nebula/outside.go
Wade Simmons 6e0ae4f9a3
firewall: add option to send REJECT replies (#738)
* firewall: add option to send REJECT replies

This change allows you to configure the firewall to send REJECT packets
when a packet is denied.

    firewall:
      # Action to take when a packet is not allowed by the firewall rules.
      # Can be one of:
      #   `drop` (default): silently drop the packet.
      #   `reject`: send a reject reply.
      #     - For TCP, this will be a RST "Connection Reset" packet.
      #     - For other protocols, this will be an ICMP port unreachable packet.
      outbound_action: drop
      inbound_action: drop

These packets are only sent to established tunnels, and only on the
overlay network (currently IPv4 only).

    $ ping -c1 192.168.100.3
    PING 192.168.100.3 (192.168.100.3) 56(84) bytes of data.
    From 192.168.100.3 icmp_seq=2 Destination Port Unreachable

    --- 192.168.100.3 ping statistics ---
    2 packets transmitted, 0 received, +1 errors, 100% packet loss, time 31ms

    $ nc -nzv 192.168.100.3 22
    (UNKNOWN) [192.168.100.3] 22 (?) : Connection refused

This change also modifies the smoke test to capture tcpdump pcaps from
both the inside and outside to inspect what is going on over the wire.
It also now does TCP and UDP packet tests using the Nmap version of
ncat.

* calculate seq and ack the same was as the kernel

The logic a bit confusing, so we copy it straight from how the kernel
does iptables `--reject-with tcp-reset`:

- https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/v5.19/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c#L193-L221

* cleanup
2023-03-13 15:08:40 -04:00

531 lines
17 KiB
Go

package nebula
import (
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"fmt"
"time"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/iputil"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
"golang.org/x/net/ipv4"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"
)
const (
minFwPacketLen = 4
)
func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(addr *udp.Addr, via interface{}, out []byte, packet []byte, h *header.H, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, lhf udp.LightHouseHandlerFunc, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
err := h.Parse(packet)
if err != nil {
// TODO: best if we return this and let caller log
// TODO: Might be better to send the literal []byte("holepunch") packet and ignore that?
// Hole punch packets are 0 or 1 byte big, so lets ignore printing those errors
if len(packet) > 1 {
f.l.WithField("packet", packet).Infof("Error while parsing inbound packet from %s: %s", addr, err)
}
return
}
//l.Error("in packet ", header, packet[HeaderLen:])
if addr != nil {
if ip4 := addr.IP.To4(); ip4 != nil {
if ipMaskContains(f.lightHouse.myVpnIp, f.lightHouse.myVpnZeros, iputil.VpnIp(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(ip4))) {
if f.l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
f.l.WithField("udpAddr", addr).Debug("Refusing to process double encrypted packet")
}
return
}
}
}
var hostinfo *HostInfo
// verify if we've seen this index before, otherwise respond to the handshake initiation
if h.Type == header.Message && h.Subtype == header.MessageRelay {
hostinfo, _ = f.hostMap.QueryRelayIndex(h.RemoteIndex)
} else {
hostinfo, _ = f.hostMap.QueryIndex(h.RemoteIndex)
}
var ci *ConnectionState
if hostinfo != nil {
ci = hostinfo.ConnectionState
}
switch h.Type {
case header.Message:
// TODO handleEncrypted sends directly to addr on error. Handle this in the tunneling case.
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, addr, h) {
return
}
switch h.Subtype {
case header.MessageNone:
f.decryptToTun(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out, packet, fwPacket, nb, q, localCache)
case header.MessageRelay:
// The entire body is sent as AD, not encrypted.
// The packet consists of a 16-byte parsed Nebula header, Associated Data-protected payload, and a trailing 16-byte AEAD signature value.
// The packet is guaranteed to be at least 16 bytes at this point, b/c it got past the h.Parse() call above. If it's
// otherwise malformed (meaning, there is no trailing 16 byte AEAD value), then this will result in at worst a 0-length slice
// which will gracefully fail in the DecryptDanger call.
signedPayload := packet[:len(packet)-hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead()]
signatureValue := packet[len(packet)-hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead():]
out, err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.DecryptDanger(out, signedPayload, signatureValue, h.MessageCounter, nb)
if err != nil {
return
}
// Successfully validated the thing. Get rid of the Relay header.
signedPayload = signedPayload[header.Len:]
// Pull the Roaming parts up here, and return in all call paths.
f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, addr)
f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo.localIndexId)
relay, ok := hostinfo.relayState.QueryRelayForByIdx(h.RemoteIndex)
if !ok {
// The only way this happens is if hostmap has an index to the correct HostInfo, but the HostInfo is missing
// its internal mapping. This shouldn't happen!
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("hostinfo", hostinfo.vpnIp).WithField("remoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex).Errorf("HostInfo missing remote index")
// Delete my local index from the hostmap
f.hostMap.DeleteRelayIdx(h.RemoteIndex)
// When the peer doesn't receive any return traffic, its connection_manager will eventually clean up
// the broken relay when it cleans up the associated HostInfo object.
return
}
switch relay.Type {
case TerminalType:
// If I am the target of this relay, process the unwrapped packet
// From this recursive point, all these variables are 'burned'. We shouldn't rely on them again.
f.readOutsidePackets(nil, &ViaSender{relayHI: hostinfo, remoteIdx: relay.RemoteIndex, relay: relay}, out[:0], signedPayload, h, fwPacket, lhf, nb, q, localCache)
return
case ForwardingType:
// Find the target HostInfo relay object
targetHI, err := f.hostMap.QueryVpnIp(relay.PeerIp)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("peerIp", relay.PeerIp).WithError(err).Info("Failed to find target host info by ip")
return
}
// find the target Relay info object
targetRelay, ok := targetHI.relayState.QueryRelayForByIp(hostinfo.vpnIp)
if !ok {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("peerIp", relay.PeerIp).Info("Failed to find relay in hostinfo")
return
}
// If that relay is Established, forward the payload through it
if targetRelay.State == Established {
switch targetRelay.Type {
case ForwardingType:
// Forward this packet through the relay tunnel
// Find the target HostInfo
f.SendVia(targetHI, targetRelay, signedPayload, nb, out, false)
return
case TerminalType:
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Unexpected Relay Type of Terminal")
}
} else {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("targetRelayState", targetRelay.State).Info("Unexpected target relay state")
return
}
}
}
case header.LightHouse:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, addr, h) {
return
}
d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out, packet, h, nb)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
WithField("packet", packet).
Error("Failed to decrypt lighthouse packet")
//TODO: maybe after build 64 is out? 06/14/2018 - NB
//f.sendRecvError(net.Addr(addr), header.RemoteIndex)
return
}
lhf(addr, hostinfo.vpnIp, d, f)
// Fallthrough to the bottom to record incoming traffic
case header.Test:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, addr, h) {
return
}
d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out, packet, h, nb)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
WithField("packet", packet).
Error("Failed to decrypt test packet")
//TODO: maybe after build 64 is out? 06/14/2018 - NB
//f.sendRecvError(net.Addr(addr), header.RemoteIndex)
return
}
if h.Subtype == header.TestRequest {
// This testRequest might be from TryPromoteBest, so we should roam
// to the new IP address before responding
f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, addr)
f.send(header.Test, header.TestReply, ci, hostinfo, d, nb, out)
}
// Fallthrough to the bottom to record incoming traffic
// Non encrypted messages below here, they should not fall through to avoid tracking incoming traffic since they
// are unauthenticated
case header.Handshake:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
HandleIncomingHandshake(f, addr, via, packet, h, hostinfo)
return
case header.RecvError:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
f.handleRecvError(addr, h)
return
case header.CloseTunnel:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, addr, h) {
return
}
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
Info("Close tunnel received, tearing down.")
f.closeTunnel(hostinfo)
return
case header.Control:
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, addr, h) {
return
}
d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out, packet, h, nb)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
WithField("packet", packet).
Error("Failed to decrypt Control packet")
return
}
m := &NebulaControl{}
err = m.Unmarshal(d)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithError(err).Error("Failed to unmarshal control message")
break
}
f.relayManager.HandleControlMsg(hostinfo, m, f)
default:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debugf("Unexpected packet received from %s", addr)
return
}
f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, addr)
f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo.localIndexId)
}
// closeTunnel closes a tunnel locally, it does not send a closeTunnel packet to the remote
func (f *Interface) closeTunnel(hostInfo *HostInfo) {
//TODO: this would be better as a single function in ConnectionManager that handled locks appropriately
f.connectionManager.ClearLocalIndex(hostInfo.localIndexId)
f.connectionManager.ClearPendingDeletion(hostInfo.localIndexId)
final := f.hostMap.DeleteHostInfo(hostInfo)
if final {
// We no longer have any tunnels with this vpn ip, clear learned lighthouse state to lower memory usage
f.lightHouse.DeleteVpnIp(hostInfo.vpnIp)
}
}
// sendCloseTunnel is a helper function to send a proper close tunnel packet to a remote
func (f *Interface) sendCloseTunnel(h *HostInfo) {
f.send(header.CloseTunnel, 0, h.ConnectionState, h, []byte{}, make([]byte, 12, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
}
func (f *Interface) handleHostRoaming(hostinfo *HostInfo, addr *udp.Addr) {
if addr != nil && !hostinfo.remote.Equals(addr) {
if !f.lightHouse.GetRemoteAllowList().Allow(hostinfo.vpnIp, addr.IP) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("newAddr", addr).Debug("lighthouse.remote_allow_list denied roaming")
return
}
if !hostinfo.lastRoam.IsZero() && addr.Equals(hostinfo.lastRoamRemote) && time.Since(hostinfo.lastRoam) < RoamingSuppressSeconds*time.Second {
if f.l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("udpAddr", hostinfo.remote).WithField("newAddr", addr).
Debugf("Suppressing roam back to previous remote for %d seconds", RoamingSuppressSeconds)
}
return
}
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("udpAddr", hostinfo.remote).WithField("newAddr", addr).
Info("Host roamed to new udp ip/port.")
hostinfo.lastRoam = time.Now()
hostinfo.lastRoamRemote = hostinfo.remote
hostinfo.SetRemote(addr)
}
}
func (f *Interface) handleEncrypted(ci *ConnectionState, addr *udp.Addr, h *header.H) bool {
// If connectionstate exists and the replay protector allows, process packet
// Else, send recv errors for 300 seconds after a restart to allow fast reconnection.
if ci == nil || !ci.window.Check(f.l, h.MessageCounter) {
if addr != nil {
f.maybeSendRecvError(addr, h.RemoteIndex)
return false
} else {
return false
}
}
return true
}
// newPacket validates and parses the interesting bits for the firewall out of the ip and sub protocol headers
func newPacket(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.Packet) error {
// Do we at least have an ipv4 header worth of data?
if len(data) < ipv4.HeaderLen {
return fmt.Errorf("packet is less than %v bytes", ipv4.HeaderLen)
}
// Is it an ipv4 packet?
if int((data[0]>>4)&0x0f) != 4 {
return fmt.Errorf("packet is not ipv4, type: %v", int((data[0]>>4)&0x0f))
}
// Adjust our start position based on the advertised ip header length
ihl := int(data[0]&0x0f) << 2
// Well formed ip header length?
if ihl < ipv4.HeaderLen {
return fmt.Errorf("packet had an invalid header length: %v", ihl)
}
// Check if this is the second or further fragment of a fragmented packet.
flagsfrags := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[6:8])
fp.Fragment = (flagsfrags & 0x1FFF) != 0
// Firewall handles protocol checks
fp.Protocol = data[9]
// Accounting for a variable header length, do we have enough data for our src/dst tuples?
minLen := ihl
if !fp.Fragment && fp.Protocol != firewall.ProtoICMP {
minLen += minFwPacketLen
}
if len(data) < minLen {
return fmt.Errorf("packet is less than %v bytes, ip header len: %v", minLen, ihl)
}
// Firewall packets are locally oriented
if incoming {
fp.RemoteIP = iputil.Ip2VpnIp(data[12:16])
fp.LocalIP = iputil.Ip2VpnIp(data[16:20])
if fp.Fragment || fp.Protocol == firewall.ProtoICMP {
fp.RemotePort = 0
fp.LocalPort = 0
} else {
fp.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[ihl : ihl+2])
fp.LocalPort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[ihl+2 : ihl+4])
}
} else {
fp.LocalIP = iputil.Ip2VpnIp(data[12:16])
fp.RemoteIP = iputil.Ip2VpnIp(data[16:20])
if fp.Fragment || fp.Protocol == firewall.ProtoICMP {
fp.RemotePort = 0
fp.LocalPort = 0
} else {
fp.LocalPort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[ihl : ihl+2])
fp.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[ihl+2 : ihl+4])
}
}
return nil
}
func (f *Interface) decrypt(hostinfo *HostInfo, mc uint64, out []byte, packet []byte, h *header.H, nb []byte) ([]byte, error) {
var err error
out, err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.DecryptDanger(out, packet[:header.Len], packet[header.Len:], mc, nb)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if !hostinfo.ConnectionState.window.Update(f.l, mc) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("header", h).
Debugln("dropping out of window packet")
return nil, errors.New("out of window packet")
}
return out, nil
}
func (f *Interface) decryptToTun(hostinfo *HostInfo, messageCounter uint64, out []byte, packet []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
var err error
out, err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.DecryptDanger(out, packet[:header.Len], packet[header.Len:], messageCounter, nb)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithError(err).Error("Failed to decrypt packet")
//TODO: maybe after build 64 is out? 06/14/2018 - NB
//f.sendRecvError(hostinfo.remote, header.RemoteIndex)
return
}
err = newPacket(out, true, fwPacket)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithError(err).WithField("packet", out).
Warnf("Error while validating inbound packet")
return
}
if !hostinfo.ConnectionState.window.Update(f.l, messageCounter) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("fwPacket", fwPacket).
Debugln("dropping out of window packet")
return
}
dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(out, *fwPacket, true, hostinfo, f.caPool, localCache)
if dropReason != nil {
f.rejectOutside(out, hostinfo.ConnectionState, hostinfo, nb, out, q)
if f.l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("fwPacket", fwPacket).
WithField("reason", dropReason).
Debugln("dropping inbound packet")
}
return
}
f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo.localIndexId)
_, err = f.readers[q].Write(out)
if err != nil {
f.l.WithError(err).Error("Failed to write to tun")
}
}
func (f *Interface) maybeSendRecvError(endpoint *udp.Addr, index uint32) {
if f.sendRecvErrorConfig.ShouldSendRecvError(endpoint.IP) {
f.sendRecvError(endpoint, index)
}
}
func (f *Interface) sendRecvError(endpoint *udp.Addr, index uint32) {
f.messageMetrics.Tx(header.RecvError, 0, 1)
//TODO: this should be a signed message so we can trust that we should drop the index
b := header.Encode(make([]byte, header.Len), header.Version, header.RecvError, 0, index, 0)
f.outside.WriteTo(b, endpoint)
if f.l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
f.l.WithField("index", index).
WithField("udpAddr", endpoint).
Debug("Recv error sent")
}
}
func (f *Interface) handleRecvError(addr *udp.Addr, h *header.H) {
if f.l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
f.l.WithField("index", h.RemoteIndex).
WithField("udpAddr", addr).
Debug("Recv error received")
}
// First, clean up in the pending hostmap
f.handshakeManager.pendingHostMap.DeleteReverseIndex(h.RemoteIndex)
hostinfo, err := f.hostMap.QueryReverseIndex(h.RemoteIndex)
if err != nil {
f.l.Debugln(err, ": ", h.RemoteIndex)
return
}
hostinfo.Lock()
defer hostinfo.Unlock()
if !hostinfo.RecvErrorExceeded() {
return
}
if hostinfo.remote != nil && !hostinfo.remote.Equals(addr) {
f.l.Infoln("Someone spoofing recv_errors? ", addr, hostinfo.remote)
return
}
f.closeTunnel(hostinfo)
// We also delete it from pending hostmap to allow for
// fast reconnect.
f.handshakeManager.DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo)
}
/*
func (f *Interface) sendMeta(ci *ConnectionState, endpoint *net.UDPAddr, meta *NebulaMeta) {
if ci.eKey != nil {
//TODO: log error?
return
}
msg, err := proto.Marshal(meta)
if err != nil {
l.Debugln("failed to encode header")
}
c := ci.messageCounter
b := HeaderEncode(nil, Version, uint8(metadata), 0, hostinfo.remoteIndexId, c)
ci.messageCounter++
msg := ci.eKey.EncryptDanger(b, nil, msg, c)
//msg := ci.eKey.EncryptDanger(b, nil, []byte(fmt.Sprintf("%d", counter)), c)
f.outside.WriteTo(msg, endpoint)
}
*/
func RecombineCertAndValidate(h *noise.HandshakeState, rawCertBytes []byte, caPool *cert.NebulaCAPool) (*cert.NebulaCertificate, error) {
pk := h.PeerStatic()
if pk == nil {
return nil, errors.New("no peer static key was present")
}
if rawCertBytes == nil {
return nil, errors.New("provided payload was empty")
}
r := &cert.RawNebulaCertificate{}
err := proto.Unmarshal(rawCertBytes, r)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error unmarshaling cert: %s", err)
}
// If the Details are nil, just exit to avoid crashing
if r.Details == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("certificate did not contain any details")
}
r.Details.PublicKey = pk
recombined, err := proto.Marshal(r)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error while recombining certificate: %s", err)
}
c, _ := cert.UnmarshalNebulaCertificate(recombined)
isValid, err := c.Verify(time.Now(), caPool)
if err != nil {
return c, fmt.Errorf("certificate validation failed: %s", err)
} else if !isValid {
// This case should never happen but here's to defensive programming!
return c, errors.New("certificate validation failed but did not return an error")
}
return c, nil
}