hold.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 4))
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 1))
@@ -266,7 +244,7 @@ func TestBitsLostCounterIssue1(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 7))
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Skip packet 8.
// assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 8))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 10))
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 11))
@@ -274,23 +252,9 @@ func TestBitsLostCounterIssue1(t *testing.T) {
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 14))
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Jump to 25. With length=16, slot 25%16=9 corresponds to packet 9
// (which we DID receive), so its bit is set and no lost++ from that
// eviction. The trace below shows the only loss is packet 8.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 25))
// current was 14, i=25. end=min(25,30)=25. count=11. startPos=15.
// steady? current=14<16, so warmup branch: per-bit n=15..25, count those
// with !get(n) AND n>16. n=17..25 are >16. Among slots 17%16=1..25%16=9
// did we set slots 1..9 (packets 1..9)? Yes for all but slot 8 (packet 8
// was skipped). n=24 maps to slot 8 which is FALSE → lost++. All other
// n in 17..25 map to slots that are set. n=16 is not strictly > 16. So
// lost = 1.
// Issue seems to be here, we reset missing packet 8 to false here and don't increment the lost counter
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 19))
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Fill in 12, 13, 15, 16. Each is below current=25 (in-window). 16 must
// recheck slot 0 — it was set by NewBits and then cleared by the
// Update(25) jump, so 16 backfills cleanly.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 12))
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 13))
@@ -299,140 +263,29 @@ func TestBitsLostCounterIssue1(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 16))
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 17))
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 18))
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 20))
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 21))
// We missed packet 8 above and that loss is still recorded once, never
// double-counted, never zeroed.
// We missed packet 8 above
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.dupeCounter.Count())
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.outOfWindowCounter.Count())
}
// TestBitsWarmupOvershoot exercises the jump path's warmup arm with an
// overshoot past one full window. NewBits leaves current=0 with only slot 0
// "set" by the marker. Jumping straight to length+k must (a) clear every
// slot the jump straddles, (b) count only past-window slack (not the
// in-window slots, which never had a "lost" tenant during warmup), and
// (c) leave the cursor at the new counter so subsequent unit advances
// count from steady state. The marker bit at slot 0 is irrelevant once
// current >= length.
func TestBitsWarmupOvershoot(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
b := NewBits(16)
b.lostCounter.Clear()
// Jump from current=0 to i=20 (length=16, overshoot=4).
// Warmup arm: counts slots in [1..16] where bit unset and n>length.
// Only n=16 was unset and >length: but slot 16%16=0 is the marker,
// so b.get(16) reads bits[0]=1 and skips. Result: 0 lost from the loop.
// Past-window: i - current - length = 20 - 0 - 16 = 4 lost.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 20))
assert.Equal(t, int64(4), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.Equal(t, uint64(20), b.current)
// Steady state now (current=20 >= length=16). Unit advance to 21
// stomps slot 21%16=5, which was cleared by the jump and not reset,
// so this is +1 lost.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 21))
assert.Equal(t, int64(5), b.lostCounter.Count())
}
// TestBitsCheckAcrossWarmupBoundary pins the underflow trick in Check's
// in-window clause. While in warmup, b.current-b.length underflows uint64
// to a huge value so the first OR-clause is always false; the second
// clause (i < length && current < length) carries the in-window check.
// Once current >= length the regimes flip cleanly.
func TestBitsCheckAcrossWarmupBoundary(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
b := NewBits(16)
// Warmup: current=0. Check(0) must read the marker (set) and return false.
assert.False(t, b.Check(l, 0), "marker slot should look already-received")
// Warmup: any 0 < i < length is in-window and unset → accepted.
for i := uint64(1); i < 16; i++ {
assert.True(t, b.Check(l, i), "warmup in-window i=%d should be accepted", i)
}
// Warmup: i >= length but > current is "next number" so accepted.
assert.True(t, b.Check(l, 16))
assert.True(t, b.Check(l, 1_000_000))
// Cross into steady state.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 100))
// Now current=100, length=16. In-window range is [85..100].
// 84 is just outside: the underflow clause activates; 84 > 100-16=84 is false.
// And the warmup clause is false (current >= length). So out of window.
assert.False(t, b.Check(l, 84))
// 85 sits at the boundary. 85 > 84 is true → in window, unset → accept.
assert.True(t, b.Check(l, 85))
// 100 is current itself; not strictly greater, in-window, but already set.
assert.False(t, b.Check(l, 100))
// Way out: clearly out of window.
assert.False(t, b.Check(l, 50))
}
// TestBitsMarkerInvariant verifies the seeded bits[0]=1 marker behaves
// correctly across warmup and beyond. Update should never clear the marker
// during warmup (clearRange skips position 0 when startPos=1), and once
// current >= length the marker is no longer consulted by Check/Update on
// the live path — but it must still report counter 0 as a duplicate while
// we are in warmup.
func TestBitsMarkerInvariant(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
b := NewBits(8)
// Counter 0 is the seeded marker; Check sees it as already received.
assert.False(t, b.Check(l, 0))
// Update(0) at current=0 hits the duplicate branch.
b.dupeCounter.Clear()
assert.False(t, b.Update(l, 0))
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.dupeCounter.Count())
// Walk forward through warmup; the marker must remain set.
for n := uint64(1); n <= 7; n++ {
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, n))
}
// Position 0 (the marker) should still read as set because we never
// cleared it; Update(0) still looks like a duplicate.
assert.False(t, b.Check(l, 0))
// Cross into steady state with a unit advance to 8: pos=0, evicts the
// marker bit. The lost-counter guard (i > b.length) is false (8 == 8),
// so this advance does NOT charge a lost packet — exactly what the
// marker is there to prevent.
b.lostCounter.Clear()
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 8))
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.lostCounter.Count())
// The slot at pos 0 is now occupied by counter 8.
assert.False(t, b.Check(l, 8))
}
// BenchmarkBitsUpdateInOrder is the steady-state hot path: each call is
// i == current+1.
func BenchmarkBitsUpdateInOrder(b *testing.B) {
l := test.NewLogger()
z := NewBits(16384)
func BenchmarkBits(b *testing.B) {
z := NewBits(10)
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
z.Update(l, uint64(n)+1)
}
}
for i := range z.bits {
z.bits[i] = true
}
for i := range z.bits {
z.bits[i] = false
}
// BenchmarkBitsUpdateReorder simulates light reorder within the window:
// every other packet arrives one slot behind its predecessor (forces the
// in-window backfill branch).
func BenchmarkBitsUpdateReorder(b *testing.B) {
l := test.NewLogger()
z := NewBits(16384)
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
base := uint64(n) * 2
z.Update(l, base+2)
z.Update(l, base+1)
}
}
// BenchmarkBitsUpdateLargeJumps stresses the clearRange word-level path.
func BenchmarkBitsUpdateLargeJumps(b *testing.B) {
l := test.NewLogger()
z := NewBits(16384)
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
z.Update(l, uint64(n+1)*1000)
}
}
-4
View File
@@ -217,10 +217,6 @@ func (ncp *CAPool) verify(c Certificate, now time.Time, certFp string, signerFp
return nil, err
}
if signer.Certificate.Curve() != c.Curve() {
return nil, ErrCurveMismatch
}
if signer.Certificate.Expired(now) {
return nil, ErrRootExpired
}
-28
View File
@@ -654,31 +654,3 @@ func TestCertificateV2_Verify_Subnets(t *testing.T) {
_, err = caPool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), c)
require.NoError(t, err)
}
func TestCertificateV2_CurveMismatch(t *testing.T) {
caIp1 := mustParsePrefixUnmapped("10.0.0.0/16")
caIp2 := mustParsePrefixUnmapped("192.168.0.0/24")
ca, _, caKey, _ := NewTestCaCert(Version2, Curve_P256, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), []netip.Prefix{caIp1, caIp2}, nil, []string{"test"})
caPem, err := ca.MarshalPEM()
require.NoError(t, err)
caPool := NewCAPool()
b, err := caPool.AddCAFromPEM(caPem)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, b)
// ip is outside the network
cIp1 := mustParsePrefixUnmapped("10.0.0.1/24")
c, _, _, _ := NewTestCert(Version2, Curve_P256, ca, caKey, "test", time.Now(), time.Now().Add(5*time.Minute), []netip.Prefix{cIp1}, nil, []string{"test"})
fp, _ := c.Fingerprint()
_, err = caPool.verify(c, time.Now(), fp, c.Issuer())
require.NoError(t, err)
//
c2 := c.(*certificateV2)
c2.curve = Curve_CURVE25519
fp, _ = c.Fingerprint()
_, err = caPool.verify(c, time.Now(), fp, c.Issuer())
require.Error(t, err)
}
-3
View File
@@ -112,9 +112,6 @@ func (c *certificateV1) CheckSignature(key []byte) bool {
}
switch c.details.curve {
case Curve_CURVE25519:
if len(key) != ed25519.PublicKeySize {
return false //avoids a panic internal to ed25519
}
return ed25519.Verify(key, b, c.signature)
case Curve_P256:
pubKey, err := ecdsa.ParseUncompressedPublicKey(elliptic.P256(), key)
-3
View File
@@ -151,9 +151,6 @@ func (c *certificateV2) CheckSignature(key []byte) bool {
switch c.curve {
case Curve_CURVE25519:
if len(key) != ed25519.PublicKeySize {
return false //avoids a panic internal to ed25519
}
return ed25519.Verify(key, b, c.signature)
case Curve_P256:
pubKey, err := ecdsa.ParseUncompressedPublicKey(elliptic.P256(), key)
-1
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ var (
ErrCaNotFound = errors.New("could not find ca for the certificate")
ErrUnknownVersion = errors.New("certificate version unrecognized")
ErrCertPubkeyPresent = errors.New("certificate has unexpected pubkey present")
ErrCurveMismatch = errors.New("certificate curve does not match CA")
ErrInvalidPEMBlock = errors.New("input did not contain a valid PEM encoded block")
ErrInvalidPEMCertificateBanner = errors.New("bytes did not contain a proper certificate banner")
+50 -18
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
@@ -44,16 +45,19 @@ type connectionManager struct {
inactivityTimeout atomic.Int64
dropInactive atomic.Bool
metricsTxPunchy metrics.Counter
l *slog.Logger
}
func newConnectionManagerFromConfig(l *slog.Logger, c *config.C, hm *HostMap, p *Punchy) *connectionManager {
cm := &connectionManager{
hostMap: hm,
l: l,
punchy: p,
relayUsed: make(map[uint32]struct{}),
relayUsedLock: &sync.RWMutex{},
hostMap: hm,
l: l,
punchy: p,
relayUsed: make(map[uint32]struct{}),
relayUsedLock: &sync.RWMutex{},
metricsTxPunchy: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("messages.tx.punchy", nil),
}
cm.reload(c, true)
@@ -149,8 +153,8 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) Start(ctx context.Context) {
defer clockSource.Stop()
p := []byte("")
nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
out := make([]byte, mtu)
// Long-lived buf for the traffic-check goroutine; never released.
buf := cm.intf.bufAlloc.Acquire()
for {
select {
@@ -165,13 +169,13 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) Start(ctx context.Context) {
break
}
cm.doTrafficCheck(localIndex, p, nb, out, now)
cm.doTrafficCheck(localIndex, p, buf, now)
}
}
}
}
func (cm *connectionManager) doTrafficCheck(localIndex uint32, p, nb, out []byte, now time.Time) {
func (cm *connectionManager) doTrafficCheck(localIndex uint32, p []byte, buf *WireBuffer, now time.Time) {
decision, hostinfo, primary := cm.makeTrafficDecision(localIndex, now)
switch decision {
@@ -195,7 +199,7 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) doTrafficCheck(localIndex uint32, p, nb, out []byte
cm.tryRehandshake(hostinfo)
case sendTestPacket:
cm.intf.SendMessageToHostInfo(header.Test, header.TestRequest, hostinfo, p, nb, out)
cm.intf.SendMessageToHostInfo(header.Test, header.TestRequest, hostinfo, p, buf)
}
cm.resetRelayTrafficCheck(hostinfo)
@@ -304,7 +308,9 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) migrateRelayUsed(oldhostinfo, newhostinfo *HostInfo
if err != nil {
cm.l.Error("failed to marshal Control message to migrate relay", "error", err)
} else {
cm.intf.SendMessageToHostInfo(header.Control, 0, newhostinfo, msg, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
migBuf := cm.intf.bufAlloc.Acquire()
cm.intf.SendMessageToHostInfo(header.Control, 0, newhostinfo, msg, migBuf)
cm.intf.bufAlloc.Release(migBuf)
cm.l.Info("send CreateRelayRequest",
"relayFrom", req.RelayFromAddr,
"relayTo", req.RelayToAddr,
@@ -365,7 +371,7 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) makeTrafficDecision(localIndex uint32, now time.Tim
if !outTraffic {
// Send a punch packet to keep the NAT state alive
cm.punchy.SendPunch(hostinfo)
cm.sendPunch(hostinfo)
}
return decision, hostinfo, primary
@@ -396,16 +402,17 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) makeTrafficDecision(localIndex uint32, now time.Tim
// If we aren't sending or receiving traffic then its an unused tunnel and we don't to test the tunnel.
// Just maintain NAT state if configured to do so.
cm.punchy.SendPunch(hostinfo)
cm.sendPunch(hostinfo)
cm.trafficTimer.Add(hostinfo.localIndexId, cm.checkInterval)
return doNothing, nil, nil
}
// We aren't receiving traffic but we are sending it. The outbound
// traffic itself refreshes the primary remote's NAT state; this
// fans out to non-primary remotes, but only if target_all_remotes
// is configured.
cm.punchy.SendPunchToAll(hostinfo)
if cm.punchy.GetTargetEverything() {
// This is similar to the old punchy behavior with a slight optimization.
// We aren't receiving traffic but we are sending it, punch on all known
// ips in case we need to re-prime NAT state
cm.sendPunch(hostinfo)
}
if cm.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(cm.l).Debug("Tunnel status",
@@ -507,6 +514,31 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) isInvalidCertificate(now time.Time, hostinfo *HostI
}
}
func (cm *connectionManager) sendPunch(hostinfo *HostInfo) {
if !cm.punchy.GetPunch() {
// Punching is disabled
return
}
if cm.intf.lightHouse.IsAnyLighthouseAddr(hostinfo.vpnAddrs) {
// Do not punch to lighthouses, we assume our lighthouse update interval is good enough.
// In the event the update interval is not sufficient to maintain NAT state then a publicly available lighthouse
// would lose the ability to notify us and punchy.respond would become unreliable.
return
}
if cm.punchy.GetTargetEverything() {
hostinfo.remotes.ForEach(cm.hostMap.GetPreferredRanges(), func(addr netip.AddrPort, preferred bool) {
cm.metricsTxPunchy.Inc(1)
cm.intf.outside.WriteTo([]byte{1}, addr)
})
} else if hostinfo.remote.IsValid() {
cm.metricsTxPunchy.Inc(1)
cm.intf.outside.WriteTo([]byte{1}, hostinfo.remote)
}
}
func (cm *connectionManager) tryRehandshake(hostinfo *HostInfo) {
cs := cm.intf.pki.getCertState()
curCrt := hostinfo.ConnectionState.myCert
+14 -14
View File
@@ -64,12 +64,12 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest(t *testing.T) {
// Create manager
conf := config.NewC(test.NewLogger())
punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf, nil)
punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf)
nc := newConnectionManagerFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf, hostMap, punchy)
nc.intf = ifce
p := []byte("")
nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
out := make([]byte, mtu)
buf := NewWireBuffer(mtu, 0)
// Add an ip we have established a connection w/ to hostmap
hostinfo := &HostInfo{
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest(t *testing.T) {
assert.True(t, hostinfo.in.Load())
// Do a traffic check tick, should not be pending deletion but should not have any in/out packets recorded
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, nb, out, time.Now())
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, buf, time.Now())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.out.Load())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.in.Load())
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest(t *testing.T) {
// Do another traffic check tick, this host should be pending deletion now
nc.Out(hostinfo)
assert.True(t, hostinfo.out.Load())
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, nb, out, time.Now())
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, buf, time.Now())
assert.True(t, hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.out.Load())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.in.Load())
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest(t *testing.T) {
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Hosts, hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0])
// Do a final traffic check tick, the host should now be removed
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, nb, out, time.Now())
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, buf, time.Now())
assert.NotContains(t, nc.hostMap.Hosts, hostinfo.vpnAddrs)
assert.NotContains(t, nc.hostMap.Indexes, hostinfo.localIndexId)
}
@@ -146,12 +146,12 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest2(t *testing.T) {
// Create manager
conf := config.NewC(test.NewLogger())
punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf, nil)
punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf)
nc := newConnectionManagerFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf, hostMap, punchy)
nc.intf = ifce
p := []byte("")
nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
out := make([]byte, mtu)
buf := NewWireBuffer(mtu, 0)
// Add an ip we have established a connection w/ to hostmap
hostinfo := &HostInfo{
@@ -174,14 +174,14 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest2(t *testing.T) {
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Indexes, hostinfo.localIndexId)
// Do a traffic check tick, should not be pending deletion but should not have any in/out packets recorded
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, nb, out, time.Now())
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, buf, time.Now())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.out.Load())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.in.Load())
// Do another traffic check tick, this host should be pending deletion now
nc.Out(hostinfo)
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, nb, out, time.Now())
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, buf, time.Now())
assert.True(t, hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.out.Load())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.in.Load())
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest2(t *testing.T) {
// We saw traffic, should no longer be pending deletion
nc.In(hostinfo)
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, nb, out, time.Now())
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, buf, time.Now())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.out.Load())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.in.Load())
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManager_DisconnectInactive(t *testing.T) {
conf.Settings["tunnels"] = map[string]any{
"drop_inactive": true,
}
punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf, nil)
punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf)
nc := newConnectionManagerFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf, hostMap, punchy)
assert.True(t, nc.dropInactive.Load())
nc.intf = ifce
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest_DisconnectInvalid(t *testing.T) {
// Create manager
conf := config.NewC(test.NewLogger())
punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf, nil)
punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf)
nc := newConnectionManagerFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf, hostMap, punchy)
nc.intf = ifce
ifce.connectionManager = nc
+5 -6
View File
@@ -7,14 +7,13 @@ import (
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/noiseutil"
)
const ReplayWindow = 8192
const ReplayWindow = 1024
type ConnectionState struct {
eKey noiseutil.CipherState
dKey noiseutil.CipherState
eKey *NebulaCipherState
dKey *NebulaCipherState
myCert cert.Certificate
peerCert *cert.CachedCertificate
initiator bool
@@ -32,8 +31,8 @@ func newConnectionStateFromResult(r *handshake.Result) *ConnectionState {
myCert: r.MyCert,
initiator: r.Initiator,
peerCert: r.RemoteCert,
eKey: noiseutil.NewCipherState(r.EKey, r.Cipher),
dKey: noiseutil.NewCipherState(r.DKey, r.Cipher),
eKey: NewNebulaCipherState(r.EKey),
dKey: NewNebulaCipherState(r.DKey),
window: NewBits(ReplayWindow),
}
ci.messageCounter.Add(r.MessageIndex)
+7 -10
View File
@@ -278,15 +278,9 @@ func (c *Control) CloseTunnel(vpnIp netip.Addr, localOnly bool) bool {
}
if !localOnly {
c.f.send(
header.CloseTunnel,
0,
hostInfo.ConnectionState,
hostInfo,
[]byte{},
make([]byte, 12, 12),
make([]byte, mtu),
)
buf := c.f.bufAlloc.Acquire()
c.f.send(header.CloseTunnel, 0, hostInfo.ConnectionState, hostInfo, []byte{}, buf)
c.f.bufAlloc.Release(buf)
}
c.f.closeTunnel(hostInfo)
@@ -296,11 +290,14 @@ func (c *Control) CloseTunnel(vpnIp netip.Addr, localOnly bool) bool {
// CloseAllTunnels is just like CloseTunnel except it goes through and shuts them all down, optionally you can avoid shutting down lighthouse tunnels
// the int returned is a count of tunnels closed
func (c *Control) CloseAllTunnels(excludeLighthouses bool) (closed int) {
// One WireBuffer for the whole shutdown loop.
buf := c.f.bufAlloc.Acquire()
defer c.f.bufAlloc.Release(buf)
shutdown := func(h *HostInfo) {
if excludeLighthouses && c.f.lightHouse.IsAnyLighthouseAddr(h.vpnAddrs) {
return
}
c.f.send(header.CloseTunnel, 0, h.ConnectionState, h, []byte{}, make([]byte, 12, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
c.f.send(header.CloseTunnel, 0, h.ConnectionState, h, []byte{}, buf)
c.f.closeTunnel(h)
c.l.Debug("Sending close tunnel message",
+68
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
//go:build e2e_testing
// +build e2e_testing
package e2e
import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/e2e/router"
)
// BenchmarkHandshake measures end-to-end tunnel establishment time. The two
// nodes and the router are constructed once before the loop so the timed window
// is just the handshake itself: trigger packet -> handshake1 -> handshake2 ->
// cached packet replay -> arrival on the remote TUN. Between iterations we
// tear down both sides locally (no CloseTunnel notification on the wire) and
// re-inject the lighthouse address that closeTunnel cleared, so the next
// iteration runs through a fresh handshake against the same harness.
func BenchmarkHandshake(b *testing.B) {
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
// Default try_interval is 100ms. The handshake manager schedules handshake1
// on its OutboundHandshakeTimer rather than firing immediately on trigger
// (the trigger channel only fast-paths static hosts), so a 100ms default
// drowns the actual handshake cost. Drop it to 1ms so the bench reflects
// the computation, not the wheel cadence.
bovr := m{"handshakes": m{"try_interval": "1ms"}}
myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "me", "10.128.0.1/24", bovr)
theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "them", "10.128.0.2/24", bovr)
myControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirUdpAddr)
theirControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myUdpAddr)
myControl.Start()
theirControl.Start()
defer myControl.Stop()
defer theirControl.Stop()
r := router.NewR(b, myControl, theirControl)
r.CancelFlowLogs()
r.EnableFanIn()
trigger := BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
b.ReportAllocs()
b.ResetTimer()
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
myControl.InjectTunPacket(trigger)
// RouteForAllUntilTxTun returns the moment the cached packet arrives at
// the remote TUN, which is also when both sides are fully established.
_ = r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
b.StopTimer()
// Local-only close removes hostmap state on both sides without putting a
// CloseTunnel packet on the wire that we'd then have to drain. The
// closeTunnel path also clears learned lighthouse state for the peer
// when the last hostinfo for that addr goes away, so we re-inject.
myControl.CloseTunnel(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), true)
theirControl.CloseTunnel(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), true)
myControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirUdpAddr)
theirControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myUdpAddr)
b.StartTimer()
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ func TestGoodHandshakeNoOverlap(t *testing.T) {
empty := []byte{}
t.Log("do something to cause a handshake")
myControl.GetF().SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.Test, header.MessageNone, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), empty, empty, empty)
myControl.GetF().SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.Test, header.MessageNone, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), empty, nebula.NewWireBuffer(9001, 0))
t.Log("Have them consume my stage 0 packet. They have a tunnel now")
theirControl.InjectUDPPacket(myControl.GetFromUDP(true))
+7 -3
View File
@@ -18,10 +18,14 @@ import (
// retry mechanism gives the wg.Wait()-driven goroutines a moment to drain
// before failing the assertion.
//
// Intentionally NOT t.Parallel()'d: concurrent tests would have their own
// goroutines running and trip the assertion.
// IgnoreCurrent is necessary in the parallelized suite: other tests can
// leave goroutines mid-shutdown when this one runs (Stop is async, the
// wg.Wait() drain is not blocking on test return). We're checking that
// *this* test's setup tears down cleanly, not that the whole suite is
// idle at this moment. Intentionally NOT t.Parallel()'d for the same
// reason — concurrent test goroutines would always show up.
func TestNoGoroutineLeaks(t *testing.T) {
defer goleak.VerifyNone(t)
defer goleak.VerifyNone(t, goleak.IgnoreCurrent())
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me", "10.128.0.1/24", nil)
-125
View File
@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
//go:build e2e_testing
// +build e2e_testing
package e2e
import (
"crypto/ed25519"
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/pem"
"net"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
)
func TestSSHDLifecycle(t *testing.T) {
// TestSSHDLifecycle exercises the in-process sshd through several config reloads and a Control.Stop.
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519,
time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute),
nil, nil, []string{},
)
hostKeyPEM := generateSSHHostKey(t)
clientSigner, clientAuthKey := generateSSHClientKey(t)
sshdAddr := allocLoopbackPort(t)
overrides := m{
"sshd": m{
"enabled": true,
"listen": sshdAddr,
"host_key": hostKeyPEM,
"authorized_users": []m{{
"user": "tester",
"keys": []string{clientAuthKey},
}},
},
}
control, _, _, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "sshd-test", "10.222.0.1/24", overrides)
control.Start()
t.Cleanup(func() { control.Stop() })
// sshd binds in a goroutine after Start returns; wait for it.
require.Eventually(t, func() bool { return canDial(sshdAddr) }, 2*time.Second, 25*time.Millisecond,
"sshd never started listening")
for i := 1; i <= 3; i++ {
out := sshExecReload(t, sshdAddr, clientSigner)
assert.Contains(t, out, "Reloading config", "reload cycle %d", i)
require.Eventually(t, func() bool { return canDial(sshdAddr) }, 2*time.Second, 25*time.Millisecond,
"sshd not listening after reload cycle %d", i)
}
control.Stop()
require.Eventually(t, func() bool { return !canDial(sshdAddr) }, 2*time.Second, 25*time.Millisecond,
"sshd still listening after Control.Stop")
}
func canDial(addr string) bool {
c, err := net.DialTimeout("tcp", addr, 100*time.Millisecond)
if err != nil {
return false
}
_ = c.Close()
return true
}
// allocLoopbackPort grabs an unused TCP port on 127.0.0.1, closes it, and returns the address. There
// is a small race between releasing the port and the sshd reclaiming it; in practice the OS keeps the
// port available long enough for the test to bind it.
func allocLoopbackPort(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
l, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
require.NoError(t, err)
addr := l.Addr().String()
require.NoError(t, l.Close())
return addr
}
func generateSSHHostKey(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
_, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
require.NoError(t, err)
block, err := ssh.MarshalPrivateKey(priv, "nebula-e2e-host")
require.NoError(t, err)
return string(pem.EncodeToMemory(block))
}
func generateSSHClientKey(t *testing.T) (ssh.Signer, string) {
t.Helper()
_, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
require.NoError(t, err)
signer, err := ssh.NewSignerFromKey(priv)
require.NoError(t, err)
auth := strings.TrimSpace(string(ssh.MarshalAuthorizedKey(signer.PublicKey())))
return signer, auth
}
func sshExecReload(t *testing.T, addr string, signer ssh.Signer) string {
t.Helper()
cfg := &ssh.ClientConfig{
User: "tester",
Auth: []ssh.AuthMethod{ssh.PublicKeys(signer)},
HostKeyCallback: ssh.InsecureIgnoreHostKey(),
Timeout: 2 * time.Second,
}
client, err := ssh.Dial("tcp", addr, cfg)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer client.Close()
sess, err := client.NewSession()
require.NoError(t, err)
defer sess.Close()
// reload tears the channel down before sending exit-status, so Output returns an error on the
// channel close. The output buffer still has whatever the reload callback wrote before that.
out, _ := sess.Output("reload")
return string(out)
}
-125
View File
@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
package nebula
import (
"io"
"log/slog"
"testing"
)
func TestInnerECN(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
pkt []byte
want byte
}{
{"empty", nil, 0},
{"v4_NotECT", v4WithToS(0x00), 0x00},
{"v4_ECT0", v4WithToS(0x02), 0x02},
{"v4_ECT1", v4WithToS(0x01), 0x01},
{"v4_CE", v4WithToS(0x03), 0x03},
{"v4_DSCP_then_NotECT", v4WithToS(0x88 | 0x00), 0x00},
{"v4_DSCP_then_CE", v4WithToS(0x88 | 0x03), 0x03},
{"v6_NotECT", v6WithTC(0x00), 0x00},
{"v6_ECT0", v6WithTC(0x02), 0x02},
{"v6_CE", v6WithTC(0x03), 0x03},
{"v6_DSCP_then_CE", v6WithTC(0x88 | 0x03), 0x03},
{"unknown_version", []byte{0xa5, 0xff}, 0},
}
for _, c := range cases {
t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := innerECN(c.pkt)
if got != c.want {
t.Errorf("innerECN=0x%02x want 0x%02x", got, c.want)
}
})
}
}
// v4WithToS returns a 2-byte slice tall enough for innerECN: byte 0 carries
// version=4 in the high nibble, byte 1 is the full ToS so we exercise both
// the DSCP and ECN portions through the byte 1 mask.
func v4WithToS(tos byte) []byte {
return []byte{0x45, tos}
}
// v6WithTC builds a 2-byte slice that places a known traffic class value
// across bytes 0 (high nibble of TC) and 1 (low nibble of TC). innerECN
// extracts ECN as (b[1]>>4)&0x03, which corresponds to TC[1:0].
func v6WithTC(tc byte) []byte {
return []byte{0x60 | (tc>>4)&0x0f, (tc & 0x0f) << 4}
}
func TestApplyOuterECN(t *testing.T) {
silent := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil))
hi := &HostInfo{}
// Build a v4 packet helper with a given inner ECN field.
v4 := func(innerECN byte) []byte {
// 20-byte minimal IPv4 header with ToS = innerECN (DSCP zeroed).
return []byte{
0x45, innerECN, 0, 28,
0, 0, 0x40, 0,
64, 6, 0, 0,
10, 0, 0, 1,
10, 0, 0, 2,
}
}
// Build a v6 packet helper with a given inner ECN field. ECN occupies
// TC[1:0] which sit at byte 1 mask 0x30.
v6 := func(innerECN byte) []byte {
// 40-byte minimal IPv6 header with TC[1:0] = innerECN.
pkt := make([]byte, 40)
pkt[0] = 0x60 // version=6, TC[7:4]=0
pkt[1] = (innerECN & 0x03) << 4 // TC[3:0]: low 2 bits = ECN, top 2 = DSCP-low (0)
return pkt
}
type cell struct {
outer byte
inner byte
wantECN byte
wantSame bool // expect inner unchanged (true => verify the byte didn't move)
}
// RFC 6040 normal-mode combine table. Only outer==CE causes mutation.
table := []cell{
{ecnNotECT, ecnNotECT, ecnNotECT, true},
{ecnNotECT, ecnECT0, ecnECT0, true},
{ecnNotECT, ecnECT1, ecnECT1, true},
{ecnNotECT, ecnCE, ecnCE, true},
{ecnECT0, ecnNotECT, ecnNotECT, true},
{ecnECT0, ecnECT0, ecnECT0, true},
{ecnECT0, ecnECT1, ecnECT1, true},
{ecnECT0, ecnCE, ecnCE, true},
{ecnECT1, ecnNotECT, ecnNotECT, true},
{ecnECT1, ecnECT0, ecnECT0, true},
{ecnECT1, ecnECT1, ecnECT1, true},
{ecnECT1, ecnCE, ecnCE, true},
{ecnCE, ecnNotECT, ecnNotECT, true}, // legacy: log, leave alone
{ecnCE, ecnECT0, ecnCE, false}, // CE folded in
{ecnCE, ecnECT1, ecnCE, false},
{ecnCE, ecnCE, ecnCE, true},
}
for _, c := range table {
t.Run("v4", func(t *testing.T) {
pkt := v4(c.inner)
applyOuterECN(pkt, c.outer, hi, silent)
got := pkt[1] & 0x03
if got != c.wantECN {
t.Errorf("v4 outer=0x%02x inner=0x%02x: got 0x%02x want 0x%02x", c.outer, c.inner, got, c.wantECN)
}
})
t.Run("v6", func(t *testing.T) {
pkt := v6(c.inner)
applyOuterECN(pkt, c.outer, hi, silent)
got := (pkt[1] >> 4) & 0x03
if got != c.wantECN {
t.Errorf("v6 outer=0x%02x inner=0x%02x: got 0x%02x want 0x%02x", c.outer, c.inner, got, c.wantECN)
}
})
}
}
-30
View File
@@ -138,14 +138,6 @@ listen:
# max, net.core.rmem_max and net.core.wmem_max
#read_buffer: 10485760
#write_buffer: 10485760
# On Windows only
# When true, Nebula installs a WFP (Windows Filtering Platform) PERMIT filter scoped to UDP at the listener port.
# WFP sits below Windows Defender Firewall, so this lets peer handshakes reach Nebula's outside socket regardless
# of WDF's inbound rules.
# Default true; set to false to leave WDF in charge of inbound decisions on the listener port. Not reloadable.
#windows_bypass_wdf: true
# By default, Nebula replies to packets it has no tunnel for with a "recv_error" packet. This packet helps speed up reconnection
# in the case that Nebula on either side did not shut down cleanly. This response can be abused as a way to discover if Nebula is running
# on a host though. This option lets you configure if you want to send "recv_error" packets always, never, or only to private network remotes.
@@ -171,21 +163,17 @@ listen:
punchy:
# Continues to punch inbound/outbound at a regular interval to avoid expiration of firewall nat mappings
# This setting is reloadable.
punch: true
# respond means that a node you are trying to reach will connect back out to you if your hole punching fails
# this is extremely useful if one node is behind a difficult nat, such as a symmetric NAT
# Default is false
# This setting is reloadable.
#respond: true
# delays a punch response for misbehaving NATs, default is 1 second.
# This setting is reloadable.
#delay: 1s
# set the delay before attempting punchy.respond. Default is 5 seconds. respond must be true to take effect.
# This setting is reloadable.
#respond_delay: 5s
# Cipher allows you to choose between the available ciphers for your network. Options are chachapoly or aes
@@ -294,24 +282,6 @@ tun:
# metric: 100
# install: true
# On Windows only, sets the network category of the nebula interface. Without this, Windows often
# leaves the network as "Unidentified" and treats it as Public, which makes the host firewall more
# restrictive than you usually want for an overlay between trusted peers. Valid values:
# private - treat the nebula network as a private/trusted network (default)
# public - treat it as a public/untrusted network
# domain - treat it as a domain-authenticated network
# unset - leave whatever Windows decided alone
# Not reloadable.
#network_category: private
# On Windows only
# When true, Nebula installs a WFP (Windows Filtering Platform) PERMIT filter scoped to the nebula adapter LUID.
# WFP sits below Windows Defender Firewall, so this lets inbound traffic through regardless of WDF rules.
# Filters are auto-removed when the adapter goes away.
# See listen.windows_bypass_wdf for the matching control over inbound to nebula's outside UDP listener.
# Default true; set to false to leave WDF in charge of inbound decisions on the nebula interface. Not reloadable.
#windows_bypass_wdf: true
# On linux only, set to true to manage unsafe routes directly on the system route table with gateway routes instead of
# in nebula configuration files. Default false, not reloadable.
#use_system_route_table: false
+25 -44
View File
@@ -80,8 +80,8 @@ type firewallMetrics struct {
type FirewallConntrack struct {
sync.Mutex
Conns map[firewall.PacketKey]*conn
TimerWheel *TimerWheel[firewall.PacketKey]
Conns map[firewall.Packet]*conn
TimerWheel *TimerWheel[firewall.Packet]
}
// FirewallTable is the entry point for a rule, the evaluation order is:
@@ -166,8 +166,8 @@ func NewFirewall(l *slog.Logger, tcpTimeout, UDPTimeout, defaultTimeout time.Dur
return &Firewall{
Conntrack: &FirewallConntrack{
Conns: make(map[firewall.PacketKey]*conn),
TimerWheel: NewTimerWheel[firewall.PacketKey](tmin, tmax),
Conns: make(map[firewall.Packet]*conn),
TimerWheel: NewTimerWheel[firewall.Packet](tmin, tmax),
},
InRules: newFirewallTable(),
OutRules: newFirewallTable(),
@@ -422,27 +422,12 @@ var ErrNoMatchingRule = errors.New("no matching rule in firewall table")
// Drop returns an error if the packet should be dropped, explaining why. It
// returns nil if the packet should not be dropped.
//
// key is the dense conntrack key — used as-is for the inConns fast path
// without touching fp at all. fp is the rich Packet form rule matching
// needs (CIDR lookups, family checks); on the conntrack-miss slow path
// Drop ensures fp is hydrated from key (idempotent if the caller already
// filled fp). On accept-via-conntrack the caller's fp is left untouched.
func (f *Firewall) Drop(key firewall.PacketKey, fp *firewall.Packet, incoming bool, h *HostInfo, caPool *cert.CAPool, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) error {
// Check if we spoke to this tuple, if we did then allow this packet.
// Hot path: only the dense key is touched.
if f.inConns(key, h, caPool, localCache) {
func (f *Firewall) Drop(fp firewall.Packet, incoming bool, h *HostInfo, caPool *cert.CAPool, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) error {
// Check if we spoke to this tuple, if we did then allow this packet
if f.inConns(fp, h, caPool, localCache) {
return nil
}
// Conntrack miss → rule matching needs the rich Packet form. Hydrate
// from the key if the caller passed a zero-valued fp (the inbound path
// after batch.ParsePacket). Outbound callers Hydrate themselves and
// skip this hop.
if !fp.LocalAddr.IsValid() {
key.Hydrate(fp)
}
// Make sure remote address matches nebula certificate, and determine how to treat it
if h.networks == nil {
// Simple case: Certificate has one address and no unsafe networks
@@ -482,13 +467,13 @@ func (f *Firewall) Drop(key firewall.PacketKey, fp *firewall.Packet, incoming bo
}
// We now know which firewall table to check against
if !table.match(*fp, incoming, h.ConnectionState.peerCert, caPool) {
if !table.match(fp, incoming, h.ConnectionState.peerCert, caPool) {
f.metrics(incoming).droppedNoRule.Inc(1)
return ErrNoMatchingRule
}
// We always want to conntrack since it is a faster operation
f.addConn(key, fp.Protocol, incoming)
f.addConn(fp, incoming)
return nil
}
@@ -517,9 +502,9 @@ func (f *Firewall) EmitStats() {
metrics.GetOrRegisterGauge("firewall.rules.hash", nil).Update(int64(f.GetRuleHashFNV()))
}
func (f *Firewall) inConns(key firewall.PacketKey, h *HostInfo, caPool *cert.CAPool, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) bool {
func (f *Firewall) inConns(fp firewall.Packet, h *HostInfo, caPool *cert.CAPool, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) bool {
if localCache != nil {
if _, ok := localCache[key]; ok {
if _, ok := localCache[fp]; ok {
return true
}
}
@@ -532,7 +517,7 @@ func (f *Firewall) inConns(key firewall.PacketKey, h *HostInfo, caPool *cert.CAP
f.evict(ep)
}
c, ok := conntrack.Conns[key]
c, ok := conntrack.Conns[fp]
if !ok {
conntrack.Unlock()
@@ -541,11 +526,7 @@ func (f *Firewall) inConns(key firewall.PacketKey, h *HostInfo, caPool *cert.CAP
if c.rulesVersion != f.rulesVersion {
// This conntrack entry was for an older rule set, validate
// it still passes with the current rule set. Rule matching needs
// the rich Packet form, so hydrate from key.
var fp firewall.Packet
key.Hydrate(&fp)
// it still passes with the current rule set
table := f.OutRules
if c.incoming {
table = f.InRules
@@ -561,7 +542,7 @@ func (f *Firewall) inConns(key firewall.PacketKey, h *HostInfo, caPool *cert.CAP
"oldRulesVersion", c.rulesVersion,
)
}
delete(conntrack.Conns, key)
delete(conntrack.Conns, fp)
conntrack.Unlock()
return false
}
@@ -578,7 +559,7 @@ func (f *Firewall) inConns(key firewall.PacketKey, h *HostInfo, caPool *cert.CAP
c.rulesVersion = f.rulesVersion
}
switch key.Protocol {
switch fp.Protocol {
case firewall.ProtoTCP:
c.Expires = time.Now().Add(f.TCPTimeout)
case firewall.ProtoUDP:
@@ -590,17 +571,17 @@ func (f *Firewall) inConns(key firewall.PacketKey, h *HostInfo, caPool *cert.CAP
conntrack.Unlock()
if localCache != nil {
localCache[key] = struct{}{}
localCache[fp] = struct{}{}
}
return true
}
func (f *Firewall) addConn(key firewall.PacketKey, protocol uint8, incoming bool) {
func (f *Firewall) addConn(fp firewall.Packet, incoming bool) {
var timeout time.Duration
c := &conn{}
switch protocol {
switch fp.Protocol {
case firewall.ProtoTCP:
timeout = f.TCPTimeout
case firewall.ProtoUDP:
@@ -611,9 +592,9 @@ func (f *Firewall) addConn(key firewall.PacketKey, protocol uint8, incoming bool
conntrack := f.Conntrack
conntrack.Lock()
if _, ok := conntrack.Conns[key]; !ok {
if _, ok := conntrack.Conns[fp]; !ok {
conntrack.TimerWheel.Advance(time.Now())
conntrack.TimerWheel.Add(key, timeout)
conntrack.TimerWheel.Add(fp, timeout)
}
// Record which rulesVersion allowed this connection, so we can retest after
@@ -621,16 +602,16 @@ func (f *Firewall) addConn(key firewall.PacketKey, protocol uint8, incoming bool
c.incoming = incoming
c.rulesVersion = f.rulesVersion
c.Expires = time.Now().Add(timeout)
conntrack.Conns[key] = c
conntrack.Conns[fp] = c
conntrack.Unlock()
}
// Evict checks if a conntrack entry has expired, if so it is removed, if not it is re-added to the wheel
// Caller must own the connMutex lock!
func (f *Firewall) evict(key firewall.PacketKey) {
func (f *Firewall) evict(p firewall.Packet) {
// Are we still tracking this conn?
conntrack := f.Conntrack
t, ok := conntrack.Conns[key]
t, ok := conntrack.Conns[p]
if !ok {
return
}
@@ -640,12 +621,12 @@ func (f *Firewall) evict(key firewall.PacketKey) {
// Timeout is in the future, re-add the timer
if newT > 0 {
conntrack.TimerWheel.Advance(time.Now())
conntrack.TimerWheel.Add(key, newT)
conntrack.TimerWheel.Add(p, newT)
return
}
// This conn is done
delete(conntrack.Conns, key)
delete(conntrack.Conns, p)
}
func (ft *FirewallTable) match(p firewall.Packet, incoming bool, c *cert.CachedCertificate, caPool *cert.CAPool) bool {
+4 -8
View File
@@ -5,15 +5,11 @@ import (
"log/slog"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/logging"
)
// ConntrackCache is used as a local routine cache to know if a given flow
// has been seen in the conntrack table. Keyed on PacketKey (dense form)
// rather than Packet so the lookup hashes raw bytes instead of the
// unique.Handle each netip.Addr in Packet carries.
type ConntrackCache map[PacketKey]struct{}
// has been seen in the conntrack table.
type ConntrackCache map[Packet]struct{}
type ConntrackCacheTicker struct {
cacheV uint64
@@ -60,8 +56,8 @@ func (c *ConntrackCacheTicker) Get() ConntrackCache {
if tick := c.cacheTick.Load(); tick != c.cacheV {
c.cacheV = tick
if ll := len(c.cache); ll > 0 {
if c.l.Enabled(context.Background(), logging.LevelTrace) {
c.l.Log(context.Background(), logging.LevelTrace, "resetting conntrack cache", "len", ll)
if c.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
c.l.Debug("resetting conntrack cache", "len", ll)
}
c.cache = make(ConntrackCache, ll)
}
+8 -9
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/logging"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
)
@@ -23,7 +22,7 @@ func newFixedTicker(t *testing.T, l *slog.Logger, cacheLen int) *ConntrackCacheT
cache: make(ConntrackCache, cacheLen),
}
for i := 0; i < cacheLen; i++ {
c.cache[PacketKey{LocalPort: uint16(i) + 1}] = struct{}{}
c.cache[Packet{LocalPort: uint16(i) + 1}] = struct{}{}
}
c.cacheTick.Store(1) // cacheV starts at 0, so Get() takes the reset path
return c
@@ -31,27 +30,27 @@ func newFixedTicker(t *testing.T, l *slog.Logger, cacheLen int) *ConntrackCacheT
func TestConntrackCacheTicker_Get_TextFormat(t *testing.T) {
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
l := test.NewLoggerWithOutputAndLevel(buf, logging.LevelTrace)
l := test.NewLoggerWithOutputAndLevel(buf, slog.LevelDebug)
c := newFixedTicker(t, l, 3)
c.Get()
assert.Equal(t, "level=DEBUG-4 msg=\"resetting conntrack cache\" len=3\n", buf.String())
assert.Equal(t, "level=DEBUG msg=\"resetting conntrack cache\" len=3\n", buf.String())
}
func TestConntrackCacheTicker_Get_JSONFormat(t *testing.T) {
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
l := test.NewJSONLoggerWithOutput(buf, logging.LevelTrace)
l := test.NewJSONLoggerWithOutput(buf, slog.LevelDebug)
c := newFixedTicker(t, l, 2)
c.Get()
assert.JSONEq(t, `{"level":"DEBUG-4","msg":"resetting conntrack cache","len":2}`, strings.TrimSpace(buf.String()))
assert.JSONEq(t, `{"level":"DEBUG","msg":"resetting conntrack cache","len":2}`, strings.TrimSpace(buf.String()))
}
func TestConntrackCacheTicker_Get_QuietBelowTrace(t *testing.T) {
func TestConntrackCacheTicker_Get_QuietBelowDebug(t *testing.T) {
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
l := test.NewLoggerWithOutputAndLevel(buf, slog.LevelDebug)
l := test.NewLoggerWithOutputAndLevel(buf, slog.LevelInfo)
c := newFixedTicker(t, l, 5)
c.Get()
@@ -61,7 +60,7 @@ func TestConntrackCacheTicker_Get_QuietBelowTrace(t *testing.T) {
func TestConntrackCacheTicker_Get_QuietWhenCacheEmpty(t *testing.T) {
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
l := test.NewLoggerWithOutputAndLevel(buf, logging.LevelTrace)
l := test.NewLoggerWithOutputAndLevel(buf, slog.LevelDebug)
c := newFixedTicker(t, l, 0)
c.Get()
-74
View File
@@ -19,25 +19,6 @@ const (
PortFragment = -1 // Special value for matching `port: fragment`
)
// PacketKey is the firewall's conntrack and ConntrackCache map key — the
// dense form of the 5-tuple plus the protocol and fragment flag the
// firewall actually discriminates flows on. Kept separate from Packet so
// the conntrack-hit fast path doesn't pay for hashing the unique.Handle
// each netip.Addr carries, and so the inbound parser can skip the
// AddrFrom4/AddrFrom16 calls until rule matching actually needs them.
//
// Superset of the coalescer's flowKey shape (same 5-tuple, just in
// Local/Remote orientation rather than wire src/dst).
type PacketKey struct {
LocalAddr [16]byte
RemoteAddr [16]byte
LocalPort uint16
RemotePort uint16
IsV6 bool
Protocol uint8
Fragment bool
}
type Packet struct {
LocalAddr netip.Addr
RemoteAddr netip.Addr
@@ -50,61 +31,6 @@ type Packet struct {
Fragment bool
}
// Key derives a PacketKey from a populated Packet. Used by the few code
// paths that have a Packet but no Key in hand (e.g. tests). Both inbound
// and outbound production parsers write straight into a PacketKey via
// batch.ParsePacket, so this function is rarely on the hot path.
func (fp *Packet) Key() PacketKey {
k := PacketKey{
Protocol: fp.Protocol,
Fragment: fp.Fragment,
}
k.LocalPort = fp.LocalPort
k.RemotePort = fp.RemotePort
k.IsV6 = !fp.LocalAddr.Is4()
if k.IsV6 {
k.LocalAddr = fp.LocalAddr.As16()
k.RemoteAddr = fp.RemoteAddr.As16()
} else {
v4 := fp.LocalAddr.As4()
copy(k.LocalAddr[:4], v4[:])
v4 = fp.RemoteAddr.As4()
copy(k.RemoteAddr[:4], v4[:])
}
return k
}
// Hydrate fills fp's netip.Addr fields and copies the rest from k. Called
// by the firewall slow path when conntrack misses and rule matching needs
// the rich Packet form (CIDR lookups, family checks). The fast path skips
// this entirely.
func (k *PacketKey) Hydrate(fp *Packet) {
fp.LocalPort = k.LocalPort
fp.RemotePort = k.RemotePort
fp.Protocol = k.Protocol
fp.Fragment = k.Fragment
if k.IsV6 {
fp.LocalAddr = netip.AddrFrom16(k.LocalAddr)
fp.RemoteAddr = netip.AddrFrom16(k.RemoteAddr)
} else {
var v4 [4]byte
copy(v4[:], k.LocalAddr[:4])
fp.LocalAddr = netip.AddrFrom4(v4)
copy(v4[:], k.RemoteAddr[:4])
fp.RemoteAddr = netip.AddrFrom4(v4)
}
}
func (k *PacketKey) GetRemoteAddr() netip.Addr {
if k.IsV6 {
return netip.AddrFrom16(k.RemoteAddr)
} else {
var v4 [4]byte
copy(v4[:], k.RemoteAddr[:4])
return netip.AddrFrom4(v4)
}
}
func (fp *Packet) Copy() *Packet {
return &Packet{
LocalAddr: fp.LocalAddr,
+53 -53
View File
@@ -211,44 +211,44 @@ func TestFirewall_Drop(t *testing.T) {
cp := cert.NewCAPool()
// Drop outbound
assert.Equal(t, ErrNoMatchingRule, fw.Drop(p.Key(), &p, false, &h, cp, nil))
assert.Equal(t, ErrNoMatchingRule, fw.Drop(p, false, &h, cp, nil))
// Allow inbound
resetConntrack(fw)
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), &p, true, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h, cp, nil))
// Allow outbound because conntrack
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), &p, false, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, false, &h, cp, nil))
// test remote mismatch
oldRemote := p.RemoteAddr
p.RemoteAddr = netip.MustParseAddr("1.2.3.10")
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), &p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrInvalidRemoteIP)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrInvalidRemoteIP)
p.RemoteAddr = oldRemote
// ensure signer doesn't get in the way of group checks
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, &c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"nope"}, "", "", "", "", "signer-shasum"))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"default-group"}, "", "", "", "", "signer-shasum-bad"))
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), &p, true, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
// test caSha doesn't drop on match
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, &c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"nope"}, "", "", "", "", "signer-shasum-bad"))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"default-group"}, "", "", "", "", "signer-shasum"))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), &p, true, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h, cp, nil))
// ensure ca name doesn't get in the way of group checks
cp.CAs["signer-shasum"] = &cert.CachedCertificate{Certificate: &dummyCert{name: "ca-good"}}
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, &c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"nope"}, "", "", "", "ca-good", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"default-group"}, "", "", "", "ca-good-bad", ""))
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), &p, true, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
// test caName doesn't drop on match
cp.CAs["signer-shasum"] = &cert.CachedCertificate{Certificate: &dummyCert{name: "ca-good"}}
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, &c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"nope"}, "", "", "", "ca-good-bad", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"default-group"}, "", "", "", "ca-good", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), &p, true, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h, cp, nil))
}
func TestFirewall_DropV6(t *testing.T) {
@@ -289,44 +289,44 @@ func TestFirewall_DropV6(t *testing.T) {
cp := cert.NewCAPool()
// Drop outbound
assert.Equal(t, ErrNoMatchingRule, fw.Drop(p.Key(), &p, false, &h, cp, nil))
assert.Equal(t, ErrNoMatchingRule, fw.Drop(p, false, &h, cp, nil))
// Allow inbound
resetConntrack(fw)
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), &p, true, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h, cp, nil))
// Allow outbound because conntrack
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), &p, false, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, false, &h, cp, nil))
// test remote mismatch
oldRemote := p.RemoteAddr
p.RemoteAddr = netip.MustParseAddr("fd12::56")
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), &p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrInvalidRemoteIP)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrInvalidRemoteIP)
p.RemoteAddr = oldRemote
// ensure signer doesn't get in the way of group checks
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, &c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"nope"}, "", "", "", "", "signer-shasum"))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"default-group"}, "", "", "", "", "signer-shasum-bad"))
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), &p, true, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
// test caSha doesn't drop on match
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, &c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"nope"}, "", "", "", "", "signer-shasum-bad"))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"default-group"}, "", "", "", "", "signer-shasum"))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), &p, true, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h, cp, nil))
// ensure ca name doesn't get in the way of group checks
cp.CAs["signer-shasum"] = &cert.CachedCertificate{Certificate: &dummyCert{name: "ca-good"}}
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, &c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"nope"}, "", "", "", "ca-good", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"default-group"}, "", "", "", "ca-good-bad", ""))
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), &p, true, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
// test caName doesn't drop on match
cp.CAs["signer-shasum"] = &cert.CachedCertificate{Certificate: &dummyCert{name: "ca-good"}}
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, &c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"nope"}, "", "", "", "ca-good-bad", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"default-group"}, "", "", "", "ca-good", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), &p, true, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h, cp, nil))
}
func BenchmarkFirewallTable_match(b *testing.B) {
@@ -533,10 +533,10 @@ func TestFirewall_Drop2(t *testing.T) {
cp := cert.NewCAPool()
// h1/c1 lacks the proper groups
require.ErrorIs(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), &p, true, &h1, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
require.ErrorIs(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h1, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
// c has the proper groups
resetConntrack(fw)
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), &p, true, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h, cp, nil))
}
func TestFirewall_Drop3(t *testing.T) {
@@ -613,18 +613,18 @@ func TestFirewall_Drop3(t *testing.T) {
cp := cert.NewCAPool()
// c1 should pass because host match
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), &p, true, &h1, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h1, cp, nil))
// c2 should pass because ca sha match
resetConntrack(fw)
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), &p, true, &h2, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h2, cp, nil))
// c3 should fail because no match
resetConntrack(fw)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), &p, true, &h3, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h3, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
// Test a remote address match
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c.Certificate)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 1, 1, []string{}, "", "1.2.3.4/24", "", "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), &p, true, &h1, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h1, cp, nil))
}
func TestFirewall_Drop3V6(t *testing.T) {
@@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ func TestFirewall_Drop3V6(t *testing.T) {
fw := NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c.Certificate)
cp := cert.NewCAPool()
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 1, 1, []string{}, "", "fd12::34/120", "", "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), &p, true, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h, cp, nil))
}
func TestFirewall_DropConntrackReload(t *testing.T) {
@@ -702,12 +702,12 @@ func TestFirewall_DropConntrackReload(t *testing.T) {
cp := cert.NewCAPool()
// Drop outbound
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), &p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
// Allow inbound
resetConntrack(fw)
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), &p, true, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h, cp, nil))
// Allow outbound because conntrack
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), &p, false, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, false, &h, cp, nil))
oldFw := fw
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c.Certificate)
@@ -716,7 +716,7 @@ func TestFirewall_DropConntrackReload(t *testing.T) {
fw.rulesVersion = oldFw.rulesVersion + 1
// Allow outbound because conntrack and new rules allow port 10
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), &p, false, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, false, &h, cp, nil))
oldFw = fw
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c.Certificate)
@@ -725,7 +725,7 @@ func TestFirewall_DropConntrackReload(t *testing.T) {
fw.rulesVersion = oldFw.rulesVersion + 1
// Drop outbound because conntrack doesn't match new ruleset
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), &p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
}
func TestFirewall_ICMPPortBehavior(t *testing.T) {
@@ -770,12 +770,12 @@ func TestFirewall_ICMPPortBehavior(t *testing.T) {
p.LocalPort = 0
p.RemotePort = 0
// Drop outbound
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(*p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
// Allow inbound
resetConntrack(fw)
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), p, true, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(*p, true, &h, cp, nil))
//now also allow outbound
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), p, false, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(*p, false, &h, cp, nil))
})
t.Run("nonzero ports", func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -783,12 +783,12 @@ func TestFirewall_ICMPPortBehavior(t *testing.T) {
p.LocalPort = 0xabcd
p.RemotePort = 0x1234
// Drop outbound
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(*p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
// Allow inbound
resetConntrack(fw)
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), p, true, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(*p, true, &h, cp, nil))
//now also allow outbound
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), p, false, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(*p, false, &h, cp, nil))
})
})
@@ -800,12 +800,12 @@ func TestFirewall_ICMPPortBehavior(t *testing.T) {
p.LocalPort = 0
p.RemotePort = 0
// Drop outbound
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(*p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
// Allow inbound
resetConntrack(fw)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), p, true, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(*p, true, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
//now also allow outbound
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(*p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
})
t.Run("nonzero ports, still blocked", func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -813,12 +813,12 @@ func TestFirewall_ICMPPortBehavior(t *testing.T) {
p.LocalPort = 0xabcd
p.RemotePort = 0x1234
// Drop outbound
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(*p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
// Allow inbound
resetConntrack(fw)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), p, true, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(*p, true, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
//now also allow outbound
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(*p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
})
t.Run("nonzero, matching ports, still blocked", func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -826,12 +826,12 @@ func TestFirewall_ICMPPortBehavior(t *testing.T) {
p.LocalPort = 80
p.RemotePort = 80
// Drop outbound
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(*p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
// Allow inbound
resetConntrack(fw)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), p, true, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(*p, true, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
//now also allow outbound
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(*p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
})
})
t.Run("Any proto, any port", func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -843,12 +843,12 @@ func TestFirewall_ICMPPortBehavior(t *testing.T) {
p.LocalPort = 0
p.RemotePort = 0
// Drop outbound
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(*p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
// Allow inbound
resetConntrack(fw)
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), p, true, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(*p, true, &h, cp, nil))
//now also allow outbound
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), p, false, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(*p, false, &h, cp, nil))
})
t.Run("nonzero ports, allowed", func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -857,15 +857,15 @@ func TestFirewall_ICMPPortBehavior(t *testing.T) {
p.LocalPort = 0xabcd
p.RemotePort = 0x1234
// Drop outbound
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(*p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
// Allow inbound
resetConntrack(fw)
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), p, true, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(*p, true, &h, cp, nil))
//now also allow outbound
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), p, false, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(*p, false, &h, cp, nil))
//different ID is blocked
p.RemotePort++
require.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
require.Equal(t, fw.Drop(*p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
})
})
@@ -913,7 +913,7 @@ func TestFirewall_DropIPSpoofing(t *testing.T) {
Protocol: firewall.ProtoUDP,
Fragment: false,
}
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p.Key(), &p, true, &h1, cp, nil), ErrInvalidRemoteIP)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h1, cp, nil), ErrInvalidRemoteIP)
}
func BenchmarkLookup(b *testing.B) {
@@ -1327,7 +1327,7 @@ func (c *testcase) Test(t *testing.T, fw *Firewall) {
t.Helper()
cp := cert.NewCAPool()
resetConntrack(fw)
err := fw.Drop(c.p.Key(), &c.p, true, c.h, cp, nil)
err := fw.Drop(c.p, true, c.h, cp, nil)
if c.err == nil {
require.NoError(t, err, "failed to not drop remote address %s", c.p.RemoteAddr)
} else {
@@ -1519,6 +1519,6 @@ func (mf *mockFirewall) AddRule(incoming bool, proto uint8, startPort int32, end
func resetConntrack(fw *Firewall) {
fw.Conntrack.Lock()
fw.Conntrack.Conns = map[firewall.PacketKey]*conn{}
fw.Conntrack.Conns = map[firewall.Packet]*conn{}
fw.Conntrack.Unlock()
}
+2 -3
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ require (
github.com/armon/go-radix v1.0.0
github.com/cyberdelia/go-metrics-graphite v0.0.0-20161219230853-39f87cc3b432
github.com/flynn/noise v1.1.0
github.com/gaissmai/bart v0.26.1
github.com/gaissmai/bart v0.26.0
github.com/gogo/protobuf v1.3.2
github.com/google/gopacket v1.1.19
github.com/kardianos/service v1.2.4
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ require (
go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.4
golang.org/x/crypto v0.50.0
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20230725093048-515e97ebf090
golang.org/x/net v0.53.0
golang.org/x/net v0.52.0
golang.org/x/sync v0.20.0
golang.org/x/sys v0.43.0
golang.org/x/term v0.42.0
@@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ require (
github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.3.0 // indirect
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1 // indirect
github.com/google/btree v1.1.2 // indirect
github.com/guptarohit/asciigraph v0.9.0 // indirect
github.com/munnerz/goautoneg v0.0.0-20191010083416-a7dc8b61c822 // indirect
github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0 // indirect
github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.6.2 // indirect
+4 -6
View File
@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1 h1:vj9j/u1bqnvCEfJOwUhtlOARqs3+rkHYY13jYWTU97c
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38=
github.com/flynn/noise v1.1.0 h1:KjPQoQCEFdZDiP03phOvGi11+SVVhBG2wOWAorLsstg=
github.com/flynn/noise v1.1.0/go.mod h1:xbMo+0i6+IGbYdJhF31t2eR1BIU0CYc12+BNAKwUTag=
github.com/gaissmai/bart v0.26.1 h1:+w4rnLGNlA2GDVn382Tfe3jOsK5vOr5n4KmigJ9lbTo=
github.com/gaissmai/bart v0.26.1/go.mod h1:GREWQfTLRWz/c5FTOsIw+KkscuFkIV5t8Rp7Nd1Td5c=
github.com/gaissmai/bart v0.26.0 h1:xOZ57E9hJLBiQaSyeZa9wgWhGuzfGACgqp4BE77OkO0=
github.com/gaissmai/bart v0.26.0/go.mod h1:GREWQfTLRWz/c5FTOsIw+KkscuFkIV5t8Rp7Nd1Td5c=
github.com/go-kit/kit v0.8.0/go.mod h1:xBxKIO96dXMWWy0MnWVtmwkA9/13aqxPnvrjFYMA2as=
github.com/go-kit/kit v0.9.0/go.mod h1:xBxKIO96dXMWWy0MnWVtmwkA9/13aqxPnvrjFYMA2as=
github.com/go-kit/log v0.1.0/go.mod h1:zbhenjAZHb184qTLMA9ZjW7ThYL0H2mk7Q6pNt4vbaY=
@@ -60,8 +60,6 @@ github.com/google/go-cmp v0.7.0/go.mod h1:pXiqmnSA92OHEEa9HXL2W4E7lf9JzCmGVUdgjX
github.com/google/gofuzz v1.0.0/go.mod h1:dBl0BpW6vV/+mYPU4Po3pmUjxk6FQPldtuIdl/M65Eg=
github.com/google/gopacket v1.1.19 h1:ves8RnFZPGiFnTS0uPQStjwru6uO6h+nlr9j6fL7kF8=
github.com/google/gopacket v1.1.19/go.mod h1:iJ8V8n6KS+z2U1A8pUwu8bW5SyEMkXJB8Yo/Vo+TKTo=
github.com/guptarohit/asciigraph v0.9.0 h1:MvCSRRVkT2XvU1IO6n92o7l7zqx1DiFaoszOUZQztbY=
github.com/guptarohit/asciigraph v0.9.0/go.mod h1:dYl5wwK4gNsnFf9Zp+l06rFiDZ5YtXM6x7SRWZ3KGag=
github.com/jpillora/backoff v1.0.0/go.mod h1:J/6gKK9jxlEcS3zixgDgUAsiuZ7yrSoa/FX5e0EB2j4=
github.com/json-iterator/go v1.1.6/go.mod h1:+SdeFBvtyEkXs7REEP0seUULqWtbJapLOCVDaaPEHmU=
github.com/json-iterator/go v1.1.10/go.mod h1:KdQUCv79m/52Kvf8AW2vK1V8akMuk1QjK/uOdHXbAo4=
@@ -184,8 +182,8 @@ golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20200226121028-0de0cce0169b/go.mod h1:z5CRVTTTmAJ677TzLL
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20200625001655-4c5254603344/go.mod h1:/O7V0waA8r7cgGh81Ro3o1hOxt32SMVPicZroKQ2sZA=
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20201021035429-f5854403a974/go.mod h1:sp8m0HH+o8qH0wwXwYZr8TS3Oi6o0r6Gce1SSxlDquU=
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20210226172049-e18ecbb05110/go.mod h1:m0MpNAwzfU5UDzcl9v0D8zg8gWTRqZa9RBIspLL5mdg=
golang.org/x/net v0.53.0 h1:d+qAbo5L0orcWAr0a9JweQpjXF19LMXJE8Ey7hwOdUA=
golang.org/x/net v0.53.0/go.mod h1:JvMuJH7rrdiCfbeHoo3fCQU24Lf5JJwT9W3sJFulfgs=
golang.org/x/net v0.52.0 h1:He/TN1l0e4mmR3QqHMT2Xab3Aj3L9qjbhRm78/6jrW0=
golang.org/x/net v0.52.0/go.mod h1:R1MAz7uMZxVMualyPXb+VaqGSa3LIaUqk0eEt3w36Sw=
golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.0.0-20190226205417-e64efc72b421/go.mod h1:gOpvHmFTYa4IltrdGE7lF6nIHvwfUNPOp7c8zoXwtLw=
golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20181108010431-42b317875d0f/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20181221193216-37e7f081c4d4/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
-2
View File
@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ type CertVerifier func(cert.Certificate) (*cert.CachedCertificate, error)
type Result struct {
EKey *noise.CipherState
DKey *noise.CipherState
Cipher noise.CipherFunc // identifies which post-handshake CipherState the data plane should wrap EKey/DKey in
MyCert cert.Certificate
RemoteCert *cert.CachedCertificate
RemoteIndex uint32
@@ -106,7 +105,6 @@ func NewMachine(
myVersion: version,
result: &Result{
Initiator: initiator,
Cipher: cred.cipherSuite,
},
}, nil
}
+12 -7
View File
@@ -971,12 +971,11 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) continueHandshake(via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostIn
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("Sending stored packets", "count", len(hh.packetStore))
}
nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
out := make([]byte, mtu)
buf := f.bufAlloc.Acquire()
for _, cp := range hh.packetStore {
//todo use a sendbatcher
cp.callback(cp.messageType, cp.messageSubType, hostinfo, cp.packet, nb, out)
cp.callback(cp.messageType, cp.messageSubType, hostinfo, cp.packet, buf)
}
f.bufAlloc.Release(buf)
f.cachedPacketMetrics.sent.Inc(int64(len(hh.packetStore)))
}
@@ -1086,7 +1085,9 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) sendHandshakeResponse(via ViaSender, msg []byte, hos
// We received a valid handshake on this relay, so make sure the relay
// state reflects that, in case it had been marked Disestablished.
via.relayHI.relayState.UpdateRelayForByIdxState(via.remoteIdx, Established)
f.SendVia(via.relayHI, via.relay, msg, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu), false)
buf := f.bufAlloc.Acquire()
f.SendVia(via.relayHI, via.relay, msg, buf)
f.bufAlloc.Release(buf)
f.l.Info("Handshake message sent", append(logFields, "relay", via.relayHI.vpnAddrs[0])...)
}
}
@@ -1103,7 +1104,9 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleCheckAndCompleteError(err error, existing, hos
switch err {
case ErrAlreadySeen:
if existing.SetRemoteIfPreferred(f.hostMap, via) {
f.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.Test, header.TestRequest, hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0], []byte(""), make([]byte, 12, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
buf := f.bufAlloc.Acquire()
f.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.Test, header.TestRequest, hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0], []byte(""), buf)
f.bufAlloc.Release(buf)
}
// Resend the original response. The peer is committed to that response's
// ephemeral keys; a freshly-built one would have different keys and break
@@ -1126,7 +1129,9 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleCheckAndCompleteError(err error, existing, hos
"responderIndex", hostinfo.localIndexId,
"handshake", hsFields,
)
f.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.Test, header.TestRequest, hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0], []byte(""), make([]byte, 12, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
buf := f.bufAlloc.Acquire()
f.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.Test, header.TestRequest, hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0], []byte(""), buf)
f.bufAlloc.Release(buf)
case ErrLocalIndexCollision:
f.l.Error("Failed to add HostInfo due to localIndex collision",
+3 -3
View File
@@ -80,15 +80,15 @@ func testCountTimerWheelEntries(tw *LockingTimerWheel[netip.Addr]) (c int) {
type mockEncWriter struct {
}
func (mw *mockEncWriter) SendMessageToVpnAddr(_ header.MessageType, _ header.MessageSubType, _ netip.Addr, _, _, _ []byte) {
func (mw *mockEncWriter) SendMessageToVpnAddr(_ header.MessageType, _ header.MessageSubType, _ netip.Addr, _ []byte, _ *WireBuffer) {
return
}
func (mw *mockEncWriter) SendVia(_ *HostInfo, _ *Relay, _, _, _ []byte, _ bool) {
func (mw *mockEncWriter) SendVia(_ *HostInfo, _ *Relay, _ []byte, _ *WireBuffer) {
return
}
func (mw *mockEncWriter) SendMessageToHostInfo(_ header.MessageType, _ header.MessageSubType, _ *HostInfo, _, _, _ []byte) {
func (mw *mockEncWriter) SendMessageToHostInfo(_ header.MessageType, _ header.MessageSubType, _ *HostInfo, _ []byte, _ *WireBuffer) {
return
}
-14
View File
@@ -174,10 +174,6 @@ func (h *H) SubTypeName() string {
return SubTypeName(h.Type, h.Subtype)
}
func (h *H) IsValidSubType() bool {
return IsValidSubType(h.Type, h.Subtype)
}
// SubTypeName will transform a nebula message sub type into a human string
func SubTypeName(t MessageType, s MessageSubType) string {
if n, ok := subTypeMap[t]; ok {
@@ -189,16 +185,6 @@ func SubTypeName(t MessageType, s MessageSubType) string {
return "unknown"
}
func IsValidSubType(t MessageType, s MessageSubType) bool {
if n, ok := subTypeMap[t]; ok {
if _, ok := (*n)[s]; ok {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// NewHeader turns bytes into a header
func NewHeader(b []byte) (*H, error) {
h := new(H)
+4 -2
View File
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ type cachedPacket struct {
packet []byte
}
type packetCallback func(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, h *HostInfo, p, nb, out []byte)
type packetCallback func(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, h *HostInfo, p []byte, buf *WireBuffer)
type cachedPacketMetrics struct {
sent metrics.Counter
@@ -691,6 +691,7 @@ func (i *HostInfo) TryPromoteBest(preferredRanges []netip.Prefix, ifce *Interfac
}
}
buf := ifce.bufAlloc.Acquire()
i.remotes.ForEach(preferredRanges, func(addr netip.AddrPort, preferred bool) {
if remote.IsValid() && (!addr.IsValid() || !preferred) {
return
@@ -698,8 +699,9 @@ func (i *HostInfo) TryPromoteBest(preferredRanges []netip.Prefix, ifce *Interfac
// Try to send a test packet to that host, this should
// cause it to detect a roaming event and switch remotes
ifce.sendTo(header.Test, header.TestRequest, i.ConnectionState, i, addr, []byte(""), make([]byte, 12, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
ifce.sendTo(header.Test, header.TestRequest, i.ConnectionState, i, addr, []byte(""), buf)
})
ifce.bufAlloc.Release(buf)
}
// Re query our lighthouses for new remotes occasionally
+96 -333
View File
@@ -2,34 +2,20 @@ package nebula
import (
"context"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/netip"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/iputil"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/noiseutil"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/batch"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
)
func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(pkt tio.Packet, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, nb []byte, sendBatch batch.TxBatcher, rejectBuf []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
// borrowed: pkt.Bytes is owned by the originating tio.Queue and is
// only valid until the next Read on that queue. Every consumer below
// (parse, self-forward, handshake cache, sendInsideMessage) reads it
// synchronously; do not retain pkt outside this call. If a future
// caller needs to keep the packet, use pkt.Clone() to detach it from
// the borrow.
//
// pkt.Bytes is either one IP datagram (GSO zero) or a TSO/USO
// superpacket. In both cases the L3+L4 headers at the start describe
// the same 5-tuple every segment will share, so a single parse +
// firewall check covers the whole superpacket.
packet := pkt.Bytes
var parsed batch.RxParsed
if err := batch.ParsePacket(packet, false, &parsed); err != nil {
func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(buf *WireBuffer, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
packet := buf.IPPacket()
err := newPacket(packet, false, buf.FwPacket)
if err != nil {
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
f.l.Debug("Error while validating outbound packet",
"packet", packet,
@@ -39,29 +25,20 @@ func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(pkt tio.Packet, fwPacket *firewall.Packe
return
}
parsed.Key.Hydrate(fwPacket)
// Ignore local broadcast packets
if f.dropLocalBroadcast {
if f.myBroadcastAddrsTable.Contains(fwPacket.RemoteAddr) {
if f.myBroadcastAddrsTable.Contains(buf.FwPacket.RemoteAddr) {
return
}
}
if f.myVpnAddrsTable.Contains(fwPacket.RemoteAddr) {
if f.myVpnAddrsTable.Contains(buf.FwPacket.RemoteAddr) {
// Immediately forward packets from self to self.
// This should only happen on Darwin-based and FreeBSD hosts, which
// routes packets from the Nebula addr to the Nebula addr through the Nebula
// TUN device.
if immediatelyForwardToSelf {
// Write copies into the kernel queue synchronously, so seg's lifetime ends at return.
// A self-forwarded superpacket would be re-handed to the
// kernel as one giant blob; segment first so the loopback
// path sees one IP datagram per Write.
err := tio.SegmentSuperpacket(pkt, func(seg []byte) error {
_, werr := f.readers[q].Write(seg)
return werr
})
_, err := f.readers[q].Write(packet)
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to forward to tun", "error", err)
}
@@ -72,32 +49,20 @@ func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(pkt tio.Packet, fwPacket *firewall.Packe
}
// Ignore multicast packets
if f.dropMulticast && fwPacket.RemoteAddr.IsMulticast() {
if f.dropMulticast && buf.FwPacket.RemoteAddr.IsMulticast() {
return
}
hostinfo, ready := f.getOrHandshakeConsiderRouting(fwPacket, func(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) {
// borrowed: SegmentSuperpacket builds each segment in the kernel-supplied pkt
// bytes underneath. cachePacket explicitly copies its argument (handshake_manager.go cachePacket),
// so retaining segments past the loop is safe.
err := tio.SegmentSuperpacket(pkt, func(seg []byte) error {
hh.cachePacket(f.l, header.Message, 0, seg, f.sendMessageNow, f.cachedPacketMetrics)
return nil
})
if err != nil && f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
f.l.Debug("Failed to segment superpacket for handshake cache",
"error", err,
"vpnAddr", fwPacket.RemoteAddr,
)
}
hostinfo, ready := f.getOrHandshakeConsiderRouting(buf.FwPacket, func(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) {
hh.cachePacket(f.l, header.Message, 0, packet, f.sendMessageNow, f.cachedPacketMetrics)
})
if hostinfo == nil {
f.rejectInside(packet, rejectBuf, q)
f.rejectInside(packet, buf.Out, q)
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
f.l.Debug("dropping outbound packet, vpnAddr not in our vpn networks or in unsafe networks",
"vpnAddr", fwPacket.RemoteAddr,
"fwPacket", fwPacket,
"vpnAddr", buf.FwPacket.RemoteAddr,
"fwPacket", buf.FwPacket,
)
}
return
@@ -107,163 +72,21 @@ func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(pkt tio.Packet, fwPacket *firewall.Packe
return
}
dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(parsed.Key, fwPacket, false, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), localCache)
dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(*buf.FwPacket, false, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), localCache)
if dropReason == nil {
f.sendInsideMessage(hostinfo, pkt, nb, sendBatch, rejectBuf, q)
f.sendNoMetrics(header.Message, 0, hostinfo.ConnectionState, hostinfo, netip.AddrPort{}, packet, buf, q)
} else {
f.rejectInside(packet, rejectBuf, q)
f.rejectInside(packet, buf.Out, q)
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("dropping outbound packet",
"fwPacket", fwPacket,
"fwPacket", buf.FwPacket,
"reason", dropReason,
)
}
}
}
func (f *Interface) sendInsideEncrypt(hostinfo *HostInfo, ci *ConnectionState, seg, scratch, nb []byte) []byte {
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
ci.writeLock.Lock()
}
c := ci.messageCounter.Add(1)
out := header.Encode(scratch, header.Version, header.Message, 0, hostinfo.remoteIndexId, c)
f.connectionManager.Out(hostinfo)
out, encErr := ci.eKey.EncryptDanger(out, out, seg, c, nb)
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
ci.writeLock.Unlock()
}
if encErr != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to encrypt outgoing packet",
"error", encErr,
"udpAddr", hostinfo.remote,
"counter", c,
)
// Skip this segment; the rest of the superpacket can still
// go out — TCP will retransmit anything we drop here.
return nil
}
return out
}
// sendInsideMessage encrypts a firewall-approved inside packet (or every
// segment of a TSO/USO superpacket) into the caller's batch slot for
// later sendmmsg flush. Segmentation is fused with encryption here so the
// kernel-supplied superpacket bytes never get written into a separate
// scratch arena: SegmentSuperpacket builds each segment's plaintext in
// segScratch[:segLen] in turn, and we encrypt directly into a fresh
// SendBatch slot.
func (f *Interface) sendInsideMessage(hostinfo *HostInfo, pkt tio.Packet, nb []byte, sendBatch batch.TxBatcher, rejectBuf []byte, q int) {
ci := hostinfo.ConnectionState
if ci.eKey == nil {
return
}
ecnEnabled := f.ecnEnabled.Load()
if hostinfo.lastRebindCount != f.rebindCount {
//NOTE: there is an update hole if a tunnel isn't used and exactly 256 rebinds occur before the tunnel is
// finally used again. This tunnel would eventually be torn down and recreated if this action didn't help.
f.lightHouse.QueryServer(hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0])
hostinfo.lastRebindCount = f.rebindCount
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("Lighthouse update triggered for punch due to rebind counter",
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
)
}
}
if !hostinfo.remote.IsValid() { //the relay path
//first, find our relay hostinfo:
var relayHostInfo *HostInfo
var relay *Relay
var err error
for _, relayIP := range hostinfo.relayState.CopyRelayIps() {
relayHostInfo, relay, err = f.hostMap.QueryVpnAddrsRelayFor(hostinfo.vpnAddrs, relayIP)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.relayState.DeleteRelay(relayIP)
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Info("sendNoMetrics failed to find HostInfo",
"relay", relayIP,
"error", err,
)
continue
}
break
}
if relayHostInfo == nil || relay == nil {
//failure already logged
return
}
err = tio.SegmentSuperpacket(pkt, func(seg []byte) error {
//relay header + header + plaintext + AEAD tag (16 bytes for both AES-GCM and ChaCha20-Poly1305) + relay tag
scratch := sendBatch.Reserve(header.Len + header.Len + len(seg) + 16 + 16)
innerPacket := f.sendInsideEncrypt(hostinfo, ci, seg, scratch[header.Len:], nb)
if innerPacket == nil {
return nil
}
//now we need to do a relay-encrypt:
toSend, err := f.prepareSendVia(relayHostInfo, relay, innerPacket, nb, scratch, true)
if err != nil {
//already logged
return nil
}
var ecn byte
if ecnEnabled {
ecn = innerECN(seg)
}
sendBatch.Commit(toSend, relayHostInfo.remote, ecn)
return nil
})
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to segment superpacket for relay send", "error", err)
}
return
}
err := tio.SegmentSuperpacket(pkt, func(seg []byte) error {
// header + plaintext + AEAD tag (16 bytes for both AES-GCM and ChaCha20-Poly1305)
scratch := sendBatch.Reserve(header.Len + len(seg) + 16)
out := f.sendInsideEncrypt(hostinfo, ci, seg, scratch, nb)
if out == nil {
return nil
}
var ecn byte
if ecnEnabled {
ecn = innerECN(seg)
}
sendBatch.Commit(out, hostinfo.remote, ecn)
return nil
})
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to segment superpacket for send",
"error", err,
)
}
}
// innerECN returns the 2-bit IP-level ECN codepoint of an inner IPv4 or IPv6
// packet, or 0 if pkt is too short or its IP version is unrecognized. Used at
// encap to copy the inner codepoint onto the outer carrier per RFC 6040.
func innerECN(pkt []byte) byte {
if len(pkt) < 2 {
return 0
}
switch pkt[0] >> 4 {
case 4:
return pkt[1] & 0x03
case 6:
return (pkt[1] >> 4) & 0x03
}
return 0
}
func (f *Interface) rejectInside(packet []byte, out []byte, q int) {
if !f.firewall.InSendReject {
return
@@ -280,27 +103,27 @@ func (f *Interface) rejectInside(packet []byte, out []byte, q int) {
}
}
func (f *Interface) rejectOutside(packet []byte, ci *ConnectionState, hostinfo *HostInfo, nb, out []byte, q int) {
func (f *Interface) rejectOutside(packet []byte, ci *ConnectionState, hostinfo *HostInfo, scratch []byte, buf *WireBuffer, q int) {
if !f.firewall.OutSendReject {
return
}
out = iputil.CreateRejectPacket(packet, out)
if len(out) == 0 {
rejectIP := iputil.CreateRejectPacket(packet, scratch)
if len(rejectIP) == 0 {
return
}
if len(out) > iputil.MaxRejectPacketSize {
if len(rejectIP) > iputil.MaxRejectPacketSize {
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelInfo) {
f.l.Info("rejectOutside: packet too big, not sending",
"packet", packet,
"outPacket", out,
"outPacket", rejectIP,
)
}
return
}
f.sendNoMetrics(header.Message, 0, ci, hostinfo, netip.AddrPort{}, out, nb, packet, q)
f.sendNoMetrics(header.Message, 0, ci, hostinfo, netip.AddrPort{}, rejectIP, buf, q)
}
// Handshake will attempt to initiate a tunnel with the provided vpn address. This is a no-op if the tunnel is already established or being established
@@ -393,17 +216,16 @@ func (f *Interface) getOrHandshakeConsiderRouting(fwPacket *firewall.Packet, cac
}
func (f *Interface) sendMessageNow(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, hostinfo *HostInfo, p, nb, out []byte) {
var parsed batch.RxParsed
if err := batch.ParsePacket(p, false, &parsed); err != nil {
func (f *Interface) sendMessageNow(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, hostinfo *HostInfo, p []byte, buf *WireBuffer) {
fp := &firewall.Packet{}
err := newPacket(p, false, fp)
if err != nil {
f.l.Warn("error while parsing outgoing packet for firewall check", "error", err)
return
}
fp := &firewall.Packet{}
parsed.Key.Hydrate(fp)
// check if packet is in outbound fw rules
dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(parsed.Key, fp, false, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), nil)
dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(*fp, false, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), nil)
if dropReason != nil {
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
f.l.Debug("dropping cached packet",
@@ -414,12 +236,12 @@ func (f *Interface) sendMessageNow(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubTyp
return
}
f.sendNoMetrics(header.Message, st, hostinfo.ConnectionState, hostinfo, netip.AddrPort{}, p, nb, out, 0)
f.sendNoMetrics(header.Message, st, hostinfo.ConnectionState, hostinfo, netip.AddrPort{}, p, buf, 0)
}
// SendMessageToVpnAddr handles real addr:port lookup and sends to the current best known address for vpnAddr.
// This function ignores myVpnNetworksTable, and will always attempt to treat the address as a vpnAddr
func (f *Interface) SendMessageToVpnAddr(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, vpnAddr netip.Addr, p, nb, out []byte) {
func (f *Interface) SendMessageToVpnAddr(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, vpnAddr netip.Addr, p []byte, buf *WireBuffer) {
hostInfo, ready := f.handshakeManager.GetOrHandshake(vpnAddr, func(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) {
hh.cachePacket(f.l, t, st, p, f.SendMessageToHostInfo, f.cachedPacketMetrics)
})
@@ -437,124 +259,73 @@ func (f *Interface) SendMessageToVpnAddr(t header.MessageType, st header.Message
return
}
f.SendMessageToHostInfo(t, st, hostInfo, p, nb, out)
f.SendMessageToHostInfo(t, st, hostInfo, p, buf)
}
func (f *Interface) SendMessageToHostInfo(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, hi *HostInfo, p, nb, out []byte) {
f.send(t, st, hi.ConnectionState, hi, p, nb, out)
func (f *Interface) SendMessageToHostInfo(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, hi *HostInfo, p []byte, buf *WireBuffer) {
f.send(t, st, hi.ConnectionState, hi, p, buf)
}
func (f *Interface) send(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, ci *ConnectionState, hostinfo *HostInfo, p, nb, out []byte) {
func (f *Interface) send(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, ci *ConnectionState, hostinfo *HostInfo, p []byte, buf *WireBuffer) {
f.messageMetrics.Tx(t, st, 1)
f.sendNoMetrics(t, st, ci, hostinfo, netip.AddrPort{}, p, nb, out, 0)
f.sendNoMetrics(t, st, ci, hostinfo, netip.AddrPort{}, p, buf, 0)
}
func (f *Interface) sendTo(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, ci *ConnectionState, hostinfo *HostInfo, remote netip.AddrPort, p, nb, out []byte) {
func (f *Interface) sendTo(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, ci *ConnectionState, hostinfo *HostInfo, remote netip.AddrPort, p []byte, buf *WireBuffer) {
f.messageMetrics.Tx(t, st, 1)
f.sendNoMetrics(t, st, ci, hostinfo, remote, p, nb, out, 0)
}
func (f *Interface) prepareSendVia(via *HostInfo,
relay *Relay,
ad,
nb,
out []byte,
nocopy bool,
) ([]byte, error) {
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
// NOTE: for goboring AESGCMTLS we need to lock because of the nonce check
via.ConnectionState.writeLock.Lock()
}
c := via.ConnectionState.messageCounter.Add(1)
out = header.Encode(out, header.Version, header.Message, header.MessageRelay, relay.RemoteIndex, c)
f.connectionManager.Out(via)
// Authenticate the header and payload, but do not encrypt for this message type.
// The payload consists of the inner, unencrypted Nebula header, as well as the end-to-end encrypted payload.
if len(out)+len(ad)+via.ConnectionState.eKey.Overhead() > cap(out) {
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
via.ConnectionState.writeLock.Unlock()
}
via.logger(f.l).Error("SendVia out buffer not large enough for relay",
"outCap", cap(out),
"payloadLen", len(ad),
"headerLen", len(out),
"cipherOverhead", via.ConnectionState.eKey.Overhead(),
)
return nil, io.ErrShortBuffer
}
// The header bytes are written to the 'out' slice; Grow the slice to hold the header and associated data payload.
offset := len(out)
out = out[:offset+len(ad)]
// In one call path, the associated data _is_ already stored in out. In other call paths, the associated data must
// be copied into 'out'.
if !nocopy {
copy(out[offset:], ad)
}
var err error
out, err = via.ConnectionState.eKey.EncryptDanger(out, out, nil, c, nb)
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
via.ConnectionState.writeLock.Unlock()
}
if err != nil {
via.logger(f.l).Info("Failed to EncryptDanger in sendVia", "error", err)
return nil, err
}
f.connectionManager.RelayUsed(relay.LocalIndex)
return out, nil
f.sendNoMetrics(t, st, ci, hostinfo, remote, p, buf, 0)
}
// SendVia sends a payload through a Relay tunnel. No authentication or encryption is done
// to the payload for the ultimate target host, making this a useful method for sending
// handshake messages to peers through relay tunnels.
// via is the HostInfo through which the message is relayed.
// ad is the plaintext data to authenticate, but not encrypt
// nb is a buffer used to store the nonce value, re-used for performance reasons.
// out is a buffer used to store the result of the Encrypt operation
// q indicates which writer to use to send the packet.
func (f *Interface) SendVia(via *HostInfo,
relay *Relay,
ad,
nb,
out []byte,
nocopy bool,
) {
toSend, err := f.prepareSendVia(via, relay, ad, nb, out, nocopy)
err = f.writers[0].WriteTo(toSend, via.remote)
if err != nil {
via.logger(f.l).Info("Failed to WriteTo in sendVia", "error", err)
//
// via is the HostInfo through which the message is relayed. ad is staged into
// the inner-payload slot of buf and then AAD-only sealed under via's key by
// SealRelayInPlace. The sendNoMetrics relay-forward path skips this entry
// point and calls sendViaInPlace directly because its inner ciphertext is
// already in place from the encrypt step.
func (f *Interface) SendVia(via *HostInfo, relay *Relay, ad []byte, buf *WireBuffer) {
if header.Len+len(ad)+via.ConnectionState.eKey.Overhead() > cap(buf.Out) {
via.logger(f.l).Error("SendVia out buffer not large enough for relay",
"outCap", cap(buf.Out),
"payloadLen", len(ad),
"headerLen", header.Len,
"cipherOverhead", via.ConnectionState.eKey.Overhead(),
)
return
}
buf.StageRelayInner(ad)
f.sendViaInPlace(via, relay, len(ad), buf)
}
func (f *Interface) sendNoMetrics(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, ci *ConnectionState, hostinfo *HostInfo, remote netip.AddrPort, p, nb, out []byte, q int) {
// sendViaInPlace stamps the outer relay header, AAD-seals over the [outer
// header | inner-already-staged] region, and writes the result to via.remote.
// Called from SendVia (after staging ad) and from sendNoMetrics' relay-forward
// path (where the inner ciphertext is already in place from SealForRelay).
func (f *Interface) sendViaInPlace(via *HostInfo, relay *Relay, innerLen int, buf *WireBuffer) {
f.connectionManager.Out(via)
out, err := buf.SealRelayInPlace(via.ConnectionState, relay.RemoteIndex, innerLen)
if err != nil {
via.logger(f.l).Info("Failed to EncryptDanger in sendVia", "error", err)
return
}
if err := f.writers[0].WriteTo(out, via.remote); err != nil {
via.logger(f.l).Info("Failed to WriteTo in sendVia", "error", err)
}
f.connectionManager.RelayUsed(relay.LocalIndex)
}
// sendNoMetrics encrypts and writes one outbound nebula packet (data, control,
// lighthouse, etc) using buf as the per-call wire scratch. When the hostinfo
// has no direct remote we encrypt into the relay-reserved slot via
// SealForRelay so sendViaInPlace can wrap it without an extra copy.
func (f *Interface) sendNoMetrics(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, ci *ConnectionState, hostinfo *HostInfo, remote netip.AddrPort, p []byte, buf *WireBuffer, q int) {
if ci.eKey == nil {
return
}
useRelay := !remote.IsValid() && !hostinfo.remote.IsValid()
fullOut := out
if useRelay {
if len(out) < header.Len {
// out always has a capacity of mtu, but not always a length greater than the header.Len.
// Grow it to make sure the next operation works.
out = out[:header.Len]
}
// Save a header's worth of data at the front of the 'out' buffer.
out = out[header.Len:]
}
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
// NOTE: for goboring AESGCMTLS we need to lock because of the nonce check
ci.writeLock.Lock()
}
c := ci.messageCounter.Add(1)
//l.WithField("trace", string(debug.Stack())).Error("out Header ", &Header{Version, t, st, 0, hostinfo.remoteIndexId, c}, p)
out = header.Encode(out, header.Version, t, st, hostinfo.remoteIndexId, c)
f.connectionManager.Out(hostinfo)
// Query our LH if we haven't since the last time we've been rebound, this will cause the remote to punch against
@@ -571,50 +342,42 @@ func (f *Interface) sendNoMetrics(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType
}
}
var out []byte
var err error
out, err = ci.eKey.EncryptDanger(out, out, p, c, nb)
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
ci.writeLock.Unlock()
if useRelay {
out, err = buf.SealForRelay(ci, t, st, hostinfo.remoteIndexId, p)
} else {
out, err = buf.Seal(ci, t, st, hostinfo.remoteIndexId, p)
}
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to encrypt outgoing packet",
"error", err,
"udpAddr", remote,
"counter", c,
"attemptedCounter", c,
)
return
}
if remote.IsValid() {
err = f.writers[q].WriteTo(out, remote)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to write outgoing packet",
"error", err,
"udpAddr", remote,
)
switch {
case remote.IsValid():
if err := f.writers[q].WriteTo(out, remote); err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to write outgoing packet", "error", err, "udpAddr", remote)
}
} else if hostinfo.remote.IsValid() {
err = f.writers[q].WriteTo(out, hostinfo.remote)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to write outgoing packet",
"error", err,
"udpAddr", remote,
)
case hostinfo.remote.IsValid():
if err := f.writers[q].WriteTo(out, hostinfo.remote); err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to write outgoing packet", "error", err, "udpAddr", hostinfo.remote)
}
} else {
// Try to send via a relay
default:
// SealForRelay placed the inner ciphertext at buf.Out[header.Len:],
// so sendViaInPlace can wrap it with the outer relay header without
// an extra copy.
for _, relayIP := range hostinfo.relayState.CopyRelayIps() {
relayHostInfo, relay, err := f.hostMap.QueryVpnAddrsRelayFor(hostinfo.vpnAddrs, relayIP)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.relayState.DeleteRelay(relayIP)
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Info("sendNoMetrics failed to find HostInfo",
"relay", relayIP,
"error", err,
)
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Info("sendNoMetrics failed to find HostInfo", "relay", relayIP, "error", err)
continue
}
f.SendVia(relayHostInfo, relay, out, nb, fullOut[:header.Len+len(out)], true)
f.sendViaInPlace(relayHostInfo, relay, len(out), buf)
break
}
}
+31 -117
View File
@@ -4,23 +4,20 @@ import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/netip"
"runtime"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/batch"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
)
@@ -50,14 +47,7 @@ type InterfaceConfig struct {
reQueryWait time.Duration
ConntrackCacheTimeout time.Duration
// CpuAffinity, when non-empty, names the CPUs each TUN reader goroutine
// should pin to. Queue i pins to CpuAffinity[i % len(CpuAffinity)] —
// shorter lists than `routines` cycle. Empty list keeps the default
// pin-to-(i % NumCPU) behavior.
CpuAffinity []int
l *slog.Logger
l *slog.Logger
}
type Interface struct {
@@ -81,16 +71,7 @@ type Interface struct {
routines int
disconnectInvalid atomic.Bool
closed atomic.Bool
// cpuAffinity, when non-empty, names the CPUs each TUN reader goroutine
// should pin to. Queue i pins to cpuAffinity[i % len(cpuAffinity)].
// Empty falls back to the default pin-to-(i % NumCPU) behavior.
cpuAffinity []int
// ecnEnabled gates RFC 6040 underlay ECN propagation. When true,
// inside.go copies the inner ECN onto the outer carrier on encap and
// decryptToTun folds outer CE into the inner header on decap. Toggle
// via tunnels.ecn (default true).
ecnEnabled atomic.Bool
relayManager *relayManager
relayManager *relayManager
tryPromoteEvery atomic.Uint32
reQueryEvery atomic.Uint32
@@ -107,12 +88,8 @@ type Interface struct {
ctx context.Context
writers []udp.Conn
readers []tio.Queue
// batchers is one per tun queue, wrapping readers[i].
// decryptToTun sends plaintext into the batch.RxBatcher;
// listenOut calls its Flush at the end of each UDP recvmmsg batch.
batchers []batch.RxBatcher
wg sync.WaitGroup
readers []io.ReadWriteCloser
wg sync.WaitGroup
// fatalErr holds the first unexpected reader error that caused shutdown.
// nil means "no fatal error" (yet)
@@ -124,19 +101,19 @@ type Interface struct {
messageMetrics *MessageMetrics
cachedPacketMetrics *cachedPacketMetrics
// bufAlloc hands out reusable WireBuffers sized for this interface's
// inside Device. All buf consumers (hot-path data-plane goroutines,
// long-lived workers, and cold callers) acquire from here so sizing
// is centralized and consistent. Long-lived owners just don't release.
bufAlloc WireBufferAllocator
l *slog.Logger
}
type EncWriter interface {
SendVia(via *HostInfo,
relay *Relay,
ad,
nb,
out []byte,
nocopy bool,
)
SendMessageToVpnAddr(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, vpnAddr netip.Addr, p, nb, out []byte)
SendMessageToHostInfo(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, hostinfo *HostInfo, p, nb, out []byte)
SendVia(via *HostInfo, relay *Relay, ad []byte, buf *WireBuffer)
SendMessageToVpnAddr(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, vpnAddr netip.Addr, p []byte, buf *WireBuffer)
SendMessageToHostInfo(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, hostinfo *HostInfo, p []byte, buf *WireBuffer)
Handshake(vpnAddr netip.Addr)
GetHostInfo(vpnAddr netip.Addr) *HostInfo
GetCertState() *CertState
@@ -210,8 +187,7 @@ func NewInterface(ctx context.Context, c *InterfaceConfig) (*Interface, error) {
routines: c.routines,
version: c.version,
writers: make([]udp.Conn, c.routines),
readers: make([]tio.Queue, c.routines),
batchers: make([]batch.RxBatcher, c.routines),
readers: make([]io.ReadWriteCloser, c.routines),
myVpnNetworks: cs.myVpnNetworks,
myVpnNetworksTable: cs.myVpnNetworksTable,
myVpnAddrs: cs.myVpnAddrs,
@@ -220,7 +196,6 @@ func NewInterface(ctx context.Context, c *InterfaceConfig) (*Interface, error) {
relayManager: c.relayManager,
connectionManager: c.connectionManager,
conntrackCacheTimeout: c.ConntrackCacheTimeout,
cpuAffinity: c.CpuAffinity,
metricHandshakes: metrics.GetOrRegisterHistogram("handshakes", nil, metrics.NewExpDecaySample(1028, 0.015)),
messageMetrics: c.MessageMetrics,
@@ -229,6 +204,8 @@ func NewInterface(ctx context.Context, c *InterfaceConfig) (*Interface, error) {
dropped: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("hostinfo.cached_packets.dropped", nil),
},
bufAlloc: NewWireBufferPool(mtu, c.Inside.TunPrefixLen()),
l: c.l,
}
@@ -270,25 +247,15 @@ func (f *Interface) activate() error {
metrics.GetOrRegisterGauge("routines", nil).Update(int64(f.routines))
// Prepare n tun queues
var reader io.ReadWriteCloser = f.inside
for i := 0; i < f.routines; i++ {
if i > 0 {
if err = f.inside.NewMultiQueueReader(); err != nil {
reader, err = f.inside.NewMultiQueueReader()
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
}
f.readers = f.inside.Readers()
for i := range f.readers {
caps := tio.QueueCapabilities(f.readers[i])
if caps.TSO || caps.USO {
// Multi-lane: TCP gets coalesced when TSO is on, UDP when USO
// is on, everything else (and either lane disabled) falls
// through to passthrough so non-IP / non-TCP-UDP traffic still
// reaches the TUN.
f.batchers[i] = batch.NewMultiCoalescer(f.readers[i], caps.TSO, caps.USO)
} else {
f.batchers[i] = batch.NewPassthrough(f.readers[i])
}
f.readers[i] = reader
}
f.wg.Add(1) // for us to wait on Close() to return
@@ -346,23 +313,12 @@ func (f *Interface) listenOut(i int) {
ctCache := firewall.NewConntrackCacheTicker(f.ctx, f.l, f.conntrackCacheTimeout)
lhh := f.lightHouse.NewRequestHandler()
h := &header.H{}
fwPacket := &firewall.Packet{}
parsedRx := &batch.RxParsed{}
nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
// Long-lived per-receive-goroutine buf; never released back to the pool.
buf := f.bufAlloc.Acquire()
listener := func(fromUdpAddr netip.AddrPort, payload []byte, meta udp.RxMeta) {
plaintext := f.batchers[i].Reserve(len(payload))
f.readOutsidePackets(ViaSender{UdpAddr: fromUdpAddr}, plaintext[:0], payload, h, fwPacket, parsedRx, lhh, nb, i, ctCache.Get(), meta)
}
flusher := func() {
if err := f.batchers[i].Flush(); err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to flush tun coalescer", "error", err)
}
}
err := li.ListenOut(listener, flusher)
err := li.ListenOut(func(fromUdpAddr netip.AddrPort, payload []byte) {
f.readOutsidePackets(ViaSender{UdpAddr: fromUdpAddr}, buf, payload, lhh, i, ctCache.Get())
})
if err != nil && !f.closed.Load() {
f.l.Error("Error while reading inbound packet, closing", "error", err)
@@ -372,35 +328,13 @@ func (f *Interface) listenOut(i int) {
f.l.Debug("underlay reader is done", "reader", i)
}
func (f *Interface) listenIn(reader tio.Queue, i int) {
// Pin this goroutine to one CPU. LockOSThread alone keeps the goroutine
// on a single OS thread but the kernel can still migrate that thread
// across CPUs — XPS reads smp_processor_id() at sendmmsg time and picks
// the TX ring from the current CPU's xps_cpus map, so an unpinned
// thread bouncing between CPUs spreads one nebula flow's packets across
// multiple TX rings, which the rings then drain at independent rates
// and the wire delivers reordered.
//
// Pinning keeps every sendmmsg from this goroutine going through the
// same TX ring, so the wire sees per-flow order. Cost: less scheduler
// flexibility — if i % NumCPU collides between two TUN reader
// goroutines they share a CPU.
cpu := i % runtime.NumCPU()
if n := len(f.cpuAffinity); n > 0 {
cpu = f.cpuAffinity[i%n]
}
if err := util.PinThreadToCPU(cpu); err != nil {
f.l.Warn("failed to pin tun reader to CPU", "queue", i, "cpu", cpu, "err", err)
}
rejectBuf := make([]byte, mtu)
sb := batch.NewSendBatch(f.writers[i], batch.SendBatchCap, udp.MTU+32)
fwPacket := &firewall.Packet{}
nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
func (f *Interface) listenIn(reader io.ReadWriteCloser, i int) {
// Long-lived per-tun-reader buf; never released back to the pool.
buf := f.bufAlloc.Acquire()
conntrackCache := firewall.NewConntrackCacheTicker(f.ctx, f.l, f.conntrackCacheTimeout)
for {
pkts, err := reader.Read()
_, err := buf.ReadIPFromTUN(reader)
if err != nil {
if !f.closed.Load() {
f.l.Error("Error while reading outbound packet, closing", "error", err, "reader", i)
@@ -409,12 +343,7 @@ func (f *Interface) listenIn(reader tio.Queue, i int) {
break
}
for _, pkt := range pkts {
f.consumeInsidePacket(pkt, fwPacket, nb, sb, rejectBuf, i, conntrackCache.Get())
}
if err := sb.Flush(); err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to write outgoing batch", "error", err, "writer", i)
}
f.consumeInsidePacket(buf, i, conntrackCache.Get())
}
f.l.Debug("overlay reader is done", "reader", i)
@@ -426,7 +355,6 @@ func (f *Interface) RegisterConfigChangeCallbacks(c *config.C) {
c.RegisterReloadCallback(f.reloadAcceptRecvError)
c.RegisterReloadCallback(f.reloadDisconnectInvalid)
c.RegisterReloadCallback(f.reloadMisc)
c.RegisterReloadCallback(f.reloadEcn)
for _, udpConn := range f.writers {
c.RegisterReloadCallback(udpConn.ReloadConfig)
@@ -550,20 +478,6 @@ func (f *Interface) reloadMisc(c *config.C) {
}
}
// reloadEcn syncs Interface.ecnEnabled with the tunnels.ecn config knob.
// Default is enabled (RFC 6040 normal mode); set false on the rare path
// where an underlay middlebox rewrites or drops ECN bits unpredictably.
func (f *Interface) reloadEcn(c *config.C) {
initial := c.InitialLoad()
if initial || c.HasChanged("tunnels.ecn") {
v := c.GetBool("tunnels.ecn", true)
f.ecnEnabled.Store(v)
if !initial {
f.l.Info("tunnels.ecn changed", "enabled", v)
}
}
}
func (f *Interface) emitStats(ctx context.Context, i time.Duration) {
ticker := time.NewTicker(i)
defer ticker.Stop()
+92 -29
View File
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@ type LightHouse struct {
myVpnNetworks []netip.Prefix
myVpnNetworksTable *bart.Lite
punchConn udp.Conn
punchy *Punchy
// Local cache of answers from light houses
@@ -61,7 +63,11 @@ type LightHouse struct {
interval atomic.Int64
updateCancel context.CancelFunc
ifce EncWriter
nebulaPort uint32 // 32 bits because protobuf does not have a uint16
// bufAlloc lets the lighthouse query/update workers, request handlers
// and punchback goroutines acquire correctly sized WireBuffers from
// the same pool as the data plane. Set by main.go alongside ifce.
bufAlloc WireBufferAllocator
nebulaPort uint32 // 32 bits because protobuf does not have a uint16
advertiseAddrs atomic.Pointer[[]netip.AddrPort]
@@ -73,8 +79,9 @@ type LightHouse struct {
calculatedRemotes atomic.Pointer[bart.Table[[]*calculatedRemote]] // Maps VpnAddr to []*calculatedRemote
metrics *MessageMetrics
l *slog.Logger
metrics *MessageMetrics
metricHolepunchTx metrics.Counter
l *slog.Logger
}
// NewLightHouseFromConfig will build a Lighthouse struct from the values provided in the config object
@@ -102,10 +109,15 @@ func NewLightHouseFromConfig(ctx context.Context, l *slog.Logger, c *config.C, c
myVpnNetworksTable: cs.myVpnNetworksTable,
addrMap: make(map[netip.Addr]*RemoteList),
nebulaPort: nebulaPort,
punchConn: pc,
punchy: p,
updateTrigger: make(chan struct{}, 1),
queryChan: make(chan netip.Addr, c.GetUint32("handshakes.query_buffer", 64)),
l: l,
// Default to a no-prefix pool so the query/update workers and
// request handlers have a working WireBufferAllocator before
// main.go wires up the real one from the Interface.
bufAlloc: NewWireBufferPool(mtu, 0),
l: l,
}
lighthouses := make([]netip.Addr, 0)
h.lighthouses.Store(&lighthouses)
@@ -114,6 +126,9 @@ func NewLightHouseFromConfig(ctx context.Context, l *slog.Logger, c *config.C, c
if c.GetBool("stats.lighthouse_metrics", false) {
h.metrics = newLighthouseMetrics()
h.metricHolepunchTx = metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("messages.tx.holepunch", nil)
} else {
h.metricHolepunchTx = metrics.NilCounter{}
}
err := h.reload(c, true)
@@ -751,21 +766,22 @@ func (lh *LightHouse) startQueryWorker() {
}
go func() {
nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
out := make([]byte, mtu)
// Long-lived per-worker WireBuffer; reused for every lighthouse query
// this worker issues for the life of the goroutine.
buf := lh.bufAlloc.Acquire()
for {
select {
case <-lh.ctx.Done():
return
case addr := <-lh.queryChan:
lh.innerQueryServer(addr, nb, out)
lh.innerQueryServer(addr, buf)
}
}
}()
}
func (lh *LightHouse) innerQueryServer(addr netip.Addr, nb, out []byte) {
func (lh *LightHouse) innerQueryServer(addr netip.Addr, buf *WireBuffer) {
if lh.IsLighthouseAddr(addr) {
return
}
@@ -814,7 +830,7 @@ func (lh *LightHouse) innerQueryServer(addr netip.Addr, nb, out []byte) {
}
}
lh.ifce.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.LightHouse, 0, lhVpnAddr, v1Query, nb, out)
lh.ifce.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.LightHouse, 0, lhVpnAddr, v1Query, buf)
queried++
} else if v == cert.Version2 {
@@ -833,7 +849,7 @@ func (lh *LightHouse) innerQueryServer(addr netip.Addr, nb, out []byte) {
}
}
lh.ifce.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.LightHouse, 0, lhVpnAddr, v2Query, nb, out)
lh.ifce.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.LightHouse, 0, lhVpnAddr, v2Query, buf)
queried++
} else {
@@ -862,8 +878,12 @@ func (lh *LightHouse) StartUpdateWorker() {
go func() {
defer clockSource.Stop()
// Long-lived per-worker WireBuffer; reused across every periodic
// update for the life of this goroutine.
buf := lh.bufAlloc.Acquire()
for {
lh.SendUpdate()
lh.sendUpdate(buf)
select {
case <-updateCtx.Done():
@@ -877,6 +897,15 @@ func (lh *LightHouse) StartUpdateWorker() {
}()
}
// SendUpdate is the public entry point that triggers a one-shot lighthouse
// update outside the worker loop (e.g. tests or reload paths). It allocates
// its own WireBuffer since callers don't already own one.
func (lh *LightHouse) SendUpdate() {
buf := lh.bufAlloc.Acquire()
defer lh.bufAlloc.Release(buf)
lh.sendUpdate(buf)
}
// TriggerUpdate requests an immediate lighthouse update. This is a non-blocking
// operation intended to be called after a handshake completes with a lighthouse,
// so the lighthouse has our current addresses without waiting for the next
@@ -888,7 +917,7 @@ func (lh *LightHouse) TriggerUpdate() {
}
}
func (lh *LightHouse) SendUpdate() {
func (lh *LightHouse) sendUpdate(buf *WireBuffer) {
var v4 []*V4AddrPort
var v6 []*V6AddrPort
@@ -914,9 +943,6 @@ func (lh *LightHouse) SendUpdate() {
}
}
nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
out := make([]byte, mtu)
var v1Update, v2Update []byte
var err error
updated := 0
@@ -967,7 +993,7 @@ func (lh *LightHouse) SendUpdate() {
}
}
lh.ifce.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.LightHouse, 0, lhVpnAddr, v1Update, nb, out)
lh.ifce.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.LightHouse, 0, lhVpnAddr, v1Update, buf)
updated++
} else if v == cert.Version2 {
@@ -996,7 +1022,7 @@ func (lh *LightHouse) SendUpdate() {
}
}
lh.ifce.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.LightHouse, 0, lhVpnAddr, v2Update, nb, out)
lh.ifce.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.LightHouse, 0, lhVpnAddr, v2Update, buf)
updated++
} else {
@@ -1012,9 +1038,11 @@ func (lh *LightHouse) SendUpdate() {
}
type LightHouseHandler struct {
lh *LightHouse
nb []byte
out []byte
lh *LightHouse
// buf is the long-lived per-handler wire scratch. NewRequestHandler is
// called once per data-plane receive goroutine, so buf is owned by that
// goroutine and reused for every lighthouse send the handler issues.
buf *WireBuffer
pb []byte
meta *NebulaMeta
l *slog.Logger
@@ -1023,8 +1051,7 @@ type LightHouseHandler struct {
func (lh *LightHouse) NewRequestHandler() *LightHouseHandler {
lhh := &LightHouseHandler{
lh: lh,
nb: make([]byte, 12, 12),
out: make([]byte, mtu),
buf: lh.bufAlloc.Acquire(),
l: lh.l,
pb: make([]byte, mtu),
@@ -1161,7 +1188,7 @@ func (lhh *LightHouseHandler) handleHostQuery(n *NebulaMeta, fromVpnAddrs []neti
}
lhh.lh.metricTx(NebulaMeta_HostQueryReply, 1)
w.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.LightHouse, 0, fromVpnAddrs[0], lhh.pb[:ln], lhh.nb, lhh.out[:0])
w.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.LightHouse, 0, fromVpnAddrs[0], lhh.pb[:ln], lhh.buf)
lhh.sendHostPunchNotification(n, fromVpnAddrs, queryVpnAddr, w)
}
@@ -1221,7 +1248,7 @@ func (lhh *LightHouseHandler) sendHostPunchNotification(n *NebulaMeta, fromVpnAd
}
lhh.lh.metricTx(NebulaMeta_HostPunchNotification, 1)
w.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.LightHouse, 0, punchNotifDest, lhh.pb[:ln], lhh.nb, lhh.out[:0])
w.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.LightHouse, 0, punchNotifDest, lhh.pb[:ln], lhh.buf)
}
func (lhh *LightHouseHandler) coalesceAnswers(v cert.Version, c *cache, n *NebulaMeta) {
@@ -1378,7 +1405,7 @@ func (lhh *LightHouseHandler) handleHostUpdateNotification(n *NebulaMeta, fromVp
}
lhh.lh.metricTx(NebulaMeta_HostUpdateNotificationAck, 1)
w.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.LightHouse, 0, fromVpnAddrs[0], lhh.pb[:ln], lhh.nb, lhh.out[:0])
w.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.LightHouse, 0, fromVpnAddrs[0], lhh.pb[:ln], lhh.buf)
}
func (lhh *LightHouseHandler) handleHostPunchNotification(n *NebulaMeta, fromVpnAddrs []netip.Addr, w EncWriter) {
@@ -1399,25 +1426,61 @@ func (lhh *LightHouseHandler) handleHostPunchNotification(n *NebulaMeta, fromVpn
return
}
empty := []byte{0}
punch := func(vpnPeer netip.AddrPort, logVpnAddr netip.Addr) {
if !vpnPeer.IsValid() {
return
}
go func() {
time.Sleep(lhh.lh.punchy.GetDelay())
lhh.lh.metricHolepunchTx.Inc(1)
lhh.lh.punchConn.WriteTo(empty, vpnPeer)
}()
if lhh.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
lhh.l.Debug("Punching",
"vpnPeer", vpnPeer,
"logVpnAddr", logVpnAddr,
)
}
}
remoteAllowList := lhh.lh.GetRemoteAllowList()
for _, a := range n.Details.V4AddrPorts {
b := protoV4AddrPortToNetAddrPort(a)
if remoteAllowList.Allow(detailsVpnAddr, b.Addr()) {
lhh.lh.punchy.Schedule(b, detailsVpnAddr)
punch(b, detailsVpnAddr)
}
}
for _, a := range n.Details.V6AddrPorts {
b := protoV6AddrPortToNetAddrPort(a)
if remoteAllowList.Allow(detailsVpnAddr, b.Addr()) {
lhh.lh.punchy.Schedule(b, detailsVpnAddr)
punch(b, detailsVpnAddr)
}
}
// This sends a nebula test packet to the host trying to contact us. In the case
// of a double nat or other difficult scenario, this may help establish
// a tunnel. ScheduleRespond is a no-op when punchy.respond is disabled.
lhh.lh.punchy.ScheduleRespond(detailsVpnAddr)
// a tunnel.
if lhh.lh.punchy.GetRespond() {
go func() {
time.Sleep(lhh.lh.punchy.GetRespondDelay())
if lhh.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
lhh.l.Debug("Sending a nebula test packet",
"vpnAddr", detailsVpnAddr,
)
}
// We acquire and release a fresh buf within this goroutine so it
// returns to the pool once the punchback send completes. We
// should move this into a timerwheel or a single goroutine
// managed by a channel.
pbuf := lhh.lh.bufAlloc.Acquire()
defer lhh.lh.bufAlloc.Release(pbuf)
w.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.Test, header.TestRequest, detailsVpnAddr, []byte(""), pbuf)
}()
}
}
func protoAddrToNetAddr(addr *Addr) netip.Addr {
+3 -3
View File
@@ -372,12 +372,12 @@ type testEncWriter struct {
protocolVersion cert.Version
}
func (tw *testEncWriter) SendVia(via *HostInfo, relay *Relay, ad, nb, out []byte, nocopy bool) {
func (tw *testEncWriter) SendVia(via *HostInfo, relay *Relay, ad []byte, buf *WireBuffer) {
}
func (tw *testEncWriter) Handshake(vpnIp netip.Addr) {
}
func (tw *testEncWriter) SendMessageToHostInfo(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, hostinfo *HostInfo, p, _, _ []byte) {
func (tw *testEncWriter) SendMessageToHostInfo(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, hostinfo *HostInfo, p []byte, _ *WireBuffer) {
msg := &NebulaMeta{}
err := msg.Unmarshal(p)
if tw.metaFilter == nil || msg.Type == *tw.metaFilter {
@@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ func (tw *testEncWriter) SendMessageToHostInfo(t header.MessageType, st header.M
}
}
func (tw *testEncWriter) SendMessageToVpnAddr(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, vpnIp netip.Addr, p, _, _ []byte) {
func (tw *testEncWriter) SendMessageToVpnAddr(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, vpnIp netip.Addr, p []byte, _ *WireBuffer) {
msg := &NebulaMeta{}
err := msg.Unmarshal(p)
if tw.metaFilter == nil || msg.Type == *tw.metaFilter {
+3 -59
View File
@@ -5,10 +5,7 @@ import (
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/http"
_ "net/http/pprof"
"net/netip"
"runtime"
"runtime/debug"
"strings"
"time"
@@ -36,9 +33,6 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
buildVersion = moduleVersion()
}
//todo no merge
go http.ListenAndServe(":6060", nil)
// Print the config if in test, the exit comes later
if configTest {
b, err := yaml.Marshal(c.Settings)
@@ -61,7 +55,7 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
}
l.Info("Firewall started", "firewallHashes", fw.GetRuleHashes())
ssh, err := sshd.NewSSHServer(ctx, l.With("subsystem", "sshd"))
ssh, err := sshd.NewSSHServer(l.With("subsystem", "sshd"))
if err != nil {
return nil, util.ContextualizeIfNeeded("Error while creating SSH server", err)
}
@@ -176,7 +170,7 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
}
hostMap := NewHostMapFromConfig(l, c)
punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(l, c, udpConns[0])
punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(l, c)
connManager := newConnectionManagerFromConfig(l, c, hostMap, punchy)
lightHouse, err := NewLightHouseFromConfig(ctx, l, c, pki.getCertState(), udpConns[0], punchy)
if err != nil {
@@ -226,7 +220,6 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
relayManager: NewRelayManager(ctx, l, hostMap, c),
punchy: punchy,
ConntrackCacheTimeout: conntrackCacheTimeout,
CpuAffinity: parseCpuAffinity(c, l, routines),
l: l,
}
@@ -239,17 +232,15 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
ifce.writers = udpConns
lightHouse.ifce = ifce
lightHouse.bufAlloc = ifce.bufAlloc
ifce.RegisterConfigChangeCallbacks(c)
ifce.reloadDisconnectInvalid(c)
ifce.reloadSendRecvError(c)
ifce.reloadAcceptRecvError(c)
ifce.reloadEcn(c)
handshakeManager.f = ifce
go handshakeManager.Run(ctx)
punchy.Start(ctx, ifce, hostMap, lightHouse)
}
stats, err := newStatsServerFromConfig(ctx, l, c, buildVersion, configTest)
@@ -279,53 +270,6 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
}, nil
}
// parseCpuAffinity reads `tun.cpu_affinity` from the config — a list of
// integer CPU IDs, one per TUN reader goroutine. Empty / unset returns nil
// (listenIn falls back to its default `i % NumCPU` pinning). Length
// mismatch with `routines` is a warning, not an error: shorter lists are
// modulo-cycled across queues, longer lists' tail is ignored. Invalid
// entries (non-integer, out of range) are also a warning and disable the
// override entirely so we don't silently pin to the wrong CPU.
func parseCpuAffinity(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, routines int) []int {
raw := c.Get("tun.cpu_affinity")
if raw == nil {
return nil
}
rv, ok := raw.([]any)
if !ok {
l.Warn("tun.cpu_affinity must be a list of integers; ignoring", "value", raw)
return nil
}
nCPU := runtime.NumCPU()
cpus := make([]int, 0, len(rv))
for i, e := range rv {
var cpu int
switch v := e.(type) {
case int:
cpu = v
case int64:
cpu = int(v)
case float64:
cpu = int(v)
default:
l.Warn("tun.cpu_affinity entry not an integer; ignoring affinity",
"index", i, "value", e)
return nil
}
if cpu < 0 || cpu >= nCPU {
l.Warn("tun.cpu_affinity entry out of range; ignoring affinity",
"index", i, "cpu", cpu, "num_cpu", nCPU)
return nil
}
cpus = append(cpus, cpu)
}
if len(cpus) != routines {
l.Warn("tun.cpu_affinity length doesn't match routines; queues will modulo-cycle through the list",
"affinity_len", len(cpus), "routines", routines)
}
return cpus
}
func moduleVersion() string {
info, ok := debug.ReadBuildInfo()
if !ok {
-8
View File
@@ -13,8 +13,6 @@ type MessageMetrics struct {
rxUnknown metrics.Counter
txUnknown metrics.Counter
rxInvalid metrics.Counter
}
func (m *MessageMetrics) Rx(t header.MessageType, s header.MessageSubType, i int64) {
@@ -35,11 +33,6 @@ func (m *MessageMetrics) Tx(t header.MessageType, s header.MessageSubType, i int
}
}
}
func (m *MessageMetrics) RxInvalid(i int64) {
if m != nil && m.rxInvalid != nil {
m.rxInvalid.Inc(i)
}
}
func newMessageMetrics() *MessageMetrics {
gen := func(t string) [][]metrics.Counter {
@@ -63,7 +56,6 @@ func newMessageMetrics() *MessageMetrics {
rxUnknown: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("messages.rx.other", nil),
txUnknown: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("messages.tx.other", nil),
rxInvalid: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("messages.rx.invalid", nil),
}
}
+86
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
package nebula
import (
"crypto/cipher"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
)
type endianness interface {
PutUint64(b []byte, v uint64)
}
var noiseEndianness endianness = binary.BigEndian
// NonceSize is the AEAD nonce length used by all ciphers nebula supports
// today (AES-GCM and ChaCha20-Poly1305 both use 96-bit nonces). Encrypt-
// and DecryptDanger lay out the nonce as 4 zero bytes followed by an 8-byte
// big-endian counter; if a future cipher with a different nonce size is
// added, this constant and those layouts must change together.
const NonceSize = 12
// AEADOverhead is the AEAD authentication tag length the ciphers nebula
// supports append to ciphertext. Both AES-GCM and ChaCha20-Poly1305 use
// 128-bit tags. NebulaCipherState.Overhead() returns this dynamically from
// the cipher; the constant is for sizing buffers at construction time.
const AEADOverhead = 16
type NebulaCipherState struct {
c cipher.AEAD
}
func NewNebulaCipherState(s *noise.CipherState) *NebulaCipherState {
x := s.Cipher()
return &NebulaCipherState{c: x.(cipher.AEAD)}
}
// EncryptDanger encrypts and authenticates a given payload.
//
// out is a destination slice to hold the output of the EncryptDanger operation.
// - ad is additional data, which will be authenticated and appended to out, but not encrypted.
// - plaintext is encrypted, authenticated and appended to out.
// - n is a nonce value which must never be re-used with this key.
// - nb is a buffer used for temporary storage in the implementation of this call, which should
// be re-used by callers to minimize garbage collection.
func (s *NebulaCipherState) EncryptDanger(out, ad, plaintext []byte, n uint64, nb []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if s != nil {
// TODO: Is this okay now that we have made messageCounter atomic?
// Alternative may be to split the counter space into ranges
//if n <= s.n {
// return nil, errors.New("CRITICAL: a duplicate counter value was used")
//}
//s.n = n
nb[0] = 0
nb[1] = 0
nb[2] = 0
nb[3] = 0
noiseEndianness.PutUint64(nb[4:], n)
out = s.c.Seal(out, nb, plaintext, ad)
//l.Debugf("Encryption: outlen: %d, nonce: %d, ad: %s, plainlen %d", len(out), n, ad, len(plaintext))
return out, nil
} else {
return nil, errors.New("no cipher state available to encrypt")
}
}
func (s *NebulaCipherState) DecryptDanger(out, ad, ciphertext []byte, n uint64, nb []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if s != nil {
nb[0] = 0
nb[1] = 0
nb[2] = 0
nb[3] = 0
noiseEndianness.PutUint64(nb[4:], n)
return s.c.Open(out, nb, ciphertext, ad)
} else {
return []byte{}, nil
}
}
func (s *NebulaCipherState) Overhead() int {
if s != nil {
return s.c.Overhead()
}
return 0
}
-53
View File
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
package noiseutil
import (
"crypto/cipher"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
)
// CipherStateAESGCM is the data-plane wrapper for the AES-GCM AEAD cipher.
// AES-GCM uses big-endian nonce encoding per the Noise spec.
type CipherStateAESGCM struct {
c cipher.AEAD
}
// NewCipherStateAESGCM extracts the underlying AEAD from the post-handshake noise.CipherState.
// The caller is responsible for ensuring the noise cipher is actually AES-GCM,
// otherwise the type assertion still succeeds but the nonce endianness will be wrong on the wire.
func NewCipherStateAESGCM(s *noise.CipherState) *CipherStateAESGCM {
return &CipherStateAESGCM{c: s.Cipher().(cipher.AEAD)}
}
func (s *CipherStateAESGCM) EncryptDanger(out, ad, plaintext []byte, n uint64, nb []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if s == nil {
return nil, errors.New("no cipher state available to encrypt")
}
nb[0] = 0
nb[1] = 0
nb[2] = 0
nb[3] = 0
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(nb[4:], n)
return s.c.Seal(out, nb, plaintext, ad), nil
}
func (s *CipherStateAESGCM) DecryptDanger(out, ad, ciphertext []byte, n uint64, nb []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if s == nil {
return []byte{}, nil
}
nb[0] = 0
nb[1] = 0
nb[2] = 0
nb[3] = 0
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(nb[4:], n)
return s.c.Open(out, nb, ciphertext, ad)
}
func (s *CipherStateAESGCM) Overhead() int {
if s == nil {
return 0
}
return s.c.Overhead()
}
-52
View File
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
package noiseutil
import (
"crypto/cipher"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
)
// CipherStateChaChaPoly is the data-plane wrapper for the ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD cipher.
// ChaCha20-Poly1305 uses little-endian nonce encoding per the Noise spec.
type CipherStateChaChaPoly struct {
c cipher.AEAD
}
// NewCipherStateChaChaPoly extracts the underlying AEAD from the post-handshake noise.CipherState.
// The caller is responsible for ensuring the noise cipher is actually ChaCha20-Poly1305.
func NewCipherStateChaChaPoly(s *noise.CipherState) *CipherStateChaChaPoly {
return &CipherStateChaChaPoly{c: s.Cipher().(cipher.AEAD)}
}
func (s *CipherStateChaChaPoly) EncryptDanger(out, ad, plaintext []byte, n uint64, nb []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if s == nil {
return nil, errors.New("no cipher state available to encrypt")
}
nb[0] = 0
nb[1] = 0
nb[2] = 0
nb[3] = 0
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(nb[4:], n)
return s.c.Seal(out, nb, plaintext, ad), nil
}
func (s *CipherStateChaChaPoly) DecryptDanger(out, ad, ciphertext []byte, n uint64, nb []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if s == nil {
return []byte{}, nil
}
nb[0] = 0
nb[1] = 0
nb[2] = 0
nb[3] = 0
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(nb[4:], n)
return s.c.Open(out, nb, ciphertext, ad)
}
func (s *CipherStateChaChaPoly) Overhead() int {
if s == nil {
return 0
}
return s.c.Overhead()
}
-40
View File
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
package noiseutil
import (
"fmt"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
)
// CipherState is the post-handshake AEAD cipher used for the data plane.
// Each supported cipher has its own concrete implementation in this package with the nonce endianness hardcoded,
// so the encrypt/decrypt fast path avoids interface dispatch on the byte order.
type CipherState interface {
// EncryptDanger encrypts and authenticates a given payload.
//
// out is a destination slice to hold the output of the EncryptDanger operation.
// - ad is additional data, which will be authenticated and appended to out, but not encrypted.
// - plaintext is encrypted, authenticated and appended to out.
// - n is a nonce value which must never be re-used with this key.
// - nb is a scratch buffer used to assemble the nonce.
EncryptDanger(out, ad, plaintext []byte, n uint64, nb []byte) ([]byte, error)
// DecryptDanger authenticates and decrypts a given payload, with the same argument shape as EncryptDanger.
DecryptDanger(out, ad, ciphertext []byte, n uint64, nb []byte) ([]byte, error)
// Overhead returns the AEAD tag size, or 0 if the receiver is nil.
Overhead() int
}
// NewCipherState wraps the post-handshake noise.CipherState in the per-cipher type that matches cipherFunc.
// cipherFunc must be the same cipher used to build the noise CipherSuite that produced s.
func NewCipherState(s *noise.CipherState, cipherFunc noise.CipherFunc) CipherState {
switch cipherFunc.CipherName() {
case CipherAESGCM.CipherName():
return NewCipherStateAESGCM(s)
case noise.CipherChaChaPoly.CipherName():
return NewCipherStateChaChaPoly(s)
default:
panic(fmt.Sprintf("noiseutil: unsupported cipher %q", cipherFunc.CipherName()))
}
}
-166
View File
@@ -1,166 +0,0 @@
package noiseutil
import (
"testing"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestCipherStateAESGCMRoundtrip(t *testing.T) {
enc, dec := buildCipherStates(t, CipherAESGCM)
roundtrip(t, NewCipherStateAESGCM(enc), NewCipherStateAESGCM(dec))
}
func TestCipherStateChaChaPolyRoundtrip(t *testing.T) {
enc, dec := buildCipherStates(t, noise.CipherChaChaPoly)
roundtrip(t, NewCipherStateChaChaPoly(enc), NewCipherStateChaChaPoly(dec))
}
func TestNewCipherStateDispatch(t *testing.T) {
encA, _ := buildCipherStates(t, CipherAESGCM)
encC, _ := buildCipherStates(t, noise.CipherChaChaPoly)
assert.IsType(t, &CipherStateAESGCM{}, NewCipherState(encA, CipherAESGCM))
assert.IsType(t, &CipherStateChaChaPoly{}, NewCipherState(encC, noise.CipherChaChaPoly))
}
func TestNewCipherStateUnsupportedPanics(t *testing.T) {
enc, _ := buildCipherStates(t, CipherAESGCM)
assert.Panics(t, func() {
NewCipherState(enc, fakeCipher{})
})
}
type fakeCipher struct{}
func (fakeCipher) Cipher(k [32]byte) noise.Cipher { return nil }
func (fakeCipher) CipherName() string { return "Fake" }
// buildCipherStates runs an in-memory NN handshake with the requested cipher
// to produce a pair of post-handshake CipherStates that share keys.
func buildCipherStates(t *testing.T, c noise.CipherFunc) (*noise.CipherState, *noise.CipherState) {
t.Helper()
suite := noise.NewCipherSuite(noise.DH25519, c, noise.HashSHA256)
cfg := noise.Config{CipherSuite: suite, Pattern: noise.HandshakeNN}
cfg.Initiator = true
hsI, err := noise.NewHandshakeState(cfg)
require.NoError(t, err)
cfg.Initiator = false
hsR, err := noise.NewHandshakeState(cfg)
require.NoError(t, err)
msg, _, _, err := hsI.WriteMessage(nil, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
_, _, _, err = hsR.ReadMessage(nil, msg)
require.NoError(t, err)
msg, dR, _, err := hsR.WriteMessage(nil, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
_, eI, _, err := hsI.ReadMessage(nil, msg)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, eI)
require.NotNil(t, dR)
// noise returns (cs1, cs2) where cs1 is the initiator->responder cipher.
return eI, dR
}
func roundtrip(t *testing.T, enc, dec CipherState) {
t.Helper()
plaintext := []byte("nebula cipher state roundtrip")
ad := []byte("aad")
nb := make([]byte, 12)
ct, err := enc.EncryptDanger(nil, ad, plaintext, 1, nb)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotEqual(t, plaintext, ct)
pt, err := dec.DecryptDanger(nil, ad, ct, 1, nb)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, plaintext, pt)
// Wrong nonce must fail authentication.
_, err = dec.DecryptDanger(nil, ad, ct, 2, nb)
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, enc.Overhead(), dec.Overhead())
assert.Equal(t, 16, enc.Overhead())
}
func BenchmarkCipherStateEncryptAESGCM(b *testing.B) {
enc, _ := buildCipherStatesB(b, CipherAESGCM)
benchEncryptCipherState(b, NewCipherState(enc, CipherAESGCM))
}
func BenchmarkCipherStateEncryptChaChaPoly(b *testing.B) {
enc, _ := buildCipherStatesB(b, noise.CipherChaChaPoly)
benchEncryptCipherState(b, NewCipherState(enc, noise.CipherChaChaPoly))
}
func benchEncryptCipherState(b *testing.B, cs CipherState) {
plaintext := make([]byte, 1280)
ad := make([]byte, 16)
nb := make([]byte, 12)
out := make([]byte, 0, len(plaintext)+cs.Overhead())
b.ResetTimer()
b.ReportAllocs()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
var err error
out, err = cs.EncryptDanger(out[:0], ad, plaintext, uint64(i+1), nb)
if err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
}
}
func buildCipherStatesB(b *testing.B, c noise.CipherFunc) (*noise.CipherState, *noise.CipherState) {
b.Helper()
suite := noise.NewCipherSuite(noise.DH25519, c, noise.HashSHA256)
cfg := noise.Config{CipherSuite: suite, Pattern: noise.HandshakeNN}
cfg.Initiator = true
hsI, err := noise.NewHandshakeState(cfg)
if err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
cfg.Initiator = false
hsR, err := noise.NewHandshakeState(cfg)
if err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
msg, _, _, err := hsI.WriteMessage(nil, nil)
if err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
if _, _, _, err := hsR.ReadMessage(nil, msg); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
msg, dR, _, err := hsR.WriteMessage(nil, nil)
if err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
_, eI, _, err := hsI.ReadMessage(nil, msg)
if err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
return eI, dR
}
func TestCipherStateNilSafety(t *testing.T) {
var aes *CipherStateAESGCM
_, err := aes.EncryptDanger(nil, nil, nil, 0, make([]byte, 12))
require.Error(t, err)
out, err := aes.DecryptDanger(nil, nil, nil, 0, make([]byte, 12))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, 0, aes.Overhead())
var cc *CipherStateChaChaPoly
_, err = cc.EncryptDanger(nil, nil, nil, 0, make([]byte, 12))
require.Error(t, err)
out, err = cc.DecryptDanger(nil, nil, nil, 0, make([]byte, 12))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, 0, cc.Overhead())
}
+426 -266
View File
@@ -2,57 +2,42 @@ package nebula
import (
"context"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"log/slog"
"net/netip"
"time"
"github.com/google/gopacket/layers"
"golang.org/x/net/ipv6"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/batch"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
"golang.org/x/net/ipv4"
)
var ErrOutOfWindow = errors.New("out of window packet")
const (
minFwPacketLen = 4
)
func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte, h *header.H, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, parsedRx *batch.RxParsed, lhf *LightHouseHandler, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache, meta udp.RxMeta) {
func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, buf *WireBuffer, packet []byte, lhf *LightHouseHandler, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
h := buf.H
err := h.Parse(packet)
if err != nil {
// Hole punch packets are 0 or 1 byte big, so lets ignore printing those errors
// TODO: record metrics for rx holepunch/punchy packets?
if len(packet) > 1 {
f.messageMetrics.RxInvalid(1)
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
f.l.Debug("Error while parsing inbound packet",
"from", via,
"error", err,
"packet", packet,
)
}
}
return
}
if h.Version != header.Version {
f.messageMetrics.RxInvalid(1)
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
f.l.Debug("Unexpected header version received", "from", via)
}
return
}
// Check before processing to see if this is a expected type/subtype
if !h.IsValidSubType() {
f.messageMetrics.RxInvalid(1)
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
f.l.Debug("Unexpected packet received", "from", via)
f.l.Info("Error while parsing inbound packet",
"from", via,
"error", err,
"packet", packet,
)
}
return
}
//l.Error("in packet ", header, packet[HeaderLen:])
if !via.IsRelayed {
if f.myVpnNetworksTable.Contains(via.UdpAddr.Addr()) {
f.messageMetrics.RxInvalid(1)
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
f.l.Debug("Refusing to process double encrypted packet", "from", via)
}
@@ -60,193 +45,217 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte,
}
}
// don't keep Rx metrics for message type, since you can see those in the tun metrics
if h.Type != header.Message {
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
}
// Unencrypted packets
switch h.Type {
case header.Handshake:
f.handshakeManager.HandleIncoming(via, packet, h)
return
case header.RecvError:
f.handleRecvError(via.UdpAddr, h)
return
}
// Relay packets are special
isMessageRelay := (h.Type == header.Message && h.Subtype == header.MessageRelay)
var hostinfo *HostInfo
if isMessageRelay {
// verify if we've seen this index before, otherwise respond to the handshake initiation
if h.Type == header.Message && h.Subtype == header.MessageRelay {
hostinfo = f.hostMap.QueryRelayIndex(h.RemoteIndex)
} else {
hostinfo = f.hostMap.QueryIndex(h.RemoteIndex)
}
// At this point we should have a valid existing tunnel, verify and send
// recvError if necessary
if hostinfo == nil || hostinfo.ConnectionState == nil {
if !via.IsRelayed {
f.maybeSendRecvError(via.UdpAddr, h.RemoteIndex)
}
return
var ci *ConnectionState
if hostinfo != nil {
ci = hostinfo.ConnectionState
}
// All remaining packets are encrypted
ci := hostinfo.ConnectionState
if !ci.window.Check(f.l, h.MessageCounter) {
return
}
// Relay packets are special
if isMessageRelay {
f.handleOutsideRelayPacket(hostinfo, via, out, packet, h, fwPacket, parsedRx, lhf, nb, q, localCache, meta)
return
}
out, err = f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out, packet, h, nb)
if err != nil {
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("Failed to decrypt packet",
"error", err,
"from", via,
"header", h,
)
}
return
}
// Roam before we respond
f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, via)
f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo)
switch h.Type {
case header.Message:
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, via, h) {
return
}
switch h.Subtype {
case header.MessageNone:
f.handleOutsideMessagePacket(hostinfo, out, packet, fwPacket, parsedRx, nb, q, localCache, meta)
default:
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("IsValidSubType was true, but unexpected message subtype seen", "from", via, "header", h)
return
if !f.decryptToTun(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, buf, packet, q, localCache) {
return
}
case header.MessageRelay:
// The entire body is sent as AD, not encrypted.
// The packet consists of a 16-byte parsed Nebula header, Associated Data-protected payload, and a trailing 16-byte AEAD signature value.
// The packet is guaranteed to be at least 16 bytes at this point, b/c it got past the h.Parse() call above. If it's
// otherwise malformed (meaning, there is no trailing 16 byte AEAD value), then this will result in at worst a 0-length slice
// which will gracefully fail in the DecryptDanger call.
signedPayload := packet[:len(packet)-hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead()]
signatureValue := packet[len(packet)-hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead():]
// AAD-only validation: passing dst=nil since there's no plaintext
// to recover (ciphertext is just the trailing AEAD tag).
if _, err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.DecryptDanger(nil, signedPayload, signatureValue, h.MessageCounter, buf.NB); err != nil {
return
}
// Successfully validated the thing. Get rid of the Relay header.
signedPayload = signedPayload[header.Len:]
// Pull the Roaming parts up here, and return in all call paths.
f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, via)
// Track usage of both the HostInfo and the Relay for the received & authenticated packet
f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo)
f.connectionManager.RelayUsed(h.RemoteIndex)
relay, ok := hostinfo.relayState.QueryRelayForByIdx(h.RemoteIndex)
if !ok {
// The only way this happens is if hostmap has an index to the correct HostInfo, but the HostInfo is missing
// its internal mapping. This should never happen.
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("HostInfo missing remote relay index",
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"remoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex,
)
return
}
switch relay.Type {
case TerminalType:
// If I am the target of this relay, process the unwrapped packet
// From this recursive point, all these variables are 'burned'. We shouldn't rely on them again.
via = ViaSender{
UdpAddr: via.UdpAddr,
relayHI: hostinfo,
remoteIdx: relay.RemoteIndex,
relay: relay,
IsRelayed: true,
}
buf.Reset()
f.readOutsidePackets(via, buf, signedPayload, lhf, q, localCache)
return
case ForwardingType:
// Find the target HostInfo relay object
targetHI, targetRelay, err := f.hostMap.QueryVpnAddrsRelayFor(hostinfo.vpnAddrs, relay.PeerAddr)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Info("Failed to find target host info by ip",
"relayTo", relay.PeerAddr,
"error", err,
"hostinfo.vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
)
return
}
// If that relay is Established, forward the payload through it
if targetRelay.State == Established {
switch targetRelay.Type {
case ForwardingType:
// Forward this packet through the relay tunnel
// Find the target HostInfo
f.SendVia(targetHI, targetRelay, signedPayload, buf)
return
case TerminalType:
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Unexpected Relay Type of Terminal")
}
} else {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Info("Unexpected target relay state",
"relayTo", relay.PeerAddr,
"relayFrom", hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0],
"targetRelayState", targetRelay.State,
)
return
}
}
}
case header.LightHouse:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, via, h) {
return
}
d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, buf, packet, h)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to decrypt lighthouse packet",
"error", err,
"from", via,
"packet", packet,
)
return
}
//TODO: assert via is not relayed
lhf.HandleRequest(via.UdpAddr, hostinfo.vpnAddrs, out, f)
lhf.HandleRequest(via.UdpAddr, hostinfo.vpnAddrs, d, f)
// Fallthrough to the bottom to record incoming traffic
case header.Test:
switch h.Subtype {
case header.TestReply:
// No-op, useful for the Roaming and connectionManager side-effects above
case header.TestRequest:
f.send(header.Test, header.TestReply, ci, hostinfo, out, nb, out)
default:
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("IsValidSubType was true, but unexpected test subtype seen", "from", via, "header", h)
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, via, h) {
return
}
d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, buf, packet, h)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to decrypt test packet",
"error", err,
"from", via,
"packet", packet,
)
return
}
if h.Subtype == header.TestRequest {
// This testRequest might be from TryPromoteBest, so we should roam
// to the new IP address before responding.
f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, via)
f.send(header.Test, header.TestReply, ci, hostinfo, d, buf)
}
// Fallthrough to the bottom to record incoming traffic
// Non encrypted messages below here, they should not fall through to avoid tracking incoming traffic since they
// are unauthenticated
case header.Handshake:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
f.handshakeManager.HandleIncoming(via, packet, h)
return
case header.RecvError:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
f.handleRecvError(via.UdpAddr, h)
return
case header.CloseTunnel:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, via, h) {
return
}
_, err = f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, buf, packet, h)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to decrypt CloseTunnel packet",
"error", err,
"from", via,
"packet", packet,
)
return
}
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Info("Close tunnel received, tearing down.", "from", via)
f.closeTunnel(hostinfo)
return
case header.Control:
f.relayManager.HandleControlMsg(hostinfo, out, f)
default:
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("IsValidSubType was true, but unexpected message type seen", "from", via, "header", h)
}
}
func (f *Interface) handleOutsideRelayPacket(hostinfo *HostInfo, via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte, h *header.H, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, parsedRx *batch.RxParsed, lhf *LightHouseHandler, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache, meta udp.RxMeta) {
// The entire body is sent as AD, not encrypted.
// The packet consists of a 16-byte parsed Nebula header, Associated Data-protected payload, and a trailing 16-byte AEAD signature value.
// The packet is guaranteed to be at least 16 bytes at this point, b/c it got past the h.Parse() call above. If it's
// otherwise malformed (meaning, there is no trailing 16 byte AEAD value), then this will result in at worst a 0-length slice
// which will gracefully fail in the DecryptDanger call.
signedPayload := packet[:len(packet)-hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead()]
signatureValue := packet[len(packet)-hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead():]
var err error
out, err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.DecryptDanger(out, signedPayload, signatureValue, h.MessageCounter, nb)
if err != nil {
return
}
// Successfully validated the thing. Get rid of the Relay header.
signedPayload = signedPayload[header.Len:]
// Pull the Roaming parts up here, and return in all call paths.
f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, via)
// Track usage of both the HostInfo and the Relay for the received & authenticated packet
f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo)
f.connectionManager.RelayUsed(h.RemoteIndex)
relay, ok := hostinfo.relayState.QueryRelayForByIdx(h.RemoteIndex)
if !ok {
// The only way this happens is if hostmap has an index to the correct HostInfo, but the HostInfo is missing
// its internal mapping. This should never happen.
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("HostInfo missing remote relay index",
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"remoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex,
)
return
}
switch relay.Type {
case TerminalType:
// If I am the target of this relay, process the unwrapped packet
// From this recursive point, all these variables are 'burned'. We shouldn't rely on them again.
via = ViaSender{
UdpAddr: via.UdpAddr,
relayHI: hostinfo,
remoteIdx: relay.RemoteIndex,
relay: relay,
IsRelayed: true,
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, via, h) {
return
}
f.readOutsidePackets(via, out[:0], signedPayload, h, fwPacket, parsedRx, lhf, nb, q, localCache, meta)
return
case ForwardingType:
// Find the target HostInfo relay object
targetHI, targetRelay, err := f.hostMap.QueryVpnAddrsRelayFor(hostinfo.vpnAddrs, relay.PeerAddr)
d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, buf, packet, h)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Info("Failed to find target host info by ip",
"relayTo", relay.PeerAddr,
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to decrypt Control packet",
"error", err,
"hostinfo.vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"packet", packet,
)
return
}
// If that relay is Established, forward the payload through it
if targetRelay.State == Established {
switch targetRelay.Type {
case ForwardingType:
// Forward this packet through the relay tunnel
// Find the target HostInfo //todo it would potentially be nice to batch these
f.SendVia(targetHI, targetRelay, signedPayload, nb, out, false)
case TerminalType:
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Unexpected Relay Type of Terminal")
return
default:
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("Unexpected targetRelay Type", "from", via, "relayType", targetRelay.Type)
}
return
}
} else {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Info("Unexpected target relay state",
"relayTo", relay.PeerAddr,
"relayFrom", hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0],
"targetRelayState", targetRelay.State,
)
return
}
f.relayManager.HandleControlMsg(hostinfo, d, f)
default:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("Unexpected relay type", "from", via, "relayType", relay.Type)
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("Unexpected packet received", "from", via)
}
return
}
f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, via)
f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo)
}
// closeTunnel closes a tunnel locally, it does not send a closeTunnel packet to the remote
@@ -260,7 +269,9 @@ func (f *Interface) closeTunnel(hostInfo *HostInfo) {
// sendCloseTunnel is a helper function to send a proper close tunnel packet to a remote
func (f *Interface) sendCloseTunnel(h *HostInfo) {
f.send(header.CloseTunnel, 0, h.ConnectionState, h, []byte{}, make([]byte, 12, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
buf := f.bufAlloc.Acquire()
defer f.bufAlloc.Release(buf)
f.send(header.CloseTunnel, 0, h.ConnectionState, h, []byte{}, buf)
}
func (f *Interface) handleHostRoaming(hostinfo *HostInfo, via ViaSender) {
@@ -294,6 +305,23 @@ func (f *Interface) handleHostRoaming(hostinfo *HostInfo, via ViaSender) {
}
// handleEncrypted returns true if a packet should be processed, false otherwise
func (f *Interface) handleEncrypted(ci *ConnectionState, via ViaSender, h *header.H) bool {
// If connectionstate does not exist, send a recv error, if possible, to encourage a fast reconnect
if ci == nil {
if !via.IsRelayed {
f.maybeSendRecvError(via.UdpAddr, h.RemoteIndex)
}
return false
}
// If the window check fails, refuse to process the packet, but don't send a recv error
if !ci.window.Check(f.l, h.MessageCounter) {
return false
}
return true
}
var (
ErrPacketTooShort = errors.New("packet is too short")
ErrUnknownIPVersion = errors.New("packet is an unknown ip version")
@@ -304,121 +332,253 @@ var (
)
// newPacket validates and parses the interesting bits for the firewall out of the ip and sub protocol headers
// newPacket parses data into a fully-hydrated firewall.Packet — kept as a
// thin wrapper around newPacketKey + Hydrate so there's one source of
// parse logic. Callers that don't need the netip.Addr-rich form (e.g.
// conntrack-only paths) should use newPacketKey directly.
func newPacket(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.Packet) error {
var parsed batch.RxParsed
if err := batch.ParsePacket(data, incoming, &parsed); err != nil {
return err
if len(data) < 1 {
return ErrPacketTooShort
}
parsed.Key.Hydrate(fp)
version := int((data[0] >> 4) & 0x0f)
switch version {
case ipv4.Version:
return parseV4(data, incoming, fp)
case ipv6.Version:
return parseV6(data, incoming, fp)
}
return ErrUnknownIPVersion
}
func parseV6(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.Packet) error {
dataLen := len(data)
if dataLen < ipv6.HeaderLen {
return ErrIPv6PacketTooShort
}
if incoming {
fp.RemoteAddr, _ = netip.AddrFromSlice(data[8:24])
fp.LocalAddr, _ = netip.AddrFromSlice(data[24:40])
} else {
fp.LocalAddr, _ = netip.AddrFromSlice(data[8:24])
fp.RemoteAddr, _ = netip.AddrFromSlice(data[24:40])
}
protoAt := 6 // NextHeader is at 6 bytes into the ipv6 header
offset := ipv6.HeaderLen // Start at the end of the ipv6 header
next := 0
for {
if protoAt >= dataLen {
break
}
proto := layers.IPProtocol(data[protoAt])
switch proto {
case layers.IPProtocolESP, layers.IPProtocolNoNextHeader:
fp.Protocol = uint8(proto)
fp.RemotePort = 0
fp.LocalPort = 0
fp.Fragment = false
return nil
case layers.IPProtocolICMPv6:
if dataLen < offset+6 {
return ErrIPv6PacketTooShort
}
fp.Protocol = uint8(proto)
fp.LocalPort = 0 //incoming vs outgoing doesn't matter for icmpv6
icmptype := data[offset+1]
switch icmptype {
case layers.ICMPv6TypeEchoRequest, layers.ICMPv6TypeEchoReply:
fp.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[offset+4 : offset+6]) //identifier
default:
fp.RemotePort = 0
}
fp.Fragment = false
return nil
case layers.IPProtocolTCP, layers.IPProtocolUDP:
if dataLen < offset+4 {
return ErrIPv6PacketTooShort
}
fp.Protocol = uint8(proto)
if incoming {
fp.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[offset : offset+2])
fp.LocalPort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[offset+2 : offset+4])
} else {
fp.LocalPort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[offset : offset+2])
fp.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[offset+2 : offset+4])
}
fp.Fragment = false
return nil
case layers.IPProtocolIPv6Fragment:
// Fragment header is 8 bytes, need at least offset+4 to read the offset field
if dataLen < offset+8 {
return ErrIPv6PacketTooShort
}
// Check if this is the first fragment
fragmentOffset := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[offset+2:offset+4]) &^ uint16(0x7) // Remove the reserved and M flag bits
if fragmentOffset != 0 {
// Non-first fragment, use what we have now and stop processing
fp.Protocol = data[offset]
fp.Fragment = true
fp.RemotePort = 0
fp.LocalPort = 0
return nil
}
// The next loop should be the transport layer since we are the first fragment
next = 8 // Fragment headers are always 8 bytes
case layers.IPProtocolAH:
// Auth headers, used by IPSec, have a different meaning for header length
if dataLen <= offset+1 {
break
}
next = int(data[offset+1]+2) << 2
default:
// Normal ipv6 header length processing
if dataLen <= offset+1 {
break
}
next = int(data[offset+1]+1) << 3
}
if next <= 0 {
// Safety check, each ipv6 header has to be at least 8 bytes
next = 8
}
protoAt = offset
offset = offset + next
}
return ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload
}
func parseV4(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.Packet) error {
// Do we at least have an ipv4 header worth of data?
if len(data) < ipv4.HeaderLen {
return ErrIPv4PacketTooShort
}
// Adjust our start position based on the advertised ip header length
ihl := int(data[0]&0x0f) << 2
// Well-formed ip header length?
if ihl < ipv4.HeaderLen {
return ErrIPv4InvalidHeaderLength
}
// Check if this is the second or further fragment of a fragmented packet.
flagsfrags := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[6:8])
fp.Fragment = (flagsfrags & 0x1FFF) != 0
// Firewall handles protocol checks
fp.Protocol = data[9]
// Accounting for a variable header length, do we have enough data for our src/dst tuples?
minLen := ihl
if !fp.Fragment {
if fp.Protocol == firewall.ProtoICMP {
minLen += minFwPacketLen + 2
} else {
minLen += minFwPacketLen
}
}
if len(data) < minLen {
return ErrIPv4InvalidHeaderLength
}
if incoming { // Firewall packets are locally oriented
fp.RemoteAddr, _ = netip.AddrFromSlice(data[12:16])
fp.LocalAddr, _ = netip.AddrFromSlice(data[16:20])
} else {
fp.LocalAddr, _ = netip.AddrFromSlice(data[12:16])
fp.RemoteAddr, _ = netip.AddrFromSlice(data[16:20])
}
if fp.Fragment {
fp.RemotePort = 0
fp.LocalPort = 0
} else if fp.Protocol == firewall.ProtoICMP { //note that orientation doesn't matter on ICMP
fp.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[ihl+4 : ihl+6]) //identifier
fp.LocalPort = 0 //code would be uint16(data[ihl+1])
} else if incoming {
fp.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[ihl : ihl+2]) //src port
fp.LocalPort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[ihl+2 : ihl+4]) //dst port
} else {
fp.LocalPort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[ihl : ihl+2]) //src port
fp.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[ihl+2 : ihl+4]) //dst port
}
return nil
}
func (f *Interface) decrypt(hostinfo *HostInfo, mc uint64, out []byte, packet []byte, h *header.H, nb []byte) ([]byte, error) {
var err error
out, err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.DecryptDanger(out, packet[:header.Len], packet[header.Len:], mc, nb)
func (f *Interface) decrypt(hostinfo *HostInfo, mc uint64, buf *WireBuffer, packet []byte, h *header.H) ([]byte, error) {
plaintext, err := buf.DecryptForHandler(hostinfo.ConnectionState, packet, mc)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if !hostinfo.ConnectionState.window.Update(f.l, mc) {
return nil, ErrOutOfWindow
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("dropping out of window packet", "header", h)
}
return nil, errors.New("out of window packet")
}
return out, nil
return plaintext, nil
}
// 2-bit IP-level ECN codepoints (lower bits of IPv4 ToS / IPv6 TC).
const (
ecnNotECT = 0x00
ecnECT1 = 0x01
ecnECT0 = 0x02
ecnCE = 0x03
)
// applyOuterECN folds an outer CE mark from the underlay into the inner
// IP header per RFC 6040 normal mode. It mutates pkt[1] in place. Other
// codepoints are advisory only and leave the inner unchanged.
//
// Merge cases (outer × inner → action):
//
// outer != CE : no-op (inner is authoritative)
// outer == CE, inner Not-ECT : log; cannot propagate to a non-ECN host
// outer == CE, inner ECT/CE : rewrite inner ECN to CE
func applyOuterECN(pkt []byte, outerECN byte, hostinfo *HostInfo, l *slog.Logger) {
if outerECN&ecnCE != ecnCE || len(pkt) < 2 {
return
}
switch pkt[0] >> 4 {
case 4:
switch pkt[1] & 0x03 {
case ecnNotECT:
if l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(l).Debug("RFC 6040: outer CE on inner Not-ECT, leaving inner unchanged")
}
case ecnCE:
// Already CE.
default:
pkt[1] = (pkt[1] &^ 0x03) | ecnCE
}
case 6:
switch (pkt[1] >> 4) & 0x03 {
case ecnNotECT:
if l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(l).Debug("RFC 6040: outer CE on inner Not-ECT, leaving inner unchanged")
}
case ecnCE:
// Already CE.
default:
pkt[1] = (pkt[1] &^ 0x30) | (ecnCE << 4)
}
}
}
func (f *Interface) handleOutsideMessagePacket(hostinfo *HostInfo, out []byte, packet []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, parsedRx *batch.RxParsed, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache, meta udp.RxMeta) {
// RFC 6040 normal-mode combine: fold any outer CE mark stamped by the
// underlay into the inner header before firewall + TUN write. Other
// outer codepoints are advisory only — we keep the inner unchanged.
if f.ecnEnabled.Load() {
applyOuterECN(out, meta.OuterECN, hostinfo, f.l)
func (f *Interface) decryptToTun(hostinfo *HostInfo, messageCounter uint64, buf *WireBuffer, packet []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) bool {
if err := buf.DecryptDatagram(hostinfo.ConnectionState, packet, messageCounter); err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to decrypt packet", "error", err)
return false
}
// Single IP+L4 walk feeds the firewall conntrack key (parsedRx.Key)
// and the batcher hint (parsedRx.tcp/udp). Replaces newPacket — and
// pointedly does NOT fill fwPacket.LocalAddr/RemoteAddr, since
// firewall.Drop's fast path uses Key alone and only hydrates fwPacket
// from Key on the slow path.
*fwPacket = firewall.Packet{}
err := batch.ParsePacket(out, true, parsedRx)
if err != nil {
ipPacket := buf.IPPacket()
if err := newPacket(ipPacket, true, buf.FwPacket); err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Warn("Error while validating inbound packet",
"error", err,
"packet", out,
"packet", ipPacket,
)
return
return false
}
dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(parsedRx.Key, fwPacket, true, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), localCache)
if !hostinfo.ConnectionState.window.Update(f.l, messageCounter) {
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("dropping out of window packet", "fwPacket", buf.FwPacket)
}
return false
}
dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(*buf.FwPacket, true, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), localCache)
if dropReason != nil {
// NOTE: We give `packet` as the `out` here since we already decrypted from it and we don't need it anymore
// This gives us a buffer to build the reject packet in
f.rejectOutside(out, hostinfo.ConnectionState, hostinfo, nb, packet, q)
// NOTE: We hand `packet` (the original UDP ciphertext we already
// decrypted from) as the reject-IP scratch since we no longer
// need its ciphertext, and it's disjoint from buf.Out where
// sendNoMetrics will encrypt the wire packet.
f.rejectOutside(ipPacket, hostinfo.ConnectionState, hostinfo, packet, buf, q)
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("dropping inbound packet",
"fwPacket", fwPacket,
"fwPacket", buf.FwPacket,
"reason", dropReason,
)
}
return
return false
}
err = f.batchers[q].CommitInbound(out, parsedRx)
if err != nil {
f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo)
if _, err := buf.WriteIPToTUN(f.readers[q]); err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to write to tun", "error", err)
}
return true
}
func (f *Interface) maybeSendRecvError(endpoint netip.AddrPort, index uint32) {
+19 -20
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import (
"github.com/google/gopacket/layers"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/batch"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"golang.org/x/net/ipv4"
@@ -22,13 +21,13 @@ func Test_newPacket(t *testing.T) {
// length fails
err := newPacket([]byte{}, true, p)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, batch.ErrPacketTooShort)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrPacketTooShort)
err = newPacket([]byte{0x40}, true, p)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, batch.ErrIPv4PacketTooShort)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIPv4PacketTooShort)
err = newPacket([]byte{0x60}, true, p)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, batch.ErrIPv6PacketTooShort)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIPv6PacketTooShort)
// length fail with ip options
h := ipv4.Header{
@@ -41,15 +40,15 @@ func Test_newPacket(t *testing.T) {
b, _ := h.Marshal()
err = newPacket(b, true, p)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, batch.ErrIPv4InvalidHeaderLength)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIPv4InvalidHeaderLength)
// not an ipv4 packet
err = newPacket([]byte{0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, true, p)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, batch.ErrUnknownIPVersion)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrUnknownIPVersion)
// invalid ihl
err = newPacket([]byte{4<<4 | (8 >> 2 & 0x0f), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, true, p)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, batch.ErrIPv4InvalidHeaderLength)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIPv4InvalidHeaderLength)
// account for variable ip header length - incoming
h = ipv4.Header{
@@ -116,7 +115,7 @@ func Test_newPacket_v6(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t, err)
err = newPacket(buffer.Bytes(), true, p)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, batch.ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload)
// A v6 packet with a hop-by-hop extension
// ICMPv6 Payload (Echo Request)
@@ -150,12 +149,12 @@ func Test_newPacket_v6(t *testing.T) {
// A full IPv6 header and 1 byte in the first extension, but missing
// the length byte.
err = newPacket(buffer.Bytes()[:41], true, p)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, batch.ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload)
// A full IPv6 header plus 1 full extension, but only 1 byte of the
// next layer, missing length byte
err = newPacket(buffer.Bytes()[:49], true, p)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, batch.ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload)
err = nil
// A good ICMP packet
@@ -218,7 +217,7 @@ func Test_newPacket_v6(t *testing.T) {
b = buffer.Bytes()
b[6] = 255 // 255 is a reserved protocol number
err = newPacket(b, true, p)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, batch.ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload)
// A good UDP packet
ip = layers.IPv6{
@@ -265,7 +264,7 @@ func Test_newPacket_v6(t *testing.T) {
// Too short UDP packet
err = newPacket(b[:len(b)-10], false, p) // pull off the last 10 bytes
require.ErrorIs(t, err, batch.ErrIPv6PacketTooShort)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIPv6PacketTooShort)
// A good TCP packet
b[6] = byte(layers.IPProtocolTCP)
@@ -292,7 +291,7 @@ func Test_newPacket_v6(t *testing.T) {
// Too short TCP packet
err = newPacket(b[:len(b)-10], false, p) // pull off the last 10 bytes
require.ErrorIs(t, err, batch.ErrIPv6PacketTooShort)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIPv6PacketTooShort)
// A good UDP packet with an AH header
ip = layers.IPv6{
@@ -337,12 +336,12 @@ func Test_newPacket_v6(t *testing.T) {
// Ensure buffer bounds checking during processing
err = newPacket(b[:41], true, p)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, batch.ErrIPv6PacketTooShort)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIPv6PacketTooShort)
// Invalid AH header
b = buffer.Bytes()
err = newPacket(b, true, p)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, batch.ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload)
}
func Test_newPacket_ipv6Fragment(t *testing.T) {
@@ -449,7 +448,7 @@ func Test_newPacket_ipv6Fragment(t *testing.T) {
// Too short of a fragment packet
err = newPacket(secondFrag[:len(secondFrag)-10], false, p)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, batch.ErrIPv6PacketTooShort)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIPv6PacketTooShort)
}
func BenchmarkParseV6(b *testing.B) {
@@ -530,7 +529,7 @@ func BenchmarkParseV6(b *testing.B) {
b.Run("Normal", func(b *testing.B) {
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
if err = newPacket(normalPacket, true, fp); err != nil {
if err = parseV6(normalPacket, true, fp); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
}
@@ -538,7 +537,7 @@ func BenchmarkParseV6(b *testing.B) {
b.Run("FirstFragment", func(b *testing.B) {
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
if err = newPacket(firstFrag, true, fp); err != nil {
if err = parseV6(firstFrag, true, fp); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
}
@@ -546,7 +545,7 @@ func BenchmarkParseV6(b *testing.B) {
b.Run("SecondFragment", func(b *testing.B) {
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
if err = newPacket(secondFrag, true, fp); err != nil {
if err = parseV6(secondFrag, true, fp); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
}
@@ -591,7 +590,7 @@ func BenchmarkParseV6(b *testing.B) {
b.Run("200 HopByHop headers", func(b *testing.B) {
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
if err = newPacket(evilBytes, false, fp); err != nil {
if err = parseV6(evilBytes, false, fp); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
}
-35
View File
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
package batch
import "net/netip"
type RxBatcher interface {
// Reserve creates a pkt to borrow
Reserve(sz int) []byte
// Commit borrows pkt. The caller must keep pkt valid until the next Flush.
// Walks IP+L4 headers itself; prefer CommitInbound when the caller already
// has an RxParsed in hand from ParsePacket.
Commit(pkt []byte) error
// CommitInbound is Commit with a hint produced by ParsePacket, so the
// batcher can skip the IP+L4 re-parse. Borrowed slice contract is the
// same as Commit. Implementations that don't coalesce may delegate to
// Commit.
CommitInbound(pkt []byte, parsed *RxParsed) error
// Flush emits every queued packet in arrival order. Returns the
// first error observed; keeps draining so one bad packet doesn't hold up
// the rest. After Flush returns, borrowed payload slices may be recycled.
Flush() error
}
type TxBatcher interface {
// Reserve creates a pkt to borrow
Reserve(sz int) []byte
// Commit borrows pkt and records its destination plus the 2-bit
// IP-level ECN codepoint to set on the outer (carrier) header. The
// caller must keep pkt valid until the next Flush. Pass 0 (Not-ECT)
// to leave the outer ECN field unset.
Commit(pkt []byte, dst netip.AddrPort, outerECN byte)
// Flush emits every queued packet via the underlying batch writer in
// arrival order. Returns an errors.Join of one or more errors. After Flush returns,
// borrowed payload slices may be recycled.
Flush() error
}
-163
View File
@@ -1,163 +0,0 @@
package batch
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/binary"
)
// flowKey identifies a transport flow by {src, dst, sport, dport, family}.
// Comparable, so map lookups and linear scans over the slot list stay tight.
// Shared by the TCP and UDP coalescers; each coalescer keeps its own
// openSlots map, so a TCP and UDP flow on the same 5-tuple-without-proto
// never alias.
type flowKey struct {
src, dst [16]byte
sport, dport uint16
isV6 bool
}
// initialSlots is the starting capacity of the slot pool. One flow per
// packet is the worst case so this matches a typical carrier-side
// recvmmsg batch on the encrypted UDP socket.
const initialSlots = 64
// parsedIP is the IP-level result of parseIPPrologue. The caller layers
// L4-specific parsing (TCP / UDP) on top.
type parsedIP struct {
fk flowKey
ipHdrLen int
// pkt is the original buffer trimmed to the IP-declared total length.
// Anything below the IP layer (transport parsers) should slice into
// pkt rather than the unbounded original.
pkt []byte
}
// parseIPPrologue extracts the IP-level fields the coalescers care about:
// IHL/payload length, version, src/dst addresses, and the L4 protocol byte.
// Returns ok=false for malformed input, IPv4 with options or fragmentation,
// or IPv6 with extension headers (all rejected by both coalescers in
// identical ways before this refactor).
//
// On success, p.pkt is len-trimmed to the IP-declared length so callers
// don't have to repeat the trim. wantProto is the IANA protocol number to
// require (6 for TCP, 17 for UDP); ok=false for any other value.
func parseIPPrologue(pkt []byte, wantProto byte) (parsedIP, bool) {
var p parsedIP
if len(pkt) < 20 {
return p, false
}
v := pkt[0] >> 4
switch v {
case 4:
ihl := int(pkt[0]&0x0f) * 4
if ihl != 20 {
return p, false
}
if pkt[9] != wantProto {
return p, false
}
// Reject actual fragmentation (MF or non-zero frag offset).
if binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[6:8])&0x3fff != 0 {
return p, false
}
totalLen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[2:4]))
if totalLen > len(pkt) || totalLen < ihl {
return p, false
}
p.ipHdrLen = 20
p.fk.isV6 = false
copy(p.fk.src[:4], pkt[12:16])
copy(p.fk.dst[:4], pkt[16:20])
p.pkt = pkt[:totalLen]
case 6:
if len(pkt) < 40 {
return p, false
}
if pkt[6] != wantProto {
return p, false
}
payloadLen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[4:6]))
if 40+payloadLen > len(pkt) {
return p, false
}
p.ipHdrLen = 40
p.fk.isV6 = true
copy(p.fk.src[:], pkt[8:24])
copy(p.fk.dst[:], pkt[24:40])
p.pkt = pkt[:40+payloadLen]
default:
return p, false
}
return p, true
}
// ipHeadersMatch compares the IP portion of two packet header prefixes for
// byte-for-byte equality on every field that must be identical across
// coalesced segments. Size/IPID/IPCsum and the 2-bit IP-level ECN field are
// masked out — the appendPayload step merges CE into the seed.
//
// The transport (L4) portion of the header is checked separately by the
// per-protocol matcher.
func ipHeadersMatch(a, b []byte, isV6 bool) bool {
if isV6 {
// IPv6: byte 0 = version/TC[7:4], byte 1 = TC[3:0]/flow[19:16],
// bytes [2:4] = flow[15:0], [6:8] = next_hdr/hop, [8:40] = src+dst.
// ECN lives in TC[1:0] = byte 1 mask 0x30. Skip [4:6] payload_len.
if a[0] != b[0] {
return false
}
if a[1]&^0x30 != b[1]&^0x30 {
return false
}
if !bytes.Equal(a[2:4], b[2:4]) {
return false
}
if !bytes.Equal(a[6:40], b[6:40]) {
return false
}
return true
}
// IPv4: byte 0 = version/IHL, byte 1 = DSCP(6)|ECN(2),
// [6:10] flags/fragoff/TTL/proto, [12:20] src+dst.
// Skip [2:4] total len, [4:6] id, [10:12] csum.
if a[0] != b[0] {
return false
}
if a[1]&^0x03 != b[1]&^0x03 {
return false
}
if !bytes.Equal(a[6:10], b[6:10]) {
return false
}
if !bytes.Equal(a[12:20], b[12:20]) {
return false
}
return true
}
// mergeECNIntoSeed ORs the 2-bit IP-level ECN field of pkt's IP header
// onto the seed's IP header, so a CE mark on any coalesced segment
// propagates to the final superpacket. (CE is 0b11; ORing yields CE if
// any segment carried it.) Used by both TCP and UDP coalescers, so the
// invariant lives in one place.
func mergeECNIntoSeed(seedHdr, pktHdr []byte, isV6 bool) {
if isV6 {
seedHdr[1] |= pktHdr[1] & 0x30
} else {
seedHdr[1] |= pktHdr[1] & 0x03
}
}
// reserveFromBacking implements the Reserve half of the RxBatcher contract
// shared by TCP and UDP coalescers. The backing slice grows on demand;
// already-committed slices reference the old array and remain valid until
// Flush resets backing.
func reserveFromBacking(backing *[]byte, sz int) []byte {
if len(*backing)+sz > cap(*backing) {
newCap := max(cap(*backing)*2, sz)
*backing = make([]byte, 0, newCap)
}
start := len(*backing)
*backing = (*backing)[:start+sz]
return (*backing)[start : start+sz : start+sz]
}
-443
View File
@@ -1,443 +0,0 @@
package batch
import (
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
)
// IANA protocol numbers we recognise during the inbound parse. Kept local
// (rather than reaching for the firewall constants for every one of these)
// so the byte-comparison hot path doesn't depend on cross-package values.
const (
ipProtoICMP = 1
ipProtoIPv6Fragment = 44
ipProtoESP = 50
ipProtoAH = 51
ipProtoICMPv6 = 58
ipProtoNoNextHdr = 59
icmpv6TypeEchoRequest = 128
icmpv6TypeEchoReply = 129
)
// Packet parse errors — the canonical sentinel set for IP+L4 parsing.
// Both inbound and outbound callers share this surface, so any code path
// that ends up at firewall.PacketKey reports drops with the same errors.
var (
ErrPacketTooShort = errors.New("packet is too short")
ErrUnknownIPVersion = errors.New("packet is an unknown ip version")
ErrIPv4InvalidHeaderLength = errors.New("invalid ipv4 header length")
ErrIPv4PacketTooShort = errors.New("ipv4 packet is too short")
ErrIPv6PacketTooShort = errors.New("ipv6 packet is too short")
ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload = errors.New("could not find payload in ipv6 packet")
)
// RxKind discriminates how an inbound plaintext packet should be committed
// after its firewall.Packet has been built. RxKindPassthrough means the
// IP shape is valid (firewall could match on it) but the coalescer's
// strict checks reject it — caller should still write it via the
// passthrough lane.
type RxKind uint8
const (
RxKindPassthrough RxKind = iota
RxKindTCP
RxKindUDP
)
// RxParsed is the unified result of one IP+L4 walk:
// - Key: the firewall's conntrack/cache lookup key. The dense form lets
// firewall.Drop hit conntrack without ever filling the rich Packet's
// netip.Addr fields. On a conntrack miss, Drop hydrates the caller's
// Packet from Key.
// - tcp/udp: the coalescer hint so commitParsed doesn't re-walk the
// headers. Meaningful only when Kind is RxKindTCP / RxKindUDP.
type RxParsed struct {
Kind RxKind
Key firewall.PacketKey
tcp parsedTCP
udp parsedUDP
}
// ParsePacket walks an IP packet once and fills parsed.Key. When incoming
// is true and the L4 shape is coalesce-eligible, also fills parsed.tcp /
// parsed.udp so CommitInbound can dispatch into the coalescer without
// re-walking the headers.
//
// Direction selects the Key orientation:
//
// incoming=true → wire src → Key.RemoteAddr/Port, wire dst → Key.LocalAddr/Port
// incoming=false → wire src → Key.LocalAddr/Port, wire dst → Key.RemoteAddr/Port
//
// ICMP always lands the identifier in Key.RemotePort, regardless of direction.
//
// Eligibility rules for the coalescer hint match the coalescer's own
// parseTCPBase/parseUDP:
// - IPv4 strict: IHL == 20, no fragmentation (MF or offset), proto TCP/UDP.
// - IPv6 strict: NextHeader is directly TCP or UDP (no extension headers).
//
// The hint is only filled for incoming packets, since the outbound path
// does not feed an inbound coalescer. Outbound callers see Kind stay at
// RxKindPassthrough and parsed.tcp/udp stay zero.
func ParsePacket(pkt []byte, incoming bool, parsed *RxParsed) error {
parsed.Kind = RxKindPassthrough
// Reset Key in full: v4 only writes the low 4 bytes of each address
// field, so without this a v6 call followed by a v4 reusing the same
// RxParsed would inherit the high 12 bytes — breaking the conntrack
// map equality for v4 flows.
parsed.Key = firewall.PacketKey{}
if len(pkt) < 1 {
return ErrPacketTooShort
}
switch pkt[0] >> 4 {
case 4:
return parsePacketV4(pkt, incoming, parsed)
case 6:
return parsePacketV6(pkt, incoming, parsed)
}
return ErrUnknownIPVersion
}
// parsePacketV4 fills parsed.Key from an IPv4 packet. Direction selects
// Local/Remote orientation. When incoming and the shape is strict, also
// fills the coalescer hint.
func parsePacketV4(pkt []byte, incoming bool, parsed *RxParsed) error {
if len(pkt) < 20 {
return ErrIPv4PacketTooShort
}
ihl := int(pkt[0]&0x0f) << 2
if ihl < 20 {
return ErrIPv4InvalidHeaderLength
}
flagsfrags := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[6:8])
parsed.Key.Fragment = (flagsfrags & 0x1FFF) != 0
parsed.Key.Protocol = pkt[9]
parsed.Key.IsV6 = false
// minFwPacketLen (4) is the L4-header prefix the firewall needs to pull
// ports; ICMP needs two extra bytes for the identifier.
minLen := ihl
if !parsed.Key.Fragment {
if parsed.Key.Protocol == firewall.ProtoICMP {
minLen += 4 + 2
} else {
minLen += 4
}
}
if len(pkt) < minLen {
return ErrIPv4InvalidHeaderLength
}
if incoming {
copy(parsed.Key.RemoteAddr[:4], pkt[12:16])
copy(parsed.Key.LocalAddr[:4], pkt[16:20])
} else {
copy(parsed.Key.LocalAddr[:4], pkt[12:16])
copy(parsed.Key.RemoteAddr[:4], pkt[16:20])
}
switch {
case parsed.Key.Fragment:
parsed.Key.RemotePort = 0
parsed.Key.LocalPort = 0
case parsed.Key.Protocol == firewall.ProtoICMP:
parsed.Key.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[ihl+4 : ihl+6])
parsed.Key.LocalPort = 0
case incoming:
parsed.Key.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[ihl : ihl+2])
parsed.Key.LocalPort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[ihl+2 : ihl+4])
default:
parsed.Key.LocalPort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[ihl : ihl+2])
parsed.Key.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[ihl+2 : ihl+4])
}
// Coalescer hint is inbound-only: no inbound coalescer fires on outgoing.
if !incoming {
return nil
}
// Coalescer-eligible? Strict shape: IHL==20, no MF/offset, TCP or UDP.
if ihl != 20 || (flagsfrags&0x3FFF) != 0 {
return nil
}
if parsed.Key.Protocol != ipProtoTCP && parsed.Key.Protocol != ipProtoUDP {
return nil
}
totalLen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[2:4]))
if totalLen > len(pkt) || totalLen < 20 {
return nil
}
pktTrim := pkt[:totalLen]
switch parsed.Key.Protocol {
case ipProtoTCP:
fillParsedTCPv4(pktTrim, parsed)
case ipProtoUDP:
fillParsedUDPv4(pktTrim, parsed)
}
return nil
}
// fillParsedTCPv4 fills parsed.tcp from a strict-shape IPv4+TCP packet
// already validated to have IHL==20 and to be totalLen-trimmed.
func fillParsedTCPv4(pkt []byte, parsed *RxParsed) {
if len(pkt) < 40 { // IPv4(20) + min TCP(20)
return
}
tcpOff := int(pkt[32]>>4) * 4
if tcpOff < 20 || tcpOff > 60 {
return
}
if len(pkt) < 20+tcpOff {
return
}
p := &parsed.tcp
p.ipHdrLen = 20
p.tcpHdrLen = tcpOff
p.hdrLen = 20 + tcpOff
p.payLen = len(pkt) - p.hdrLen
p.seq = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(pkt[24:28])
p.flags = pkt[33]
p.fk.isV6 = false
p.fk.sport = parsed.Key.RemotePort
p.fk.dport = parsed.Key.LocalPort
copy(p.fk.src[:4], pkt[12:16])
copy(p.fk.dst[:4], pkt[16:20])
parsed.Kind = RxKindTCP
}
// fillParsedUDPv4 fills parsed.udp from a strict-shape IPv4+UDP packet.
func fillParsedUDPv4(pkt []byte, parsed *RxParsed) {
if len(pkt) < 28 { // IPv4(20) + UDP(8)
return
}
udpLen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[24:26]))
if udpLen < 8 || udpLen > len(pkt)-20 {
return
}
p := &parsed.udp
p.ipHdrLen = 20
p.hdrLen = 28
p.payLen = udpLen - 8
p.fk.isV6 = false
p.fk.sport = parsed.Key.RemotePort
p.fk.dport = parsed.Key.LocalPort
copy(p.fk.src[:4], pkt[12:16])
copy(p.fk.dst[:4], pkt[16:20])
parsed.Kind = RxKindUDP
}
// parsePacketV6 fills parsed.Key from an IPv6 packet. Direction selects
// Local/Remote orientation. The coalescer hint fast path only triggers
// when NextHeader is directly TCP or UDP — any extension header chain
// falls into the lenient walk below, and the hint stays unfilled.
func parsePacketV6(pkt []byte, incoming bool, parsed *RxParsed) error {
if len(pkt) < 40 {
return ErrIPv6PacketTooShort
}
parsed.Key.IsV6 = true
if incoming {
copy(parsed.Key.RemoteAddr[:], pkt[8:24])
copy(parsed.Key.LocalAddr[:], pkt[24:40])
} else {
copy(parsed.Key.LocalAddr[:], pkt[8:24])
copy(parsed.Key.RemoteAddr[:], pkt[24:40])
}
if proto := pkt[6]; proto == ipProtoTCP || proto == ipProtoUDP {
// Strict v6: ports are at the IP header end. Always fill key; only
// fill the coalescer hint if the L4 shape passes.
if len(pkt) < 44 {
return ErrIPv6PacketTooShort
}
parsed.Key.Protocol = proto
parsed.Key.Fragment = false
if incoming {
parsed.Key.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[40:42])
parsed.Key.LocalPort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[42:44])
} else {
parsed.Key.LocalPort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[40:42])
parsed.Key.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[42:44])
}
// Coalescer hint is inbound-only.
if !incoming {
return nil
}
payloadLen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[4:6]))
if 40+payloadLen > len(pkt) {
return nil
}
pktTrim := pkt[:40+payloadLen]
switch proto {
case ipProtoTCP:
fillParsedTCPv6(pktTrim, parsed)
case ipProtoUDP:
fillParsedUDPv6(pktTrim, parsed)
}
return nil
}
// Slow path: walk extension header chain. Coalescer hint never fires
// here, so direction only matters for L4 port orientation.
return walkV6Headers(pkt, incoming, parsed)
}
func fillParsedTCPv6(pkt []byte, parsed *RxParsed) {
if len(pkt) < 60 { // IPv6(40) + min TCP(20)
return
}
tcpOff := int(pkt[52]>>4) * 4
if tcpOff < 20 || tcpOff > 60 {
return
}
if len(pkt) < 40+tcpOff {
return
}
p := &parsed.tcp
p.ipHdrLen = 40
p.tcpHdrLen = tcpOff
p.hdrLen = 40 + tcpOff
p.payLen = len(pkt) - p.hdrLen
p.seq = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(pkt[44:48])
p.flags = pkt[53]
p.fk.isV6 = true
p.fk.sport = parsed.Key.RemotePort
p.fk.dport = parsed.Key.LocalPort
copy(p.fk.src[:], pkt[8:24])
copy(p.fk.dst[:], pkt[24:40])
parsed.Kind = RxKindTCP
}
func fillParsedUDPv6(pkt []byte, parsed *RxParsed) {
if len(pkt) < 48 { // IPv6(40) + UDP(8)
return
}
udpLen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[44:46]))
if udpLen < 8 || udpLen > len(pkt)-40 {
return
}
p := &parsed.udp
p.ipHdrLen = 40
p.hdrLen = 48
p.payLen = udpLen - 8
p.fk.isV6 = true
p.fk.sport = parsed.Key.RemotePort
p.fk.dport = parsed.Key.LocalPort
copy(p.fk.src[:], pkt[8:24])
copy(p.fk.dst[:], pkt[24:40])
parsed.Kind = RxKindUDP
}
// walkV6Headers handles every IPv6 case the strict "NextHeader == TCP/UDP"
// fast path doesn't: ESP, NoNextHeader, ICMPv6, fragment headers (first vs
// later), AH, generic extension headers. Coalescer eligibility is always
// RxKindPassthrough on this path (parsed already initialised that way).
// Direction matters only for the L4 port orientation when the chain
// terminates at TCP/UDP.
func walkV6Headers(pkt []byte, incoming bool, parsed *RxParsed) error {
dataLen := len(pkt)
protoAt := 6
offset := 40
next := 0
for {
if protoAt >= dataLen {
break
}
proto := pkt[protoAt]
switch proto {
case ipProtoESP, ipProtoNoNextHdr:
parsed.Key.Protocol = proto
parsed.Key.RemotePort = 0
parsed.Key.LocalPort = 0
parsed.Key.Fragment = false
return nil
case ipProtoICMPv6:
if dataLen < offset+6 {
return ErrIPv6PacketTooShort
}
parsed.Key.Protocol = proto
parsed.Key.LocalPort = 0
switch pkt[offset+1] {
case icmpv6TypeEchoRequest, icmpv6TypeEchoReply:
parsed.Key.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[offset+4 : offset+6])
default:
parsed.Key.RemotePort = 0
}
parsed.Key.Fragment = false
return nil
case ipProtoTCP, ipProtoUDP:
// Reachable when an extension-header chain ends at TCP/UDP. The
// strict-eligible fast path above already handled the no-extension
// case; here we only fill firewall ports and stay passthrough.
if dataLen < offset+4 {
return ErrIPv6PacketTooShort
}
parsed.Key.Protocol = proto
if incoming {
parsed.Key.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[offset : offset+2])
parsed.Key.LocalPort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[offset+2 : offset+4])
} else {
parsed.Key.LocalPort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[offset : offset+2])
parsed.Key.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[offset+2 : offset+4])
}
parsed.Key.Fragment = false
return nil
case ipProtoIPv6Fragment:
if dataLen < offset+8 {
return ErrIPv6PacketTooShort
}
fragmentOffset := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[offset+2:offset+4]) &^ uint16(0x7)
if fragmentOffset != 0 {
// Non-first fragment: report the fragment flag and stop.
parsed.Key.Protocol = pkt[offset]
parsed.Key.Fragment = true
parsed.Key.RemotePort = 0
parsed.Key.LocalPort = 0
return nil
}
next = 8
case ipProtoAH:
if dataLen <= offset+1 {
break
}
next = int(pkt[offset+1]+2) << 2
default:
if dataLen <= offset+1 {
break
}
next = int(pkt[offset+1]+1) << 3
}
if next <= 0 {
next = 8
}
protoAt = offset
offset = offset + next
}
return ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload
}
// CommitInbound dispatches pkt to the appropriate lane using parsed.Kind,
// skipping the IP+L4 re-parse that MultiCoalescer.Commit would otherwise
// do. Borrowed slice contract is identical to MultiCoalescer.Commit.
func (m *MultiCoalescer) CommitInbound(pkt []byte, parsed *RxParsed) error {
switch parsed.Kind {
case RxKindTCP:
if m.tcp != nil {
return m.tcp.commitParsed(pkt, parsed.tcp)
}
case RxKindUDP:
if m.udp != nil {
return m.udp.commitParsed(pkt, parsed.udp)
}
}
return m.pt.Commit(pkt)
}
-394
View File
@@ -1,394 +0,0 @@
package batch
import (
"encoding/binary"
"net/netip"
"testing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
)
// parseV4InboundBaseline mirrors what outside.go's parseV4(incoming=true)
// does, so the "split" bench measures the *current* state: firewall-side
// parse, then m.Commit re-parses inside the coalescer. Two walks per
// packet. Kept faithful in shape (one read per field, AddrFromSlice for
// the addrs) so the CPU profile matches the production parseV4.
func parseV4InboundBaseline(pkt []byte, fp *firewall.Packet) bool {
if len(pkt) < 20 {
return false
}
ihl := int(pkt[0]&0x0f) << 2
if ihl < 20 {
return false
}
flagsfrags := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[6:8])
fp.Fragment = (flagsfrags & 0x1FFF) != 0
fp.Protocol = pkt[9]
minLen := ihl
if !fp.Fragment {
if fp.Protocol == firewall.ProtoICMP {
minLen += 4 + 2
} else {
minLen += 4
}
}
if len(pkt) < minLen {
return false
}
fp.RemoteAddr, _ = netip.AddrFromSlice(pkt[12:16])
fp.LocalAddr, _ = netip.AddrFromSlice(pkt[16:20])
switch {
case fp.Fragment:
fp.RemotePort = 0
fp.LocalPort = 0
case fp.Protocol == firewall.ProtoICMP:
fp.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[ihl+4 : ihl+6])
fp.LocalPort = 0
default:
fp.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[ihl : ihl+2])
fp.LocalPort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[ihl+2 : ihl+4])
}
return true
}
// parseV6InboundBaseline is the v6 analogue: replicates parseV6's
// extension-header walk so the split bench captures its true cost.
func parseV6InboundBaseline(pkt []byte, fp *firewall.Packet) bool {
dataLen := len(pkt)
if dataLen < 40 {
return false
}
fp.RemoteAddr, _ = netip.AddrFromSlice(pkt[8:24])
fp.LocalAddr, _ = netip.AddrFromSlice(pkt[24:40])
protoAt := 6
offset := 40
next := 0
for {
if protoAt >= dataLen {
return false
}
proto := pkt[protoAt]
switch proto {
case ipProtoESP, ipProtoNoNextHdr:
fp.Protocol = proto
fp.RemotePort = 0
fp.LocalPort = 0
fp.Fragment = false
return true
case ipProtoICMPv6:
if dataLen < offset+6 {
return false
}
fp.Protocol = proto
fp.LocalPort = 0
switch pkt[offset+1] {
case icmpv6TypeEchoRequest, icmpv6TypeEchoReply:
fp.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[offset+4 : offset+6])
default:
fp.RemotePort = 0
}
fp.Fragment = false
return true
case ipProtoTCP, ipProtoUDP:
if dataLen < offset+4 {
return false
}
fp.Protocol = proto
fp.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[offset : offset+2])
fp.LocalPort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[offset+2 : offset+4])
fp.Fragment = false
return true
case ipProtoIPv6Fragment:
if dataLen < offset+8 {
return false
}
fragmentOffset := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[offset+2:offset+4]) &^ uint16(0x7)
if fragmentOffset != 0 {
fp.Protocol = pkt[offset]
fp.Fragment = true
fp.RemotePort = 0
fp.LocalPort = 0
return true
}
next = 8
case ipProtoAH:
if dataLen <= offset+1 {
return false
}
next = int(pkt[offset+1]+2) << 2
default:
if dataLen <= offset+1 {
return false
}
next = int(pkt[offset+1]+1) << 3
}
if next <= 0 {
next = 8
}
protoAt = offset
offset = offset + next
}
}
// runRxSplit drives the split path: faithful inbound parse for the firewall
// side, then m.Commit re-parses to coalesce. v6 controls which baseline
// parser we run.
func runRxSplit(b *testing.B, pkts [][]byte, batchSize int, v6 bool) {
b.Helper()
m := NewMultiCoalescer(nopTunWriter{}, true, true)
var fp firewall.Packet
b.ReportAllocs()
b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkts[0])))
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
pkt := pkts[i%len(pkts)]
var ok bool
if v6 {
ok = parseV6InboundBaseline(pkt, &fp)
} else {
ok = parseV4InboundBaseline(pkt, &fp)
}
if !ok {
b.Fatal("baseline parse failed")
}
if err := m.Commit(pkt); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
if (i+1)%batchSize == 0 {
if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
}
}
_ = m.Flush()
}
// runRxUnified drives the unified path: ParseInbound walks once, filling
// the conntrack key + coalescer hint in parsed; CommitInbound dispatches
// without re-parsing.
func runRxUnified(b *testing.B, pkts [][]byte, batchSize int) {
b.Helper()
m := NewMultiCoalescer(nopTunWriter{}, true, true)
var parsed RxParsed
b.ReportAllocs()
b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkts[0])))
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
pkt := pkts[i%len(pkts)]
if err := ParsePacket(pkt, true, &parsed); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.CommitInbound(pkt, &parsed); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
if (i+1)%batchSize == 0 {
if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
}
}
_ = m.Flush()
}
// buildUDPv4Bulk returns N UDP packets on a single 5-tuple suitable for the
// UDP coalescer's append path.
func buildUDPv4Bulk(n, payloadLen int) [][]byte {
pkts := make([][]byte, n)
pay := make([]byte, payloadLen)
for i := range n {
pkts[i] = buildUDPv4(1000, 53, pay)
}
return pkts
}
func buildTCPv6Bulk(n, payloadLen int) [][]byte {
pkts := make([][]byte, n)
pay := make([]byte, payloadLen)
seq := uint32(1000)
for i := range n {
pkts[i] = buildTCPv6(0, seq, tcpAck, pay)
seq += uint32(payloadLen)
}
return pkts
}
func buildICMPv4Bulk(n int) [][]byte {
pkts := make([][]byte, n)
for i := range pkts {
pkts[i] = buildICMPv4()
}
return pkts
}
// === TCPv4 ===
func BenchmarkRxSplitTCPv4(b *testing.B) {
pkts := buildTCPv4BulkFlow(tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
runRxSplit(b, pkts, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, false)
}
func BenchmarkRxUnifiedTCPv4(b *testing.B) {
pkts := buildTCPv4BulkFlow(tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
runRxUnified(b, pkts, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs)
}
// === TCPv4 interleaved (4 flows) ===
func BenchmarkRxSplitTCPv4Interleaved4(b *testing.B) {
pkts := buildTCPv4Interleaved(4, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
runRxSplit(b, pkts, len(pkts), false)
}
func BenchmarkRxUnifiedTCPv4Interleaved4(b *testing.B) {
pkts := buildTCPv4Interleaved(4, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
runRxUnified(b, pkts, len(pkts))
}
// === UDPv4 ===
func BenchmarkRxSplitUDPv4(b *testing.B) {
pkts := buildUDPv4Bulk(udpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
runRxSplit(b, pkts, udpCoalesceMaxSegs, false)
}
func BenchmarkRxUnifiedUDPv4(b *testing.B) {
pkts := buildUDPv4Bulk(udpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
runRxUnified(b, pkts, udpCoalesceMaxSegs)
}
// === TCPv6 ===
func BenchmarkRxSplitTCPv6(b *testing.B) {
pkts := buildTCPv6Bulk(tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
runRxSplit(b, pkts, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, true)
}
func BenchmarkRxUnifiedTCPv6(b *testing.B) {
pkts := buildTCPv6Bulk(tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
runRxUnified(b, pkts, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs)
}
// === ICMPv4 (passthrough) — measures the unified parser on the coalescer-
// rejected path, where both lenient and unified must still fill fp. ===
func BenchmarkRxSplitICMPv4(b *testing.B) {
pkts := buildICMPv4Bulk(64)
runRxSplit(b, pkts, 64, false)
}
func BenchmarkRxUnifiedICMPv4(b *testing.B) {
pkts := buildICMPv4Bulk(64)
runRxUnified(b, pkts, 64)
}
// === Firewall fast-path (conntrack-hit) — exercises the savings from the
// dense PacketKey: smaller hash key for the per-routine ConntrackCache,
// and skipping the AddrFrom4 calls that the old path needed to fill the
// netip.Addr-rich firewall.Packet up-front. ===
//
// The "split" baseline simulates the legacy path: parseV4InboundBaseline
// fills a netip.Addr-rich Packet, then we probe a localCache keyed on
// Packet. The "unified" path: ParseInbound fills only the dense PacketKey,
// and we probe a localCache keyed on PacketKey. Both paths follow with
// the coalescer Commit so the bench captures end-to-end RX-side cost.
// runRxSplitWithCache mirrors runRxSplit but runs the legacy-style
// firewall fast path (localCache keyed on firewall.Packet) on every
// packet so we can compare against the unified path.
func runRxSplitWithCache(b *testing.B, pkts [][]byte, batchSize int) {
b.Helper()
m := NewMultiCoalescer(nopTunWriter{}, true, true)
var fp firewall.Packet
// Pre-warm a per-packet cache keyed on the netip.Addr-rich Packet form.
cache := make(map[firewall.Packet]struct{}, len(pkts))
for _, pkt := range pkts {
var seedFp firewall.Packet
if !parseV4InboundBaseline(pkt, &seedFp) {
b.Fatal("seed parse failed")
}
cache[seedFp] = struct{}{}
}
b.ReportAllocs()
b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkts[0])))
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
pkt := pkts[i%len(pkts)]
if !parseV4InboundBaseline(pkt, &fp) {
b.Fatal("baseline parse failed")
}
if _, ok := cache[fp]; !ok {
b.Fatal("cache miss")
}
if err := m.Commit(pkt); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
if (i+1)%batchSize == 0 {
if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
}
}
_ = m.Flush()
}
// runRxUnifiedWithCache: unified path with a PacketKey-keyed localCache.
// Each iteration: ParseInbound → conntrack-cache hit → CommitInbound.
func runRxUnifiedWithCache(b *testing.B, pkts [][]byte, batchSize int) {
b.Helper()
m := NewMultiCoalescer(nopTunWriter{}, true, true)
var parsed RxParsed
cache := make(firewall.ConntrackCache, len(pkts))
for _, pkt := range pkts {
var seed RxParsed
if err := ParsePacket(pkt, true, &seed); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
cache[seed.Key] = struct{}{}
}
b.ReportAllocs()
b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkts[0])))
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
pkt := pkts[i%len(pkts)]
if err := ParsePacket(pkt, true, &parsed); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
if _, ok := cache[parsed.Key]; !ok {
b.Fatal("cache miss")
}
if err := m.CommitInbound(pkt, &parsed); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
if (i+1)%batchSize == 0 {
if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
}
}
_ = m.Flush()
}
func BenchmarkRxSplitTCPv4WithCache(b *testing.B) {
pkts := buildTCPv4BulkFlow(tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
runRxSplitWithCache(b, pkts, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs)
}
func BenchmarkRxUnifiedTCPv4WithCache(b *testing.B) {
pkts := buildTCPv4BulkFlow(tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
runRxUnifiedWithCache(b, pkts, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs)
}
func BenchmarkRxSplitInterleaved4WithCache(b *testing.B) {
pkts := buildTCPv4Interleaved(4, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
runRxSplitWithCache(b, pkts, len(pkts))
}
func BenchmarkRxUnifiedInterleaved4WithCache(b *testing.B) {
pkts := buildTCPv4Interleaved(4, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
runRxUnifiedWithCache(b, pkts, len(pkts))
}
-174
View File
@@ -1,174 +0,0 @@
package batch
import (
"net/netip"
"testing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
)
// TestParseInboundParity asserts that ParseInbound + Key.Hydrate produces
// the same firewall.Packet that the lenient baseline parsers (which
// mirror outside.go's parseV4/parseV6 with incoming=true) produce for
// every shape we care about. Catches drift between the unified
// parse-then-hydrate flow and the production newPacket behavior so
// swapping one for the other is observably safe.
func TestParseInboundParity(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
pkt []byte
v6 bool
}{
{"tcp_v4", buildTCPv4Ports(1234, 443, 1000, tcpAck, []byte("payload")), false},
{"tcp_v4_psh", buildTCPv4Ports(1234, 443, 2000, tcpAckPsh, make([]byte, 1200)), false},
{"udp_v4", buildUDPv4(40000, 53, []byte("dnsquery")), false},
{"icmp_v4", buildICMPv4(), false},
{"tcp_v6", buildTCPv6(0, 5000, tcpAck, make([]byte, 800)), true},
{"udp_v6", buildUDPv6(40001, 53, []byte("v6dns")), true},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
var fpUnified, fpBaseline firewall.Packet
var parsed RxParsed
if err := ParsePacket(tc.pkt, true, &parsed); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParsePacket: %v", err)
}
parsed.Key.Hydrate(&fpUnified)
var ok bool
if tc.v6 {
ok = parseV6InboundBaseline(tc.pkt, &fpBaseline)
} else {
ok = parseV4InboundBaseline(tc.pkt, &fpBaseline)
}
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("baseline parse failed")
}
if fpUnified != fpBaseline {
t.Errorf("firewall.Packet mismatch:\n unified: %+v\n baseline: %+v", fpUnified, fpBaseline)
}
})
}
}
// TestParseInboundFlowKey checks that the coalescer hint the unified parser
// produces matches what parseTCPBase/parseUDP would produce on the same
// packet — same flowKey, ipHdrLen, payLen, etc. The hint is only valid
// when Kind is RxKindTCP/RxKindUDP.
func TestParseInboundFlowKey(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("tcp_v4", func(t *testing.T) {
pkt := buildTCPv4Ports(1234, 443, 5000, tcpAck, make([]byte, 800))
var parsed RxParsed
if err := ParsePacket(pkt, true, &parsed); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if parsed.Kind != RxKindTCP {
t.Fatalf("kind=%v want TCP", parsed.Kind)
}
ref, ok := parseTCPBase(pkt)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("parseTCPBase failed")
}
if parsed.tcp != ref {
t.Errorf("parsedTCP mismatch:\n unified: %+v\n ref: %+v", parsed.tcp, ref)
}
})
t.Run("udp_v4", func(t *testing.T) {
pkt := buildUDPv4(40000, 53, []byte("dnsquery"))
var parsed RxParsed
if err := ParsePacket(pkt, true, &parsed); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if parsed.Kind != RxKindUDP {
t.Fatalf("kind=%v want UDP", parsed.Kind)
}
ref, ok := parseUDP(pkt)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("parseUDP failed")
}
if parsed.udp != ref {
t.Errorf("parsedUDP mismatch:\n unified: %+v\n ref: %+v", parsed.udp, ref)
}
})
t.Run("tcp_v6", func(t *testing.T) {
pkt := buildTCPv6(0, 9000, tcpAck, make([]byte, 800))
var parsed RxParsed
if err := ParsePacket(pkt, true, &parsed); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if parsed.Kind != RxKindTCP {
t.Fatalf("kind=%v want TCP", parsed.Kind)
}
ref, ok := parseTCPBase(pkt)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("parseTCPBase failed")
}
if parsed.tcp != ref {
t.Errorf("parsedTCP mismatch:\n unified: %+v\n ref: %+v", parsed.tcp, ref)
}
})
}
// TestParseInboundICMPPassthrough confirms ICMP packets populate the
// conntrack key (including the ICMP identifier in RemotePort) but stay
// RxKindPassthrough so the batcher writes them verbatim. After Hydrate
// the firewall.Packet form should match what the legacy parseV4 produced.
func TestParseInboundICMPPassthrough(t *testing.T) {
pkt := buildICMPv4()
// Stamp a non-zero identifier into the ICMP header so we can check
// RemotePort gets it.
pkt[20] = 8 // type=echo
pkt[24] = 0xab
pkt[25] = 0xcd
var parsed RxParsed
if err := ParsePacket(pkt, true, &parsed); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if parsed.Kind != RxKindPassthrough {
t.Errorf("kind=%v want Passthrough", parsed.Kind)
}
var fp firewall.Packet
parsed.Key.Hydrate(&fp)
if fp.Protocol != firewall.ProtoICMP {
t.Errorf("Protocol=%d want %d", fp.Protocol, firewall.ProtoICMP)
}
if fp.RemotePort != 0xabcd {
t.Errorf("RemotePort=0x%x want 0xabcd", fp.RemotePort)
}
if fp.LocalPort != 0 {
t.Errorf("LocalPort=%d want 0", fp.LocalPort)
}
wantRemote := netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.1")
wantLocal := netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.2")
if fp.RemoteAddr != wantRemote || fp.LocalAddr != wantLocal {
t.Errorf("addrs: remote=%v local=%v want %v/%v", fp.RemoteAddr, fp.LocalAddr, wantRemote, wantLocal)
}
}
// TestParseInboundV4Fragment confirms a fragmented v4 packet fills the
// conntrack key with Fragment=true and falls into Passthrough on the
// coalescer side.
func TestParseInboundV4Fragment(t *testing.T) {
// Build a TCP packet then twiddle the IP flags to make it look like a
// non-first fragment (offset != 0).
pkt := buildTCPv4Ports(1234, 443, 1000, tcpAck, []byte("payload"))
// Set a non-zero fragment offset (bytes 6-7, low 13 bits).
pkt[6] = 0x00
pkt[7] = 0x10 // offset = 16 (in 8-byte units)
var parsed RxParsed
if err := ParsePacket(pkt, true, &parsed); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !parsed.Key.Fragment {
t.Error("Fragment=false, want true")
}
if parsed.Kind != RxKindPassthrough {
t.Errorf("kind=%v want Passthrough", parsed.Kind)
}
}
-133
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@@ -1,133 +0,0 @@
package batch
import (
"errors"
"io"
)
// MultiCoalescer fans plaintext packets out to lane-specific batchers based
// on the IP/L4 protocol of the packet, sharing a single Reserve arena
// across lanes so the caller's allocation pattern is unchanged.
//
// Lanes are processed independently: the TCP coalescer only sees TCP, the
// UDP coalescer only sees UDP, and the passthrough lane handles everything
// else. Per-flow arrival order is preserved because a single 5-tuple only
// ever lands in one lane and each lane preserves its own slot order.
//
// Cross-lane order is NOT preserved across the TCP/UDP/passthrough split.
// This is acceptable because the carrier-side recvmmsg path already
// stable-sorts by (peer, message counter) before delivering plaintext
// here, so replay-window invariants are unaffected, and apps observe
// correct per-flow ordering — which is all the IP layer guarantees anyway.
// Do not "fix" this by interleaving lane outputs at flush time; that
// negates the entire point of coalescing (each lane needs to see runs of
// adjacent same-flow packets to coalesce them).
type MultiCoalescer struct {
tcp *TCPCoalescer
udp *UDPCoalescer
pt *Passthrough
// arena shared across all lanes so a single Reserve grows one backing
// slice; lane Commit calls borrow into this same arena.
backing []byte
}
// NewMultiCoalescer builds a multi-lane batcher. tcpEnabled lets the caller
// opt out of TCP coalescing (e.g. when the queue can't do TSO); udpEnabled
// likewise gates UDP coalescing (only enable when USO was negotiated).
// Either lane disabled redirects its traffic into the passthrough lane.
func NewMultiCoalescer(w io.Writer, tcpEnabled, udpEnabled bool) *MultiCoalescer {
m := &MultiCoalescer{
pt: NewPassthrough(w),
backing: make([]byte, 0, initialSlots*65535),
}
if tcpEnabled {
m.tcp = NewTCPCoalescer(w)
}
if udpEnabled {
m.udp = NewUDPCoalescer(w)
}
return m
}
func (m *MultiCoalescer) Reserve(sz int) []byte {
if len(m.backing)+sz > cap(m.backing) {
newCap := max(cap(m.backing)*2, sz)
m.backing = make([]byte, 0, newCap)
}
start := len(m.backing)
m.backing = m.backing[:start+sz]
return m.backing[start : start+sz : start+sz]
}
// Commit dispatches pkt to the appropriate lane based on IP version + L4
// proto. Borrowed slice contract is identical to the single-lane batchers,
// pkt must remain valid until the next Flush.
//
// On the success path the IP/TCP-or-UDP parse happens here once and the
// parsed struct is handed to the lane via commitParsed so the lane doesn't
// re-walk the header.
func (m *MultiCoalescer) Commit(pkt []byte) error {
if len(pkt) < 20 {
return m.pt.Commit(pkt)
}
v := pkt[0] >> 4
var proto byte
switch v {
case 4:
proto = pkt[9]
case 6:
if len(pkt) < 40 {
return m.pt.Commit(pkt)
}
proto = pkt[6]
default:
return m.pt.Commit(pkt)
}
switch proto {
case ipProtoTCP:
if m.tcp != nil {
info, ok := parseTCPBase(pkt)
if !ok {
// Malformed/unsupported TCP shape (IP options, fragments, ...).
// Handle this via passthrough support in the TCP coalescer, to attempt to preserve flow order.
m.tcp.addPassthrough(pkt)
return nil
}
return m.tcp.commitParsed(pkt, info)
}
case ipProtoUDP:
if m.udp != nil {
info, ok := parseUDP(pkt)
if !ok {
m.udp.addPassthrough(pkt) //we could also m.pt.Commit() here I guess?
return nil
}
return m.udp.commitParsed(pkt, info)
}
}
return m.pt.Commit(pkt)
}
// Flush drains every lane in a fixed order: TCP, UDP, passthrough. Errors
// from a lane do not stop subsequent lanes from flushing, we keep
// draining and return the first observed error so a single bad packet
// doesn't strand the others.
func (m *MultiCoalescer) Flush() error {
var errs []error
if m.tcp != nil {
if err := m.tcp.Flush(); err != nil {
errs = append(errs, err)
}
}
if m.udp != nil {
if err := m.udp.Flush(); err != nil {
errs = append(errs, err)
}
}
if err := m.pt.Flush(); err != nil {
errs = append(errs, err)
}
m.backing = m.backing[:0]
return errors.Join(errs...)
}
-94
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@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
package batch
import (
"testing"
)
// TestMultiCoalescerRoutesByProto confirms TCP/UDP/other land in the right
// lane: TCP and UDP get coalesced when their lanes are enabled, anything
// else (ICMP here) falls through to plain Write.
func TestMultiCoalescerRoutesByProto(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
m := NewMultiCoalescer(w, true, true)
tcpPay := make([]byte, 1200)
udpPay := make([]byte, 1200)
icmp := make([]byte, 28)
icmp[0] = 0x45
icmp[2] = 0
icmp[3] = 28
icmp[9] = 1
if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, tcpPay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4(2200, tcpAck, tcpPay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Commit(buildUDPv4(2000, 53, udpPay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Commit(buildUDPv4(2000, 53, udpPay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Commit(icmp); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// 1 TCP super (2 segments) + 1 UDP super (2 segments) = 2 gso writes.
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 gso writes (one TCP + one UDP), got %d", len(w.gsoWrites))
}
if len(w.writes) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("want 1 plain write (ICMP), got %d", len(w.writes))
}
}
// TestMultiCoalescerDisabledUDPFallsThrough verifies that when the UDP lane
// is disabled (e.g. kernel doesn't support USO), UDP packets still reach
// the kernel via the passthrough lane rather than being lost.
func TestMultiCoalescerDisabledUDPFallsThrough(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
m := NewMultiCoalescer(w, true, false) // TSO on, USO off
if err := m.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, make([]byte, 800))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, make([]byte, 800))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 0 {
t.Errorf("UDP must NOT be coalesced when USO disabled, got %d gso writes", len(w.gsoWrites))
}
if len(w.writes) != 2 {
t.Errorf("UDP must pass through as 2 plain writes, got %d", len(w.writes))
}
}
// TestMultiCoalescerDisabledTCPFallsThrough mirrors the TSO=off case.
func TestMultiCoalescerDisabledTCPFallsThrough(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
m := NewMultiCoalescer(w, false, true) // TSO off, USO on
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4(2200, tcpAck, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 0 {
t.Errorf("TCP must NOT be coalesced when TSO disabled, got %d gso writes", len(w.gsoWrites))
}
if len(w.writes) != 2 {
t.Errorf("TCP must pass through as 2 plain writes, got %d", len(w.writes))
}
}
-62
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@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
package batch
import (
"io"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
)
// Passthrough is a RxBatcher that doesn't batch anything, it just accumulates and then sends packets.
type Passthrough struct {
out io.Writer
slots [][]byte
backing []byte
cursor int
}
func NewPassthrough(w io.Writer) *Passthrough {
const baseNumSlots = 128
return &Passthrough{
out: w,
slots: make([][]byte, 0, baseNumSlots),
backing: make([]byte, 0, baseNumSlots*udp.MTU),
}
}
func (p *Passthrough) Reserve(sz int) []byte {
if len(p.backing)+sz > cap(p.backing) {
// Grow: allocate a fresh backing. Already-committed slices still
// reference the old array and remain valid until Flush drops them.
newCap := max(cap(p.backing)*2, sz)
p.backing = make([]byte, 0, newCap)
}
start := len(p.backing)
p.backing = p.backing[:start+sz]
return p.backing[start : start+sz : start+sz] //return zero length, sz-cap slice
}
func (p *Passthrough) Commit(pkt []byte) error {
p.slots = append(p.slots, pkt)
return nil
}
// CommitInbound ignores the hint — Passthrough never coalesces, so there's
// no IP/L4 re-parse to skip. Present so Passthrough satisfies the RxBatcher
// interface alongside MultiCoalescer.
func (p *Passthrough) CommitInbound(pkt []byte, _ *RxParsed) error {
return p.Commit(pkt)
}
func (p *Passthrough) Flush() error {
var firstErr error
for _, s := range p.slots {
_, err := p.out.Write(s)
if err != nil && firstErr == nil {
firstErr = err
}
}
clear(p.slots)
p.slots = p.slots[:0]
p.backing = p.backing[:0]
return firstErr
}
-731
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@@ -1,731 +0,0 @@
package batch
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/binary"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/netip"
"slices"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
)
// ipProtoTCP is the IANA protocol number for TCP. Hardcoded instead of
// reaching for golang.org/x/sys/unix — that package doesn't define the
// constant on Windows, which would break cross-compiles even though this
// file runs unchanged on every platform.
const ipProtoTCP = 6
// tcpCoalesceBufSize caps total bytes per superpacket. Mirrors the kernel's
// sk_gso_max_size of ~64KiB; anything beyond this would be rejected anyway.
const tcpCoalesceBufSize = 65535
// tcpCoalesceMaxSegs caps how many segments we'll coalesce into a single
// superpacket. Keeping this well below the kernel's TSO ceiling bounds
// latency.
const tcpCoalesceMaxSegs = 64
// tcpCoalesceHdrCap is the scratch space we copy a seed's IP+TCP header
// into. IPv6 (40) + TCP with full options (60) = 100 bytes.
const tcpCoalesceHdrCap = 100
// coalesceSlot is one entry in the coalescer's ordered event queue. When
// passthrough is true the slot holds a single borrowed packet that must be
// emitted verbatim (non-TCP, non-admissible TCP, or oversize seed). When
// passthrough is false the slot is an in-progress coalesced superpacket:
// hdrBuf is a mutable copy of the seed's IP+TCP header (we patch total
// length and pseudo-header partial at flush), and payIovs are *borrowed*
// slices from the caller's plaintext buffers — no payload is ever copied.
// The caller (listenOut) must keep those buffers alive until Flush.
type coalesceSlot struct {
passthrough bool
rawPkt []byte // borrowed when passthrough
fk flowKey
hdrBuf [tcpCoalesceHdrCap]byte
hdrLen int
ipHdrLen int
isV6 bool
gsoSize int
numSeg int
totalPay int
nextSeq uint32
// psh closes the chain: set when the last-accepted segment had PSH or
// was sub-gsoSize. No further appends after that.
psh bool
payIovs [][]byte
}
// TCPCoalescer accumulates adjacent in-flow TCP data segments across
// multiple concurrent flows and emits each flow's run as a single TSO
// superpacket via tio.GSOWriter. All output — coalesced or not — is
// deferred until Flush so arrival order is preserved on the wire. Owns
// no locks; one coalescer per TUN write queue.
type TCPCoalescer struct {
plainW io.Writer
gsoW tio.GSOWriter // nil when the queue doesn't support TSO
// slots is the ordered event queue. Flush walks it once and emits each
// entry as either a WriteGSO (coalesced) or a plainW.Write (passthrough).
slots []*coalesceSlot
// openSlots maps a flow key to its most recent non-sealed slot, so new
// segments can extend an in-progress superpacket in O(1). Slots are
// removed from this map when they close (PSH or short-last-segment),
// when a non-admissible packet for that flow arrives, or in Flush.
openSlots map[flowKey]*coalesceSlot
// lastSlot caches the most recently touched open slot. Steady-state
// bulk traffic is dominated by a single flow, so comparing the
// incoming key against the cached slot's own fk lets the hot path
// skip the map lookup (and the aeshash of a 38-byte key) entirely.
// Kept in lockstep with openSlots: nil whenever the slot it pointed
// at is removed/sealed.
lastSlot *coalesceSlot
pool []*coalesceSlot // free list for reuse
backing []byte
}
func NewTCPCoalescer(w io.Writer) *TCPCoalescer {
c := &TCPCoalescer{
plainW: w,
slots: make([]*coalesceSlot, 0, initialSlots),
openSlots: make(map[flowKey]*coalesceSlot, initialSlots),
pool: make([]*coalesceSlot, 0, initialSlots),
backing: make([]byte, 0, initialSlots*65535),
}
if gw, ok := tio.SupportsGSO(w, tio.GSOProtoTCP); ok {
c.gsoW = gw
}
return c
}
// parsedTCP holds the fields extracted from a single parse so later steps
// (admission, slot lookup, canAppend) don't re-walk the header.
type parsedTCP struct {
fk flowKey
ipHdrLen int
tcpHdrLen int
hdrLen int
payLen int
seq uint32
flags byte
}
// parseTCPBase extracts the flow key and IP/TCP offsets for any TCP packet,
// regardless of whether it's admissible for coalescing. Returns ok=false
// for non-TCP or malformed input. Accepts IPv4 (no options, no fragmentation)
// and IPv6 (no extension headers).
func parseTCPBase(pkt []byte) (parsedTCP, bool) {
var p parsedTCP
ip, ok := parseIPPrologue(pkt, ipProtoTCP)
if !ok {
return p, false
}
pkt = ip.pkt
p.fk = ip.fk
p.ipHdrLen = ip.ipHdrLen
if len(pkt) < p.ipHdrLen+20 {
return p, false
}
tcpOff := int(pkt[p.ipHdrLen+12]>>4) * 4
if tcpOff < 20 || tcpOff > 60 {
return p, false
}
if len(pkt) < p.ipHdrLen+tcpOff {
return p, false
}
p.tcpHdrLen = tcpOff
p.hdrLen = p.ipHdrLen + tcpOff
p.payLen = len(pkt) - p.hdrLen
p.seq = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(pkt[p.ipHdrLen+4 : p.ipHdrLen+8])
p.flags = pkt[p.ipHdrLen+13]
p.fk.sport = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[p.ipHdrLen : p.ipHdrLen+2])
p.fk.dport = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[p.ipHdrLen+2 : p.ipHdrLen+4])
return p, true
}
// TCP flag bits (byte 13 of the TCP header). Only the bits actually consulted
// by the coalescer are named; FIN/SYN/RST/URG/CWR are rejected via the
// negative mask in coalesceable, not by name.
const (
tcpFlagPsh = 0x08
tcpFlagAck = 0x10
tcpFlagEce = 0x40
)
// coalesceable reports whether a parsed TCP segment is eligible for
// coalescing. Accepts ACK, ACK|PSH, ACK|ECE, ACK|PSH|ECE with a
// non-empty payload. CWR is excluded because it marks a one-shot
// congestion-window-reduced transition the receiver must observe at a
// segment boundary.
func (p parsedTCP) coalesceable() bool {
if p.flags&tcpFlagAck == 0 {
return false
}
if p.flags&^(tcpFlagAck|tcpFlagPsh|tcpFlagEce) != 0 {
return false
}
return p.payLen > 0
}
func (c *TCPCoalescer) Reserve(sz int) []byte {
return reserveFromBacking(&c.backing, sz)
}
// Commit borrows pkt. The caller must keep pkt valid until the next Flush,
// whether or not the packet was coalesced — passthrough (non-admissible)
// packets are queued and written at Flush time, not synchronously.
func (c *TCPCoalescer) Commit(pkt []byte) error {
if c.gsoW == nil {
c.addPassthrough(pkt)
return nil
}
info, ok := parseTCPBase(pkt)
if !ok {
c.addPassthrough(pkt)
return nil
}
return c.commitParsed(pkt, info)
}
// commitParsed is the post-parse half of Commit. The caller must have
// already verified parseTCPBase succeeded (info is a valid TCP parse).
// Used by MultiCoalescer.Commit to avoid re-walking the IP/TCP header
// after the dispatcher has already done so.
func (c *TCPCoalescer) commitParsed(pkt []byte, info parsedTCP) error {
if c.gsoW == nil {
c.addPassthrough(pkt)
return nil
}
if !info.coalesceable() {
// TCP but not admissible (SYN/FIN/RST/URG/CWR or zero-payload).
// Seal this flow's open slot so later in-flow packets don't extend
// it and accidentally reorder past this passthrough.
if last := c.lastSlot; last != nil && last.fk == info.fk {
c.lastSlot = nil
}
delete(c.openSlots, info.fk)
c.addPassthrough(pkt)
return nil
}
// Single-flow fast path: with only one open flow the cache hits every
// packet, and len(openSlots)==1 lets us skip the 38-byte fk compare
// when there are multiple flows in flight (where the hit rate would
// be ~0 and the compare is pure overhead).
var open *coalesceSlot
if last := c.lastSlot; last != nil && len(c.openSlots) == 1 && last.fk == info.fk {
open = last
} else {
open = c.openSlots[info.fk]
}
if open != nil {
if c.canAppend(open, pkt, info) {
c.appendPayload(open, pkt, info)
if open.psh {
delete(c.openSlots, info.fk)
c.lastSlot = nil
} else {
c.lastSlot = open
}
return nil
}
// Can't extend — seal it and fall through to seed a fresh slot.
delete(c.openSlots, info.fk)
if c.lastSlot == open {
c.lastSlot = nil
}
}
c.seed(pkt, info)
return nil
}
// Flush emits every queued event in (per-flow) seq order. Coalesced slots
// go out via WriteGSO; passthrough slots go out via plainW.Write.
// reorderForFlush first sorts each flow's slots into TCP-seq order within
// passthrough-bounded segments and merges contiguous adjacent slots, so
// any wire-side reorder that crossed an rxOrder batch boundary doesn't
// get amplified into kernel-visible reorder by the slot machinery.
// Returns the first error observed; keeps draining so one bad packet
// doesn't hold up the rest. After Flush returns, borrowed payload slices
// may be recycled.
func (c *TCPCoalescer) Flush() error {
c.reorderForFlush()
var first error
for _, s := range c.slots {
var err error
if s.passthrough {
_, err = c.plainW.Write(s.rawPkt)
} else {
err = c.flushSlot(s)
}
if err != nil && first == nil {
first = err
}
c.release(s)
}
clear(c.slots)
c.slots = c.slots[:0]
clear(c.openSlots)
c.lastSlot = nil
c.backing = c.backing[:0]
return first
}
func (c *TCPCoalescer) addPassthrough(pkt []byte) {
s := c.take()
s.passthrough = true
s.rawPkt = pkt
c.slots = append(c.slots, s)
}
func (c *TCPCoalescer) seed(pkt []byte, info parsedTCP) {
if info.hdrLen > tcpCoalesceHdrCap || info.hdrLen+info.payLen > tcpCoalesceBufSize {
// Pathological shape — can't fit our scratch, emit as-is.
c.addPassthrough(pkt)
return
}
s := c.take()
s.passthrough = false
s.rawPkt = nil
copy(s.hdrBuf[:], pkt[:info.hdrLen])
s.hdrLen = info.hdrLen
s.ipHdrLen = info.ipHdrLen
s.isV6 = info.fk.isV6
s.fk = info.fk
s.gsoSize = info.payLen
s.numSeg = 1
s.totalPay = info.payLen
s.nextSeq = info.seq + uint32(info.payLen)
s.psh = info.flags&tcpFlagPsh != 0
s.payIovs = append(s.payIovs[:0], pkt[info.hdrLen:info.hdrLen+info.payLen])
c.slots = append(c.slots, s)
if !s.psh {
c.openSlots[info.fk] = s
c.lastSlot = s
} else if last := c.lastSlot; last != nil && last.fk == info.fk {
// PSH-on-seed seals the slot immediately. Any prior cached open
// slot for this flow has just been sealed-and-replaced by this
// passthrough-shaped seed, so drop the cache too.
c.lastSlot = nil
}
}
// canAppend reports whether info's packet extends the slot's seed: same
// header shape and stable contents, adjacent seq, not oversized, chain not
// closed.
func (c *TCPCoalescer) canAppend(s *coalesceSlot, pkt []byte, info parsedTCP) bool {
if s.psh {
return false
}
if info.hdrLen != s.hdrLen {
return false
}
if info.seq != s.nextSeq {
return false
}
if s.numSeg >= tcpCoalesceMaxSegs {
return false
}
if info.payLen > s.gsoSize {
return false
}
if s.hdrLen+s.totalPay+info.payLen > tcpCoalesceBufSize {
return false
}
// ECE state must be stable across a burst — receivers expect the
// flag set on every segment of a CE-echoing window or none.
seedFlags := s.hdrBuf[s.ipHdrLen+13]
if (seedFlags^info.flags)&tcpFlagEce != 0 {
return false
}
if !headersMatch(s.hdrBuf[:s.hdrLen], pkt[:info.hdrLen], s.isV6, s.ipHdrLen) {
return false
}
return true
}
func (c *TCPCoalescer) appendPayload(s *coalesceSlot, pkt []byte, info parsedTCP) {
s.payIovs = append(s.payIovs, pkt[info.hdrLen:info.hdrLen+info.payLen])
s.numSeg++
s.totalPay += info.payLen
s.nextSeq = info.seq + uint32(info.payLen)
if info.flags&tcpFlagPsh != 0 {
// Propagate PSH into the seed header so kernel TSO sets it on the
// last segment. Without this the sender's push signal is dropped.
s.hdrBuf[s.ipHdrLen+13] |= tcpFlagPsh
}
// Merge IP-level CE marks into the seed: headersMatch ignores ECN, so
// this is the one place the signal is preserved.
mergeECNIntoSeed(s.hdrBuf[:s.ipHdrLen], pkt[:s.ipHdrLen], s.isV6)
if info.payLen < s.gsoSize || info.flags&tcpFlagPsh != 0 {
s.psh = true
}
}
func (c *TCPCoalescer) take() *coalesceSlot {
if n := len(c.pool); n > 0 {
s := c.pool[n-1]
c.pool[n-1] = nil
c.pool = c.pool[:n-1]
return s
}
return &coalesceSlot{}
}
func (c *TCPCoalescer) release(s *coalesceSlot) {
s.passthrough = false
s.rawPkt = nil
clear(s.payIovs)
s.payIovs = s.payIovs[:0]
s.numSeg = 0
s.totalPay = 0
s.psh = false
c.pool = append(c.pool, s)
}
// flushSlot patches the header and calls WriteGSO. Does not remove the
// slot from c.slots.
func (c *TCPCoalescer) flushSlot(s *coalesceSlot) error {
total := s.hdrLen + s.totalPay
l4Len := total - s.ipHdrLen
hdr := s.hdrBuf[:s.hdrLen]
if s.isV6 {
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[4:6], uint16(l4Len))
} else {
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[2:4], uint16(total))
hdr[10] = 0
hdr[11] = 0
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[10:12], ipv4HdrChecksum(hdr[:s.ipHdrLen]))
}
var psum uint32
if s.isV6 {
psum = pseudoSumIPv6(hdr[8:24], hdr[24:40], ipProtoTCP, l4Len)
} else {
psum = pseudoSumIPv4(hdr[12:16], hdr[16:20], ipProtoTCP, l4Len)
}
tcsum := s.ipHdrLen + 16
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[tcsum:tcsum+2], foldOnceNoInvert(psum))
return c.gsoW.WriteGSO(hdr[:s.ipHdrLen], hdr[s.ipHdrLen:], s.payIovs, tio.GSOProtoTCP)
}
// headersMatch compares two IP+TCP header prefixes for byte-for-byte
// equality on every field that must be identical across coalesced
// segments. Size/IPID/IPCsum/seq/flags/tcpCsum are masked out, as is the
// 2-bit IP-level ECN field — appendPayload merges CE into the seed.
func headersMatch(a, b []byte, isV6 bool, ipHdrLen int) bool {
if len(a) != len(b) {
return false
}
if !ipHeadersMatch(a, b, isV6) {
return false
}
// TCP: compare [0:4] ports, [8:13] ack+dataoff, [14:16] window,
// [18:tcpHdrLen] options (incl. urgent).
tcp := ipHdrLen
if !bytes.Equal(a[tcp:tcp+4], b[tcp:tcp+4]) {
return false
}
if !bytes.Equal(a[tcp+8:tcp+13], b[tcp+8:tcp+13]) {
return false
}
if !bytes.Equal(a[tcp+14:tcp+16], b[tcp+14:tcp+16]) {
return false
}
if !bytes.Equal(a[tcp+18:], b[tcp+18:]) {
return false
}
return true
}
// reorderForFlush neutralizes wire-side reorder that the rxOrder buffer
// couldn't catch (anything crossing a recvmmsg batch boundary). Without
// this pass a small wire reorder — counter 250 arriving in batch K when
// 200..249 are coming in batch K+1 — would seed an out-of-seq slot first
// and emit it ahead of the lower-seq slot, manifesting at the inner TCP
// receiver as a much larger reorder than the wire actually had.
//
// Two phases:
// 1. Sort each passthrough-bounded segment of c.slots by (flow, seq).
// Cross-flow ordering inside a segment isn't preserved (it never was
// and doesn't matter for any single flow's TCP correctness).
// 2. Sweep once and merge adjacent same-flow slots whose ranges are now
// contiguous AND whose tail is gsoSize-aligned. The tail constraint
// matters because the kernel TSO splitter chops at gsoSize from the
// start of the merged payload — a short segment in the middle would
// desynchronize every later segment.
//
// Passthrough slots act as barriers: the merge check skips them on either
// side, so a SYN/FIN/RST/CWR is never reordered relative to its flow's
// data.
func (c *TCPCoalescer) reorderForFlush() {
if len(c.slots) <= 1 {
return
}
runStart := 0
for i := 0; i <= len(c.slots); i++ {
if i < len(c.slots) && !c.slots[i].passthrough {
continue
}
c.sortRun(c.slots[runStart:i])
runStart = i + 1
}
out := c.slots[:0]
logged := false
for _, s := range c.slots {
if n := len(out); n > 0 {
prev := out[n-1]
if !prev.passthrough && !s.passthrough && prev.fk == s.fk {
// Same-flow neighbors after sort. If they aren't seq-
// contiguous it's a real gap — packets the wire reordered
// across batches, or actual loss before nebula. Log it so
// the operator can quantify how often it happens; the data
// itself still emits in seq order, kernel TCP handles the
// gap via its OOO queue.
if prev.nextSeq != slotSeedSeq(s) {
logged = true
gap := int64(slotSeedSeq(s)) - int64(prev.nextSeq)
slog.Default().Warn("tcp coalesce: cross-slot seq gap",
"src", flowKeyAddr(s.fk, false),
"dst", flowKeyAddr(s.fk, true),
"sport", s.fk.sport,
"dport", s.fk.dport,
"prev_seed_seq", slotSeedSeq(prev),
"prev_next_seq", prev.nextSeq,
"this_seed_seq", slotSeedSeq(s),
"gap_bytes", gap,
"prev_seg_count", prev.numSeg,
"prev_total_pay", prev.totalPay,
)
}
if canMergeSlots(prev, s) {
mergeSlots(prev, s)
c.release(s)
continue
}
}
}
out = append(out, s)
}
if logged {
slog.Default().Warn("==== end of batch ====")
}
c.slots = out
}
// flowKeyAddr returns the src or dst address from fk as a netip.Addr for
// logging. Only used on the cold gap-log path so the netip allocation
// doesn't matter.
func flowKeyAddr(fk flowKey, dst bool) netip.Addr {
src := fk.src
if dst {
src = fk.dst
}
if fk.isV6 {
return netip.AddrFrom16(src)
}
var v4 [4]byte
copy(v4[:], src[:4])
return netip.AddrFrom4(v4)
}
// sortRun stable-sorts run by (flowKey, seedSeq) so each flow's slots
// cluster together in seq order, ready for the merge sweep. Stable so
// equal-key slots keep their original relative position (defensive — a
// duplicate seedSeq would already mean something's wrong upstream).
func (c *TCPCoalescer) sortRun(run []*coalesceSlot) {
if len(run) <= 1 {
return
}
// slices.SortStableFunc with a free, non-capturing comparator avoids the
// reflection + closure-escape allocations that sort.SliceStable forces.
slices.SortStableFunc(run, compareCoalesceSlots)
}
func compareCoalesceSlots(a, b *coalesceSlot) int {
if cmp := flowKeyCompare(a.fk, b.fk); cmp != 0 {
return cmp
}
aSeq, bSeq := slotSeedSeq(a), slotSeedSeq(b)
if aSeq == bSeq {
return 0
}
if tcpSeqLess(aSeq, bSeq) {
return -1
}
return 1
}
// slotSeedSeq returns the TCP seq of the slot's seed (first segment).
// nextSeq tracks the seq just past the last appended byte; subtracting
// totalPay walks back to the seed. uint32 wraparound is the right TCP
// arithmetic so no special-casing is needed.
func slotSeedSeq(s *coalesceSlot) uint32 {
return s.nextSeq - uint32(s.totalPay)
}
// tcpSeqLess reports whether a precedes b in TCP serial-number arithmetic
// (RFC 1323 §2.3). The signed int32 cast turns the modular subtraction
// into the right comparison even across the 2^32 wrap.
func tcpSeqLess(a, b uint32) bool {
return int32(a-b) < 0
}
// flowKeyCompare orders flowKeys deterministically. The exact ordering
// is irrelevant — only that same-flow slots cluster together so the
// post-sort sweep can merge contiguous pairs.
func flowKeyCompare(a, b flowKey) int {
// Cheap scalar fields first so most non-matching keys short-circuit
// without ever calling bytes.Compare. sport is the ephemeral port on
// egress flows and discriminates fastest. For matching keys (same
// flow), array equality on src/dst inlines to word-sized compares,
// so we only pay bytes.Compare when the arrays actually differ.
if a.sport != b.sport {
if a.sport < b.sport {
return -1
}
return 1
}
if a.dport != b.dport {
if a.dport < b.dport {
return -1
}
return 1
}
if a.dst != b.dst {
return bytes.Compare(a.dst[:], b.dst[:])
}
if a.src != b.src {
return bytes.Compare(a.src[:], b.src[:])
}
if a.isV6 != b.isV6 {
if !a.isV6 {
return -1
}
return 1
}
return 0
}
// canMergeSlots reports whether s can fold into prev as one merged TSO
// superpacket. Same flow, contiguous TCP byte range, equal gsoSize, and
// fits within the kernel TSO limits. The tail-of-prev check rejects any
// merge whose first slot ended on a sub-gsoSize segment — kernel TSO
// would split the merged skb at gsoSize boundaries from the start, so a
// short segment in the middle would corrupt every later segment. PSH and
// ECE state must agree across both slots: PSH is a semantic delimiter
// (preserving the sender's push boundary) and ECE state must be uniform
// across a window (the same rule canAppend enforces for in-flow appends).
//
// Note: a slot sealed by reorder (canAppend returned false on seq
// mismatch) keeps psh=false, so this restriction does not block the
// reorder-fix merge — only legitimate PSH-set seals.
func canMergeSlots(prev, s *coalesceSlot) bool {
if prev.psh {
return false
}
if prev.fk != s.fk {
return false
}
if prev.gsoSize != s.gsoSize {
return false
}
if prev.nextSeq != slotSeedSeq(s) {
return false
}
if prev.numSeg+s.numSeg > tcpCoalesceMaxSegs {
return false
}
if prev.hdrLen+prev.totalPay+s.totalPay > tcpCoalesceBufSize {
return false
}
if len(prev.payIovs[len(prev.payIovs)-1]) != prev.gsoSize {
return false
}
prevFlags := prev.hdrBuf[prev.ipHdrLen+13]
sFlags := s.hdrBuf[s.ipHdrLen+13]
if (prevFlags^sFlags)&tcpFlagEce != 0 {
return false
}
if !headersMatch(prev.hdrBuf[:prev.hdrLen], s.hdrBuf[:s.hdrLen], prev.isV6, prev.ipHdrLen) {
return false
}
return true
}
// mergeSlots folds src into dst in place: payIovs concatenated, counters
// and totals updated, PSH and IP-level CE bits OR'd into the seed header
// so neither the push signal nor a CE mark is lost. The seed header's
// seq, gsoSize, and fk are unchanged. Caller is responsible for releasing
// src (it's no longer in c.slots after this call).
func mergeSlots(dst, src *coalesceSlot) {
dst.payIovs = append(dst.payIovs, src.payIovs...)
dst.numSeg += src.numSeg
dst.totalPay += src.totalPay
dst.nextSeq = src.nextSeq
if src.psh {
dst.psh = true
dst.hdrBuf[dst.ipHdrLen+13] |= tcpFlagPsh
}
mergeECNIntoSeed(dst.hdrBuf[:dst.ipHdrLen], src.hdrBuf[:src.ipHdrLen], dst.isV6)
}
// ipv4HdrChecksum computes the IPv4 header checksum over hdr (which must
// already have its checksum field zeroed) and returns the folded/inverted
// 16-bit value to store.
func ipv4HdrChecksum(hdr []byte) uint16 {
var sum uint32
for i := 0; i+1 < len(hdr); i += 2 {
sum += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(hdr[i : i+2]))
}
if len(hdr)%2 == 1 {
sum += uint32(hdr[len(hdr)-1]) << 8
}
for sum>>16 != 0 {
sum = (sum & 0xffff) + (sum >> 16)
}
return ^uint16(sum)
}
// pseudoSumIPv4 / pseudoSumIPv6 build the L4 pseudo-header partial sum
// expected by the virtio NEEDS_CSUM kernel path: the 32-bit accumulator
// before folding. proto selects the L4 (TCP or UDP); the UDP coalescer
// reuses these helpers.
func pseudoSumIPv4(src, dst []byte, proto byte, l4Len int) uint32 {
var sum uint32
sum += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(src[0:2]))
sum += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(src[2:4]))
sum += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(dst[0:2]))
sum += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(dst[2:4]))
sum += uint32(proto)
sum += uint32(l4Len)
return sum
}
func pseudoSumIPv6(src, dst []byte, proto byte, l4Len int) uint32 {
var sum uint32
for i := 0; i < 16; i += 2 {
sum += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(src[i : i+2]))
sum += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(dst[i : i+2]))
}
sum += uint32(l4Len >> 16)
sum += uint32(l4Len & 0xffff)
sum += uint32(proto)
return sum
}
// foldOnceNoInvert folds the 32-bit accumulator to 16 bits and returns it
// unchanged (no one's complement). This is what virtio NEEDS_CSUM wants in
// the L4 checksum field — the kernel will add the payload sum and invert.
func foldOnceNoInvert(sum uint32) uint16 {
for sum>>16 != 0 {
sum = (sum & 0xffff) + (sum >> 16)
}
return uint16(sum)
}
-239
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@@ -1,239 +0,0 @@
package batch
import (
"encoding/binary"
"runtime"
"testing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
)
// nopTunWriter is a zero-alloc tio.GSOWriter for benchmarks. Discards
// everything but satisfies the interface the coalescer detects.
type nopTunWriter struct{}
func (nopTunWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return len(p), nil }
func (nopTunWriter) WriteGSO(hdr []byte, transportHdr []byte, pays [][]byte, _ tio.GSOProto) error {
return nil
}
func (nopTunWriter) Capabilities() tio.Capabilities {
return tio.Capabilities{TSO: true, USO: true}
}
// buildTCPv4BulkFlow returns a slice of N adjacent ACK-only TCP segments
// on a single 5-tuple, each carrying payloadLen bytes. Seq numbers are
// contiguous so every packet is coalesceable onto the previous one.
func buildTCPv4BulkFlow(n, payloadLen int) [][]byte {
pkts := make([][]byte, n)
pay := make([]byte, payloadLen)
seq := uint32(1000)
for i := range n {
pkts[i] = buildTCPv4(seq, tcpAck, pay)
seq += uint32(payloadLen)
}
return pkts
}
// buildTCPv4Interleaved returns nFlows * perFlow packets with per-flow
// seq continuity but round-robin across flows — worst case for any
// "last-slot" cache.
func buildTCPv4Interleaved(nFlows, perFlow, payloadLen int) [][]byte {
pay := make([]byte, payloadLen)
seqs := make([]uint32, nFlows)
for i := range seqs {
seqs[i] = uint32(1000 + i*1000000)
}
pkts := make([][]byte, 0, nFlows*perFlow)
for range perFlow {
for f := range nFlows {
sport := uint16(10000 + f)
pkts = append(pkts, buildTCPv4Ports(sport, 2000, seqs[f], tcpAck, pay))
seqs[f] += uint32(payloadLen)
}
}
return pkts
}
// buildICMPv4 returns a minimal non-TCP packet that takes the passthrough
// branch in Commit.
func buildICMPv4() []byte {
pkt := make([]byte, 28)
pkt[0] = 0x45
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[2:4], 28)
pkt[9] = 1 // ICMP
copy(pkt[12:16], []byte{10, 0, 0, 1})
copy(pkt[16:20], []byte{10, 0, 0, 2})
return pkt
}
// runCommitBench drives Commit over pkts batchSize at a time, flushing
// between batches, and reports per-packet cost.
func runCommitBench(b *testing.B, pkts [][]byte, batchSize int) {
b.Helper()
c := NewTCPCoalescer(nopTunWriter{})
b.ReportAllocs()
b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkts[0])))
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
pkt := pkts[i%len(pkts)]
if err := c.Commit(pkt); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
if (i+1)%batchSize == 0 {
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
}
}
// Drain any trailing partial batch so slot state doesn't leak across runs.
_ = c.Flush()
}
// BenchmarkCommitSingleFlow is the bulk-TCP steady state: one flow,
// contiguous seq, 1200-byte payloads. Every packet past the seed should
// append onto the open slot. This is the case we most care about.
func BenchmarkCommitSingleFlow(b *testing.B) {
pkts := buildTCPv4BulkFlow(tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
runCommitBench(b, pkts, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs)
}
// BenchmarkCommitInterleaved4 has 4 concurrent bulk flows round-robined.
// A single-entry fast-path cache will miss on every packet; an N-way
// cache or map lookup carries the weight.
func BenchmarkCommitInterleaved4(b *testing.B) {
pkts := buildTCPv4Interleaved(4, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
runCommitBench(b, pkts, len(pkts))
}
// BenchmarkCommitInterleaved16 stresses the map at higher flow counts.
func BenchmarkCommitInterleaved16(b *testing.B) {
pkts := buildTCPv4Interleaved(16, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
runCommitBench(b, pkts, len(pkts))
}
// BenchmarkCommitPassthrough exercises the non-TCP branch: parseTCPBase
// bails early and addPassthrough is the only work.
func BenchmarkCommitPassthrough(b *testing.B) {
pkt := buildICMPv4()
pkts := make([][]byte, 64)
for i := range pkts {
pkts[i] = pkt
}
runCommitBench(b, pkts, 64)
}
// BenchmarkCommitNonCoalesceableTCP sends SYN|ACK packets on one flow.
// Each packet takes the "TCP but not admissible" branch which does a
// map delete + passthrough. Measures the seal-without-slot cost.
func BenchmarkCommitNonCoalesceableTCP(b *testing.B) {
pay := make([]byte, 0)
pkts := make([][]byte, 64)
for i := range pkts {
pkts[i] = buildTCPv4(uint32(1000+i), tcpSyn|tcpAck, pay)
}
runCommitBench(b, pkts, 64)
}
// runMultiCommitBench drives MultiCoalescer.Commit. The dispatcher does
// the IP/L4 parse once and passes the parsed struct to the lane, so this
// is the bench that shows the savings of skipping the lane's re-parse.
func runMultiCommitBench(b *testing.B, pkts [][]byte, batchSize int) {
b.Helper()
m := NewMultiCoalescer(nopTunWriter{}, true, true)
b.ReportAllocs()
b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkts[0])))
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
pkt := pkts[i%len(pkts)]
if err := m.Commit(pkt); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
if (i+1)%batchSize == 0 {
if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
}
}
_ = m.Flush()
}
// BenchmarkMultiCommitSingleFlow is the multi-lane analogue of
// BenchmarkCommitSingleFlow — same workload but routed through the
// dispatcher. The delta vs the single-lane bench measures dispatcher
// overhead.
func BenchmarkMultiCommitSingleFlow(b *testing.B) {
pkts := buildTCPv4BulkFlow(tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
runMultiCommitBench(b, pkts, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs)
}
// BenchmarkMultiCommitInterleaved4 mirrors BenchmarkCommitInterleaved4
// through the dispatcher.
func BenchmarkMultiCommitInterleaved4(b *testing.B) {
pkts := buildTCPv4Interleaved(4, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
runMultiCommitBench(b, pkts, len(pkts))
}
// flowKeyPair is one comparison input for the flowKeyCompare bench.
type flowKeyPair struct{ a, b flowKey }
// makeFlowKey builds an IPv4 flowKey from compact inputs.
func makeFlowKey(srcLow, dstLow uint32, sport, dport uint16) flowKey {
var fk flowKey
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(fk.src[12:16], srcLow)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(fk.dst[12:16], dstLow)
fk.sport = sport
fk.dport = dport
return fk
}
// flowKeyCases are the workload mixes flowKeyCompare sees in practice.
// - sameFlow: equal keys; tests the equal-path cost (sort runs hit this
// repeatedly when many segments share a flow).
// - sportDiffers: same src/dst/dport, different sport — the typical
// "sibling flows from one host to one server" pattern.
// - dstDiffers: same src/sport/dport, different dst — outbound to many
// servers from a fixed local port.
// - allDiffer: every field differs; worst case for short-circuiting.
func flowKeyCases() map[string][]flowKeyPair {
const n = 64
cases := map[string][]flowKeyPair{
"sameFlow": make([]flowKeyPair, n),
"sportDiffers": make([]flowKeyPair, n),
"dstDiffers": make([]flowKeyPair, n),
"allDiffer": make([]flowKeyPair, n),
}
for i := range n {
base := makeFlowKey(0x0a000001, 0x0a000002, 40000, 443)
cases["sameFlow"][i] = flowKeyPair{a: base, b: base}
cases["sportDiffers"][i] = flowKeyPair{
a: base,
b: makeFlowKey(0x0a000001, 0x0a000002, uint16(40001+i), 443),
}
cases["dstDiffers"][i] = flowKeyPair{
a: base,
b: makeFlowKey(0x0a000001, uint32(0x0a000002+i+1), 40000, 443),
}
cases["allDiffer"][i] = flowKeyPair{
a: makeFlowKey(uint32(0x0a000001+i), uint32(0x0a000002+i), uint16(40000+i), uint16(80+i)),
b: makeFlowKey(uint32(0x0b000001+i), uint32(0x0b000002+i), uint16(50000+i), uint16(443+i)),
}
}
return cases
}
// BenchmarkFlowKeyCompare measures flowKeyCompare across the workloads
// the sort step actually sees. Use this to compare reorderings.
func BenchmarkFlowKeyCompare(b *testing.B) {
for name, pairs := range flowKeyCases() {
b.Run(name, func(b *testing.B) {
b.ReportAllocs()
b.ResetTimer()
var sink int
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
p := pairs[i&(len(pairs)-1)]
sink += flowKeyCompare(p.a, p.b)
}
runtime.KeepAlive(sink)
})
}
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
-64
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@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
package batch
import "net/netip"
const SendBatchCap = 128
// batchWriter is the minimal subset of udp.Conn needed by SendBatch to flush.
type batchWriter interface {
WriteBatch(bufs [][]byte, addrs []netip.AddrPort, outerECNs []byte) error
}
// SendBatch accumulates encrypted UDP packets and flushes them via WriteBatch.
// One SendBatch is owned by each listenIn goroutine; no locking is needed.
// The backing arena grows on demand: when there isn't room for the next slot
// we allocate a fresh backing array. Already-committed slices keep referencing
// the old array and remain valid until Flush drops them.
type SendBatch struct {
out batchWriter
bufs [][]byte
dsts []netip.AddrPort
ecns []byte
backing []byte
}
func NewSendBatch(out batchWriter, batchCap, slotCap int) *SendBatch {
return &SendBatch{
out: out,
bufs: make([][]byte, 0, batchCap),
dsts: make([]netip.AddrPort, 0, batchCap),
ecns: make([]byte, 0, batchCap),
backing: make([]byte, 0, batchCap*slotCap),
}
}
func (b *SendBatch) Reserve(sz int) []byte {
if len(b.backing)+sz > cap(b.backing) {
// Grow: allocate a fresh backing. Already-committed slices still
// reference the old array and remain valid until Flush drops them.
newCap := max(cap(b.backing)*2, sz)
b.backing = make([]byte, 0, newCap)
}
start := len(b.backing)
b.backing = b.backing[:start+sz]
return b.backing[start : start+sz : start+sz]
}
func (b *SendBatch) Commit(pkt []byte, dst netip.AddrPort, outerECN byte) {
b.bufs = append(b.bufs, pkt)
b.dsts = append(b.dsts, dst)
b.ecns = append(b.ecns, outerECN)
}
func (b *SendBatch) Flush() error {
var err error
if len(b.bufs) > 0 {
err = b.out.WriteBatch(b.bufs, b.dsts, b.ecns)
}
clear(b.bufs)
b.bufs = b.bufs[:0]
b.dsts = b.dsts[:0]
b.ecns = b.ecns[:0]
b.backing = b.backing[:0]
return err
}
-124
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@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
package batch
import (
"net/netip"
"testing"
)
type fakeBatchWriter struct {
bufs [][]byte
addrs []netip.AddrPort
ecns []byte
}
func (w *fakeBatchWriter) WriteBatch(bufs [][]byte, addrs []netip.AddrPort, ecns []byte) error {
// Snapshot — SendBatch.Flush nils its slot pointers right after WriteBatch
// returns, so tests must capture data before that happens.
w.bufs = make([][]byte, len(bufs))
for i, b := range bufs {
cp := make([]byte, len(b))
copy(cp, b)
w.bufs[i] = cp
}
w.addrs = append(w.addrs[:0], addrs...)
w.ecns = append(w.ecns[:0], ecns...)
return nil
}
func TestSendBatchReserveCommitFlush(t *testing.T) {
fw := &fakeBatchWriter{}
b := NewSendBatch(fw, 4, 32)
ap := netip.MustParseAddrPort("10.0.0.1:4242")
for i := 0; i < 4; i++ {
slot := b.Reserve(32)
if cap(slot) != 32 {
t.Fatalf("slot %d: cap=%d want 32", i, cap(slot))
}
pkt := append(slot[:0], byte(i), byte(i+1), byte(i+2))
b.Commit(pkt, ap, 0)
}
if err := b.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Flush: %v", err)
}
if len(fw.bufs) != 4 {
t.Fatalf("WriteBatch got %d bufs want 4", len(fw.bufs))
}
for i, buf := range fw.bufs {
if len(buf) != 3 || buf[0] != byte(i) {
t.Errorf("buf %d: %x", i, buf)
}
if fw.addrs[i] != ap {
t.Errorf("addr %d: got %v want %v", i, fw.addrs[i], ap)
}
}
// Flush again with nothing committed — should be a no-op.
fw.bufs = nil
if err := b.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("empty Flush: %v", err)
}
if fw.bufs != nil {
t.Fatalf("empty Flush triggered WriteBatch")
}
// Reuse after Flush.
slot := b.Reserve(32)
if cap(slot) != 32 {
t.Fatalf("after Flush Reserve wrong cap: %d", cap(slot))
}
}
func TestSendBatchSlotsDoNotOverlap(t *testing.T) {
fw := &fakeBatchWriter{}
b := NewSendBatch(fw, 3, 8)
ap := netip.MustParseAddrPort("10.0.0.1:80")
for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
s := b.Reserve(8)
pkt := append(s[:0], byte(0xA0+i), byte(0xB0+i))
b.Commit(pkt, ap, 0)
}
if err := b.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Flush: %v", err)
}
for i, buf := range fw.bufs {
if buf[0] != byte(0xA0+i) || buf[1] != byte(0xB0+i) {
t.Errorf("slot %d corrupted: %x", i, buf)
}
}
}
func TestSendBatchGrowPreservesCommitted(t *testing.T) {
fw := &fakeBatchWriter{}
// Tiny initial backing forces a grow on the second Reserve.
b := NewSendBatch(fw, 1, 4)
ap := netip.MustParseAddrPort("10.0.0.1:80")
s1 := b.Reserve(4)
pkt1 := append(s1[:0], 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44)
b.Commit(pkt1, ap, 0)
s2 := b.Reserve(8) // exceeds remaining cap, triggers grow
pkt2 := append(s2[:0], 0xA, 0xB, 0xC, 0xD, 0xE)
b.Commit(pkt2, ap, 0)
// pkt1 must still be intact even though backing reallocated.
if pkt1[0] != 0x11 || pkt1[3] != 0x44 {
t.Fatalf("first packet corrupted by grow: %x", pkt1)
}
if err := b.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Flush: %v", err)
}
if len(fw.bufs) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("got %d bufs want 2", len(fw.bufs))
}
if fw.bufs[0][0] != 0x11 || fw.bufs[0][3] != 0x44 {
t.Errorf("first packet on the wire: %x", fw.bufs[0])
}
if fw.bufs[1][0] != 0xA || fw.bufs[1][4] != 0xE {
t.Errorf("second packet on the wire: %x", fw.bufs[1])
}
}
-336
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@@ -1,336 +0,0 @@
package batch
import (
"encoding/binary"
"io"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
)
// ipProtoUDP is the IANA protocol number for UDP.
const ipProtoUDP = 17
// udpCoalesceBufSize caps total bytes per UDP superpacket. Mirrors the
// kernel's gso_max_size; payloads beyond this are emitted as-is.
const udpCoalesceBufSize = 65535
// udpCoalesceMaxSegs caps how many segments we'll coalesce. Kernel UDP-GSO
// accepts up to 64 segments per skb (UDP_MAX_SEGMENTS); stay under that.
const udpCoalesceMaxSegs = 64
// udpCoalesceHdrCap is the scratch space we copy a seed's IP+UDP header
// into. IPv6 (40) + UDP (8) = 48; round up for safety.
const udpCoalesceHdrCap = 64
// udpSlot is one entry in the UDPCoalescer's ordered event queue. Same
// passthrough-vs-coalesced shape as the TCP coalescer's slot, but no
// seq/PSH/CWR bookkeeping — UDP segments only need 5-tuple + length
// matching to coalesce.
type udpSlot struct {
passthrough bool
rawPkt []byte // borrowed when passthrough
fk flowKey
hdrBuf [udpCoalesceHdrCap]byte
hdrLen int
ipHdrLen int
isV6 bool
gsoSize int // per-segment UDP payload length
numSeg int
totalPay int
// sealed closes the chain: set when a sub-gsoSize segment is appended
// (kernel UDP-GSO requires every segment but the last to be exactly
// gsoSize) or when limits are hit. No further appends after.
sealed bool
payIovs [][]byte
}
// UDPCoalescer accumulates adjacent in-flow UDP datagrams across multiple
// concurrent flows and emits each flow's run as a single GSO_UDP_L4
// superpacket via tio.GSOWriter. Falls back to per-packet writes when the
// underlying writer doesn't support USO.
//
// All output — coalesced or not — is deferred until Flush so per-flow
// arrival order is preserved on the wire. Cross-flow order is NOT preserved
// across the TCP/UDP/passthrough split when this coalescer runs alongside
// others — see multi_coalesce.go. Per-flow order is preserved because a
// single 5-tuple only ever lands in one lane and each lane preserves its
// own slot order.
//
// Owns no locks; one coalescer per TUN write queue.
type UDPCoalescer struct {
plainW io.Writer
gsoW tio.GSOWriter // nil when the queue can't accept GSO_UDP_L4
slots []*udpSlot
openSlots map[flowKey]*udpSlot
pool []*udpSlot
backing []byte
}
// NewUDPCoalescer wraps w. The caller is responsible for only constructing
// this when the underlying Queue's Capabilities advertise USO; otherwise
// the kernel may reject GSO_UDP_L4 writes. If w does not implement
// tio.GSOWriter at all (single-packet Queue), the coalescer degrades to
// plain Writes — same defensive shape as the TCP coalescer.
func NewUDPCoalescer(w io.Writer) *UDPCoalescer {
c := &UDPCoalescer{
plainW: w,
slots: make([]*udpSlot, 0, initialSlots),
openSlots: make(map[flowKey]*udpSlot, initialSlots),
pool: make([]*udpSlot, 0, initialSlots),
backing: make([]byte, 0, initialSlots*udpCoalesceBufSize),
}
if gw, ok := tio.SupportsGSO(w, tio.GSOProtoUDP); ok {
c.gsoW = gw
}
return c
}
// parsedUDP holds the fields extracted from a single parse so later steps
// (admission, slot lookup, canAppend) don't re-walk the header.
type parsedUDP struct {
fk flowKey
ipHdrLen int
hdrLen int // ipHdrLen + 8
payLen int
}
// parseUDP extracts the flow key and IP/UDP offsets for a UDP packet.
// Returns ok=false for non-UDP, malformed, or unsupported header shapes
// (IPv4 with options/fragmentation, IPv6 with extension headers).
func parseUDP(pkt []byte) (parsedUDP, bool) {
var p parsedUDP
ip, ok := parseIPPrologue(pkt, ipProtoUDP)
if !ok {
return p, false
}
pkt = ip.pkt
p.fk = ip.fk
p.ipHdrLen = ip.ipHdrLen
if len(pkt) < p.ipHdrLen+8 {
return p, false
}
p.hdrLen = p.ipHdrLen + 8
// UDP `length` field: must equal IP-derived length-of-UDP-header-plus-payload.
udpLen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[p.ipHdrLen+4 : p.ipHdrLen+6]))
if udpLen < 8 || udpLen > len(pkt)-p.ipHdrLen {
return p, false
}
p.payLen = udpLen - 8
p.fk.sport = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[p.ipHdrLen : p.ipHdrLen+2])
p.fk.dport = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[p.ipHdrLen+2 : p.ipHdrLen+4])
return p, true
}
func (c *UDPCoalescer) Reserve(sz int) []byte {
return reserveFromBacking(&c.backing, sz)
}
// Commit borrows pkt. The caller must keep pkt valid until the next Flush.
func (c *UDPCoalescer) Commit(pkt []byte) error {
if c.gsoW == nil {
c.addPassthrough(pkt)
return nil
}
info, ok := parseUDP(pkt)
if !ok {
c.addPassthrough(pkt)
return nil
}
return c.commitParsed(pkt, info)
}
// commitParsed is the post-parse half of Commit. The caller must have
// already verified parseUDP succeeded. Used by MultiCoalescer.Commit to
// avoid re-walking the IP/UDP header.
func (c *UDPCoalescer) commitParsed(pkt []byte, info parsedUDP) error {
if c.gsoW == nil {
c.addPassthrough(pkt)
return nil
}
if open := c.openSlots[info.fk]; open != nil {
if c.canAppend(open, pkt, info) {
c.appendPayload(open, pkt, info)
if open.sealed {
delete(c.openSlots, info.fk)
}
return nil
}
// Can't extend — seal it and fall through to seed a fresh slot.
delete(c.openSlots, info.fk)
}
c.seed(pkt, info)
return nil
}
func (c *UDPCoalescer) Flush() error {
var first error
for _, s := range c.slots {
var err error
if s.passthrough {
_, err = c.plainW.Write(s.rawPkt)
} else {
err = c.flushSlot(s)
}
if err != nil && first == nil {
first = err
}
c.release(s)
}
clear(c.slots)
c.slots = c.slots[:0]
clear(c.openSlots)
c.backing = c.backing[:0]
return first
}
func (c *UDPCoalescer) addPassthrough(pkt []byte) {
s := c.take()
s.passthrough = true
s.rawPkt = pkt
c.slots = append(c.slots, s)
}
func (c *UDPCoalescer) seed(pkt []byte, info parsedUDP) {
if info.hdrLen > udpCoalesceHdrCap || info.hdrLen+info.payLen > udpCoalesceBufSize {
c.addPassthrough(pkt)
return
}
s := c.take()
s.passthrough = false
s.rawPkt = nil
copy(s.hdrBuf[:], pkt[:info.hdrLen])
s.hdrLen = info.hdrLen
s.ipHdrLen = info.ipHdrLen
s.isV6 = info.fk.isV6
s.fk = info.fk
s.gsoSize = info.payLen
s.numSeg = 1
s.totalPay = info.payLen
s.sealed = false
s.payIovs = append(s.payIovs[:0], pkt[info.hdrLen:info.hdrLen+info.payLen])
c.slots = append(c.slots, s)
c.openSlots[info.fk] = s
}
// canAppend reports whether info's packet extends the slot's seed.
// Kernel UDP-GSO requires every segment except possibly the last to be
// exactly gsoSize, and the last may be shorter (≤ gsoSize).
func (c *UDPCoalescer) canAppend(s *udpSlot, pkt []byte, info parsedUDP) bool {
if s.sealed {
return false
}
if info.hdrLen != s.hdrLen {
return false
}
if s.numSeg >= udpCoalesceMaxSegs {
return false
}
if info.payLen > s.gsoSize {
return false
}
if s.hdrLen+s.totalPay+info.payLen > udpCoalesceBufSize {
return false
}
if !udpHeadersMatch(s.hdrBuf[:s.hdrLen], pkt[:info.hdrLen], s.isV6, s.ipHdrLen) {
return false
}
return true
}
func (c *UDPCoalescer) appendPayload(s *udpSlot, pkt []byte, info parsedUDP) {
s.payIovs = append(s.payIovs, pkt[info.hdrLen:info.hdrLen+info.payLen])
s.numSeg++
s.totalPay += info.payLen
// Merge IP-level CE marks into the seed (same trick TCP coalescer uses).
mergeECNIntoSeed(s.hdrBuf[:s.ipHdrLen], pkt[:s.ipHdrLen], s.isV6)
if info.payLen < s.gsoSize {
// Last-segment-can-be-shorter: this seals the chain.
s.sealed = true
}
}
func (c *UDPCoalescer) take() *udpSlot {
if n := len(c.pool); n > 0 {
s := c.pool[n-1]
c.pool[n-1] = nil
c.pool = c.pool[:n-1]
return s
}
return &udpSlot{}
}
func (c *UDPCoalescer) release(s *udpSlot) {
s.passthrough = false
s.rawPkt = nil
clear(s.payIovs)
s.payIovs = s.payIovs[:0]
s.numSeg = 0
s.totalPay = 0
s.sealed = false
c.pool = append(c.pool, s)
}
// flushSlot patches the IP header total length / IPv6 payload length and
// the UDP length to the *total* across all coalesced segments, then seeds
// the UDP checksum field with the pseudo-header partial (single-fold, not
// inverted) per virtio NEEDS_CSUM. The kernel's ip_rcv_core (v4) and
// ip6_rcv_core (v6) trim the skb to those length fields, so per-segment
// values would silently drop everything but the first segment. The kernel
// then walks each segment in __udp_gso_segment, recomputing per-segment
// uh->len / iph->tot_len / IPv6 plen and adjusting the checksum via
// `check = csum16_add(csum16_sub(uh->check, uh->len), newlen)` — meaning
// our seed's uh->check must be consistent with the seed's uh->len, which
// is what passing the total to both pseudoSum and the UDP length field
// guarantees.
func (c *UDPCoalescer) flushSlot(s *udpSlot) error {
hdr := s.hdrBuf[:s.hdrLen]
total := s.hdrLen + s.totalPay // full IP+UDP+all_payloads bytes
l4Len := total - s.ipHdrLen // total UDP (8 + sum of payloads)
if s.isV6 {
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[4:6], uint16(l4Len))
} else {
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[2:4], uint16(total))
hdr[10] = 0
hdr[11] = 0
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[10:12], ipv4HdrChecksum(hdr[:s.ipHdrLen]))
}
// UDP length field (offset 4 inside the UDP header) = total UDP size.
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[s.ipHdrLen+4:s.ipHdrLen+6], uint16(l4Len))
var psum uint32
if s.isV6 {
psum = pseudoSumIPv6(hdr[8:24], hdr[24:40], ipProtoUDP, l4Len)
} else {
psum = pseudoSumIPv4(hdr[12:16], hdr[16:20], ipProtoUDP, l4Len)
}
udpCsumOff := s.ipHdrLen + 6
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[udpCsumOff:udpCsumOff+2], foldOnceNoInvert(psum))
return c.gsoW.WriteGSO(hdr[:s.ipHdrLen], hdr[s.ipHdrLen:], s.payIovs, tio.GSOProtoUDP)
}
// udpHeadersMatch compares two IP+UDP header prefixes for byte-equality on
// every field that must be identical across coalesced segments. Length
// fields and the ECN bits in IP TOS/TC are masked out — appendPayload
// merges CE into the seed; flushSlot rewrites lengths.
func udpHeadersMatch(a, b []byte, isV6 bool, ipHdrLen int) bool {
if len(a) != len(b) {
return false
}
if !ipHeadersMatch(a, b, isV6) {
return false
}
// UDP: compare sport+dport ([0:4]). Skip length [4:6] and checksum [6:8] —
// length varies (we rewrite at flush) and the checksum will be redone.
udp := ipHdrLen
if a[udp] != b[udp] || a[udp+1] != b[udp+1] || a[udp+2] != b[udp+2] || a[udp+3] != b[udp+3] {
return false
}
return true
}
-383
View File
@@ -1,383 +0,0 @@
package batch
import (
"encoding/binary"
"testing"
)
// buildUDPv4 builds a minimal IPv4+UDP packet with the given payload and ports.
func buildUDPv4(sport, dport uint16, payload []byte) []byte {
const ipHdrLen = 20
const udpHdrLen = 8
total := ipHdrLen + udpHdrLen + len(payload)
pkt := make([]byte, total)
pkt[0] = 0x45
pkt[1] = 0x00
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[2:4], uint16(total))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], 0)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[6:8], 0x4000)
pkt[8] = 64
pkt[9] = ipProtoUDP
copy(pkt[12:16], []byte{10, 0, 0, 1})
copy(pkt[16:20], []byte{10, 0, 0, 2})
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[20:22], sport)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[22:24], dport)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[24:26], uint16(udpHdrLen+len(payload)))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[26:28], 0)
copy(pkt[28:], payload)
return pkt
}
// buildUDPv6 builds a minimal IPv6+UDP packet.
func buildUDPv6(sport, dport uint16, payload []byte) []byte {
const ipHdrLen = 40
const udpHdrLen = 8
total := ipHdrLen + udpHdrLen + len(payload)
pkt := make([]byte, total)
pkt[0] = 0x60
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(udpHdrLen+len(payload)))
pkt[6] = ipProtoUDP
pkt[7] = 64
pkt[8] = 0xfe
pkt[9] = 0x80
pkt[23] = 1
pkt[24] = 0xfe
pkt[25] = 0x80
pkt[39] = 2
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[40:42], sport)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[42:44], dport)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[44:46], uint16(udpHdrLen+len(payload)))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[46:48], 0)
copy(pkt[48:], payload)
return pkt
}
func TestUDPCoalescerPassthroughWhenGSOUnavailable(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: false}
c := NewUDPCoalescer(w)
pkt := buildUDPv4(1000, 53, make([]byte, 100))
if err := c.Commit(pkt); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.writes) != 0 || len(w.gsoWrites) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("no Add-time writes: writes=%d gso=%d", len(w.writes), len(w.gsoWrites))
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.writes) != 1 || len(w.gsoWrites) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("want single plain write, got writes=%d gso=%d", len(w.writes), len(w.gsoWrites))
}
}
func TestUDPCoalescerNonUDPPassthrough(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewUDPCoalescer(w)
// ICMP packet
pkt := make([]byte, 28)
pkt[0] = 0x45
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[2:4], 28)
pkt[9] = 1
copy(pkt[12:16], []byte{10, 0, 0, 1})
copy(pkt[16:20], []byte{10, 0, 0, 2})
if err := c.Commit(pkt); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.writes) != 1 || len(w.gsoWrites) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("ICMP must pass through unchanged: writes=%d gso=%d", len(w.writes), len(w.gsoWrites))
}
}
func TestUDPCoalescerSeedThenFlushAlone(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewUDPCoalescer(w)
pkt := buildUDPv4(1000, 53, make([]byte, 800))
if err := c.Commit(pkt); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Single-segment flush goes through WriteGSO; the writer infers GSO_NONE
// from len(pays)==1 and the kernel fills in the UDP csum (NEEDS_CSUM).
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 1 || len(w.writes) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("single-seg flush: writes=%d gso=%d", len(w.writes), len(w.gsoWrites))
}
}
func TestUDPCoalescerCoalescesEqualSized(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewUDPCoalescer(w)
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("want 1 gso write, got %d (plain=%d)", len(w.gsoWrites), len(w.writes))
}
g := w.gsoWrites[0]
if g.gsoSize != 1200 {
t.Errorf("gsoSize=%d want 1200", g.gsoSize)
}
if len(g.pays) != 3 {
t.Errorf("pay count=%d want 3", len(g.pays))
}
if g.csumStart != 20 {
t.Errorf("csumStart=%d want 20", g.csumStart)
}
// IP totalLen and UDP length must be the TOTAL across all segments —
// the kernel's ip_rcv_core trims skbs to iph->tot_len, so a per-segment
// value would silently drop everything but the first segment. Total =
// IP(20) + UDP(8) + 3*1200 = 3628.
gotTotalLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(g.hdr[2:4])
if gotTotalLen != 3628 {
t.Errorf("ipv4 total_len=%d want 3628 (must be total across segments)", gotTotalLen)
}
gotUDPLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(g.hdr[20+4 : 20+6])
if gotUDPLen != 8+3*1200 {
t.Errorf("udp len=%d want %d", gotUDPLen, 8+3*1200)
}
}
// Last segment may be shorter, sealing the chain.
func TestUDPCoalescerShortLastSegmentSeals(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewUDPCoalescer(w)
full := make([]byte, 1200)
tail := make([]byte, 600)
if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, full)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, full)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, tail)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// A 4th packet, even same-sized, must NOT join — chain is sealed.
if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, full)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 gso writes (sealed + new seed), got %d", len(w.gsoWrites))
}
if len(w.gsoWrites[0].pays) != 3 {
t.Errorf("first super: want 3 pays, got %d", len(w.gsoWrites[0].pays))
}
if len(w.gsoWrites[1].pays) != 1 {
t.Errorf("second super: want 1 pay (re-seed), got %d", len(w.gsoWrites[1].pays))
}
}
// A larger-than-gsoSize packet cannot extend the slot — it reseeds.
func TestUDPCoalescerLargerThanSeedReseeds(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewUDPCoalescer(w)
if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, make([]byte, 800))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, make([]byte, 1200))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 separate seeds, got %d", len(w.gsoWrites))
}
}
// Different 5-tuples must not coalesce.
func TestUDPCoalescerDifferentFlowsKeepSeparate(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewUDPCoalescer(w)
pay := make([]byte, 800)
if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(2000, 53, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(2000, 53, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Two flows × 2 datagrams each = 2 superpackets of 2 segments.
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 gso writes (one per flow), got %d", len(w.gsoWrites))
}
for i, g := range w.gsoWrites {
if len(g.pays) != 2 {
t.Errorf("super %d: want 2 pays, got %d", i, len(g.pays))
}
}
}
// Caps at udpCoalesceMaxSegs.
func TestUDPCoalescerCapsAtMaxSegs(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewUDPCoalescer(w)
pay := make([]byte, 100)
for i := 0; i < udpCoalesceMaxSegs+5; i++ {
if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// First superpacket holds udpCoalesceMaxSegs segments; the spillover
// reseeds a new one.
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 gso writes (cap then reseed), got %d", len(w.gsoWrites))
}
if len(w.gsoWrites[0].pays) != udpCoalesceMaxSegs {
t.Errorf("first super: pays=%d want %d", len(w.gsoWrites[0].pays), udpCoalesceMaxSegs)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites[1].pays) != 5 {
t.Errorf("second super: pays=%d want 5", len(w.gsoWrites[1].pays))
}
}
// CE marks on appended segments must be merged into the seed's IP TOS.
func TestUDPCoalescerMergesCEMark(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewUDPCoalescer(w)
pay := make([]byte, 800)
pkt0 := buildUDPv4(1000, 53, pay) // ECN=00
pkt1 := buildUDPv4(1000, 53, pay)
pkt1[1] = 0x03 // CE
pkt2 := buildUDPv4(1000, 53, pay)
if err := c.Commit(pkt0); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(pkt1); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(pkt2); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("want 1 merged gso write, got %d (plain=%d)", len(w.gsoWrites), len(w.writes))
}
if w.gsoWrites[0].hdr[1]&0x03 != 0x03 {
t.Errorf("CE not merged into seed (tos=%#x)", w.gsoWrites[0].hdr[1])
}
}
// IPv6 path: same flow, equal-sized → coalesced.
func TestUDPCoalescerIPv6Coalesces(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewUDPCoalescer(w)
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv6(1000, 53, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("want 1 gso write, got %d", len(w.gsoWrites))
}
g := w.gsoWrites[0]
if !g.isV6 {
t.Errorf("expected v6 write")
}
if g.csumStart != 40 {
t.Errorf("csumStart=%d want 40", g.csumStart)
}
// IPv6 payload_len and UDP length must be TOTAL — kernel's
// ip6_rcv_core trims to payload_len + ipv6 hdr size. Total UDP = 8 +
// 3*1200 = 3608.
gotPlen := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(g.hdr[4:6])
if gotPlen != 8+3*1200 {
t.Errorf("ipv6 payload_len=%d want %d (must be total)", gotPlen, 8+3*1200)
}
gotUDPLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(g.hdr[40+4 : 40+6])
if gotUDPLen != 8+3*1200 {
t.Errorf("udp len=%d want %d", gotUDPLen, 8+3*1200)
}
}
// DSCP differences must reseed (headers don't match outside ECN).
func TestUDPCoalescerDSCPMismatchReseeds(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewUDPCoalescer(w)
pay := make([]byte, 800)
pkt0 := buildUDPv4(1000, 53, pay)
pkt1 := buildUDPv4(1000, 53, pay)
pkt1[1] = 0xb8 // EF DSCP, ECN=0
if err := c.Commit(pkt0); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(pkt1); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 separate seeds (different DSCP), got %d", len(w.gsoWrites))
}
}
// Fragmented IPv4 must not be coalesced.
func TestUDPCoalescerFragmentedIPv4PassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewUDPCoalescer(w)
pkt := buildUDPv4(1000, 53, make([]byte, 200))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[6:8], 0x2000) // MF=1
if err := c.Commit(pkt); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.writes) != 1 || len(w.gsoWrites) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("frag must pass through plain, got writes=%d gso=%d", len(w.writes), len(w.gsoWrites))
}
}
// IPv4 with options is not admissible (we require IHL=5).
func TestUDPCoalescerIPv4WithOptionsPassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewUDPCoalescer(w)
pkt := buildUDPv4(1000, 53, make([]byte, 200))
pkt[0] = 0x46 // IHL = 6 (24-byte IPv4 header — has options)
if err := c.Commit(pkt); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.writes) != 1 || len(w.gsoWrites) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("ipv4-with-options must pass through plain, got writes=%d gso=%d", len(w.writes), len(w.gsoWrites))
}
}
-23
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@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
package checksum
import (
"golang.org/x/sys/cpu"
gvisorchecksum "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/tcpip/checksum"
)
//go:noescape
func checksumAVX2(buf []byte, initial uint16) uint16
var hasAVX2 = cpu.X86.HasAVX2
// Checksum computes the RFC 1071 ones-complement sum of buf, seeded with
// initial. It is a drop-in replacement for gvisor's checksum.Checksum that
// dispatches to a hand-written AVX2 routine on amd64 CPUs that support it,
// falling back to gvisor's pure-Go implementation otherwise. The result
// matches gvisor's bit-for-bit for any buffer length and initial seed.
func Checksum(buf []byte, initial uint16) uint16 {
if hasAVX2 {
return checksumAVX2(buf, initial)
}
return gvisorchecksum.Checksum(buf, initial)
}
-157
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@@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
#include "textflag.h"
// func checksumAVX2(buf []byte, initial uint16) uint16
//
// Computes the RFC 1071 ones-complement sum of buf, seeded with initial.
//
// Algorithm: sum the buffer treating it as a stream of uint32s in machine
// (little-endian) byte order, accumulating into 64-bit lanes (top 32 bits
// hold cross-add carries at 1 byte / lane / iter we have 32 bits of
// headroom which is far more than the 16 KB/64 KB max practical inputs).
// At the end we fold to 16 bits and byte-swap once to recover the on-wire
// (big-endian) result. RFC 1071 §1.2.B byte-order independence makes this
// equivalent to summing as 16-bit big-endian words.
//
// The ymm accumulators (Y4..Y7) hold 4 uint64 lanes each = 16 parallel
// partial sums. The main loop loads 64 bytes per iter as four 16-byte
// chunks, zero-extending each chunk's four uint32s into a ymm via
// VPMOVZXDQ-from-memory, then VPADDQ into a separate accumulator per
// chunk to break the dep chain. After the vector loop the lane sums are
// horizontally reduced and merged with a scalar accumulator that handles
// the trailing 0..63 bytes plus the (byte-swapped) initial seed.
TEXT ·checksumAVX2(SB), NOSPLIT, $0-34
MOVQ buf_base+0(FP), SI
MOVQ buf_len+8(FP), CX
MOVWQZX initial+24(FP), AX
// Pre-byteswap initial into the LE-summing space so it merges directly
// with the rest of the accumulator. The final fold's bswap16 will undo
// this and convert the whole result back to BE.
XCHGB AH, AL
CMPQ CX, $32
JLT scalar_tail
VPXOR Y4, Y4, Y4
VPXOR Y5, Y5, Y5
VPXOR Y6, Y6, Y6
VPXOR Y7, Y7, Y7
CMPQ CX, $64
JLT loop32
loop64:
VPMOVZXDQ (SI), Y0
VPMOVZXDQ 16(SI), Y1
VPMOVZXDQ 32(SI), Y2
VPMOVZXDQ 48(SI), Y3
VPADDQ Y0, Y4, Y4
VPADDQ Y1, Y5, Y5
VPADDQ Y2, Y6, Y6
VPADDQ Y3, Y7, Y7
ADDQ $64, SI
SUBQ $64, CX
CMPQ CX, $64
JGE loop64
loop32:
CMPQ CX, $32
JLT reduce_vec
VPMOVZXDQ (SI), Y0
VPMOVZXDQ 16(SI), Y1
VPADDQ Y0, Y4, Y4
VPADDQ Y1, Y5, Y5
ADDQ $32, SI
SUBQ $32, CX
JMP loop32
reduce_vec:
// Combine the four ymm accumulators into Y4.
VPADDQ Y5, Y4, Y4
VPADDQ Y7, Y6, Y6
VPADDQ Y6, Y4, Y4
// Horizontally reduce Y4's four uint64 lanes to a single scalar.
VEXTRACTI128 $1, Y4, X5
VPADDQ X5, X4, X4
VPSHUFD $0x4e, X4, X5
VPADDQ X5, X4, X4
VMOVQ X4, R8
VZEROUPPER
ADDQ R8, AX
ADCQ $0, AX
scalar_tail:
// Handle remaining 0..63 bytes (or the entire buffer if it was < 32).
CMPQ CX, $8
JLT tail4
loop8:
ADDQ (SI), AX
ADCQ $0, AX
ADDQ $8, SI
SUBQ $8, CX
CMPQ CX, $8
JGE loop8
tail4:
CMPQ CX, $4
JLT tail2
MOVL (SI), R8
ADDQ R8, AX
ADCQ $0, AX
ADDQ $4, SI
SUBQ $4, CX
tail2:
CMPQ CX, $2
JLT tail1
MOVWQZX (SI), R8
ADDQ R8, AX
ADCQ $0, AX
ADDQ $2, SI
SUBQ $2, CX
tail1:
TESTQ CX, CX
JZ fold
MOVBQZX (SI), R8
ADDQ R8, AX
ADCQ $0, AX
fold:
// Fold the 64-bit accumulator to 16 bits via four rounds, mirroring
// gvisor's reduce(). Each pair (split, add) halves the live width;
// the truncation steps absorb the single bit that may be left over
// after each add so the next round's bound holds.
// 64 33 bits.
MOVQ AX, R8
SHRQ $32, R8
MOVL AX, AX
ADDQ R8, AX
// 33 32 bits. AX += (AX>>32); truncate to 32. AX is now ≤ 0xFFFF_FFFF.
MOVQ AX, R8
SHRQ $32, R8
ADDQ R8, AX
MOVL AX, AX
// 32 17 bits.
MOVQ AX, R8
SHRQ $16, R8
MOVWQZX AX, AX
ADDQ R8, AX
// 17 16 bits. AX += (AX>>16); the trailing MOVW truncates bit 16.
MOVQ AX, R8
SHRQ $16, R8
ADDQ R8, AX
// AX low 16 bits hold the 16-bit sum in machine (LE) byte order; flip
// to big-endian to match the gvisor API contract.
XCHGB AH, AL
MOVW AX, ret+32(FP)
RET
-12
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@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
package checksum
//go:noescape
func checksumNEON(buf []byte, initial uint16) uint16
// Checksum computes the RFC 1071 ones-complement sum of buf, seeded with
// initial. It is a drop-in replacement for gvisor's checksum.Checksum
// that dispatches to a hand-written NEON routine. NEON is mandatory in
// armv8 so no feature check is needed.
func Checksum(buf []byte, initial uint16) uint16 {
return checksumNEON(buf, initial)
}
-143
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@@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
#include "textflag.h"
// func checksumNEON(buf []byte, initial uint16) uint16
//
// Mirrors the algorithm in checksum_amd64.s: sum the buffer treating it as
// a stream of uint32s in machine (little-endian) byte order, accumulating
// into 64-bit lanes that have ample carry headroom; fold and byte-swap once
// at the very end to recover the on-wire (big-endian) result.
//
// Each loop iteration loads 64 bytes via VLD1.P into V0..V3 (4 Q regs).
// VUADDW takes the low two uint32 lanes of a Q reg, zero-extends them to
// uint64, and adds them into a 2×uint64 accumulator; VUADDW2 does the same
// for the high two lanes. Four ymm-equivalent accumulators (V8..V11) get
// updated twice per iter to break the dep chain. Tail bytes go through a
// scalar ADCS chain seeded with the byte-swapped initial.
TEXT ·checksumNEON(SB), NOSPLIT, $0-34
MOVD buf_base+0(FP), R0
MOVD buf_len+8(FP), R1
MOVHU initial+24(FP), R2
// Pre-byteswap initial into the LE-summing space so it merges directly
// with the rest of the accumulator.
REV16W R2, R2
MOVD ZR, R3 // scalar accumulator
CMP $32, R1
BLT scalar_tail
VEOR V8.B16, V8.B16, V8.B16
VEOR V9.B16, V9.B16, V9.B16
VEOR V10.B16, V10.B16, V10.B16
VEOR V11.B16, V11.B16, V11.B16
CMP $64, R1
BLT loop16_init
loop64:
VLD1.P 64(R0), [V0.B16, V1.B16, V2.B16, V3.B16]
VUADDW V0.S2, V8.D2, V8.D2
VUADDW2 V0.S4, V9.D2, V9.D2
VUADDW V1.S2, V10.D2, V10.D2
VUADDW2 V1.S4, V11.D2, V11.D2
VUADDW V2.S2, V8.D2, V8.D2
VUADDW2 V2.S4, V9.D2, V9.D2
VUADDW V3.S2, V10.D2, V10.D2
VUADDW2 V3.S4, V11.D2, V11.D2
SUB $64, R1, R1
CMP $64, R1
BGE loop64
loop16_init:
CMP $16, R1
BLT reduce_vec
loop16:
VLD1.P 16(R0), [V0.B16]
VUADDW V0.S2, V8.D2, V8.D2
VUADDW2 V0.S4, V9.D2, V9.D2
SUB $16, R1, R1
CMP $16, R1
BGE loop16
reduce_vec:
// Combine the four accumulators into V8.
VADD V9.D2, V8.D2, V8.D2
VADD V11.D2, V10.D2, V10.D2
VADD V10.D2, V8.D2, V8.D2
// Horizontal-add the two lanes of V8.D2 into a single uint64.
VADDP V8.D2, V8.D2, V8.D2
VMOV V8.D[0], R8
ADDS R8, R3, R3
ADC ZR, R3, R3
scalar_tail:
CMP $8, R1
BLT tail4
loop8:
MOVD.P 8(R0), R8
ADDS R8, R3, R3
ADC ZR, R3, R3
SUB $8, R1, R1
CMP $8, R1
BGE loop8
tail4:
CMP $4, R1
BLT tail2
MOVWU.P 4(R0), R8
ADDS R8, R3, R3
ADC ZR, R3, R3
SUB $4, R1, R1
tail2:
CMP $2, R1
BLT tail1
MOVHU.P 2(R0), R8
ADDS R8, R3, R3
ADC ZR, R3, R3
SUB $2, R1, R1
tail1:
CBZ R1, fold
MOVBU (R0), R8
ADDS R8, R3, R3
ADC ZR, R3, R3
fold:
// Merge the byte-swapped initial into our LE-form accumulator.
ADDS R2, R3, R3
ADC ZR, R3, R3
// 64 33 bits.
LSR $32, R3, R8
AND $0xffffffff, R3, R3
ADD R8, R3, R3
// 33 32 (truncate after adding bit 32 back).
LSR $32, R3, R8
ADD R8, R3, R3
AND $0xffffffff, R3, R3
// 32 17.
LSR $16, R3, R8
AND $0xffff, R3, R3
ADD R8, R3, R3
// 17 16 (truncation absorbs bit 16 below).
LSR $16, R3, R8
ADD R8, R3, R3
// AX low 16 bits hold the 16-bit sum in machine (LE) byte order; flip
// to big-endian to match the gvisor API contract. REV16W swaps bytes
// within each 16-bit halfword of the low 32 bits, so it acts as a
// 16-bit byte-swap on the live low 16.
REV16W R3, R3
AND $0xffff, R3, R3
MOVH R3, ret+32(FP)
RET
-10
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@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
//go:build !amd64 && !arm64
package checksum
import gvisorchecksum "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/tcpip/checksum"
// Checksum delegates to gvisor on architectures without a hand-written body.
func Checksum(buf []byte, initial uint16) uint16 {
return gvisorchecksum.Checksum(buf, initial)
}
-190
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@@ -1,190 +0,0 @@
package checksum
import (
"fmt"
"math/rand/v2"
"testing"
gvisorchecksum "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/tcpip/checksum"
)
// TestChecksumMatchesGvisor walks lengths from 0 to 4096, with several initial
// seeds and a handful of starting alignments, asserting that our local
// Checksum matches gvisor's reference bit-for-bit.
func TestChecksumMatchesGvisor(t *testing.T) {
rng := rand.New(rand.NewPCG(1, 2))
const padFront = 16
// Random pool large enough for the longest case + alignment slop.
pool := make([]byte, 4096+padFront)
for i := range pool {
pool[i] = byte(rng.Uint32())
}
seeds := []uint16{0, 0x0001, 0xabcd, 0xffff, 0x1234, 0xfedc}
offsets := []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 15, 16}
for length := 0; length <= 4096; length++ {
for _, seed := range seeds {
for _, off := range offsets {
if off+length > len(pool) {
continue
}
buf := pool[off : off+length]
want := gvisorchecksum.Checksum(buf, seed)
got := Checksum(buf, seed)
if got != want {
t.Fatalf("len=%d off=%d seed=%#x: got %#04x want %#04x",
length, off, seed, got, want)
}
}
}
}
}
// TestChecksumPatternedBuffers exercises specific byte patterns that have
// historically tripped up checksum implementations: all-zero, all-0xff,
// alternating, and ascending sequences.
func TestChecksumPatternedBuffers(t *testing.T) {
for length := 0; length <= 256; length++ {
patterns := map[string][]byte{
"zeros": make([]byte, length),
"ones": bytes(length, 0xff),
"alternating": pattern(length, []byte{0xa5, 0x5a}),
"ascending": ascending(length),
}
for name, buf := range patterns {
for _, seed := range []uint16{0, 0xffff, 0x8000} {
want := gvisorchecksum.Checksum(buf, seed)
got := Checksum(buf, seed)
if got != want {
t.Fatalf("%s len=%d seed=%#x: got %#04x want %#04x",
name, length, seed, got, want)
}
}
}
}
}
func bytes(n int, v byte) []byte {
b := make([]byte, n)
for i := range b {
b[i] = v
}
return b
}
func pattern(n int, p []byte) []byte {
b := make([]byte, n)
for i := range b {
b[i] = p[i%len(p)]
}
return b
}
func ascending(n int) []byte {
b := make([]byte, n)
for i := range b {
b[i] = byte(i)
}
return b
}
// TestChecksumTailPaths targets every combination of (SIMD body iterations,
// trailing tail bytes) the asm handlers walk through. The tail handlers
// peel off 8 → 4 → 2 → 1 byte chunks in turn; this test exercises each by
// constructing lengths of the form 64*k + tail for tail ∈ [0, 63] and a
// representative spread of k values, including k=0 (no main loop, all tail)
// and k=1 (one main loop iter, then tail). It's explicit coverage for
// payload sizes that are odd, not divisible by 4, by 8, or by 32.
func TestChecksumTailPaths(t *testing.T) {
rng := rand.New(rand.NewPCG(42, 17))
const padFront = 16
const maxK = 8
pool := make([]byte, 64*maxK+padFront+64)
for i := range pool {
pool[i] = byte(rng.Uint32())
}
seeds := []uint16{0, 0xffff, 0xabcd}
offsets := []int{0, 1, 3, 7, 15} // mix of aligned and odd starts
for k := 0; k <= maxK; k++ {
for tail := 0; tail < 64; tail++ {
length := 64*k + tail
for _, seed := range seeds {
for _, off := range offsets {
if off+length > len(pool) {
continue
}
buf := pool[off : off+length]
want := gvisorchecksum.Checksum(buf, seed)
got := Checksum(buf, seed)
if got != want {
t.Fatalf("k=%d tail=%d (len=%d) off=%d seed=%#x: got %#04x want %#04x",
k, tail, length, off, seed, got, want)
}
}
}
}
}
}
// BenchmarkChecksumTailSizes covers payload sizes that aren't clean multiples
// of the SIMD body's 32-byte (amd64) or 16-byte (arm64) chunks, so the tail
// handler is meaningfully on the hot path. Sizes are picked to either exercise
// every tail branch (tiny lengths) or sit slightly off realistic packet
// boundaries (e.g. 1499 = MTU 1).
func BenchmarkChecksumTailSizes(b *testing.B) {
sizes := []int{
1, 3, 7, 15, 31, // sub-SIMD; entire work is scalar tail
33, 35, 47, 63, // one loop32 + assorted tails
65, 95, 127, // one loop64 + assorted tails
1447, 1471, 1499, 1501, // around MTU
8191, 8193, // around USO
65531, 65533, // near the kernel max
}
for _, size := range sizes {
buf := make([]byte, size)
for i := range buf {
buf[i] = byte(i)
}
b.Run(fmt.Sprintf("size=%d/local", size), func(b *testing.B) {
b.SetBytes(int64(size))
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
_ = Checksum(buf, 0)
}
})
b.Run(fmt.Sprintf("size=%d/gvisor", size), func(b *testing.B) {
b.SetBytes(int64(size))
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
_ = gvisorchecksum.Checksum(buf, 0)
}
})
}
}
// BenchmarkChecksum compares the local Checksum to gvisor's at sizes that
// match real traffic: a TCP/IP header (60), a typical MSS (1448), a typical
// USO size (8192), and the kernel's max GSO superpacket (65535).
func BenchmarkChecksum(b *testing.B) {
for _, size := range []int{60, 1448, 8192, 65535} {
buf := make([]byte, size)
for i := range buf {
buf[i] = byte(i)
}
b.Run(fmt.Sprintf("size=%d/local", size), func(b *testing.B) {
b.SetBytes(int64(size))
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
_ = Checksum(buf, 0)
}
})
b.Run(fmt.Sprintf("size=%d/gvisor", size), func(b *testing.B) {
b.SetBytes(int64(size))
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
_ = gvisorchecksum.Checksum(buf, 0)
}
})
}
}
+5 -8
View File
@@ -4,21 +4,18 @@ import (
"io"
"net/netip"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
)
// defaultBatchBufSize is the per-Queue scratch size for Read on backends
// that don't do TSO segmentation. 65535 covers any single IP packet.
const defaultBatchBufSize = 65535
type Device interface {
io.Closer
io.ReadWriteCloser
Activate() error
Networks() []netip.Prefix
Name() string
RoutesFor(netip.Addr) routing.Gateways
SupportsMultiqueue() bool
NewMultiQueueReader() error
Readers() []tio.Queue
NewMultiQueueReader() (io.ReadWriteCloser, error)
// TunPrefixLen reports the number of bytes the device prepends to every IP packet on the wire.
// Currently only non zero for the BSD tun devices.
TunPrefixLen() int
}
-358
View File
@@ -1,358 +0,0 @@
//go:build !e2e_testing
// +build !e2e_testing
package overlay
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"runtime"
"strings"
"syscall"
"time"
"unsafe"
"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
)
// networkCategory mirrors NLM_NETWORK_CATEGORY from netlistmgr.h.
type networkCategory int32
const (
networkCategoryPublic networkCategory = 0
networkCategoryPrivate networkCategory = 1
networkCategoryDomainAuthenticated networkCategory = 2
)
func (c networkCategory) String() string {
switch c {
case networkCategoryPublic:
return "public"
case networkCategoryPrivate:
return "private"
case networkCategoryDomainAuthenticated:
return "domain"
}
return fmt.Sprintf("unknown(%d)", c)
}
// parseNetworkCategory accepts the user-supplied tun.network_category. A
// second return of false means "leave the category alone".
func parseNetworkCategory(s string) (networkCategory, bool, error) {
switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(s)) {
case "", "unset":
return 0, false, nil
case "public":
return networkCategoryPublic, true, nil
case "private":
return networkCategoryPrivate, true, nil
case "domain", "domainauthenticated":
return networkCategoryDomainAuthenticated, true, nil
}
return 0, false, fmt.Errorf("unknown tun.network_category %q (expected public, private, domain, or unset)", s)
}
// CLSID_NetworkListManager {DCB00C01-570F-4A9B-8D69-199FDBA5723B}
var clsidNetworkListManager = windows.GUID{
Data1: 0xDCB00C01, Data2: 0x570F, Data3: 0x4A9B,
Data4: [8]byte{0x8D, 0x69, 0x19, 0x9F, 0xDB, 0xA5, 0x72, 0x3B},
}
// IID_INetworkListManager {DCB00000-570F-4A9B-8D69-199FDBA5723B}
var iidINetworkListManager = windows.GUID{
Data1: 0xDCB00000, Data2: 0x570F, Data3: 0x4A9B,
Data4: [8]byte{0x8D, 0x69, 0x19, 0x9F, 0xDB, 0xA5, 0x72, 0x3B},
}
// x/sys/windows doesn't expose CoCreateInstance, so we bind it ourselves.
var procCoCreateInstance = windows.NewLazySystemDLL("ole32.dll").NewProc("CoCreateInstance")
const clsCtxAll = windows.CLSCTX_INPROC_SERVER | windows.CLSCTX_INPROC_HANDLER |
windows.CLSCTX_LOCAL_SERVER | windows.CLSCTX_REMOTE_SERVER
const (
hrSFALSE = 0x00000001
hrRPCEChangedMode = 0x80010106
)
type hresult uint32
func (h hresult) failed() bool { return int32(h) < 0 }
func (h hresult) String() string {
return fmt.Sprintf("HRESULT 0x%08x", uint32(h))
}
var errAdapterNotFound = errors.New("adapter not present in network connections enumeration")
// Vtable layouts. Slot order must match the declaration order in netlistmgr.h.
// All NLM interfaces here derive from IDispatch, which derives from IUnknown.
type iUnknownVtbl struct {
QueryInterface uintptr
AddRef uintptr
Release uintptr
}
type iDispatchVtbl struct {
iUnknownVtbl
GetTypeInfoCount uintptr
GetTypeInfo uintptr
GetIDsOfNames uintptr
Invoke uintptr
}
type iNetworkListManagerVtbl struct {
iDispatchVtbl
GetNetworks uintptr
GetNetwork uintptr
GetNetworkConnections uintptr
GetNetworkConnection uintptr
IsConnectedToInternet uintptr
IsConnected uintptr
GetConnectivity uintptr
}
type iNetworkListManager struct{ Vtbl *iNetworkListManagerVtbl }
func (n *iNetworkListManager) Release() {
syscall.SyscallN(n.Vtbl.Release, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(n)))
}
func (n *iNetworkListManager) GetNetworkConnections() (*iEnumNetworkConnections, error) {
var enum *iEnumNetworkConnections
r1, _, _ := syscall.SyscallN(n.Vtbl.GetNetworkConnections,
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(n)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&enum)),
)
if hr := hresult(r1); hr.failed() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("INetworkListManager.GetNetworkConnections: %s", hr)
}
return enum, nil
}
type iEnumNetworkConnectionsVtbl struct {
iDispatchVtbl
NewEnum uintptr
Next uintptr
Skip uintptr
Reset uintptr
Clone uintptr
}
type iEnumNetworkConnections struct{ Vtbl *iEnumNetworkConnectionsVtbl }
func (e *iEnumNetworkConnections) Release() {
syscall.SyscallN(e.Vtbl.Release, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(e)))
}
// Next returns the next connection, or (nil, nil) at the end of the enumeration.
func (e *iEnumNetworkConnections) Next() (*iNetworkConnection, error) {
var conn *iNetworkConnection
var fetched uint32
r1, _, _ := syscall.SyscallN(e.Vtbl.Next,
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(e)), 1,
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&conn)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&fetched)),
)
if hr := hresult(r1); hr.failed() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("IEnumNetworkConnections.Next: %s", hr)
}
if fetched == 0 {
return nil, nil
}
return conn, nil
}
type iNetworkConnectionVtbl struct {
iDispatchVtbl
GetNetwork uintptr
IsConnectedToInternet uintptr
IsConnected uintptr
GetConnectivity uintptr
GetConnectionId uintptr
GetAdapterId uintptr
GetDomainType uintptr
}
type iNetworkConnection struct{ Vtbl *iNetworkConnectionVtbl }
func (c *iNetworkConnection) Release() {
syscall.SyscallN(c.Vtbl.Release, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(c)))
}
func (c *iNetworkConnection) GetAdapterId() (windows.GUID, error) {
var g windows.GUID
r1, _, _ := syscall.SyscallN(c.Vtbl.GetAdapterId,
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(c)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&g)),
)
if hr := hresult(r1); hr.failed() {
return windows.GUID{}, fmt.Errorf("INetworkConnection.GetAdapterId: %s", hr)
}
return g, nil
}
func (c *iNetworkConnection) GetNetwork() (*iNetwork, error) {
var net *iNetwork
r1, _, _ := syscall.SyscallN(c.Vtbl.GetNetwork,
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(c)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&net)),
)
if hr := hresult(r1); hr.failed() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("INetworkConnection.GetNetwork: %s", hr)
}
return net, nil
}
type iNetworkVtbl struct {
iDispatchVtbl
GetName uintptr
SetName uintptr
GetDescription uintptr
SetDescription uintptr
GetNetworkId uintptr
GetDomainType uintptr
GetNetworkConnections uintptr
GetTimeCreatedAndConnected uintptr
IsConnectedToInternet uintptr
IsConnected uintptr
GetConnectivity uintptr
GetCategory uintptr
SetCategory uintptr
}
type iNetwork struct{ Vtbl *iNetworkVtbl }
func (n *iNetwork) Release() {
syscall.SyscallN(n.Vtbl.Release, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(n)))
}
func (n *iNetwork) GetCategory() (networkCategory, error) {
var c networkCategory
r1, _, _ := syscall.SyscallN(n.Vtbl.GetCategory,
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(n)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&c)),
)
if hr := hresult(r1); hr.failed() {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("INetwork.GetCategory: %s", hr)
}
return c, nil
}
func (n *iNetwork) SetCategory(c networkCategory) error {
r1, _, _ := syscall.SyscallN(n.Vtbl.SetCategory,
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(n)), uintptr(int32(c)),
)
if hr := hresult(r1); hr.failed() {
return fmt.Errorf("INetwork.SetCategory: %s", hr)
}
return nil
}
// coInit initializes COM for the current OS thread. The returned function must
// be deferred to balance a successful init. RPC_E_CHANGED_MODE means COM is
// already initialized in a different mode on this thread, which is still fine
// for our calls but we must not Uninitialize in that case.
func coInit() (func(), error) {
err := windows.CoInitializeEx(0, windows.COINIT_MULTITHREADED)
if err == nil {
return windows.CoUninitialize, nil
}
if e, ok := err.(syscall.Errno); ok {
switch uint32(e) {
case hrSFALSE:
return windows.CoUninitialize, nil
case hrRPCEChangedMode:
return func() {}, nil
}
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("CoInitializeEx: %w", err)
}
func createNetworkListManager() (*iNetworkListManager, error) {
var nlm *iNetworkListManager
r1, _, _ := procCoCreateInstance.Call(
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&clsidNetworkListManager)),
0,
uintptr(clsCtxAll),
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&iidINetworkListManager)),
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&nlm)),
)
if hr := hresult(r1); hr.failed() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("CoCreateInstance(NetworkListManager): %s", hr)
}
return nlm, nil
}
// setNetworkCategory locates the network connection bound to adapterGUID and
// sets the category of its parent network. Returns errAdapterNotFound if the
// adapter is not yet visible in the NLM enumeration.
func setNetworkCategory(adapterGUID windows.GUID, cat networkCategory) error {
deinit, err := coInit()
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer deinit()
nlm, err := createNetworkListManager()
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer nlm.Release()
enum, err := nlm.GetNetworkConnections()
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer enum.Release()
for {
conn, err := enum.Next()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if conn == nil {
return errAdapterNotFound
}
guid, err := conn.GetAdapterId()
if err != nil || guid != adapterGUID {
conn.Release()
continue
}
net, err := conn.GetNetwork()
conn.Release()
if err != nil {
return err
}
err = net.SetCategory(cat)
net.Release()
return err
}
}
// applyNetworkCategory polls until the wintun adapter shows up in the NLM
// enumeration, then sets the category. Intended to run in its own goroutine.
func applyNetworkCategory(l *slog.Logger, adapterGUID windows.GUID, cat networkCategory) {
// COM Init/Uninit must be paired on the same OS thread.
runtime.LockOSThread()
defer runtime.UnlockOSThread()
const (
attempts = 30
interval = 500 * time.Millisecond
)
for i := 0; i < attempts; i++ {
err := setNetworkCategory(adapterGUID, cat)
if err == nil {
l.Info("Set Windows network category", "category", cat.String())
return
}
if !errors.Is(err, errAdapterNotFound) {
l.Warn("Failed to set Windows network category", "error", err, "category", cat.String())
return
}
time.Sleep(interval)
}
l.Warn("Gave up waiting for adapter to appear in NLM enumeration; network category not set",
"category", cat.String(),
"waited", time.Duration(attempts)*interval,
)
}
-109
View File
@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
//go:build !e2e_testing
// +build !e2e_testing
package overlay
import (
"testing"
)
func Test_parseNetworkCategory(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
in string
wantCat networkCategory
wantApply bool
wantErr bool
}{
{"", 0, false, false},
{"unset", 0, false, false},
{" UNSET ", 0, false, false},
{"private", networkCategoryPrivate, true, false},
{"Private", networkCategoryPrivate, true, false},
{" PRIVATE ", networkCategoryPrivate, true, false},
{"public", networkCategoryPublic, true, false},
{"PUBLIC", networkCategoryPublic, true, false},
{"domain", networkCategoryDomainAuthenticated, true, false},
{"DomainAuthenticated", networkCategoryDomainAuthenticated, true, false},
{"garbage", 0, false, true},
{"privates", 0, false, true},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
cat, apply, err := parseNetworkCategory(tc.in)
if (err != nil) != tc.wantErr {
t.Errorf("parseNetworkCategory(%q) err=%v, wantErr=%v", tc.in, err, tc.wantErr)
continue
}
if cat != tc.wantCat || apply != tc.wantApply {
t.Errorf("parseNetworkCategory(%q) = (%v, %v), want (%v, %v)", tc.in, cat, apply, tc.wantCat, tc.wantApply)
}
}
}
// Test_NLM_round_trip exercises every COM call path used by setNetworkCategory
// without mutating the host's network state. It validates the CLSID/IID
// constants and every vtable index by enumerating connections, fetching the
// adapter id and parent network, reading the current category, and writing it
// back unchanged.
//
// Requires Windows but does not require admin or the wintun driver. Skips if
// no network connections are available (unlikely outside of an isolated
// container).
func Test_NLM_round_trip(t *testing.T) {
deinit, err := coInit()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("coInit: %v", err)
}
defer deinit()
nlm, err := createNetworkListManager()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("createNetworkListManager: %v", err)
}
defer nlm.Release()
enum, err := nlm.GetNetworkConnections()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GetNetworkConnections: %v", err)
}
defer enum.Release()
saw := 0
for {
conn, err := enum.Next()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("EnumNetworkConnections.Next: %v", err)
}
if conn == nil {
break
}
saw++
if _, err := conn.GetAdapterId(); err != nil {
conn.Release()
t.Fatalf("INetworkConnection.GetAdapterId: %v", err)
}
net, err := conn.GetNetwork()
conn.Release()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("INetworkConnection.GetNetwork: %v", err)
}
cat, err := net.GetCategory()
if err != nil {
net.Release()
t.Fatalf("INetwork.GetCategory: %v", err)
}
// Set to the current value so the host's NLM state is unchanged but
// SetCategory's vtable slot is still validated end-to-end.
if err := net.SetCategory(cat); err != nil {
net.Release()
t.Fatalf("INetwork.SetCategory(%v): %v", cat, err)
}
net.Release()
}
if saw == 0 {
t.Skip("no NLM network connections available; skipping round-trip")
}
}
+7 -9
View File
@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ package overlaytest
import (
"errors"
"io"
"net/netip"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
)
@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ func (NoopTun) Name() string {
return "noop"
}
func (NoopTun) Read() ([]tio.Packet, error) {
return nil, nil
func (NoopTun) Read([]byte) (int, error) {
return 0, nil
}
func (NoopTun) Write([]byte) (int, error) {
@@ -43,14 +43,12 @@ func (NoopTun) SupportsMultiqueue() bool {
return false
}
func (NoopTun) NewMultiQueueReader() error {
return errors.New("unsupported")
}
func (NoopTun) Readers() []tio.Queue {
return []tio.Queue{NoopTun{}}
func (NoopTun) NewMultiQueueReader() (io.ReadWriteCloser, error) {
return nil, errors.New("unsupported")
}
func (NoopTun) Close() error {
return nil
}
func (NoopTun) TunPrefixLen() int { return 0 }
-79
View File
@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
package tio
import (
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"fmt"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
type offloadQueueSet struct {
pq []*Offload
// pqi is exactly the same as pq, but stored as the interface type
pqi []Queue
shutdownFd int
// usoEnabled is true when newTun successfully negotiated TUN_F_USO4|6
// with the kernel. Queues created by Add inherit this and surface it
// via Offload.USOSupported so coalescers can gate USO emission.
usoEnabled bool
}
// NewOffloadQueueSet creates a QueueSet that uses virtio_net_hdr to do
// TSO segmentation in userspace. usoEnabled tells downstream queues whether
// the kernel agreed to deliver/accept GSO_UDP_L4 superpackets — coalescers
// should fall back to per-packet writes when this is false.
func NewOffloadQueueSet(usoEnabled bool) (QueueSet, error) {
shutdownFd, err := unix.Eventfd(0, unix.EFD_NONBLOCK|unix.EFD_CLOEXEC)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create eventfd: %w", err)
}
out := &offloadQueueSet{
pq: []*Offload{},
pqi: []Queue{},
shutdownFd: shutdownFd,
usoEnabled: usoEnabled,
}
return out, nil
}
func (c *offloadQueueSet) Queues() []Queue {
return c.pqi
}
func (c *offloadQueueSet) Add(fd int) error {
x, err := newOffload(fd, c.shutdownFd, c.usoEnabled)
if err != nil {
return err
}
c.pq = append(c.pq, x)
c.pqi = append(c.pqi, x)
return nil
}
func (c *offloadQueueSet) wakeForShutdown() error {
var buf [8]byte
binary.NativeEndian.PutUint64(buf[:], 1)
_, err := unix.Write(c.shutdownFd, buf[:])
return err
}
func (c *offloadQueueSet) Close() error {
errs := []error{}
// Signal all readers blocked in poll to wake up and exit
if err := c.wakeForShutdown(); err != nil {
errs = append(errs, err)
}
for _, x := range c.pq {
if err := x.Close(); err != nil {
errs = append(errs, err)
}
}
return errors.Join(errs...)
}
-69
View File
@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
package tio
import (
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"fmt"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
type pollQueueSet struct {
pq []*Poll
// pqi is exactly the same as pq, but stored as the interface type
pqi []Queue
shutdownFd int
}
func NewPollQueueSet() (QueueSet, error) {
shutdownFd, err := unix.Eventfd(0, unix.EFD_NONBLOCK|unix.EFD_CLOEXEC)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create eventfd: %w", err)
}
out := &pollQueueSet{
pq: []*Poll{},
pqi: []Queue{},
shutdownFd: shutdownFd,
}
return out, nil
}
func (c *pollQueueSet) Queues() []Queue {
return c.pqi
}
func (c *pollQueueSet) Add(fd int) error {
x, err := newPoll(fd, c.shutdownFd)
if err != nil {
return err
}
c.pq = append(c.pq, x)
c.pqi = append(c.pqi, x)
return nil
}
func (c *pollQueueSet) wakeForShutdown() error {
var buf [8]byte
binary.NativeEndian.PutUint64(buf[:], 1)
_, err := unix.Write(int(c.shutdownFd), buf[:])
return err
}
func (c *pollQueueSet) Close() error {
errs := []error{}
if err := c.wakeForShutdown(); err != nil {
errs = append(errs, err)
}
for _, x := range c.pq {
if err := x.Close(); err != nil {
errs = append(errs, err)
}
}
return errors.Join(errs...)
}
-65
View File
@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
//go:build linux && !android && !e2e_testing
package tio
import "testing"
// fakeBatch stands in for batch.TxBatcher inside the bench — same shape
// of pointer-capturing closure that sendInsideMessage builds.
type fakeBatch struct{ buf [65536]byte }
func (b *fakeBatch) Reserve(sz int) []byte { return b.buf[:sz] }
func (b *fakeBatch) Commit([]byte) {}
type fakeHostInfo struct {
remoteIndexId uint32
counter uint64
}
type fakeIface struct {
rebindCount uint8
hi *fakeHostInfo
}
// BenchmarkSegmentSuperpacketAllocsTSO measures allocation per
// SegmentSuperpacket call when a closure captures pointer-bearing
// receivers — the realistic shape of sendInsideMessage's closure.
func BenchmarkSegmentSuperpacketAllocsTSO(b *testing.B) {
const mss = 1400
const numSeg = 32
pkt := buildTSOv6(mss*numSeg, mss)
gso := GSOInfo{
Size: mss,
HdrLen: 60, // 40 (IPv6) + 20 (TCP)
CsumStart: 40,
Proto: GSOProtoTCP,
}
p := Packet{Bytes: pkt, GSO: gso}
hi := &fakeHostInfo{remoteIndexId: 0xdeadbeef}
f := &fakeIface{rebindCount: 7, hi: hi}
fb := &fakeBatch{}
// SegmentSuperpacket consumes pkt destructively; refresh from a master
// copy each iter (matches the production pattern where every TUN read
// hands the segmenter a fresh kernel-supplied buffer).
master := append([]byte(nil), pkt...)
work := make([]byte, len(pkt))
p.Bytes = work
b.ReportAllocs()
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
copy(work, master)
err := SegmentSuperpacket(p, func(seg []byte) error {
out := fb.Reserve(16 + len(seg) + 16)
out[0] = byte(f.rebindCount)
out[1] = byte(hi.counter)
hi.counter++
fb.Commit(out)
return nil
})
if err != nil {
b.Fatalf("SegmentSuperpacket: %v", err)
}
}
}
-22
View File
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
//go:build !linux || android || e2e_testing
package tio
import "fmt"
func protoFromGSOType(_ uint8) (GSOProto, error) {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("GSO unsupported")
}
// SegmentSuperpacket invokes fn once per segment of pkt. On non-Linux
// builds (and Android/e2e_testing) this package does not provide a Queue
// implementation, so any caller that does construct a Packet here can only
// be operating on non-superpacket bytes and the stub forwards them
// directly. A non-zero GSO field is a programming error from the caller
// and returns an explicit error rather than silently misbehaving.
func SegmentSuperpacket(pkt Packet, fn func(seg []byte) error) error {
if pkt.GSO.IsSuperpacket() {
return fmt.Errorf("tio: GSO superpacket on platform without segmentation support")
}
return fn(pkt.Bytes)
}
-170
View File
@@ -1,170 +0,0 @@
package tio
import (
"io"
)
// QueueSet holds one or many Queue objects and helps close them in an orderly way.
type QueueSet interface {
io.Closer
Queues() []Queue
// Add takes a tun fd, adds it to the set, and prepares it for use as a Queue.
Add(fd int) error
}
// Capabilities advertises which kernel offload features a Queue
// successfully negotiated. Callers consult this to decide which coalescers
// to wire onto the write path — a Queue without TSO can't usefully accept a
// TCPCoalescer, and a Queue without USO can't accept a UDPCoalescer.
type Capabilities struct {
// TSO means the FD was opened with IFF_VNET_HDR and the kernel agreed
// to TUN_F_TSO4|TSO6 — i.e. WriteGSO with GSOProtoTCP is safe.
TSO bool
// USO means the kernel additionally agreed to TUN_F_USO4|USO6, so
// WriteGSO with GSOProtoUDP is safe. Linux ≥ 6.2.
USO bool
}
// Queue is a readable/writable Poll queue. One Queue is driven by a single
// read goroutine plus a single writer (see Write below).
type Queue interface {
io.Closer
// Read returns one or more packets. The returned Packet.Bytes slices
// are borrowed from the Queue's internal buffer and are only valid
// until the next Read or Close on this Queue - callers must encrypt
// or copy each slice before the next call. A Packet may carry a
// GSO/USO superpacket (see GSOInfo); when GSO.IsSuperpacket() is
// true the caller must segment Bytes before treating it as a single
// IP datagram. Not safe for concurrent Reads.
Read() ([]Packet, error)
// Write emits a single packet on the plaintext (outside→inside)
// delivery path. Not safe for concurrent Writes.
Write(p []byte) (int, error)
}
// Packet is the unit Queue.Read returns. Bytes points into the queue's
// internal buffer and is only valid until the next Read or Close on the
// queue that produced it. GSO is the zero value for an already-segmented
// IP datagram; when non-zero it describes a kernel-supplied TSO/USO
// superpacket the caller must segment before consuming.
type Packet struct {
Bytes []byte
GSO GSOInfo
}
// GSOInfo describes a kernel-supplied superpacket sitting in Packet.Bytes.
// The zero value means "not a superpacket" — Bytes is one regular IP
// datagram and no segmentation is required.
type GSOInfo struct {
// Size is the GSO segment size: max payload bytes per segment
// (== TCP MSS for TSO, == UDP payload chunk for USO). Zero means
// not a superpacket.
Size uint16
// HdrLen is the total L3+L4 header length within Bytes (already
// corrected via correctHdrLen, so safe to slice on).
HdrLen uint16
// CsumStart is the L4 header offset inside Bytes (== L3 header
// length).
CsumStart uint16
// Proto picks the L4 protocol (TCP or UDP) so the segmenter knows
// which checksum/header layout to apply.
Proto GSOProto
}
// IsSuperpacket reports whether g describes a multi-segment GSO/USO
// superpacket that needs segmentation before its bytes can be encrypted
// and sent on the wire.
func (g GSOInfo) IsSuperpacket() bool { return g.Size > 0 }
// Clone returns a Packet whose Bytes is a freshly allocated copy of p.Bytes,
// safe to retain past the next Read or Close on the originating Queue.
// GSO metadata is copied verbatim. Use this only when a caller genuinely
// needs to outlive the borrowed-slice contract — the hot path reads should
// continue to consume the borrow synchronously to avoid the allocation.
func (p Packet) Clone() Packet {
if p.Bytes == nil {
return p
}
cp := make([]byte, len(p.Bytes))
copy(cp, p.Bytes)
return Packet{Bytes: cp, GSO: p.GSO}
}
// CapsProvider is an optional interface implemented by Queues that
// successfully negotiated kernel offload features at open time. Callers
// pick a write-path coalescer based on the result. Queues that don't
// implement it are treated as having no offload capability — callers must
// fall back to plain per-packet writes.
type CapsProvider interface {
Capabilities() Capabilities
}
// QueueCapabilities returns q's negotiated offload capabilities, or the
// zero value when q does not advertise any.
func QueueCapabilities(q Queue) Capabilities {
if cp, ok := q.(CapsProvider); ok {
return cp.Capabilities()
}
return Capabilities{}
}
// GSOProto selects the L4 protocol for a GSO superpacket. Determines which
// VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_* type the writer stamps and which checksum offset
// inside the transport header virtio NEEDS_CSUM expects.
type GSOProto uint8
const (
GSOProtoTCP GSOProto = iota
GSOProtoUDP
)
// GSOWriter is implemented by Queues that can emit a TCP or UDP superpacket
// assembled from a header prefix plus one or more borrowed payload
// fragments, in a single vectored write (writev with a leading
// virtio_net_hdr). This lets the coalescer avoid copying payload bytes
// between the caller's decrypt buffer and the TUN. Backends without GSO
// support do not implement this interface and coalescing is skipped.
//
// hdr contains the IPv4/IPv6 header prefix (mutable - callers will have
// filled in total length and IP csum). transportHdr is the TCP or UDP
// header (mutable - the L4 checksum field must hold the pseudo-header
// partial, single-fold not inverted, per virtio NEEDS_CSUM semantics).
// pays are non-overlapping payload fragments whose concatenation is the
// full superpacket payload; they are read-only from the writer's
// perspective and must remain valid until the call returns. Every segment
// in pays except possibly the last is exactly the same size. proto picks
// the L4 protocol so the writer knows which GSOType / CsumOffset to set.
//
// Callers should also consult CapsProvider (via SupportsGSO or
// QueueCapabilities) for the per-protocol negotiated capability; an
// implementation of GSOWriter is necessary but not sufficient since USO
// may not have been negotiated even when TSO was.
type GSOWriter interface {
WriteGSO(hdr []byte, transportHdr []byte, pays [][]byte, proto GSOProto) error
}
// SupportsGSO reports whether w implements GSOWriter and the underlying
// queue advertises the negotiated capability for `want`. A writer that
// implements GSOWriter but not CapsProvider is treated as permissive
// (used by tests and fakes that don't negotiate).
func SupportsGSO(w any, want GSOProto) (GSOWriter, bool) {
gw, ok := w.(GSOWriter)
if !ok {
return nil, false
}
cp, ok := w.(CapsProvider)
if !ok {
return gw, true
}
caps := cp.Capabilities()
switch want {
case GSOProtoTCP:
return gw, caps.TSO
case GSOProtoUDP:
return gw, caps.USO
}
return gw, false
}
-461
View File
@@ -1,461 +0,0 @@
package tio
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"os"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"syscall"
"unsafe"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio/virtio"
)
// tunRxBufSize is the per-Read worst-case footprint inside rxBuf: one
// kernel-supplied packet body, which is at most ~64 KiB (tunReadBufSize).
// Segmentation happens at encrypt time on a per-routine MTU-sized scratch
// (see SegmentSuperpacket), so rxBuf only holds raw kernel-supplied bytes.
// We round up to give comfortable margin for the drain headroom check
// below.
const tunRxBufSize = 64 * 1024
// tunRxBufCap is the total size we allocate for the per-reader rx
// buffer. With reads landing directly in rxBuf, each drain iteration
// consumes up to tunRxBufSize of headroom for the kernel-supplied bytes.
// Sized to two such iterations so the initial blocking read plus one
// drain read both fit without partial-drop.
const tunRxBufCap = tunRxBufSize * 2
// tunDrainCap caps how many packets a single Read will accumulate via
// the post-wake drain loop. Sized to soak up a burst of small ACKs while
// bounding how much work a single caller holds before handing off.
const tunDrainCap = 64
// gsoMaxIovs caps the iovec budget WriteGSO assembles per call: 3 fixed
// entries (virtio_net_hdr, IP hdr, transport hdr) plus up to gsoMaxIovs-3
// payload fragments. Sized comfortably above the typical kernel GSO
// segment cap (Linux UDP_GRO is 64) so realistic coalesced bursts never
// touch the limit. iovecs are tiny (16 bytes), so the entire scratch is
// 4 KiB — fine to keep resident on every queue. WriteGSO returns an error
// rather than reallocating when a caller exceeds this budget.
const gsoMaxIovs = 256
// validVnetHdr is the 10-byte virtio_net_hdr we prepend to every non-GSO TUN
// write. Only flag set is VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_DATA_VALID, which marks the skb
// CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY so the receiving network stack skips L4 checksum
// verification. All packets that reach the plain Write paths already carry
// a valid L4 checksum (either supplied by a remote peer whose ciphertext we
// AEAD-authenticated, produced by segmentTCPYield/segmentUDPYield during
// superpacket segmentation, or built locally by CreateRejectPacket), so
// trusting them is safe.
var validVnetHdr = [virtio.Size]byte{unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_DATA_VALID}
// Offload wraps a TUN file descriptor with poll-based reads. The FD provided will be changed to non-blocking.
// A shared eventfd allows Close to wake all readers blocked in poll.
type Offload struct {
fd int
shutdownFd int
readPoll [2]unix.PollFd
writePoll [2]unix.PollFd
// writeLock serializes blockOnWrite's read+clear of writePoll[*].Revents.
// Any goroutine that calls Write may end up parked in poll(2); without
// the lock concurrent waiters could race the Revents reset and lose
// events.
writeLock sync.Mutex
closed atomic.Bool
rxBuf []byte // backing store for kernel-handed packets read this drain
rxOff int // cursor into rxBuf for the current Read drain
pending []Packet // packets returned from the most recent Read
// readVnetScratch holds the 10-byte virtio_net_hdr split off the front of
// every TUN read via readv(2). Decoupling the header from the packet body
// lets us read the body directly into rxBuf at the current rxOff with
// no userspace copy on the GSO_NONE fast path.
readVnetScratch [virtio.Size]byte
// readIovs is the readv(2) iovec scratch wired once at construction —
// iovec[0] points at readVnetScratch; iovec[1].Base/Len is updated per
// read to address the current rxBuf slot.
readIovs [2]unix.Iovec
// usoEnabled records whether the kernel agreed to TUN_F_USO* on this FD,
// so writers can decide whether emitting GSO_UDP_L4 superpackets is safe.
usoEnabled bool
// gsoHdrBuf is a per-queue 10-byte scratch for the virtio_net_hdr emitted
// by WriteGSO. Kept separate from the read-only package-level validVnetHdr
// so non-GSO Writes can ship that constant directly while WriteGSO
// rewrites this scratch on every call.
gsoHdrBuf [virtio.Size]byte
// gsoIovs is the writev iovec scratch for WriteGSO. Pre-sized to
// gsoMaxIovs at construction; never grown. WriteGSO returns an error
// (and drops the call) if a caller hands it more fragments than fit.
gsoIovs []unix.Iovec
}
func newOffload(fd int, shutdownFd int, usoEnabled bool) (*Offload, error) {
if err := unix.SetNonblock(fd, true); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to set tun fd non-blocking: %w", err)
}
out := &Offload{
fd: fd,
shutdownFd: shutdownFd,
usoEnabled: usoEnabled,
closed: atomic.Bool{},
readPoll: [2]unix.PollFd{
{Fd: int32(fd), Events: unix.POLLIN},
{Fd: int32(shutdownFd), Events: unix.POLLIN},
},
writePoll: [2]unix.PollFd{
{Fd: int32(fd), Events: unix.POLLOUT},
{Fd: int32(shutdownFd), Events: unix.POLLIN},
},
writeLock: sync.Mutex{},
rxBuf: make([]byte, tunRxBufCap),
gsoIovs: make([]unix.Iovec, 2, gsoMaxIovs),
}
out.gsoIovs[0].Base = &out.gsoHdrBuf[0]
out.gsoIovs[0].SetLen(virtio.Size)
// readIovs[0] is wired once to the virtio_net_hdr scratch; per-read we
// only repoint readIovs[1] at the next rxBuf slot (see readPacket).
out.readIovs[0].Base = &out.readVnetScratch[0]
out.readIovs[0].SetLen(virtio.Size)
return out, nil
}
func (r *Offload) blockOnRead() error {
const problemFlags = unix.POLLHUP | unix.POLLNVAL | unix.POLLERR
var err error
for {
_, err = unix.Poll(r.readPoll[:], -1)
if err != unix.EINTR {
break
}
}
//always reset these!
tunEvents := r.readPoll[0].Revents
shutdownEvents := r.readPoll[1].Revents
r.readPoll[0].Revents = 0
r.readPoll[1].Revents = 0
//do the err check before trusting the potentially bogus bits we just got
if err != nil {
return err
}
if shutdownEvents&(unix.POLLIN|problemFlags) != 0 {
return os.ErrClosed
} else if tunEvents&problemFlags != 0 {
return os.ErrClosed
}
return nil
}
func (r *Offload) blockOnWrite() error {
const problemFlags = unix.POLLHUP | unix.POLLNVAL | unix.POLLERR
var err error
for {
_, err = unix.Poll(r.writePoll[:], -1)
if err != unix.EINTR {
break
}
}
//always reset these!
r.writeLock.Lock()
tunEvents := r.writePoll[0].Revents
shutdownEvents := r.writePoll[1].Revents
r.writePoll[0].Revents = 0
r.writePoll[1].Revents = 0
r.writeLock.Unlock()
//do the err check before trusting the potentially bogus bits we just got
if err != nil {
return err
}
if shutdownEvents&(unix.POLLIN|problemFlags) != 0 {
return os.ErrClosed
} else if tunEvents&problemFlags != 0 {
return os.ErrClosed
}
return nil
}
// readPacket issues a single readv(2) splitting the virtio_net_hdr off
// into readVnetScratch and reading the packet body directly into rxBuf at
// the current rxOff. Returns the body length (zero virtio header bytes,
// just the IP packet/superpacket). block controls whether EAGAIN is
// retried via poll: the initial read of a drain blocks; subsequent drain
// reads do not.
//
// The body iovec capacity is always tunReadBufSize; callers (the Read
// drain loop) gate entry on tunRxBufCap-rxOff >= tunRxBufSize, sized to
// hold one worst-case kernel-supplied packet body. Without that gate the
// body iovec could be smaller than the next inbound packet and the
// kernel would truncate.
func (r *Offload) readPacket(block bool) (int, error) {
for {
r.readIovs[1].Base = &r.rxBuf[r.rxOff]
r.readIovs[1].SetLen(tunReadBufSize)
n, _, errno := syscall.Syscall(unix.SYS_READV, uintptr(r.fd), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&r.readIovs[0])), uintptr(len(r.readIovs)))
if errno == 0 {
if int(n) < virtio.Size {
return 0, io.ErrShortWrite
}
return int(n) - virtio.Size, nil
}
if errno == unix.EAGAIN {
if !block {
return 0, errno
}
if err := r.blockOnRead(); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
continue
}
if errno == unix.EINTR {
continue
}
if errno == unix.EBADF {
return 0, os.ErrClosed
}
return 0, errno
}
}
// Read returns one or more packets from the tun. Each Packet either
// carries a single ready-to-use IP datagram (GSO zero) or a TSO/USO
// superpacket plus the GSOInfo a caller needs to segment it (see
// SegmentSuperpacket). The first read blocks via poll; once the fd is
// known readable we drain additional packets non-blocking until the
// kernel queue is empty (EAGAIN), we've collected tunDrainCap packets,
// or we're out of rxBuf headroom. This amortizes the poll wake over
// bursts of small packets (e.g. TCP ACKs). Packet.Bytes slices point
// into the Offload's internal buffer and are only valid until the next
// Read or Close on this Queue.
func (r *Offload) Read() ([]Packet, error) {
r.pending = r.pending[:0]
r.rxOff = 0
// Initial (blocking) read. Retry on decode errors so a single bad
// packet does not stall the reader.
for {
n, err := r.readPacket(true)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := r.decodeRead(n); err != nil {
// Drop and read again — a bad packet should not kill the reader.
continue
}
break
}
// Drain: non-blocking reads until the kernel queue is empty, the drain
// cap is reached, or rxBuf no longer has room for another worst-case
// kernel-supplied packet (tunRxBufSize).
for len(r.pending) < tunDrainCap && tunRxBufCap-r.rxOff >= tunRxBufSize {
n, err := r.readPacket(false)
if err != nil {
// EAGAIN / EINTR / anything else: stop draining. We already
// have a valid batch from the first read.
break
}
if n <= 0 {
break
}
if err := r.decodeRead(n); err != nil {
// Drop this packet and stop the drain; we'd rather hand off
// what we have than keep spinning here.
break
}
}
return r.pending, nil
}
// decodeRead processes the packet sitting in rxBuf at rxOff (length
// pktLen). The bytes stay in rxBuf — for GSO_NONE we slice them as a
// regular IP datagram (running finishChecksum if NEEDS_CSUM is set);
// for TSO/USO superpackets we attach the corrected GSO metadata so the
// caller can segment lazily at encrypt time. rxOff advances past the
// kernel-supplied body and nothing else, since segmentation no longer
// writes back into rxBuf.
func (r *Offload) decodeRead(pktLen int) error {
if pktLen <= 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("short tun read: %d", pktLen)
}
var hdr virtio.Hdr
hdr.Decode(r.readVnetScratch[:])
body := r.rxBuf[r.rxOff : r.rxOff+pktLen]
if hdr.GSOType == unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE {
if hdr.Flags&unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM != 0 {
if err := virtio.FinishChecksum(body, hdr); err != nil {
return err
}
}
r.pending = append(r.pending, Packet{Bytes: body})
r.rxOff += pktLen
return nil
}
// GSO superpacket: validate, fix the kernel-supplied HdrLen on the
// FORWARD path (CorrectHdrLen), pick the L4 protocol, and attach
// the metadata. The bytes stay in rxBuf untouched, segmentation
// happens in SegmentSuperpacket at encrypt time.
if err := virtio.CheckValid(body, hdr); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := virtio.CorrectHdrLen(body, &hdr); err != nil {
return err
}
proto, err := protoFromGSOType(hdr.GSOType)
if err != nil {
return err
}
r.pending = append(r.pending, Packet{
Bytes: body,
GSO: GSOInfo{
Size: hdr.GSOSize,
HdrLen: hdr.HdrLen,
CsumStart: hdr.CsumStart,
Proto: proto,
},
})
r.rxOff += pktLen
return nil
}
func (r *Offload) Write(buf []byte) (int, error) {
iovs := [2]unix.Iovec{
{Base: &validVnetHdr[0]},
{Base: &buf[0]},
}
iovs[0].SetLen(virtio.Size)
iovs[1].SetLen(len(buf))
return r.writeWithScratch(buf, &iovs)
}
func (r *Offload) writeWithScratch(buf []byte, iovs *[2]unix.Iovec) (int, error) {
if len(buf) == 0 {
return 0, nil
}
iovs[1].Base = &buf[0]
iovs[1].SetLen(len(buf))
return r.rawWrite(unsafe.Slice(&iovs[0], len(iovs)))
}
func (r *Offload) rawWrite(iovs []unix.Iovec) (int, error) {
for {
n, _, errno := syscall.Syscall(unix.SYS_WRITEV, uintptr(r.fd), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&iovs[0])), uintptr(len(iovs)))
if errno == 0 {
if int(n) < virtio.Size {
return 0, io.ErrShortWrite
}
return int(n) - virtio.Size, nil
}
if errno == unix.EAGAIN {
if err := r.blockOnWrite(); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
continue
}
if errno == unix.EINTR {
continue
}
if errno == unix.EBADF {
return 0, os.ErrClosed
}
return 0, errno
}
}
// Capabilities reports the offload features negotiated for this Queue. TSO
// is always true for Offload (we only construct it on IFF_VNET_HDR FDs);
// USO is true only when the kernel agreed to TUN_F_USO4|6 at open time
// (Linux ≥ 6.2).
func (r *Offload) Capabilities() Capabilities {
return Capabilities{TSO: true, USO: r.usoEnabled}
}
func (r *Offload) WriteGSO(hdr []byte, transportHdr []byte, pays [][]byte, proto GSOProto) error {
if len(hdr) == 0 || len(pays) == 0 || len(transportHdr) == 0 {
return nil
}
// L4 checksum offset inside transportHdr: TCP=16 (the `check` field after
// seq/ack/dataoff/flags/window), UDP=6 (after sport/dport/length).
var csumOff uint16
switch proto {
case GSOProtoUDP:
csumOff = 6
default:
csumOff = 16
}
vhdr := virtio.Hdr{
Flags: unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM,
HdrLen: uint16(len(hdr) + len(transportHdr)),
GSOSize: uint16(len(pays[0])),
CsumStart: uint16(len(hdr)),
CsumOffset: csumOff,
}
if len(pays) > 1 {
ipVer := hdr[0] >> 4
switch {
case proto == GSOProtoUDP && (ipVer == 4 || ipVer == 6):
vhdr.GSOType = unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP_L4
case ipVer == 6:
vhdr.GSOType = unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6
case ipVer == 4:
vhdr.GSOType = unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4
default:
vhdr.GSOType = unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE
vhdr.GSOSize = 0
}
} else {
vhdr.GSOType = unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE
vhdr.GSOSize = 0
}
vhdr.Encode(r.gsoHdrBuf[:])
// Build the iovec array: [virtio_hdr, hdr, transportHdr, pays...]. r.gsoIovs[0] is
// wired to gsoHdrBuf at construction and never changes.
need := 3 + len(pays)
if need > cap(r.gsoIovs) {
slog.Default().Warn("tio: WriteGSO iovec budget exceeded; dropping superpacket",
"need", need, "cap", cap(r.gsoIovs), "segments", len(pays))
return fmt.Errorf("tio: WriteGSO needs %d iovecs but cap is %d", need, cap(r.gsoIovs))
}
r.gsoIovs = r.gsoIovs[:need]
r.gsoIovs[1].Base = &hdr[0]
r.gsoIovs[1].SetLen(len(hdr))
r.gsoIovs[2].Base = &transportHdr[0]
r.gsoIovs[2].SetLen(len(transportHdr))
for i, p := range pays {
r.gsoIovs[3+i].Base = &p[0]
r.gsoIovs[3+i].SetLen(len(p))
}
_, err := r.rawWrite(r.gsoIovs)
return err
}
func (r *Offload) Close() error {
if r.closed.Swap(true) {
return nil
}
//shutdownFd is owned by the container, so we should not close it
var err error
if r.fd >= 0 {
err = unix.Close(r.fd)
r.fd = -1
}
return err
}
-164
View File
@@ -1,164 +0,0 @@
package tio
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"sync/atomic"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
// Maximum size we accept for a single read from a TUN with IFF_VNET_HDR. A
// TSO superpacket can be up to 64KiB of payload plus a single L2/L3/L4 header
// prefix plus the virtio header.
const tunReadBufSize = 65535
type Poll struct {
fd int
readPoll [2]unix.PollFd
writePoll [2]unix.PollFd
closed atomic.Bool
readBuf []byte
batchRet [1]Packet
}
func newPoll(fd int, shutdownFd int) (*Poll, error) {
if err := unix.SetNonblock(fd, true); err != nil {
_ = unix.Close(fd)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to set Poll device as nonblocking: %w", err)
}
out := &Poll{
fd: fd,
readBuf: make([]byte, tunReadBufSize),
readPoll: [2]unix.PollFd{
{Fd: int32(fd), Events: unix.POLLIN},
{Fd: int32(shutdownFd), Events: unix.POLLIN},
},
writePoll: [2]unix.PollFd{
{Fd: int32(fd), Events: unix.POLLOUT},
{Fd: int32(shutdownFd), Events: unix.POLLIN},
},
}
return out, nil
}
// blockOnRead waits until the Poll fd is readable or shutdown has been signaled.
// Returns os.ErrClosed if Close was called.
func (t *Poll) blockOnRead() error {
const problemFlags = unix.POLLHUP | unix.POLLNVAL | unix.POLLERR
var err error
for {
_, err = unix.Poll(t.readPoll[:], -1)
if err != unix.EINTR {
break
}
}
tunEvents := t.readPoll[0].Revents
shutdownEvents := t.readPoll[1].Revents
t.readPoll[0].Revents = 0
t.readPoll[1].Revents = 0
if err != nil {
return err
}
if shutdownEvents&(unix.POLLIN|problemFlags) != 0 {
return os.ErrClosed
}
if tunEvents&problemFlags != 0 {
return os.ErrClosed
}
return nil
}
func (t *Poll) blockOnWrite() error {
const problemFlags = unix.POLLHUP | unix.POLLNVAL | unix.POLLERR
var err error
for {
_, err = unix.Poll(t.writePoll[:], -1)
if err != unix.EINTR {
break
}
}
tunEvents := t.writePoll[0].Revents
shutdownEvents := t.writePoll[1].Revents
t.writePoll[0].Revents = 0
t.writePoll[1].Revents = 0
if err != nil {
return err
}
if shutdownEvents&(unix.POLLIN|problemFlags) != 0 {
return os.ErrClosed
}
if tunEvents&problemFlags != 0 {
return os.ErrClosed
}
return nil
}
func (t *Poll) Read() ([]Packet, error) {
n, err := t.readOne(t.readBuf)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
t.batchRet[0] = Packet{Bytes: t.readBuf[:n]}
return t.batchRet[:], nil
}
func (t *Poll) readOne(to []byte) (int, error) {
for {
n, errno := unix.Read(t.fd, to)
if errno == nil {
return n, nil
}
switch errno {
case unix.EAGAIN:
if err := t.blockOnRead(); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
case unix.EINTR:
// retry
case unix.EBADF:
return 0, os.ErrClosed
default:
return 0, errno
}
}
}
// Write is only valid for single threaded use
func (t *Poll) Write(from []byte) (int, error) {
for {
n, errno := unix.Write(t.fd, from)
if errno == nil {
return n, nil
}
switch errno {
case unix.EAGAIN:
if err := t.blockOnWrite(); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
case unix.EINTR:
// retry
case unix.EBADF:
return 0, os.ErrClosed
default:
return 0, errno
}
}
}
func (t *Poll) Close() error {
if t.closed.Swap(true) {
return nil
}
//shutdownFd is owned by the container, so we should not close it
var err error
if t.fd >= 0 {
err = unix.Close(t.fd)
t.fd = -1
}
return err
}
-82
View File
@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
//go:build linux && !android && !e2e_testing
// +build linux,!android,!e2e_testing
package tio
import (
"errors"
"os"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
// newReadPipe returns a read fd. The matching write fd is registered for cleanup.
// The caller takes ownership of the read fd (pass it into a QueueSet).
func newReadPipe(t *testing.T) int {
t.Helper()
var fds [2]int
if err := unix.Pipe2(fds[:], unix.O_CLOEXEC); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("pipe2: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = unix.Close(fds[1]) })
return fds[0]
}
func TestPoll_WakeForShutdown_WakesFriends(t *testing.T) {
pipe1 := newReadPipe(t)
pipe2 := newReadPipe(t)
parent, err := NewPollQueueSet()
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, parent.Add(pipe1))
require.NoError(t, parent.Add(pipe2))
t.Cleanup(func() {
_ = unix.Close(pipe1)
_ = unix.Close(pipe2)
})
readers := parent.Queues()
errs := make([]error, len(readers))
var wg sync.WaitGroup
for i, r := range readers {
wg.Add(1)
go func(i int, r Queue) {
defer wg.Done()
_, errs[i] = r.Read()
}(i, r)
}
time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
if err := parent.Close(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Close: %v", err)
}
done := make(chan struct{})
go func() { wg.Wait(); close(done) }()
select {
case <-done:
case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("readers did not wake")
}
for i, err := range errs {
if !errors.Is(err, os.ErrClosed) {
t.Errorf("reader %d: expected os.ErrClosed, got %v", i, err)
}
}
}
func TestPoll_Close_Idempotent(t *testing.T) {
tf, err := newPoll(newReadPipe(t), 1)
require.NoError(t, err)
if err := tf.Close(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first Close: %v", err)
}
if err := tf.Close(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("second Close should be a no-op, got %v", err)
}
}
-51
View File
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
//go:build linux && !android && !e2e_testing
// +build linux,!android,!e2e_testing
package tio
import (
"fmt"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio/virtio"
)
// protoFromGSOType maps a virtio_net_hdr GSOType to the GSOProto value the
// segment-time helpers use. Returns an error for GSO_NONE or any unknown
// value — the caller should only invoke this on a confirmed superpacket.
func protoFromGSOType(t uint8) (GSOProto, error) {
switch t {
case unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4, unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6:
return GSOProtoTCP, nil
case unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP_L4:
return GSOProtoUDP, nil
default:
return 0, fmt.Errorf("unsupported virtio gso type: %d", t)
}
}
// SegmentSuperpacket invokes fn once per segment of pkt. For non-GSO pkts
// fn is called once with pkt.Bytes (no segmentation, no copy). For GSO/USO
// superpackets fn is called once per segment with a slice of pkt.Bytes
// holding that segment's plaintext (a freshly-patched L3+L4 header sliced
// in front of the original payload chunk). The slide is destructive: pkt is
// consumed by this call and its bytes are in an undefined state when
// SegmentSuperpacket returns. Callers must not retain pkt or any earlier
// seg slice past fn's return for that segment. The scratch parameter is
// unused on the destructive path and kept only for cross-platform
// signature compatibility. Aborts and returns the first error from fn or
// from per-segment construction.
func SegmentSuperpacket(pkt Packet, fn func(seg []byte) error) error {
if !pkt.GSO.IsSuperpacket() {
return fn(pkt.Bytes)
}
switch pkt.GSO.Proto {
case GSOProtoTCP:
return virtio.SegmentTCP(pkt.Bytes, pkt.GSO.HdrLen, pkt.GSO.CsumStart, pkt.GSO.Size, fn)
case GSOProtoUDP:
return virtio.SegmentUDP(pkt.Bytes, pkt.GSO.HdrLen, pkt.GSO.CsumStart, pkt.GSO.Size, fn)
default:
return fmt.Errorf("unsupported gso proto: %d", pkt.GSO.Proto)
}
}
-794
View File
@@ -1,794 +0,0 @@
//go:build linux && !android && !e2e_testing
// +build linux,!android,!e2e_testing
package tio
import (
"encoding/binary"
"os"
"testing"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
"gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/tcpip/checksum"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio/virtio"
)
// testSegScratchSize is a generous segmentation scratch sized to fit any
// of the synthetic TSO/USO superpackets these tests generate (one
// worst-case 64 KiB superpacket plus replicated per-segment headers).
const testSegScratchSize = 192 * 1024
// verifyChecksum confirms that the one's-complement sum across `b`, seeded
// with a folded pseudo-header sum, equals all-ones (valid).
func verifyChecksum(b []byte, pseudo uint16) bool {
return checksum.Checksum(b, pseudo) == 0xffff
}
// segmentForTest is the test-only counterpart to the production
// SegmentSuperpacket path. It handles GSO_NONE (with optional
// finishChecksum) inline and dispatches GSO superpackets through
// SegmentSuperpacket, draining each yielded segment into a
// freshly-copied [][]byte slot so callers can iterate after the call
// returns. Tests pre-set hdr.HdrLen correctly, so correctHdrLen is not
// invoked here.
func segmentForTest(pkt []byte, hdr virtio.Hdr, out *[][]byte, scratch []byte) error {
if hdr.GSOType == unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE {
cp := append([]byte(nil), pkt...)
if hdr.Flags&unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM != 0 {
if err := virtio.FinishChecksum(cp, hdr); err != nil {
return err
}
}
*out = append(*out, cp)
return nil
}
proto, err := protoFromGSOType(hdr.GSOType)
if err != nil {
return err
}
gso := GSOInfo{
Size: hdr.GSOSize,
HdrLen: hdr.HdrLen,
CsumStart: hdr.CsumStart,
Proto: proto,
}
return SegmentSuperpacket(Packet{Bytes: pkt, GSO: gso}, func(seg []byte) error {
*out = append(*out, append([]byte(nil), seg...))
return nil
})
}
// pseudoHeaderIPv4 returns the folded pseudo-header sum used to verify a
// TCP/UDP segment's checksum in tests. src/dst are 4 bytes each.
func pseudoHeaderIPv4(src, dst []byte, proto byte, l4Len int) uint16 {
s := uint32(checksum.Checksum(src, 0)) + uint32(checksum.Checksum(dst, 0))
s += uint32(proto) + uint32(l4Len)
s = (s & 0xffff) + (s >> 16)
s = (s & 0xffff) + (s >> 16)
return uint16(s)
}
// pseudoHeaderIPv6 returns the folded pseudo-header sum used to verify a
// TCP/UDP segment's checksum in tests. src/dst are 16 bytes each.
func pseudoHeaderIPv6(src, dst []byte, proto byte, l4Len int) uint16 {
s := uint32(checksum.Checksum(src, 0)) + uint32(checksum.Checksum(dst, 0))
s += uint32(l4Len>>16) + uint32(l4Len&0xffff) + uint32(proto)
s = (s & 0xffff) + (s >> 16)
s = (s & 0xffff) + (s >> 16)
return uint16(s)
}
// buildTSOv4 builds a synthetic IPv4/TCP TSO superpacket with a payload of
// `payLen` bytes split at `mss`.
func buildTSOv4(t *testing.T, payLen, mss int) ([]byte, virtio.Hdr) {
t.Helper()
const ipLen = 20
const tcpLen = 20
pkt := make([]byte, ipLen+tcpLen+payLen)
// IPv4 header
pkt[0] = 0x45 // version 4, IHL 5
// total length is meaningless for TSO but set it anyway
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[2:4], uint16(ipLen+tcpLen+payLen))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], 0x4242) // original ID
pkt[8] = 64 // TTL
pkt[9] = unix.IPPROTO_TCP
copy(pkt[12:16], []byte{10, 0, 0, 1}) // src
copy(pkt[16:20], []byte{10, 0, 0, 2}) // dst
// TCP header
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[20:22], 12345) // sport
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[22:24], 80) // dport
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(pkt[24:28], 10000) // seq
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(pkt[28:32], 20000) // ack
pkt[32] = 0x50 // data offset 5 words
pkt[33] = 0x18 // ACK | PSH
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[34:36], 65535) // window
// payload
for i := 0; i < payLen; i++ {
pkt[ipLen+tcpLen+i] = byte(i & 0xff)
}
return pkt, virtio.Hdr{
Flags: unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM,
GSOType: unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4,
HdrLen: uint16(ipLen + tcpLen),
GSOSize: uint16(mss),
CsumStart: uint16(ipLen),
CsumOffset: 16,
}
}
func TestSegmentTCPv4(t *testing.T) {
const mss = 100
const numSeg = 3
pkt, hdr := buildTSOv4(t, mss*numSeg, mss)
scratch := make([]byte, testSegScratchSize)
var out [][]byte
if err := segmentForTest(pkt, hdr, &out, scratch); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("segmentForTest: %v", err)
}
if len(out) != numSeg {
t.Fatalf("expected %d segments, got %d", numSeg, len(out))
}
for i, seg := range out {
if len(seg) != 40+mss {
t.Errorf("seg %d: unexpected len %d", i, len(seg))
}
totalLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(seg[2:4])
if totalLen != uint16(40+mss) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: total_len=%d want %d", i, totalLen, 40+mss)
}
id := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(seg[4:6])
if id != 0x4242+uint16(i) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: ip id=%#x want %#x", i, id, 0x4242+uint16(i))
}
seq := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(seg[24:28])
wantSeq := uint32(10000 + i*mss)
if seq != wantSeq {
t.Errorf("seg %d: seq=%d want %d", i, seq, wantSeq)
}
flags := seg[33]
wantFlags := byte(0x10) // ACK only, PSH cleared
if i == numSeg-1 {
wantFlags = 0x18 // ACK | PSH preserved on last
}
if flags != wantFlags {
t.Errorf("seg %d: flags=%#x want %#x", i, flags, wantFlags)
}
// IPv4 header checksum must verify against itself.
if !verifyChecksum(seg[:20], 0) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: bad IPv4 header checksum", i)
}
// TCP checksum must verify against the pseudo-header.
psum := pseudoHeaderIPv4(seg[12:16], seg[16:20], unix.IPPROTO_TCP, 20+mss)
if !verifyChecksum(seg[20:], psum) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: bad TCP checksum", i)
}
}
}
func TestSegmentTCPv4OddTail(t *testing.T) {
// Payload of 250 bytes with MSS 100 → segments of 100, 100, 50.
pkt, hdr := buildTSOv4(t, 250, 100)
scratch := make([]byte, testSegScratchSize)
var out [][]byte
if err := segmentForTest(pkt, hdr, &out, scratch); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("segmentForTest: %v", err)
}
if len(out) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("want 3 segments, got %d", len(out))
}
wantPayLens := []int{100, 100, 50}
for i, seg := range out {
if len(seg)-40 != wantPayLens[i] {
t.Errorf("seg %d: pay len %d want %d", i, len(seg)-40, wantPayLens[i])
}
if !verifyChecksum(seg[:20], 0) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: bad IPv4 header checksum", i)
}
psum := pseudoHeaderIPv4(seg[12:16], seg[16:20], unix.IPPROTO_TCP, 20+wantPayLens[i])
if !verifyChecksum(seg[20:], psum) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: bad TCP checksum", i)
}
}
}
func TestSegmentTCPv6(t *testing.T) {
const ipLen = 40
const tcpLen = 20
const mss = 120
const numSeg = 2
payLen := mss * numSeg
pkt := make([]byte, ipLen+tcpLen+payLen)
// IPv6 header
pkt[0] = 0x60 // version 6
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(tcpLen+payLen))
pkt[6] = unix.IPPROTO_TCP
pkt[7] = 64
// src/dst fe80::1 / fe80::2
pkt[8] = 0xfe
pkt[9] = 0x80
pkt[23] = 1
pkt[24] = 0xfe
pkt[25] = 0x80
pkt[39] = 2
// TCP header
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[40:42], 12345)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[42:44], 80)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(pkt[44:48], 7)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(pkt[48:52], 99)
pkt[52] = 0x50
pkt[53] = 0x19 // FIN | ACK | PSH — exercise FIN clearing too
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[54:56], 65535)
for i := 0; i < payLen; i++ {
pkt[ipLen+tcpLen+i] = byte(i)
}
hdr := virtio.Hdr{
Flags: unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM,
GSOType: unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6,
HdrLen: uint16(ipLen + tcpLen),
GSOSize: uint16(mss),
CsumStart: uint16(ipLen),
CsumOffset: 16,
}
scratch := make([]byte, testSegScratchSize)
var out [][]byte
if err := segmentForTest(pkt, hdr, &out, scratch); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("segmentForTest: %v", err)
}
if len(out) != numSeg {
t.Fatalf("want %d segments, got %d", numSeg, len(out))
}
for i, seg := range out {
if len(seg) != ipLen+tcpLen+mss {
t.Errorf("seg %d: len %d want %d", i, len(seg), ipLen+tcpLen+mss)
}
pl := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(seg[4:6])
if pl != uint16(tcpLen+mss) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: payload_length=%d want %d", i, pl, tcpLen+mss)
}
seq := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(seg[44:48])
if seq != uint32(7+i*mss) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: seq=%d want %d", i, seq, 7+i*mss)
}
flags := seg[53]
// Original flags = 0x19 (FIN|ACK|PSH). FIN(0x01)+PSH(0x08) should be
// cleared on all but the last; ACK(0x10) always preserved.
wantFlags := byte(0x10)
if i == numSeg-1 {
wantFlags = 0x19
}
if flags != wantFlags {
t.Errorf("seg %d: flags=%#x want %#x", i, flags, wantFlags)
}
psum := pseudoHeaderIPv6(seg[8:24], seg[24:40], unix.IPPROTO_TCP, tcpLen+mss)
if !verifyChecksum(seg[ipLen:], psum) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: bad TCP checksum", i)
}
}
}
func TestSegmentGSONonePassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
pkt, hdr := buildTSOv4(t, 100, 100)
hdr.GSOType = unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE
hdr.Flags = 0 // no NEEDS_CSUM, leave packet untouched
scratch := make([]byte, testSegScratchSize)
var out [][]byte
if err := segmentForTest(pkt, hdr, &out, scratch); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("segmentForTest: %v", err)
}
if len(out) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("want 1 segment, got %d", len(out))
}
if len(out[0]) != len(pkt) {
t.Fatalf("unexpected length: %d vs %d", len(out[0]), len(pkt))
}
}
// TestSegmentRejectsLegacyUDPGSO ensures the legacy GSO_UDP (UFO) marker is
// still rejected; only modern GSO_UDP_L4 (USO) is supported.
func TestSegmentRejectsLegacyUDPGSO(t *testing.T) {
hdr := virtio.Hdr{GSOType: unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP}
var out [][]byte
if err := segmentForTest(nil, hdr, &out, nil); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected rejection for legacy UDP GSO")
}
}
// buildUSOv4 builds a synthetic IPv4/UDP USO superpacket with payload of
// payLen bytes, segmented at gsoSize.
func buildUSOv4(t *testing.T, payLen, gsoSize int) ([]byte, virtio.Hdr) {
t.Helper()
const ipLen = 20
const udpLen = 8
pkt := make([]byte, ipLen+udpLen+payLen)
// IPv4 header
pkt[0] = 0x45 // version 4, IHL 5
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[2:4], uint16(ipLen+udpLen+payLen))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], 0x4242)
pkt[8] = 64
pkt[9] = unix.IPPROTO_UDP
copy(pkt[12:16], []byte{10, 0, 0, 1})
copy(pkt[16:20], []byte{10, 0, 0, 2})
// UDP header (length + checksum filled in per segment by segmentUDPYield)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[20:22], 12345) // sport
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[22:24], 53) // dport
for i := 0; i < payLen; i++ {
pkt[ipLen+udpLen+i] = byte(i & 0xff)
}
return pkt, virtio.Hdr{
Flags: unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM,
GSOType: unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP_L4,
HdrLen: uint16(ipLen + udpLen),
GSOSize: uint16(gsoSize),
CsumStart: uint16(ipLen),
CsumOffset: 6,
}
}
func TestSegmentUDPv4(t *testing.T) {
const gso = 100
const numSeg = 3
pkt, hdr := buildUSOv4(t, gso*numSeg, gso)
scratch := make([]byte, testSegScratchSize)
var out [][]byte
if err := segmentForTest(pkt, hdr, &out, scratch); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("segmentForTest: %v", err)
}
if len(out) != numSeg {
t.Fatalf("expected %d segments, got %d", numSeg, len(out))
}
for i, seg := range out {
if len(seg) != 28+gso {
t.Errorf("seg %d: len %d want %d", i, len(seg), 28+gso)
}
totalLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(seg[2:4])
if totalLen != uint16(28+gso) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: total_len=%d want %d", i, totalLen, 28+gso)
}
// kernel UDP-GSO does NOT bump the IPv4 ID across segments; every
// segment carries the same ID as the seed.
id := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(seg[4:6])
if id != 0x4242 {
t.Errorf("seg %d: ip id=%#x want %#x", i, id, 0x4242)
}
udpLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(seg[24:26])
if udpLen != uint16(8+gso) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: udp len=%d want %d", i, udpLen, 8+gso)
}
if !verifyChecksum(seg[:20], 0) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: bad IPv4 header checksum", i)
}
psum := pseudoHeaderIPv4(seg[12:16], seg[16:20], unix.IPPROTO_UDP, 8+gso)
if !verifyChecksum(seg[20:], psum) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: bad UDP checksum", i)
}
}
}
func TestSegmentUDPv4OddTail(t *testing.T) {
// 250 bytes payload, gsoSize=100 → segments of 100, 100, 50.
pkt, hdr := buildUSOv4(t, 250, 100)
scratch := make([]byte, testSegScratchSize)
var out [][]byte
if err := segmentForTest(pkt, hdr, &out, scratch); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("segmentForTest: %v", err)
}
if len(out) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("want 3 segments, got %d", len(out))
}
wantPay := []int{100, 100, 50}
for i, seg := range out {
if len(seg)-28 != wantPay[i] {
t.Errorf("seg %d: pay len %d want %d", i, len(seg)-28, wantPay[i])
}
udpLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(seg[24:26])
if udpLen != uint16(8+wantPay[i]) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: udp len=%d want %d", i, udpLen, 8+wantPay[i])
}
if !verifyChecksum(seg[:20], 0) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: bad IPv4 header checksum", i)
}
psum := pseudoHeaderIPv4(seg[12:16], seg[16:20], unix.IPPROTO_UDP, 8+wantPay[i])
if !verifyChecksum(seg[20:], psum) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: bad UDP checksum", i)
}
}
}
func TestSegmentUDPv6(t *testing.T) {
const ipLen = 40
const udpLen = 8
const gso = 120
const numSeg = 2
payLen := gso * numSeg
pkt := make([]byte, ipLen+udpLen+payLen)
// IPv6 header
pkt[0] = 0x60
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(udpLen+payLen))
pkt[6] = unix.IPPROTO_UDP
pkt[7] = 64
pkt[8] = 0xfe
pkt[9] = 0x80
pkt[23] = 1
pkt[24] = 0xfe
pkt[25] = 0x80
pkt[39] = 2
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[40:42], 12345)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[42:44], 53)
for i := 0; i < payLen; i++ {
pkt[ipLen+udpLen+i] = byte(i)
}
hdr := virtio.Hdr{
Flags: unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM,
GSOType: unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP_L4,
HdrLen: uint16(ipLen + udpLen),
GSOSize: uint16(gso),
CsumStart: uint16(ipLen),
CsumOffset: 6,
}
scratch := make([]byte, testSegScratchSize)
var out [][]byte
if err := segmentForTest(pkt, hdr, &out, scratch); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("segmentForTest: %v", err)
}
if len(out) != numSeg {
t.Fatalf("want %d segments, got %d", numSeg, len(out))
}
for i, seg := range out {
if len(seg) != ipLen+udpLen+gso {
t.Errorf("seg %d: len %d want %d", i, len(seg), ipLen+udpLen+gso)
}
pl := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(seg[4:6])
if pl != uint16(udpLen+gso) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: payload_length=%d want %d", i, pl, udpLen+gso)
}
ul := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(seg[ipLen+4 : ipLen+6])
if ul != uint16(udpLen+gso) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: udp len=%d want %d", i, ul, udpLen+gso)
}
psum := pseudoHeaderIPv6(seg[8:24], seg[24:40], unix.IPPROTO_UDP, udpLen+gso)
if !verifyChecksum(seg[ipLen:], psum) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: bad UDP checksum", i)
}
}
}
// TestSegmentUDPCEPropagates confirms IP-level CE marks on the seed appear on
// every segment. UDP has no transport-level CWR/ECE: the IP TOS/TC byte is
// copied verbatim into every segment by the segment-prefix copy.
func TestSegmentUDPCEPropagates(t *testing.T) {
pkt, hdr := buildUSOv4(t, 200, 100)
pkt[1] = 0x03 // CE codepoint in IP-ECN
scratch := make([]byte, testSegScratchSize)
var out [][]byte
if err := segmentForTest(pkt, hdr, &out, scratch); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("segmentForTest: %v", err)
}
if len(out) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 segments, got %d", len(out))
}
for i, seg := range out {
if seg[1]&0x03 != 0x03 {
t.Errorf("seg %d: CE missing (tos=%#x)", i, seg[1])
}
if !verifyChecksum(seg[:20], 0) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: bad IPv4 header checksum", i)
}
}
}
// TestSegmentTCPCwrFirstSegmentOnly confirms RFC 3168 §6.1.2: when a TSO
// burst's seed has CWR set, only the first emitted segment carries CWR.
// ECE is preserved on every segment (different signal, persistent state).
func TestSegmentTCPCwrFirstSegmentOnly(t *testing.T) {
const mss = 100
const numSeg = 3
pkt, hdr := buildTSOv4(t, mss*numSeg, mss)
// Seed flags: CWR | ECE | ACK | PSH.
pkt[33] = 0x80 | 0x40 | 0x10 | 0x08
scratch := make([]byte, testSegScratchSize)
var out [][]byte
if err := segmentForTest(pkt, hdr, &out, scratch); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("segmentForTest: %v", err)
}
if len(out) != numSeg {
t.Fatalf("expected %d segments, got %d", numSeg, len(out))
}
for i, seg := range out {
flags := seg[33]
hasCwr := flags&0x80 != 0
hasEce := flags&0x40 != 0
hasPsh := flags&0x08 != 0
wantCwr := i == 0
wantPsh := i == numSeg-1
if hasCwr != wantCwr {
t.Errorf("seg %d: CWR=%v want %v (flags=%#x)", i, hasCwr, wantCwr, flags)
}
if !hasEce {
t.Errorf("seg %d: ECE missing (flags=%#x)", i, flags)
}
if hasPsh != wantPsh {
t.Errorf("seg %d: PSH=%v want %v (flags=%#x)", i, hasPsh, wantPsh, flags)
}
// IP and TCP checksums must still verify after the flag rewrite.
if !verifyChecksum(seg[:20], 0) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: bad IPv4 header checksum", i)
}
psum := pseudoHeaderIPv4(seg[12:16], seg[16:20], unix.IPPROTO_TCP, 20+mss)
if !verifyChecksum(seg[20:], psum) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: bad TCP checksum", i)
}
}
}
func BenchmarkSegmentTCPv4(b *testing.B) {
sizes := []struct {
name string
payLen int
mss int
}{
{"64KiB_MSS1460", 65000, 1460},
{"16KiB_MSS1460", 16384, 1460},
{"4KiB_MSS1460", 4096, 1460},
}
for _, sz := range sizes {
b.Run(sz.name, func(b *testing.B) {
const ipLen = 20
const tcpLen = 20
pkt := make([]byte, ipLen+tcpLen+sz.payLen)
pkt[0] = 0x45
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[2:4], uint16(ipLen+tcpLen+sz.payLen))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], 0x4242)
pkt[8] = 64
pkt[9] = unix.IPPROTO_TCP
copy(pkt[12:16], []byte{10, 0, 0, 1})
copy(pkt[16:20], []byte{10, 0, 0, 2})
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[20:22], 12345)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[22:24], 80)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(pkt[24:28], 10000)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(pkt[28:32], 20000)
pkt[32] = 0x50
pkt[33] = 0x18
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[34:36], 65535)
for i := 0; i < sz.payLen; i++ {
pkt[ipLen+tcpLen+i] = byte(i)
}
hdr := virtio.Hdr{
Flags: unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM,
GSOType: unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4,
HdrLen: uint16(ipLen + tcpLen),
GSOSize: uint16(sz.mss),
CsumStart: uint16(ipLen),
CsumOffset: 16,
}
scratch := make([]byte, testSegScratchSize)
out := make([][]byte, 0, 64)
// SegmentSuperpacket consumes its input destructively; restore
// pkt from a master copy each iteration. The restore mirrors the
// kernel→userspace copy that hands a fresh GSO blob to the
// segmenter in production, so it's representative cost rather
// than bench overhead.
master := append([]byte(nil), pkt...)
work := make([]byte, len(pkt))
b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkt)))
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
copy(work, master)
out = out[:0]
if err := segmentForTest(work, hdr, &out, scratch); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
}
})
}
}
// TestTunFileWriteVnetHdrNoAlloc verifies the IFF_VNET_HDR fast-path write is
// allocation-free. We write to /dev/null so every call succeeds synchronously.
func TestTunFileWriteVnetHdrNoAlloc(t *testing.T) {
fd, err := unix.Open("/dev/null", os.O_WRONLY, 0)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("open /dev/null: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = unix.Close(fd) })
tf := &Offload{fd: fd}
payload := make([]byte, 1400)
// Warm up (first call may trigger one-time internal allocations elsewhere).
if _, err := tf.Write(payload); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Write: %v", err)
}
allocs := testing.AllocsPerRun(1000, func() {
if _, err := tf.Write(payload); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Write: %v", err)
}
})
if allocs != 0 {
t.Fatalf("Write allocated %.1f times per call, want 0", allocs)
}
}
// buildTSOv6 builds a synthetic IPv6/TCP TSO superpacket with payLen bytes
// of payload, segmented at gso. Returns the packet bytes only; the
// virtio_net_hdr is the caller's responsibility.
func buildTSOv6(payLen, gso int) []byte {
const ipLen = 40
const tcpLen = 20
pkt := make([]byte, ipLen+tcpLen+payLen)
pkt[0] = 0x60 // version 6
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(tcpLen+payLen))
pkt[6] = unix.IPPROTO_TCP
pkt[7] = 64
pkt[8] = 0xfe
pkt[9] = 0x80
pkt[23] = 1
pkt[24] = 0xfe
pkt[25] = 0x80
pkt[39] = 2
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[40:42], 12345)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[42:44], 80)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(pkt[44:48], 7)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(pkt[48:52], 99)
pkt[52] = 0x50
pkt[53] = 0x10 // ACK only
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[54:56], 65535)
for i := 0; i < payLen; i++ {
pkt[ipLen+tcpLen+i] = byte(i)
}
return pkt
}
// TestDecodeReadFitsMaxTSOAtDrainThreshold proves the rxBuf sizing is
// correct: when rxOff is at the maximum value the drain headroom check
// allows, decodeRead must still be able to absorb a worst-case 64KiB
// TSO superpacket without dropping the burst. With segmentation deferred
// to encrypt time, decodeRead writes only the kernel-supplied bytes into
// rxBuf, so the size requirement is just "fit one worst-case input."
//
// Regression history: in a prior layout the rx buffer doubled as the
// segmentation output, a near-threshold drain read returned "scratch too
// small", the whole 45-segment TSO burst was dropped, and the remote's TCP
// fast-retransmit collapsed cwnd. Keeping this test in the new layout
// guards against re-introducing a drain headroom shortfall.
func TestDecodeReadFitsMaxTSOAtDrainThreshold(t *testing.T) {
const ipv6HdrLen = 40
const tcpHdrLen = 20
const headerLen = ipv6HdrLen + tcpHdrLen
// Maximum TUN read body. The tunReadBufSize cap on readv's body iovec
// is what bounds the kernel's superpacket length.
pktLen := tunReadBufSize
payLen := pktLen - headerLen
const targetSegs = 64
gsoSize := (payLen + targetSegs - 1) / targetSegs
pkt := buildTSOv6(payLen, gsoSize)
if len(pkt) != pktLen {
t.Fatalf("buildTSOv6 produced %d bytes, want %d", len(pkt), pktLen)
}
o := &Offload{
rxBuf: make([]byte, tunRxBufCap),
}
// rxOff at the maximum value the drain headroom check permits before
// it would refuse another read. Any drain-time read up to this
// threshold MUST still process correctly.
o.rxOff = tunRxBufCap - tunRxBufSize
// Stage the body in rxBuf as if readv(2) just placed it there.
copy(o.rxBuf[o.rxOff:], pkt)
// Encode the matching virtio_net_hdr.
hdr := virtio.Hdr{
Flags: unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM,
GSOType: unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6,
HdrLen: uint16(headerLen),
GSOSize: uint16(gsoSize),
CsumStart: uint16(ipv6HdrLen),
CsumOffset: 16,
}
hdr.Encode(o.readVnetScratch[:])
startRxOff := o.rxOff
if err := o.decodeRead(pktLen); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decodeRead at drain threshold returned %v — rxBuf sizing regression: "+
"tunRxBufSize=%d must hold one worst-case input (%d)",
err, tunRxBufSize, pktLen)
}
if len(o.pending) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("got %d packets, want 1 superpacket entry", len(o.pending))
}
got := o.pending[0]
if !got.GSO.IsSuperpacket() {
t.Fatalf("expected superpacket GSO metadata, got %+v", got.GSO)
}
if got.GSO.Proto != GSOProtoTCP {
t.Errorf("GSO.Proto=%d want TCP", got.GSO.Proto)
}
if got.GSO.Size != uint16(gsoSize) {
t.Errorf("GSO.Size=%d want %d", got.GSO.Size, gsoSize)
}
if got.GSO.HdrLen != uint16(headerLen) {
t.Errorf("GSO.HdrLen=%d want %d", got.GSO.HdrLen, headerLen)
}
if got.GSO.CsumStart != uint16(ipv6HdrLen) {
t.Errorf("GSO.CsumStart=%d want %d", got.GSO.CsumStart, ipv6HdrLen)
}
if len(got.Bytes) != pktLen {
t.Errorf("len(Bytes)=%d want %d", len(got.Bytes), pktLen)
}
// rxOff advances exactly by the kernel-supplied body length — no
// segmentation output to account for any more.
if o.rxOff != startRxOff+pktLen {
t.Errorf("rxOff=%d want %d", o.rxOff, startRxOff+pktLen)
}
if o.rxOff > tunRxBufCap {
t.Fatalf("rxOff=%d overran rxBuf (cap=%d)", o.rxOff, tunRxBufCap)
}
// Validate that segmenting the returned superpacket reproduces the
// expected per-segment IPv6 payload length and TCP checksum.
wantSegs := (payLen + gsoSize - 1) / gsoSize
gotSegs := 0
if err := SegmentSuperpacket(got, func(seg []byte) error {
defer func() { gotSegs++ }()
if len(seg) < headerLen+1 {
t.Errorf("seg %d too short: %d", gotSegs, len(seg))
return nil
}
if seg[0]>>4 != 6 {
t.Errorf("seg %d: bad IP version %#x", gotSegs, seg[0])
}
segPay := len(seg) - headerLen
gotPL := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(seg[4:6])
if gotPL != uint16(tcpHdrLen+segPay) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: payload_len=%d want %d", gotSegs, gotPL, tcpHdrLen+segPay)
}
psum := pseudoHeaderIPv6(seg[8:24], seg[24:40], unix.IPPROTO_TCP, tcpHdrLen+segPay)
if !verifyChecksum(seg[ipv6HdrLen:], psum) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: bad TCP checksum", gotSegs)
}
return nil
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SegmentSuperpacket: %v", err)
}
if gotSegs != wantSegs {
t.Fatalf("got %d segments, want %d", gotSegs, wantSegs)
}
}
-43
View File
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
//go:build linux && !android
// +build linux,!android
package virtio
import "encoding/binary"
// Size is the on-wire length of struct virtio_net_hdr the kernel
// prepends/expects on a TUN opened with IFF_VNET_HDR (TUNSETVNETHDRSZ
// not set).
const Size = 10
// Hdr is the Go view of the legacy virtio_net_hdr.
type Hdr struct {
Flags uint8
GSOType uint8
HdrLen uint16
GSOSize uint16
CsumStart uint16
CsumOffset uint16
}
// Decode reads a virtio_net_hdr in host byte order (TUN default; we never
// call TUNSETVNETLE so the kernel matches our endianness).
func (h *Hdr) Decode(b []byte) {
h.Flags = b[0]
h.GSOType = b[1]
h.HdrLen = binary.NativeEndian.Uint16(b[2:4])
h.GSOSize = binary.NativeEndian.Uint16(b[4:6])
h.CsumStart = binary.NativeEndian.Uint16(b[6:8])
h.CsumOffset = binary.NativeEndian.Uint16(b[8:10])
}
// Encode is the inverse of Decode: writes the virtio_net_hdr fields into b
// (must be at least Size bytes). Used to emit a TSO superpacket on egress.
func (h *Hdr) Encode(b []byte) {
b[0] = h.Flags
b[1] = h.GSOType
binary.NativeEndian.PutUint16(b[2:4], h.HdrLen)
binary.NativeEndian.PutUint16(b[4:6], h.GSOSize)
binary.NativeEndian.PutUint16(b[6:8], h.CsumStart)
binary.NativeEndian.PutUint16(b[8:10], h.CsumOffset)
}
-402
View File
@@ -1,402 +0,0 @@
//go:build linux && !android
// +build linux,!android
// Package virtio implements the pure validation, header-correction, and
// per-segment slicing logic for kernel-supplied TSO/USO superpackets on
// IFF_VNET_HDR TUN devices. It is FD-free and depends only on the byte
// layout of the virtio_net_hdr and the IP/TCP/UDP headers it describes,
// so it can be unit-tested in isolation from the tio Queue runtime.
package virtio
import (
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"fmt"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/checksum"
)
// Protocol header size bounds used to validate / cap kernel-supplied offsets.
const (
ipv4HeaderMinLen = 20 // IHL=5, no options
ipv4HeaderMaxLen = 60 // IHL=15, max options
ipv6FixedLen = 40 // IPv6 base header; extensions would extend this
tcpHeaderMinLen = 20 // data-offset=5, no options
tcpHeaderMaxLen = 60 // data-offset=15, max options
)
// Byte offsets inside an IPv4 header.
const (
ipv4TotalLenOff = 2
ipv4IDOff = 4
ipv4ChecksumOff = 10
ipv4SrcOff = 12
ipv4AddrsEnd = 20 // end of dst address (ipv4SrcOff + 2*4)
)
// Byte offsets inside an IPv6 header.
const (
ipv6PayloadLenOff = 4
ipv6SrcOff = 8
ipv6AddrsEnd = 40 // end of dst address (ipv6SrcOff + 2*16)
)
// Byte offsets inside a TCP header (relative to its start, i.e. csumStart).
const (
tcpSeqOff = 4
tcpDataOffOff = 12 // upper nibble is header len in 32-bit words
tcpFlagsOff = 13
tcpChecksumOff = 16
)
// UDP header is fixed at 8 bytes: {sport, dport, length, checksum}.
const (
udpHeaderLen = 8
udpLengthOff = 4
udpChecksumOff = 6
)
// tcpFinPshMask is cleared on every segment except the last of a TSO burst.
const tcpFinPshMask = 0x09 // FIN(0x01) | PSH(0x08)
// tcpCwrFlag is cleared on every segment except the first. Per RFC 3168
// §6.1.2 the CWR bit signals a one-shot transition (the sender just halved
// its window) and must appear on the first segment of a TSO burst only.
const tcpCwrFlag = 0x80
// CheckValid rejects packets whose virtio_net_hdr/IP combination would
// cause a downstream miscompute. The TUN should never emit RSC_INFO and
// the GSO type must agree with the IP version nibble.
func CheckValid(pkt []byte, hdr Hdr) error {
// When RSC_INFO is set the csum_start/csum_offset fields are repurposed to
// carry coalescing info rather than checksum offsets. A TUN writing via
// IFF_VNET_HDR should never emit this, but if it did we would silently
// miscompute the segment checksums — refuse the packet instead.
if hdr.Flags&unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_RSC_INFO != 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("virtio RSC_INFO flag not supported on TUN reads")
}
if len(pkt) < ipv4HeaderMinLen {
return fmt.Errorf("packet too short")
}
ipVersion := pkt[0] >> 4
switch hdr.GSOType {
case unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4:
if ipVersion != 4 {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid IP version %d for GSO type %d", ipVersion, hdr.GSOType)
}
case unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6:
if ipVersion != 6 {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid IP version %d for GSO type %d", ipVersion, hdr.GSOType)
}
case unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP_L4:
// USO carries either v4 or v6; the leading nibble disambiguates.
if !(ipVersion == 4 || ipVersion == 6) {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid IP version %d for GSO type %d", ipVersion, hdr.GSOType)
}
default:
if !(ipVersion == 6 || ipVersion == 4) {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid IP version %d for GSO type %d", ipVersion, hdr.GSOType)
}
}
return nil
}
// CorrectHdrLen rewrites hdr.HdrLen based on the actual transport header
// length read out of pkt. The kernel's hdr.HdrLen on the FORWARD path can
// be the length of the entire first packet, so we don't trust it.
func CorrectHdrLen(pkt []byte, hdr *Hdr) error {
// Thank you wireguard-go for documenting these edge-cases
// Don't trust hdr.hdrLen from the kernel as it can be equal to the length
// of the entire first packet when the kernel is handling it as part of a
// FORWARD path. Instead, parse the transport header length and add it onto
// csumStart, which is synonymous for IP header length.
if hdr.GSOType == unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP_L4 {
hdr.HdrLen = hdr.CsumStart + 8
} else {
if len(pkt) <= int(hdr.CsumStart+tcpDataOffOff) {
return errors.New("packet is too short")
}
tcpHLen := uint16(pkt[hdr.CsumStart+tcpDataOffOff] >> 4 * 4)
if tcpHLen < 20 || tcpHLen > 60 {
// A TCP header must be between 20 and 60 bytes in length.
return fmt.Errorf("tcp header len is invalid: %d", tcpHLen)
}
hdr.HdrLen = hdr.CsumStart + tcpHLen
}
if len(pkt) < int(hdr.HdrLen) {
return fmt.Errorf("length of packet (%d) < virtioNetHdr.HdrLen (%d)", len(pkt), hdr.HdrLen)
}
if hdr.HdrLen < hdr.CsumStart {
return fmt.Errorf("virtioNetHdr.HdrLen (%d) < virtioNetHdr.CsumStart (%d)", hdr.HdrLen, hdr.CsumStart)
}
cSumAt := int(hdr.CsumStart + hdr.CsumStart)
if cSumAt+1 >= len(pkt) {
return fmt.Errorf("end of checksum offset (%d) exceeds packet length (%d)", cSumAt+1, len(pkt))
}
return nil
}
// SegmentTCP walks a TSO superpacket pkt, yielding each segment as a
// slice into pkt itself. Per-segment plaintext is laid out by sliding a
// freshly-patched copy of the L3+L4 header into pkt at offset i*gsoSize,
// where it sits immediately before that segment's payload chunk in the
// original buffer. The slide is destructive: iter i's header write overwrites
// the last hdrLen bytes of seg_{i-1}'s payload, which is dead by the time
// the next iteration begins. pkt is consumed by this call and must not be
// inspected by the caller after the final yield.
func SegmentTCP(pkt []byte, hdrLenU, csumStartU, gsoSizeU uint16, yield func(seg []byte) error) error {
if gsoSizeU == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("gso_size is zero")
}
if csumStartU == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("csum_start is zero")
}
headerLen := int(hdrLenU)
csumStart := int(csumStartU)
isV4 := pkt[0]>>4 == 4
tcpHdrLen := int(pkt[csumStart+tcpDataOffOff]>>4) * 4
payLen := len(pkt) - headerLen
gsoSize := int(gsoSizeU)
numSeg := (payLen + gsoSize - 1) / gsoSize
if numSeg == 0 {
numSeg = 1
}
origSeq := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(pkt[csumStart+tcpSeqOff : csumStart+tcpSeqOff+4])
origFlags := pkt[csumStart+tcpFlagsOff]
var tmp [tcpHeaderMaxLen]byte
copy(tmp[:tcpHdrLen], pkt[csumStart:headerLen])
tmp[tcpSeqOff], tmp[tcpSeqOff+1], tmp[tcpSeqOff+2], tmp[tcpSeqOff+3] = 0, 0, 0, 0
tmp[tcpFlagsOff] = 0
tmp[tcpChecksumOff], tmp[tcpChecksumOff+1] = 0, 0
baseTcpHdrSum := uint32(checksum.Checksum(tmp[:tcpHdrLen], 0))
var baseProtoSum uint32
if isV4 {
baseProtoSum = uint32(checksum.Checksum(pkt[ipv4SrcOff:ipv4AddrsEnd], 0))
} else {
baseProtoSum = uint32(checksum.Checksum(pkt[ipv6SrcOff:ipv6AddrsEnd], 0))
}
baseProtoSum += uint32(unix.IPPROTO_TCP)
var origIPID uint16
var baseIPHdrSum uint32
if isV4 {
origIPID = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[ipv4IDOff : ipv4IDOff+2])
ihl := int(pkt[0]&0x0f) * 4
if ihl < ipv4HeaderMinLen || ihl > csumStart {
return fmt.Errorf("bad IPv4 IHL: %d", ihl)
}
var ipTmp [ipv4HeaderMaxLen]byte
copy(ipTmp[:ihl], pkt[:ihl])
ipTmp[ipv4TotalLenOff], ipTmp[ipv4TotalLenOff+1] = 0, 0
ipTmp[ipv4IDOff], ipTmp[ipv4IDOff+1] = 0, 0
ipTmp[ipv4ChecksumOff], ipTmp[ipv4ChecksumOff+1] = 0, 0
baseIPHdrSum = uint32(checksum.Checksum(ipTmp[:ihl], 0))
}
for i := 0; i < numSeg; i++ {
segStart := i * gsoSize
segEnd := segStart + gsoSize
if segEnd > payLen {
segEnd = payLen
}
segPayLen := segEnd - segStart
segLen := headerLen + segPayLen
headerOff := i * gsoSize
// Slide the header into place immediately before this segment's
// payload. Iter 0's header is already at pkt[:headerLen]; for
// i ≥ 1 we copy from there. The constant-byte fields of pkt[:headerLen]
// survive iter 0's in-place patches (only seq/flags/cksum/totalLen/id
// are touched), and iter 0's stale variable-field values are
// overwritten by the per-segment patches below.
if i > 0 {
copy(pkt[headerOff:headerOff+headerLen], pkt[:headerLen])
}
seg := pkt[headerOff : headerOff+segLen]
segSeq := origSeq + uint32(segStart)
segFlags := origFlags
if i != 0 {
segFlags &^= tcpCwrFlag
}
if i != numSeg-1 {
segFlags &^= tcpFinPshMask
}
totalLen := segLen
if isV4 {
segID := origIPID + uint16(i)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[ipv4TotalLenOff:ipv4TotalLenOff+2], uint16(totalLen))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[ipv4IDOff:ipv4IDOff+2], segID)
ipSum := baseIPHdrSum + uint32(totalLen) + uint32(segID)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[ipv4ChecksumOff:ipv4ChecksumOff+2], foldComplement(ipSum))
} else {
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[ipv6PayloadLenOff:ipv6PayloadLenOff+2], uint16(headerLen-ipv6FixedLen+segPayLen))
}
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(seg[csumStart+tcpSeqOff:csumStart+tcpSeqOff+4], segSeq)
seg[csumStart+tcpFlagsOff] = segFlags
tcpLen := tcpHdrLen + segPayLen
// Payload bytes still live at their original offset in pkt. The
// header slide above only writes into pkt[i*G : i*G+H], which is
// the tail of seg_{i-1}'s payload (already consumed) and never
// overlaps seg_i's own payload at pkt[H+i*G : H+(i+1)*G].
paySum := uint32(checksum.Checksum(pkt[headerLen+segStart:headerLen+segEnd], 0))
wide := uint64(baseTcpHdrSum) + uint64(paySum) + uint64(baseProtoSum)
wide += uint64(segSeq) + uint64(segFlags) + uint64(tcpLen)
wide = (wide & 0xffffffff) + (wide >> 32)
wide = (wide & 0xffffffff) + (wide >> 32)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[csumStart+tcpChecksumOff:csumStart+tcpChecksumOff+2], foldComplement(uint32(wide)))
if err := yield(seg); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// SegmentUDP walks a USO superpacket, sliding a per-segment-patched
// L3+L4 header into pkt at offset i*gsoSize and yielding pkt[i*G:i*G+segLen]
// to the caller. Per-segment patches are total_len + IPv4 csum (or IPv6
// payload_len) plus the UDP length and checksum. pkt is consumed
// destructively; see SegmentTCP for the layout reasoning.
//
// UDP-GSO leaves the IPv4 ID identical across segments (the kernel does not
// bump it), which is why the IP-level per-segment work is limited to
// total_len + IPv4 header checksum (v4) or payload_len (v6).
func SegmentUDP(pkt []byte, hdrLenU, csumStartU, gsoSizeU uint16, yield func(seg []byte) error) error {
if gsoSizeU == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("gso_size is zero")
}
if csumStartU == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("csum_start is zero")
}
isV4 := pkt[0]>>4 == 4
headerLen := int(hdrLenU)
csumStart := int(csumStartU)
if headerLen-csumStart != udpHeaderLen {
return fmt.Errorf("udp header len mismatch: %d", headerLen-csumStart)
}
payLen := len(pkt) - headerLen
gsoSize := int(gsoSizeU)
numSeg := (payLen + gsoSize - 1) / gsoSize
if numSeg == 0 {
numSeg = 1
}
var udpTmp [udpHeaderLen]byte
copy(udpTmp[:], pkt[csumStart:headerLen])
udpTmp[udpLengthOff], udpTmp[udpLengthOff+1] = 0, 0
udpTmp[udpChecksumOff], udpTmp[udpChecksumOff+1] = 0, 0
baseUDPHdrSum := uint32(checksum.Checksum(udpTmp[:], 0))
var baseProtoSum uint32
if isV4 {
baseProtoSum = uint32(checksum.Checksum(pkt[ipv4SrcOff:ipv4AddrsEnd], 0))
} else {
baseProtoSum = uint32(checksum.Checksum(pkt[ipv6SrcOff:ipv6AddrsEnd], 0))
}
baseProtoSum += uint32(unix.IPPROTO_UDP)
var baseIPHdrSum uint32
if isV4 {
ihl := int(pkt[0]&0x0f) * 4
if ihl < ipv4HeaderMinLen || ihl > csumStart {
return fmt.Errorf("bad IPv4 IHL: %d", ihl)
}
var ipTmp [ipv4HeaderMaxLen]byte
copy(ipTmp[:ihl], pkt[:ihl])
ipTmp[ipv4TotalLenOff], ipTmp[ipv4TotalLenOff+1] = 0, 0
ipTmp[ipv4ChecksumOff], ipTmp[ipv4ChecksumOff+1] = 0, 0
baseIPHdrSum = uint32(checksum.Checksum(ipTmp[:ihl], 0))
}
for i := 0; i < numSeg; i++ {
segStart := i * gsoSize
segEnd := segStart + gsoSize
if segEnd > payLen {
segEnd = payLen
}
segPayLen := segEnd - segStart
segLen := headerLen + segPayLen
headerOff := i * gsoSize
if i > 0 {
copy(pkt[headerOff:headerOff+headerLen], pkt[:headerLen])
}
seg := pkt[headerOff : headerOff+segLen]
totalLen := segLen
udpLen := udpHeaderLen + segPayLen
if isV4 {
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[ipv4TotalLenOff:ipv4TotalLenOff+2], uint16(totalLen))
ipSum := baseIPHdrSum + uint32(totalLen)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[ipv4ChecksumOff:ipv4ChecksumOff+2], foldComplement(ipSum))
} else {
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[ipv6PayloadLenOff:ipv6PayloadLenOff+2], uint16(headerLen-ipv6FixedLen+segPayLen))
}
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[csumStart+udpLengthOff:csumStart+udpLengthOff+2], uint16(udpLen))
paySum := uint32(checksum.Checksum(pkt[headerLen+segStart:headerLen+segEnd], 0))
wide := uint64(baseUDPHdrSum) + uint64(paySum) + uint64(baseProtoSum)
wide += uint64(udpLen) + uint64(udpLen)
wide = (wide & 0xffffffff) + (wide >> 32)
wide = (wide & 0xffffffff) + (wide >> 32)
csum := foldComplement(uint32(wide))
if csum == 0 {
csum = 0xffff
}
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[csumStart+udpChecksumOff:csumStart+udpChecksumOff+2], csum)
if err := yield(seg); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// FinishChecksum computes the L4 checksum for a non-GSO packet that the kernel
// handed us with NEEDS_CSUM set. csum_start / csum_offset point at the 16-bit
// checksum field; we zero it, fold a full sum (the field was pre-loaded with
// the pseudo-header partial sum by the kernel), and store the result.
func FinishChecksum(seg []byte, hdr Hdr) error {
cs := int(hdr.CsumStart)
co := int(hdr.CsumOffset)
if cs+co+2 > len(seg) {
return fmt.Errorf("csum offsets out of range: start=%d offset=%d len=%d", cs, co, len(seg))
}
// The kernel stores a partial pseudo-header sum at [cs+co:]; sum over the
// L4 region starting at cs, folding the prior partial in as the seed.
partial := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(seg[cs+co : cs+co+2])
seg[cs+co] = 0
seg[cs+co+1] = 0
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[cs+co:cs+co+2], ^checksum.Checksum(seg[cs:], partial))
return nil
}
// foldComplement folds a 32-bit one's-complement partial sum to 16 bits and
// complements it, yielding the on-wire Internet checksum value.
func foldComplement(sum uint32) uint16 {
sum = (sum & 0xffff) + (sum >> 16)
sum = (sum & 0xffff) + (sum >> 16)
return ^uint16(sum)
}
+9 -33
View File
@@ -13,38 +13,17 @@ import (
"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
)
type tun struct {
rwc io.ReadWriteCloser
io.ReadWriteCloser
fd int
vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix
Routes atomic.Pointer[[]Route]
routeTree atomic.Pointer[bart.Table[routing.Gateways]]
l *slog.Logger
readBuf []byte
batchRet [1]tio.Packet
}
func (t *tun) Read() ([]tio.Packet, error) {
n, err := t.rwc.Read(t.readBuf)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
t.batchRet[0] = tio.Packet{Bytes: t.readBuf[:n]}
return t.batchRet[:], nil
}
func (t *tun) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
return t.rwc.Write(p)
}
func (t *tun) Close() error {
return t.rwc.Close()
}
func newTunFromFd(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, deviceFd int, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix) (*tun, error) {
@@ -53,11 +32,10 @@ func newTunFromFd(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, deviceFd int, vpnNetworks []netip
file := os.NewFile(uintptr(deviceFd), "/dev/net/tun")
t := &tun{
rwc: file,
fd: deviceFd,
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
l: l,
readBuf: make([]byte, defaultBatchBufSize),
ReadWriteCloser: file,
fd: deviceFd,
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
l: l,
}
err := t.reload(c, true)
@@ -84,7 +62,7 @@ func (t *tun) RoutesFor(ip netip.Addr) routing.Gateways {
return r
}
func (t *tun) Activate() error {
func (t tun) Activate() error {
return nil
}
@@ -121,10 +99,8 @@ func (t *tun) SupportsMultiqueue() bool {
return false
}
func (t *tun) NewMultiQueueReader() error {
return fmt.Errorf("TODO: multiqueue not implemented for android")
func (t *tun) NewMultiQueueReader() (io.ReadWriteCloser, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("TODO: multiqueue not implemented for android")
}
func (t *tun) Readers() []tio.Queue {
return []tio.Queue{t}
}
func (t *tun) TunPrefixLen() int { return 0 }
+29
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
//go:build (darwin || ios || freebsd || openbsd || netbsd) && !e2e_testing
package overlay
import (
"fmt"
"syscall"
)
// StampTunPrefix writes the 4-byte AF_INET / AF_INET6 protocol-family marker into buf[0:4] in place,
// picking the family from the first byte of the IP packet at buf[4].
func StampTunPrefix(buf []byte) error {
if len(buf) < 5 {
return fmt.Errorf("tun write buffer too small for prefix")
}
ipVer := buf[4] >> 4
buf[0] = 0
buf[1] = 0
buf[2] = 0
switch ipVer {
case 4:
buf[3] = syscall.AF_INET
case 6:
buf[3] = syscall.AF_INET6
default:
return fmt.Errorf("unable to determine IP version from packet")
}
return nil
}
-23
View File
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
//go:build (amd64 || arm64) && !e2e_testing
// +build amd64 arm64
// +build !e2e_testing
package overlay
import (
"log/slog"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/wfp"
)
// installInterfaceBypass installs a WFP PERMIT filter scoped to the wintun interface LUID so inbound traffic on the
// nebula adapter bypasses Windows Defender Firewall.
func installInterfaceBypass(l *slog.Logger, luid uint64) closer {
s, err := wfp.PermitInterface(luid)
if err != nil {
l.Warn("Failed to install WFP bypass filters on nebula interface", "error", err)
return nil
}
l.Info("Installed WFP filters bypassing Windows Defender Firewall on nebula interface")
return s
}
-11
View File
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
//go:build !e2e_testing
// +build !e2e_testing
package overlay
import "log/slog"
// installInterfaceBypass is a no-op on windows-386 because we don't currently build for it.
func installInterfaceBypass(_ *slog.Logger, _ uint64) closer {
return nil
}
+13 -69
View File
@@ -11,12 +11,10 @@ import (
"net/netip"
"os"
"sync/atomic"
"syscall"
"unsafe"
"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
netroute "golang.org/x/net/route"
@@ -24,7 +22,7 @@ import (
)
type tun struct {
rwc io.ReadWriteCloser
io.ReadWriteCloser
Device string
vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix
DefaultMTU int
@@ -32,12 +30,6 @@ type tun struct {
routeTree atomic.Pointer[bart.Table[routing.Gateways]]
linkAddr *netroute.LinkAddr
l *slog.Logger
// cache out buffer since we need to prepend 4 bytes for tun metadata
out []byte
readBuf []byte
batchRet [1]tio.Packet
}
type ifReq struct {
@@ -128,12 +120,11 @@ func newTun(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, _ bool) (*t
}
t := &tun{
rwc: os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), ""),
Device: name,
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
DefaultMTU: c.GetInt("tun.mtu", DefaultMTU),
l: l,
readBuf: make([]byte, defaultBatchBufSize),
ReadWriteCloser: os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), ""),
Device: name,
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
DefaultMTU: c.GetInt("tun.mtu", DefaultMTU),
l: l,
}
err = t.reload(c, true)
@@ -163,8 +154,8 @@ func newTunFromFd(_ *config.C, _ *slog.Logger, _ int, _ []netip.Prefix) (*tun, e
}
func (t *tun) Close() error {
if t.rwc != nil {
return t.rwc.Close()
if t.ReadWriteCloser != nil {
return t.ReadWriteCloser.Close()
}
return nil
}
@@ -507,53 +498,6 @@ func delRoute(prefix netip.Prefix, gateway netroute.Addr) error {
return nil
}
func (t *tun) readOne(to []byte) (int, error) {
buf := make([]byte, len(to)+4)
n, err := t.rwc.Read(buf)
copy(to, buf[4:])
return n - 4, err
}
func (t *tun) Read() ([]tio.Packet, error) {
n, err := t.readOne(t.readBuf)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
t.batchRet[0] = tio.Packet{Bytes: t.readBuf[:n]}
return t.batchRet[:], nil
}
// Write is only valid for single threaded use
func (t *tun) Write(from []byte) (int, error) {
buf := t.out
if cap(buf) < len(from)+4 {
buf = make([]byte, len(from)+4)
t.out = buf
}
buf = buf[:len(from)+4]
if len(from) == 0 {
return 0, syscall.EIO
}
// Determine the IP Family for the NULL L2 Header
ipVer := from[0] >> 4
if ipVer == 4 {
buf[3] = syscall.AF_INET
} else if ipVer == 6 {
buf[3] = syscall.AF_INET6
} else {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("unable to determine IP version from packet")
}
copy(buf[4:], from)
n, err := t.rwc.Write(buf)
return n - 4, err
}
func (t *tun) Networks() []netip.Prefix {
return t.vpnNetworks
}
@@ -566,10 +510,10 @@ func (t *tun) SupportsMultiqueue() bool {
return false
}
func (t *tun) NewMultiQueueReader() error {
return fmt.Errorf("TODO: multiqueue not implemented for darwin")
func (t *tun) NewMultiQueueReader() (io.ReadWriteCloser, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("TODO: multiqueue not implemented for darwin")
}
func (t *tun) Readers() []tio.Queue {
return []tio.Queue{t}
}
// TunPrefixLen reports the 4-byte BSD AF_INET / AF_INET6 protocol-family
// marker the kernel prepends on read and expects on write.
func (t *tun) TunPrefixLen() int { return 4 }
+25 -52
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ import (
"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/iputil"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
)
@@ -19,45 +18,9 @@ type disabledTun struct {
vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix
// Track these metrics since we don't have the tun device to do it for us
tx metrics.Counter
rx metrics.Counter
l *slog.Logger
numReaders int
}
// disabledQueue is one tio.Queue view onto a shared disabledTun. Each queue
// owns a private batchRet so concurrent Read calls from different reader
// goroutines do not race on the returned slice.
type disabledQueue struct {
parent *disabledTun
batchRet [1]tio.Packet
}
func (q *disabledQueue) Read() ([]tio.Packet, error) {
r, ok := <-q.parent.read
if !ok {
return nil, io.EOF
}
q.parent.tx.Inc(1)
if q.parent.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
q.parent.l.Debug("Write payload", "raw", prettyPacket(r))
}
q.batchRet[0] = tio.Packet{Bytes: r}
return q.batchRet[:], nil
}
// Write on a queue forwards to the underlying disabledTun. All queues share
// one ICMP-handling/log path so this is a thin pass-through.
func (q *disabledQueue) Write(b []byte) (int, error) {
return q.parent.Write(b)
}
// Close on a queue is a no-op. The shared channel and metrics are owned by
// the disabledTun; Close on the device tears them down once for everybody.
func (q *disabledQueue) Close() error {
return nil
tx metrics.Counter
rx metrics.Counter
l *slog.Logger
}
func newDisabledTun(vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, queueLen int, metricsEnabled bool, l *slog.Logger) *disabledTun {
@@ -65,7 +28,6 @@ func newDisabledTun(vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, queueLen int, metricsEnabled boo
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
read: make(chan []byte, queueLen),
l: l,
numReaders: 1,
}
if metricsEnabled {
@@ -95,6 +57,24 @@ func (*disabledTun) Name() string {
return "disabled"
}
func (t *disabledTun) Read(b []byte) (int, error) {
r, ok := <-t.read
if !ok {
return 0, io.EOF
}
if len(r) > len(b) {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("packet larger than mtu: %d > %d bytes", len(r), len(b))
}
t.tx.Inc(1)
if t.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
t.l.Debug("Write payload", "raw", prettyPacket(r))
}
return copy(b, r), nil
}
func (t *disabledTun) handleICMPEchoRequest(b []byte) bool {
out := make([]byte, len(b))
out = iputil.CreateICMPEchoResponse(b, out)
@@ -130,17 +110,8 @@ func (t *disabledTun) SupportsMultiqueue() bool {
return true
}
func (t *disabledTun) NewMultiQueueReader() error {
t.numReaders++
return nil
}
func (t *disabledTun) Readers() []tio.Queue {
out := make([]tio.Queue, t.numReaders)
for i := range t.numReaders {
out[i] = &disabledQueue{parent: t}
}
return out
func (t *disabledTun) NewMultiQueueReader() (io.ReadWriteCloser, error) {
return t, nil
}
func (t *disabledTun) Close() error {
@@ -165,3 +136,5 @@ func (p prettyPacket) String() string {
return s.String()
}
func (t *disabledTun) TunPrefixLen() int { return 0 }
+120
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
//go:build linux && !android && !e2e_testing
// +build linux,!android,!e2e_testing
package overlay
import (
"errors"
"os"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
// newReadPipe returns a read fd. The matching write fd is registered for cleanup.
// The caller takes ownership of the read fd (pass it to newTunFd / newFriend).
func newReadPipe(t *testing.T) int {
t.Helper()
var fds [2]int
if err := unix.Pipe2(fds[:], unix.O_CLOEXEC); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("pipe2: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = unix.Close(fds[1]) })
return fds[0]
}
func TestTunFile_WakeForShutdown_UnblocksRead(t *testing.T) {
tf, err := newTunFd(newReadPipe(t))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("newTunFd: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = tf.Close() })
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
_, err := tf.Read(make([]byte, 64))
done <- err
}()
// Verify Read is actually blocked in poll.
select {
case err := <-done:
t.Fatalf("Read returned before shutdown signal: %v", err)
case <-time.After(50 * time.Millisecond):
}
if err := tf.wakeForShutdown(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("wakeForShutdown: %v", err)
}
select {
case err := <-done:
if !errors.Is(err, os.ErrClosed) {
t.Fatalf("expected os.ErrClosed, got %v", err)
}
case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("Read did not wake on shutdown")
}
}
func TestTunFile_WakeForShutdown_WakesFriends(t *testing.T) {
parent, err := newTunFd(newReadPipe(t))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("newTunFd: %v", err)
}
friend, err := parent.newFriend(newReadPipe(t))
if err != nil {
_ = parent.Close()
t.Fatalf("newFriend: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
_ = friend.Close()
_ = parent.Close()
})
readers := []*tunFile{parent, friend}
errs := make([]error, len(readers))
var wg sync.WaitGroup
for i, r := range readers {
wg.Add(1)
go func(i int, r *tunFile) {
defer wg.Done()
_, errs[i] = r.Read(make([]byte, 64))
}(i, r)
}
time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
if err := parent.wakeForShutdown(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("wakeForShutdown: %v", err)
}
done := make(chan struct{})
go func() { wg.Wait(); close(done) }()
select {
case <-done:
case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("readers did not wake")
}
for i, err := range errs {
if !errors.Is(err, os.ErrClosed) {
t.Errorf("reader %d: expected os.ErrClosed, got %v", i, err)
}
}
}
func TestTunFile_Close_Idempotent(t *testing.T) {
tf, err := newTunFd(newReadPipe(t))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("newTunFd: %v", err)
}
if err := tf.Close(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first Close: %v", err)
}
if err := tf.Close(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("second Close should be a no-op, got %v", err)
}
}
+23 -66
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
"bytes"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"io/fs"
"log/slog"
"net/netip"
@@ -19,7 +20,7 @@ import (
"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
netroute "golang.org/x/net/route"
@@ -102,9 +103,6 @@ type tun struct {
readPoll [2]unix.PollFd
writePoll [2]unix.PollFd
closed atomic.Bool
readBuf []byte
batchRet [1]tio.Packet
}
// blockOnRead waits until the tun fd is readable or shutdown has been signaled.
@@ -159,84 +157,44 @@ func (t *tun) blockOnWrite() error {
return nil
}
func (t *tun) Read() ([]tio.Packet, error) {
n, err := t.readOne(t.readBuf)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
t.batchRet[0] = tio.Packet{Bytes: t.readBuf[:n]}
return t.batchRet[:], nil
}
func (t *tun) readOne(to []byte) (int, error) {
// first 4 bytes is protocol family, in network byte order
var head [4]byte
iovecs := [2]syscall.Iovec{
{&head[0], 4},
{&to[0], uint64(len(to))},
}
func (t *tun) Read(to []byte) (int, error) {
for {
n, _, errno := syscall.Syscall(syscall.SYS_READV, uintptr(t.fd), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&iovecs[0])), 2)
if errno == 0 {
bytesRead := int(n)
if bytesRead < 4 {
return 0, nil
}
return bytesRead - 4, nil
n, err := unix.Read(t.fd, to)
if err == nil {
return n, nil
}
switch errno {
switch err {
case unix.EAGAIN:
if err := t.blockOnRead(); err != nil {
return 0, err
if berr := t.blockOnRead(); berr != nil {
return 0, berr
}
case unix.EINTR:
// retry
case unix.EBADF:
return 0, os.ErrClosed
default:
return 0, errno
return 0, err
}
}
}
// Write is only valid for single threaded use
func (t *tun) Write(from []byte) (int, error) {
if len(from) <= 1 {
return 0, syscall.EIO
}
ipVer := from[0] >> 4
var head [4]byte
// first 4 bytes is protocol family, in network byte order
switch ipVer {
case 4:
head[3] = syscall.AF_INET
case 6:
head[3] = syscall.AF_INET6
default:
return 0, fmt.Errorf("unable to determine IP version from packet")
}
iovecs := [2]syscall.Iovec{
{&head[0], 4},
{&from[0], uint64(len(from))},
}
for {
n, _, errno := syscall.Syscall(syscall.SYS_WRITEV, uintptr(t.fd), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&iovecs[0])), 2)
if errno == 0 {
return int(n) - 4, nil
n, err := unix.Write(t.fd, from)
if err == nil {
return n, nil
}
switch errno {
switch err {
case unix.EAGAIN:
if err := t.blockOnWrite(); err != nil {
return 0, err
if berr := t.blockOnWrite(); berr != nil {
return 0, berr
}
case unix.EINTR:
// retry
case unix.EBADF:
return 0, os.ErrClosed
default:
return 0, errno
return 0, err
}
}
}
@@ -386,7 +344,6 @@ func newTun(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, _ bool) (*t
MTU: c.GetInt("tun.mtu", DefaultMTU),
l: l,
fd: fd,
readBuf: make([]byte, defaultBatchBufSize),
shutdownR: shutdownR,
shutdownW: shutdownW,
readPoll: [2]unix.PollFd{
@@ -577,8 +534,8 @@ func (t *tun) SupportsMultiqueue() bool {
return false
}
func (t *tun) NewMultiQueueReader() error {
return fmt.Errorf("TODO: multiqueue not implemented for freebsd")
func (t *tun) NewMultiQueueReader() (io.ReadWriteCloser, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("TODO: multiqueue not implemented for freebsd")
}
func (t *tun) addRoutes(logErrors bool) error {
@@ -605,10 +562,6 @@ func (t *tun) addRoutes(logErrors bool) error {
return nil
}
func (t *tun) Readers() []tio.Queue {
return []tio.Queue{t}
}
func (t *tun) removeRoutes(routes []Route) error {
for _, r := range routes {
if !r.Install {
@@ -748,3 +701,7 @@ func getLinkAddr(name string) (*netroute.LinkAddr, error) {
return nil, nil
}
// TunPrefixLen reports the 4-byte BSD AF_INET / AF_INET6 protocol-family
// marker the kernel prepends on read and expects on write.
func (t *tun) TunPrefixLen() int { return 4 }
+9 -92
View File
@@ -4,49 +4,25 @@
package overlay
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/netip"
"os"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"syscall"
"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
)
type tun struct {
rwc io.ReadWriteCloser
io.ReadWriteCloser
vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix
Routes atomic.Pointer[[]Route]
routeTree atomic.Pointer[bart.Table[routing.Gateways]]
l *slog.Logger
readBuf []byte
batchRet [1]tio.Packet
}
func (t *tun) Read() ([]tio.Packet, error) {
n, err := t.rwc.Read(t.readBuf)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
t.batchRet[0] = tio.Packet{Bytes: t.readBuf[:n]}
return t.batchRet[:], nil
}
func (t *tun) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
return t.rwc.Write(p)
}
func (t *tun) Close() error {
return t.rwc.Close()
}
func newTun(_ *config.C, _ *slog.Logger, _ []netip.Prefix, _ bool) (*tun, error) {
@@ -56,10 +32,9 @@ func newTun(_ *config.C, _ *slog.Logger, _ []netip.Prefix, _ bool) (*tun, error)
func newTunFromFd(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, deviceFd int, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix) (*tun, error) {
file := os.NewFile(uintptr(deviceFd), "/dev/tun")
t := &tun{
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
rwc: &tunReadCloser{f: file},
l: l,
readBuf: make([]byte, defaultBatchBufSize),
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
ReadWriteCloser: file,
l: l,
}
err := t.reload(c, true)
@@ -107,64 +82,6 @@ func (t *tun) RoutesFor(ip netip.Addr) routing.Gateways {
return r
}
// The following is hoisted up from water, we do this so we can inject our own fd on iOS
type tunReadCloser struct {
f io.ReadWriteCloser
rMu sync.Mutex
rBuf []byte
wMu sync.Mutex
wBuf []byte
}
func (tr *tunReadCloser) Read(to []byte) (int, error) {
tr.rMu.Lock()
defer tr.rMu.Unlock()
if cap(tr.rBuf) < len(to)+4 {
tr.rBuf = make([]byte, len(to)+4)
}
tr.rBuf = tr.rBuf[:len(to)+4]
n, err := tr.f.Read(tr.rBuf)
copy(to, tr.rBuf[4:])
return n - 4, err
}
func (tr *tunReadCloser) Write(from []byte) (int, error) {
if len(from) == 0 {
return 0, syscall.EIO
}
tr.wMu.Lock()
defer tr.wMu.Unlock()
if cap(tr.wBuf) < len(from)+4 {
tr.wBuf = make([]byte, len(from)+4)
}
tr.wBuf = tr.wBuf[:len(from)+4]
// Determine the IP Family for the NULL L2 Header
ipVer := from[0] >> 4
if ipVer == 4 {
tr.wBuf[3] = syscall.AF_INET
} else if ipVer == 6 {
tr.wBuf[3] = syscall.AF_INET6
} else {
return 0, errors.New("unable to determine IP version from packet")
}
copy(tr.wBuf[4:], from)
n, err := tr.f.Write(tr.wBuf)
return n - 4, err
}
func (tr *tunReadCloser) Close() error {
return tr.f.Close()
}
func (t *tun) Networks() []netip.Prefix {
return t.vpnNetworks
}
@@ -177,10 +94,10 @@ func (t *tun) SupportsMultiqueue() bool {
return false
}
func (t *tun) NewMultiQueueReader() error {
return fmt.Errorf("TODO: multiqueue not implemented for ios")
func (t *tun) NewMultiQueueReader() (io.ReadWriteCloser, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("TODO: multiqueue not implemented for ios")
}
func (t *tun) Readers() []tio.Queue {
return []tio.Queue{t}
}
// TunPrefixLen reports the 4-byte BSD AF_INET / AF_INET6 protocol-family
// marker the kernel prepends on read and expects on write.
func (t *tun) TunPrefixLen() int { return 4 }
+243 -160
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,9 @@
package overlay
import (
"encoding/binary"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/netip"
@@ -17,15 +19,180 @@ import (
"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
"github.com/vishvananda/netlink"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
// tunFile wraps a TUN file descriptor with poll-based reads. The FD provided will be changed to non-blocking.
// A shared eventfd allows Close to wake all readers blocked in poll.
type tunFile struct {
fd int
shutdownFd int
lastOne bool
readPoll [2]unix.PollFd
writePoll [2]unix.PollFd
closed bool
}
// newFriend makes a tunFile for a MultiQueueReader that copies the shutdown eventfd from the parent tun
func (r *tunFile) newFriend(fd int) (*tunFile, error) {
if err := unix.SetNonblock(fd, true); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to set tun fd non-blocking: %w", err)
}
return &tunFile{
fd: fd,
shutdownFd: r.shutdownFd,
readPoll: [2]unix.PollFd{
{Fd: int32(fd), Events: unix.POLLIN},
{Fd: int32(r.shutdownFd), Events: unix.POLLIN},
},
writePoll: [2]unix.PollFd{
{Fd: int32(fd), Events: unix.POLLOUT},
{Fd: int32(r.shutdownFd), Events: unix.POLLIN},
},
}, nil
}
func newTunFd(fd int) (*tunFile, error) {
if err := unix.SetNonblock(fd, true); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to set tun fd non-blocking: %w", err)
}
shutdownFd, err := unix.Eventfd(0, unix.EFD_NONBLOCK|unix.EFD_CLOEXEC)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create eventfd: %w", err)
}
out := &tunFile{
fd: fd,
shutdownFd: shutdownFd,
lastOne: true,
readPoll: [2]unix.PollFd{
{Fd: int32(fd), Events: unix.POLLIN},
{Fd: int32(shutdownFd), Events: unix.POLLIN},
},
writePoll: [2]unix.PollFd{
{Fd: int32(fd), Events: unix.POLLOUT},
{Fd: int32(shutdownFd), Events: unix.POLLIN},
},
}
return out, nil
}
func (r *tunFile) blockOnRead() error {
const problemFlags = unix.POLLHUP | unix.POLLNVAL | unix.POLLERR
var err error
for {
_, err = unix.Poll(r.readPoll[:], -1)
if err != unix.EINTR {
break
}
}
//always reset these!
tunEvents := r.readPoll[0].Revents
shutdownEvents := r.readPoll[1].Revents
r.readPoll[0].Revents = 0
r.readPoll[1].Revents = 0
//do the err check before trusting the potentially bogus bits we just got
if err != nil {
return err
}
if shutdownEvents&(unix.POLLIN|problemFlags) != 0 {
return os.ErrClosed
} else if tunEvents&problemFlags != 0 {
return os.ErrClosed
}
return nil
}
func (r *tunFile) blockOnWrite() error {
const problemFlags = unix.POLLHUP | unix.POLLNVAL | unix.POLLERR
var err error
for {
_, err = unix.Poll(r.writePoll[:], -1)
if err != unix.EINTR {
break
}
}
//always reset these!
tunEvents := r.writePoll[0].Revents
shutdownEvents := r.writePoll[1].Revents
r.writePoll[0].Revents = 0
r.writePoll[1].Revents = 0
//do the err check before trusting the potentially bogus bits we just got
if err != nil {
return err
}
if shutdownEvents&(unix.POLLIN|problemFlags) != 0 {
return os.ErrClosed
} else if tunEvents&problemFlags != 0 {
return os.ErrClosed
}
return nil
}
func (r *tunFile) Read(buf []byte) (int, error) {
for {
if n, err := unix.Read(r.fd, buf); err == nil {
return n, nil
} else if err == unix.EAGAIN {
if err = r.blockOnRead(); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
continue
} else if err == unix.EINTR {
continue
} else if err == unix.EBADF {
return 0, os.ErrClosed
} else {
return 0, err
}
}
}
func (r *tunFile) Write(buf []byte) (int, error) {
for {
if n, err := unix.Write(r.fd, buf); err == nil {
return n, nil
} else if err == unix.EAGAIN {
if err = r.blockOnWrite(); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
continue
} else if err == unix.EINTR {
continue
} else if err == unix.EBADF {
return 0, os.ErrClosed
} else {
return 0, err
}
}
}
func (r *tunFile) wakeForShutdown() error {
var buf [8]byte
binary.NativeEndian.PutUint64(buf[:], 1)
_, err := unix.Write(int(r.readPoll[1].Fd), buf[:])
return err
}
func (r *tunFile) Close() error {
if r.closed { // avoid closing more than once. Technically a fd could get re-used, which would be a problem
return nil
}
r.closed = true
if r.lastOne {
_ = unix.Close(r.shutdownFd)
}
return unix.Close(r.fd)
}
type tun struct {
readers tio.QueueSet
*tunFile
readers []*tunFile
closeLock sync.Mutex
Device string
vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix
@@ -34,14 +201,6 @@ type tun struct {
TXQueueLen int
deviceIndex int
ioctlFd uintptr
vnetHdr bool
// routeFeatureECN, when true, sets RTAX_FEATURE_ECN on every route we
// install for the tun. The kernel then actively negotiates ECN for
// connections destined to those prefixes (equivalent to `ip route
// change ... features ecn`) regardless of net.ipv4.tcp_ecn, so flows
// across the nebula mesh use ECN even when the host default is the
// passive setting (=2). Disable via tunnels.ecn=false.
routeFeatureECN bool
Routes atomic.Pointer[[]Route]
routeTree atomic.Pointer[bart.Table[routing.Gateways]]
@@ -80,9 +239,7 @@ type ifreqQLEN struct {
}
func newTunFromFd(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, deviceFd int, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix) (*tun, error) {
// We don't know what flags the caller opened this fd with and can't turn
// on IFF_VNET_HDR after TUNSETIFF, so skip offload on inherited fds.
t, err := newTunGeneric(c, l, deviceFd, false, false, vpnNetworks)
t, err := newTunGeneric(c, l, deviceFd, vpnNetworks)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -92,105 +249,46 @@ func newTunFromFd(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, deviceFd int, vpnNetworks []netip
return t, nil
}
// openTunDev opens /dev/net/tun, creating the device node first if it's
// missing (docker containers occasionally omit it).
func openTunDev() (int, error) {
fd, err := unix.Open("/dev/net/tun", os.O_RDWR, 0)
if err == nil {
return fd, nil
}
if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
return -1, err
}
if err = os.MkdirAll("/dev/net", 0755); err != nil {
return -1, fmt.Errorf("/dev/net/tun doesn't exist, failed to mkdir -p /dev/net: %w", err)
}
if err = unix.Mknod("/dev/net/tun", unix.S_IFCHR|0600, int(unix.Mkdev(10, 200))); err != nil {
return -1, fmt.Errorf("failed to create /dev/net/tun: %w", err)
}
fd, err = unix.Open("/dev/net/tun", os.O_RDWR, 0)
if err != nil {
return -1, fmt.Errorf("created /dev/net/tun, but still failed: %w", err)
}
return fd, nil
}
// tunSetIff runs TUNSETIFF with the given flags and returns the kernel-chosen
// device name on success.
func tunSetIff(fd int, name string, flags uint16) (string, error) {
var req ifReq
req.Flags = flags
copy(req.Name[:], name)
if err := ioctl(uintptr(fd), uintptr(unix.TUNSETIFF), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&req))); err != nil {
return "", err
}
return strings.Trim(string(req.Name[:]), "\x00"), nil
}
// tsoOffloadFlags are the TUN_F_* bits we ask the kernel to enable when a
// TSO-capable TUN is available. CSUM is required as a prerequisite for TSO.
// TSO_ECN tells the kernel we propagate ECN correctly through coalesce and
// segmentation, so it can deliver superpackets whose seed has CWR/ECE set
// or whose IP-level codepoint is CE.
const tsoOffloadFlags = unix.TUN_F_CSUM | unix.TUN_F_TSO4 | unix.TUN_F_TSO6 | unix.TUN_F_TSO_ECN
// usoOffloadFlags adds UDP Segmentation Offload to tsoOffloadFlags. Requires
// Linux ≥ 6.2; older kernels reject it and we fall back to TCP-only TSO via
// tsoOffloadFlags.
const usoOffloadFlags = tsoOffloadFlags | unix.TUN_F_USO4 | unix.TUN_F_USO6
func newTun(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, multiqueue bool) (*tun, error) {
baseFlags := uint16(unix.IFF_TUN | unix.IFF_NO_PI)
if multiqueue {
baseFlags |= unix.IFF_MULTI_QUEUE
}
nameStr := c.GetString("tun.dev", "")
// First try to enable IFF_VNET_HDR via TUNSETIFF and negotiate TUN_F_*
// offloads via TUNSETOFFLOAD so we can receive TSO/USO superpackets.
// We try TSO+USO first, fall back to TSO-only on kernels without USO
// (Linux < 6.2), and finally give up on virtio headers entirely and
// reopen as a plain TUN if neither offload mask is accepted.
fd, err := openTunDev()
fd, err := unix.Open("/dev/net/tun", os.O_RDWR, 0)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
vnetHdr := true
usoEnabled := false
name, err := tunSetIff(fd, nameStr, baseFlags|unix.IFF_VNET_HDR)
if err != nil {
_ = unix.Close(fd)
vnetHdr = false
} else {
// Try TSO+USO first. On kernels without USO support (Linux < 6.2)
// the ioctl returns EINVAL; fall back to the TCP-only mask before
// giving up on VNET_HDR entirely.
if err = ioctl(uintptr(fd), unix.TUNSETOFFLOAD, uintptr(usoOffloadFlags)); err == nil {
usoEnabled = true
} else if err = ioctl(uintptr(fd), unix.TUNSETOFFLOAD, uintptr(tsoOffloadFlags)); err != nil {
l.Warn("Failed to enable TUN offload (TSO); proceeding without virtio headers", "error", err)
_ = unix.Close(fd)
vnetHdr = false
}
}
// If /dev/net/tun doesn't exist, try to create it (will happen in docker)
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
err = os.MkdirAll("/dev/net", 0755)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("/dev/net/tun doesn't exist, failed to mkdir -p /dev/net: %w", err)
}
err = unix.Mknod("/dev/net/tun", unix.S_IFCHR|0600, int(unix.Mkdev(10, 200)))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create /dev/net/tun: %w", err)
}
if !vnetHdr {
fd, err = openTunDev()
if err != nil {
fd, err = unix.Open("/dev/net/tun", os.O_RDWR, 0)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("created /dev/net/tun, but still failed: %w", err)
}
} else {
return nil, err
}
name, err = tunSetIff(fd, nameStr, baseFlags)
if err != nil {
_ = unix.Close(fd)
return nil, &NameError{Name: nameStr, Underlying: err}
}
var req ifReq
req.Flags = uint16(unix.IFF_TUN | unix.IFF_NO_PI)
if multiqueue {
req.Flags |= unix.IFF_MULTI_QUEUE
}
nameStr := c.GetString("tun.dev", "")
copy(req.Name[:], nameStr)
if err = ioctl(uintptr(fd), uintptr(unix.TUNSETIFF), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&req))); err != nil {
_ = unix.Close(fd)
return nil, &NameError{
Name: nameStr,
Underlying: err,
}
}
name := strings.Trim(string(req.Name[:]), "\x00")
if vnetHdr {
l.Info("TUN offload enabled", "tso", true, "uso", usoEnabled)
}
t, err := newTunGeneric(c, l, fd, vnetHdr, usoEnabled, vpnNetworks)
t, err := newTunGeneric(c, l, fd, vpnNetworks)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -201,34 +299,20 @@ func newTun(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, multiqueue
}
// newTunGeneric does all the stuff common to different tun initialization paths. It will close your files on error.
func newTunGeneric(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, fd int, vnetHdr, usoEnabled bool, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix) (*tun, error) {
var qs tio.QueueSet
var err error
if vnetHdr {
qs, err = tio.NewOffloadQueueSet(usoEnabled)
} else {
qs, err = tio.NewPollQueueSet()
}
func newTunGeneric(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, fd int, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix) (*tun, error) {
tfd, err := newTunFd(fd)
if err != nil {
_ = unix.Close(fd)
return nil, err
}
err = qs.Add(fd)
if err != nil {
_ = unix.Close(fd)
return nil, err
}
t := &tun{
readers: qs,
tunFile: tfd,
readers: []*tunFile{tfd},
closeLock: sync.Mutex{},
vnetHdr: vnetHdr,
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
TXQueueLen: c.GetInt("tun.tx_queue", 500),
useSystemRoutes: c.GetBool("tun.use_system_route_table", false),
useSystemRoutesBufferSize: c.GetInt("tun.use_system_route_table_buffer_size", 0),
routeFeatureECN: c.GetBool("tunnels.ecn", true),
routesFromSystem: map[netip.Prefix]routing.Gateways{},
l: l,
}
@@ -326,38 +410,32 @@ func (t *tun) SupportsMultiqueue() bool {
return true
}
func (t *tun) NewMultiQueueReader() error {
func (t *tun) NewMultiQueueReader() (io.ReadWriteCloser, error) {
t.closeLock.Lock()
defer t.closeLock.Unlock()
fd, err := unix.Open("/dev/net/tun", os.O_RDWR, 0)
if err != nil {
return err
return nil, err
}
flags := uint16(unix.IFF_TUN | unix.IFF_NO_PI | unix.IFF_MULTI_QUEUE)
if t.vnetHdr {
flags |= unix.IFF_VNET_HDR
}
if _, err = tunSetIff(fd, t.Device, flags); err != nil {
var req ifReq
req.Flags = uint16(unix.IFF_TUN | unix.IFF_NO_PI | unix.IFF_MULTI_QUEUE)
copy(req.Name[:], t.Device)
if err = ioctl(uintptr(fd), uintptr(unix.TUNSETIFF), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&req))); err != nil {
_ = unix.Close(fd)
return err
return nil, err
}
if t.vnetHdr {
if err = ioctl(uintptr(fd), unix.TUNSETOFFLOAD, uintptr(tsoOffloadFlags)); err != nil {
_ = unix.Close(fd)
return fmt.Errorf("failed to enable offload on multiqueue tun fd: %w", err)
}
}
err = t.readers.Add(fd)
out, err := t.tunFile.newFriend(fd)
if err != nil {
_ = unix.Close(fd)
return err
return nil, err
}
return nil
t.readers = append(t.readers, out)
return out, nil
}
func (t *tun) RoutesFor(ip netip.Addr) routing.Gateways {
@@ -525,18 +603,6 @@ func (t *tun) setDefaultRoute(cidr netip.Prefix) error {
Table: unix.RT_TABLE_MAIN,
Type: unix.RTN_UNICAST,
}
// Match the metric the kernel uses for its auto-installed connected
// route, so RouteReplace overwrites it in place instead of adding a
// second route at a worse metric. IPv6 connected routes are installed
// at metric 256 (IP6_RT_PRIO_KERN); IPv4 uses 0. Without this, the
// kernel route wins lookups and our MTU / AdvMSS / Features never
// apply on v6.
if cidr.Addr().Is6() {
nr.Priority = 256
}
if t.routeFeatureECN {
nr.Features |= unix.RTAX_FEATURE_ECN
}
err := netlink.RouteReplace(&nr)
if err != nil {
t.l.Warn("Failed to set default route MTU, retrying", "error", err, "cidr", cidr)
@@ -586,9 +652,6 @@ func (t *tun) addRoutes(logErrors bool) error {
if r.Metric > 0 {
nr.Priority = r.Metric
}
if t.routeFeatureECN {
nr.Features |= unix.RTAX_FEATURE_ECN
}
err := netlink.RouteReplace(&nr)
if err != nil {
@@ -806,10 +869,6 @@ func (t *tun) updateRoutes(r netlink.RouteUpdate) {
t.routeTree.Store(newTree)
}
func (t *tun) Readers() []tio.Queue {
return t.readers.Queues()
}
func (t *tun) Close() error {
t.closeLock.Lock()
defer t.closeLock.Unlock()
@@ -819,10 +878,34 @@ func (t *tun) Close() error {
t.routeChan = nil
}
// Signal all readers blocked in poll to wake up and exit
_ = t.tunFile.wakeForShutdown()
if t.ioctlFd > 0 {
_ = unix.Close(int(t.ioctlFd))
t.ioctlFd = 0
}
return t.readers.Close()
for i := range t.readers {
if i == 0 {
continue //we want to close the zeroth reader last
}
err := t.readers[i].Close()
if err != nil {
t.l.Error("error closing tun reader", "reader", i, "error", err)
} else {
t.l.Info("closed tun reader", "reader", i)
}
}
//this is t.readers[0] too
err := t.tunFile.Close()
if err != nil {
t.l.Error("error closing tun reader", "reader", 0, "error", err)
} else {
t.l.Info("closed tun reader", "reader", 0)
}
return err
}
func (t *tun) TunPrefixLen() int { return 0 }
+1 -3
View File
@@ -3,9 +3,7 @@
package overlay
import (
"testing"
)
import "testing"
var runAdvMSSTests = []struct {
name string
+17 -123
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ package overlay
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/netip"
"os"
@@ -16,7 +17,6 @@ import (
"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
netroute "golang.org/x/net/route"
@@ -58,30 +58,14 @@ type addrLifetime struct {
}
type tun struct {
io.ReadWriteCloser
Device string
vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix
MTU int
Routes atomic.Pointer[[]Route]
routeTree atomic.Pointer[bart.Table[routing.Gateways]]
l *slog.Logger
f *os.File
fd int
readBuf []byte
batchRet [1]tio.Packet
}
func (t *tun) Read() ([]tio.Packet, error) {
n, err := t.readOne(t.readBuf)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
t.batchRet[0] = tio.Packet{Bytes: t.readBuf[:n]}
return t.batchRet[:], nil
}
func (t *tun) Readers() []tio.Queue {
return []tio.Queue{t}
}
var deviceNameRE = regexp.MustCompile(`^tun[0-9]+$`)
@@ -112,13 +96,12 @@ func newTun(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, _ bool) (*t
}
t := &tun{
f: os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), ""),
fd: fd,
Device: deviceName,
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
MTU: c.GetInt("tun.mtu", DefaultMTU),
l: l,
readBuf: make([]byte, defaultBatchBufSize),
ReadWriteCloser: os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), ""),
fd: fd,
Device: deviceName,
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
MTU: c.GetInt("tun.mtu", DefaultMTU),
l: l,
}
err = t.reload(c, true)
@@ -137,12 +120,12 @@ func newTun(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, _ bool) (*t
}
func (t *tun) Close() error {
if t.f != nil {
if err := t.f.Close(); err != nil {
if t.ReadWriteCloser != nil {
if err := t.ReadWriteCloser.Close(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error closing tun file: %w", err)
}
// t.f.Close should have handled it for us but let's be extra sure
// Close on the os.File should have handled the fd for us but let's be extra sure
_ = unix.Close(t.fd)
s, err := syscall.Socket(syscall.AF_INET, syscall.SOCK_DGRAM, syscall.IPPROTO_IP)
@@ -158,99 +141,6 @@ func (t *tun) Close() error {
return nil
}
func (t *tun) readOne(to []byte) (int, error) {
rc, err := t.f.SyscallConn()
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to get syscall conn for tun: %w", err)
}
var errno syscall.Errno
var n uintptr
err = rc.Read(func(fd uintptr) bool {
// first 4 bytes is protocol family, in network byte order
head := [4]byte{}
iovecs := []syscall.Iovec{
{&head[0], 4},
{&to[0], uint64(len(to))},
}
n, _, errno = syscall.Syscall(syscall.SYS_READV, fd, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&iovecs[0])), uintptr(2))
if errno.Temporary() {
// We got an EAGAIN, EINTR, or EWOULDBLOCK, go again
return false
}
return true
})
if err != nil {
if err == syscall.EBADF || err.Error() == "use of closed file" {
// Go doesn't export poll.ErrFileClosing but happily reports it to us so here we are
// https://github.com/golang/go/blob/master/src/internal/poll/fd_poll_runtime.go#L121
return 0, os.ErrClosed
}
return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to make read call for tun: %w", err)
}
if errno != 0 {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to make inner read call for tun: %w", errno)
}
// fix bytes read number to exclude header
bytesRead := int(n)
if bytesRead < 0 {
return bytesRead, nil
} else if bytesRead < 4 {
return 0, nil
} else {
return bytesRead - 4, nil
}
}
// Write is only valid for single threaded use
func (t *tun) Write(from []byte) (int, error) {
if len(from) <= 1 {
return 0, syscall.EIO
}
ipVer := from[0] >> 4
var head [4]byte
// first 4 bytes is protocol family, in network byte order
if ipVer == 4 {
head[3] = syscall.AF_INET
} else if ipVer == 6 {
head[3] = syscall.AF_INET6
} else {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("unable to determine IP version from packet")
}
rc, err := t.f.SyscallConn()
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
var errno syscall.Errno
var n uintptr
err = rc.Write(func(fd uintptr) bool {
iovecs := []syscall.Iovec{
{&head[0], 4},
{&from[0], uint64(len(from))},
}
n, _, errno = syscall.Syscall(syscall.SYS_WRITEV, fd, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&iovecs[0])), uintptr(2))
// According to NetBSD documentation for TUN, writes will only return errors in which
// this packet will never be delivered so just go on living life.
return true
})
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
if errno != 0 {
return 0, errno
}
return int(n) - 4, err
}
func (t *tun) addIp(cidr netip.Prefix) error {
if cidr.Addr().Is4() {
var req ifreqAlias4
@@ -411,8 +301,8 @@ func (t *tun) SupportsMultiqueue() bool {
return false
}
func (t *tun) NewMultiQueueReader() error {
return fmt.Errorf("TODO: multiqueue not implemented for netbsd")
func (t *tun) NewMultiQueueReader() (io.ReadWriteCloser, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("TODO: multiqueue not implemented for netbsd")
}
func (t *tun) addRoutes(logErrors bool) error {
@@ -568,3 +458,7 @@ func delRoute(prefix netip.Prefix, gateways []netip.Prefix) error {
return nil
}
// TunPrefixLen reports the 4-byte BSD AF_INET / AF_INET6 protocol-family
// marker the kernel prepends on read and expects on write.
func (t *tun) TunPrefixLen() int { return 4 }
+10
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
//go:build (!darwin && !ios && !freebsd && !openbsd && !netbsd) || e2e_testing
package overlay
// StampTunPrefix is a no-op on platforms whose tun devices have no
// protocol-family marker. WireBuffer only invokes it when its prefixLen
// is non-zero, so this should never be reached on these platforms.
func StampTunPrefix(buf []byte) error {
return nil
}
+17 -70
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ package overlay
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/netip"
"os"
@@ -16,7 +17,6 @@ import (
"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
netroute "golang.org/x/net/route"
@@ -49,28 +49,14 @@ type ifreq struct {
}
type tun struct {
io.ReadWriteCloser
Device string
vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix
MTU int
Routes atomic.Pointer[[]Route]
routeTree atomic.Pointer[bart.Table[routing.Gateways]]
l *slog.Logger
f *os.File
fd int
// cache out buffer since we need to prepend 4 bytes for tun metadata
out []byte
readBuf []byte
batchRet [1]tio.Packet
}
func (t *tun) Read() ([]tio.Packet, error) {
n, err := t.readOne(t.readBuf)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
t.batchRet[0] = tio.Packet{Bytes: t.readBuf[:n]}
return t.batchRet[:], nil
}
var deviceNameRE = regexp.MustCompile(`^tun[0-9]+$`)
@@ -101,13 +87,12 @@ func newTun(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, _ bool) (*t
}
t := &tun{
f: os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), ""),
fd: fd,
Device: deviceName,
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
MTU: c.GetInt("tun.mtu", DefaultMTU),
l: l,
readBuf: make([]byte, defaultBatchBufSize),
ReadWriteCloser: os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), ""),
fd: fd,
Device: deviceName,
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
MTU: c.GetInt("tun.mtu", DefaultMTU),
l: l,
}
err = t.reload(c, true)
@@ -126,55 +111,17 @@ func newTun(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, _ bool) (*t
}
func (t *tun) Close() error {
if t.f != nil {
if err := t.f.Close(); err != nil {
if t.ReadWriteCloser != nil {
if err := t.ReadWriteCloser.Close(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error closing tun file: %w", err)
}
// t.f.Close should have handled it for us but let's be extra sure
// Close on the os.File should have handled the fd for us but let's be extra sure
_ = unix.Close(t.fd)
}
return nil
}
func (t *tun) readOne(to []byte) (int, error) {
buf := make([]byte, len(to)+4)
n, err := t.f.Read(buf)
copy(to, buf[4:])
return n - 4, err
}
// Write is only valid for single threaded use
func (t *tun) Write(from []byte) (int, error) {
buf := t.out
if cap(buf) < len(from)+4 {
buf = make([]byte, len(from)+4)
t.out = buf
}
buf = buf[:len(from)+4]
if len(from) == 0 {
return 0, syscall.EIO
}
// Determine the IP Family for the NULL L2 Header
ipVer := from[0] >> 4
if ipVer == 4 {
buf[3] = syscall.AF_INET
} else if ipVer == 6 {
buf[3] = syscall.AF_INET6
} else {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("unable to determine IP version from packet")
}
copy(buf[4:], from)
n, err := t.f.Write(buf)
return n - 4, err
}
func (t *tun) addIp(cidr netip.Prefix) error {
if cidr.Addr().Is4() {
var req ifreqAlias4
@@ -327,8 +274,8 @@ func (t *tun) SupportsMultiqueue() bool {
return false
}
func (t *tun) NewMultiQueueReader() error {
return fmt.Errorf("TODO: multiqueue not implemented for openbsd")
func (t *tun) NewMultiQueueReader() (io.ReadWriteCloser, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("TODO: multiqueue not implemented for openbsd")
}
func (t *tun) addRoutes(logErrors bool) error {
@@ -379,10 +326,6 @@ func (t *tun) deviceBytes() (o [16]byte) {
return
}
func (t *tun) Readers() []tio.Queue {
return []tio.Queue{t}
}
func addRoute(prefix netip.Prefix, gateways []netip.Prefix) error {
sock, err := unix.Socket(unix.AF_ROUTE, unix.SOCK_RAW, unix.AF_UNSPEC)
if err != nil {
@@ -488,3 +431,7 @@ func delRoute(prefix netip.Prefix, gateways []netip.Prefix) error {
return nil
}
// TunPrefixLen reports the 4-byte BSD AF_INET / AF_INET6 protocol-family
// marker the kernel prepends on read and expects on write.
func (t *tun) TunPrefixLen() int { return 4 }
+5 -23
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ import (
"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
)
@@ -29,8 +28,6 @@ type TestTun struct {
closed atomic.Bool
rxPackets chan []byte // Packets to receive into nebula
TxPackets chan []byte // Packets transmitted outside by nebula
batchRet [1]tio.Packet
}
func newTun(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, _ bool) (*TestTun, error) {
@@ -51,9 +48,6 @@ func newTun(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, _ bool) (*T
l: l,
rxPackets: make(chan []byte, 10),
TxPackets: make(chan []byte, 10),
batchRet: [1]tio.Packet{
tio.Packet{Bytes: make([]byte, udp.MTU)},
},
}, nil
}
@@ -168,17 +162,7 @@ func (t *TestTun) Close() error {
return nil
}
func (t *TestTun) Read() ([]tio.Packet, error) {
t.batchRet[0].Bytes = t.batchRet[0].Bytes[:udp.MTU]
n, err := t.read(t.batchRet[0].Bytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
t.batchRet[0].Bytes = t.batchRet[0].Bytes[:n]
return t.batchRet[:], nil
}
func (t *TestTun) read(b []byte) (int, error) {
func (t *TestTun) Read(b []byte) (int, error) {
p, ok := <-t.rxPackets
if !ok {
return 0, os.ErrClosed
@@ -193,14 +177,12 @@ func (t *TestTun) read(b []byte) (int, error) {
return n, nil
}
func (t *TestTun) Readers() []tio.Queue {
return []tio.Queue{t}
}
func (t *TestTun) SupportsMultiqueue() bool {
return false
}
func (t *TestTun) NewMultiQueueReader() error {
return fmt.Errorf("TODO: multiqueue not implemented")
func (t *TestTun) NewMultiQueueReader() (io.ReadWriteCloser, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("TODO: multiqueue not implemented")
}
func (t *TestTun) TunPrefixLen() int { return 0 }

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