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# Post-quantum handshake transport compared with QUIC
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Status: analysis, 2026-10-14. Compares the fragment transport in
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[pq-handshake.md](pq-handshake.md) with how QUIC makes its handshake reliable. TLS is out of
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scope; only the transport mechanics are compared.
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## Summary
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QUIC's handshake reliability is closed-loop: the receiver acknowledges, and the sender
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repairs exactly what is missing. Ours is open-loop: repair symbols are sent up front, and a
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timer sends fresh symbols. At handshake sizes (K <= 15) a QUIC-style acknowledgement
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shrinks to a 16-bit bitmap, and with an MDS code to a single count. So the real comparison
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is forward error correction versus acknowledgements, not QUIC versus us.
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FEC is the right core. One piece of feedback is worth adding, initiator to responder and for
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msg2 only (see [Worth taking from QUIC](#worth-taking-from-quic)).
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## What QUIC does
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- **Messages as a stream.** Handshake bytes travel as `CRYPTO` frames (offset and length)
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and are reassembled in order. Initial and Handshake packets each have their own packet
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number space.
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- **Immediate acknowledgements.** Receivers must acknowledge Initial and Handshake packets
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without delay. ACK frames list ranges of received packet numbers.
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- **Loss detection** (RFC 9002). A packet is lost once 3 later packets are acknowledged, or
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after 9/8 of the round-trip time. Lost bytes are resent in new packets.
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- **Probe timeout (PTO).** If a whole flight vanishes, a probe timer fires. Before any RTT
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sample it starts at about 1 s (333 ms initial RTT plus 4x its variance) and doubles each
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time. Both endpoints run it.
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- **Amplification limit and anti-deadlock.** The server may send at most 3x what it
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received until the client's address is validated. The client must keep probing so a
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server stuck at that limit cannot deadlock.
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- **Retry.** A stateless round trip to validate the address. `NEW_TOKEN` lets later
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connections skip it.
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- **Congestion control from the first packet.** The initial window is 10 packets of 1200
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bytes.
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## Side by side
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| | QUIC | pq-handshake |
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|---|---|---|
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| Receiver feedback | ACK ranges, sent immediately | None; the next handshake message is the only acknowledgement |
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| Partial loss | +1 to 2 RTT (ACK, detect, resend) | 0 RTT while at most m symbols are lost |
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| Total loss | PTO: about 1 s, then doubling | Next PQ tick: 300 ms, then 1 s (alternating), or 100/300/600 ms (sticky) |
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| Spurious retransmit | Wasted bytes | Still useful: fresh repair indexes add to what the receiver holds |
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| Reassembly | Every byte offset, in order | Any K of up to 256 symbols |
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| Who retransmits | Both sides on their own timers | Initiator on a timer; the responder resends msg2 only when a repeat msg1 arrives (rate limited) |
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| State from the first packet | Server buffers and acknowledges partial flights | Capped pre-authentication table that never acknowledges |
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| Address validation | Retry, 1 RTT | Cookie under load, 1 RTT |
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From the [simulation results](pq-handshake.md#simulation-results): phase 2 at 5% random
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loss with no FEC completes on the first attempt 39.8% of the time. Under
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acknowledgement-based recovery roughly 60% of handshakes would pay at least one extra round
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trip. With FEC, 0.4% wait for a retry. Spending bandwidth to save round trips is the stated
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design preference, and open-loop recovery delivers it.
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## Where the designs already agree
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- **1200-byte floor and the 3x amplification budget**, both taken directly from QUIC.
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- **Cookie and Retry.** Both cost one round trip and both can be forged by an on-path
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attacker. QUIC's Retry integrity tag uses a fixed, published key.
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- **On-path injection.** QUIC's Initial keys are derived from the client's connection ID,
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which an observer can read, so QUIC accepts the same handshake-blocking injection
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weakness documented for our symbols in
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[Injected symbols](pq-handshake.md#injected-symbols).
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- **Phase 2 msg3 confirmation.** Resending msg3 until any authenticated packet arrives,
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with a `Test` from the responder on completion, is QUIC's handshake confirmation and
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`HANDSHAKE_DONE`.
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## Worth taking from QUIC
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### 1. A msg2 progress probe from the initiator
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This is the main gap. Today, recovering a partially lost msg2 means the initiator resends a
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full msg1 attempt; the responder decodes it, matches it in the answered-msg1 cache, and
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resends msg2. In phase 2 that is about 12 fragments (~13 KB) uploaded just to act as an
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acknowledgement, and recovery waits for the 300 ms or 1 s tick.
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- The initiator already knows the responder's index: msg2 fragments carry it as `FragID`
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(`sendFragmentedResponse` passes `hostinfo.localIndexId`).
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- A one-packet probe, "msg2: have n of K", sent to that index would recover in about one
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round trip. The responder finds it the way phase 2 plans to find msg3.
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- Timing comes for free: msg1 send to first msg2 fragment is an RTT sample. Probe at
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roughly RTT/8 plus the repair delay after the first msg2 fragment if decoding has not
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completed.
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- Forging a probe needs the 32-bit responder index, so only an on-path attacker can, and
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the existing 3x budget bounds the reply.
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- If no msg2 fragment arrived at all, the initiator keeps today's msg1 resend. That is the
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same tail-loss case QUIC's PTO covers.
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The reverse direction, the responder reporting progress on msg1, should not be added. It
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needs per-entry timers on the pre-authentication path, which is exactly the state QUIC
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servers carry and the reason QUIC needs Retry.
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### 2. Buffer early data in phase 2
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QUIC stacks hold a few packets they cannot decrypt yet. The phase 2 plan drops data that
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reaches the responder before msg3 decodes. Because repair fragments trail by
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`handshakes.pq.repair_delay` (10 ms), losing one msg3 data fragment drops about 10 ms of
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the initiator's first data while the repair is in flight. A small queue on the pending
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responder entry, replayed once msg3 verifies, avoids this.
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### 3. Burst size across remotes
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QUIC handshakes on a single path. `handleOutbound` sends the same `now` and `later` sets to
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every known remote and to relays (`StartRelays`).
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- Phase 1 is fine.
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- In phase 2, four remotes means about 48 packets (~54 KB) leaving one uplink at once,
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every PQ tick, about 4x QUIC's initial window.
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- The Gilbert-Elliott simulation treats each path independently, so it does not capture
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this self-inflicted burst on a constrained uplink such as cellular.
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- Options: send the full FEC set only to the most likely remote and a reduced set to the
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others, or interleave packets across remotes.
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## Not worth taking
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- **Packet numbers, ACK ranges, an RTT estimator, loss thresholds, congestion control.**
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QUIC pays for this machinery because it also serves a data transport. Nebula carries
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packets and leaves reliability to the overlay's own transports. Building it only for
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handshakes of at most 15 fragments buys nothing a symbol count cannot.
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- **Offset-based reassembly.** It gives up the any-K-of-256 property and makes spurious
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retransmits wasteful again.
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- **An RTT-adaptive retry timer.** Low value. The fixed 100 ms linear schedule already fires
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sooner than QUIC's 1 s first PTO, and a spurious resend costs bandwidth, not correctness.
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## Conclusion
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Keep FEC as the core and add the msg2 progress probe. That gets QUIC's roughly one round
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trip tail recovery without pre-authentication state, and cuts phase 2's retry cost on the
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uplink by about 10x. Items 2 and 3 are phase 2 concerns; item 1 also helps phase 1.
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@@ -1,348 +0,0 @@
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# Post-quantum handshakes
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Status: draft. Decisions below were made on 2026-10-13; open items are listed at the end.
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Phase 1 is implemented (see [Implementation](#implementation-phase-1)).
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## Goals
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1. **Confidentiality against harvest-now-decrypt-later.** Traffic recorded today must stay
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secret after a cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists. This needs a
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post-quantum key exchange now.
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2. **Post-quantum authentication, later.** Needs certificates whose CA signature and host
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keys are post-quantum. This requires reissuing certificates, so it ships second.
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3. **Never rely on IP fragmentation.** ML-KEM and ML-DSA do not fit in one packet, so the
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handshake must carry messages larger than the path MTU itself.
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Non-goals: identity hiding beyond what IX offers today, and signatures at handshake time.
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The only signature in the system stays the CA signature inside the certificate.
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## Primitives and sizes
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| Primitive | Size |
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|---|---|
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| ML-KEM-1024 encapsulation key | 1568 B |
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| ML-KEM-1024 ciphertext | 1568 B |
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| ML-DSA-87 public key / signature | 2592 B / 4627 B |
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| Today's IX msg1 / msg2 (v2 cert, 151 B) | 252 B / 287 B |
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`crypto/mlkem` is available in Go 1.26 (the current `go.mod`); `crypto/mldsa` arrives in
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Go 1.27 and is only needed for phase 2.
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## Phase 1: ephemeral ML-KEM on today's certificates
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A new handshake subtype, `ix_psk2_mlkem1024` (2), IX-shaped (2 messages; the responder
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completes on msg1 as today), using the flynn/noise `psk2` modifier. The Noise protocol name
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becomes `Noise_IXpsk2_...`, which separates it from the classical subtype.
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- **msg1**: the initiator generates a fresh ML-KEM-1024 key pair and places the
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encapsulation key in `NebulaHandshakeDetails.KEMKey` (field 9). msg1's payload is mixed
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into the Noise transcript, so it cannot be stripped or replaced without msg2 failing.
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With the psk modifier Noise also mixes `e` into the cipher key, so msg1's static key and
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payload are encrypted, though only under a key derived from the public ephemeral.
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- **Responder**: after `ReadMessage(msg1)` it encapsulates to that key, obtaining
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`(ct, ss)`, and calls `HandshakeState.SetPresharedKey(psk)` before writing msg2, with
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`psk = HKDF-Extract(SHA-256, salt = "nebula ix_psk2_mlkem1024 v1", ikm = ss || ct)`.
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The ciphertext is bound in because, unlike the encapsulation key, it is not part of the
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Noise transcript.
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- **msg2** on the wire is `ct || noise_msg2`. The ciphertext travels outside the Noise
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message because the initiator needs `ss` before processing msg2's `psk` token. Any change
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to `ct` yields a different `ss` (ML-KEM implicit rejection) and the handshake fails.
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Transport keys depend on both the X25519 DH outputs and the ML-KEM shared secret.
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Authentication is unchanged and classical. With a minimal v2 certificate msg1 and msg2 are
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about 1.84 KB each, so each travels as 2 data and 2 repair fragments of about 936 bytes.
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A KEM key on the classical subtype, or a missing or malformed one on this subtype, is a fatal
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protocol error; a forged ciphertext only fails that packet.
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## Phase 2: pqIX hybrid with certificate v3
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Certificate v3 is hybrid: the classical static key and CA signature plus a static
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ML-KEM-1024 key and an ML-DSA-87 CA signature. Host authentication is by KEM rather than by
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signature, following PQNoise's pqIX, while keeping the classical DH tokens:
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- **msg1** (I to R): `e, s`, ephemeral ML-KEM key, initiator cert.
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- **msg2** (R to I): `e, s`, ciphertext to I's ephemeral KEM key, ciphertext to I's static
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KEM key, responder cert.
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- **msg3** (I to R): ciphertext to R's static KEM key, plus first data. R authenticates I
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when msg3 decrypts; I authenticates R implicitly when R's first reply decrypts.
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msg3 is about 1.6 KB, 2 data and 2 repair fragments, and adds no new message types:
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- **Responder.** After sending msg2 the responder keeps a pending Machine, found by its
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local index like the initiator's today; this is the multi-message responder support the
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manager lacks now. A repeat msg1 maps to it through the answered-msg1 cache and gets msg2
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resent with fresh symbols, exactly as in phase 1. Until msg3 verifies, data for that
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index is dropped silently: it must not draw a RecvError, which would tear down the
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initiator's new tunnel. On completing it sends an empty `Test`/`TestReply` under the
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new keys, so the initiator hears back even when there is no traffic.
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- **Initiator.** Writing msg3 yields the transport keys, so the hostinfo moves to the main
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hostmap and data flows at once, readable only by the real responder. The handshake entry
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stays behind in a confirming state: each retry tick resends msg3 with fresh symbols until
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any packet from the responder decrypts on the new tunnel, and if that never happens
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within the handshake timeout the tunnel is torn down. Losing msg3 costs the data sent
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behind it, which the overlay's own transport retransmits.
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- msg3's fragments use the responder's index as RemoteIndex and land on the responder's
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|
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pending entry, so they never enter the pre-authentication table.
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|
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|
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The initiator never caches the responder's certificate, so every handshake has three
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messages and carries both full certificates. With ML-DSA-87:
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| Message | Size | Data fragments (k) |
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|---|---|---|
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| msg1 | ~8.2 KB | 8 |
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| msg2 | ~9.8 KB | 9 |
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| msg3 | ~1.6 KB | 2 |
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|
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|
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flynn/noise cannot mix multiple KEM secrets into the chaining key, so phase 2 needs a
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|
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KEM-aware Noise symmetric state written in this repository. Both subtypes coexist.
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|
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|
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Cryptographic review of the hybrid composition will be done by in-house cryptographers.
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## Fragment transport
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### Requirements
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|
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|
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- No IP fragmentation: every datagram's UDP payload is at most 1232 bytes **after** relay
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|
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wrapping (16 B header + 16 B tag), the IPv6 minimum MTU budget also used by DNS Flag Day
|
|
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2020 and Solana's Turbine.
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|
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- Every fragment of a handshake uses the same 5-tuple.
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|
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- Bounded pre-authentication state, bounded amplification, selective loss recovery,
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|
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tolerance of reordering and duplication, and a strictly validated, fuzzable parser.
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|
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|
|
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### Wire format
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|
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|
|
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Every packet of a fragmented handshake subtype is:
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|
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|
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```
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|
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Nebula header (16) Version | Type=Handshake | Subtype | Reserved=0 | RemoteIndex | Counter
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|
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Fragment header (8) FragID u32 | MsgLen u16 | Index u8 | Flags u8
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|
||||||
Cookie (16) only when Flags has 0x01
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|
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Symbol SymbolSize bytes
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|
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```
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|
||||||
|
|
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- `Counter` is the Noise message number (1, 2, 3). `RemoteIndex` is 0 for msg1, as today.
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|
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- `FragID` is the sender's local index (random, non-zero).
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|
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- `MsgLen` is the length of the whole message. Both ends derive the layout from it:
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|
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`K = ceil(MsgLen / 1160)`, `SymbolSize = ceil(MsgLen / K)`. Every symbol has the same
|
|
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size. Room for a cookie is always reserved, so a packet is at most
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|
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16 + 8 + 16 + 1160 = 1200 bytes with or without one.
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|
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- `Index < K` is a data symbol (a slice of the message, the last one zero padded);
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|
||||||
`Index >= K` is a repair symbol.
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|
||||||
- `Flags` bit 0x01 means a cookie follows the fragment header. Other bits must be zero.
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|
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|
|
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A cookie reply, sent by a responder under load, is a bare 32 byte packet:
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|
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|
|
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```
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|
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Nebula header (16) Version | Type=Handshake | Subtype | Reserved=0 | RemoteIndex=FragID | Counter=0
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|
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Cookie (16)
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|
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```
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|
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|
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It names the initiator's FragID, so the initiator finds its attempt the same way it finds
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|
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msg2.
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|
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### Forward error correction
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|
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|
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Messages are protected with a systematic Reed-Solomon code over GF(2^8), implemented in
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|
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`handshake/fec`:
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|
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|
|
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- The repair rows form a Cauchy matrix, `coefficient(row, col) = 1 / (row XOR col)` with
|
|
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`row >= K > col`, so every square submatrix is invertible and **any K distinct symbols
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|
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reconstruct the message**. Naive identity-over-Vandermonde constructions are not MDS
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|
||||||
(the PAR1 flaw and the 1997 Plank tutorial erratum).
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|
||||||
- A repair row depends only on its index, so repair symbols are generated on demand and
|
|
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their indexes never need to be agreed in advance. Up to 256 symbols exist per message.
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|
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- Known-answer vectors in `fec_test.go` pin the encoding and were cross-checked against an
|
|
||||||
independent implementation; changing them is a wire format change.
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|
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- Cost for a 9.8 KB message (k=9): about 13 µs for three repair symbols, about 19 µs to
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|
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decode with three data symbols missing.
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|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**The sender chooses m**, the number of repair symbols per attempt. The receiver only needs
|
|
||||||
any K symbols, so this is policy and can change without a protocol change. The starting
|
|
||||||
rule is `m = max(2, ceil(K/3))`.
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|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Retries send fresh symbols.** Attempt 0 sends indexes `0 .. K+m-1`; each retry sends
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|
||||||
the next `K+m` unused indexes. The receiver merges all distinct symbols across attempts,
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|
||||||
so no received fragment is wasted. Indexes are a deterministic function of the message,
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|
||||||
so retransmits stay idempotent: the responder caches msg2 itself and regenerates any
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|
||||||
symbol.
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|
||||||
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|
||||||
**Repair symbols trail the data.** Data symbols go out back to back; repair symbols follow
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|
||||||
after a short delay, so a queue tail-drop at the end of the data run does not also take the
|
|
||||||
repair. In simulation this lifts small messages substantially (k=2 at 10% loss, burst 8:
|
|
||||||
91.4% to 98.2% first-attempt success). Pacing every fragment was also evaluated; it gains
|
|
||||||
about 5 more points for k=7..9 on bursty paths, which is not worth the extra machinery,
|
|
||||||
and the retry with fresh symbols covers the remainder.
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|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Receiver rules
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Implemented in `handshake/fragment` (`Sender`, `Assembly`, and the capped `Table`).
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- Fragments are stored individually as they arrive and charged against a memory cap.
|
|
||||||
Nothing is allocated from a claimed size alone (FragmentSmack, game-engine "fragment
|
|
||||||
bombs").
|
|
||||||
- `MsgLen` must be identical for every fragment of a `FragID`; a mismatch drops the whole
|
|
||||||
entry. msg1 is capped at `MsgLen <= 16384` (K <= 15).
|
|
||||||
- The decoder keeps at most K distinct symbols, so an entry never exceeds about MsgLen bytes
|
|
||||||
however many repair symbols arrive.
|
|
||||||
- When K symbols are present the message is decoded and handed to the handshake `Machine`
|
|
||||||
as a synthetic `[header | message]`. The Machine never sees fragments.
|
|
||||||
- A completed entry is forgotten immediately. A late duplicate fragment starts a new entry
|
|
||||||
and, once enough arrive, reconstructs the same message again; the handshake layer's
|
|
||||||
duplicate detection recognises it.
|
|
||||||
- If Noise rejects a decoded message, the entry is discarded and the next attempt
|
|
||||||
supplies fresh symbols. (Possible refinement: keep a few spare symbols so an injected
|
|
||||||
bad symbol can be identified by re-encoding instead of waiting for a retry.)
|
|
||||||
- Pre-authentication msg1 entries live in a table keyed by (source address or relay index,
|
|
||||||
FragID) with a total memory cap, per-source quotas (/32 for IPv4, /64 for IPv6), a
|
|
||||||
sliding TTL of about 2 s refreshed by progress, and random eviction under pressure.
|
|
||||||
msg2 and msg3 reassembly attaches to the existing pending handshake found by RemoteIndex.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Retransmission and amplification
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- Only timers cause transmission. Reactive resends (the responder resending its cached
|
|
||||||
msg2 when a duplicate msg1 completes) are rate limited to one per handshake per retry
|
|
||||||
interval, to avoid TFTP's Sorcerer's Apprentice amplification.
|
|
||||||
- Duplicate msg1 detection compares the decoded message to the cached one **before**
|
|
||||||
running Noise or certificate verification.
|
|
||||||
- Before an address is validated, a responder sends at most 3x the bytes it received from
|
|
||||||
it (QUIC's rule). Normal handshakes sit near 1.1-1.2x.
|
|
||||||
- In phase 2 the initiator retransmits msg3 until any authenticated packet arrives from
|
|
||||||
the responder; the responder sends a small confirmation on completion and holds tunnel
|
|
||||||
traffic until msg3 verifies.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Denial of service
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The responder can no longer complete statelessly on msg1, since msg1 arrives in pieces.
|
|
||||||
Defenses are the capped table above plus a **cookie under load**, in the style of
|
|
||||||
WireGuard's mac2, QUIC Retry and the SCTP state cookie:
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- Once the msg1 table is at least half full (by bytes or by entries), every msg1 fragment
|
|
||||||
must carry a valid cookie. One without is answered with a cookie reply and leaves no
|
|
||||||
state. Fragments that already belong to an entry need one too, so an attacker cannot
|
|
||||||
hold old entries open.
|
|
||||||
- A cookie is `HMAC-SHA256(secret, source address and port, relay channel, FragID)`
|
|
||||||
truncated to 16 bytes. The secret rotates every 2 minutes and the previous one is still
|
|
||||||
accepted, so a cookie is good for 2 to 4 minutes.
|
|
||||||
- Replies are never larger than the packet that prompted them (no amplification) and are
|
|
||||||
rate limited as a whole (a burst of 256, then 1000 per second), so spoofed floods cannot
|
|
||||||
turn the responder into a reflector.
|
|
||||||
- The initiator attaches the cookie to its PQ attempt, so every later packet carries it,
|
|
||||||
and immediately resends fresh symbols to the address the reply came from, at most once
|
|
||||||
per retry interval. Under load a PQ handshake costs one extra round trip, which in
|
|
||||||
practice still beats the classical attempt on the next retry tick.
|
|
||||||
- An attacker on the path can forge a cookie reply; the bogus cookie is simply rejected
|
|
||||||
and answered with a real one.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
A CA-keyed pre-filter MAC was considered and rejected: networks commonly trust many CAs.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#### Injected symbols
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The decoder keeps the first K distinct symbols it sees, so one forged symbol in those K
|
|
||||||
spoils that attempt's decode; Noise rejects the result and the next attempt brings fresh
|
|
||||||
symbols. Forging one needs the attempt's FragID or index, which are random 32 bit values,
|
|
||||||
and for msg1 the initiator's exact address and port too, so in practice only an attacker
|
|
||||||
who sees the traffic can do it. An attacker who can also drop packets gains nothing new.
|
|
||||||
One who can only inject, and races a forged symbol into every attempt, can stop a PQ
|
|
||||||
handshake where it could not stop a classical one, since classical msg2s are tried one
|
|
||||||
packet at a time. Keeping spare symbols to find a consistent subset only raises the number
|
|
||||||
of forgeries needed per attempt, and authenticating symbols is impossible for msg1, which
|
|
||||||
travels before any key exists. So the decoder deliberately does neither. A non-sticky
|
|
||||||
initiator still gets a classical tunnel from its next attempt; a sticky one, by design,
|
|
||||||
does not downgrade.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Rollout
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- Separate settings for initiating and accepting PQ handshakes, both off by default:
|
|
||||||
`handshakes.pq.initiate`, `handshakes.pq.accept`. `handshakes.pq.repair_delay` (default
|
|
||||||
10ms) sets how long repair fragments trail the data fragments.
|
|
||||||
- `handshakes.pq.require` makes every handshake PQ: it implies `initiate` and `accept`,
|
|
||||||
never offers a classical attempt, and drops classical msg1s.
|
|
||||||
- Old nodes silently drop unknown subtypes, so discovery is speculative: an initiator with
|
|
||||||
`initiate` enabled alternates PQ and classical attempts on successive timer retries,
|
|
||||||
keeping both pending, and the first to complete wins. A path nothing has been sent over
|
|
||||||
yet gets the PQ attempt first: an early resend triggered by a lighthouse reply is PQ, and
|
|
||||||
a relay that comes up pushes the PQ attempt through at once, counting as the PQ turn.
|
|
||||||
Without that, relays set up during the first attempt handed every relayed handshake to
|
|
||||||
the classical retry (seen on real hosts: 11 of 11). Once a msg2 fragment or cookie reply
|
|
||||||
arrives for the PQ attempt the peer evidently speaks PQ, and classical stops getting
|
|
||||||
turns.
|
|
||||||
- All `handshakes.pq` settings reload without a restart. Handshakes in flight carry on;
|
|
||||||
the new settings apply to the next attempt and the next packet.
|
|
||||||
- `handshakes.pq.sticky` (default off): once a peer has completed a PQ handshake, never fall
|
|
||||||
back to classical for it again during this process lifetime. This resists active
|
|
||||||
downgrade after first contact.
|
|
||||||
- No lighthouse capability advertisement.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Simulation results
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Gilbert-Elliott channel (bad state drops everything), losses expressed as average rate and
|
|
||||||
mean burst length in packets. First-attempt success for the whole handshake with
|
|
||||||
`m = max(2, ceil(K/3))` and repair delayed 16 packet slots, compared with no FEC:
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
| Handshake | Loss | Burst 1 | Burst 2 | Burst 4 | Burst 8 |
|
|
||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
||||||
| phase 1 (2, 2) no FEC | 5% | 81.4% | 85.6% | 87.9% | 89.0% |
|
|
||||||
| phase 1 (2, 2) FEC | 5% | 99.9% | 99.4% | 99.3% | 98.6% |
|
|
||||||
| phase 1 (2, 2) FEC | 10% | 99.3% | 97.5% | 97.4% | 96.3% |
|
|
||||||
| phase 2 (8, 9, 2) no FEC | 5% | 37.8% | 56.0% | 69.3% | 77.1% |
|
|
||||||
| phase 2 (8, 9, 2) FEC | 5% | 99.6% | 93.7% | 89.9% | 88.4% |
|
|
||||||
| phase 2 (8, 9, 2) FEC | 10% | 95.3% | 83.5% | 77.9% | 76.7% |
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
With fresh repair symbols, phase 2 completes within two attempts at least 99.1% of the time
|
|
||||||
in every scenario above, and within three at least 99.98%.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The simulators and their outputs are in [pq-handshake-sim](pq-handshake-sim/README.md),
|
|
||||||
including a comparison with classical handshakes and a model of time to a working tunnel
|
|
||||||
under Nebula's retry schedule.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Prior art
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- **WireGuard / Rosenpass**: fit every message in one packet; cookies and biscuits for
|
|
||||||
statelessness. Not possible at our sizes.
|
|
||||||
- **IKEv2**: RFC 7383 fragments only after keys exist, with each fragment authenticated;
|
|
||||||
RFC 9242/9370 move PQ key exchange into intermediate exchanges for that reason.
|
|
||||||
- **QUIC / DTLS 1.3**: offset-based reassembly with ACKs; QUIC's 3x amplification limit and
|
|
||||||
1200-byte floor.
|
|
||||||
- **Solana Turbine**: Reed-Solomon over 1232-byte UDP packets through untrusted relays;
|
|
||||||
moved to Merkle-authenticated shreds after unauthenticated repair symbols enabled
|
|
||||||
poisoning.
|
|
||||||
- **kcp-go, UDPspeeder, CM256**: RS FEC over UDP; parity must scale up for small groups.
|
|
||||||
- **gQUIC FEC (removed)**: FEC does not pay for bulk transfer under bursty loss; it does
|
|
||||||
for short, latency-critical transfers such as handshakes.
|
|
||||||
- **TFTP, NFS duplicate request cache, memcached UDP, IP reassembly bugs**: retransmit
|
|
||||||
storms, ID-wrap misassembly, reflection amplification, and allocation from claimed sizes.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Implementation (phase 1)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- `handshake`: the `ix_psk2_mlkem1024` subtype (`patterns.go`, `kem.go`), the `KEMKey`
|
|
||||||
payload field, and the psk2 plumbing in `Machine`.
|
|
||||||
- `handshake/fec`, `handshake/fragment`: the code and the fragment transport.
|
|
||||||
- `handshake_manager_pq.go` and the manager:
|
|
||||||
- **Initiator.** Attempts alternate PQ and classical, starting with PQ (sticky peers get
|
|
||||||
only PQ). The PQ attempt has its own local index registered alongside the classical
|
|
||||||
one; whichever response completes first wins, and the other index is released
|
|
||||||
(`settleIndex`). A timed out or deleted pending handshake releases both.
|
|
||||||
- **Responder.** msg1 fragments go into the capped pre-authentication table. A decoded
|
|
||||||
msg1 is looked up by hash among recently answered ones before any Noise, KEM or
|
|
||||||
certificate work: the trailing repair fragments of an attempt rebuild a msg1 its data
|
|
||||||
fragments already completed, and a retrying initiator offers fresh symbols for the
|
|
||||||
same msg1. A repeat goes straight to the cached-response resend, which offers fresh
|
|
||||||
msg2 symbols, is rate limited to one per retry interval and is held to the 3x
|
|
||||||
amplification budget.
|
|
||||||
- **Relays** carry fragments unchanged; repair fragments trail via a timer.
|
|
||||||
- The pre-authentication table is capped at 4 MiB, 1024 entries, 4 per source (IPv4 /32,
|
|
||||||
IPv6 /64, or relay channel), 16 KiB messages and a 3 s idle timeout. Cookies are
|
|
||||||
demanded from half full.
|
|
||||||
- Tests: Noise-level KEM tests, codec and fragment tests and fuzzers, manager unit tests
|
|
||||||
for the response budget and rate limit, and e2e tests for a clean handshake, loss of
|
|
||||||
data fragments in both directions, fallback to a peer that does not accept PQ, a lost
|
|
||||||
msg2 recovered by fresh symbols, sticky mode under an attacker dropping PQ packets,
|
|
||||||
relays, index cleanup on completion, fallback and timeout, and a responder flooded from
|
|
||||||
spoofed sources demanding and accepting a cookie. Unit tests cover cookie binding and
|
|
||||||
rotation, the never-amplify rule, the initiator's rate limited resend, and reload. ML-KEM and HKDF also
|
|
||||||
pass under `GOEXPERIMENT=boringcrypto` and `GODEBUG=fips140=on`.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Open items
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
None for phase 1. Phase 2 needs certificate v3, the KEM-aware Noise symmetric state, and
|
|
||||||
the msg3 design above.
|
|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
|
|||||||
|
# vpnemu
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Reproduces, on macOS and without Tailscale, the way a VPN with an exit node takes nebula's vpn network route
|
||||||
|
away from its utun (#1931).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A macOS network extension never touches the routing table. Its routes are published in configd's dynamic store
|
||||||
|
under `State:/Network/Service/<id>/IPv4` and `/IPv6`, and configd's IPMonitor installs them. vpnemu creates a
|
||||||
|
utun and publishes those keys itself, so configd does exactly what it would do for the real app. It publishes
|
||||||
|
the routes Tailscale would with an exit node: every interface prefix that isn't a single IP, the rule in
|
||||||
|
Tailscale's `ipnlocal.internalAndExternalInterfacesFrom`.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
| mode | Tailscale setting | published as | where nebula's prefix goes |
|
||||||
|
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|
||||||
|
| `claim` | exit node, no LAN access | `AdditionalRoutes` | into vpnemu's utun |
|
||||||
|
| `exclude` | exit node, LAN access | `ExcludedRoutes`, service overrides primary | out the next interface (en0) |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
configd answers `EEXIST` with a delete and an add, so whatever held the prefix loses it. When the service is
|
||||||
|
withdrawn, configd deletes its routes by prefix alone, whoever holds them by then.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Build
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
It is its own module, so `purego` stays out of nebula's `go.mod`. purego reaches CoreFoundation and
|
||||||
|
SystemConfiguration without cgo, so it cross compiles and runs on a mac with no developer tools.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
```sh
|
||||||
|
cd e2e/darwin/vpnemu
|
||||||
|
CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=darwin GOARCH=arm64 go build -o vpnemu .
|
||||||
|
# a cross compiled binary copied to a mac may need: codesign -s - -f vpnemu
|
||||||
|
```
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Run
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
```sh
|
||||||
|
sudo ./vpnemu -mode claim -keep en0 # runs until ctrl-c, then withdraws and closes its utun
|
||||||
|
sudo ./vpnemu -clear # withdraw a service a crashed run left behind
|
||||||
|
```
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
`-keep` names interfaces whose prefixes are never published. Keep the one your ssh session arrives on, or
|
||||||
|
`claim` takes your LAN into a utun nobody reads. `exclude` makes vpnemu primary, so anything off a kept
|
||||||
|
interface's subnet, internet included, goes into its utun and is dropped while it runs.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
`-follow` (default on) republishes when interface prefixes change, as Tailscale does on link changes. With
|
||||||
|
`-follow=false` a route stays published after its interface is gone, which stages the route configd leaves
|
||||||
|
behind for a nebula that restarts before the VPN has caught up.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## A/B a nebula build
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
`repro.sh` starts nebula, then runs vpnemu, and reports egress and ping per peer before, during and after:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
```sh
|
||||||
|
sudo ./repro.sh -n ./nebula -c config.yml -p 192.168.212.1 -p fd19:31::1 -m claim -k en0
|
||||||
|
```
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Before #1931 (utun holds `/24` and `/64`):
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
```
|
||||||
|
during 192.168.212.1 egress=utun2 ping=FAIL
|
||||||
|
after 192.168.212.1 egress=en0 ping=FAIL
|
||||||
|
```
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
With #1931 (utun holds `/32` and `/128`, network routes added explicitly) every phase stays on nebula's utun.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Leftover route
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Run an old nebula, start `vpnemu -follow=false`, then restart onto a new nebula while vpnemu is still up. The
|
||||||
|
new nebula finds the vpn network routed to vpnemu's utun, replaces it and starts. Stop vpnemu and configd deletes
|
||||||
|
the prefix, taking nebula's route with it until nebula restarts. With real Tailscale this needs nebula to restart
|
||||||
|
before Tailscale notices the old utun is gone, a one time window when upgrading from a nebula without #1931.
|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
|
|||||||
|
module github.com/slackhq/nebula/e2e/darwin/vpnemu
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
go 1.26.0
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
require (
|
||||||
|
github.com/ebitengine/purego v0.9.1
|
||||||
|
golang.org/x/sys v0.48.0
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
|
|||||||
|
github.com/ebitengine/purego v0.9.1 h1:a/k2f2HQU3Pi399RPW1MOaZyhKJL9w/xFpKAg4q1s0A=
|
||||||
|
github.com/ebitengine/purego v0.9.1/go.mod h1:iIjxzd6CiRiOG0UyXP+V1+jWqUXVjPKLAI0mRfJZTmQ=
|
||||||
|
golang.org/x/sys v0.48.0 h1:bbX/i/6MgT9BVLM9RT1thmxL04yeTAhbEz4SyadbXoo=
|
||||||
|
golang.org/x/sys v0.48.0/go.mod h1:hNLxWAXmnKAxqDtdwIYC4bM9oQPEecfsnNMuSxOs3og=
|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,292 @@
|
|||||||
|
//go:build darwin
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// vpnemu stands in for a macOS VPN app with an exit node in use, so route hijacks like the one
|
||||||
|
// Tailscale causes can be reproduced without Tailscale.
|
||||||
|
//
|
||||||
|
// A network extension does not touch the routing table itself. It hands its routes to
|
||||||
|
// nesessionmanager, which publishes them in configd's dynamic store under
|
||||||
|
// State:/Network/Service/<id>/IPv4 and /IPv6, and configd's IPMonitor installs them. vpnemu
|
||||||
|
// creates a utun and publishes the same keys directly, so configd does exactly what it would do
|
||||||
|
// for the real thing.
|
||||||
|
//
|
||||||
|
// Which routes it publishes follows Tailscale's rule for exit nodes
|
||||||
|
// (ipnlocal.internalAndExternalInterfacesFrom): every interface address prefix that is not a
|
||||||
|
// single IP counts as an attached LAN. With LAN access off those prefixes are claimed into the
|
||||||
|
// tunnel (-mode claim, published as AdditionalRoutes). With LAN access on they are excluded and
|
||||||
|
// leave through the next interface (-mode exclude, published as ExcludedRoutes on a service that
|
||||||
|
// overrides the primary).
|
||||||
|
//
|
||||||
|
// It runs until interrupted, then withdraws the service and closes its utun. Needs root.
|
||||||
|
package main
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
import (
|
||||||
|
"flag"
|
||||||
|
"fmt"
|
||||||
|
"log"
|
||||||
|
"net"
|
||||||
|
"net/netip"
|
||||||
|
"os"
|
||||||
|
"os/exec"
|
||||||
|
"os/signal"
|
||||||
|
"slices"
|
||||||
|
"strings"
|
||||||
|
"syscall"
|
||||||
|
"time"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
"github.com/ebitengine/purego"
|
||||||
|
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const (
|
||||||
|
serviceID = "VPNEMU"
|
||||||
|
// Tailscale's own addresses, single IPs, so the rule skips them like Tailscale skips its own
|
||||||
|
addr4 = "100.100.0.1"
|
||||||
|
addr6 = "fd7a:115c:a1e0::1"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
utunControlName = "com.apple.net.utun_control"
|
||||||
|
utunOptIfname = 2
|
||||||
|
cfStringUTF8 = 0x08000100
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
var (
|
||||||
|
cfStringCreateWithCString func(alloc uintptr, s *byte, enc uint32) uintptr
|
||||||
|
cfDataCreate func(alloc uintptr, b *byte, n int) uintptr
|
||||||
|
cfPropertyListCreateWithData func(alloc, data uintptr, opts uint, format *int, err *uintptr) uintptr
|
||||||
|
cfRelease func(ref uintptr)
|
||||||
|
scDynamicStoreCreate func(alloc, name, callout, ctx uintptr) uintptr
|
||||||
|
scDynamicStoreSetValue func(store, key, value uintptr) bool
|
||||||
|
scDynamicStoreRemoveValue func(store, key uintptr) bool
|
||||||
|
scError func() int32
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// loadFrameworks binds the few CoreFoundation and SystemConfiguration calls we need. purego does
|
||||||
|
// it without cgo, so this cross compiles and runs on a mac with no developer tools. JXA can read
|
||||||
|
// the dynamic store but its writes fail, and scutil cannot build the arrays of dictionaries the
|
||||||
|
// route keys hold.
|
||||||
|
func loadFrameworks() {
|
||||||
|
cf, err := purego.Dlopen("/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/CoreFoundation", purego.RTLD_NOW|purego.RTLD_GLOBAL)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
log.Fatal(err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
sc, err := purego.Dlopen("/System/Library/Frameworks/SystemConfiguration.framework/SystemConfiguration", purego.RTLD_NOW|purego.RTLD_GLOBAL)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
log.Fatal(err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
purego.RegisterLibFunc(&cfStringCreateWithCString, cf, "CFStringCreateWithCString")
|
||||||
|
purego.RegisterLibFunc(&cfDataCreate, cf, "CFDataCreate")
|
||||||
|
purego.RegisterLibFunc(&cfPropertyListCreateWithData, cf, "CFPropertyListCreateWithData")
|
||||||
|
purego.RegisterLibFunc(&cfRelease, cf, "CFRelease")
|
||||||
|
purego.RegisterLibFunc(&scDynamicStoreCreate, sc, "SCDynamicStoreCreate")
|
||||||
|
purego.RegisterLibFunc(&scDynamicStoreSetValue, sc, "SCDynamicStoreSetValue")
|
||||||
|
purego.RegisterLibFunc(&scDynamicStoreRemoveValue, sc, "SCDynamicStoreRemoveValue")
|
||||||
|
purego.RegisterLibFunc(&scError, sc, "SCError")
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func cfString(s string) uintptr {
|
||||||
|
b := append([]byte(s), 0)
|
||||||
|
return cfStringCreateWithCString(0, &b[0], cfStringUTF8)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// cfPlist builds a property list from its xml form, the least code way to make nested CF values
|
||||||
|
func cfPlist(xml string) uintptr {
|
||||||
|
b := []byte(xml)
|
||||||
|
d := cfDataCreate(0, &b[0], len(b))
|
||||||
|
defer cfRelease(d)
|
||||||
|
var errRef uintptr
|
||||||
|
p := cfPropertyListCreateWithData(0, d, 0, nil, &errRef)
|
||||||
|
if p == 0 {
|
||||||
|
log.Fatalf("invalid property list:\n%s", xml)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return p
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
type store struct {
|
||||||
|
ref uintptr
|
||||||
|
k4, k6 uintptr
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func openStore() *store {
|
||||||
|
return &store{
|
||||||
|
ref: scDynamicStoreCreate(0, cfString("vpnemu"), 0, 0),
|
||||||
|
k4: cfString("State:/Network/Service/" + serviceID + "/IPv4"),
|
||||||
|
k6: cfString("State:/Network/Service/" + serviceID + "/IPv6"),
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func (s *store) set(key uintptr, xml string) {
|
||||||
|
v := cfPlist(xml)
|
||||||
|
defer cfRelease(v)
|
||||||
|
if !scDynamicStoreSetValue(s.ref, key, v) {
|
||||||
|
log.Fatalf("SCDynamicStoreSetValue failed: SCError %d", scError())
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func (s *store) withdraw() {
|
||||||
|
scDynamicStoreRemoveValue(s.ref, s.k4)
|
||||||
|
scDynamicStoreRemoveValue(s.ref, s.k6)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// createUtun opens a utun the kernel numbers for us and gives it Tailscale-like single addresses.
|
||||||
|
// The interface lives as long as the returned fd.
|
||||||
|
func createUtun() (int, string) {
|
||||||
|
fd, err := unix.Socket(unix.AF_SYSTEM, unix.SOCK_DGRAM, unix.AF_SYS_CONTROL)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
log.Fatalf("system socket: %v", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
info := &unix.CtlInfo{}
|
||||||
|
copy(info.Name[:], utunControlName)
|
||||||
|
if err = unix.IoctlCtlInfo(fd, info); err != nil {
|
||||||
|
log.Fatalf("CTLIOCGINFO: %v", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if err = unix.Connect(fd, &unix.SockaddrCtl{ID: info.Id, Unit: 0}); err != nil {
|
||||||
|
log.Fatalf("connect utun control: %v", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
name, err := unix.GetsockoptString(fd, unix.AF_SYS_CONTROL, utunOptIfname)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
log.Fatalf("utun name: %v", err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
for _, args := range [][]string{
|
||||||
|
{name, "inet", addr4, addr4, "netmask", "255.255.255.255", "up"},
|
||||||
|
{name, "inet6", addr6, "prefixlen", "128"},
|
||||||
|
} {
|
||||||
|
if out, err := exec.Command("ifconfig", args...).CombinedOutput(); err != nil {
|
||||||
|
log.Fatalf("ifconfig %s: %v: %s", strings.Join(args, " "), err, out)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return fd, name
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// lanPrefixes applies Tailscale's attached-LAN rule to every interface but those in skip
|
||||||
|
func lanPrefixes(skip []string) (v4, v6 []netip.Prefix) {
|
||||||
|
ifs, err := net.Interfaces()
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
log.Fatal(err)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
for _, i := range ifs {
|
||||||
|
if slices.Contains(skip, i.Name) || i.Flags&net.FlagLoopback != 0 {
|
||||||
|
continue
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
addrs, _ := i.Addrs()
|
||||||
|
for _, a := range addrs {
|
||||||
|
n, ok := a.(*net.IPNet)
|
||||||
|
if !ok {
|
||||||
|
continue
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
ip, _ := netip.AddrFromSlice(n.IP)
|
||||||
|
ip = ip.Unmap()
|
||||||
|
ones, _ := n.Mask.Size()
|
||||||
|
pfx := netip.PrefixFrom(ip, ones).Masked()
|
||||||
|
// Tailscale skips single IPs. Link-local is our addition, every interface has the
|
||||||
|
// same fe80::/64 and claiming it would only break the harness's own host.
|
||||||
|
if pfx.IsSingleIP() || ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() {
|
||||||
|
continue
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if ip.Is4() {
|
||||||
|
v4 = append(v4, pfx)
|
||||||
|
} else {
|
||||||
|
v6 = append(v6, pfx)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
slices.SortFunc(v4, func(a, b netip.Prefix) int { return a.Addr().Compare(b.Addr()) })
|
||||||
|
slices.SortFunc(v6, func(a, b netip.Prefix) int { return a.Addr().Compare(b.Addr()) })
|
||||||
|
return v4, v6
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func routes4(ps []netip.Prefix) string {
|
||||||
|
var b strings.Builder
|
||||||
|
for _, p := range ps {
|
||||||
|
mask := net.IP(net.CIDRMask(p.Bits(), 32)).String()
|
||||||
|
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "<dict><key>DestinationAddress</key><string>%s</string><key>SubnetMask</key><string>%s</string></dict>", p.Addr(), mask)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return b.String()
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func routes6(ps []netip.Prefix) string {
|
||||||
|
var b strings.Builder
|
||||||
|
for _, p := range ps {
|
||||||
|
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "<dict><key>DestinationAddress</key><string>%s</string><key>PrefixLength</key><integer>%d</integer></dict>", p.Addr(), p.Bits())
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return b.String()
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func (s *store) publish(ifName string, exclude bool, v4, v6 []netip.Prefix) {
|
||||||
|
routesKey, primary := "AdditionalRoutes", ""
|
||||||
|
if exclude {
|
||||||
|
// configd only steers excluded routes for a service with a default route that is primary.
|
||||||
|
// While this runs, everything not on a kept interface's subnet goes into the utun and dies.
|
||||||
|
routesKey = "ExcludedRoutes"
|
||||||
|
primary = "<key>Router</key><string>" + addr4 + "</string><key>OverridePrimary</key><integer>1</integer>"
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const head = `<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><plist version="1.0"><dict>`
|
||||||
|
s.set(s.k4, head+
|
||||||
|
"<key>InterfaceName</key><string>"+ifName+"</string>"+
|
||||||
|
"<key>Addresses</key><array><string>"+addr4+"</string></array>"+
|
||||||
|
"<key>SubnetMasks</key><array><string>255.255.255.255</string></array>"+primary+
|
||||||
|
"<key>"+routesKey+"</key><array>"+routes4(v4)+"</array></dict></plist>")
|
||||||
|
s.set(s.k6, head+
|
||||||
|
"<key>InterfaceName</key><string>"+ifName+"</string>"+
|
||||||
|
"<key>Addresses</key><array><string>"+addr6+"</string></array>"+
|
||||||
|
"<key>PrefixLength</key><array><integer>128</integer></array>"+
|
||||||
|
"<key>"+routesKey+"</key><array>"+routes6(v6)+"</array></dict></plist>")
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
log.Printf("published %s on %s, %s: %v %v", serviceID, ifName, routesKey, v4, v6)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func main() {
|
||||||
|
mode := flag.String("mode", "claim", "claim: exit node without LAN access, the prefixes are routed into the vpn\n"+
|
||||||
|
"exclude: exit node with LAN access, the prefixes leave via the next interface and the vpn becomes primary")
|
||||||
|
keep := flag.String("keep", "en0", "comma separated interfaces whose prefixes are never published, keep the one your ssh session uses")
|
||||||
|
follow := flag.Bool("follow", true, "republish when interface prefixes change, as Tailscale does on link changes.\n"+
|
||||||
|
"Off, a route stays published after its interface is gone, which is how a leftover route is staged")
|
||||||
|
clear := flag.Bool("clear", false, "withdraw a service a crashed run left behind, then exit")
|
||||||
|
flag.Parse()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if *mode != "claim" && *mode != "exclude" {
|
||||||
|
log.Fatalf("unknown -mode %q", *mode)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if os.Geteuid() != 0 {
|
||||||
|
log.Fatal("needs root, to create the utun and write configd's dynamic store")
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
loadFrameworks()
|
||||||
|
s := openStore()
|
||||||
|
if *clear {
|
||||||
|
s.withdraw()
|
||||||
|
log.Print("withdrawn")
|
||||||
|
return
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
fd, ifName := createUtun()
|
||||||
|
exclude := *mode == "exclude"
|
||||||
|
skip := append(strings.Split(*keep, ","), ifName)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
v4, v6 := lanPrefixes(skip)
|
||||||
|
s.publish(ifName, exclude, v4, v6)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
sig := make(chan os.Signal, 1)
|
||||||
|
signal.Notify(sig, syscall.SIGINT, syscall.SIGTERM)
|
||||||
|
tick := time.NewTicker(time.Second)
|
||||||
|
defer tick.Stop()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
for {
|
||||||
|
select {
|
||||||
|
case <-sig:
|
||||||
|
s.withdraw()
|
||||||
|
_ = unix.Close(fd)
|
||||||
|
log.Print("withdrawn")
|
||||||
|
return
|
||||||
|
case <-tick.C:
|
||||||
|
if !*follow {
|
||||||
|
continue
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
n4, n6 := lanPrefixes(skip)
|
||||||
|
if !slices.Equal(n4, v4) || !slices.Equal(n6, v6) {
|
||||||
|
v4, v6 = n4, n6
|
||||||
|
s.publish(ifName, exclude, v4, v6)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
Executable
+76
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
|
|||||||
|
#!/bin/sh
|
||||||
|
# Reports where traffic to nebula peers goes before, during and after a vpnemu exit node.
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# usage: sudo ./repro.sh -n <nebula binary> -c <nebula config> -p <peer vpn addr> [-p <peer>...]
|
||||||
|
# [-m claim|exclude] [-k <keep interfaces>]
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# Each peer should answer pings over the overlay. A healthy run shows the nebula utun as egress
|
||||||
|
# and the ping working in all three phases.
|
||||||
|
set -u
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
MODE=claim
|
||||||
|
KEEP=en0
|
||||||
|
PEERS=""
|
||||||
|
NEBULA=""
|
||||||
|
CONFIG=""
|
||||||
|
while getopts n:c:p:m:k: o; do
|
||||||
|
case $o in
|
||||||
|
n) NEBULA=$OPTARG ;;
|
||||||
|
c) CONFIG=$OPTARG ;;
|
||||||
|
p) PEERS="$PEERS $OPTARG" ;;
|
||||||
|
m) MODE=$OPTARG ;;
|
||||||
|
k) KEEP=$OPTARG ;;
|
||||||
|
*) exit 2 ;;
|
||||||
|
esac
|
||||||
|
done
|
||||||
|
if [ -z "$NEBULA" ] || [ -z "$CONFIG" ] || [ -z "$PEERS" ]; then
|
||||||
|
sed -n '4,5p' "$0"
|
||||||
|
exit 2
|
||||||
|
fi
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
HERE=$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)
|
||||||
|
VPNEMU=${VPNEMU:-$HERE/vpnemu}
|
||||||
|
LOG=$(mktemp -t nebula-repro)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
report() {
|
||||||
|
for p in $PEERS; do
|
||||||
|
case $p in
|
||||||
|
*:*) fam=-inet6 ping=ping6 ;;
|
||||||
|
*) fam=-inet ping="ping -t 3" ;;
|
||||||
|
esac
|
||||||
|
egress=$(route -n get $fam "$p" 2>/dev/null | awk '/interface:/{print $2}')
|
||||||
|
if $ping -c 2 "$p" >/dev/null 2>&1; then ok=ok; else ok=FAIL; fi
|
||||||
|
printf '%-8s %-24s egress=%-8s ping=%s\n' "$1" "$p" "${egress:-none}" "$ok"
|
||||||
|
done
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
cleanup() {
|
||||||
|
[ -n "${EMU:-}" ] && kill "$EMU" 2>/dev/null
|
||||||
|
[ -n "${NEB:-}" ] && kill "$NEB" 2>/dev/null
|
||||||
|
wait 2>/dev/null
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
trap cleanup EXIT INT TERM
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
"$NEBULA" -config "$CONFIG" >"$LOG" 2>&1 &
|
||||||
|
NEB=$!
|
||||||
|
sleep 3
|
||||||
|
if ! kill -0 $NEB 2>/dev/null; then
|
||||||
|
echo "nebula exited:"
|
||||||
|
tail -5 "$LOG"
|
||||||
|
exit 1
|
||||||
|
fi
|
||||||
|
echo "nebula on $(grep -o 'interface=utun[0-9]*' "$LOG" | head -1 | cut -d= -f2), log in $LOG"
|
||||||
|
report before
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
"$VPNEMU" -mode "$MODE" -keep "$KEEP" &
|
||||||
|
EMU=$!
|
||||||
|
sleep 3
|
||||||
|
report during
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
kill $EMU
|
||||||
|
wait $EMU 2>/dev/null
|
||||||
|
EMU=
|
||||||
|
sleep 2
|
||||||
|
report after
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
grep -E 'level=(WARN|ERROR).*(route|Route)' "$LOG"
|
||||||
@@ -1,476 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
//go:build e2e_testing
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
package e2e
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
import (
|
|
||||||
"net/netip"
|
|
||||||
"sync"
|
|
||||||
"testing"
|
|
||||||
"time"
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula"
|
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
|
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
|
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/e2e/router"
|
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake/fragment"
|
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
|
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
|
|
||||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
|
|
||||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func pqRequire() m {
|
|
||||||
return m{"handshakes": m{"pq": m{"require": true, "repair_delay": "0s"}}}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func pqConfig(initiate, accept, sticky bool) m {
|
|
||||||
return m{"handshakes": m{"pq": m{
|
|
||||||
"initiate": initiate,
|
|
||||||
"accept": accept,
|
|
||||||
"sticky": sticky,
|
|
||||||
"repair_delay": "0s",
|
|
||||||
}}}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// handshakeOf returns the handshake header p carries, looking inside relay
|
|
||||||
// wrapping, plus the fragment header when the handshake is fragmented.
|
|
||||||
func handshakeOf(p *udp.Packet) (*header.H, *fragment.Header) {
|
|
||||||
b := p.Data
|
|
||||||
h := &header.H{}
|
|
||||||
if h.Parse(b) != nil {
|
|
||||||
return nil, nil
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if h.Type == header.Message && h.Subtype == header.MessageRelay {
|
|
||||||
// Relays authenticate but do not encrypt the inner packet.
|
|
||||||
b = b[header.Len:]
|
|
||||||
if h.Parse(b) != nil {
|
|
||||||
return nil, nil
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if h.Type != header.Handshake {
|
|
||||||
return nil, nil
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if !header.IsFragmented(h.Subtype) {
|
|
||||||
return h, nil
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
// A relayed packet still has the relay's AEAD tag on the end.
|
|
||||||
for _, tag := range []int{0, 16} {
|
|
||||||
if len(b) < header.Len+tag {
|
|
||||||
break
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if fh, _, err := fragment.Parse(b[header.Len : len(b)-tag]); err == nil {
|
|
||||||
return h, &fh
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return h, nil
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// handshakeTally counts handshake packets by style as the router moves them.
|
|
||||||
type handshakeTally struct {
|
|
||||||
sync.Mutex
|
|
||||||
pq, classical int
|
|
||||||
maxPQLen int
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func (ht *handshakeTally) observe(p *udp.Packet) {
|
|
||||||
h, _ := handshakeOf(p)
|
|
||||||
if h == nil {
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
ht.Lock()
|
|
||||||
defer ht.Unlock()
|
|
||||||
if h.Subtype == header.HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024 {
|
|
||||||
ht.pq++
|
|
||||||
ht.maxPQLen = max(ht.maxPQLen, len(p.Data))
|
|
||||||
} else {
|
|
||||||
ht.classical++
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// isTunnelData reports whether p is ordinary tunnel traffic headed for to,
|
|
||||||
// directly or as the last hop of a relay.
|
|
||||||
func isTunnelData(p *udp.Packet, receiver, to *nebula.Control) bool {
|
|
||||||
h := &header.H{}
|
|
||||||
if receiver != to || h.Parse(p.Data) != nil || h.Type != header.Message {
|
|
||||||
return false
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if h.Subtype == header.MessageRelay {
|
|
||||||
if h.Parse(p.Data[header.Len:]) != nil {
|
|
||||||
return false
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return h.Type == header.Message && h.Subtype == header.MessageNone
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func newPQPair(t *testing.T, mine, theirs m) (myControl, theirControl *nebula.Control, myVpn, theirVpn []netip.Prefix, myUdp, theirUdp netip.AddrPort, r *router.R) {
|
|
||||||
t.Helper()
|
|
||||||
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
|
|
||||||
myControl, myVpn, myUdp, _ = newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "me", "10.128.0.1/24", mine)
|
|
||||||
theirControl, theirVpn, theirUdp, _ = newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "them", "10.128.0.2/24", theirs)
|
|
||||||
myControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(theirVpn[0].Addr(), theirUdp)
|
|
||||||
r = router.NewR(t, myControl, theirControl)
|
|
||||||
myControl.Start()
|
|
||||||
theirControl.Start()
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func TestPQHandshake(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
t.Parallel()
|
|
||||||
// They only accept, which is all a PQ initiator needs.
|
|
||||||
myControl, theirControl, myVpn, theirVpn, myUdp, theirUdp, r := newPQPair(t, pqConfig(true, true, false), pqConfig(false, true, false))
|
|
||||||
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
var tally handshakeTally
|
|
||||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, myVpn[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
|
|
||||||
require.True(t, r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(5*time.Second, func(p *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
|
||||||
tally.observe(p)
|
|
||||||
if isTunnelData(p, receiver, theirControl) {
|
|
||||||
return router.RouteAndExit
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return router.KeepRouting
|
|
||||||
}), "tunnel never came up")
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me"), theirControl.GetFromTun(true), myVpn[0].Addr(), theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
|
|
||||||
assert.Zero(t, tally.classical, "no classical handshake should be needed")
|
|
||||||
assert.GreaterOrEqual(t, tally.pq, 4, "both messages travel as several fragments")
|
|
||||||
assert.LessOrEqual(t, tally.maxPQLen, fragment.MaxPacketLen)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
assertHostInfoPair(t, myUdp, theirUdp, myVpn, theirVpn, myControl, theirControl)
|
|
||||||
assertTunnel(t, myVpn[0].Addr(), theirVpn[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
|
|
||||||
assert.Empty(t, myControl.ListHostmapIndexes(true), "no pending index may outlive the handshake")
|
|
||||||
assert.Empty(t, theirControl.ListHostmapIndexes(true))
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
myControl.Stop()
|
|
||||||
theirControl.Stop()
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// TestPQHandshakeLoss drops data fragments of both messages; the repair
|
|
||||||
// fragments must carry the handshake without a retry.
|
|
||||||
func TestPQHandshakeLoss(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
t.Parallel()
|
|
||||||
myControl, theirControl, myVpn, theirVpn, _, _, r := newPQPair(t, pqConfig(true, true, false), pqConfig(false, true, false))
|
|
||||||
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
var tally handshakeTally
|
|
||||||
dropped := 0
|
|
||||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, myVpn[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
|
|
||||||
require.True(t, r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(5*time.Second, func(p *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
|
||||||
if h, fh := handshakeOf(p); fh != nil {
|
|
||||||
// Every data fragment of msg1, and the first of msg2.
|
|
||||||
if (h.MessageCounter == 1 && int(fh.Index) < 2) || (h.MessageCounter == 2 && fh.Index == 0) {
|
|
||||||
dropped++
|
|
||||||
return router.Drop
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
tally.observe(p)
|
|
||||||
if isTunnelData(p, receiver, theirControl) {
|
|
||||||
return router.RouteAndExit
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return router.KeepRouting
|
|
||||||
}), "tunnel never came up")
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me"), theirControl.GetFromTun(true), myVpn[0].Addr(), theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, 3, dropped)
|
|
||||||
assert.Zero(t, tally.classical, "the first attempt should succeed from repair fragments")
|
|
||||||
assertTunnel(t, myVpn[0].Addr(), theirVpn[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
myControl.Stop()
|
|
||||||
theirControl.Stop()
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// TestPQFallback has a peer that does not accept PQ handshakes. The initiator's
|
|
||||||
// next attempt is classical and the tunnel comes up anyway.
|
|
||||||
func TestPQFallback(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
t.Parallel()
|
|
||||||
myControl, theirControl, myVpn, theirVpn, myUdp, theirUdp, r := newPQPair(t, pqConfig(true, true, false), nil)
|
|
||||||
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
var tally handshakeTally
|
|
||||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, myVpn[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
|
|
||||||
require.True(t, r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(5*time.Second, func(p *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
|
||||||
tally.observe(p)
|
|
||||||
if isTunnelData(p, receiver, theirControl) {
|
|
||||||
return router.RouteAndExit
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return router.KeepRouting
|
|
||||||
}), "tunnel never came up")
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me"), theirControl.GetFromTun(true), myVpn[0].Addr(), theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
|
|
||||||
assert.Positive(t, tally.pq, "a PQ attempt comes first")
|
|
||||||
assert.Positive(t, tally.classical, "then a classical one")
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
assertHostInfoPair(t, myUdp, theirUdp, myVpn, theirVpn, myControl, theirControl)
|
|
||||||
assertTunnel(t, myVpn[0].Addr(), theirVpn[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
|
|
||||||
assert.Empty(t, myControl.ListHostmapIndexes(true), "the losing PQ attempt's index must be released")
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
myControl.Stop()
|
|
||||||
theirControl.Stop()
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// TestPQResendFreshSymbols loses the responder's whole first msg2. The
|
|
||||||
// initiator's next PQ attempt offers fresh msg1 symbols, the responder
|
|
||||||
// recognises the repeat and resends msg2 with symbols it has not sent before.
|
|
||||||
func TestPQResendFreshSymbols(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
t.Parallel()
|
|
||||||
myControl, theirControl, myVpn, theirVpn, _, _, r := newPQPair(t, pqConfig(true, true, false), pqConfig(false, true, false))
|
|
||||||
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
var firstMsg2, freshMsg2, freshMsg1 int
|
|
||||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, myVpn[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
|
|
||||||
require.True(t, r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(10*time.Second, func(p *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
|
||||||
h, fh := handshakeOf(p)
|
|
||||||
switch {
|
|
||||||
case h != nil && fh == nil:
|
|
||||||
// Keep the classical fallback out of the way.
|
|
||||||
return router.Drop
|
|
||||||
case fh != nil && h.MessageCounter == 2 && fh.Index < 4:
|
|
||||||
firstMsg2++
|
|
||||||
return router.Drop
|
|
||||||
case fh != nil && h.MessageCounter == 2:
|
|
||||||
freshMsg2++
|
|
||||||
case fh != nil && h.MessageCounter == 1 && fh.Index >= 4:
|
|
||||||
freshMsg1++
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if isTunnelData(p, receiver, theirControl) {
|
|
||||||
return router.RouteAndExit
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return router.KeepRouting
|
|
||||||
}), "tunnel never came up")
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me"), theirControl.GetFromTun(true), myVpn[0].Addr(), theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, 4, firstMsg2, "the first msg2 is 2 data and 2 repair fragments")
|
|
||||||
assert.Positive(t, freshMsg1, "the retry offers fresh msg1 symbols")
|
|
||||||
assert.Positive(t, freshMsg2, "the resend offers fresh msg2 symbols")
|
|
||||||
assertTunnel(t, myVpn[0].Addr(), theirVpn[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
myControl.Stop()
|
|
||||||
theirControl.Stop()
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// TestPQSticky checks a sticky initiator never offers a classical handshake to a
|
|
||||||
// peer it has already completed a PQ handshake with.
|
|
||||||
func TestPQSticky(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
t.Parallel()
|
|
||||||
myControl, theirControl, myVpn, theirVpn, _, _, r := newPQPair(t, pqConfig(true, true, true), pqConfig(false, true, false))
|
|
||||||
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, myVpn[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
|
|
||||||
require.True(t, r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(5*time.Second, func(p *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
|
||||||
if isTunnelData(p, receiver, theirControl) {
|
|
||||||
return router.RouteAndExit
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return router.KeepRouting
|
|
||||||
}), "tunnel never came up")
|
|
||||||
theirControl.GetFromTun(true)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Log("Rehandshake while an attacker drops every PQ packet")
|
|
||||||
var tally handshakeTally
|
|
||||||
myControl.ReHandshake(theirVpn[0].Addr())
|
|
||||||
r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(time.Second, func(p *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
|
||||||
tally.observe(p)
|
|
||||||
if h, _ := handshakeOf(p); h != nil && h.Subtype == header.HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024 {
|
|
||||||
return router.Drop
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return router.KeepRouting
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
assert.Positive(t, tally.pq, "PQ attempts keep being made")
|
|
||||||
assert.Zero(t, tally.classical, "sticky must never fall back")
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
myControl.Stop()
|
|
||||||
theirControl.Stop()
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func TestPQRelays(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
t.Parallel()
|
|
||||||
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
|
|
||||||
useRelays := pqConfig(true, true, false)
|
|
||||||
useRelays["relay"] = m{"use_relays": true}
|
|
||||||
amRelay := pqConfig(true, true, false)
|
|
||||||
amRelay["relay"] = m{"am_relay": true}
|
|
||||||
myControl, myVpnIpNet, _, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me ", "10.128.0.1/24", useRelays)
|
|
||||||
relayControl, relayVpnIpNet, relayUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "relay ", "10.128.0.128/24", amRelay)
|
|
||||||
theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "them ", "10.128.0.2/24", useRelays)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
myControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(relayVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), relayUdpAddr)
|
|
||||||
myControl.InjectRelays(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), []netip.Addr{relayVpnIpNet[0].Addr()})
|
|
||||||
relayControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirUdpAddr)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
r := router.NewR(t, myControl, relayControl, theirControl)
|
|
||||||
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
myControl.Start()
|
|
||||||
relayControl.Start()
|
|
||||||
theirControl.Start()
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
var tally handshakeTally
|
|
||||||
var relayedPQ, relayedClassical int
|
|
||||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
|
|
||||||
require.True(t, r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(10*time.Second, func(p *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
|
||||||
tally.observe(p)
|
|
||||||
outer := &header.H{}
|
|
||||||
if outer.Parse(p.Data) == nil && outer.Type == header.Message && outer.Subtype == header.MessageRelay {
|
|
||||||
if h, fh := handshakeOf(p); h != nil && fh != nil {
|
|
||||||
relayedPQ++
|
|
||||||
assert.LessOrEqual(t, len(p.Data), fragment.MaxPacketLen+32, "a relayed fragment fits the IPv6 minimum MTU")
|
|
||||||
} else if h != nil {
|
|
||||||
relayedClassical++
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if isTunnelData(p, receiver, theirControl) {
|
|
||||||
return router.RouteAndExit
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return router.KeepRouting
|
|
||||||
}), "tunnel never came up")
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me"), theirControl.GetFromTun(true), myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
|
|
||||||
assert.Positive(t, relayedPQ, "the end to end handshake is PQ through the relay")
|
|
||||||
assert.Zero(t, relayedClassical, "the relay coming up carries the PQ attempt, not the classical retry")
|
|
||||||
r.RenderHostmaps("Final hostmaps", myControl, relayControl, theirControl)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
myControl.Stop()
|
|
||||||
relayControl.Stop()
|
|
||||||
theirControl.Stop()
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// TestPQTimeoutReleasesIndexes lets a handshake with both a PQ and a classical
|
|
||||||
// attempt pending time out, and checks neither index is left behind.
|
|
||||||
func TestPQTimeoutReleasesIndexes(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
t.Parallel()
|
|
||||||
mine := pqConfig(true, true, false)
|
|
||||||
mine["handshakes"].(m)["retries"] = 2
|
|
||||||
myControl, theirControl, myVpn, theirVpn, _, _, r := newPQPair(t, mine, pqConfig(false, true, false))
|
|
||||||
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
var tally handshakeTally
|
|
||||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, myVpn[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
|
|
||||||
r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(1500*time.Millisecond, func(p *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
|
||||||
tally.observe(p)
|
|
||||||
return router.Drop
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
assert.Positive(t, tally.pq)
|
|
||||||
assert.Positive(t, tally.classical)
|
|
||||||
assert.Nil(t, myControl.GetHostInfoByVpnAddr(theirVpn[0].Addr(), true), "the handshake should have timed out")
|
|
||||||
assert.Empty(t, myControl.ListHostmapIndexes(true))
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
myControl.Stop()
|
|
||||||
theirControl.Stop()
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// TestPQCookieUnderLoad floods the responder with msg1 fragments from spoofed
|
|
||||||
// sources until it demands cookies, then checks a real initiator picks up the
|
|
||||||
// cookie and still completes a PQ handshake.
|
|
||||||
func TestPQCookieUnderLoad(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
t.Parallel()
|
|
||||||
myControl, theirControl, myVpn, theirVpn, _, theirUdp, r := newPQPair(t, pqConfig(true, true, false), pqConfig(false, true, false))
|
|
||||||
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Half of the 1024 entry table is the cookie threshold. Stopping exactly there
|
|
||||||
// keeps them from answering the spoofed sources, which the router cannot reach.
|
|
||||||
t.Log("Flood them with the first fragment of msg1s nobody will finish")
|
|
||||||
for i := range 512 {
|
|
||||||
from := netip.AddrPortFrom(netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{198, 18, byte(i >> 8), byte(i)}), 4242)
|
|
||||||
s, err := fragment.NewSender(make([]byte, 2000), header.HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024, 0, 1, uint32(i+1))
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
pkts, _, err := s.Attempt(0)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
theirControl.InjectUDPPacket(&udp.Packet{From: from, To: theirUdp, Data: pkts[0]})
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
var tally handshakeTally
|
|
||||||
var cookieReplies, msg2, withCookie int
|
|
||||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, myVpn[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
|
|
||||||
require.True(t, r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(5*time.Second, func(p *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
|
||||||
tally.observe(p)
|
|
||||||
if h, fh := handshakeOf(p); h != nil && h.Subtype == header.HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024 {
|
|
||||||
switch {
|
|
||||||
case h.MessageCounter == 0:
|
|
||||||
cookieReplies++
|
|
||||||
case h.MessageCounter == 2:
|
|
||||||
msg2++
|
|
||||||
case fh != nil && fh.HasCookie():
|
|
||||||
withCookie++
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if isTunnelData(p, receiver, theirControl) {
|
|
||||||
return router.RouteAndExit
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return router.KeepRouting
|
|
||||||
}), "tunnel never came up")
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me"), theirControl.GetFromTun(true), myVpn[0].Addr(), theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
|
|
||||||
assert.Positive(t, cookieReplies, "a loaded responder asks for a cookie")
|
|
||||||
assert.Positive(t, withCookie, "the initiator resends with it")
|
|
||||||
assert.Positive(t, msg2, "and the handshake completes post-quantum")
|
|
||||||
assert.Zero(t, tally.classical, "the cookie round trip beats the classical fallback")
|
|
||||||
assertTunnel(t, myVpn[0].Addr(), theirVpn[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
myControl.Stop()
|
|
||||||
theirControl.Stop()
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// TestPQRequire checks require mode never handshakes classically, in either
|
|
||||||
// direction.
|
|
||||||
func TestPQRequire(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
t.Parallel()
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Run("initiator", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
// They neither speak PQ nor require it; we never fall back.
|
|
||||||
myControl, theirControl, myVpn, theirVpn, _, _, r := newPQPair(t, pqRequire(), nil)
|
|
||||||
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
var tally handshakeTally
|
|
||||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, myVpn[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
|
|
||||||
r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(time.Second, func(p *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
|
||||||
tally.observe(p)
|
|
||||||
return router.KeepRouting
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
assert.Positive(t, tally.pq)
|
|
||||||
assert.Zero(t, tally.classical)
|
|
||||||
assert.Nil(t, theirControl.GetHostInfoByVpnAddr(myVpn[0].Addr(), false), "no tunnel without PQ")
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
myControl.Stop()
|
|
||||||
theirControl.Stop()
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Run("responder", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
// We only speak classical; they refuse it.
|
|
||||||
myControl, theirControl, myVpn, theirVpn, _, _, r := newPQPair(t, nil, pqRequire())
|
|
||||||
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
var answers int
|
|
||||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, myVpn[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
|
|
||||||
r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(time.Second, func(p *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
|
||||||
if h, _ := handshakeOf(p); h != nil && h.MessageCounter == 2 {
|
|
||||||
answers++
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return router.KeepRouting
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
assert.Zero(t, answers, "a classical msg1 gets no answer")
|
|
||||||
assert.Nil(t, theirControl.GetHostInfoByVpnAddr(myVpn[0].Addr(), false))
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
myControl.Stop()
|
|
||||||
theirControl.Stop()
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Run("both", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
myControl, theirControl, myVpn, theirVpn, _, _, r := newPQPair(t, pqRequire(), pqRequire())
|
|
||||||
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
var tally handshakeTally
|
|
||||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, myVpn[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
|
|
||||||
require.True(t, r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(5*time.Second, func(p *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
|
||||||
tally.observe(p)
|
|
||||||
if isTunnelData(p, receiver, theirControl) {
|
|
||||||
return router.RouteAndExit
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return router.KeepRouting
|
|
||||||
}), "tunnel never came up")
|
|
||||||
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me"), theirControl.GetFromTun(true), myVpn[0].Addr(), theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
|
|
||||||
assert.Zero(t, tally.classical)
|
|
||||||
assertTunnel(t, myVpn[0].Addr(), theirVpn[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
myControl.Stop()
|
|
||||||
theirControl.Stop()
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
@@ -418,24 +418,6 @@ logging:
|
|||||||
# after receiving the response for lighthouse queries
|
# after receiving the response for lighthouse queries
|
||||||
#trigger_buffer: 64
|
#trigger_buffer: 64
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# pq enables handshakes that mix an ephemeral ML-KEM-1024 key exchange into the session keys, protecting
|
|
||||||
# recorded traffic against a future quantum computer. Authentication is unchanged. These handshakes are too
|
|
||||||
# large for one packet and travel as fragments with forward error correction.
|
|
||||||
#pq:
|
|
||||||
# initiate starts post-quantum handshakes. Attempts alternate between post-quantum and classical until one is
|
|
||||||
# answered, so peers that do not support them still connect.
|
|
||||||
#initiate: false
|
|
||||||
# accept answers post-quantum handshakes from peers.
|
|
||||||
#accept: false
|
|
||||||
# require makes every handshake post-quantum: it implies initiate and accept, never offers a classical handshake
|
|
||||||
# and refuses classical handshakes from peers. Only enable it once every host can speak post-quantum handshakes.
|
|
||||||
#require: false
|
|
||||||
# sticky never falls back to a classical handshake with a peer that has completed a post-quantum one since
|
|
||||||
# nebula started, which defeats an attacker who drops post-quantum handshakes to force a downgrade.
|
|
||||||
#sticky: false
|
|
||||||
# repair_delay is how long the forward error correction fragments trail the rest of a handshake message.
|
|
||||||
#repair_delay: 10ms
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Tunnel manager settings
|
# Tunnel manager settings
|
||||||
#tunnels:
|
#tunnels:
|
||||||
# drop_inactive controls whether inactive tunnels are maintained or dropped after the inactive_timeout period has
|
# drop_inactive controls whether inactive tunnels are maintained or dropped after the inactive_timeout period has
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -35,9 +35,7 @@ func NewCredential(
|
|||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// buildHandshakeState creates a noise.HandshakeState from this credential.
|
// buildHandshakeState creates a noise.HandshakeState from this credential.
|
||||||
// pskPlacement selects the noise psk modifier; 0 means none. A psk for
|
func (hc *Credential) buildHandshakeState(initiator bool, pattern noise.HandshakePattern) (*noise.HandshakeState, error) {
|
||||||
// placements 2 and up is supplied later with SetPresharedKey.
|
|
||||||
func (hc *Credential) buildHandshakeState(initiator bool, pattern noise.HandshakePattern, pskPlacement int) (*noise.HandshakeState, error) {
|
|
||||||
return noise.NewHandshakeState(noise.Config{
|
return noise.NewHandshakeState(noise.Config{
|
||||||
CipherSuite: hc.cipherSuite,
|
CipherSuite: hc.cipherSuite,
|
||||||
Random: rand.Reader,
|
Random: rand.Reader,
|
||||||
@@ -45,7 +43,7 @@ func (hc *Credential) buildHandshakeState(initiator bool, pattern noise.Handshak
|
|||||||
Initiator: initiator,
|
Initiator: initiator,
|
||||||
StaticKeypair: noise.DHKey{Private: hc.privateKey, Public: hc.Cert.PublicKey()},
|
StaticKeypair: noise.DHKey{Private: hc.privateKey, Public: hc.Cert.PublicKey()},
|
||||||
PresharedKey: []byte{},
|
PresharedKey: []byte{},
|
||||||
PresharedKeyPlacement: pskPlacement,
|
PresharedKeyPlacement: 0,
|
||||||
})
|
})
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -1,216 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
// Package fec implements the systematic Reed-Solomon erasure code used to carry
|
|
||||||
// handshake messages that do not fit in a single UDP packet.
|
|
||||||
//
|
|
||||||
// A message is split into K equally sized data symbols (the last one zero
|
|
||||||
// padded). Symbol indexes 0..K-1 are the data symbols themselves; indexes
|
|
||||||
// K..MaxSymbols-1 are repair symbols. Any K distinct symbols reconstruct the
|
|
||||||
// message. Repair symbols are generated on demand, so a sender can emit fresh
|
|
||||||
// ones on every retransmit and a receiver can merge everything it has seen.
|
|
||||||
package fec
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
import (
|
|
||||||
"errors"
|
|
||||||
"fmt"
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// MaxSymbols is the number of distinct symbols, data and repair together, one
|
|
||||||
// message can be encoded into. It is bounded by the size of GF(2^8).
|
|
||||||
const MaxSymbols = 256
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
var (
|
|
||||||
ErrInvalidLayout = errors.New("invalid fec layout")
|
|
||||||
ErrIndexRange = errors.New("symbol index out of range")
|
|
||||||
ErrSymbolSize = errors.New("symbol has the wrong size")
|
|
||||||
ErrNotEnough = errors.New("not enough symbols to decode")
|
|
||||||
ErrCorrupt = errors.New("decoded message has non-zero padding")
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Layout describes how a message is split into symbols. Both ends derive it
|
|
||||||
// from the message length alone, so it never has to be sent.
|
|
||||||
type Layout struct {
|
|
||||||
MsgLen int // length of the message in bytes
|
|
||||||
K int // number of data symbols
|
|
||||||
SymbolSize int // size of every symbol, data and repair
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// NewLayout returns the layout for a message of msgLen bytes carried in symbols
|
|
||||||
// of at most maxSymbolSize bytes. Symbols are balanced, so padding is always
|
|
||||||
// less than K bytes.
|
|
||||||
func NewLayout(msgLen, maxSymbolSize int) (Layout, error) {
|
|
||||||
if msgLen <= 0 || maxSymbolSize <= 0 {
|
|
||||||
return Layout{}, ErrInvalidLayout
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
k := (msgLen + maxSymbolSize - 1) / maxSymbolSize
|
|
||||||
if k >= MaxSymbols {
|
|
||||||
return Layout{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: %d data symbols", ErrInvalidLayout, k)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return Layout{
|
|
||||||
MsgLen: msgLen,
|
|
||||||
K: k,
|
|
||||||
SymbolSize: (msgLen + k - 1) / k,
|
|
||||||
}, nil
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Encoder produces symbols for one message.
|
|
||||||
type Encoder struct {
|
|
||||||
layout Layout
|
|
||||||
data [][]byte
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// NewEncoder copies msg into padded data symbols.
|
|
||||||
func NewEncoder(msg []byte, maxSymbolSize int) (*Encoder, error) {
|
|
||||||
l, err := NewLayout(len(msg), maxSymbolSize)
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
return nil, err
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
buf := make([]byte, l.K*l.SymbolSize)
|
|
||||||
copy(buf, msg)
|
|
||||||
data := make([][]byte, l.K)
|
|
||||||
for i := range data {
|
|
||||||
data[i] = buf[i*l.SymbolSize : (i+1)*l.SymbolSize]
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return &Encoder{layout: l, data: data}, nil
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func (e *Encoder) Layout() Layout {
|
|
||||||
return e.layout
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Symbol appends the symbol with the given index to dst and returns the result.
|
|
||||||
func (e *Encoder) Symbol(dst []byte, index int) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
||||||
if index < 0 || index >= MaxSymbols {
|
|
||||||
return nil, ErrIndexRange
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if index < e.layout.K {
|
|
||||||
return append(dst, e.data[index]...), nil
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
start := len(dst)
|
|
||||||
dst = append(dst, make([]byte, e.layout.SymbolSize)...)
|
|
||||||
out := dst[start:]
|
|
||||||
for col, d := range e.data {
|
|
||||||
mulAdd(out, d, coefficient(index, col))
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return dst, nil
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Decoder collects symbols for one message until it can reconstruct it.
|
|
||||||
// It stores at most K symbols, so its memory is bounded by the layout no matter
|
|
||||||
// how many symbols arrive.
|
|
||||||
type Decoder struct {
|
|
||||||
layout Layout
|
|
||||||
have [MaxSymbols]bool
|
|
||||||
syms map[int][]byte
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// NewDecoder returns a decoder for a message of msgLen bytes that was encoded
|
|
||||||
// with the same maxSymbolSize.
|
|
||||||
func NewDecoder(msgLen, maxSymbolSize int) (*Decoder, error) {
|
|
||||||
l, err := NewLayout(msgLen, maxSymbolSize)
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
return nil, err
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return &Decoder{layout: l, syms: make(map[int][]byte, l.K)}, nil
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func (d *Decoder) Layout() Layout {
|
|
||||||
return d.layout
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Stored returns the number of symbols held.
|
|
||||||
func (d *Decoder) Stored() int {
|
|
||||||
return len(d.syms)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Has reports whether the symbol with the given index is held.
|
|
||||||
func (d *Decoder) Has(index int) bool {
|
|
||||||
return index >= 0 && index < MaxSymbols && d.have[index]
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Ready reports whether enough symbols have arrived to decode.
|
|
||||||
func (d *Decoder) Ready() bool {
|
|
||||||
return len(d.syms) >= d.layout.K
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Add stores a copy of the symbol. Duplicates, and anything beyond the first K
|
|
||||||
// distinct symbols, are ignored. It returns whether the decoder is ready.
|
|
||||||
func (d *Decoder) Add(index int, sym []byte) (bool, error) {
|
|
||||||
if index < 0 || index >= MaxSymbols {
|
|
||||||
return d.Ready(), ErrIndexRange
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if len(sym) != d.layout.SymbolSize {
|
|
||||||
return d.Ready(), ErrSymbolSize
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if d.have[index] || d.Ready() {
|
|
||||||
return d.Ready(), nil
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
d.have[index] = true
|
|
||||||
d.syms[index] = append([]byte(nil), sym...)
|
|
||||||
return d.Ready(), nil
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Decode reconstructs the message from the stored symbols.
|
|
||||||
func (d *Decoder) Decode() ([]byte, error) {
|
|
||||||
if !d.Ready() {
|
|
||||||
return nil, ErrNotEnough
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
l := d.layout
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
out := make([]byte, l.K*l.SymbolSize)
|
|
||||||
var missing, repair []int
|
|
||||||
for i := range l.K {
|
|
||||||
if s, ok := d.syms[i]; ok {
|
|
||||||
copy(out[i*l.SymbolSize:], s)
|
|
||||||
} else {
|
|
||||||
missing = append(missing, i)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if len(missing) > 0 {
|
|
||||||
for i := l.K; i < MaxSymbols && len(repair) < len(missing); i++ {
|
|
||||||
if d.have[i] {
|
|
||||||
repair = append(repair, i)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if len(repair) < len(missing) {
|
|
||||||
return nil, ErrNotEnough
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Each repair symbol r satisfies r = sum_col coefficient(r, col) * data[col].
|
|
||||||
// Move the known data columns to the left hand side, leaving a square
|
|
||||||
// Cauchy system in the missing columns.
|
|
||||||
rhs := make([][]byte, len(repair))
|
|
||||||
m := make([][]byte, len(repair))
|
|
||||||
for ri, row := range repair {
|
|
||||||
rhs[ri] = append([]byte(nil), d.syms[row]...)
|
|
||||||
m[ri] = make([]byte, len(missing))
|
|
||||||
mi := 0
|
|
||||||
for col := range l.K {
|
|
||||||
if mi < len(missing) && missing[mi] == col {
|
|
||||||
m[ri][mi] = coefficient(row, col)
|
|
||||||
mi++
|
|
||||||
continue
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
mulAdd(rhs[ri], out[col*l.SymbolSize:(col+1)*l.SymbolSize], coefficient(row, col))
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if !invert(m) {
|
|
||||||
// Unreachable for a Cauchy matrix; kept so a broken invariant fails loudly.
|
|
||||||
return nil, errors.New("fec: singular decode matrix")
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
for mi, col := range missing {
|
|
||||||
dst := out[col*l.SymbolSize : (col+1)*l.SymbolSize]
|
|
||||||
for ri := range repair {
|
|
||||||
mulAdd(dst, rhs[ri], m[mi][ri])
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
for _, b := range out[l.MsgLen:] {
|
|
||||||
if b != 0 {
|
|
||||||
return nil, ErrCorrupt
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return out[:l.MsgLen], nil
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
@@ -1,318 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
package fec
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
import (
|
|
||||||
"crypto/sha256"
|
|
||||||
"encoding/hex"
|
|
||||||
"math/rand/v2"
|
|
||||||
"testing"
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
|
|
||||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// slowMul is carry-less multiplication reduced by gfPoly, used to check the tables.
|
|
||||||
func slowMul(a, b byte) byte {
|
|
||||||
var p int
|
|
||||||
x, y := int(a), int(b)
|
|
||||||
for y > 0 {
|
|
||||||
if y&1 != 0 {
|
|
||||||
p ^= x
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
x <<= 1
|
|
||||||
if x&0x100 != 0 {
|
|
||||||
x ^= gfPoly
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
y >>= 1
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return byte(p)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func TestGF(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
for a := range 256 {
|
|
||||||
for b := range 256 {
|
|
||||||
require.Equal(t, slowMul(byte(a), byte(b)), gfMul(byte(a), byte(b)), "%d*%d", a, b)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if a != 0 {
|
|
||||||
require.Equal(t, byte(1), gfMul(byte(a), gfInv(byte(a))), "inv(%d)", a)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
src := make([]byte, 256)
|
|
||||||
for i := range src {
|
|
||||||
src[i] = byte(i)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
for c := range 256 {
|
|
||||||
dst := make([]byte, 256)
|
|
||||||
mulAdd(dst, src, byte(c))
|
|
||||||
for i := range src {
|
|
||||||
require.Equal(t, gfMul(byte(c), src[i]), dst[i])
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func TestLayout(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
for msgLen := 1; msgLen <= 20000; msgLen++ {
|
|
||||||
l, err := NewLayout(msgLen, 1176)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
require.Equal(t, (msgLen+1175)/1176, l.K)
|
|
||||||
require.LessOrEqual(t, l.SymbolSize, 1176)
|
|
||||||
require.GreaterOrEqual(t, l.K*l.SymbolSize, msgLen)
|
|
||||||
require.Less(t, l.K*l.SymbolSize-msgLen, l.K, "padding must be less than one byte per symbol")
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
l, err := NewLayout(65535, 1176)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, 56, l.K)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
_, err = NewLayout(0, 1176)
|
|
||||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInvalidLayout)
|
|
||||||
_, err = NewLayout(100, 0)
|
|
||||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInvalidLayout)
|
|
||||||
_, err = NewLayout(256, 1)
|
|
||||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInvalidLayout)
|
|
||||||
_, err = NewLayout(255, 1)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func randMsg(r *rand.Rand, n int) []byte {
|
|
||||||
b := make([]byte, n)
|
|
||||||
for i := range b {
|
|
||||||
b[i] = byte(r.Uint32())
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return b
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func decodeWith(t *testing.T, enc *Encoder, msgLen, maxSym int, indexes []int) []byte {
|
|
||||||
t.Helper()
|
|
||||||
dec, err := NewDecoder(msgLen, maxSym)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
for _, idx := range indexes {
|
|
||||||
sym, err := enc.Symbol(nil, idx)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
_, err = dec.Add(idx, sym)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
require.True(t, dec.Ready())
|
|
||||||
out, err := dec.Decode()
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
return out
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// TestExhaustiveSubsets decodes every k-subset of the first k+m symbols for
|
|
||||||
// small codes, which checks the MDS property directly.
|
|
||||||
func TestExhaustiveSubsets(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
r := rand.New(rand.NewPCG(1, 2))
|
|
||||||
const maxSym = 16
|
|
||||||
for k := 1; k <= 10; k++ {
|
|
||||||
for m := 1; m <= 5; m++ {
|
|
||||||
msgLen := (k-1)*maxSym + 1 + r.IntN(maxSym)
|
|
||||||
msg := randMsg(r, msgLen)
|
|
||||||
enc, err := NewEncoder(msg, maxSym)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
require.Equal(t, k, enc.Layout().K)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
n := k + m
|
|
||||||
for mask := 0; mask < 1<<n; mask++ {
|
|
||||||
var idx []int
|
|
||||||
for i := range n {
|
|
||||||
if mask&(1<<i) != 0 {
|
|
||||||
idx = append(idx, i)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if len(idx) != k {
|
|
||||||
continue
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
require.Equal(t, msg, decodeWith(t, enc, msgLen, maxSym, idx), "k=%d m=%d idx=%v", k, m, idx)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// TestRandomHighIndexes draws symbols from the whole index space, the shape
|
|
||||||
// retransmits produce once fresh repair symbols are in play.
|
|
||||||
func TestRandomHighIndexes(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
r := rand.New(rand.NewPCG(3, 4))
|
|
||||||
for range 2000 {
|
|
||||||
msgLen := 1 + r.IntN(65535)
|
|
||||||
msg := randMsg(r, msgLen)
|
|
||||||
enc, err := NewEncoder(msg, 1176)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
k := enc.Layout().K
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
idx := r.Perm(MaxSymbols)[:k]
|
|
||||||
require.Equal(t, msg, decodeWith(t, enc, msgLen, 1176, idx), "k=%d idx=%v", k, idx)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func TestDecoderBounds(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
r := rand.New(rand.NewPCG(5, 6))
|
|
||||||
msg := randMsg(r, 3000)
|
|
||||||
enc, err := NewEncoder(msg, 1176)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
l := enc.Layout()
|
|
||||||
require.Equal(t, 3, l.K)
|
|
||||||
require.Equal(t, 1000, l.SymbolSize)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
dec, err := NewDecoder(3000, 1176)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
_, err = dec.Decode()
|
|
||||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNotEnough)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
_, err = dec.Add(-1, make([]byte, 1000))
|
|
||||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIndexRange)
|
|
||||||
_, err = dec.Add(MaxSymbols, make([]byte, 1000))
|
|
||||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIndexRange)
|
|
||||||
_, err = dec.Add(0, make([]byte, 999))
|
|
||||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrSymbolSize)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
s5, _ := enc.Symbol(nil, 5)
|
|
||||||
ready, err := dec.Add(5, s5)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
require.False(t, ready)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// A duplicate index is ignored, even with different contents.
|
|
||||||
ready, err = dec.Add(5, make([]byte, 1000))
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
require.False(t, ready)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
s0, _ := enc.Symbol(nil, 0)
|
|
||||||
s9, _ := enc.Symbol(nil, 9)
|
|
||||||
_, err = dec.Add(0, s0)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
ready, err = dec.Add(9, s9)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
require.True(t, ready)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Symbols beyond K are not stored.
|
|
||||||
ready, err = dec.Add(1, make([]byte, 1000))
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
require.True(t, ready)
|
|
||||||
require.Len(t, dec.syms, 3)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
out, err := dec.Decode()
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
require.Equal(t, msg, out)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func TestCorruptPadding(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
// 3001 bytes in 3 symbols of 1001 leaves 2 bytes of padding in the last one.
|
|
||||||
dec, err := NewDecoder(3001, 1176)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
require.Equal(t, 1001, dec.Layout().SymbolSize)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
last := make([]byte, 1001)
|
|
||||||
last[1000] = 1
|
|
||||||
for i, s := range [][]byte{make([]byte, 1001), make([]byte, 1001), last} {
|
|
||||||
_, err = dec.Add(i, s)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
_, err = dec.Decode()
|
|
||||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrCorrupt)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// TestKnownAnswer pins the encoding. Both ends of a handshake must produce
|
|
||||||
// identical repair symbols, so any change here is a wire format change.
|
|
||||||
func TestKnownAnswer(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
msg := make([]byte, 3000)
|
|
||||||
for i := range msg {
|
|
||||||
msg[i] = byte(i*7 + 3)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
enc, err := NewEncoder(msg, 1176)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Cross-checked against an independent bit-serial GF(2^8) implementation.
|
|
||||||
want := map[int]string{
|
|
||||||
3: "52124f58276ec6338d3b3f4eed273bc7cabfe4f0f467928962b046ad1b348f50",
|
|
||||||
4: "a50928b04738981985a7d4a17ffaf8d7e30014ca64fc53c99800ffb61aec4aa7",
|
|
||||||
5: "ada4c95a7facbc542aaef584e6f0d081b7b0d0eed69ded03b57d0753a119cfc9",
|
|
||||||
255: "839066cdf94f963b223fb1c1c1360f698c14f6349b25653ff5b521791a4021b1",
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
for idx, h := range want {
|
|
||||||
sym, err := enc.Symbol(nil, idx)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
sum := sha256.Sum256(sym)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, h, hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]), "symbol %d", idx)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func FuzzRoundTrip(f *testing.F) {
|
|
||||||
f.Add([]byte("hello"), uint16(2), uint64(0))
|
|
||||||
f.Add(make([]byte, 9000), uint16(1176), uint64(7))
|
|
||||||
f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, msg []byte, maxSym uint16, seed uint64) {
|
|
||||||
if len(msg) == 0 || maxSym == 0 {
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
enc, err := NewEncoder(msg, int(maxSym))
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
r := rand.New(rand.NewPCG(seed, seed))
|
|
||||||
idx := r.Perm(MaxSymbols)[:enc.Layout().K]
|
|
||||||
require.Equal(t, msg, decodeWith(t, enc, len(msg), int(maxSym), idx))
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// FuzzDecoder feeds arbitrary symbols to a decoder; it must never panic and
|
|
||||||
// must either fail or return a message of the declared length.
|
|
||||||
func FuzzDecoder(f *testing.F) {
|
|
||||||
f.Add(uint16(3000), []byte{0, 5, 9, 200}, []byte("some symbol bytes"))
|
|
||||||
f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, msgLen uint16, indexes []byte, fill []byte) {
|
|
||||||
dec, err := NewDecoder(int(msgLen), 1176)
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
size := dec.Layout().SymbolSize
|
|
||||||
for i, idx := range indexes {
|
|
||||||
sym := make([]byte, size)
|
|
||||||
for j := range sym {
|
|
||||||
if len(fill) > 0 {
|
|
||||||
sym[j] = fill[(i+j)%len(fill)]
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if _, err := dec.Add(int(idx), sym); err != nil {
|
|
||||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
out, err := dec.Decode()
|
|
||||||
if err == nil {
|
|
||||||
require.Len(t, out, int(msgLen))
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// BenchmarkRepair and BenchmarkDecode use a v3-sized msg2 (~9.8KB, k=9) with
|
|
||||||
// three repair symbols, decoding with three data symbols missing.
|
|
||||||
func BenchmarkRepair(b *testing.B) {
|
|
||||||
msg := randMsg(rand.New(rand.NewPCG(7, 8)), 9800)
|
|
||||||
enc, err := NewEncoder(msg, 1176)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(b, err)
|
|
||||||
buf := make([]byte, 0, 1176)
|
|
||||||
b.SetBytes(int64(len(msg)))
|
|
||||||
for b.Loop() {
|
|
||||||
for idx := 9; idx < 12; idx++ {
|
|
||||||
buf, _ = enc.Symbol(buf[:0], idx)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func BenchmarkDecode(b *testing.B) {
|
|
||||||
msg := randMsg(rand.New(rand.NewPCG(7, 8)), 9800)
|
|
||||||
enc, err := NewEncoder(msg, 1176)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(b, err)
|
|
||||||
idx := []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11}
|
|
||||||
syms := make([][]byte, len(idx))
|
|
||||||
for i, x := range idx {
|
|
||||||
syms[i], _ = enc.Symbol(nil, x)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
b.SetBytes(int64(len(msg)))
|
|
||||||
for b.Loop() {
|
|
||||||
dec, _ := NewDecoder(len(msg), 1176)
|
|
||||||
for i, x := range idx {
|
|
||||||
_, _ = dec.Add(x, syms[i])
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if _, err := dec.Decode(); err != nil {
|
|
||||||
b.Fatal(err)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
package fec
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Arithmetic over GF(2^8) with the reducing polynomial x^8+x^4+x^3+x^2+1 (0x11d).
|
|
||||||
// Addition is XOR. Multiplication uses log/exp tables; the exp table is doubled so
|
|
||||||
// the sum of two logs never needs reducing mod 255.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
const gfPoly = 0x11d
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
var (
|
|
||||||
gfExp [510]byte
|
|
||||||
gfLog [256]byte
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func init() {
|
|
||||||
x := 1
|
|
||||||
for i := range 255 {
|
|
||||||
gfExp[i] = byte(x)
|
|
||||||
gfExp[i+255] = byte(x)
|
|
||||||
gfLog[x] = byte(i)
|
|
||||||
x <<= 1
|
|
||||||
if x&0x100 != 0 {
|
|
||||||
x ^= gfPoly
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func gfMul(a, b byte) byte {
|
|
||||||
if a == 0 || b == 0 {
|
|
||||||
return 0
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return gfExp[int(gfLog[a])+int(gfLog[b])]
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// gfInv returns the multiplicative inverse of a. a must be non-zero.
|
|
||||||
func gfInv(a byte) byte {
|
|
||||||
return gfExp[255-int(gfLog[a])]
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// mulAdd computes dst ^= c*src element-wise. dst must be at least as long as src.
|
|
||||||
func mulAdd(dst, src []byte, c byte) {
|
|
||||||
switch c {
|
|
||||||
case 0:
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
case 1:
|
|
||||||
for i, s := range src {
|
|
||||||
dst[i] ^= s
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
var t [256]byte
|
|
||||||
lc := int(gfLog[c])
|
|
||||||
for s := 1; s < 256; s++ {
|
|
||||||
t[s] = gfExp[int(gfLog[s])+lc]
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
for i, s := range src {
|
|
||||||
dst[i] ^= t[s]
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// coefficient returns the generator matrix entry for repair symbol index row and
|
|
||||||
// data symbol index col. Repair rows are a Cauchy matrix 1/(x_row + y_col) with
|
|
||||||
// x_row = row and y_col = col: rows are always >= k and columns < k so the two
|
|
||||||
// sets are disjoint, which makes every square submatrix invertible and the
|
|
||||||
// systematic code [I; C] MDS. A row depends only on its index, never on how many
|
|
||||||
// repair symbols exist, so new repair symbols can be generated at any time.
|
|
||||||
func coefficient(row, col int) byte {
|
|
||||||
return gfInv(byte(row) ^ byte(col))
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// invert inverts the n x n matrix m in place with Gauss-Jordan elimination.
|
|
||||||
// It returns false if m is singular.
|
|
||||||
func invert(m [][]byte) bool {
|
|
||||||
n := len(m)
|
|
||||||
inv := make([][]byte, n)
|
|
||||||
for i := range inv {
|
|
||||||
inv[i] = make([]byte, n)
|
|
||||||
inv[i][i] = 1
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
for col := range n {
|
|
||||||
pivot := -1
|
|
||||||
for r := col; r < n; r++ {
|
|
||||||
if m[r][col] != 0 {
|
|
||||||
pivot = r
|
|
||||||
break
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if pivot < 0 {
|
|
||||||
return false
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
m[col], m[pivot] = m[pivot], m[col]
|
|
||||||
inv[col], inv[pivot] = inv[pivot], inv[col]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
scale := gfInv(m[col][col])
|
|
||||||
for c := range n {
|
|
||||||
m[col][c] = gfMul(m[col][c], scale)
|
|
||||||
inv[col][c] = gfMul(inv[col][c], scale)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
for r := 0; r < n; r++ {
|
|
||||||
if r == col || m[r][col] == 0 {
|
|
||||||
continue
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
f := m[r][col]
|
|
||||||
for c := range n {
|
|
||||||
m[r][c] ^= gfMul(f, m[col][c])
|
|
||||||
inv[r][c] ^= gfMul(f, inv[col][c])
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
copy(m, inv)
|
|
||||||
return true
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
package fragment
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
import (
|
|
||||||
"errors"
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake/fec"
|
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// ErrMismatch is returned when a fragment disagrees with the message it claims to
|
|
||||||
// belong to. The caller should discard the whole assembly.
|
|
||||||
var ErrMismatch = errors.New("fragment does not match its message")
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Assembly collects the fragments of one incoming message. Its memory is bounded
|
|
||||||
// by the message length: at most K symbols are kept however many arrive.
|
|
||||||
//
|
|
||||||
// An Assembly is not safe for concurrent use.
|
|
||||||
type Assembly struct {
|
|
||||||
fragID uint32
|
|
||||||
msgLen uint16
|
|
||||||
dec *fec.Decoder
|
|
||||||
received int
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// NewAssembly starts an assembly for the message described by h. The fragment
|
|
||||||
// itself still has to be passed to Add.
|
|
||||||
func NewAssembly(h Header) (*Assembly, error) {
|
|
||||||
dec, err := fec.NewDecoder(int(h.MsgLen), MaxSymbolSize)
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
return nil, err
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return &Assembly{fragID: h.FragID, msgLen: h.MsgLen, dec: dec}, nil
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Add records a fragment parsed by Parse. It returns true once enough symbols
|
|
||||||
// are held to call Decode.
|
|
||||||
func (a *Assembly) Add(h Header, sym []byte) (bool, error) {
|
|
||||||
if h.FragID != a.fragID || h.MsgLen != a.msgLen {
|
|
||||||
return a.dec.Ready(), ErrMismatch
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
a.received += header.Len + HeaderLen + len(sym)
|
|
||||||
return a.dec.Add(int(h.Index), sym)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// wouldStore returns how many bytes Add would retain for this fragment.
|
|
||||||
func (a *Assembly) wouldStore(h Header, sym []byte) int {
|
|
||||||
if h.FragID != a.fragID || h.MsgLen != a.msgLen || a.dec.Ready() || a.dec.Has(int(h.Index)) {
|
|
||||||
return 0
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return len(sym)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Decode reconstructs the message. It requires Add to have reported ready.
|
|
||||||
func (a *Assembly) Decode() ([]byte, error) {
|
|
||||||
return a.dec.Decode()
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Stored returns the number of symbol bytes held.
|
|
||||||
func (a *Assembly) Stored() int {
|
|
||||||
return a.dec.Stored() * a.dec.Layout().SymbolSize
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Received returns the number of packet bytes received for this message,
|
|
||||||
// duplicates included. It is the basis for the amplification budget.
|
|
||||||
func (a *Assembly) Received() int {
|
|
||||||
return a.received
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
@@ -1,515 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
package fragment
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
import (
|
|
||||||
"bytes"
|
|
||||||
"math/rand/v2"
|
|
||||||
"sync"
|
|
||||||
"testing"
|
|
||||||
"time"
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
|
|
||||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
|
|
||||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
const testSubtype = header.MessageSubType(9)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
type testKey struct {
|
|
||||||
src string
|
|
||||||
fragID uint32
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func randMsg(r *rand.Rand, n int) []byte {
|
|
||||||
b := make([]byte, n)
|
|
||||||
for i := range b {
|
|
||||||
b[i] = byte(r.Uint32())
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return b
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func testConfig() TableConfig {
|
|
||||||
return TableConfig{
|
|
||||||
MaxBytes: 1 << 20,
|
|
||||||
MaxEntries: 64,
|
|
||||||
MaxPerSource: 4,
|
|
||||||
MaxMsgLen: 16384,
|
|
||||||
TTL: 2 * time.Second,
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// checkInvariants verifies the table's bookkeeping against its contents.
|
|
||||||
func checkInvariants[K, S comparable](t *testing.T, tb *Table[K, S]) {
|
|
||||||
t.Helper()
|
|
||||||
tb.mu.Lock()
|
|
||||||
defer tb.mu.Unlock()
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
require.Len(t, tb.order, len(tb.entries))
|
|
||||||
require.LessOrEqual(t, len(tb.entries), tb.cfg.MaxEntries)
|
|
||||||
bytes := 0
|
|
||||||
perSource := map[S]int{}
|
|
||||||
for i, key := range tb.order {
|
|
||||||
e, ok := tb.entries[key]
|
|
||||||
require.True(t, ok)
|
|
||||||
require.Equal(t, i, e.pos)
|
|
||||||
bytes += e.a.Stored()
|
|
||||||
perSource[e.source]++
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
require.Equal(t, bytes, tb.bytes)
|
|
||||||
require.LessOrEqual(t, tb.bytes, tb.cfg.MaxBytes)
|
|
||||||
require.Equal(t, perSource, tb.perSource)
|
|
||||||
for _, n := range perSource {
|
|
||||||
require.LessOrEqual(t, n, tb.cfg.MaxPerSource)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func parse(t *testing.T, p []byte) (header.H, Header, []byte) {
|
|
||||||
t.Helper()
|
|
||||||
var nh header.H
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, nh.Parse(p))
|
|
||||||
h, sym, err := Parse(p[header.Len:])
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
return nh, h, sym
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func TestParse(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
h := Header{FragID: 0xdeadbeef, MsgLen: 3000, Index: 7}
|
|
||||||
b := h.Encode(nil)
|
|
||||||
require.Len(t, b, HeaderLen)
|
|
||||||
b = append(b, make([]byte, 1000)...)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
got, sym, err := Parse(b)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, h, got)
|
|
||||||
assert.Len(t, sym, 1000)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
_, _, err = Parse(b[:HeaderLen-1])
|
|
||||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrShortFragment)
|
|
||||||
_, _, err = Parse(b[:len(b)-1])
|
|
||||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrSymbolSize)
|
|
||||||
_, _, err = Parse(append(b, 0))
|
|
||||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrSymbolSize)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
bad := Header{FragID: 0, MsgLen: 3000}.Encode(nil)
|
|
||||||
_, _, err = Parse(append(bad, make([]byte, 1000)...))
|
|
||||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrFragID)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
bad = Header{FragID: 1, MsgLen: 0}.Encode(nil)
|
|
||||||
_, _, err = Parse(bad)
|
|
||||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrMsgLen)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
bad = Header{FragID: 1, MsgLen: 3000, Flags: 0x02}.Encode(nil)
|
|
||||||
_, _, err = Parse(append(bad, make([]byte, 1000)...))
|
|
||||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrFlags)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Run("cookie", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
h := Header{FragID: 7, MsgLen: 3000, Index: 4, Flags: FlagCookie}
|
|
||||||
for i := range h.Cookie {
|
|
||||||
h.Cookie[i] = byte(i + 1)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
b := h.Encode(nil)
|
|
||||||
require.Len(t, b, HeaderLen+CookieLen)
|
|
||||||
b = append(b, make([]byte, 1000)...)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
got, sym, err := Parse(b)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, h, got)
|
|
||||||
assert.True(t, got.HasCookie())
|
|
||||||
assert.Len(t, sym, 1000)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
_, _, err = Parse(b[:HeaderLen+CookieLen-1])
|
|
||||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNoCookie)
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func TestDefaultRepair(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
for k, want := range map[int]int{1: 2, 2: 2, 6: 2, 7: 3, 9: 3, 10: 4, 14: 5} {
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, want, DefaultRepair(k), "k=%d", k)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func TestSender(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
_, err := NewSender(nil, testSubtype, 0, 1, 1)
|
|
||||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrMsgLen)
|
|
||||||
_, err = NewSender(make([]byte, 65536), testSubtype, 0, 1, 1)
|
|
||||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrMsgLen)
|
|
||||||
_, err = NewSender(make([]byte, 10), testSubtype, 0, 1, 0)
|
|
||||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrFragID)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
msg := randMsg(rand.New(rand.NewPCG(1, 1)), 9800)
|
|
||||||
s, err := NewSender(msg, testSubtype, 77, 2, 1234)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
require.Equal(t, 9, s.Layout().K)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
indexes := func(ps [][]byte) []int {
|
|
||||||
var out []int
|
|
||||||
for _, p := range ps {
|
|
||||||
require.LessOrEqual(t, len(p), MaxPacketLen)
|
|
||||||
nh, h, _ := parse(t, p)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, header.Handshake, nh.Type)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, testSubtype, nh.Subtype)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, uint32(77), nh.RemoteIndex)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, uint64(2), nh.MessageCounter)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, uint32(1234), h.FragID)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, uint16(9800), h.MsgLen)
|
|
||||||
out = append(out, int(h.Index))
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return out
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
now, later, err := s.Attempt(3)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}, indexes(now))
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, []int{9, 10, 11}, indexes(later))
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// A retry offers only indexes the receiver has not seen.
|
|
||||||
now, later, err = s.Attempt(3)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, []int{12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20}, indexes(now))
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, []int{21, 22, 23}, indexes(later))
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// A sender rebuilt from the same message resumes where it was told to.
|
|
||||||
s2, err := NewSender(msg, testSubtype, 77, 2, 1234)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
s2.SetNext(s.Next())
|
|
||||||
now2, _, err := s2.Attempt(0)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, []int{24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32}, indexes(now2))
|
|
||||||
s2.SetNext(-1)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, 255, s2.Next())
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// A cookie rides on every later packet, which still fits MaxPacketLen even
|
|
||||||
// with a full size symbol.
|
|
||||||
full, err := NewSender(make([]byte, 2*MaxSymbolSize), testSubtype, 0, 1, 9)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
full.SetCookie(Cookie{1, 2, 3})
|
|
||||||
pkts, _, err := full.Attempt(1)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
for _, p := range pkts {
|
|
||||||
assert.Len(t, p, MaxPacketLen)
|
|
||||||
_, h, _ := parse(t, p)
|
|
||||||
assert.True(t, h.HasCookie())
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, Cookie{1, 2, 3}, h.Cookie)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Indexes wrap once the space is used up.
|
|
||||||
for range 19 {
|
|
||||||
_, _, err = s.Attempt(3)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
now, _, err = s.Attempt(3)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, []int{252, 253, 254, 255, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, indexes(now))
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// TestLossy runs whole messages through heavy loss, reordering and duplication,
|
|
||||||
// merging across attempts, and checks the table ends empty.
|
|
||||||
func TestLossy(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
r := rand.New(rand.NewPCG(2, 2))
|
|
||||||
tb := NewTable[testKey, string](testConfig())
|
|
||||||
now := time.Unix(1000, 0)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
for i := range 300 {
|
|
||||||
msg := randMsg(r, 1+r.IntN(16384))
|
|
||||||
fragID := uint32(i + 1)
|
|
||||||
s, err := NewSender(msg, testSubtype, 0, 1, fragID)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
var got *Result
|
|
||||||
for attempt := 0; got == nil; attempt++ {
|
|
||||||
require.Less(t, attempt, 20, "message never completed")
|
|
||||||
a, b, err := s.Attempt(DefaultRepair(s.Layout().K))
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
var pkts [][]byte
|
|
||||||
for _, p := range append(a, b...) {
|
|
||||||
if r.Float64() < 0.3 {
|
|
||||||
continue
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
pkts = append(pkts, p)
|
|
||||||
if r.Float64() < 0.2 {
|
|
||||||
pkts = append(pkts, p)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
r.Shuffle(len(pkts), func(i, j int) { pkts[i], pkts[j] = pkts[j], pkts[i] })
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
for _, p := range pkts {
|
|
||||||
_, h, sym := parse(t, p)
|
|
||||||
res, err := tb.Add(testKey{"a", h.FragID}, "a", now, h, sym)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
if res != nil {
|
|
||||||
// The table keeps no memory of completed messages, so a late
|
|
||||||
// duplicate can complete one again; the handshake layer
|
|
||||||
// recognises the repeat.
|
|
||||||
require.True(t, bytes.Equal(msg, res.Msg))
|
|
||||||
got = res
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
checkInvariants(t, tb)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
now = now.Add(100 * time.Millisecond)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
require.Positive(t, got.Received)
|
|
||||||
// Late fragments of a completed message start a fresh entry; drop it.
|
|
||||||
tb.Expire(now.Add(time.Hour))
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
assert.Zero(t, tb.Len())
|
|
||||||
assert.Zero(t, tb.Bytes())
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// TestConcurrent spreads each message's fragments across goroutines, as
|
|
||||||
// multiple UDP reader routines would.
|
|
||||||
func TestConcurrent(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
tb := NewTable[testKey, string](testConfig())
|
|
||||||
now := time.Unix(1000, 0)
|
|
||||||
r := rand.New(rand.NewPCG(3, 3))
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
const msgs = 50
|
|
||||||
want := make(map[uint32][]byte, msgs)
|
|
||||||
var pkts [][]byte
|
|
||||||
for id := uint32(1); id <= msgs; id++ {
|
|
||||||
msg := randMsg(r, 1+r.IntN(16384))
|
|
||||||
want[id] = msg
|
|
||||||
s, err := NewSender(msg, testSubtype, 0, 1, id)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
a, b, err := s.Attempt(DefaultRepair(s.Layout().K))
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
pkts = append(pkts, a...)
|
|
||||||
pkts = append(pkts, b...)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
r.Shuffle(len(pkts), func(i, j int) { pkts[i], pkts[j] = pkts[j], pkts[i] })
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
var mu sync.Mutex
|
|
||||||
done := map[uint32]bool{}
|
|
||||||
var wg sync.WaitGroup
|
|
||||||
for w := range 8 {
|
|
||||||
wg.Go(func() {
|
|
||||||
for i := w; i < len(pkts); i += 8 {
|
|
||||||
h, sym, err := Parse(pkts[i][16:])
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
t.Error(err)
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
src := string(rune('a' + h.FragID))
|
|
||||||
res, err := tb.Add(testKey{src, h.FragID}, src, now, h, sym)
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
t.Error(err)
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if res != nil {
|
|
||||||
if !bytes.Equal(want[h.FragID], res.Msg) {
|
|
||||||
t.Errorf("message %d decoded wrong", h.FragID)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
mu.Lock()
|
|
||||||
done[h.FragID] = true
|
|
||||||
mu.Unlock()
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
wg.Wait()
|
|
||||||
assert.Len(t, done, msgs)
|
|
||||||
checkInvariants(t, tb)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func firstFragment(t *testing.T, msgLen int, fragID uint32) (Header, []byte) {
|
|
||||||
t.Helper()
|
|
||||||
s, err := NewSender(make([]byte, msgLen), testSubtype, 0, 1, fragID)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
now, _, err := s.Attempt(0)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
_, h, sym := parse(t, now[0])
|
|
||||||
return h, sym
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func TestTableLimits(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
now := time.Unix(1000, 0)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Run("max message length", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
tb := NewTable[testKey, string](testConfig())
|
|
||||||
h, sym := firstFragment(t, 16385, 1)
|
|
||||||
_, err := tb.Add(testKey{"a", 1}, "a", now, h, sym)
|
|
||||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrTooLarge)
|
|
||||||
assert.Zero(t, tb.Len())
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Run("per source quota", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
cfg := testConfig()
|
|
||||||
cfg.MaxPerSource = 2
|
|
||||||
tb := NewTable[testKey, string](cfg)
|
|
||||||
for id := uint32(1); id <= 3; id++ {
|
|
||||||
h, sym := firstFragment(t, 5000, id)
|
|
||||||
_, err := tb.Add(testKey{"a", id}, "a", now, h, sym)
|
|
||||||
if id <= 2 {
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
} else {
|
|
||||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrSourceQuota)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
h, sym := firstFragment(t, 5000, 4)
|
|
||||||
_, err := tb.Add(testKey{"b", 4}, "b", now, h, sym)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, 3, tb.Len())
|
|
||||||
checkInvariants(t, tb)
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Run("max entries evicts", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
cfg := testConfig()
|
|
||||||
cfg.MaxEntries = 4
|
|
||||||
tb := NewTable[testKey, string](cfg)
|
|
||||||
for id := uint32(1); id <= 10; id++ {
|
|
||||||
h, sym := firstFragment(t, 5000, id)
|
|
||||||
src := string(rune('a' + id))
|
|
||||||
_, err := tb.Add(testKey{src, id}, src, now, h, sym)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
checkInvariants(t, tb)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, 4, tb.Len())
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Run("max bytes evicts others", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
cfg := testConfig()
|
|
||||||
cfg.MaxBytes = 3 * 1000
|
|
||||||
tb := NewTable[testKey, string](cfg)
|
|
||||||
for id := uint32(1); id <= 10; id++ {
|
|
||||||
h, sym := firstFragment(t, 5000, id) // 5 symbols of 1000
|
|
||||||
src := string(rune('a' + id))
|
|
||||||
_, err := tb.Add(testKey{src, id}, src, now, h, sym)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
checkInvariants(t, tb)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, 3000, tb.Bytes())
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Run("no room removes new entry", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
cfg := testConfig()
|
|
||||||
cfg.MaxBytes = 500
|
|
||||||
tb := NewTable[testKey, string](cfg)
|
|
||||||
h, sym := firstFragment(t, 5000, 1)
|
|
||||||
_, err := tb.Add(testKey{"a", 1}, "a", now, h, sym)
|
|
||||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNoRoom)
|
|
||||||
assert.Zero(t, tb.Len())
|
|
||||||
checkInvariants(t, tb)
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Run("duplicates are not charged", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
tb := NewTable[testKey, string](testConfig())
|
|
||||||
h, sym := firstFragment(t, 5000, 1)
|
|
||||||
for range 5 {
|
|
||||||
_, err := tb.Add(testKey{"a", 1}, "a", now, h, sym)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, 1000, tb.Bytes())
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Run("mismatch drops the entry", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
tb := NewTable[testKey, string](testConfig())
|
|
||||||
h, sym := firstFragment(t, 5000, 1)
|
|
||||||
_, err := tb.Add(testKey{"a", 1}, "a", now, h, sym)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
h2, sym2 := firstFragment(t, 6000, 1)
|
|
||||||
_, err = tb.Add(testKey{"a", 1}, "a", now, h2, sym2)
|
|
||||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrMismatch)
|
|
||||||
assert.Zero(t, tb.Len())
|
|
||||||
assert.Zero(t, tb.Bytes())
|
|
||||||
checkInvariants(t, tb)
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Run("load", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
cfg := testConfig()
|
|
||||||
cfg.MaxEntries = 4
|
|
||||||
cfg.MaxBytes = 10000
|
|
||||||
tb := NewTable[testKey, string](cfg)
|
|
||||||
assert.Zero(t, tb.Load())
|
|
||||||
h, sym := firstFragment(t, 5000, 1)
|
|
||||||
_, err := tb.Add(testKey{"a", 1}, "a", now, h, sym)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
assert.InDelta(t, 0.25, tb.Load(), 0.001, "one of four entries")
|
|
||||||
h, sym = firstFragment(t, 5000, 2)
|
|
||||||
_, err = tb.Add(testKey{"b", 2}, "b", now, h, sym)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
assert.InDelta(t, 0.5, tb.Load(), 0.001)
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Run("ttl", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
tb := NewTable[testKey, string](testConfig())
|
|
||||||
s, err := NewSender(make([]byte, 5000), testSubtype, 0, 1, 1)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
pkts, _, err := s.Attempt(0)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
_, h, sym := parse(t, pkts[0])
|
|
||||||
_, err = tb.Add(testKey{"a", 1}, "a", now, h, sym)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Activity within the TTL keeps the entry and slides its deadline.
|
|
||||||
_, h, sym = parse(t, pkts[1])
|
|
||||||
_, err = tb.Add(testKey{"a", 1}, "a", now.Add(1500*time.Millisecond), h, sym)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, 2000, tb.Bytes())
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
tb.Expire(now.Add(3 * time.Second))
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, 1, tb.Len())
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// A stale entry is restarted rather than merged.
|
|
||||||
_, h, sym = parse(t, pkts[2])
|
|
||||||
_, err = tb.Add(testKey{"a", 1}, "a", now.Add(10*time.Second), h, sym)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, 1000, tb.Bytes())
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
tb.Expire(now.Add(time.Minute))
|
|
||||||
assert.Zero(t, tb.Len())
|
|
||||||
checkInvariants(t, tb)
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func FuzzParse(f *testing.F) {
|
|
||||||
f.Add(append(Header{FragID: 1, MsgLen: 3000}.Encode(nil), make([]byte, 1000)...))
|
|
||||||
f.Add([]byte{0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 7})
|
|
||||||
f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, b []byte) {
|
|
||||||
h, sym, err := Parse(b)
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
require.Equal(t, b, append(h.Encode(nil), sym...))
|
|
||||||
l, err := h.Layout()
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
require.LessOrEqual(t, l.SymbolSize, MaxSymbolSize)
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// FuzzTable drives a small table with arbitrary fragments and checks its
|
|
||||||
// bookkeeping after every step.
|
|
||||||
func FuzzTable(f *testing.F) {
|
|
||||||
f.Add([]byte{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12})
|
|
||||||
f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, ops []byte) {
|
|
||||||
tb := NewTable[testKey, string](TableConfig{
|
|
||||||
MaxBytes: 4000,
|
|
||||||
MaxEntries: 3,
|
|
||||||
MaxPerSource: 2,
|
|
||||||
MaxMsgLen: 6000,
|
|
||||||
TTL: time.Second,
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
now := time.Unix(0, 0)
|
|
||||||
for len(ops) >= 4 {
|
|
||||||
src := string(rune('a' + ops[0]%4))
|
|
||||||
fragID := uint32(ops[1]%5) + 1
|
|
||||||
msgLen := uint16(ops[2])*32 + 1
|
|
||||||
index := ops[3]
|
|
||||||
ops = ops[4:]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
h := Header{FragID: fragID, MsgLen: msgLen, Index: index}
|
|
||||||
l, err := h.Layout()
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
sym := make([]byte, l.SymbolSize)
|
|
||||||
if index%7 == 0 {
|
|
||||||
now = now.Add(600 * time.Millisecond)
|
|
||||||
tb.Expire(now)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
res, err := tb.Add(testKey{src, fragID}, src, now, h, sym)
|
|
||||||
if res != nil {
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
require.Len(t, res.Msg, int(msgLen))
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
checkInvariants(t, tb)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
@@ -1,118 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
package fragment
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
import (
|
|
||||||
"errors"
|
|
||||||
"math"
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake/fec"
|
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// DefaultRepair is the starting number of repair symbols per attempt for a
|
|
||||||
// message of k data symbols. Small messages get proportionally more repair.
|
|
||||||
func DefaultRepair(k int) int {
|
|
||||||
return max(2, (k+2)/3)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Sender produces the fragment packets of one outgoing handshake message.
|
|
||||||
//
|
|
||||||
// The first attempt sends the K data symbols followed by repair symbols. Every
|
|
||||||
// later attempt sends symbols with indexes the receiver has not been offered yet,
|
|
||||||
// so whatever it already holds still counts toward K. Symbols are a deterministic
|
|
||||||
// function of the message, which keeps retransmits idempotent. Once all
|
|
||||||
// fec.MaxSymbols indexes are used the sequence wraps and repeats.
|
|
||||||
//
|
|
||||||
// A Sender is not safe for concurrent use.
|
|
||||||
type Sender struct {
|
|
||||||
enc *fec.Encoder
|
|
||||||
subtype header.MessageSubType
|
|
||||||
remoteIndex uint32
|
|
||||||
counter uint64
|
|
||||||
fragID uint32
|
|
||||||
next int
|
|
||||||
cookie *Cookie
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// NewSender prepares msg for sending. subtype, remoteIndex and counter fill the
|
|
||||||
// Nebula header of every fragment; fragID is the sender's local index.
|
|
||||||
func NewSender(msg []byte, subtype header.MessageSubType, remoteIndex uint32, counter uint64, fragID uint32) (*Sender, error) {
|
|
||||||
if len(msg) == 0 || len(msg) > math.MaxUint16 {
|
|
||||||
return nil, ErrMsgLen
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if fragID == 0 {
|
|
||||||
return nil, ErrFragID
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
enc, err := fec.NewEncoder(msg, MaxSymbolSize)
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
return nil, err
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return &Sender{
|
|
||||||
enc: enc,
|
|
||||||
subtype: subtype,
|
|
||||||
remoteIndex: remoteIndex,
|
|
||||||
counter: counter,
|
|
||||||
fragID: fragID,
|
|
||||||
}, nil
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func (s *Sender) Layout() fec.Layout {
|
|
||||||
return s.enc.Layout()
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// SetNext sets the index the next attempt starts from, so a sender rebuilt from
|
|
||||||
// a cached message can carry on offering fresh symbols.
|
|
||||||
func (s *Sender) SetNext(index int) {
|
|
||||||
s.next = ((index % fec.MaxSymbols) + fec.MaxSymbols) % fec.MaxSymbols
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// SetCookie attaches a cookie from a responder under load to every later packet.
|
|
||||||
func (s *Sender) SetCookie(c Cookie) {
|
|
||||||
s.cookie = &c
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Next returns the index the next attempt starts from.
|
|
||||||
func (s *Sender) Next() int {
|
|
||||||
return s.next
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Attempt returns the packets for one transmission attempt carrying K+repair
|
|
||||||
// symbols. now should be sent immediately and later after the repair delay, so
|
|
||||||
// a tail drop at the end of the first burst does not also take the repair.
|
|
||||||
func (s *Sender) Attempt(repair int) (now, later [][]byte, err error) {
|
|
||||||
if repair < 0 {
|
|
||||||
return nil, nil, errors.New("negative repair count")
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
k := s.enc.Layout().K
|
|
||||||
now = make([][]byte, 0, k)
|
|
||||||
later = make([][]byte, 0, repair)
|
|
||||||
for i := range k + repair {
|
|
||||||
p, err := s.packet(s.next)
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
return nil, nil, err
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
s.next = (s.next + 1) % fec.MaxSymbols
|
|
||||||
if i < k {
|
|
||||||
now = append(now, p)
|
|
||||||
} else {
|
|
||||||
later = append(later, p)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return now, later, nil
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func (s *Sender) packet(index int) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
||||||
l := s.enc.Layout()
|
|
||||||
p := make([]byte, header.Len, header.Len+HeaderLen+CookieLen+l.SymbolSize)
|
|
||||||
header.Encode(p, header.Version, header.Handshake, s.subtype, s.remoteIndex, s.counter)
|
|
||||||
h := Header{
|
|
||||||
FragID: s.fragID,
|
|
||||||
MsgLen: uint16(l.MsgLen),
|
|
||||||
Index: uint8(index),
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if s.cookie != nil {
|
|
||||||
h.Flags |= FlagCookie
|
|
||||||
h.Cookie = *s.cookie
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
p = h.Encode(p)
|
|
||||||
return s.enc.Symbol(p, index)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
@@ -1,220 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
package fragment
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
import (
|
|
||||||
"errors"
|
|
||||||
"math/rand/v2"
|
|
||||||
"sync"
|
|
||||||
"time"
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
var (
|
|
||||||
ErrTooLarge = errors.New("fragmented message exceeds the size limit")
|
|
||||||
ErrSourceQuota = errors.New("source has too many messages in progress")
|
|
||||||
ErrNoRoom = errors.New("no room for fragment")
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// TableConfig bounds a Table.
|
|
||||||
type TableConfig struct {
|
|
||||||
MaxBytes int // symbol bytes held across all entries
|
|
||||||
MaxEntries int // messages in progress across all sources
|
|
||||||
MaxPerSource int // messages in progress per source
|
|
||||||
MaxMsgLen int // largest message accepted
|
|
||||||
TTL time.Duration // an entry idle this long is dropped
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Table reassembles messages from senders that have not authenticated yet, the
|
|
||||||
// responder's view of msg1. Every resource is capped. When a cap is hit a
|
|
||||||
// random entry is evicted; random eviction is harder to aim than LRU, which a
|
|
||||||
// flood can use to flush specific entries.
|
|
||||||
//
|
|
||||||
// K identifies one message, typically the source plus FragID. S identifies the
|
|
||||||
// source for quotas, typically the address masked to /32 or /64.
|
|
||||||
//
|
|
||||||
// A Table is safe for concurrent use.
|
|
||||||
type Table[K, S comparable] struct {
|
|
||||||
mu sync.Mutex
|
|
||||||
cfg TableConfig
|
|
||||||
entries map[K]*tableEntry[K, S]
|
|
||||||
order []K
|
|
||||||
perSource map[S]int
|
|
||||||
bytes int
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
type tableEntry[K, S comparable] struct {
|
|
||||||
a *Assembly
|
|
||||||
source S
|
|
||||||
lastSeen time.Time
|
|
||||||
pos int
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func NewTable[K, S comparable](cfg TableConfig) *Table[K, S] {
|
|
||||||
return &Table[K, S]{
|
|
||||||
cfg: cfg,
|
|
||||||
entries: make(map[K]*tableEntry[K, S]),
|
|
||||||
perSource: make(map[S]int),
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Result describes a completed message.
|
|
||||||
type Result struct {
|
|
||||||
Msg []byte // the decoded message
|
|
||||||
Received int // packet bytes received for it, for the amplification budget
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Add records a fragment parsed by Parse. When the message is complete its entry
|
|
||||||
// is removed and the result returned; otherwise the result is nil. A decode
|
|
||||||
// error means the message is lost and must be retransmitted.
|
|
||||||
func (t *Table[K, S]) Add(key K, source S, now time.Time, h Header, sym []byte) (*Result, error) {
|
|
||||||
if int(h.MsgLen) > t.cfg.MaxMsgLen {
|
|
||||||
return nil, ErrTooLarge
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.mu.Lock()
|
|
||||||
e, ok := t.entries[key]
|
|
||||||
if ok && now.Sub(e.lastSeen) > t.cfg.TTL {
|
|
||||||
t.remove(key, e)
|
|
||||||
ok = false
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if !ok {
|
|
||||||
var err error
|
|
||||||
e, err = t.insert(key, source, h)
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
t.mu.Unlock()
|
|
||||||
return nil, err
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
e.lastSeen = now
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if !t.makeRoom(key, e.a.wouldStore(h, sym)) {
|
|
||||||
if e.a.Stored() == 0 {
|
|
||||||
t.remove(key, e)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
t.mu.Unlock()
|
|
||||||
return nil, ErrNoRoom
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
before := e.a.Stored()
|
|
||||||
ready, err := e.a.Add(h, sym)
|
|
||||||
t.bytes += e.a.Stored() - before
|
|
||||||
if err != nil || !ready {
|
|
||||||
if errors.Is(err, ErrMismatch) || (err != nil && e.a.Stored() == 0) {
|
|
||||||
t.remove(key, e)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
t.mu.Unlock()
|
|
||||||
return nil, err
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.remove(key, e)
|
|
||||||
t.mu.Unlock()
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
msg, err := e.a.Decode()
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
return nil, err
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return &Result{Msg: msg, Received: e.a.Received()}, nil
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Expire drops every entry idle for longer than the TTL.
|
|
||||||
func (t *Table[K, S]) Expire(now time.Time) {
|
|
||||||
t.mu.Lock()
|
|
||||||
defer t.mu.Unlock()
|
|
||||||
for i := 0; i < len(t.order); {
|
|
||||||
key := t.order[i]
|
|
||||||
e := t.entries[key]
|
|
||||||
if now.Sub(e.lastSeen) > t.cfg.TTL {
|
|
||||||
// remove swaps the last entry into position i, so look at i again.
|
|
||||||
t.remove(key, e)
|
|
||||||
continue
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
i++
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Len returns the number of messages in progress.
|
|
||||||
func (t *Table[K, S]) Len() int {
|
|
||||||
t.mu.Lock()
|
|
||||||
defer t.mu.Unlock()
|
|
||||||
return len(t.entries)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Load returns how full the table is, from 0 to 1, by whichever of its byte and
|
|
||||||
// entry limits is closer.
|
|
||||||
func (t *Table[K, S]) Load() float64 {
|
|
||||||
t.mu.Lock()
|
|
||||||
defer t.mu.Unlock()
|
|
||||||
return max(float64(t.bytes)/float64(t.cfg.MaxBytes), float64(len(t.entries))/float64(t.cfg.MaxEntries))
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Bytes returns the number of symbol bytes held.
|
|
||||||
func (t *Table[K, S]) Bytes() int {
|
|
||||||
t.mu.Lock()
|
|
||||||
defer t.mu.Unlock()
|
|
||||||
return t.bytes
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func (t *Table[K, S]) insert(key K, source S, h Header) (*tableEntry[K, S], error) {
|
|
||||||
if t.perSource[source] >= t.cfg.MaxPerSource {
|
|
||||||
return nil, ErrSourceQuota
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
a, err := NewAssembly(h)
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
return nil, err
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
for len(t.entries) >= t.cfg.MaxEntries {
|
|
||||||
if !t.evictRandom(nil) {
|
|
||||||
return nil, ErrNoRoom
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
e := &tableEntry[K, S]{a: a, source: source, pos: len(t.order)}
|
|
||||||
t.entries[key] = e
|
|
||||||
t.order = append(t.order, key)
|
|
||||||
t.perSource[source]++
|
|
||||||
return e, nil
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// makeRoom evicts random entries other than keep until n more bytes fit.
|
|
||||||
func (t *Table[K, S]) makeRoom(keep K, n int) bool {
|
|
||||||
for t.bytes+n > t.cfg.MaxBytes {
|
|
||||||
if !t.evictRandom(&keep) {
|
|
||||||
return false
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return true
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func (t *Table[K, S]) evictRandom(keep *K) bool {
|
|
||||||
candidates := len(t.order)
|
|
||||||
if keep != nil {
|
|
||||||
if _, ok := t.entries[*keep]; ok {
|
|
||||||
candidates--
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if candidates <= 0 {
|
|
||||||
return false
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
for {
|
|
||||||
key := t.order[rand.IntN(len(t.order))]
|
|
||||||
if keep != nil && key == *keep {
|
|
||||||
continue
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
t.remove(key, t.entries[key])
|
|
||||||
return true
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func (t *Table[K, S]) remove(key K, e *tableEntry[K, S]) {
|
|
||||||
last := len(t.order) - 1
|
|
||||||
moved := t.order[last]
|
|
||||||
t.order[e.pos] = moved
|
|
||||||
t.entries[moved].pos = e.pos
|
|
||||||
t.order = t.order[:last]
|
|
||||||
delete(t.entries, key)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.bytes -= e.a.Stored()
|
|
||||||
if t.perSource[e.source] <= 1 {
|
|
||||||
delete(t.perSource, e.source)
|
|
||||||
} else {
|
|
||||||
t.perSource[e.source]--
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
// Package fragment carries handshake messages that do not fit in one UDP
|
|
||||||
// packet. A message is Reed-Solomon coded into equally sized symbols (see
|
|
||||||
// handshake/fec) and each symbol travels in its own packet:
|
|
||||||
//
|
|
||||||
// Nebula header (16) | Fragment header (8) | [cookie (16)] | symbol
|
|
||||||
//
|
|
||||||
// The fragment header is FragID u32 | MsgLen u16 | Index u8 | Flags u8, all big
|
|
||||||
// endian. Both ends derive the symbol layout from MsgLen, so any MsgLen-derived
|
|
||||||
// value never has to be sent. FlagCookie marks a cookie a responder under load
|
|
||||||
// asked for; room for it is always reserved, so a fragment never outgrows
|
|
||||||
// MaxPacketLen.
|
|
||||||
package fragment
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
import (
|
|
||||||
"encoding/binary"
|
|
||||||
"errors"
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake/fec"
|
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
const (
|
|
||||||
// HeaderLen is the size of the fragment header that follows the Nebula header.
|
|
||||||
HeaderLen = 8
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// CookieLen is the size of the cookie a fragment carries when FlagCookie is set.
|
|
||||||
CookieLen = 16
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// FlagCookie marks a fragment that carries a cookie after its header.
|
|
||||||
FlagCookie uint8 = 0x01
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// MaxPacketLen bounds every fragment packet, Nebula header included. A relayed
|
|
||||||
// fragment gains a 16 byte header and a 16 byte tag, which lands exactly on
|
|
||||||
// the 1232 byte UDP payload available on an IPv6 minimum MTU path.
|
|
||||||
MaxPacketLen = 1200
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// MaxSymbolSize is the largest symbol that fits in MaxPacketLen alongside a cookie.
|
|
||||||
MaxSymbolSize = MaxPacketLen - header.Len - HeaderLen - CookieLen
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
var (
|
|
||||||
ErrShortFragment = errors.New("fragment is too short")
|
|
||||||
ErrFragID = errors.New("fragment has a zero FragID")
|
|
||||||
ErrMsgLen = errors.New("fragment has a zero MsgLen")
|
|
||||||
ErrFlags = errors.New("fragment has reserved flags set")
|
|
||||||
ErrNoCookie = errors.New("fragment is too short for its cookie")
|
|
||||||
ErrSymbolSize = errors.New("fragment symbol size does not match its MsgLen")
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Cookie proves a sender received a responder's reply at its address.
|
|
||||||
type Cookie [CookieLen]byte
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Header is the fragment header.
|
|
||||||
type Header struct {
|
|
||||||
FragID uint32 // the sender's local index for this handshake, never zero
|
|
||||||
MsgLen uint16 // length of the whole message
|
|
||||||
Index uint8 // symbol index, data below K and repair from K
|
|
||||||
Flags uint8 // FlagCookie, other bits reserved and zero
|
|
||||||
Cookie Cookie // valid when Flags has FlagCookie
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func (h Header) HasCookie() bool {
|
|
||||||
return h.Flags&FlagCookie != 0
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Encode appends the header, and its cookie if it has one, to b.
|
|
||||||
func (h Header) Encode(b []byte) []byte {
|
|
||||||
b = binary.BigEndian.AppendUint32(b, h.FragID)
|
|
||||||
b = binary.BigEndian.AppendUint16(b, h.MsgLen)
|
|
||||||
b = append(b, h.Index, h.Flags)
|
|
||||||
if h.HasCookie() {
|
|
||||||
b = append(b, h.Cookie[:]...)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return b
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Layout returns the symbol layout the header's MsgLen implies.
|
|
||||||
func (h Header) Layout() (fec.Layout, error) {
|
|
||||||
return fec.NewLayout(int(h.MsgLen), MaxSymbolSize)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Parse validates the bytes following the Nebula header and splits them into
|
|
||||||
// the fragment header and the symbol. The symbol aliases b.
|
|
||||||
func Parse(b []byte) (Header, []byte, error) {
|
|
||||||
if len(b) < HeaderLen {
|
|
||||||
return Header{}, nil, ErrShortFragment
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
h := Header{
|
|
||||||
FragID: binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[0:4]),
|
|
||||||
MsgLen: binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[4:6]),
|
|
||||||
Index: b[6],
|
|
||||||
Flags: b[7],
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if h.FragID == 0 {
|
|
||||||
return Header{}, nil, ErrFragID
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if h.MsgLen == 0 {
|
|
||||||
return Header{}, nil, ErrMsgLen
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if h.Flags&^FlagCookie != 0 {
|
|
||||||
return Header{}, nil, ErrFlags
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
b = b[HeaderLen:]
|
|
||||||
if h.HasCookie() {
|
|
||||||
if len(b) < CookieLen {
|
|
||||||
return Header{}, nil, ErrNoCookie
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
copy(h.Cookie[:], b)
|
|
||||||
b = b[CookieLen:]
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
l, err := h.Layout()
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
return Header{}, nil, err
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
sym := b
|
|
||||||
if len(sym) != l.SymbolSize {
|
|
||||||
return Header{}, nil, ErrSymbolSize
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return h, sym, nil
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
@@ -24,9 +24,6 @@ message NebulaHandshakeDetails {
|
|||||||
uint64 Cookie = 4 [deprecated = true];
|
uint64 Cookie = 4 [deprecated = true];
|
||||||
uint64 Time = 5;
|
uint64 Time = 5;
|
||||||
uint32 CertVersion = 8;
|
uint32 CertVersion = 8;
|
||||||
// KEMKey is the initiator's ephemeral ML-KEM-1024 encapsulation key. It is
|
|
||||||
// only present in msg1 of the ix_psk2_mlkem1024 subtype.
|
|
||||||
bytes KEMKey = 9;
|
|
||||||
// reserved for WIP multiport
|
// reserved for WIP multiport
|
||||||
reserved 6, 7;
|
reserved 6, 7;
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
package handshake
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
import (
|
|
||||||
"crypto/hkdf"
|
|
||||||
"crypto/mlkem"
|
|
||||||
"crypto/sha256"
|
|
||||||
"errors"
|
|
||||||
"fmt"
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// kemPSKSalt separates the psk derivation from any other use of the secret.
|
|
||||||
const kemPSKSalt = "nebula ix_psk2_mlkem1024 v1"
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
var ErrInvalidKEMKey = errors.New("peer sent an invalid ML-KEM encapsulation key")
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// kemPSK derives the noise psk from an ML-KEM shared secret. The ciphertext is
|
|
||||||
// bound in because, unlike the encapsulation key, it travels outside the noise
|
|
||||||
// transcript.
|
|
||||||
func kemPSK(sharedKey, ciphertext []byte) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
||||||
secret := make([]byte, 0, len(sharedKey)+len(ciphertext))
|
|
||||||
secret = append(secret, sharedKey...)
|
|
||||||
secret = append(secret, ciphertext...)
|
|
||||||
return hkdf.Extract(sha256.New, secret, []byte(kemPSKSalt))
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// kemEncapsulate is the responder half: encapsulate to the initiator's key,
|
|
||||||
// install the psk, and remember the ciphertext to prefix the response with.
|
|
||||||
func (m *Machine) kemEncapsulate(encapsulationKey []byte) error {
|
|
||||||
ek, err := mlkem.NewEncapsulationKey1024(encapsulationKey)
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", ErrInvalidKEMKey, err)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
sharedKey, ct := ek.Encapsulate()
|
|
||||||
psk, err := kemPSK(sharedKey, ct)
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
return err
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if err := m.hs.SetPresharedKey(psk); err != nil {
|
|
||||||
return err
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
m.kemCiphertext = ct
|
|
||||||
return nil
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// kemDecapsulate is the initiator half: recover the shared secret from the
|
|
||||||
// ciphertext prefixing the response and install the psk. It returns the rest of
|
|
||||||
// the message, which is the noise message.
|
|
||||||
func (m *Machine) kemDecapsulate(msg []byte) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
||||||
if len(msg) < mlkem.CiphertextSize1024 {
|
|
||||||
return nil, ErrPacketTooShort
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if m.kemKey == nil {
|
|
||||||
return nil, errors.New("no ML-KEM decapsulation key for this handshake")
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
ct := msg[:mlkem.CiphertextSize1024]
|
|
||||||
sharedKey, err := m.kemKey.Decapsulate(ct)
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
return nil, err
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
psk, err := kemPSK(sharedKey, ct)
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
return nil, err
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if err := m.hs.SetPresharedKey(psk); err != nil {
|
|
||||||
return nil, err
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return msg[mlkem.CiphertextSize1024:], nil
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
@@ -1,208 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
package handshake
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
import (
|
|
||||||
"bytes"
|
|
||||||
"crypto/mlkem"
|
|
||||||
"net/netip"
|
|
||||||
"testing"
|
|
||||||
"time"
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
"github.com/flynn/noise"
|
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
|
|
||||||
ct "github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
|
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
|
|
||||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
|
|
||||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func newKEMMachine(t *testing.T, cs *testCertState, v CertVerifier, initiator bool, index uint32) *Machine {
|
|
||||||
t.Helper()
|
|
||||||
m, err := NewMachine(
|
|
||||||
cs.version, cs.getCredential, v,
|
|
||||||
func() (uint32, error) { return index, nil },
|
|
||||||
initiator, header.HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024,
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
return m
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
type kemFixture struct {
|
|
||||||
initCS, respCS *testCertState
|
|
||||||
v CertVerifier
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func newKEMFixture(t *testing.T, cipher noise.CipherFunc) kemFixture {
|
|
||||||
ca, _, caKey, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
|
|
||||||
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
return kemFixture{
|
|
||||||
initCS: newTestCertStateWithCipher(t, ca, caKey, "initiator", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")}, cipher),
|
|
||||||
respCS: newTestCertStateWithCipher(t, ca, caKey, "responder", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.2/24")}, cipher),
|
|
||||||
v: testVerifier(ct.NewTestCAPool(ca)),
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func requireKeysMatch(t *testing.T, a, b *Result) {
|
|
||||||
t.Helper()
|
|
||||||
c, err := a.EKey.Encrypt(nil, nil, []byte("hello"))
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
p, err := b.DKey.Decrypt(nil, nil, c)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, []byte("hello"), p)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
c, err = b.EKey.Encrypt(nil, nil, []byte("world"))
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
p, err = a.DKey.Decrypt(nil, nil, c)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, []byte("world"), p)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func TestKEMHandshake(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
for _, cipher := range []noise.CipherFunc{noise.CipherChaChaPoly, noise.CipherAESGCM} {
|
|
||||||
t.Run(cipher.CipherName(), func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
f := newKEMFixture(t, cipher)
|
|
||||||
initM := newKEMMachine(t, f.initCS, f.v, true, 1000)
|
|
||||||
respM := newKEMMachine(t, f.respCS, f.v, false, 2000)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
msg1, err := initM.Initiate(nil)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, header.HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024, header.MessageSubType(msg1[1]))
|
|
||||||
assert.Greater(t, len(msg1), header.Len+mlkem.EncapsulationKeySize1024)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
msg2, respR, err := respM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg1)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
require.NotNil(t, respR)
|
|
||||||
assert.Greater(t, len(msg2), header.Len+mlkem.CiphertextSize1024)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
_, initR, err := initM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg2)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
require.NotNil(t, initR)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, "responder", initR.RemoteCert.Certificate.Name())
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, "initiator", respR.RemoteCert.Certificate.Name())
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, uint32(2000), initR.RemoteIndex)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, uint32(1000), respR.RemoteIndex)
|
|
||||||
requireKeysMatch(t, initR, respR)
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// TestKEMSecretMatters checks the ML-KEM secret really reaches the transport
|
|
||||||
// keys: an initiator holding a different decapsulation key cannot complete even
|
|
||||||
// though every DH input is genuine.
|
|
||||||
func TestKEMSecretMatters(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
f := newKEMFixture(t, noise.CipherChaChaPoly)
|
|
||||||
initM := newKEMMachine(t, f.initCS, f.v, true, 1000)
|
|
||||||
respM := newKEMMachine(t, f.respCS, f.v, false, 2000)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
msg1, err := initM.Initiate(nil)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
msg2, _, err := respM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg1)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
other, err := mlkem.GenerateKey1024()
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
initM.kemKey = other
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
_, res, err := initM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg2)
|
|
||||||
require.Error(t, err)
|
|
||||||
assert.Nil(t, res)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func TestKEMTamperedCiphertext(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
f := newKEMFixture(t, noise.CipherChaChaPoly)
|
|
||||||
initM := newKEMMachine(t, f.initCS, f.v, true, 1000)
|
|
||||||
respM := newKEMMachine(t, f.respCS, f.v, false, 2000)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
msg1, err := initM.Initiate(nil)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
msg2, respR, err := respM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg1)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Run("truncated", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
_, res, err := initM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg2[:header.Len+mlkem.CiphertextSize1024-1])
|
|
||||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrPacketTooShort)
|
|
||||||
assert.Nil(t, res)
|
|
||||||
assert.False(t, initM.Failed())
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Run("flipped ciphertext bit", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
bad := bytes.Clone(msg2)
|
|
||||||
bad[header.Len+10] ^= 1
|
|
||||||
_, res, err := initM.ProcessPacket(nil, bad)
|
|
||||||
require.Error(t, err)
|
|
||||||
assert.Nil(t, res)
|
|
||||||
assert.False(t, initM.Failed(), "a forged ciphertext must not kill the handshake")
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Run("genuine response still completes", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
_, initR, err := initM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg2)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
require.NotNil(t, initR)
|
|
||||||
requireKeysMatch(t, initR, respR)
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// TestKEMBadMsg1 drives processPayload by hand. With the psk modifier msg1's
|
|
||||||
// payload is encrypted under a key derived from the public ephemeral, so a
|
|
||||||
// forged payload would need re-encrypting; the parsing rules are what matter.
|
|
||||||
func TestKEMBadMsg1(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
f := newKEMFixture(t, noise.CipherChaChaPoly)
|
|
||||||
msg1Flags := subtypeInfos[header.HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024].msgs[0]
|
|
||||||
cert := f.initCS.creds[cert.Version2]
|
|
||||||
payload := func(kemKey []byte) []byte {
|
|
||||||
return MarshalPayload(nil, Payload{
|
|
||||||
Cert: cert.Bytes,
|
|
||||||
CertVersion: uint32(cert.Cert.Version()),
|
|
||||||
InitiatorIndex: 1000,
|
|
||||||
Time: 1,
|
|
||||||
KEMKey: kemKey,
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
dk, err := mlkem.GenerateKey1024()
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Run("missing KEM key", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
m := newKEMMachine(t, f.respCS, f.v, false, 2000)
|
|
||||||
err := m.processPayload(payload(nil), msg1Flags)
|
|
||||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrUnexpectedContent)
|
|
||||||
assert.True(t, m.Failed())
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Run("invalid KEM key", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
m := newKEMMachine(t, f.respCS, f.v, false, 2000)
|
|
||||||
// Coefficients of 0xfff exceed the modulus, which ML-KEM must reject.
|
|
||||||
bad := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xff}, mlkem.EncapsulationKeySize1024)
|
|
||||||
err := m.kemEncapsulate(bad)
|
|
||||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInvalidKEMKey)
|
|
||||||
err = m.kemEncapsulate(bad[:100])
|
|
||||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInvalidKEMKey)
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Run("valid KEM key", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
m := newKEMMachine(t, f.respCS, f.v, false, 2000)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, m.kemEncapsulate(dk.EncapsulationKey().Bytes()))
|
|
||||||
assert.Len(t, m.kemCiphertext, mlkem.CiphertextSize1024)
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Run("KEM key on the classical subtype", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
m := newTestMachine(t, f.respCS, f.v, false, 2000)
|
|
||||||
classical := subtypeInfos[header.HandshakeIXPSK0].msgs[0]
|
|
||||||
err := m.processPayload(payload(dk.EncapsulationKey().Bytes()), classical)
|
|
||||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrUnexpectedContent)
|
|
||||||
assert.True(t, m.Failed())
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// TestKEMDistinctFromClassical makes sure the two subtypes cannot be mixed: a
|
|
||||||
// classical responder cannot answer a KEM initiator.
|
|
||||||
func TestKEMDistinctFromClassical(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
f := newKEMFixture(t, noise.CipherChaChaPoly)
|
|
||||||
initM := newKEMMachine(t, f.initCS, f.v, true, 1000)
|
|
||||||
respM := newTestMachine(t, f.respCS, f.v, false, 2000)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
msg1, err := initM.Initiate(nil)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
_, _, err = respM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg1)
|
|
||||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrSubtypeMismatch)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
+5
-54
@@ -2,8 +2,6 @@ package handshake
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
import (
|
import (
|
||||||
"bytes"
|
"bytes"
|
||||||
"crypto/mlkem"
|
|
||||||
"errors"
|
|
||||||
"fmt"
|
"fmt"
|
||||||
"slices"
|
"slices"
|
||||||
"time"
|
"time"
|
||||||
@@ -69,9 +67,6 @@ type Machine struct {
|
|||||||
remoteCertSet bool
|
remoteCertSet bool
|
||||||
payloadSet bool
|
payloadSet bool
|
||||||
failed bool
|
failed bool
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
kemKey *mlkem.DecapsulationKey1024 // initiator's ephemeral ML-KEM key, until completion
|
|
||||||
kemCiphertext []byte // responder's ciphertext to prefix its response with
|
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// NewMachine creates a handshake state machine. The subtype determines both
|
// NewMachine creates a handshake state machine. The subtype determines both
|
||||||
@@ -96,7 +91,7 @@ func NewMachine(
|
|||||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrNoCredential, version)
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrNoCredential, version)
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
hs, err := cred.buildHandshakeState(initiator, info.pattern, info.pskPlacement)
|
hs, err := cred.buildHandshakeState(initiator, info.pattern)
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("build noise state: %w", err)
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("build noise state: %w", err)
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -142,8 +137,7 @@ func (m *Machine) requireComplete() error {
|
|||||||
return nil
|
return nil
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// myMsgFlags returns the flags for the current outgoing message, which are
|
// myMsgFlags returns the flags for the current outgoing message.
|
||||||
// also the flags of the next incoming message before it is read.
|
|
||||||
func (m *Machine) myMsgFlags() msgFlags {
|
func (m *Machine) myMsgFlags() msgFlags {
|
||||||
idx := m.hs.MessageIndex()
|
idx := m.hs.MessageIndex()
|
||||||
if idx < len(m.msgs) {
|
if idx < len(m.msgs) {
|
||||||
@@ -231,18 +225,7 @@ func (m *Machine) ProcessPacket(out, packet []byte) ([]byte, *Result, error) {
|
|||||||
// noise returns (cs1, cs2) where cs1 is the initiator->responder cipher.
|
// noise returns (cs1, cs2) where cs1 is the initiator->responder cipher.
|
||||||
// For 3-message patterns where a responder finishes by reading the final
|
// For 3-message patterns where a responder finishes by reading the final
|
||||||
// message, this ordering would be wrong; revisit when XX/pqIX lands.
|
// message, this ordering would be wrong; revisit when XX/pqIX lands.
|
||||||
noiseMsg := packet[header.Len:]
|
msg, eKey, dKey, err := m.hs.ReadMessage(nil, packet[header.Len:])
|
||||||
if m.myMsgFlags().kemCiphertext {
|
|
||||||
var err error
|
|
||||||
// Installing a psk derived from a forged ciphertext is harmless: ReadMessage
|
|
||||||
// then fails without advancing, and the next packet installs its own.
|
|
||||||
noiseMsg, err = m.kemDecapsulate(noiseMsg)
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
return nil, nil, err
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
msg, eKey, dKey, err := m.hs.ReadMessage(nil, noiseMsg)
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
// Noise ReadMessage failed. The noise library checkpoints and rolls back
|
// Noise ReadMessage failed. The noise library checkpoints and rolls back
|
||||||
// on failure, so the Machine is still alive. The caller can retry with
|
// on failure, so the Machine is still alive. The caller can retry with
|
||||||
@@ -293,8 +276,6 @@ func (m *Machine) ProcessPacket(out, packet []byte) ([]byte, *Result, error) {
|
|||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func (m *Machine) completed(eKey, dKey *noise.CipherState) *Result {
|
func (m *Machine) completed(eKey, dKey *noise.CipherState) *Result {
|
||||||
m.kemKey = nil
|
|
||||||
m.kemCiphertext = nil
|
|
||||||
m.result.EKey = eKey
|
m.result.EKey = eKey
|
||||||
m.result.DKey = dKey
|
m.result.DKey = dKey
|
||||||
m.result.MessageIndex = uint64(m.hs.MessageIndex())
|
m.result.MessageIndex = uint64(m.hs.MessageIndex())
|
||||||
@@ -303,7 +284,7 @@ func (m *Machine) completed(eKey, dKey *noise.CipherState) *Result {
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
func (m *Machine) processPayload(msg []byte, flags msgFlags) error {
|
func (m *Machine) processPayload(msg []byte, flags msgFlags) error {
|
||||||
if len(msg) == 0 {
|
if len(msg) == 0 {
|
||||||
if flags.expectsPayload || flags.expectsCert || flags.kemKey {
|
if flags.expectsPayload || flags.expectsCert {
|
||||||
m.failed = true
|
m.failed = true
|
||||||
return ErrMissingContent
|
return ErrMissingContent
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -329,12 +310,6 @@ func (m *Machine) processPayload(msg []byte, flags msgFlags) error {
|
|||||||
return ErrUnexpectedContent
|
return ErrUnexpectedContent
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
hasKEMKey := len(payload.KEMKey) > 0
|
|
||||||
if hasKEMKey != flags.kemKey {
|
|
||||||
m.failed = true
|
|
||||||
return ErrUnexpectedContent
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Process payload
|
// Process payload
|
||||||
if flags.expectsPayload {
|
if flags.expectsPayload {
|
||||||
var remoteIndex uint32
|
var remoteIndex uint32
|
||||||
@@ -361,13 +336,6 @@ func (m *Machine) processPayload(msg []byte, flags msgFlags) error {
|
|||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if flags.kemKey {
|
|
||||||
if err := m.kemEncapsulate(payload.KEMKey); err != nil {
|
|
||||||
m.failed = true
|
|
||||||
return err
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
return nil
|
return nil
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -412,21 +380,11 @@ func (m *Machine) validateCert(payload Payload) error {
|
|||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func (m *Machine) marshalOutgoing(flags msgFlags) ([]byte, error) {
|
func (m *Machine) marshalOutgoing(flags msgFlags) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||||
if !flags.expectsPayload && !flags.expectsCert && !flags.kemKey {
|
if !flags.expectsPayload && !flags.expectsCert {
|
||||||
return nil, nil
|
return nil, nil
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
var p Payload
|
var p Payload
|
||||||
if flags.kemKey {
|
|
||||||
if m.kemKey == nil {
|
|
||||||
dk, err := mlkem.GenerateKey1024()
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("generate ML-KEM key: %w", err)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
m.kemKey = dk
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
p.KEMKey = m.kemKey.EncapsulationKey().Bytes()
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if flags.expectsPayload {
|
if flags.expectsPayload {
|
||||||
if !m.indexAllocated {
|
if !m.indexAllocated {
|
||||||
index, err := m.allocIndex()
|
index, err := m.allocIndex()
|
||||||
@@ -478,13 +436,6 @@ func (m *Machine) buildResponse(out []byte) ([]byte, *noise.CipherState, *noise.
|
|||||||
uint64(m.hs.MessageIndex()+1),
|
uint64(m.hs.MessageIndex()+1),
|
||||||
)
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if flags.kemCiphertext {
|
|
||||||
if m.kemCiphertext == nil {
|
|
||||||
return nil, nil, nil, errors.New("no ML-KEM ciphertext to send")
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
out = append(out, m.kemCiphertext...)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// noise.WriteMessage appends the encrypted handshake message to out,
|
// noise.WriteMessage appends the encrypted handshake message to out,
|
||||||
// reusing capacity when present.
|
// reusing capacity when present.
|
||||||
//
|
//
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -11,15 +11,12 @@ import (
|
|||||||
type msgFlags struct {
|
type msgFlags struct {
|
||||||
expectsPayload bool // message carries indexes and time
|
expectsPayload bool // message carries indexes and time
|
||||||
expectsCert bool // message carries the certificate
|
expectsCert bool // message carries the certificate
|
||||||
kemKey bool // payload carries an ML-KEM encapsulation key
|
|
||||||
kemCiphertext bool // message is prefixed with the ML-KEM ciphertext for the peer's key
|
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// subtypeInfo bundles the noise pattern with the per-message flags for a
|
// subtypeInfo bundles the noise pattern with the per-message flags for a
|
||||||
// given handshake subtype.
|
// given handshake subtype.
|
||||||
type subtypeInfo struct {
|
type subtypeInfo struct {
|
||||||
pattern noise.HandshakePattern
|
pattern noise.HandshakePattern
|
||||||
pskPlacement int // noise psk modifier position, 0 means no psk token
|
|
||||||
msgs []msgFlags
|
msgs []msgFlags
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -35,22 +32,6 @@ var subtypeInfos = map[header.MessageSubType]subtypeInfo{
|
|||||||
},
|
},
|
||||||
},
|
},
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// IX with an ephemeral ML-KEM-1024 exchange:
|
|
||||||
// msg1 (I->R): payload + cert + encapsulation key
|
|
||||||
// msg2 (R->I): ciphertext || noise(payload + cert)
|
|
||||||
// The responder encapsulates after reading msg1 and mixes the shared secret in
|
|
||||||
// through the psk2 token at the end of msg2. The ciphertext travels outside the
|
|
||||||
// noise message because the initiator needs the secret before it can process
|
|
||||||
// that token.
|
|
||||||
header.HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024: {
|
|
||||||
pattern: noise.HandshakeIX,
|
|
||||||
pskPlacement: 2,
|
|
||||||
msgs: []msgFlags{
|
|
||||||
{expectsPayload: true, expectsCert: true, kemKey: true},
|
|
||||||
{expectsPayload: true, expectsCert: true, kemCiphertext: true},
|
|
||||||
},
|
|
||||||
},
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// XX: 3 messages
|
// XX: 3 messages
|
||||||
// msg1 (I->R): payload only
|
// msg1 (I->R): payload only
|
||||||
// msg2 (R->I): payload + cert
|
// msg2 (R->I): payload + cert
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ type Payload struct {
|
|||||||
ResponderIndex uint32
|
ResponderIndex uint32
|
||||||
Time uint64
|
Time uint64
|
||||||
CertVersion uint32
|
CertVersion uint32
|
||||||
KEMKey []byte // ML-KEM encapsulation key, only in subtypes that carry one
|
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Proto field numbers for NebulaHandshakeDetails
|
// Proto field numbers for NebulaHandshakeDetails
|
||||||
@@ -30,7 +29,6 @@ const (
|
|||||||
fieldResponderIndex = 3 // uint32
|
fieldResponderIndex = 3 // uint32
|
||||||
fieldTime = 5 // uint64
|
fieldTime = 5 // uint64
|
||||||
fieldCertVersion = 8 // uint32
|
fieldCertVersion = 8 // uint32
|
||||||
fieldKEMKey = 9 // bytes
|
|
||||||
)
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// MarshalPayload encodes a handshake payload in protobuf wire format compatible
|
// MarshalPayload encodes a handshake payload in protobuf wire format compatible
|
||||||
@@ -59,10 +57,6 @@ func MarshalPayload(out []byte, p Payload) []byte {
|
|||||||
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldCertVersion, protowire.VarintType)
|
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldCertVersion, protowire.VarintType)
|
||||||
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, uint64(p.CertVersion))
|
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, uint64(p.CertVersion))
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
if len(p.KEMKey) > 0 {
|
|
||||||
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldKEMKey, protowire.BytesType)
|
|
||||||
details = protowire.AppendBytes(details, p.KEMKey)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
out = protowire.AppendTag(out, 1, protowire.BytesType)
|
out = protowire.AppendTag(out, 1, protowire.BytesType)
|
||||||
out = protowire.AppendBytes(out, details)
|
out = protowire.AppendBytes(out, details)
|
||||||
@@ -167,16 +161,6 @@ func unmarshalPayloadDetails(p *Payload, b []byte) error {
|
|||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
p.CertVersion = uint32(v)
|
p.CertVersion = uint32(v)
|
||||||
b = b[n:]
|
b = b[n:]
|
||||||
case fieldKEMKey:
|
|
||||||
if typ != protowire.BytesType {
|
|
||||||
return errInvalidHandshakeDetails
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
v, n := protowire.ConsumeBytes(b)
|
|
||||||
if n < 0 {
|
|
||||||
return errInvalidHandshakeDetails
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
p.KEMKey = append([]byte(nil), v...)
|
|
||||||
b = b[n:]
|
|
||||||
default:
|
default:
|
||||||
n := protowire.ConsumeFieldValue(num, typ, b)
|
n := protowire.ConsumeFieldValue(num, typ, b)
|
||||||
if n < 0 {
|
if n < 0 {
|
||||||
|
|||||||
+37
-142
@@ -10,15 +10,12 @@ import (
|
|||||||
"net/netip"
|
"net/netip"
|
||||||
"slices"
|
"slices"
|
||||||
"sync"
|
"sync"
|
||||||
"sync/atomic"
|
|
||||||
"time"
|
"time"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
|
"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
|
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake"
|
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake"
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake/fragment"
|
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
|
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/ratelimit"
|
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
|
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
|
||||||
)
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -52,7 +49,6 @@ type HandshakeConfig struct {
|
|||||||
tryInterval time.Duration
|
tryInterval time.Duration
|
||||||
retries int64
|
retries int64
|
||||||
triggerBuffer int
|
triggerBuffer int
|
||||||
pq pqHandshakeConfig
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
messageMetrics *MessageMetrics
|
messageMetrics *MessageMetrics
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -78,18 +74,6 @@ type HandshakeManager struct {
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
// can be used to trigger outbound handshake for the given vpnIp
|
// can be used to trigger outbound handshake for the given vpnIp
|
||||||
trigger chan netip.Addr
|
trigger chan netip.Addr
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// pq holds the post-quantum settings, which change on reload.
|
|
||||||
pq atomic.Pointer[pqHandshakeConfig]
|
|
||||||
// pqTable reassembles post-quantum msg1s from senders that have not authenticated yet.
|
|
||||||
pqTable *fragment.Table[pqFragKey, pqFragSource]
|
|
||||||
// pqPeers holds vpn addresses that completed a post-quantum handshake, for sticky mode.
|
|
||||||
pqPeers sync.Map
|
|
||||||
// pqAnswered recognises repeats of post-quantum msg1s already answered.
|
|
||||||
pqAnswered *pqAnswered
|
|
||||||
// pqCookies and pqCookieLimiter serve cookies while pqTable is under load.
|
|
||||||
pqCookies *pqCookies
|
|
||||||
pqCookieLimiter *ratelimit.Limiter
|
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
type HandshakeHostInfo struct {
|
type HandshakeHostInfo struct {
|
||||||
@@ -105,8 +89,6 @@ type HandshakeHostInfo struct {
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
hostinfo *HostInfo
|
hostinfo *HostInfo
|
||||||
machine *handshake.Machine // The handshake state machine, set during stage 0 (initiator) or beginHandshake (responder multi-message)
|
machine *handshake.Machine // The handshake state machine, set during stage 0 (initiator) or beginHandshake (responder multi-message)
|
||||||
pq *pqAttempt // The initiator's post-quantum attempt, pending alongside the classical one
|
|
||||||
lastPQ bool // Whether the latest attempt was post-quantum
|
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func (hh *HandshakeHostInfo) cachePacket(l *slog.Logger, t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, packet []byte, f packetCallback, m *cachedPacketMetrics) {
|
func (hh *HandshakeHostInfo) cachePacket(l *slog.Logger, t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, packet []byte, f packetCallback, m *cachedPacketMetrics) {
|
||||||
@@ -135,7 +117,7 @@ func (hh *HandshakeHostInfo) cachePacket(l *slog.Logger, t header.MessageType, s
|
|||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func NewHandshakeManager(l *slog.Logger, mainHostMap *HostMap, lightHouse *LightHouse, outside udp.Conn, config HandshakeConfig) *HandshakeManager {
|
func NewHandshakeManager(l *slog.Logger, mainHostMap *HostMap, lightHouse *LightHouse, outside udp.Conn, config HandshakeConfig) *HandshakeManager {
|
||||||
hm := &HandshakeManager{
|
return &HandshakeManager{
|
||||||
vpnIps: map[netip.Addr]*HandshakeHostInfo{},
|
vpnIps: map[netip.Addr]*HandshakeHostInfo{},
|
||||||
indexes: map[uint32]*HandshakeHostInfo{},
|
indexes: map[uint32]*HandshakeHostInfo{},
|
||||||
mainHostMap: mainHostMap,
|
mainHostMap: mainHostMap,
|
||||||
@@ -148,16 +130,7 @@ func NewHandshakeManager(l *slog.Logger, mainHostMap *HostMap, lightHouse *Light
|
|||||||
metricInitiated: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("handshake_manager.initiated", nil),
|
metricInitiated: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("handshake_manager.initiated", nil),
|
||||||
metricTimedOut: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("handshake_manager.timed_out", nil),
|
metricTimedOut: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("handshake_manager.timed_out", nil),
|
||||||
l: l,
|
l: l,
|
||||||
pqTable: fragment.NewTable[pqFragKey, pqFragSource](pqTableConfig),
|
|
||||||
pqAnswered: newPQAnswered(hsTimeout(config.retries, config.tryInterval)),
|
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
pq := config.pq
|
|
||||||
hm.pq.Store(&pq)
|
|
||||||
hm.pqCookies = newPQCookies(time.Now())
|
|
||||||
// Cookie replies are tiny, but a flood of spoofed fragments must not turn
|
|
||||||
// into a flood of replies.
|
|
||||||
hm.pqCookieLimiter, _ = ratelimit.New(256, time.Millisecond)
|
|
||||||
return hm
|
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) Run(ctx context.Context) {
|
func (hm *HandshakeManager) Run(ctx context.Context) {
|
||||||
@@ -172,8 +145,6 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) Run(ctx context.Context) {
|
|||||||
hm.handleOutbound(vpnIP, true)
|
hm.handleOutbound(vpnIP, true)
|
||||||
case now := <-clockSource.C:
|
case now := <-clockSource.C:
|
||||||
hm.NextOutboundHandshakeTimerTick(now)
|
hm.NextOutboundHandshakeTimerTick(now)
|
||||||
hm.pqTable.Expire(now)
|
|
||||||
hm.pqAnswered.expire(now)
|
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -183,7 +154,7 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) HandleIncoming(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *head
|
|||||||
// don't yet support) are dropped here rather than silently routed through
|
// don't yet support) are dropped here rather than silently routed through
|
||||||
// the IX path. Add a case when introducing a new pattern.
|
// the IX path. Add a case when introducing a new pattern.
|
||||||
switch h.Subtype {
|
switch h.Subtype {
|
||||||
case header.HandshakeIXPSK0, pqSubtype:
|
case header.HandshakeIXPSK0:
|
||||||
// supported
|
// supported
|
||||||
default:
|
default:
|
||||||
hm.l.Debug("dropping handshake with unsupported subtype",
|
hm.l.Debug("dropping handshake with unsupported subtype",
|
||||||
@@ -199,11 +170,6 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) HandleIncoming(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *head
|
|||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if header.IsFragmented(h.Subtype) {
|
|
||||||
hm.handleFragment(via, packet, h)
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// First message of a new handshake. The wire format requires RemoteIndex
|
// First message of a new handshake. The wire format requires RemoteIndex
|
||||||
// to be zero here (the initiator has no responder index to fill in yet),
|
// to be zero here (the initiator has no responder index to fill in yet),
|
||||||
// and generateIndex never allocates 0, so any non-zero RemoteIndex on a
|
// and generateIndex never allocates 0, so any non-zero RemoteIndex on a
|
||||||
@@ -215,11 +181,7 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) HandleIncoming(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *head
|
|||||||
"from", via, "remoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex)
|
"from", via, "remoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex)
|
||||||
return
|
return
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
if hm.pqConfig().require {
|
hm.beginHandshake(via, packet, h)
|
||||||
hm.l.Debug("dropping classical handshake, post-quantum handshakes are required", "from", via)
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
hm.beginHandshake(via, packet, h, 0)
|
|
||||||
return
|
return
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -268,9 +230,6 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleOutbound(vpnIp netip.Addr, lighthouseTriggered
|
|||||||
"style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, hh.machine.Subtype()),
|
"style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, hh.machine.Subtype()),
|
||||||
})
|
})
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
if hh.pq != nil {
|
|
||||||
fields = append(fields, "pqInitiatorIndex", hh.pq.index)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
hh.hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Info("Handshake timed out", fields...)
|
hh.hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Info("Handshake timed out", fields...)
|
||||||
hm.metricTimedOut.Inc(1)
|
hm.metricTimedOut.Inc(1)
|
||||||
hm.DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo)
|
hm.DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo)
|
||||||
@@ -280,32 +239,14 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleOutbound(vpnIp netip.Addr, lighthouseTriggered
|
|||||||
// Increment the counter to increase our delay, linear backoff
|
// Increment the counter to increase our delay, linear backoff
|
||||||
hh.counter++
|
hh.counter++
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Pick this attempt's style and make sure its first message exists. A PQ
|
// Check if we have a handshake packet to transmit yet
|
||||||
// attempt sends msg1 as fragments: now goes out immediately, later after the
|
|
||||||
// repair delay, and every attempt offers fresh repair symbols.
|
|
||||||
var now, later [][]byte
|
|
||||||
var machine *handshake.Machine
|
|
||||||
hh.lastPQ = hm.usePQ(hh, vpnIp, lighthouseTriggered)
|
|
||||||
if hh.lastPQ {
|
|
||||||
if hh.pq == nil && !hm.buildPQAttempt(hh) {
|
|
||||||
hm.OutboundHandshakeTimer.Add(vpnIp, hm.config.tryInterval*time.Duration(hh.counter))
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
var err error
|
|
||||||
now, later, err = hh.pq.sender.Attempt(fragment.DefaultRepair(hh.pq.sender.Layout().K))
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Error("Failed to fragment handshake", "error", err)
|
|
||||||
hm.OutboundHandshakeTimer.Add(vpnIp, hm.config.tryInterval*time.Duration(hh.counter))
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
machine = hh.pq.machine
|
|
||||||
} else {
|
|
||||||
if !hh.ready {
|
if !hh.ready {
|
||||||
if !hm.buildStage0Packet(hh) {
|
if !hm.buildStage0Packet(hh) {
|
||||||
hm.OutboundHandshakeTimer.Add(vpnIp, hm.config.tryInterval*time.Duration(hh.counter))
|
hm.OutboundHandshakeTimer.Add(vpnIp, hm.config.tryInterval*time.Duration(hh.counter))
|
||||||
return
|
return
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// TODO: this hardcodes "always retransmit stage 0", which is correct for
|
// TODO: this hardcodes "always retransmit stage 0", which is correct for
|
||||||
// IX (the initiator only ever sends one packet, msg1) but wrong the
|
// IX (the initiator only ever sends one packet, msg1) but wrong the
|
||||||
// moment a 3+ message pattern lands. The retry loop should resend the
|
// moment a 3+ message pattern lands. The retry loop should resend the
|
||||||
@@ -313,12 +254,10 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleOutbound(vpnIp netip.Addr, lighthouseTriggered
|
|||||||
// HandshakeHostInfo tracking a single "currentOutbound" packet (bytes +
|
// HandshakeHostInfo tracking a single "currentOutbound" packet (bytes +
|
||||||
// header metadata) that gets replaced as the handshake progresses,
|
// header metadata) that gets replaced as the handshake progresses,
|
||||||
// instead of indexing into HandshakePacket.
|
// instead of indexing into HandshakePacket.
|
||||||
now = [][]byte{hostinfo.HandshakePacket[handshakePacketStage0]}
|
stage0 := hostinfo.HandshakePacket[handshakePacketStage0]
|
||||||
machine = hh.machine
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
hsFields := m{
|
hsFields := m{
|
||||||
"stage": uint64(machine.MessageIndex()),
|
"stage": uint64(hh.machine.MessageIndex()),
|
||||||
"style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, machine.Subtype()),
|
"style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, hh.machine.Subtype()),
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
remotes := hostinfo.remotes.CopyAddrs(hm.mainHostMap.GetPreferredRanges())
|
remotes := hostinfo.remotes.CopyAddrs(hm.mainHostMap.GetPreferredRanges())
|
||||||
@@ -346,10 +285,8 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleOutbound(vpnIp netip.Addr, lighthouseTriggered
|
|||||||
// Send the handshake to all known ips, stage 2 takes care of assigning the hostinfo.remote based on the first to reply
|
// Send the handshake to all known ips, stage 2 takes care of assigning the hostinfo.remote based on the first to reply
|
||||||
var sentTo []netip.AddrPort
|
var sentTo []netip.AddrPort
|
||||||
hostinfo.remotes.ForEach(hm.mainHostMap.GetPreferredRanges(), func(addr netip.AddrPort, _ bool) {
|
hostinfo.remotes.ForEach(hm.mainHostMap.GetPreferredRanges(), func(addr netip.AddrPort, _ bool) {
|
||||||
hm.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Handshake, machine.Subtype(), int64(len(now)+len(later)))
|
hm.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Handshake, hh.machine.Subtype(), 1)
|
||||||
err := hm.sendFragmented(now, later, func(p []byte) error {
|
err := hm.outside.WriteTo(stage0, addr)
|
||||||
return hm.outside.WriteTo(p, addr)
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
// These repeat every attempt, so match the success log below and only shout when the remotes changed
|
// These repeat every attempt, so match the success log below and only shout when the remotes changed
|
||||||
level := slog.LevelDebug
|
level := slog.LevelDebug
|
||||||
@@ -385,7 +322,7 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleOutbound(vpnIp netip.Addr, lighthouseTriggered
|
|||||||
)
|
)
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
hm.f.relayManager.StartRelays(hm.f, vpnIp, hh, now, later)
|
hm.f.relayManager.StartRelays(hm.f, vpnIp, hh, stage0)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// If a lighthouse triggered this attempt then we are still in the timer wheel and do not need to re-add
|
// If a lighthouse triggered this attempt then we are still in the timer wheel and do not need to re-add
|
||||||
if !lighthouseTriggered {
|
if !lighthouseTriggered {
|
||||||
@@ -595,10 +532,6 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo *HostInfo) {
|
|||||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) unlockedDeleteHostInfo(hostinfo *HostInfo) {
|
func (hm *HandshakeManager) unlockedDeleteHostInfo(hostinfo *HostInfo) {
|
||||||
for _, addr := range hostinfo.vpnAddrs {
|
for _, addr := range hostinfo.vpnAddrs {
|
||||||
if cur, ok := hm.vpnIps[addr]; ok && cur.hostinfo == hostinfo {
|
if cur, ok := hm.vpnIps[addr]; ok && cur.hostinfo == hostinfo {
|
||||||
// A PQ attempt holds its own index alongside the hostinfo's.
|
|
||||||
if idx := cur.pqIndex(); idx != 0 && hm.indexes[idx] == cur {
|
|
||||||
delete(hm.indexes, idx)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
delete(hm.vpnIps, addr)
|
delete(hm.vpnIps, addr)
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -709,8 +642,9 @@ func hsTimeout(tries int64, interval time.Duration) time.Duration {
|
|||||||
return time.Duration(tries / 2 * ((2 * int64(interval)) + (tries-1)*int64(interval)))
|
return time.Duration(tries / 2 * ((2 * int64(interval)) + (tries-1)*int64(interval)))
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// initiatingVersion picks the certificate version to initiate a handshake with.
|
// buildStage0Packet creates the initial handshake packet for the initiator.
|
||||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) initiatingVersion(hh *HandshakeHostInfo, cs *CertState) cert.Version {
|
func (hm *HandshakeManager) buildStage0Packet(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) bool {
|
||||||
|
cs := hm.f.pki.getCertState()
|
||||||
v := cs.DefaultVersion()
|
v := cs.DefaultVersion()
|
||||||
if hh.initiatingVersionOverride != cert.VersionPre1 {
|
if hh.initiatingVersionOverride != cert.VersionPre1 {
|
||||||
v = hh.initiatingVersionOverride
|
v = hh.initiatingVersionOverride
|
||||||
@@ -722,13 +656,6 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) initiatingVersion(hh *HandshakeHostInfo, cs *CertSta
|
|||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
return v
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// buildStage0Packet creates the initial handshake packet for the initiator.
|
|
||||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) buildStage0Packet(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) bool {
|
|
||||||
cs := hm.f.pki.getCertState()
|
|
||||||
v := hm.initiatingVersion(hh, cs)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
cred := cs.GetCredential(v)
|
cred := cs.GetCredential(v)
|
||||||
if cred == nil {
|
if cred == nil {
|
||||||
@@ -767,10 +694,7 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) buildStage0Packet(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) bool {
|
|||||||
// beginHandshake handles an incoming handshake packet that doesn't match any
|
// beginHandshake handles an incoming handshake packet that doesn't match any
|
||||||
// existing pending handshake. It creates a new responder Machine and processes
|
// existing pending handshake. It creates a new responder Machine and processes
|
||||||
// the first message.
|
// the first message.
|
||||||
//
|
func (hm *HandshakeManager) beginHandshake(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H) {
|
||||||
// received is the number of bytes a fragmented msg1 arrived in, which bounds the
|
|
||||||
// response sent back before the address is validated; 0 for unfragmented ones.
|
|
||||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) beginHandshake(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H, received int) {
|
|
||||||
f := hm.f
|
f := hm.f
|
||||||
cs := f.pki.getCertState()
|
cs := f.pki.getCertState()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -784,7 +708,7 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) beginHandshake(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *head
|
|||||||
machine, err := handshake.NewMachine(
|
machine, err := handshake.NewMachine(
|
||||||
v, cs.GetCredential,
|
v, cs.GetCredential,
|
||||||
hm.certVerifier(), func() (uint32, error) { return generateIndex(f.l) },
|
hm.certVerifier(), func() (uint32, error) { return generateIndex(f.l) },
|
||||||
false, h.Subtype,
|
false, header.HandshakeIXPSK0,
|
||||||
)
|
)
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
f.l.Error("Failed to create handshake machine", "from", via, "error", err)
|
f.l.Error("Failed to create handshake machine", "from", via, "error", err)
|
||||||
@@ -874,15 +798,11 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) beginHandshake(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *head
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
existing, err := hm.CheckAndComplete(hostinfo, handshakePacketStage0, f)
|
existing, err := hm.CheckAndComplete(hostinfo, handshakePacketStage0, f)
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
hm.handleCheckAndCompleteError(err, existing, hostinfo, via, machine.Subtype(), received)
|
hm.handleCheckAndCompleteError(err, existing, hostinfo, via)
|
||||||
return
|
return
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
hm.sendHandshakeResponse(via, response, hostinfo, false, received)
|
hm.sendHandshakeResponse(via, response, hostinfo, false)
|
||||||
if header.IsFragmented(machine.Subtype()) {
|
|
||||||
hm.pqAnswered.add(packet[header.Len:], hostinfo, time.Now())
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
hm.notePQPeer(machine.Subtype(), vpnAddrs)
|
|
||||||
hostinfo.remotes.RefreshFromHandshake(vpnAddrs)
|
hostinfo.remotes.RefreshFromHandshake(vpnAddrs)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Don't wait for UpdateWorker
|
// Don't wait for UpdateWorker
|
||||||
@@ -893,32 +813,23 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) beginHandshake(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *head
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
// continueHandshake feeds an incoming packet to an existing pending handshake Machine.
|
// continueHandshake feeds an incoming packet to an existing pending handshake Machine.
|
||||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) continueHandshake(via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostInfo, packet []byte) {
|
func (hm *HandshakeManager) continueHandshake(via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostInfo, packet []byte) {
|
||||||
|
f := hm.f
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
hh.Lock()
|
hh.Lock()
|
||||||
defer hh.Unlock()
|
defer hh.Unlock()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if !hm.stillPending(hh, hh.hostinfo.localIndexId) {
|
// Re-verify hh is still tracked. Between queryIndex returning and us taking
|
||||||
|
// hh.Lock, handleOutbound may have timed out and deleted it. Once we hold
|
||||||
|
// hh.Lock no other deleter can race our index: handleOutbound also takes
|
||||||
|
// hh.Lock first, and handleRecvError targets a main-hostmap entry with a
|
||||||
|
// different localIndexId.
|
||||||
|
hm.RLock()
|
||||||
|
cur, ok := hm.indexes[hh.hostinfo.localIndexId]
|
||||||
|
hm.RUnlock()
|
||||||
|
if !ok || cur != hh {
|
||||||
return
|
return
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
hm.processResponse(via, hh, hh.machine, packet)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// stillPending re-verifies hh is still tracked under index. Between queryIndex
|
|
||||||
// returning and the caller taking hh.Lock, handleOutbound may have timed out and
|
|
||||||
// deleted it. Once hh.Lock is held no other deleter can race the index:
|
|
||||||
// handleOutbound also takes hh.Lock first, and handleRecvError targets a
|
|
||||||
// main-hostmap entry with a different localIndexId. The caller must hold hh.Lock.
|
|
||||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) stillPending(hh *HandshakeHostInfo, index uint32) bool {
|
|
||||||
hm.RLock()
|
|
||||||
defer hm.RUnlock()
|
|
||||||
cur, ok := hm.indexes[index]
|
|
||||||
return ok && cur == hh
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// processResponse runs a responder's message through one of the initiator's
|
|
||||||
// pending attempts and completes the tunnel when the handshake finishes. The
|
|
||||||
// caller must hold hh.Lock.
|
|
||||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) processResponse(via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostInfo, machine *handshake.Machine, packet []byte) {
|
|
||||||
f := hm.f
|
|
||||||
hostinfo := hh.hostinfo
|
hostinfo := hh.hostinfo
|
||||||
if !via.IsRelayed {
|
if !via.IsRelayed {
|
||||||
if !f.lightHouse.GetRemoteAllowList().AllowAll(hostinfo.vpnAddrs, via.UdpAddr.Addr()) {
|
if !f.lightHouse.GetRemoteAllowList().AllowAll(hostinfo.vpnAddrs, via.UdpAddr.Addr()) {
|
||||||
@@ -928,6 +839,7 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) processResponse(via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostInfo
|
|||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
machine := hh.machine
|
||||||
if machine == nil {
|
if machine == nil {
|
||||||
f.l.Error("No handshake machine available for continuation",
|
f.l.Error("No handshake machine available for continuation",
|
||||||
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "from", via)
|
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "from", via)
|
||||||
@@ -950,7 +862,7 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) processResponse(via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostInfo
|
|||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if response != nil {
|
if response != nil {
|
||||||
hm.sendHandshakeResponse(via, response, hostinfo, false, 0)
|
hm.sendHandshakeResponse(via, response, hostinfo, false)
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if result == nil {
|
if result == nil {
|
||||||
@@ -1063,10 +975,7 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) processResponse(via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostInfo
|
|||||||
hostinfo.vpnAddrs = vpnAddrs
|
hostinfo.vpnAddrs = vpnAddrs
|
||||||
hostinfo.buildNetworks(f.myVpnNetworksTable, remoteCert.Certificate)
|
hostinfo.buildNetworks(f.myVpnNetworksTable, remoteCert.Certificate)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// The classical and PQ attempts each hold an index; keep the one that won.
|
|
||||||
hm.settleIndex(hh, result.LocalIndex)
|
|
||||||
hm.Complete(hostinfo, f)
|
hm.Complete(hostinfo, f)
|
||||||
hm.notePQPeer(machine.Subtype(), vpnAddrs)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if len(hh.packetStore) > 0 {
|
if len(hh.packetStore) > 0 {
|
||||||
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
|
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
|
||||||
@@ -1145,23 +1054,20 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) validatePeerCert(via ViaSender, remoteCert *cert.Cac
|
|||||||
// cached is true when msg is a stored response being retransmitted because
|
// cached is true when msg is a stored response being retransmitted because
|
||||||
// the peer's stage-1 retransmit landed (the ErrAlreadySeen path); false on a
|
// the peer's stage-1 retransmit landed (the ErrAlreadySeen path); false on a
|
||||||
// fresh response.
|
// fresh response.
|
||||||
//
|
func (hm *HandshakeManager) sendHandshakeResponse(via ViaSender, msg []byte, hostinfo *HostInfo, cached bool) {
|
||||||
// received is the number of bytes a fragmented msg1 arrived in; it bounds what a
|
|
||||||
// fragmented response may send back. It is ignored for unfragmented subtypes.
|
|
||||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) sendHandshakeResponse(via ViaSender, msg []byte, hostinfo *HostInfo, cached bool, received int) {
|
|
||||||
if msg == nil {
|
if msg == nil {
|
||||||
return
|
return
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
f := hm.f
|
f := hm.f
|
||||||
subtype := header.MessageSubType(msg[1])
|
f.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Handshake, header.MessageSubType(msg[1]), 1)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Common log fields. peerCert may be nil during intermediate
|
// Common log fields. peerCert may be nil during intermediate
|
||||||
// multi-message flows (handshake hasn't completed yet); skip the cert
|
// multi-message flows (handshake hasn't completed yet); skip the cert
|
||||||
// block if so.
|
// block if so.
|
||||||
logFields := []any{
|
logFields := []any{
|
||||||
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
|
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
|
||||||
"handshake", m{"stage": uint64(2), "style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, subtype)},
|
"handshake", m{"stage": uint64(2), "style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, header.HandshakeIXPSK0)},
|
||||||
"cached", cached,
|
"cached", cached,
|
||||||
"initiatorIndex", hostinfo.remoteIndexId,
|
"initiatorIndex", hostinfo.remoteIndexId,
|
||||||
"responderIndex", hostinfo.localIndexId,
|
"responderIndex", hostinfo.localIndexId,
|
||||||
@@ -1175,17 +1081,6 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) sendHandshakeResponse(via ViaSender, msg []byte, hos
|
|||||||
)
|
)
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if header.IsFragmented(subtype) {
|
|
||||||
fields := append(logFields, "from", via)
|
|
||||||
if err := hm.sendFragmentedResponse(via, msg, hostinfo, cached, received); err != nil {
|
|
||||||
f.l.Debug("Did not send handshake message", append(fields, "error", err)...)
|
|
||||||
} else {
|
|
||||||
f.l.Info("Handshake message sent", fields...)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
f.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Handshake, subtype, 1)
|
|
||||||
if !via.IsRelayed {
|
if !via.IsRelayed {
|
||||||
fields := append(logFields, "from", via)
|
fields := append(logFields, "from", via)
|
||||||
err := f.outside.WriteTo(msg, via.UdpAddr)
|
err := f.outside.WriteTo(msg, via.UdpAddr)
|
||||||
@@ -1212,10 +1107,10 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) sendHandshakeResponse(via ViaSender, msg []byte, hos
|
|||||||
// This only fires from the responder-side beginHandshake path, after the
|
// This only fires from the responder-side beginHandshake path, after the
|
||||||
// peer cert has been validated and ConnectionState populated, so peerCert
|
// peer cert has been validated and ConnectionState populated, so peerCert
|
||||||
// is always non-nil for the cases that log it.
|
// is always non-nil for the cases that log it.
|
||||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleCheckAndCompleteError(err error, existing, hostinfo *HostInfo, via ViaSender, subtype header.MessageSubType, received int) {
|
func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleCheckAndCompleteError(err error, existing, hostinfo *HostInfo, via ViaSender) {
|
||||||
f := hm.f
|
f := hm.f
|
||||||
peerCert := hostinfo.ConnectionState.peerCert
|
peerCert := hostinfo.ConnectionState.peerCert
|
||||||
hsFields := m{"stage": uint64(1), "style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, subtype)}
|
hsFields := m{"stage": uint64(1), "style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, header.HandshakeIXPSK0)}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
switch err {
|
switch err {
|
||||||
case ErrAlreadySeen:
|
case ErrAlreadySeen:
|
||||||
@@ -1226,7 +1121,7 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleCheckAndCompleteError(err error, existing, hos
|
|||||||
// ephemeral keys; a freshly-built one would have different keys and break
|
// ephemeral keys; a freshly-built one would have different keys and break
|
||||||
// the tunnel even though both sides "completed" the handshake.
|
// the tunnel even though both sides "completed" the handshake.
|
||||||
if msg := existing.HandshakePacket[handshakePacketStage2]; msg != nil {
|
if msg := existing.HandshakePacket[handshakePacketStage2]; msg != nil {
|
||||||
hm.sendHandshakeResponse(via, msg, existing, true, received)
|
hm.sendHandshakeResponse(via, msg, existing, true)
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
case ErrExistingHostInfo:
|
case ErrExistingHostInfo:
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -1,699 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
package nebula
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
import (
|
|
||||||
"context"
|
|
||||||
"crypto/hmac"
|
|
||||||
"crypto/rand"
|
|
||||||
"crypto/sha256"
|
|
||||||
"encoding/binary"
|
|
||||||
"errors"
|
|
||||||
"log/slog"
|
|
||||||
"net/netip"
|
|
||||||
"sync"
|
|
||||||
"time"
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
|
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake"
|
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake/fragment"
|
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
const (
|
|
||||||
// pqSubtype is the post-quantum handshake this node speaks.
|
|
||||||
pqSubtype = header.HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// DefaultPQRepairDelay is how long repair fragments trail the data fragments.
|
|
||||||
DefaultPQRepairDelay = 10 * time.Millisecond
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// pqAmplification bounds what a responder sends in reply to an unvalidated
|
|
||||||
// address, as a multiple of what it received from it.
|
|
||||||
pqAmplification = 3
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// pqTableConfig bounds the responder's reassembly of msg1 fragments from senders
|
|
||||||
// that have not authenticated yet.
|
|
||||||
var pqTableConfig = fragment.TableConfig{
|
|
||||||
MaxBytes: 4 << 20,
|
|
||||||
MaxEntries: 1024,
|
|
||||||
MaxPerSource: 4,
|
|
||||||
MaxMsgLen: 16384,
|
|
||||||
TTL: 3 * time.Second,
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
type pqHandshakeConfig struct {
|
|
||||||
initiate bool // start PQ handshakes
|
|
||||||
accept bool // answer PQ handshakes
|
|
||||||
require bool // only PQ handshakes, in either direction
|
|
||||||
sticky bool // never fall back to classical for a peer that completed PQ
|
|
||||||
repairDelay time.Duration // delay between data and repair fragments
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func pqHandshakeConfigFrom(c *config.C) pqHandshakeConfig {
|
|
||||||
cfg := pqHandshakeConfig{
|
|
||||||
initiate: c.GetBool("handshakes.pq.initiate", false),
|
|
||||||
accept: c.GetBool("handshakes.pq.accept", false),
|
|
||||||
require: c.GetBool("handshakes.pq.require", false),
|
|
||||||
sticky: c.GetBool("handshakes.pq.sticky", false),
|
|
||||||
repairDelay: c.GetDuration("handshakes.pq.repair_delay", DefaultPQRepairDelay),
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if cfg.require {
|
|
||||||
cfg.initiate = true
|
|
||||||
cfg.accept = true
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return cfg
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// pqConfig returns the post-quantum settings in effect.
|
|
||||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) pqConfig() *pqHandshakeConfig {
|
|
||||||
return hm.pq.Load()
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// reloadPQ applies changed post-quantum settings. Handshakes already in flight
|
|
||||||
// keep going; the new settings apply to the next attempt and packet.
|
|
||||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) reloadPQ(c *config.C) {
|
|
||||||
if !c.HasChanged("handshakes.pq") {
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
old := hm.pqConfig()
|
|
||||||
cfg := pqHandshakeConfigFrom(c)
|
|
||||||
hm.pq.Store(&cfg)
|
|
||||||
hm.l.Info("Post-quantum handshake settings changed",
|
|
||||||
"initiate", cfg.initiate, "oldInitiate", old.initiate,
|
|
||||||
"accept", cfg.accept, "oldAccept", old.accept,
|
|
||||||
"require", cfg.require, "oldRequire", old.require,
|
|
||||||
"sticky", cfg.sticky, "oldSticky", old.sticky,
|
|
||||||
"repairDelay", cfg.repairDelay, "oldRepairDelay", old.repairDelay,
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// pqAttempt is the initiator's post-quantum attempt for a pending handshake. It
|
|
||||||
// lives alongside the classical attempt in HandshakeHostInfo and has its own
|
|
||||||
// local index, so whichever answer arrives first wins.
|
|
||||||
type pqAttempt struct {
|
|
||||||
machine *handshake.Machine
|
|
||||||
index uint32
|
|
||||||
sender *fragment.Sender
|
|
||||||
msg2 *fragment.Assembly
|
|
||||||
cookieResendAt time.Time // last resend prompted by a cookie reply
|
|
||||||
heard bool // a msg2 fragment or cookie reply arrived, so the peer speaks PQ
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// pqFragKey identifies one msg1 being reassembled.
|
|
||||||
type pqFragKey struct {
|
|
||||||
addr netip.AddrPort
|
|
||||||
relay uint32
|
|
||||||
fragID uint32
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// pqFragSource groups msg1 reassemblies for the per-source quota: an IPv4 /32,
|
|
||||||
// an IPv6 /64, or one relay channel.
|
|
||||||
type pqFragSource struct {
|
|
||||||
prefix netip.Prefix
|
|
||||||
relay uint32
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func pqFragKeyFor(via ViaSender, fragID uint32) (pqFragKey, pqFragSource) {
|
|
||||||
if via.IsRelayed {
|
|
||||||
return pqFragKey{relay: via.relay.LocalIndex, fragID: fragID},
|
|
||||||
pqFragSource{relay: via.relay.LocalIndex}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
addr := via.UdpAddr.Addr().Unmap()
|
|
||||||
bits := 64
|
|
||||||
if addr.Is4() {
|
|
||||||
bits = 32
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
prefix, _ := addr.Prefix(bits)
|
|
||||||
return pqFragKey{addr: via.UdpAddr, fragID: fragID}, pqFragSource{prefix: prefix}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// reassembled rebuilds the packet the handshake Machine expects from the header
|
|
||||||
// of a fragment and the decoded message.
|
|
||||||
func reassembled(h *header.H, msg []byte) []byte {
|
|
||||||
p := make([]byte, header.Len, header.Len+len(msg))
|
|
||||||
header.Encode(p, header.Version, header.Handshake, h.Subtype, h.RemoteIndex, h.MessageCounter)
|
|
||||||
return append(p, msg...)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// usePQ decides whether this outbound attempt is post-quantum. A peer that does
|
|
||||||
// not speak PQ silently drops it, so timer retries alternate between PQ and
|
|
||||||
// classical, starting with PQ. An attempt triggered early by a lighthouse reply
|
|
||||||
// is sending to addresses nothing has been sent to yet, and a new path gets the
|
|
||||||
// PQ attempt first. With require, or for a peer that completed a PQ handshake
|
|
||||||
// when sticky is on, every attempt is PQ. Once anything has come back for the PQ
|
|
||||||
// attempt the peer evidently speaks PQ, and a classical attempt would only race
|
|
||||||
// it, so classical stops getting turns.
|
|
||||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) usePQ(hh *HandshakeHostInfo, vpnIp netip.Addr, triggered bool) bool {
|
|
||||||
cfg := hm.pqConfig()
|
|
||||||
switch {
|
|
||||||
case !cfg.initiate:
|
|
||||||
return false
|
|
||||||
case cfg.require:
|
|
||||||
return true
|
|
||||||
case hh.pq != nil && hh.pq.heard:
|
|
||||||
return true
|
|
||||||
case cfg.sticky:
|
|
||||||
if _, ok := hm.pqPeers.Load(vpnIp); ok {
|
|
||||||
return true
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return hh.counter <= 1 || triggered || !hh.lastPQ
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// relayEstablished pushes the pending handshake with target through a relay that
|
|
||||||
// just came up, rather than leaving it for the next retry. Nothing has gone over
|
|
||||||
// the relay yet, so like any new path it gets the PQ attempt first, which then
|
|
||||||
// counts as the PQ turn: the next retry is classical, as if it had been sent on
|
|
||||||
// schedule. Without this, relays coming up while the first attempt is in flight
|
|
||||||
// handed every relayed handshake to the classical retry.
|
|
||||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) relayEstablished(target netip.Addr, relayHI *HostInfo, relay *Relay) {
|
|
||||||
hh := hm.queryVpnIp(target)
|
|
||||||
if hh == nil {
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
hh.Lock()
|
|
||||||
defer hh.Unlock()
|
|
||||||
if hm.queryVpnIp(target) != hh {
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
var now, later [][]byte
|
|
||||||
switch {
|
|
||||||
case hh.pq != nil:
|
|
||||||
var err error
|
|
||||||
now, later, err = hh.pq.sender.Attempt(fragment.DefaultRepair(hh.pq.sender.Layout().K))
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
hh.lastPQ = true
|
|
||||||
case hh.ready:
|
|
||||||
now = [][]byte{hh.hostinfo.HandshakePacket[handshakePacketStage0]}
|
|
||||||
default:
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
f := hm.f
|
|
||||||
hh.hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Info("Send handshake via new relay", "relay", relayHI.vpnAddrs[0])
|
|
||||||
_ = hm.sendFragmented(now, later, func(p []byte) error {
|
|
||||||
f.SendVia(relayHI, relay, p, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu), false, 0)
|
|
||||||
return nil
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// buildPQAttempt creates the initiator's PQ Machine and msg1 sender.
|
|
||||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) buildPQAttempt(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) bool {
|
|
||||||
cs := hm.f.pki.getCertState()
|
|
||||||
v := hm.initiatingVersion(hh, cs)
|
|
||||||
if cs.GetCredential(v) == nil {
|
|
||||||
hm.f.l.Error("Unable to handshake with host because no certificate is available",
|
|
||||||
"vpnAddrs", hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "certVersion", v)
|
|
||||||
return false
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
pq := &pqAttempt{}
|
|
||||||
machine, err := handshake.NewMachine(
|
|
||||||
v, cs.GetCredential,
|
|
||||||
hm.certVerifier(), func() (uint32, error) { return hm.allocatePQIndex(hh, pq) },
|
|
||||||
true, pqSubtype,
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
hm.f.l.Error("Failed to create handshake machine",
|
|
||||||
"vpnAddrs", hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "error", err)
|
|
||||||
return false
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
msg, err := machine.Initiate(nil)
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
hm.f.l.Error("Failed to initiate handshake",
|
|
||||||
"vpnAddrs", hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "error", err)
|
|
||||||
hm.releasePQIndex(hh, pq)
|
|
||||||
return false
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
sender, err := fragment.NewSender(msg[header.Len:], pqSubtype, 0, 1, pq.index)
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
hm.f.l.Error("Failed to fragment handshake",
|
|
||||||
"vpnAddrs", hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "error", err)
|
|
||||||
hm.releasePQIndex(hh, pq)
|
|
||||||
return false
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
pq.machine = machine
|
|
||||||
pq.sender = sender
|
|
||||||
hh.pq = pq
|
|
||||||
return true
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// allocatePQIndex registers a local index for the PQ attempt. Unlike
|
|
||||||
// allocateIndex it leaves hostinfo.localIndexId alone; that is settled when one
|
|
||||||
// of the attempts completes.
|
|
||||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) allocatePQIndex(hh *HandshakeHostInfo, pq *pqAttempt) (uint32, error) {
|
|
||||||
hm.mainHostMap.RLock()
|
|
||||||
defer hm.mainHostMap.RUnlock()
|
|
||||||
hm.Lock()
|
|
||||||
defer hm.Unlock()
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
for range 32 {
|
|
||||||
index, err := generateIndex(hm.l)
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
return 0, err
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
_, inPending := hm.indexes[index]
|
|
||||||
_, inMain := hm.mainHostMap.Indexes[index]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if !inMain && !inPending {
|
|
||||||
pq.index = index
|
|
||||||
hm.indexes[index] = hh
|
|
||||||
return index, nil
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
return 0, errors.New("failed to generate unique localIndexId")
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) releasePQIndex(hh *HandshakeHostInfo, pq *pqAttempt) {
|
|
||||||
hm.Lock()
|
|
||||||
defer hm.Unlock()
|
|
||||||
if pq.index != 0 && hm.indexes[pq.index] == hh {
|
|
||||||
delete(hm.indexes, pq.index)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// settleIndex makes winner the hostinfo's local index and releases the index of
|
|
||||||
// the attempt that lost.
|
|
||||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) settleIndex(hh *HandshakeHostInfo, winner uint32) {
|
|
||||||
hm.Lock()
|
|
||||||
defer hm.Unlock()
|
|
||||||
for _, idx := range []uint32{hh.hostinfo.localIndexId, hh.pqIndex()} {
|
|
||||||
if idx != 0 && idx != winner && hm.indexes[idx] == hh {
|
|
||||||
delete(hm.indexes, idx)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
hh.hostinfo.localIndexId = winner
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func (hh *HandshakeHostInfo) pqIndex() uint32 {
|
|
||||||
if hh.pq == nil {
|
|
||||||
return 0
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return hh.pq.index
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// handleFragment routes one fragment of a PQ handshake message.
|
|
||||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleFragment(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H) {
|
|
||||||
if h.MessageCounter == pqCookieCounter {
|
|
||||||
hm.handleCookie(via, packet, h)
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
fh, sym, err := fragment.Parse(packet[header.Len:])
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
hm.l.Debug("dropping malformed handshake fragment", "from", via, "error", err)
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
switch h.MessageCounter {
|
|
||||||
case 1:
|
|
||||||
if !hm.pqConfig().accept {
|
|
||||||
hm.l.Debug("dropping post-quantum handshake, not accepting them", "from", via)
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if h.RemoteIndex != 0 {
|
|
||||||
hm.l.Debug("dropping stage-1 handshake with non-zero RemoteIndex",
|
|
||||||
"from", via, "remoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex)
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
now := time.Now()
|
|
||||||
key, src := pqFragKeyFor(via, fh.FragID)
|
|
||||||
if hm.pqTable.Load() >= pqCookieLoad && !(fh.HasCookie() && hm.pqCookies.valid(key, fh.Cookie, now)) {
|
|
||||||
hm.sendCookie(via, fh, key, len(packet), now)
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
res, err := hm.pqTable.Add(key, src, now, fh, sym)
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
hm.l.Debug("dropping handshake fragment", "from", via, "error", err)
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if res == nil {
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if existing := hm.pqAnswered.lookup(res.Msg, time.Now()); existing != nil {
|
|
||||||
// Already answered: resend, rate limited, with fresh symbols.
|
|
||||||
if msg := existing.HandshakePacket[handshakePacketStage2]; msg != nil {
|
|
||||||
hm.sendHandshakeResponse(via, msg, existing, true, res.Received)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
hm.beginHandshake(via, reassembled(h, res.Msg), h, res.Received)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
case 2:
|
|
||||||
if hh := hm.queryIndex(h.RemoteIndex); hh != nil {
|
|
||||||
hm.continuePQ(via, hh, h, fh, sym)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// continuePQ collects msg2 fragments for the initiator's PQ attempt.
|
|
||||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) continuePQ(via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostInfo, h *header.H, fh fragment.Header, sym []byte) {
|
|
||||||
hh.Lock()
|
|
||||||
defer hh.Unlock()
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
pq := hh.pq
|
|
||||||
if pq == nil || pq.index != h.RemoteIndex || !hm.stillPending(hh, pq.index) {
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
pq.heard = true
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if pq.msg2 == nil {
|
|
||||||
a, err := fragment.NewAssembly(fh)
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
pq.msg2 = a
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
ready, err := pq.msg2.Add(fh, sym)
|
|
||||||
if errors.Is(err, fragment.ErrMismatch) {
|
|
||||||
// The responder's FragID and MsgLen never change, so this is a stray or a
|
|
||||||
// forgery. Start over from this fragment rather than wedge.
|
|
||||||
pq.msg2 = nil
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if err != nil || !ready {
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
msg, err := pq.msg2.Decode()
|
|
||||||
pq.msg2 = nil
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
hm.l.Debug("failed to decode handshake fragments", "from", via, "error", err)
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
hm.processResponse(via, hh, pq.machine, reassembled(h, msg))
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// sendFragmented sends packets to a peer: now immediately and later after the
|
|
||||||
// repair delay. It returns the first error from the immediate sends; errors from
|
|
||||||
// delayed sends are only logged.
|
|
||||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) sendFragmented(now, later [][]byte, send func([]byte) error) error {
|
|
||||||
var first error
|
|
||||||
for _, p := range now {
|
|
||||||
if err := send(p); err != nil && first == nil {
|
|
||||||
first = err
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
sendLater := func() {
|
|
||||||
for _, p := range later {
|
|
||||||
if err := send(p); err != nil {
|
|
||||||
hm.l.Debug("Failed to send handshake repair fragment", "error", err)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
delay := hm.pqConfig().repairDelay
|
|
||||||
switch {
|
|
||||||
case len(later) == 0:
|
|
||||||
case delay <= 0:
|
|
||||||
sendLater()
|
|
||||||
default:
|
|
||||||
time.AfterFunc(delay, sendLater)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return first
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// sendFragmentedResponse sends the responder's msg2 as fragments. A resend of a
|
|
||||||
// cached response (cached) offers fresh symbols and is rate limited to one per
|
|
||||||
// retry interval. received is how many bytes the triggering msg1 took, which
|
|
||||||
// bounds what may be sent back before the address is validated.
|
|
||||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) sendFragmentedResponse(via ViaSender, msg []byte, hostinfo *HostInfo, cached bool, received int) error {
|
|
||||||
now := time.Now()
|
|
||||||
if cached {
|
|
||||||
last := hostinfo.handshakeResendAt.Load()
|
|
||||||
if now.UnixNano()-last < int64(hm.config.tryInterval) ||
|
|
||||||
!hostinfo.handshakeResendAt.CompareAndSwap(last, now.UnixNano()) {
|
|
||||||
return errors.New("handshake response resend rate limited")
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
} else {
|
|
||||||
hostinfo.handshakeResendAt.Store(now.UnixNano())
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
var h header.H
|
|
||||||
if err := h.Parse(msg); err != nil {
|
|
||||||
return err
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
s, err := fragment.NewSender(msg[header.Len:], h.Subtype, h.RemoteIndex, h.MessageCounter, hostinfo.localIndexId)
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
return err
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
l := s.Layout()
|
|
||||||
repair := fragment.DefaultRepair(l.K)
|
|
||||||
if received > 0 {
|
|
||||||
pktLen := header.Len + fragment.HeaderLen + l.SymbolSize
|
|
||||||
budget := pqAmplification * received / pktLen
|
|
||||||
if budget < l.K {
|
|
||||||
return errors.New("handshake response exceeds the amplification budget")
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
repair = min(repair, budget-l.K)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
n := uint32(l.K + repair)
|
|
||||||
s.SetNext(int(hostinfo.handshakeNextSymbol.Add(n) - n))
|
|
||||||
pkts, later, err := s.Attempt(repair)
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
return err
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if via.IsRelayed {
|
|
||||||
if via.relay == nil {
|
|
||||||
return errors.New("both addr and via.relay are nil")
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
// We received a valid handshake on this relay, so make sure the relay
|
|
||||||
// state reflects that, in case it had been marked Disestablished.
|
|
||||||
hostinfo.relayState.InsertRelayTo(via.relayHI.vpnAddrs[0])
|
|
||||||
via.relayHI.relayState.UpdateRelayForByIdxState(via.relay.LocalIndex, Established)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
hm.f.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Handshake, h.Subtype, int64(len(pkts)+len(later)))
|
|
||||||
return hm.sendFragmented(pkts, later, hm.sendTo(via))
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// notePQPeer remembers peers that completed a PQ handshake, for sticky mode.
|
|
||||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) notePQPeer(subtype header.MessageSubType, vpnAddrs []netip.Addr) {
|
|
||||||
if !hm.pqConfig().sticky || subtype != pqSubtype {
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
for _, a := range vpnAddrs {
|
|
||||||
hm.pqPeers.Store(a, struct{}{})
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if hm.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
|
|
||||||
hm.l.Debug("Remembering post-quantum peer", "vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// pqAnswered remembers the msg1s a responder recently answered, keyed by hash,
|
|
||||||
// so a repeat is recognised before any noise, KEM or certificate work. Repeats
|
|
||||||
// are routine: the trailing repair fragments of an attempt rebuild a msg1 that
|
|
||||||
// its data fragments already completed, and a retrying initiator offers fresh
|
|
||||||
// symbols for the same msg1. Entries only exist for completed handshakes, which
|
|
||||||
// need a valid certificate, and live as long as an initiator keeps retrying.
|
|
||||||
type pqAnswered struct {
|
|
||||||
sync.Mutex
|
|
||||||
ttl time.Duration
|
|
||||||
entries map[[sha256.Size]byte]pqAnsweredEntry
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
type pqAnsweredEntry struct {
|
|
||||||
hostinfo *HostInfo
|
|
||||||
at time.Time
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
const pqAnsweredMax = 4096
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func newPQAnswered(ttl time.Duration) *pqAnswered {
|
|
||||||
return &pqAnswered{ttl: ttl, entries: map[[sha256.Size]byte]pqAnsweredEntry{}}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func (a *pqAnswered) add(msg1 []byte, hostinfo *HostInfo, now time.Time) {
|
|
||||||
a.Lock()
|
|
||||||
defer a.Unlock()
|
|
||||||
if len(a.entries) >= pqAnsweredMax {
|
|
||||||
for k := range a.entries {
|
|
||||||
delete(a.entries, k)
|
|
||||||
break
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
a.entries[sha256.Sum256(msg1)] = pqAnsweredEntry{hostinfo: hostinfo, at: now}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func (a *pqAnswered) lookup(msg1 []byte, now time.Time) *HostInfo {
|
|
||||||
a.Lock()
|
|
||||||
defer a.Unlock()
|
|
||||||
e, ok := a.entries[sha256.Sum256(msg1)]
|
|
||||||
if !ok || now.Sub(e.at) > a.ttl {
|
|
||||||
return nil
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return e.hostinfo
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func (a *pqAnswered) expire(now time.Time) {
|
|
||||||
a.Lock()
|
|
||||||
defer a.Unlock()
|
|
||||||
for k, e := range a.entries {
|
|
||||||
if now.Sub(e.at) > a.ttl {
|
|
||||||
delete(a.entries, k)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// A responder whose msg1 table is under load stops keeping state for senders
|
|
||||||
// that have not shown they receive at their address. It answers a fragment
|
|
||||||
// without a valid cookie with a cookie reply and keeps nothing; the initiator
|
|
||||||
// resends with the cookie attached. This is WireGuard's under-load cookie, QUIC's
|
|
||||||
// Retry and SCTP's state cookie: one extra round trip, only while under attack.
|
|
||||||
const (
|
|
||||||
// pqCookieLoad is the table load above which msg1 fragments need a cookie.
|
|
||||||
pqCookieLoad = 0.5
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// pqCookieCounter marks a cookie reply in the header's message counter.
|
|
||||||
// Handshake messages count from 1.
|
|
||||||
pqCookieCounter = 0
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// pqCookieRotate is how often the cookie secret changes. A cookie stays
|
|
||||||
// valid for between one and two rotations.
|
|
||||||
pqCookieRotate = 2 * time.Minute
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
pqCookieReplyLen = header.Len + fragment.CookieLen
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// pqCookies mints and checks cookies: an HMAC over the sender's address (or relay
|
|
||||||
// channel) and FragID under a rotating secret, with the previous secret still
|
|
||||||
// accepted.
|
|
||||||
type pqCookies struct {
|
|
||||||
sync.Mutex
|
|
||||||
secrets [2][32]byte
|
|
||||||
rotatedAt time.Time
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func newPQCookies(now time.Time) *pqCookies {
|
|
||||||
c := &pqCookies{rotatedAt: now}
|
|
||||||
_, _ = rand.Read(c.secrets[0][:])
|
|
||||||
_, _ = rand.Read(c.secrets[1][:])
|
|
||||||
return c
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func (c *pqCookies) rotate(now time.Time) {
|
|
||||||
if now.Sub(c.rotatedAt) < pqCookieRotate {
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
c.secrets[1] = c.secrets[0]
|
|
||||||
_, _ = rand.Read(c.secrets[0][:])
|
|
||||||
c.rotatedAt = now
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func cookieMAC(secret []byte, key pqFragKey) fragment.Cookie {
|
|
||||||
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, secret)
|
|
||||||
addr := key.addr.Addr().As16()
|
|
||||||
mac.Write(addr[:])
|
|
||||||
var b [10]byte
|
|
||||||
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(b[0:], key.addr.Port())
|
|
||||||
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(b[2:], key.relay)
|
|
||||||
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(b[6:], key.fragID)
|
|
||||||
mac.Write(b[:])
|
|
||||||
var c fragment.Cookie
|
|
||||||
copy(c[:], mac.Sum(nil))
|
|
||||||
return c
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func (c *pqCookies) make(key pqFragKey, now time.Time) fragment.Cookie {
|
|
||||||
c.Lock()
|
|
||||||
defer c.Unlock()
|
|
||||||
c.rotate(now)
|
|
||||||
return cookieMAC(c.secrets[0][:], key)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func (c *pqCookies) valid(key pqFragKey, cookie fragment.Cookie, now time.Time) bool {
|
|
||||||
c.Lock()
|
|
||||||
defer c.Unlock()
|
|
||||||
c.rotate(now)
|
|
||||||
for _, s := range c.secrets {
|
|
||||||
want := cookieMAC(s[:], key)
|
|
||||||
if hmac.Equal(want[:], cookie[:]) {
|
|
||||||
return true
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return false
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// sendCookie answers a msg1 fragment that arrived without a valid cookie while
|
|
||||||
// under load. The reply is never larger than what triggered it, and replies are
|
|
||||||
// rate limited as a whole.
|
|
||||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) sendCookie(via ViaSender, fh fragment.Header, key pqFragKey, received int, now time.Time) {
|
|
||||||
if received < pqCookieReplyLen {
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if _, ok := hm.pqCookieLimiter.Allow(); !ok {
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
c := hm.pqCookies.make(key, now)
|
|
||||||
reply := make([]byte, header.Len, pqCookieReplyLen)
|
|
||||||
header.Encode(reply, header.Version, header.Handshake, pqSubtype, fh.FragID, pqCookieCounter)
|
|
||||||
reply = append(reply, c[:]...)
|
|
||||||
hm.f.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Handshake, pqSubtype, 1)
|
|
||||||
if err := hm.sendTo(via)(reply); err != nil {
|
|
||||||
hm.l.Debug("Failed to send handshake cookie", "to", via, "error", err)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// handleCookie attaches a responder's cookie to the PQ attempt it names and
|
|
||||||
// resends right away, at most once per retry interval, rather than waiting for
|
|
||||||
// the next attempt.
|
|
||||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleCookie(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H) {
|
|
||||||
if len(packet) != pqCookieReplyLen {
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
hh := hm.queryIndex(h.RemoteIndex)
|
|
||||||
if hh == nil {
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
hh.Lock()
|
|
||||||
defer hh.Unlock()
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
pq := hh.pq
|
|
||||||
if pq == nil || pq.index != h.RemoteIndex || !hm.stillPending(hh, pq.index) {
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
var c fragment.Cookie
|
|
||||||
copy(c[:], packet[header.Len:])
|
|
||||||
pq.sender.SetCookie(c)
|
|
||||||
pq.heard = true
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
now := time.Now()
|
|
||||||
if now.Sub(pq.cookieResendAt) < hm.config.tryInterval {
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
pq.cookieResendAt = now
|
|
||||||
pkts, later, err := pq.sender.Attempt(fragment.DefaultRepair(pq.sender.Layout().K))
|
|
||||||
if err != nil {
|
|
||||||
return
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
hm.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Handshake, pqSubtype, int64(len(pkts)+len(later)))
|
|
||||||
if err := hm.sendFragmented(pkts, later, hm.sendTo(via)); err != nil {
|
|
||||||
hm.l.Debug("Failed to resend handshake with cookie", "to", via, "error", err)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// sendTo returns a function sending a packet back the way via came: directly, or
|
|
||||||
// through the relay it arrived on.
|
|
||||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) sendTo(via ViaSender) func([]byte) error {
|
|
||||||
f := hm.f
|
|
||||||
if !via.IsRelayed {
|
|
||||||
return func(p []byte) error {
|
|
||||||
return f.outside.WriteTo(p, via.UdpAddr)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return func(p []byte) error {
|
|
||||||
if via.relay == nil {
|
|
||||||
return errors.New("both addr and via.relay are nil")
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
f.SendVia(via.relayHI, via.relay, p, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu), false, 0)
|
|
||||||
return nil
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
@@ -1,398 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
package nebula
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
import (
|
|
||||||
"math/rand/v2"
|
|
||||||
"net/netip"
|
|
||||||
"sync"
|
|
||||||
"testing"
|
|
||||||
"time"
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
|
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake/fragment"
|
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
|
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
|
|
||||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
|
|
||||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
|
|
||||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
|
|
||||||
)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// recordingConn captures what is written to it.
|
|
||||||
type recordingConn struct {
|
|
||||||
udp.NoopConn
|
|
||||||
sync.Mutex
|
|
||||||
sent [][]byte
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func (c *recordingConn) WriteTo(b []byte, _ netip.AddrPort) error {
|
|
||||||
c.Lock()
|
|
||||||
defer c.Unlock()
|
|
||||||
c.sent = append(c.sent, append([]byte(nil), b...))
|
|
||||||
return nil
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func (c *recordingConn) take() [][]byte {
|
|
||||||
c.Lock()
|
|
||||||
defer c.Unlock()
|
|
||||||
s := c.sent
|
|
||||||
c.sent = nil
|
|
||||||
return s
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func newPQTestManager(t *testing.T) (*HandshakeManager, *recordingConn) {
|
|
||||||
l := test.NewLogger()
|
|
||||||
conn := &recordingConn{}
|
|
||||||
cfg := defaultHandshakeConfig
|
|
||||||
cfg.pq = pqHandshakeConfig{initiate: true, accept: true}
|
|
||||||
hm := NewHandshakeManager(l, newHostMap(l), newTestLighthouse(), conn, cfg)
|
|
||||||
hm.f = &Interface{
|
|
||||||
handshakeManager: hm,
|
|
||||||
outside: conn,
|
|
||||||
messageMetrics: newMessageMetricsOnlyRecvError(),
|
|
||||||
l: l,
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return hm, conn
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// fragmentIndexes checks every packet is a fragment of the expected response and
|
|
||||||
// returns their symbol indexes.
|
|
||||||
func fragmentIndexes(t *testing.T, pkts [][]byte, fragID, remoteIndex uint32) []int {
|
|
||||||
t.Helper()
|
|
||||||
var out []int
|
|
||||||
for _, p := range pkts {
|
|
||||||
require.LessOrEqual(t, len(p), fragment.MaxPacketLen)
|
|
||||||
var h header.H
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, h.Parse(p))
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, pqSubtype, h.Subtype)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, remoteIndex, h.RemoteIndex)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, uint64(2), h.MessageCounter)
|
|
||||||
fh, _, err := fragment.Parse(p[header.Len:])
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, fragID, fh.FragID)
|
|
||||||
out = append(out, int(fh.Index))
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return out
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func TestSendFragmentedResponse(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
hm, conn := newPQTestManager(t)
|
|
||||||
via := ViaSender{UdpAddr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.1:4242")}
|
|
||||||
hostinfo := &HostInfo{localIndexId: 77}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// A 2000 byte message is 2 symbols of 1000, so packets of 1024 bytes.
|
|
||||||
msg := make([]byte, header.Len, header.Len+2000)
|
|
||||||
header.Encode(msg, header.Version, header.Handshake, pqSubtype, 5, 2)
|
|
||||||
r := rand.New(rand.NewPCG(1, 1))
|
|
||||||
for range 2000 {
|
|
||||||
msg = append(msg, byte(r.Uint32()))
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
const pktLen = header.Len + fragment.HeaderLen + 1000
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Run("first send", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, hm.sendFragmentedResponse(via, msg, hostinfo, false, 0))
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, []int{0, 1, 2, 3}, fragmentIndexes(t, conn.take(), 77, 5))
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Run("resends are rate limited", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
require.Error(t, hm.sendFragmentedResponse(via, msg, hostinfo, true, 10*pktLen))
|
|
||||||
assert.Empty(t, conn.take())
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
allowResend := func() {
|
|
||||||
hostinfo.handshakeResendAt.Store(time.Now().Add(-time.Second).UnixNano())
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Run("resend offers fresh symbols", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
allowResend()
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, hm.sendFragmentedResponse(via, msg, hostinfo, true, 10*pktLen))
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, []int{4, 5, 6, 7}, fragmentIndexes(t, conn.take(), 77, 5))
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Run("amplification budget trims repair", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
allowResend()
|
|
||||||
// 3x of a little over one packet allows 3 packets: both data and 1 repair.
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, hm.sendFragmentedResponse(via, msg, hostinfo, true, pktLen+10))
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, []int{8, 9, 10}, fragmentIndexes(t, conn.take(), 77, 5))
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Run("amplification budget below the data refuses", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
allowResend()
|
|
||||||
require.Error(t, hm.sendFragmentedResponse(via, msg, hostinfo, true, pktLen/2))
|
|
||||||
assert.Empty(t, conn.take())
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func TestPQAnswered(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
now := time.Unix(1000, 0)
|
|
||||||
a := newPQAnswered(5 * time.Second)
|
|
||||||
hi := &HostInfo{}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
assert.Nil(t, a.lookup([]byte("msg1"), now))
|
|
||||||
a.add([]byte("msg1"), hi, now)
|
|
||||||
assert.Same(t, hi, a.lookup([]byte("msg1"), now.Add(time.Second)))
|
|
||||||
assert.Nil(t, a.lookup([]byte("other"), now))
|
|
||||||
assert.Nil(t, a.lookup([]byte("msg1"), now.Add(6*time.Second)), "stale entries are not answered")
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
a.expire(now.Add(6 * time.Second))
|
|
||||||
assert.Empty(t, a.entries)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
for i := range pqAnsweredMax + 10 {
|
|
||||||
a.add([]byte{byte(i), byte(i >> 8)}, hi, now)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
assert.Len(t, a.entries, pqAnsweredMax)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func TestPQFragKeyFor(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
k1, s1 := pqFragKeyFor(ViaSender{UdpAddr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.1:4242")}, 9)
|
|
||||||
k2, s2 := pqFragKeyFor(ViaSender{UdpAddr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.1:4243")}, 9)
|
|
||||||
assert.NotEqual(t, k1, k2, "different ports are different messages")
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, s1, s2, "but share an IPv4 /32 quota")
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
_, s3 := pqFragKeyFor(ViaSender{UdpAddr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("[2001:db8::1]:1")}, 9)
|
|
||||||
_, s4 := pqFragKeyFor(ViaSender{UdpAddr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("[2001:db8::ffff]:1")}, 9)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, s3, s4, "an IPv6 /64 shares a quota")
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
_, s5 := pqFragKeyFor(ViaSender{UdpAddr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("[::ffff:192.0.2.1]:1")}, 9)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, s1, s5, "v4-mapped addresses count as IPv4")
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func TestPQCookies(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
now := time.Unix(1000, 0)
|
|
||||||
c := newPQCookies(now)
|
|
||||||
key := pqFragKey{addr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.1:4242"), fragID: 9}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
cookie := c.make(key, now)
|
|
||||||
assert.True(t, c.valid(key, cookie, now))
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
for _, other := range []pqFragKey{
|
|
||||||
{addr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.2:4242"), fragID: 9},
|
|
||||||
{addr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.1:4243"), fragID: 9},
|
|
||||||
{addr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.1:4242"), fragID: 10},
|
|
||||||
{addr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.1:4242"), relay: 1, fragID: 9},
|
|
||||||
} {
|
|
||||||
assert.False(t, c.valid(other, cookie, now), "%+v", other)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
now = now.Add(pqCookieRotate)
|
|
||||||
assert.True(t, c.valid(key, cookie, now), "the previous secret is still accepted")
|
|
||||||
assert.NotEqual(t, cookie, c.make(key, now), "new cookies come from the new secret")
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
now = now.Add(pqCookieRotate)
|
|
||||||
assert.False(t, c.valid(key, cookie, now), "two rotations retire a cookie")
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// pqMsg1Fragment builds the first fragment of a msg1, optionally with a cookie.
|
|
||||||
func pqMsg1Fragment(t *testing.T, fragID uint32, cookie *fragment.Cookie) ([]byte, *header.H) {
|
|
||||||
t.Helper()
|
|
||||||
s, err := fragment.NewSender(make([]byte, 2000), pqSubtype, 0, 1, fragID)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
if cookie != nil {
|
|
||||||
s.SetCookie(*cookie)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
pkts, _, err := s.Attempt(0)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
var h header.H
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, h.Parse(pkts[0]))
|
|
||||||
return pkts[0], &h
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// fillPQTable puts the responder's msg1 table at the cookie threshold.
|
|
||||||
func fillPQTable(t *testing.T, hm *HandshakeManager) {
|
|
||||||
t.Helper()
|
|
||||||
now := time.Now()
|
|
||||||
for i := 0; hm.pqTable.Load() < pqCookieLoad; i++ {
|
|
||||||
p, _ := pqMsg1Fragment(t, uint32(i+1), nil)
|
|
||||||
fh, sym, err := fragment.Parse(p[header.Len:])
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
addr := netip.AddrPortFrom(netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{198, 18, byte(i >> 8), byte(i)}), 4242)
|
|
||||||
key, src := pqFragKeyFor(ViaSender{UdpAddr: addr}, fh.FragID)
|
|
||||||
_, err = hm.pqTable.Add(key, src, now, fh, sym)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func TestPQCookieUnderLoad(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
hm, conn := newPQTestManager(t)
|
|
||||||
via := ViaSender{UdpAddr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.1:4242")}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Run("no cookie needed below the threshold", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
p, h := pqMsg1Fragment(t, 5000, nil)
|
|
||||||
before := hm.pqTable.Len()
|
|
||||||
hm.handleFragment(via, p, h)
|
|
||||||
assert.Empty(t, conn.take())
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, before+1, hm.pqTable.Len())
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
fillPQTable(t, hm)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
var cookie fragment.Cookie
|
|
||||||
t.Run("a fragment without a cookie gets one and leaves no state", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
p, h := pqMsg1Fragment(t, 7, nil)
|
|
||||||
before := hm.pqTable.Len()
|
|
||||||
hm.handleFragment(via, p, h)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, before, hm.pqTable.Len())
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
sent := conn.take()
|
|
||||||
require.Len(t, sent, 1)
|
|
||||||
reply := sent[0]
|
|
||||||
require.Len(t, reply, pqCookieReplyLen)
|
|
||||||
var rh header.H
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, rh.Parse(reply))
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, header.Handshake, rh.Type)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, pqSubtype, rh.Subtype)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, uint32(7), rh.RemoteIndex, "the reply names the initiator's FragID")
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, uint64(pqCookieCounter), rh.MessageCounter)
|
|
||||||
copy(cookie[:], reply[header.Len:])
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Run("a forged cookie gets a fresh one", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
bad := cookie
|
|
||||||
bad[0] ^= 1
|
|
||||||
p, h := pqMsg1Fragment(t, 7, &bad)
|
|
||||||
before := hm.pqTable.Len()
|
|
||||||
hm.handleFragment(via, p, h)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, before, hm.pqTable.Len())
|
|
||||||
assert.Len(t, conn.take(), 1)
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Run("the cookie gets the fragment in", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
p, h := pqMsg1Fragment(t, 7, &cookie)
|
|
||||||
before := hm.pqTable.Len()
|
|
||||||
hm.handleFragment(via, p, h)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, before+1, hm.pqTable.Len())
|
|
||||||
assert.Empty(t, conn.take())
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Run("a cookie is bound to its address", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
p, h := pqMsg1Fragment(t, 7, &cookie)
|
|
||||||
hm.handleFragment(ViaSender{UdpAddr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.99:4242")}, p, h)
|
|
||||||
assert.Len(t, conn.take(), 1, "another address gets its own cookie instead")
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Run("a reply never outgrows what prompted it", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
p, h := pqMsg1Fragment(t, 8, nil)
|
|
||||||
hm.sendCookie(via, fragment.Header{FragID: 8}, pqFragKey{}, pqCookieReplyLen-1, time.Now())
|
|
||||||
assert.Empty(t, conn.take())
|
|
||||||
hm.handleFragment(via, p, h)
|
|
||||||
assert.Len(t, conn.take(), 1)
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func TestPQHandleCookie(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
hm, conn := newPQTestManager(t)
|
|
||||||
via := ViaSender{UdpAddr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.1:4242")}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
s, err := fragment.NewSender(make([]byte, 2000), pqSubtype, 0, 1, 99)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
_, _, err = s.Attempt(2)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
hh := &HandshakeHostInfo{hostinfo: &HostInfo{}, pq: &pqAttempt{index: 99, sender: s}}
|
|
||||||
hm.indexes[99] = hh
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
reply := make([]byte, header.Len, pqCookieReplyLen)
|
|
||||||
header.Encode(reply, header.Version, header.Handshake, pqSubtype, 99, pqCookieCounter)
|
|
||||||
reply = append(reply, bytes16(0xab)...)
|
|
||||||
var h header.H
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, h.Parse(reply))
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
hm.handleFragment(via, reply, &h)
|
|
||||||
assert.True(t, hh.pq.heard, "a cookie reply shows the peer speaks PQ")
|
|
||||||
sent := conn.take()
|
|
||||||
require.Len(t, sent, 4, "an immediate resend of fresh symbols")
|
|
||||||
for i, p := range sent {
|
|
||||||
fh, _, err := fragment.Parse(p[header.Len:])
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
||||||
assert.True(t, fh.HasCookie())
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, fragment.Cookie(bytes16(0xab)), fh.Cookie)
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, uint8(4+i), fh.Index)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
hm.handleFragment(via, reply, &h)
|
|
||||||
assert.Empty(t, conn.take(), "immediate resends are rate limited")
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Run("replies for other indexes are ignored", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
other := append([]byte(nil), reply...)
|
|
||||||
header.Encode(other, header.Version, header.Handshake, pqSubtype, 98, pqCookieCounter)
|
|
||||||
var oh header.H
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, oh.Parse(other))
|
|
||||||
hh.pq.cookieResendAt = time.Time{}
|
|
||||||
hm.handleFragment(via, other, &oh)
|
|
||||||
assert.Empty(t, conn.take())
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func bytes16(b byte) []byte {
|
|
||||||
out := make([]byte, 16)
|
|
||||||
for i := range out {
|
|
||||||
out[i] = b
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return out
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func TestReloadPQ(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
l := test.NewLogger()
|
|
||||||
c := config.NewC(l)
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, c.LoadString(`handshakes: {pq: {initiate: false}}`))
|
|
||||||
cfg := defaultHandshakeConfig
|
|
||||||
cfg.pq = pqHandshakeConfigFrom(c)
|
|
||||||
hm := NewHandshakeManager(l, newHostMap(l), newTestLighthouse(), &udp.NoopConn{}, cfg)
|
|
||||||
c.RegisterReloadCallback(hm.reloadPQ)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, pqHandshakeConfig{repairDelay: DefaultPQRepairDelay}, *hm.pqConfig())
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, c.ReloadConfigString(`handshakes: {pq: {initiate: true, accept: true, sticky: true, repair_delay: 25ms}}`))
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, pqHandshakeConfig{initiate: true, accept: true, sticky: true, repairDelay: 25 * time.Millisecond}, *hm.pqConfig())
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
before := hm.pqConfig()
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, c.ReloadConfigString(`handshakes: {try_interval: 1s, pq: {initiate: true, accept: true, sticky: true, repair_delay: 25ms}}`))
|
|
||||||
assert.Same(t, before, hm.pqConfig(), "an unrelated change leaves the settings alone")
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, c.ReloadConfigString(`handshakes: {}`))
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, pqHandshakeConfig{repairDelay: DefaultPQRepairDelay}, *hm.pqConfig(), "removing the section restores the defaults")
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
require.NoError(t, c.ReloadConfigString(`handshakes: {pq: {require: true}}`))
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, pqHandshakeConfig{initiate: true, accept: true, require: true, repairDelay: DefaultPQRepairDelay}, *hm.pqConfig(), "require implies initiate and accept")
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func TestUsePQ(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
hm, _ := newPQTestManager(t)
|
|
||||||
peer := netip.MustParseAddr("10.1.0.1")
|
|
||||||
set := func(cfg pqHandshakeConfig) { hm.pq.Store(&cfg) }
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// attempts plays a run of attempts, given whether each was triggered early,
|
|
||||||
// and returns which were PQ.
|
|
||||||
attempts := func(triggered ...bool) []bool {
|
|
||||||
hh := &HandshakeHostInfo{}
|
|
||||||
var out []bool
|
|
||||||
for _, tr := range triggered {
|
|
||||||
hh.counter++
|
|
||||||
hh.lastPQ = hm.usePQ(hh, peer, tr)
|
|
||||||
out = append(out, hh.lastPQ)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
return out
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
set(pqHandshakeConfig{})
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, []bool{false, false, false}, attempts(false, false, false), "off")
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
set(pqHandshakeConfig{initiate: true})
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, []bool{true, false, true, false}, attempts(false, false, false, false), "timer retries alternate, PQ first")
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, []bool{true, true, false, true, false}, attempts(false, true, false, true, false), "an early trigger is a new path, which gets PQ first")
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, []bool{true, true, false}, attempts(true, true, false), "a triggered first attempt is PQ")
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
t.Run("hearing back stops the classical turns", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
||||||
hh := &HandshakeHostInfo{pq: &pqAttempt{}}
|
|
||||||
hh.counter, hh.lastPQ = 1, true
|
|
||||||
hh.counter++
|
|
||||||
assert.False(t, hm.usePQ(hh, peer, false), "unheard, the classical attempt gets its turn")
|
|
||||||
hh.pq.heard = true
|
|
||||||
assert.True(t, hm.usePQ(hh, peer, false))
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
set(pqHandshakeConfig{initiate: true, accept: true, require: true})
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, []bool{true, true, true, true}, attempts(false, false, true, false), "require never offers classical")
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
set(pqHandshakeConfig{initiate: true, sticky: true})
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, []bool{true, false}, attempts(false, false), "sticky alternates until the peer has done PQ")
|
|
||||||
hm.notePQPeer(pqSubtype, []netip.Addr{peer})
|
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, []bool{true, true, true}, attempts(false, false, false), "then only PQ")
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
+1
-13
@@ -67,19 +67,8 @@ const (
|
|||||||
const (
|
const (
|
||||||
HandshakeIXPSK0 MessageSubType = 0
|
HandshakeIXPSK0 MessageSubType = 0
|
||||||
HandshakeXXPSK0 MessageSubType = 1
|
HandshakeXXPSK0 MessageSubType = 1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024 is IX with an ephemeral ML-KEM-1024 exchange mixed
|
|
||||||
// in through the psk2 slot. Its messages exceed the MTU and travel as
|
|
||||||
// fragments (see handshake/fragment).
|
|
||||||
HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024 MessageSubType = 2
|
|
||||||
)
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// IsFragmented reports whether handshake messages of this subtype travel as
|
|
||||||
// fragments.
|
|
||||||
func IsFragmented(st MessageSubType) bool {
|
|
||||||
return st == HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
var ErrHeaderTooShort = errors.New("header is too short")
|
var ErrHeaderTooShort = errors.New("header is too short")
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
var subTypeTestMap = map[MessageSubType]string{
|
var subTypeTestMap = map[MessageSubType]string{
|
||||||
@@ -100,7 +89,6 @@ var subTypeMap = map[MessageType]*map[MessageSubType]string{
|
|||||||
CloseTunnel: &subTypeNoneMap,
|
CloseTunnel: &subTypeNoneMap,
|
||||||
Handshake: {
|
Handshake: {
|
||||||
HandshakeIXPSK0: "ix_psk0",
|
HandshakeIXPSK0: "ix_psk0",
|
||||||
HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024: "ix_psk2_mlkem1024",
|
|
||||||
},
|
},
|
||||||
Control: &subTypeNoneMap,
|
Control: &subTypeNoneMap,
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -211,7 +199,7 @@ func IsValidSubType(t MessageType, s MessageSubType) bool {
|
|||||||
case Message:
|
case Message:
|
||||||
return s == MessageNone || s == MessageRelay
|
return s == MessageNone || s == MessageRelay
|
||||||
case Handshake:
|
case Handshake:
|
||||||
return s == HandshakeIXPSK0 || s == HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024
|
return s == HandshakeIXPSK0
|
||||||
case Test:
|
case Test:
|
||||||
return s == TestReply || s == TestRequest
|
return s == TestReply || s == TestRequest
|
||||||
case Control, CloseTunnel, RecvError, LightHouse:
|
case Control, CloseTunnel, RecvError, LightHouse:
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -97,7 +97,6 @@ func TestTypeMap(t *testing.T) {
|
|||||||
CloseTunnel: &subTypeNoneMap,
|
CloseTunnel: &subTypeNoneMap,
|
||||||
Handshake: {
|
Handshake: {
|
||||||
HandshakeIXPSK0: "ix_psk0",
|
HandshakeIXPSK0: "ix_psk0",
|
||||||
HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024: "ix_psk2_mlkem1024",
|
|
||||||
},
|
},
|
||||||
Control: &subTypeNoneMap,
|
Control: &subTypeNoneMap,
|
||||||
}, subTypeMap)
|
}, subTypeMap)
|
||||||
@@ -123,7 +122,6 @@ func TestIsValidSubType(t *testing.T) {
|
|||||||
assert.False(t, IsValidSubType(Message, 2))
|
assert.False(t, IsValidSubType(Message, 2))
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
assert.True(t, IsValidSubType(Handshake, HandshakeIXPSK0))
|
assert.True(t, IsValidSubType(Handshake, HandshakeIXPSK0))
|
||||||
assert.True(t, IsValidSubType(Handshake, HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024))
|
|
||||||
// HandshakeXXPSK0 is defined but not a wire-valid subtype.
|
// HandshakeXXPSK0 is defined but not a wire-valid subtype.
|
||||||
assert.False(t, IsValidSubType(Handshake, HandshakeXXPSK0))
|
assert.False(t, IsValidSubType(Handshake, HandshakeXXPSK0))
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -260,11 +260,6 @@ type HostInfo struct {
|
|||||||
// We need these to avoid replayed handshake packets creating new hostinfos which causes churn
|
// We need these to avoid replayed handshake packets creating new hostinfos which causes churn
|
||||||
HandshakePacket map[uint8][]byte
|
HandshakePacket map[uint8][]byte
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// A responder resending a fragmented handshake response offers symbols it has
|
|
||||||
// not sent before, at most once per retry interval.
|
|
||||||
handshakeResendAt atomic.Int64 // unix nanos of the last send
|
|
||||||
handshakeNextSymbol atomic.Uint32 // next fragment symbol index to offer
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// nextLHQuery is the earliest we can ask the lighthouse for new information.
|
// nextLHQuery is the earliest we can ask the lighthouse for new information.
|
||||||
// This is used to limit lighthouse re-queries in chatty clients
|
// This is used to limit lighthouse re-queries in chatty clients
|
||||||
nextLHQuery atomic.Int64
|
nextLHQuery atomic.Int64
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -232,11 +232,9 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
|
|||||||
retries: int64(c.GetInt("handshakes.retries", DefaultHandshakeRetries)),
|
retries: int64(c.GetInt("handshakes.retries", DefaultHandshakeRetries)),
|
||||||
triggerBuffer: c.GetInt("handshakes.trigger_buffer", DefaultHandshakeTriggerBuffer),
|
triggerBuffer: c.GetInt("handshakes.trigger_buffer", DefaultHandshakeTriggerBuffer),
|
||||||
messageMetrics: messageMetrics,
|
messageMetrics: messageMetrics,
|
||||||
pq: pqHandshakeConfigFrom(c),
|
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
handshakeManager := NewHandshakeManager(l, hostMap, lightHouse, udpConns[0], handshakeConfig)
|
handshakeManager := NewHandshakeManager(l, hostMap, lightHouse, udpConns[0], handshakeConfig)
|
||||||
c.RegisterReloadCallback(handshakeManager.reloadPQ)
|
|
||||||
lightHouse.handshakeTrigger = handshakeManager.trigger
|
lightHouse.handshakeTrigger = handshakeManager.trigger
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
ds, err := newDnsServerFromConfig(ctx, l, pki, hostMap, c)
|
ds, err := newDnsServerFromConfig(ctx, l, pki, hostMap, c)
|
||||||
|
|||||||
+3
-9
@@ -57,9 +57,8 @@ func (rm *relayManager) GetUseRelays() bool {
|
|||||||
// StartRelays drives the relay-establishment side of an outbound handshake attempt.
|
// StartRelays drives the relay-establishment side of an outbound handshake attempt.
|
||||||
// For each candidate relay it either kicks off a handshake to the relay, sends a CreateRelayRequest, retransmits
|
// For each candidate relay it either kicks off a handshake to the relay, sends a CreateRelayRequest, retransmits
|
||||||
// one that may have been lost, or, once the relay is Established, forwards the in-progress
|
// one that may have been lost, or, once the relay is Established, forwards the in-progress
|
||||||
// stage 0 handshake packets for vpnIp through it: now immediately and later after the
|
// stage 0 handshake packet for vpnIp through it.
|
||||||
// handshake repair delay.
|
func (rm *relayManager) StartRelays(f *Interface, vpnIp netip.Addr, hh *HandshakeHostInfo, stage0 []byte) {
|
||||||
func (rm *relayManager) StartRelays(f *Interface, vpnIp netip.Addr, hh *HandshakeHostInfo, now, later [][]byte) {
|
|
||||||
hostinfo := hh.hostinfo
|
hostinfo := hh.hostinfo
|
||||||
if !rm.GetUseRelays() || len(hostinfo.remotes.relays) == 0 {
|
if !rm.GetUseRelays() || len(hostinfo.remotes.relays) == 0 {
|
||||||
hh.lastRelays = nil
|
hh.lastRelays = nil
|
||||||
@@ -162,10 +161,7 @@ func (rm *relayManager) StartRelays(f *Interface, vpnIp netip.Addr, hh *Handshak
|
|||||||
switch existingRelay.State {
|
switch existingRelay.State {
|
||||||
case Established:
|
case Established:
|
||||||
hl.Log(context.Background(), level, "Send handshake via relay", "relay", relay.String())
|
hl.Log(context.Background(), level, "Send handshake via relay", "relay", relay.String())
|
||||||
_ = f.handshakeManager.sendFragmented(now, later, func(p []byte) error {
|
f.SendVia(relayHostInfo, existingRelay, stage0, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu), false, 0)
|
||||||
f.SendVia(relayHostInfo, existingRelay, p, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu), false, 0)
|
|
||||||
return nil
|
|
||||||
})
|
|
||||||
case Disestablished:
|
case Disestablished:
|
||||||
// Mark this relay as 'requested'
|
// Mark this relay as 'requested'
|
||||||
relayHostInfo.relayState.UpdateRelayForByIpState(vpnIp, Requested)
|
relayHostInfo.relayState.UpdateRelayForByIpState(vpnIp, Requested)
|
||||||
@@ -364,8 +360,6 @@ func (rm *relayManager) handleCreateRelayResponse(v cert.Version, h *HostInfo, f
|
|||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
// Do I need to complete the relays now?
|
// Do I need to complete the relays now?
|
||||||
if relay.Type == TerminalType {
|
if relay.Type == TerminalType {
|
||||||
// The relay I asked for is up; a handshake waiting on it can go now.
|
|
||||||
f.handshakeManager.relayEstablished(relay.PeerAddr, h, relay)
|
|
||||||
return
|
return
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
// I'm the middle man. Let the initiator know that the I've established the relay they requested.
|
// I'm the middle man. Let the initiator know that the I've established the relay they requested.
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ func TestStartRelaysLogDedupe(t *testing.T) {
|
|||||||
var buf bytes.Buffer
|
var buf bytes.Buffer
|
||||||
rm := newRM(&buf)
|
rm := newRM(&buf)
|
||||||
hh := newHH()
|
hh := newHH()
|
||||||
rm.StartRelays(f, vpnIp, hh, nil, nil)
|
rm.StartRelays(f, vpnIp, hh, nil)
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, []netip.Addr{vpnIp}, hh.lastRelays, "lastRelays should record the relay set we just attempted")
|
assert.Equal(t, []netip.Addr{vpnIp}, hh.lastRelays, "lastRelays should record the relay set we just attempted")
|
||||||
assert.Contains(t, buf.String(), "level=INFO "+msg, "expected Info level on first attempt")
|
assert.Contains(t, buf.String(), "level=INFO "+msg, "expected Info level on first attempt")
|
||||||
})
|
})
|
||||||
@@ -59,10 +59,10 @@ func TestStartRelaysLogDedupe(t *testing.T) {
|
|||||||
var buf bytes.Buffer
|
var buf bytes.Buffer
|
||||||
rm := newRM(&buf)
|
rm := newRM(&buf)
|
||||||
hh := newHH()
|
hh := newHH()
|
||||||
rm.StartRelays(f, vpnIp, hh, nil, nil)
|
rm.StartRelays(f, vpnIp, hh, nil)
|
||||||
first := append([]netip.Addr(nil), hh.lastRelays...)
|
first := append([]netip.Addr(nil), hh.lastRelays...)
|
||||||
buf.Reset()
|
buf.Reset()
|
||||||
rm.StartRelays(f, vpnIp, hh, nil, nil)
|
rm.StartRelays(f, vpnIp, hh, nil)
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, first, hh.lastRelays)
|
assert.Equal(t, first, hh.lastRelays)
|
||||||
assert.Contains(t, buf.String(), "level=DEBUG "+msg, "expected Debug level on identical retry")
|
assert.Contains(t, buf.String(), "level=DEBUG "+msg, "expected Debug level on identical retry")
|
||||||
assert.NotContains(t, buf.String(), "level=INFO "+msg, "Info should not fire on identical retry")
|
assert.NotContains(t, buf.String(), "level=INFO "+msg, "Info should not fire on identical retry")
|
||||||
@@ -72,13 +72,13 @@ func TestStartRelaysLogDedupe(t *testing.T) {
|
|||||||
var buf bytes.Buffer
|
var buf bytes.Buffer
|
||||||
rm := newRM(&buf)
|
rm := newRM(&buf)
|
||||||
hh := newHH()
|
hh := newHH()
|
||||||
rm.StartRelays(f, vpnIp, hh, nil, nil)
|
rm.StartRelays(f, vpnIp, hh, nil)
|
||||||
buf.Reset()
|
buf.Reset()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// The lighthouse handed us a new set this round.
|
// The lighthouse handed us a new set this round.
|
||||||
hh.hostinfo.remotes.relays = []netip.Addr{vpnIp, otherRelay}
|
hh.hostinfo.remotes.relays = []netip.Addr{vpnIp, otherRelay}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
rm.StartRelays(f, vpnIp, hh, nil, nil)
|
rm.StartRelays(f, vpnIp, hh, nil)
|
||||||
assert.Equal(t, []netip.Addr{vpnIp, otherRelay}, hh.lastRelays)
|
assert.Equal(t, []netip.Addr{vpnIp, otherRelay}, hh.lastRelays)
|
||||||
assert.Contains(t, buf.String(), "level=INFO "+msg, "expected Info when the relay list changes")
|
assert.Contains(t, buf.String(), "level=INFO "+msg, "expected Info when the relay list changes")
|
||||||
})
|
})
|
||||||
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ func TestStartRelaysLogDedupe(t *testing.T) {
|
|||||||
hh := newHH()
|
hh := newHH()
|
||||||
hh.lastRelays = []netip.Addr{vpnIp}
|
hh.lastRelays = []netip.Addr{vpnIp}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
rm.StartRelays(f, vpnIp, hh, nil, nil)
|
rm.StartRelays(f, vpnIp, hh, nil)
|
||||||
assert.Nil(t, hh.lastRelays, "with relays disabled lastRelays should be cleared")
|
assert.Nil(t, hh.lastRelays, "with relays disabled lastRelays should be cleared")
|
||||||
assert.NotContains(t, buf.String(), msg, "should not log when we shortcut out")
|
assert.NotContains(t, buf.String(), msg, "should not log when we shortcut out")
|
||||||
})
|
})
|
||||||
|
|||||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user