mirror of
https://github.com/slackhq/nebula.git
synced 2026-08-15 13:06:57 +02:00
put locks around the replay window
This commit is contained in:
@@ -2,11 +2,13 @@ package nebula
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import (
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"encoding/json"
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"log/slog"
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"sync"
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"sync/atomic"
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"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
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"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake"
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"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
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"github.com/slackhq/nebula/noiseutil"
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)
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@@ -20,6 +22,7 @@ type ConnectionState struct {
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initiator bool
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messageCounter atomic.Uint64
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window *Bits
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decryptLock sync.Mutex
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writeLock sync.Mutex
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}
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@@ -54,3 +57,54 @@ func (cs *ConnectionState) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
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func (cs *ConnectionState) Curve() cert.Curve {
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return cs.myCert.Curve()
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}
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func (cs *ConnectionState) Decrypt(l *slog.Logger, messageCounter uint64, packet []byte, nb []byte) ([]byte, error) {
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cs.decryptLock.Lock()
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result := cs.window.Check(l, messageCounter)
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cs.decryptLock.Unlock()
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if !result {
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return nil, ErrAlreadySeen
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}
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out, err := cs.dKey.DecryptDanger(packet[header.Len:header.Len], packet[:header.Len], packet[header.Len:], messageCounter, nb)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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cs.decryptLock.Lock()
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result = cs.window.Update(l, messageCounter)
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cs.decryptLock.Unlock()
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if !result {
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return nil, ErrAlreadySeen
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}
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return out, nil
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}
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func (cs *ConnectionState) VerifyRelay(l *slog.Logger, messageCounter uint64, packet []byte, nb []byte) error {
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cs.decryptLock.Lock()
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result := cs.window.Check(l, messageCounter)
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cs.decryptLock.Unlock()
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if !result {
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return ErrAlreadySeen
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}
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// The entire body is sent as AD, not encrypted.
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// The packet consists of a 16-byte parsed Nebula header, Associated Data-protected payload, and a trailing 16-byte AEAD signature value.
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// The packet is guaranteed to be at least 16 bytes at this point, b/c it got past the h.Parse() call above. If it's
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// otherwise malformed (meaning, there is no trailing 16 byte AEAD value), then this will result in at worst a 0-length slice
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// which will gracefully fail in the DecryptDanger call.
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signedPayload := packet[:len(packet)-cs.dKey.Overhead()]
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signatureValue := packet[len(packet)-cs.dKey.Overhead():]
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_, err := cs.dKey.DecryptDanger(nil, signedPayload, signatureValue, messageCounter, nb)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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cs.decryptLock.Lock()
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result = cs.window.Update(l, messageCounter)
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cs.decryptLock.Unlock()
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if !result {
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return ErrAlreadySeen
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}
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return nil
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}
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+14
-35
@@ -107,25 +107,23 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, scratch []byte, packet []b
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}
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// All remaining packets are encrypted
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ci := hostinfo.ConnectionState
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if !ci.window.Check(f.l, h.MessageCounter) {
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return
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}
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// Relay packets are special
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if isMessageRelay {
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// Relay packets are special, this branch should always early-return
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err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.VerifyRelay(f.l, h.MessageCounter, packet, nb)
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if err != nil {
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if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
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hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("Failed to verify relay packet", "error", err, "from", via, "header", h)
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}
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return
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}
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f.handleOutsideRelayPacket(hostinfo, via, scratch, packet, h, fwPacket, lhf, nb, q, localCache, meta)
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return
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}
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out, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, packet, nb)
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out, err := hostinfo.ConnectionState.Decrypt(f.l, h.MessageCounter, packet, nb)
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if err != nil {
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if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
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hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("Failed to decrypt packet",
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"error", err,
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"from", via,
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"header", h,
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)
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hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("Failed to decrypt packet", "error", err, "from", via, "header", h)
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}
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return
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}
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@@ -156,7 +154,7 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, scratch []byte, packet []b
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const maxCipherOverhead = 16 //todo we use this too often, needs a real importable const
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const maxOverhead = header.Len + header.Len + maxCipherOverhead + maxCipherOverhead
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if maxOverhead+len(out) <= len(scratch) {
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f.send(header.Test, header.TestReply, ci, hostinfo, out, nb, scratch[:0])
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f.send(header.Test, header.TestReply, hostinfo.ConnectionState, hostinfo, out, nb, scratch[:0])
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return
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} else if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
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hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("dropping oversized test request", "payloadLen", len(out), "from", via)
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@@ -180,25 +178,8 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, scratch []byte, packet []b
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}
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func (f *Interface) handleOutsideRelayPacket(hostinfo *HostInfo, via ViaSender, scratch []byte, packet []byte, h *header.H, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, lhf *LightHouseHandler, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache, meta udp.RxMeta) {
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// The entire body is sent as AD, not encrypted.
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// The packet consists of a 16-byte parsed Nebula header, Associated Data-protected payload, and a trailing 16-byte AEAD signature value.
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// The packet is guaranteed to be at least 16 bytes at this point, b/c it got past the h.Parse() call above. If it's
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// otherwise malformed (meaning, there is no trailing 16 byte AEAD value), then this will result in at worst a 0-length slice
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// which will gracefully fail in the DecryptDanger call.
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signedPayload := packet[:len(packet)-hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead()]
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signatureValue := packet[len(packet)-hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead():]
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if _, err := hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.DecryptDanger(nil, signedPayload, signatureValue, h.MessageCounter, nb); err != nil {
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return
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}
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// Advance the replay window now that the frame is authenticated
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if !hostinfo.ConnectionState.window.Update(f.l, h.MessageCounter) {
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if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
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hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("dropping out of window relay packet", "header", h)
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}
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return
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}
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// Successfully validated the thing. Get rid of the Relay header.
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signedPayload = signedPayload[header.Len:]
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// Successfully validated the thing. Get rid of the Relay header and the AEAD tag
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signedPayload := packet[header.Len : len(packet)-hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead()]
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// Pull the Roaming parts up here, and return in all call paths.
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f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, via)
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// Track usage of both the HostInfo and the Relay for the received & authenticated packet
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@@ -209,9 +190,7 @@ func (f *Interface) handleOutsideRelayPacket(hostinfo *HostInfo, via ViaSender,
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if !ok {
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// The only way this happens is if hostmap has an index to the correct HostInfo, but the HostInfo is missing
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// its internal mapping. This should never happen.
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hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("HostInfo missing remote relay index",
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"relayRemoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex,
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)
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hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("HostInfo missing remote relay index", "relayRemoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex)
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return
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}
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