mirror of
https://github.com/slackhq/nebula.git
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209 lines
6.8 KiB
Go
209 lines
6.8 KiB
Go
package handshake
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import (
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"bytes"
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"crypto/mlkem"
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"net/netip"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/DefinedNet/noise"
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"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
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ct "github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
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"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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)
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func newKEMMachine(t *testing.T, cs *testCertState, v CertVerifier, initiator bool, index uint32) *Machine {
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t.Helper()
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m, err := NewMachine(
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cs.version, cs.getCredential, v,
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func() (uint32, error) { return index, nil },
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initiator, header.HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024,
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)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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return m
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}
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type kemFixture struct {
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initCS, respCS *testCertState
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v CertVerifier
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}
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func newKEMFixture(t *testing.T, cipher noise.CipherFunc) kemFixture {
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ca, _, caKey, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
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cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
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)
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return kemFixture{
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initCS: newTestCertStateWithCipher(t, ca, caKey, "initiator", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")}, cipher),
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respCS: newTestCertStateWithCipher(t, ca, caKey, "responder", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.2/24")}, cipher),
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v: testVerifier(ct.NewTestCAPool(ca)),
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}
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}
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func requireKeysMatch(t *testing.T, a, b *Result) {
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t.Helper()
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c, err := a.EKey.Encrypt(nil, nil, []byte("hello"))
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require.NoError(t, err)
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p, err := b.DKey.Decrypt(nil, nil, c)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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assert.Equal(t, []byte("hello"), p)
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c, err = b.EKey.Encrypt(nil, nil, []byte("world"))
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require.NoError(t, err)
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p, err = a.DKey.Decrypt(nil, nil, c)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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assert.Equal(t, []byte("world"), p)
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}
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func TestKEMHandshake(t *testing.T) {
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for _, cipher := range []noise.CipherFunc{noise.CipherChaChaPoly, noise.CipherAESGCM} {
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t.Run(cipher.CipherName(), func(t *testing.T) {
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f := newKEMFixture(t, cipher)
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initM := newKEMMachine(t, f.initCS, f.v, true, 1000)
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respM := newKEMMachine(t, f.respCS, f.v, false, 2000)
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msg1, err := initM.Initiate(nil)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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assert.Equal(t, header.HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024, header.MessageSubType(msg1[1]))
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assert.Greater(t, len(msg1), header.Len+mlkem.EncapsulationKeySize1024)
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msg2, respR, err := respM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg1)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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require.NotNil(t, respR)
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assert.Greater(t, len(msg2), header.Len+mlkem.CiphertextSize1024)
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_, initR, err := initM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg2)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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require.NotNil(t, initR)
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assert.Equal(t, "responder", initR.RemoteCert.Certificate.Name())
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assert.Equal(t, "initiator", respR.RemoteCert.Certificate.Name())
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assert.Equal(t, uint32(2000), initR.RemoteIndex)
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assert.Equal(t, uint32(1000), respR.RemoteIndex)
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requireKeysMatch(t, initR, respR)
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})
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}
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}
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// TestKEMSecretMatters checks the ML-KEM secret really reaches the transport
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// keys: an initiator holding a different decapsulation key cannot complete even
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// though every DH input is genuine.
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func TestKEMSecretMatters(t *testing.T) {
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f := newKEMFixture(t, noise.CipherChaChaPoly)
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initM := newKEMMachine(t, f.initCS, f.v, true, 1000)
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respM := newKEMMachine(t, f.respCS, f.v, false, 2000)
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msg1, err := initM.Initiate(nil)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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msg2, _, err := respM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg1)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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other, err := mlkem.GenerateKey1024()
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require.NoError(t, err)
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initM.kemKey = other
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_, res, err := initM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg2)
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require.Error(t, err)
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assert.Nil(t, res)
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}
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func TestKEMTamperedCiphertext(t *testing.T) {
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f := newKEMFixture(t, noise.CipherChaChaPoly)
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initM := newKEMMachine(t, f.initCS, f.v, true, 1000)
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respM := newKEMMachine(t, f.respCS, f.v, false, 2000)
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msg1, err := initM.Initiate(nil)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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msg2, respR, err := respM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg1)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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t.Run("truncated", func(t *testing.T) {
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_, res, err := initM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg2[:header.Len+mlkem.CiphertextSize1024-1])
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require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrPacketTooShort)
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assert.Nil(t, res)
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assert.False(t, initM.Failed())
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})
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t.Run("flipped ciphertext bit", func(t *testing.T) {
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bad := bytes.Clone(msg2)
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bad[header.Len+10] ^= 1
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_, res, err := initM.ProcessPacket(nil, bad)
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require.Error(t, err)
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assert.Nil(t, res)
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assert.False(t, initM.Failed(), "a forged ciphertext must not kill the handshake")
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})
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t.Run("genuine response still completes", func(t *testing.T) {
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_, initR, err := initM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg2)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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require.NotNil(t, initR)
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requireKeysMatch(t, initR, respR)
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})
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}
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// TestKEMBadMsg1 drives processPayload by hand. With the psk modifier msg1's
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// payload is encrypted under a key derived from the public ephemeral, so a
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// forged payload would need re-encrypting; the parsing rules are what matter.
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func TestKEMBadMsg1(t *testing.T) {
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f := newKEMFixture(t, noise.CipherChaChaPoly)
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msg1Flags := subtypeInfos[header.HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024].msgs[0]
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cert := f.initCS.creds[cert.Version2]
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payload := func(kemKey []byte) []byte {
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return MarshalPayload(nil, Payload{
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Cert: cert.Bytes,
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CertVersion: uint32(cert.Cert.Version()),
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InitiatorIndex: 1000,
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Time: 1,
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KEMKey: kemKey,
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})
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}
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dk, err := mlkem.GenerateKey1024()
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require.NoError(t, err)
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t.Run("missing KEM key", func(t *testing.T) {
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m := newKEMMachine(t, f.respCS, f.v, false, 2000)
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err := m.processPayload(payload(nil), msg1Flags)
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require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrUnexpectedContent)
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assert.True(t, m.Failed())
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})
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t.Run("invalid KEM key", func(t *testing.T) {
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m := newKEMMachine(t, f.respCS, f.v, false, 2000)
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// Coefficients of 0xfff exceed the modulus, which ML-KEM must reject.
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bad := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xff}, mlkem.EncapsulationKeySize1024)
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err := m.kemEncapsulate(bad)
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require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInvalidKEMKey)
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err = m.kemEncapsulate(bad[:100])
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require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInvalidKEMKey)
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})
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t.Run("valid KEM key", func(t *testing.T) {
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m := newKEMMachine(t, f.respCS, f.v, false, 2000)
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require.NoError(t, m.kemEncapsulate(dk.EncapsulationKey().Bytes()))
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assert.Len(t, m.kemCiphertext, mlkem.CiphertextSize1024)
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})
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t.Run("KEM key on the classical subtype", func(t *testing.T) {
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m := newTestMachine(t, f.respCS, f.v, false, 2000)
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classical := subtypeInfos[header.HandshakeIXPSK0].msgs[0]
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err := m.processPayload(payload(dk.EncapsulationKey().Bytes()), classical)
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require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrUnexpectedContent)
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assert.True(t, m.Failed())
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})
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}
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// TestKEMDistinctFromClassical makes sure the two subtypes cannot be mixed: a
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// classical responder cannot answer a KEM initiator.
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func TestKEMDistinctFromClassical(t *testing.T) {
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f := newKEMFixture(t, noise.CipherChaChaPoly)
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initM := newKEMMachine(t, f.initCS, f.v, true, 1000)
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respM := newTestMachine(t, f.respCS, f.v, false, 2000)
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msg1, err := initM.Initiate(nil)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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_, _, err = respM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg1)
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require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrSubtypeMismatch)
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}
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