Compare commits

...
Author SHA1 Message Date
Ryan Huber 6826c04103 tun: Separate inside-packet filtering from sending 2026-10-16 21:21:03 +00:00
John Maguire 5bf666dd90 Treat uppercase blocked fingerprints the same as lowercase (#1964)
- Error for invalid on startup 
- Still block the valid blocklist entries when a reload has a bad one
2026-10-16 16:28:37 -04:00
John Maguire 49207da077 Remove the ssh debug profiling commands (#1965)
We plan to move this functionality into the debug socket.
2026-10-16 15:47:56 -04:00
8 changed files with 272 additions and 212 deletions

No files matched your search

+5
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,11 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
## [Unreleased] ## [Unreleased]
### Removed
- The SSH debug server's `start-cpu-profile`, `stop-cpu-profile`, `save-heap-profile`, `save-mutex-profile`, and
`mutex-profile-fraction` commands, and `sshd.sandbox_dir`, which is now ignored if set.
### Fixed ### Fixed
- `create-tunnel -address <ip:port>` panicked on a nil RemoteList and, over the ssh debug server, took nebula - `create-tunnel -address <ip:port>` panicked on a nil RemoteList and, over the ssh debug server, took nebula
+1 -7
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ pki:
cert: /etc/nebula/host.crt cert: /etc/nebula/host.crt
key: /etc/nebula/host.key key: /etc/nebula/host.key
# blocklist is a list of certificate fingerprints that we will refuse to talk to # blocklist is a list of certificate fingerprints that we will refuse to talk to
# Entries are the hex fingerprints shown by `nebula-cert print`, an invalid entry fails startup and reload.
#blocklist: #blocklist:
# - c99d4e650533b92061b09918e838a5a0a6aaee21eed1d12fd937682865936c72 # - c99d4e650533b92061b09918e838a5a0a6aaee21eed1d12fd937682865936c72
# disconnect_invalid is a toggle to force a client to be disconnected if the certificate is expired or invalid. # disconnect_invalid is a toggle to force a client to be disconnected if the certificate is expired or invalid.
@@ -232,13 +233,6 @@ punchy:
# Trusted SSH CA public keys. These are the public keys of the CAs that are allowed to sign SSH keys for access. # Trusted SSH CA public keys. These are the public keys of the CAs that are allowed to sign SSH keys for access.
#trusted_cas: #trusted_cas:
#- "ssh public key string" #- "ssh public key string"
# sandbox_dir restricts file paths for profiling commands (start-cpu-profile, save-heap-profile,
# save-mutex-profile) to the specified directory. Relative paths will be resolved within this directory,
# and absolute paths outside of it will be rejected. Default is $TMP/nebula-debug.
# The directory is NOT automatically created.
# Overriding this to "" is the same as "/" and will allow overwriting any path on the host.
# Not reloadable.
#sandbox_dir: /var/tmp/nebula-debug
# EXPERIMENTAL: relay support for networks that can't establish direct connections. # EXPERIMENTAL: relay support for networks that can't establish direct connections.
relay: relay:
+23 -14
View File
@@ -18,12 +18,20 @@ import (
) )
func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(pkt tio.Packet, fwPacket *firewall.ParsedPacket, nb []byte, sendBatch *batch.SendBatch, rejectBuf []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) { func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(pkt tio.Packet, fwPacket *firewall.ParsedPacket, nb []byte, sendBatch *batch.SendBatch, rejectBuf []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
if hostinfo := f.filterInsidePacket(pkt, fwPacket, rejectBuf, q, localCache); hostinfo != nil {
f.sendInsideMessage(hostinfo, pkt, nb, sendBatch)
}
}
// filterInsidePacket parses and filters pkt, handling local traffic, destination lookup, pending handshakes and
// the outbound firewall. It returns the hostinfo to send pkt to, or nil when pkt was dropped, rejected, forwarded
// to self or cached for a pending handshake.
func (f *Interface) filterInsidePacket(pkt tio.Packet, fwPacket *firewall.ParsedPacket, rejectBuf []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) *HostInfo {
// borrowed: pkt.Bytes is owned by the originating tio.Queue and is // borrowed: pkt.Bytes is owned by the originating tio.Queue and is
// only valid until the next Read on that queue. Every consumer below // only valid until the next Read on that queue. Filtering and sending
// (parse, self-forward, handshake cache, sendInsideMessage) reads it // must finish before then. Self-forwarding writes synchronously and the
// synchronously; do not retain pkt outside this call. If a future // handshake cache copies each segment. To retain the packet beyond the
// caller needs to keep the packet, use pkt.Clone() to detach it from // next Read, use pkt.Clone() to detach it from the borrow.
// the borrow.
// //
// pkt.Bytes is either one IP datagram (GSO zero) or a TSO/USO // pkt.Bytes is either one IP datagram (GSO zero) or a TSO/USO
// superpacket. In both cases the L3+L4 headers at the start describe // superpacket. In both cases the L3+L4 headers at the start describe
@@ -38,13 +46,13 @@ func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(pkt tio.Packet, fwPacket *firewall.Parse
"error", err, "error", err,
) )
} }
return return nil
} }
// Ignore local broadcast packets // Ignore local broadcast packets
if f.dropLocalBroadcast { if f.dropLocalBroadcast {
if f.myBroadcastAddrsTable.Contains(fwPacket.RemoteAddr) { if f.myBroadcastAddrsTable.Contains(fwPacket.RemoteAddr) {
return return nil
} }
} }
@@ -71,12 +79,12 @@ func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(pkt tio.Packet, fwPacket *firewall.Parse
} }
// Otherwise, drop. On linux, we should never see these packets - Linux // Otherwise, drop. On linux, we should never see these packets - Linux
// routes packets from the nebula addr to the nebula addr through the loopback device. // routes packets from the nebula addr to the nebula addr through the loopback device.
return return nil
} }
// Ignore multicast packets // Ignore multicast packets
if f.dropMulticast && fwPacket.RemoteAddr.IsMulticast() { if f.dropMulticast && fwPacket.RemoteAddr.IsMulticast() {
return return nil
} }
hostinfo, ready := f.getOrHandshakeConsiderRouting(&fwPacket.Packet, func(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) { hostinfo, ready := f.getOrHandshakeConsiderRouting(&fwPacket.Packet, func(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) {
@@ -103,17 +111,18 @@ func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(pkt tio.Packet, fwPacket *firewall.Parse
"fwPacket", fwPacket, "fwPacket", fwPacket,
) )
} }
return return nil
} }
if !ready { if !ready {
return return nil
} }
dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(fwPacket.Packet, false, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), localCache) dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(fwPacket.Packet, false, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), localCache)
if dropReason == nil { if dropReason == nil {
f.sendInsideMessage(hostinfo, pkt, nb, sendBatch) return hostinfo
} else { }
f.rejectInside(packet, rejectBuf, q) f.rejectInside(packet, rejectBuf, q)
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) { if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("dropping outbound packet", hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("dropping outbound packet",
@@ -121,7 +130,7 @@ func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(pkt tio.Packet, fwPacket *firewall.Parse
"reason", dropReason, "reason", dropReason,
) )
} }
} return nil
} }
func (f *Interface) sendInsideEncrypt(hostinfo *HostInfo, ci *ConnectionState, seg, scratch, nb []byte) []byte { func (f *Interface) sendInsideEncrypt(hostinfo *HostInfo, ci *ConnectionState, seg, scratch, nb []byte) []byte {
+180
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
package nebula
import (
"net/netip"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/batch"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/overlaytest"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func newInsideFilterTestInterface(t *testing.T, allow bool) (*Interface, *HostInfo, *capturingTun) {
t.Helper()
local := netip.MustParseAddr("192.0.2.1")
remote := netip.MustParseAddr("192.0.2.2")
f, tun := newSelfForwardInterface(local)
f.inside = overlaytest.NoopTun{}
f.myVpnNetworksTable = &bart.Lite{}
f.myVpnNetworksTable.Insert(netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.0/24"))
f.myBroadcastAddrsTable.Insert(netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.255/32"))
f.dropLocalBroadcast, f.dropMulticast = true, true
localCert := &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1, networks: []netip.Prefix{netip.PrefixFrom(local, 24)}}
peerCert := &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1, networks: []netip.Prefix{netip.PrefixFrom(remote, 24)}}
f.firewall = NewFirewall(f.l, time.Minute, time.Minute, time.Minute, localCert)
if allow {
require.NoError(t, f.firewall.AddRule(false, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"any"}, "", "", "", "", ""))
}
f.pki = &PKI{}
f.pki.caPool.Store(cert.NewCAPool())
f.hostMap = newHostMap(f.l)
f.lightHouse = newTestLighthouse()
f.lightHouse.amLighthouse = true // Keep destination lookup from probing other remotes.
f.handshakeManager = NewHandshakeManager(f.l, f.hostMap, f.lightHouse, udp.NoopConn{}, defaultHandshakeConfig)
f.handshakeManager.f = f
f.connectionManager = &connectionManager{intf: f}
h := &HostInfo{
vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{remote},
ConnectionState: &ConnectionState{
peerCert: &cert.CachedCertificate{Certificate: peerCert},
},
}
f.hostMap.Hosts[remote] = h
return f, h, tun
}
func TestFilterInsidePacket(t *testing.T) {
local := netip.MustParseAddr("192.0.2.1")
remote := netip.MustParseAddr("192.0.2.2")
for _, tt := range []struct {
name string
packet []byte
allow bool
reject bool
ready bool
writes int
}{
{name: "allowed", packet: buildIPv4(local, remote, tcpSyn), allow: true, ready: true},
{name: "malformed", packet: []byte{0x45}, allow: true},
{name: "broadcast", packet: buildIPv4(local, netip.MustParseAddr("192.0.2.255"), udpDatagram), allow: true},
{name: "multicast", packet: buildIPv4(local, netip.MustParseAddr("224.0.0.1"), udpDatagram), allow: true},
{name: "firewall drop", packet: buildIPv4(local, remote, tcpSyn)},
{name: "firewall reject", packet: buildIPv4(local, remote, tcpSyn), reject: true, writes: 1},
{name: "unroutable drop", packet: buildIPv4(local, netip.MustParseAddr("198.51.100.1"), tcpSyn), allow: true},
{name: "unroutable reject", packet: buildIPv4(local, netip.MustParseAddr("198.51.100.1"), tcpSyn), allow: true, reject: true, writes: 1},
} {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
f, h, tun := newInsideFilterTestInterface(t, tt.allow)
f.firewall.OutboundSendReject = tt.reject
fp := &firewall.ParsedPacket{}
got := f.filterInsidePacket(tio.Packet{Bytes: tt.packet}, fp, make([]byte, mtu), 0, nil)
if tt.ready {
require.Same(t, h, got)
assert.Equal(t, local, fp.LocalAddr)
assert.Equal(t, remote, fp.RemoteAddr)
} else {
require.Nil(t, got)
}
assert.Zero(t, h.ConnectionState.messageCounter.Load(), "filtering must not allocate encryption counters")
assert.False(t, h.sentSinceCheck(), "filtering must not mark outbound traffic")
require.Len(t, tun.writes, tt.writes)
if tt.writes > 0 {
require.GreaterOrEqual(t, len(tun.writes[0]), 40)
assert.Equal(t, tt.packet[16:20], tun.writes[0][12:16])
assert.Equal(t, tt.packet[12:16], tun.writes[0][16:20])
assert.NotZero(t, tun.writes[0][33]&0x04, "reject must carry a TCP reset")
}
})
}
}
func TestFilterInsidePacketSelf(t *testing.T) {
local := netip.MustParseAddr("192.0.2.1")
f, _, tun := newInsideFilterTestInterface(t, true)
pkt := buildIPv4(local, local, tcpSyn)
require.Nil(t, f.filterInsidePacket(tio.Packet{Bytes: pkt}, &firewall.ParsedPacket{}, nil, 0, nil))
if immediatelyForwardToSelf {
require.Len(t, tun.writes, 1)
assert.Equal(t, pkt, tun.writes[0])
} else {
assert.Empty(t, tun.writes)
}
}
func TestFilterInsidePacketPendingHandshake(t *testing.T) {
f, h, tun := newInsideFilterTestInterface(t, true)
remote := h.vpnAddrs[0]
delete(f.hostMap.Hosts, remote)
hh := &HandshakeHostInfo{hostinfo: h}
f.handshakeManager.vpnIps[remote] = hh
pkt := buildIPv4(netip.MustParseAddr("192.0.2.1"), remote, udpDatagram)
want := append([]byte(nil), pkt...)
require.Nil(t, f.filterInsidePacket(tio.Packet{Bytes: pkt}, &firewall.ParsedPacket{}, nil, 0, nil))
require.Len(t, hh.packetStore, 1)
clear(pkt)
assert.Equal(t, want, hh.packetStore[0].packet, "the handshake cache must own its packet")
assert.Equal(t, header.Message, hh.packetStore[0].messageType)
assert.Empty(t, tun.writes)
assert.Zero(t, h.ConnectionState.messageCounter.Load())
}
type insideFilterConn struct {
udp.NoopConn
packets [][]byte
}
func (c *insideFilterConn) WriteBatch(bufs [][]byte, _ []netip.AddrPort) (int, error) {
for _, b := range bufs {
c.packets = append(c.packets, append([]byte(nil), b...))
}
return len(bufs), nil
}
func TestConsumeInsidePacketFilterAndSend(t *testing.T) {
for _, allow := range []bool{false, true} {
t.Run(map[bool]string{false: "denied", true: "allowed"}[allow], func(t *testing.T) {
f, h, _ := newInsideFilterTestInterface(t, allow)
initR, respR := runTestHandshake(t)
ci, err := newConnectionStateFromResult(initR)
require.NoError(t, err)
rci, err := newConnectionStateFromResult(respR)
require.NoError(t, err)
ci.peerCert = h.ConnectionState.peerCert
h.ConnectionState = ci
h.remoteIndexId = 100
remote := netip.MustParseAddrPort("198.51.100.2:4242")
h.remote.Store(&remote)
conn := &insideFilterConn{}
sb := batch.NewSendBatch(conn, 1, mtu)
pkt := buildIPv4(netip.MustParseAddr("192.0.2.1"), h.vpnAddrs[0], udpDatagram)
before := ci.messageCounter.Load()
f.consumeInsidePacket(tio.Packet{Bytes: pkt}, &firewall.ParsedPacket{}, make([]byte, 12), sb, nil, 0, nil)
_, err = sb.Flush()
require.NoError(t, err)
if !allow {
assert.Empty(t, conn.packets)
assert.Equal(t, before, ci.messageCounter.Load())
assert.False(t, h.sentSinceCheck())
return
}
require.Len(t, conn.packets, 1)
assert.True(t, h.sentSinceCheck())
hdr := &header.H{}
require.NoError(t, hdr.Parse(conn.packets[0]))
assert.Equal(t, header.Message, hdr.Type)
assert.Equal(t, h.remoteIndexId, hdr.RemoteIndex)
assert.Equal(t, before+1, hdr.MessageCounter)
plain, err := rci.Decrypt(f.l, hdr.MessageCounter, conn.packets[0], make([]byte, 12))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, pkt, plain)
})
}
}
+19 -4
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,9 @@ package nebula
import ( import (
"crypto/fips140" "crypto/fips140"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/binary" "encoding/binary"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json" "encoding/json"
"errors" "errors"
"fmt" "fmt"
@@ -233,12 +235,14 @@ func (p *PKI) reloadCerts(c *config.C, initial bool) *util.ContextualError {
func (p *PKI) reloadCAPool(c *config.C) *util.ContextualError { func (p *PKI) reloadCAPool(c *config.C) *util.ContextualError {
caPool, err := loadCAPoolFromConfig(p.l, c) caPool, err := loadCAPoolFromConfig(p.l, c)
if caPool != nil {
p.caPool.Store(caPool)
p.l.Debug("Trusted CA fingerprints", "fingerprints", caPool.GetFingerprints())
}
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return util.NewContextualError("Failed to load ca from config", nil, err) return util.NewContextualError("Failed to load ca from config", nil, err)
} }
p.caPool.Store(caPool)
p.l.Debug("Trusted CA fingerprints", "fingerprints", caPool.GetFingerprints())
return nil return nil
} }
@@ -613,11 +617,22 @@ func loadCAPoolFromConfig(l *slog.Logger, c *config.C) (*cert.CAPool, error) {
bl := c.GetStringSlice("pki.blocklist", []string{}) bl := c.GetStringSlice("pki.blocklist", []string{})
if len(bl) > 0 { if len(bl) > 0 {
for _, fp := range bl { var bad []string
for i, raw := range bl {
// Fingerprints are compared as lowercase hex strings, a malformed entry would silently block nothing
fp := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(raw))
if b, err := hex.DecodeString(fp); err != nil || len(b) != sha256.Size {
bad = append(bad, fmt.Sprintf("entry %d %q", i+1, raw))
continue
}
caPool.BlocklistFingerprint(fp) caPool.BlocklistFingerprint(fp)
} }
l.Info("Blocklisted certificates", "fingerprintCount", len(bl)) l.Info("Blocklisted certificates", "fingerprintCount", len(bl)-len(bad))
if len(bad) > 0 {
// The valid entries are still returned so a failed reload blocks them, startup refuses the error
return caPool, fmt.Errorf("pki.blocklist entries are not hex certificate fingerprints: %s", strings.Join(bad, ", "))
}
} }
return caPool, nil return caPool, nil
+43
View File
@@ -217,3 +217,46 @@ func TestPKIReloadChachapolyInFIPSOnlyFails(t *testing.T) {
assert.True(t, res.Failed) assert.True(t, res.Failed)
assert.False(t, res.RestartRequired) assert.False(t, res.RestartRequired)
} }
func TestLoadCAPoolBlocklist(t *testing.T) {
ca, _, caKey, caPEM := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil)
crt, _, _, _ := cert_test.NewTestCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, ca, caKey, "host", time.Time{}, time.Time{}, []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.1.0.2/24")}, nil, nil)
fp, err := crt.Fingerprint()
require.NoError(t, err)
load := func(entry string) (*cert.CAPool, error) {
c := config.NewC(test.NewLogger())
require.NoError(t, c.LoadString(fmt.Sprintf("pki:\n ca: %q\n blocklist:\n - %q\n", caPEM, entry)))
return loadCAPoolFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), c)
}
for _, entry := range []string{fp, strings.ToUpper(fp), " " + fp + "\t"} {
pool, err := load(entry)
require.NoError(t, err, entry)
assert.True(t, pool.IsBlocklisted(fp), entry)
}
for _, entry := range []string{fp[1:], fp + "00", "sha256:" + fp, "zz" + fp[2:], ""} {
_, err := load(entry)
require.Error(t, err, entry)
}
// A bad entry on reload fails it, the valid entries are still blocked
_, _, keyPEM, certPEM := cert_test.NewTestCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, ca, caKey, "me", time.Time{}, time.Time{}, []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.1.0.1/24")}, nil, nil)
pkiConfig := func(entry string) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("pki:\n ca: %q\n cert: %q\n key: %q\n blocklist:\n - %q\n", caPEM, certPEM, keyPEM, entry)
}
c := config.NewC(test.NewLogger())
require.NoError(t, c.LoadString(pkiConfig(fp)))
p, err := NewPKIFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), c)
require.NoError(t, err)
other, _, _, _ := cert_test.NewTestCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, ca, caKey, "other", time.Time{}, time.Time{}, []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.1.0.3/24")}, nil, nil)
otherFp, err := other.Fingerprint()
require.NoError(t, err)
res := c.ReloadConfigString(pkiConfig(fp) + fmt.Sprintf(" - %q\n - %q\n", otherFp, fp[1:]))
assert.True(t, res.Failed)
assert.True(t, p.GetCAPool().IsBlocklisted(fp))
assert.True(t, p.GetCAPool().IsBlocklisted(otherFp))
}
+1 -175
View File
@@ -11,12 +11,8 @@ import (
"net" "net"
"net/netip" "net/netip"
"os" "os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"runtime/pprof"
"slices" "slices"
"sort" "sort"
"strconv"
"strings" "strings"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config" "github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
@@ -60,8 +56,6 @@ type sshDeviceInfoFlags struct {
func wireSSHReload(l *slog.Logger, ssh *sshd.SSHServer, c *config.C) { func wireSSHReload(l *slog.Logger, ssh *sshd.SSHServer, c *config.C) {
c.RegisterReloadCallback(func(c *config.C, r *config.Reload) { c.RegisterReloadCallback(func(c *config.C, r *config.Reload) {
// sshd.sandbox_dir is read once, when the commands are attached
r.RestartRequiredIfChanged("sshd.sandbox_dir")
if c.GetBool("sshd.enabled", false) { if c.GetBool("sshd.enabled", false) {
// Restarting the server drops every open session, the one that asked for this reload included. Only restart // Restarting the server drops every open session, the one that asked for this reload included. Only restart
// when it isn't running or its config changed. The host key file can change under the same config, new // when it isn't running or its config changed. The host key file can change under the same config, new
@@ -93,8 +87,7 @@ func wireSSHReload(l *slog.Logger, ssh *sshd.SSHServer, c *config.C) {
}) })
} }
// sshdServerKeys are what configSSH reads. sshd.sandbox_dir isn't one, it's read once at startup and restarting the // sshdServerKeys are what configSSH reads
// server doesn't apply it
var sshdServerKeys = []string{"sshd.enabled", "sshd.listen", "sshd.host_key", "sshd.trusted_cas", "sshd.authorized_users"} var sshdServerKeys = []string{"sshd.enabled", "sshd.listen", "sshd.host_key", "sshd.trusted_cas", "sshd.authorized_users"}
// loadSSHHostKey returns sshd.host_key, read from its file when it names one. // loadSSHHostKey returns sshd.host_key, read from its file when it names one.
@@ -236,12 +229,6 @@ func configSSH(l *slog.Logger, ssh *sshd.SSHServer, c *config.C, r *config.Reloa
} }
func attachCommands(l *slog.Logger, c *config.C, ssh *sshd.SSHServer, f *Interface) { func attachCommands(l *slog.Logger, c *config.C, ssh *sshd.SSHServer, f *Interface) {
// sandboxDir defaults to a dir in temp. The intention is that end user will
// create this dir as needed. Overriding this config value to "" allows
// writing to anywhere in the system.
defaultDir := filepath.Join(os.TempDir(), "nebula-debug")
sandboxDir := c.GetString("sshd.sandbox_dir", defaultDir)
ssh.RegisterCommand(&sshd.Command{ ssh.RegisterCommand(&sshd.Command{
Name: "list-hostmap", Name: "list-hostmap",
ShortDescription: "List all known previously connected hosts", ShortDescription: "List all known previously connected hosts",
@@ -297,45 +284,6 @@ func attachCommands(l *slog.Logger, c *config.C, ssh *sshd.SSHServer, f *Interfa
}, },
}) })
ssh.RegisterCommand(&sshd.Command{
Name: "start-cpu-profile",
ShortDescription: "Starts a cpu profile and write output to the provided file, ex: `cpu-profile.pb.gz`",
Callback: func(fs any, a []string, w sshd.StringWriter) error {
return sshStartCpuProfile(sandboxDir, fs, a, w)
},
})
ssh.RegisterCommand(&sshd.Command{
Name: "stop-cpu-profile",
ShortDescription: "Stops a cpu profile and writes output to the previously provided file",
Callback: func(fs any, a []string, w sshd.StringWriter) error {
pprof.StopCPUProfile()
return w.WriteLine("If a CPU profile was running it is now stopped")
},
})
ssh.RegisterCommand(&sshd.Command{
Name: "save-heap-profile",
ShortDescription: "Saves a heap profile to the provided path, ex: `heap-profile.pb.gz`",
Callback: func(fs any, a []string, w sshd.StringWriter) error {
return sshGetHeapProfile(sandboxDir, fs, a, w)
},
})
ssh.RegisterCommand(&sshd.Command{
Name: "mutex-profile-fraction",
ShortDescription: "Gets or sets runtime.SetMutexProfileFraction",
Callback: sshMutexProfileFraction,
})
ssh.RegisterCommand(&sshd.Command{
Name: "save-mutex-profile",
ShortDescription: "Saves a mutex profile to the provided path, ex: `mutex-profile.pb.gz`",
Callback: func(fs any, a []string, w sshd.StringWriter) error {
return sshGetMutexProfile(sandboxDir, fs, a, w)
},
})
ssh.RegisterCommand(&sshd.Command{ ssh.RegisterCommand(&sshd.Command{
Name: "log-level", Name: "log-level",
ShortDescription: "Gets or sets the current log level", ShortDescription: "Gets or sets the current log level",
@@ -566,58 +514,6 @@ func sshListLighthouseMap(lightHouse *LightHouse, a any, w sshd.StringWriter) er
return nil return nil
} }
// sshSanitizeFilePath validates that the given file path is within the sandbox directory.
// If sandboxDir is empty, the path is returned as-is for backwards compatibility.
func sshSanitizeFilePath(sandboxDir, filePath string) (string, error) {
if sandboxDir == "" {
return filePath, nil
}
// Clean and resolve the path relative to the sandbox directory
if !filepath.IsAbs(filePath) {
filePath = filepath.Join(sandboxDir, filePath)
}
cleaned := filepath.Clean(filePath)
// Ensure the resolved path is within the sandbox directory
cleanedSandbox := filepath.Clean(sandboxDir)
if cleaned == cleanedSandbox {
return "", fmt.Errorf("path %q resolves to the sandbox directory itself %q", filePath, sandboxDir)
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(cleaned, cleanedSandbox+string(filepath.Separator)) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("path %q is outside the sandbox directory %q", filePath, sandboxDir)
}
return cleaned, nil
}
func sshStartCpuProfile(sandboxDir string, fs any, a []string, w sshd.StringWriter) error {
if len(a) == 0 {
err := w.WriteLine("No path to write profile provided")
return err
}
filePath, err := sshSanitizeFilePath(sandboxDir, a[0])
if err != nil {
return w.WriteLine(err.Error())
}
file, err := os.Create(filePath)
if err != nil {
err = w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Unable to create profile file: %s", err))
return err
}
err = pprof.StartCPUProfile(file)
if err != nil {
err = w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Unable to start cpu profile: %s", err))
return err
}
err = w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Started cpu profile, issue stop-cpu-profile to write the output to %s", a))
return err
}
func sshVersion(ifce *Interface, fs any, a []string, w sshd.StringWriter) error { func sshVersion(ifce *Interface, fs any, a []string, w sshd.StringWriter) error {
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("%s", ifce.version)) return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("%s", ifce.version))
} }
@@ -770,76 +666,6 @@ func sshChangeRemote(ifce *Interface, fs any, a []string, w sshd.StringWriter) e
return w.WriteLine("Changed") return w.WriteLine("Changed")
} }
func sshGetHeapProfile(sandboxDir string, fs any, a []string, w sshd.StringWriter) error {
if len(a) == 0 {
return w.WriteLine("No path to write profile provided")
}
filePath, err := sshSanitizeFilePath(sandboxDir, a[0])
if err != nil {
return w.WriteLine(err.Error())
}
file, err := os.Create(filePath)
if err != nil {
err = w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Unable to create profile file: %s", err))
return err
}
err = pprof.WriteHeapProfile(file)
if err != nil {
err = w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Unable to write profile: %s", err))
return err
}
err = w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Mem profile created at %s", a))
return err
}
func sshMutexProfileFraction(fs any, a []string, w sshd.StringWriter) error {
if len(a) == 0 {
rate := runtime.SetMutexProfileFraction(-1)
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Current value: %d", rate))
}
newRate, err := strconv.Atoi(a[0])
if err != nil {
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Invalid argument: %s", a[0]))
}
oldRate := runtime.SetMutexProfileFraction(newRate)
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("New value: %d. Old value: %d", newRate, oldRate))
}
func sshGetMutexProfile(sandboxDir string, fs any, a []string, w sshd.StringWriter) error {
if len(a) == 0 {
return w.WriteLine("No path to write profile provided")
}
filePath, err := sshSanitizeFilePath(sandboxDir, a[0])
if err != nil {
return w.WriteLine(err.Error())
}
file, err := os.Create(filePath)
if err != nil {
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Unable to create profile file: %s", err))
}
defer file.Close()
mutexProfile := pprof.Lookup("mutex")
if mutexProfile == nil {
return w.WriteLine("Unable to get pprof.Lookup(\"mutex\")")
}
err = mutexProfile.WriteTo(file, 0)
if err != nil {
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Unable to write profile: %s", err))
}
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Mutex profile created at %s", a))
}
func sshLogLevel(l *slog.Logger, fs any, a []string, w sshd.StringWriter) error { func sshLogLevel(l *slog.Logger, fs any, a []string, w sshd.StringWriter) error {
ctrl, ok := l.Handler().(interface { ctrl, ok := l.Handler().(interface {
GetLevel() slog.Level GetLevel() slog.Level
-12
View File
@@ -165,18 +165,6 @@ func TestSSHDReload_ChangedConfigRestarts(t *testing.T) {
} }
} }
// sandbox_dir is only read at startup, restarting sshd for it would drop every session and still not apply it
func TestSSHDReload_SandboxDirKeepsSessions(t *testing.T) {
h := newSSHDReloadHarness(t)
client, _ := h.connect(t)
h.extra = " sandbox_dir: " + t.TempDir() + "\n"
res := h.c.ReloadConfigString(h.config())
require.NoError(t, res.Err)
assert.Equal(t, []string{"sshd.sandbox_dir"}, res.RestartKeys)
assert.False(t, dropped(client, 500*time.Millisecond), "sshd was restarted")
}
// The config can stay the same while the host key file it names changes. New connections get the new key, open // The config can stay the same while the host key file it names changes. New connections get the new key, open
// sessions are left alone // sessions are left alone
func TestSSHDReload_ChangedHostKeyFile(t *testing.T) { func TestSSHDReload_ChangedHostKeyFile(t *testing.T) {