what about with bad GRO on UDP

This commit is contained in:
JackDoan
2025-11-10 14:47:38 -06:00
parent 42591c2042
commit c645a45438
8 changed files with 411 additions and 223 deletions

View File

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import (
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/packet"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
)
@@ -268,12 +269,9 @@ func (f *Interface) listenOut(q int) {
ctCache := firewall.NewConntrackCacheTicker(f.conntrackCacheTimeout)
lhh := f.lightHouse.NewRequestHandler()
plaintexts := make([][]byte, batch)
outNeedsTun := make([]*int, batch)
outPackets := make([]*packet.OutPacket, batch)
for i := 0; i < batch; i++ {
plaintexts[i] = make([]byte, udp.MTU)
outNeedsTun[i] = new(int)
*outNeedsTun[i] = -1
outPackets[i] = packet.NewOut()
}
h := &header.H{}
@@ -282,16 +280,23 @@ func (f *Interface) listenOut(q int) {
toSend := make([][]byte, batch)
li.ListenOut(func(fromUdpAddrs []netip.AddrPort, payloads [][]byte) {
li.ListenOut(func(pkts []*packet.Packet) {
toSend = toSend[:0]
for i := range plaintexts {
plaintexts[i] = plaintexts[i][:0]
for i := range outPackets {
outPackets[i].Valid = false
outPackets[i].SegCounter = 0
}
f.readOutsidePacketsMany(fromUdpAddrs, plaintexts, outNeedsTun, payloads, h, fwPacket, lhh, nb, q, ctCache.Get(f.l))
for i := range plaintexts {
if *outNeedsTun[i] != -1 {
toSend = append(toSend, plaintexts[i][:*outNeedsTun[i]])
*outNeedsTun[i] = -1
f.readOutsidePacketsMany(pkts, outPackets, h, fwPacket, lhh, nb, q, ctCache.Get(f.l))
for i := range outPackets {
if pkts[i].OutLen != -1 {
for j := 0; j < outPackets[i].SegCounter; j++ {
if len(outPackets[i].Segments[j]) > 0 {
toSend = append(toSend, outPackets[i].Segments[j])
}
}
//toSend = append(toSend, outPackets[i])
//toSendCount++
}
}

View File

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/google/gopacket/layers"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/packet"
"golang.org/x/net/ipv6"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
@@ -216,21 +217,14 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(ip netip.AddrPort, via *ViaSender, out []
f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo)
}
func (f *Interface) readOutsidePacketsMany(ip []netip.AddrPort, out [][]byte, outNeedsTun []*int, packets [][]byte, h *header.H, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, lhf *LightHouseHandler, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
for i, packet := range packets {
err := h.Parse(packet)
if err != nil {
// Hole punch packets are 0 or 1 byte big, so lets ignore printing those errors
if len(packet) > 1 {
f.l.WithField("packet", packet).Infof("Error while parsing inbound packet from %s: %s", ip, err)
}
return
}
func (f *Interface) readOutsidePacketsMany(packets []*packet.Packet, out []*packet.OutPacket, h *header.H, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, lhf *LightHouseHandler, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
for i, pkt := range packets {
out[i].Scratch = out[i].Scratch[:0]
ip := pkt.AddrPort()
//l.Error("in packet ", header, packet[HeaderLen:])
if ip[i].IsValid() {
if f.myVpnNetworksTable.Contains(ip[i].Addr()) {
if ip.IsValid() {
if f.myVpnNetworksTable.Contains(ip.Addr()) {
if f.l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
f.l.WithField("udpAddr", ip).Debug("Refusing to process double encrypted packet")
}
@@ -238,182 +232,194 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePacketsMany(ip []netip.AddrPort, out [][]byte, ou
}
}
var hostinfo *HostInfo
// verify if we've seen this index before, otherwise respond to the handshake initiation
if h.Type == header.Message && h.Subtype == header.MessageRelay {
hostinfo = f.hostMap.QueryRelayIndex(h.RemoteIndex)
} else {
hostinfo = f.hostMap.QueryIndex(h.RemoteIndex)
}
//todo per-segment!
for segment := range pkt.Segments() {
var ci *ConnectionState
if hostinfo != nil {
ci = hostinfo.ConnectionState
}
switch h.Type {
case header.Message:
// TODO handleEncrypted sends directly to addr on error. Handle this in the tunneling case.
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, ip[i], h) {
err := h.Parse(segment)
if err != nil {
// Hole punch packets are 0 or 1 byte big, so lets ignore printing those errors
if len(segment) > 1 {
f.l.WithField("packet", pkt).Infof("Error while parsing inbound packet from %s: %s", ip, err)
}
return
}
switch h.Subtype {
case header.MessageNone:
out[i] = out[i][:0]
if !f.decryptToTunDelayWrite(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out[i][:0], outNeedsTun[i], packet, fwPacket, nb, q, localCache) {
return
}
case header.MessageRelay:
// The entire body is sent as AD, not encrypted.
// The packet consists of a 16-byte parsed Nebula header, Associated Data-protected payload, and a trailing 16-byte AEAD signature value.
// The packet is guaranteed to be at least 16 bytes at this point, b/c it got past the h.Parse() call above. If it's
// otherwise malformed (meaning, there is no trailing 16 byte AEAD value), then this will result in at worst a 0-length slice
// which will gracefully fail in the DecryptDanger call.
signedPayload := packet[:len(packet)-hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead()]
signatureValue := packet[len(packet)-hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead():]
out[i], err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.DecryptDanger(out[i], signedPayload, signatureValue, h.MessageCounter, nb)
if err != nil {
return
}
// Successfully validated the thing. Get rid of the Relay header.
signedPayload = signedPayload[header.Len:]
// Pull the Roaming parts up here, and return in all call paths.
f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, ip[i])
// Track usage of both the HostInfo and the Relay for the received & authenticated packet
f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo)
f.connectionManager.RelayUsed(h.RemoteIndex)
var hostinfo *HostInfo
// verify if we've seen this index before, otherwise respond to the handshake initiation
if h.Type == header.Message && h.Subtype == header.MessageRelay {
hostinfo = f.hostMap.QueryRelayIndex(h.RemoteIndex)
} else {
hostinfo = f.hostMap.QueryIndex(h.RemoteIndex)
}
relay, ok := hostinfo.relayState.QueryRelayForByIdx(h.RemoteIndex)
if !ok {
// The only way this happens is if hostmap has an index to the correct HostInfo, but the HostInfo is missing
// its internal mapping. This should never happen.
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithFields(logrus.Fields{"vpnAddrs": hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "remoteIndex": h.RemoteIndex}).Error("HostInfo missing remote relay index")
var ci *ConnectionState
if hostinfo != nil {
ci = hostinfo.ConnectionState
}
switch h.Type {
case header.Message:
// TODO handleEncrypted sends directly to addr on error. Handle this in the tunneling case.
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, ip, h) {
return
}
switch relay.Type {
case TerminalType:
// If I am the target of this relay, process the unwrapped packet
// From this recursive point, all these variables are 'burned'. We shouldn't rely on them again.
f.readOutsidePackets(netip.AddrPort{}, &ViaSender{relayHI: hostinfo, remoteIdx: relay.RemoteIndex, relay: relay}, out[i][:0], signedPayload, h, fwPacket, lhf, nb, q, localCache)
return
case ForwardingType:
// Find the target HostInfo relay object
targetHI, targetRelay, err := f.hostMap.QueryVpnAddrsRelayFor(hostinfo.vpnAddrs, relay.PeerAddr)
switch h.Subtype {
case header.MessageNone:
if !f.decryptToTunDelayWrite(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out[i], pkt, segment, fwPacket, nb, q, localCache) {
return
}
case header.MessageRelay:
// The entire body is sent as AD, not encrypted.
// The packet consists of a 16-byte parsed Nebula header, Associated Data-protected payload, and a trailing 16-byte AEAD signature value.
// The packet is guaranteed to be at least 16 bytes at this point, b/c it got past the h.Parse() call above. If it's
// otherwise malformed (meaning, there is no trailing 16 byte AEAD value), then this will result in at worst a 0-length slice
// which will gracefully fail in the DecryptDanger call.
signedPayload := segment[:len(segment)-hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead()]
signatureValue := segment[len(segment)-hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead():]
out[i].Scratch, err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.DecryptDanger(out[i].Scratch, signedPayload, signatureValue, h.MessageCounter, nb)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("relayTo", relay.PeerAddr).WithError(err).WithField("hostinfo.vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs).Info("Failed to find target host info by ip")
return
}
// Successfully validated the thing. Get rid of the Relay header.
signedPayload = signedPayload[header.Len:]
// Pull the Roaming parts up here, and return in all call paths.
f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, ip)
// Track usage of both the HostInfo and the Relay for the received & authenticated packet
f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo)
f.connectionManager.RelayUsed(h.RemoteIndex)
relay, ok := hostinfo.relayState.QueryRelayForByIdx(h.RemoteIndex)
if !ok {
// The only way this happens is if hostmap has an index to the correct HostInfo, but the HostInfo is missing
// its internal mapping. This should never happen.
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithFields(logrus.Fields{"vpnAddrs": hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "remoteIndex": h.RemoteIndex}).Error("HostInfo missing remote relay index")
return
}
// If that relay is Established, forward the payload through it
if targetRelay.State == Established {
switch targetRelay.Type {
case ForwardingType:
// Forward this packet through the relay tunnel
// Find the target HostInfo
f.SendVia(targetHI, targetRelay, signedPayload, nb, out[i], false)
return
case TerminalType:
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Unexpected Relay Type of Terminal")
}
} else {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithFields(logrus.Fields{"relayTo": relay.PeerAddr, "relayFrom": hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0], "targetRelayState": targetRelay.State}).Info("Unexpected target relay state")
switch relay.Type {
case TerminalType:
// If I am the target of this relay, process the unwrapped packet
// From this recursive point, all these variables are 'burned'. We shouldn't rely on them again.
f.readOutsidePackets(netip.AddrPort{}, &ViaSender{relayHI: hostinfo, remoteIdx: relay.RemoteIndex, relay: relay}, out[i].Scratch[:0], signedPayload, h, fwPacket, lhf, nb, q, localCache)
return
case ForwardingType:
// Find the target HostInfo relay object
targetHI, targetRelay, err := f.hostMap.QueryVpnAddrsRelayFor(hostinfo.vpnAddrs, relay.PeerAddr)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("relayTo", relay.PeerAddr).WithError(err).WithField("hostinfo.vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs).Info("Failed to find target host info by ip")
return
}
// If that relay is Established, forward the payload through it
if targetRelay.State == Established {
switch targetRelay.Type {
case ForwardingType:
// Forward this packet through the relay tunnel
// Find the target HostInfo
f.SendVia(targetHI, targetRelay, signedPayload, nb, out[i].Scratch, false)
return
case TerminalType:
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Unexpected Relay Type of Terminal")
}
} else {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithFields(logrus.Fields{"relayTo": relay.PeerAddr, "relayFrom": hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0], "targetRelayState": targetRelay.State}).Info("Unexpected target relay state")
return
}
}
}
}
case header.LightHouse:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, ip[i], h) {
case header.LightHouse:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, ip, h) {
return
}
d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out[i].Scratch, segment, h, nb)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", ip).
WithField("packet", segment).
Error("Failed to decrypt lighthouse packet")
return
}
lhf.HandleRequest(ip, hostinfo.vpnAddrs, d, f)
// Fallthrough to the bottom to record incoming traffic
case header.Test:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, ip, h) {
return
}
d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out[i].Scratch, segment, h, nb)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", ip).
WithField("packet", segment).
Error("Failed to decrypt test packet")
return
}
if h.Subtype == header.TestRequest {
// This testRequest might be from TryPromoteBest, so we should roam
// to the new IP address before responding
f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, ip)
f.send(header.Test, header.TestReply, ci, hostinfo, d, nb, out[i].Scratch)
}
// Fallthrough to the bottom to record incoming traffic
// Non encrypted messages below here, they should not fall through to avoid tracking incoming traffic since they
// are unauthenticated
case header.Handshake:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
f.handshakeManager.HandleIncoming(ip, nil, segment, h)
return
case header.RecvError:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
f.handleRecvError(ip, h)
return
case header.CloseTunnel:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, ip, h) {
return
}
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("udpAddr", ip).
Info("Close tunnel received, tearing down.")
f.closeTunnel(hostinfo)
return
case header.Control:
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, ip, h) {
return
}
d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out[i].Scratch, segment, h, nb)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", ip).
WithField("packet", segment).
Error("Failed to decrypt Control packet")
return
}
f.relayManager.HandleControlMsg(hostinfo, d, f)
default:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debugf("Unexpected packet received from %s", ip)
return
}
d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out[i], packet, h, nb)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", ip).
WithField("packet", packet).
Error("Failed to decrypt lighthouse packet")
return
}
f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, ip)
lhf.HandleRequest(ip[i], hostinfo.vpnAddrs, d, f)
// Fallthrough to the bottom to record incoming traffic
case header.Test:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, ip[i], h) {
return
}
d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out[i], packet, h, nb)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", ip).
WithField("packet", packet).
Error("Failed to decrypt test packet")
return
}
if h.Subtype == header.TestRequest {
// This testRequest might be from TryPromoteBest, so we should roam
// to the new IP address before responding
f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, ip[i])
f.send(header.Test, header.TestReply, ci, hostinfo, d, nb, out[i])
}
// Fallthrough to the bottom to record incoming traffic
// Non encrypted messages below here, they should not fall through to avoid tracking incoming traffic since they
// are unauthenticated
case header.Handshake:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
f.handshakeManager.HandleIncoming(ip[i], nil, packet, h)
return
case header.RecvError:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
f.handleRecvError(ip[i], h)
return
case header.CloseTunnel:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, ip[i], h) {
return
}
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("udpAddr", ip).
Info("Close tunnel received, tearing down.")
f.closeTunnel(hostinfo)
return
case header.Control:
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, ip[i], h) {
return
}
d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out[i], packet, h, nb)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", ip).
WithField("packet", packet).
Error("Failed to decrypt Control packet")
return
}
f.relayManager.HandleControlMsg(hostinfo, d, f)
default:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debugf("Unexpected packet received from %s", ip)
return
f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo)
}
f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, ip[i])
f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo)
}
}
@@ -666,16 +672,17 @@ func (f *Interface) decrypt(hostinfo *HostInfo, mc uint64, out []byte, packet []
return out, nil
}
func (f *Interface) decryptToTunDelayWrite(hostinfo *HostInfo, messageCounter uint64, out []byte, outNeedsTun *int, packet []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) bool {
func (f *Interface) decryptToTunDelayWrite(hostinfo *HostInfo, messageCounter uint64, out *packet.OutPacket, pkt *packet.Packet, inSegment []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) bool {
var err error
out, err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.DecryptDanger(out, packet[:header.Len], packet[header.Len:], messageCounter, nb)
out.Segments[out.SegCounter] = out.Segments[out.SegCounter][:0]
out.Segments[out.SegCounter], err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.DecryptDanger(out.Segments[out.SegCounter], inSegment[:header.Len], inSegment[header.Len:], messageCounter, nb)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithError(err).Error("Failed to decrypt packet")
return false
}
err = newPacket(out, true, fwPacket)
err = newPacket(out.Segments[out.SegCounter], true, fwPacket)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithError(err).WithField("packet", out).
Warnf("Error while validating inbound packet")
@@ -692,7 +699,7 @@ func (f *Interface) decryptToTunDelayWrite(hostinfo *HostInfo, messageCounter ui
if dropReason != nil {
// NOTE: We give `packet` as the `out` here since we already decrypted from it and we don't need it anymore
// This gives us a buffer to build the reject packet in
f.rejectOutside(out, hostinfo.ConnectionState, hostinfo, nb, packet, q)
f.rejectOutside(out.Segments[out.SegCounter], hostinfo.ConnectionState, hostinfo, nb, inSegment, q)
if f.l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("fwPacket", fwPacket).
WithField("reason", dropReason).
@@ -702,7 +709,8 @@ func (f *Interface) decryptToTunDelayWrite(hostinfo *HostInfo, messageCounter ui
}
f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo)
*outNeedsTun = len(out)
pkt.OutLen += len(inSegment)
out.SegCounter++
return true
}

View File

@@ -128,8 +128,10 @@ func newTun(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, multiqueu
return nil, fmt.Errorf("set vnethdr size: %w", err)
}
flags := 0
//flags := unix.TUN_F_CSUM
//|unix.TUN_F_USO4|unix.TUN_F_USO6
err = unix.IoctlSetInt(fd, unix.TUNSETOFFLOAD, 0) //todo!
err = unix.IoctlSetInt(fd, unix.TUNSETOFFLOAD, flags)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("set offloads: %w", err)
}

23
packet/outpacket.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
package packet
type OutPacket struct {
Segments [][]byte
//todo virtio header?
SegSize int
SegCounter int
Valid bool
wasSegmented bool
Scratch []byte
}
func NewOut() *OutPacket {
out := new(OutPacket)
const numSegments = 64
out.Segments = make([][]byte, numSegments)
for i := 0; i < numSegments; i++ { //todo this is dumb
out.Segments[i] = make([]byte, Size)
}
out.Scratch = make([]byte, Size)
return out
}

117
packet/packet.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
package packet
import (
"encoding/binary"
"iter"
"net/netip"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
const Size = 0xffff
type Packet struct {
Payload []byte
Control []byte
Name []byte
SegSize int
//todo should this hold out as well?
OutLen int
wasSegmented bool
isV4 bool
//Addr netip.AddrPort
}
func New(isV4 bool) *Packet {
return &Packet{
Payload: make([]byte, Size),
Control: make([]byte, unix.CmsgSpace(2)),
Name: make([]byte, unix.SizeofSockaddrInet6),
isV4: isV4,
}
}
func (p *Packet) AddrPort() netip.AddrPort {
var ip netip.Addr
// Its ok to skip the ok check here, the slicing is the only error that can occur and it will panic
if p.isV4 {
ip, _ = netip.AddrFromSlice(p.Name[4:8])
} else {
ip, _ = netip.AddrFromSlice(p.Name[8:24])
}
return netip.AddrPortFrom(ip.Unmap(), binary.BigEndian.Uint16(p.Name[2:4]))
}
func (p *Packet) updateCtrl(ctrlLen int) {
p.SegSize = len(p.Payload)
p.wasSegmented = false
if ctrlLen == 0 {
return
}
if len(p.Control) == 0 {
return
}
cmsgs, err := unix.ParseSocketControlMessage(p.Control)
if err != nil {
return // oh well
}
for _, c := range cmsgs {
if c.Header.Level == unix.SOL_UDP && c.Header.Type == unix.UDP_GRO && len(c.Data) >= 2 {
p.wasSegmented = true
p.SegSize = int(binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(c.Data[:2]))
return
}
}
}
// Update sets a Packet into "just received, not processed" state
func (p *Packet) Update(ctrlLen int) {
p.OutLen = -1
p.updateCtrl(ctrlLen)
}
func (p *Packet) Segments() iter.Seq[[]byte] {
return func(yield func([]byte) bool) {
//cursor := 0
for offset := 0; offset < len(p.Payload); offset += p.SegSize {
end := offset + p.SegSize
if end > len(p.Payload) {
end = len(p.Payload)
}
if !yield(p.Payload[offset:end]) {
return
}
}
//if p.SegSize > 0 && p.SegSize < len(p.Payload) {
//
//} else {
// f.readOutsidePackets(p.Addr, nil, result2[:0], p.Payload, h, fwPacket2, lhh, nb2, i, conntrackCache.Get(f.l))
//}
}
}
//type Pool struct {
// pool sync.Pool
//}
//
//var bigPool = &Pool{
// pool: sync.Pool{New: func() any { return New() }},
//}
//
//func GetPool() *Pool {
// return bigPool
//}
//
//func (p *Pool) Get() *Packet {
// return p.pool.Get().(*Packet)
//}
//
//func (p *Pool) Put(x *Packet) {
// x.Payload = x.Payload[:Size]
// p.pool.Put(x)
//}

View File

@@ -4,13 +4,13 @@ import (
"net/netip"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/packet"
)
const MTU = 9001
type EncReader func(
addrs []netip.AddrPort,
payload [][]byte,
[]*packet.Packet,
)
type Conn interface {

View File

@@ -18,18 +18,11 @@ import (
)
type StdConn struct {
sysFd int
isV4 bool
l *logrus.Logger
batch int
}
func maybeIPV4(ip net.IP) (net.IP, bool) {
ip4 := ip.To4()
if ip4 != nil {
return ip4, true
}
return ip, false
sysFd int
isV4 bool
l *logrus.Logger
batch int
enableGRO bool
}
func NewListener(l *logrus.Logger, ip netip.Addr, port int, multi bool, batch int) (Conn, error) {
@@ -119,9 +112,7 @@ func (u *StdConn) LocalAddr() (netip.AddrPort, error) {
}
func (u *StdConn) ListenOut(r EncReader) {
var ip netip.Addr
addrPorts := make([]netip.AddrPort, u.batch)
msgs, buffers, names := u.PrepareRawMessages(u.batch)
msgs, packets := u.PrepareRawMessages(u.batch, u.isV4)
read := u.ReadMulti
if u.batch == 1 {
read = u.ReadSingle
@@ -135,17 +126,13 @@ func (u *StdConn) ListenOut(r EncReader) {
}
for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
// Its ok to skip the ok check here, the slicing is the only error that can occur and it will panic
if u.isV4 {
ip, _ = netip.AddrFromSlice(names[i][4:8])
} else {
ip, _ = netip.AddrFromSlice(names[i][8:24])
}
addrPorts[i] = netip.AddrPortFrom(ip.Unmap(), binary.BigEndian.Uint16(names[i][2:4]))
buffers[i] = buffers[i][:msgs[i].Len]
packets[i].Payload = packets[i].Payload[:msgs[i].Len]
packets[i].Update(getRawMessageControlLen(&msgs[i]))
}
r(packets)
for i := 0; i < n; i++ { //todo reset this in prev loop, but this makes debug ez
msgs[i].Hdr.Controllen = uint64(unix.CmsgSpace(2))
}
r(addrPorts, buffers)
}
}
@@ -297,6 +284,27 @@ func (u *StdConn) ReloadConfig(c *config.C) {
u.l.WithError(err).Error("Failed to set listen.so_mark")
}
}
u.configureGRO(true)
}
func (u *StdConn) configureGRO(enable bool) {
if enable == u.enableGRO {
return
}
if enable {
if err := unix.SetsockoptInt(u.sysFd, unix.SOL_UDP, unix.UDP_GRO, 1); err != nil {
u.l.WithError(err).Warn("Failed to enable UDP GRO")
return
}
u.enableGRO = true
u.l.Info("UDP GRO enabled")
} else {
if err := unix.SetsockoptInt(u.sysFd, unix.SOL_UDP, unix.UDP_GRO, 0); err != nil && err != unix.ENOPROTOOPT {
u.l.WithError(err).Warn("Failed to disable UDP GRO")
}
u.enableGRO = false
}
}
func (u *StdConn) getMemInfo(meminfo *[unix.SK_MEMINFO_VARS]uint32) error {

View File

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
package udp
import (
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/packet"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
@@ -33,25 +34,49 @@ type rawMessage struct {
Pad0 [4]byte
}
func (u *StdConn) PrepareRawMessages(n int) ([]rawMessage, [][]byte, [][]byte) {
func setRawMessageControl(msg *rawMessage, buf []byte) {
if len(buf) == 0 {
msg.Hdr.Control = nil
msg.Hdr.Controllen = 0
return
}
msg.Hdr.Control = &buf[0]
msg.Hdr.Controllen = uint64(len(buf))
}
func getRawMessageControlLen(msg *rawMessage) int {
return int(msg.Hdr.Controllen)
}
func setCmsgLen(h *unix.Cmsghdr, l int) {
h.Len = uint64(l)
}
func (u *StdConn) PrepareRawMessages(n int, isV4 bool) ([]rawMessage, []*packet.Packet) {
msgs := make([]rawMessage, n)
buffers := make([][]byte, n)
names := make([][]byte, n)
packets := make([]*packet.Packet, n)
for i := range msgs {
buffers[i] = make([]byte, MTU)
names[i] = make([]byte, unix.SizeofSockaddrInet6)
packets[i] = packet.New(isV4)
vs := []iovec{
{Base: &buffers[i][0], Len: uint64(len(buffers[i]))},
{Base: &packets[i].Payload[0], Len: uint64(packet.Size)},
}
msgs[i].Hdr.Iov = &vs[0]
msgs[i].Hdr.Iovlen = uint64(len(vs))
msgs[i].Hdr.Name = &names[i][0]
msgs[i].Hdr.Namelen = uint32(len(names[i]))
msgs[i].Hdr.Name = &packets[i].Name[0]
msgs[i].Hdr.Namelen = uint32(len(packets[i].Name))
if u.enableGRO {
msgs[i].Hdr.Control = &packets[i].Control[0]
msgs[i].Hdr.Controllen = uint64(len(packets[i].Control))
} else {
msgs[i].Hdr.Control = nil
msgs[i].Hdr.Controllen = 0
}
}
return msgs, buffers, names
return msgs, packets
}