mutate packet 0, but, avoids a 100-byte copy

This reverts commit e1d96b932a.

.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ jobs:
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v7
 
-      - uses: actions/setup-go@v6
+      - uses: actions/setup-go@v7
         with:
-          go-version: '1.25'
+          go-version: '1.26'
           check-latest: true
 
       - name: Build
@@ -38,9 +38,9 @@ jobs:
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v7
 
-      - uses: actions/setup-go@v6
+      - uses: actions/setup-go@v7
         with:
-          go-version: '1.25'
+          go-version: '1.26'
           check-latest: true
 
       - name: Build
@@ -78,9 +78,9 @@ jobs:
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v7
 
-      - uses: actions/setup-go@v6
+      - uses: actions/setup-go@v7
         with:
-          go-version: '1.25'
+          go-version: '1.26'
           check-latest: true
 
       - name: Import certificates

.github/workflows/smoke-extra.yml

@@ -32,9 +32,9 @@ jobs:
 
     - uses: actions/checkout@v7
 
-    - uses: actions/setup-go@v6
+    - uses: actions/setup-go@v7
       with:
-        go-version: '1.25'
+        go-version: '1.26'
         check-latest: true
 
     - name: add hashicorp source
@@ -64,9 +64,9 @@ jobs:
 
     - uses: actions/checkout@v7
 
-    - uses: actions/setup-go@v6
+    - uses: actions/setup-go@v7
       with:
-        go-version: '1.25'
+        go-version: '1.26'
         check-latest: true
 
     - name: add hashicorp source
@@ -90,9 +90,9 @@ jobs:
 
     - uses: actions/checkout@v7
 
-    - uses: actions/setup-go@v6
+    - uses: actions/setup-go@v7
       with:
-        go-version: '1.25'
+        go-version: '1.26'
         check-latest: true
 
     # WSL2 + Ubuntu so the smoke can run a real linux peer with its own

.github/workflows/smoke.yml

@@ -20,9 +20,9 @@ jobs:
 
     - uses: actions/checkout@v7
 
-    - uses: actions/setup-go@v6
+    - uses: actions/setup-go@v7
       with:
-        go-version: '1.25'
+        go-version: '1.26'
         check-latest: true
 
     - name: build

.github/workflows/test.yml

@@ -20,9 +20,9 @@ jobs:
 
     - uses: actions/checkout@v7
 
-    - uses: actions/setup-go@v6
+    - uses: actions/setup-go@v7
       with:
-        go-version: '1.25'
+        go-version: '1.26'
         check-latest: true
 
     - name: Install goimports
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ jobs:
     - name: golangci-lint
       uses: golangci/golangci-lint-action@v9
       with:
-        version: v2.5
+        version: v2.12
 
   test:
     name: Test ${{ matrix.name }}
@@ -80,9 +80,9 @@ jobs:
 
     - uses: actions/checkout@v7
 
-    - uses: actions/setup-go@v6
+    - uses: actions/setup-go@v7
       with:
-        go-version: '1.25'
+        go-version: '1.26'
         check-latest: true
 
     - name: Build
@@ -125,9 +125,9 @@ jobs:
 
     - uses: actions/checkout@v7
 
-    - uses: actions/setup-go@v6
+    - uses: actions/setup-go@v7
       with:
-        go-version: '1.25'
+        go-version: '1.26'
         check-latest: true
 
     - name: Build ${{ matrix.name }}

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -7,6 +7,88 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+## [1.11.0] - 2026-07-23
+
+See the [v1.11.0](https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/milestone/25?closed=1) milestone for a complete list of changes.
+
+### Breaking
+
+- Logging has switched from logrus to Go's structured `slog`. Log output changes: levels are upper case
+  (`level=INFO`), trace prints as `level=DEBUG-4`, timestamps are always RFC3339Nano and `logging.timestamp_format`
+  is ignored, and some messages were reworded. Review any log parsing before upgrading. This is also an API break
+  for embedders, as constructors now take a `*slog.Logger`. (#1672, #1734, #1621)
+- `firewall.inbound_action` and `firewall.outbound_action` (used to set reject vs. drop policy) were each being
+  applied to the opposite direction, that is now corrected. This only affects how blocked packets are answered, not
+  which packets the firewall allows or denies. If you set either of these you are getting the behavior of the other
+  one today and likely want to swap them before upgrading. (#1798)
+- On Windows, Nebula now installs WFP PERMIT filters for the nebula adapter and the listener port by default. WFP
+  sits below Windows Defender Firewall, so any WDF inbound rules you rely on for either will no longer apply. Set
+  `tun.windows_bypass_wdf` and `listen.windows_bypass_wdf` to false to leave WDF in charge. (#1710)
+- On Windows, the nebula device is now set to the `private` network category instead of whatever Windows decided,
+  which is usually `Public`. This makes the host firewall less restrictive on the overlay. Set
+  `tun.network_category` to `unset` to keep the old behavior. (#1710)
+- Reject packets for non-TCP now use ICMP code 13, communication administratively prohibited, instead of code 3,
+  port unreachable. Anything keying off the old code needs updating. (#1766, #1768)
+- The SSH debug server's profiling commands are now confined to `sshd.sandbox_dir`, which defaults to
+  `$TMP/nebula-debug`. Relative paths resolve inside it and absolute paths outside it are rejected, so anything
+  scripting `start-cpu-profile`, `save-heap-profile`, or `save-mutex-profile` with a path elsewhere needs the
+  directory set. The directory is not created for you. (#1622)
+
+### Added
+
+- Sign the Windows release binaries. (#1718)
+- Generate IPv6 reject packets, matching the existing IPv4 behavior. (#1766, #1767, #1768)
+- Accept `-` in `nebula-cert` to read from stdin or write to stdout. (#1714)
+- Search for both `config.yml` and `config.yaml` in service and command line modes. (#1717)
+- Add version labels to the Docker/OCI images. (#1772)
+- Rebind the listener and re-query lighthouses on macOS when the underlay network changes, so devices moving
+  between wifi and wired or between networks recover without waiting for dead tunnel detection. Controlled by
+  `listen.rebind_on_network_change` (default `true`, not reloadable). (#1816)
+
+### Changed
+
+- Reload the firewall when the unsafe networks in the certificate change. (#1719)
+- Reconfigure, start, and stop the stats listener on a config reload instead of requiring a restart. (#1670)
+- Update a static host's addresses when they change on reload. (#1713)
+- Don't require a port on ICMP firewall rules. (#1609)
+- Connection track ICMP traffic. (#1602)
+- Return `NODATA` instead of `NXDOMAIN` from the DNS server for a name that exists but has no record of the
+  requested type, so clients that query `AAAA` first (busybox/Alpine) fall through to `A`. (#1668)
+- Record the local host's details in the DNS server. (#1716)
+- Install Windows unsafe routes as link routes. (#1709)
+- Reduce relay handshake log spam, and only log a handshake send error at error level when the remote list
+  changes. (#1733, #1765, #1810)
+- Start, stop, and reload subsystems (DNS, stats, conntrack, ssh, punchy) cleanly without leaking goroutines. (#1640, #1654, #1661, #1667, #1669, #1708, #1806, #1815)
+- `Control` is now safe to stop and wait on from any lifecycle state, and a new `Control.Wait` blocks until nebula
+  has fully stopped and returns the first fatal reader error. Failed starts release the udp sockets and tun fd
+  instead of leaking them. (#1794)
+- Trigger an immediate lighthouse update when reconnecting to or adding a lighthouse instead of waiting for the next update tick. (#1645)
+- Bring the Darwin and OpenBSD tun implementations in line with the other BSDs. (#1703)
+- Update to build against go v1.26. (#1818)
+- Various dependency updates. (#1586, #1587, #1604, #1617, #1618, #1627, #1628, #1629, #1652, #1664, #1665, #1697, #1721, #1732, #1742, #1743, #1750, #1763, #1771, #1782, #1800, #1807)
+
+### Fixed
+
+- Fix a data race on a host's remote address that could send packets to the wrong address during a roam. (#1773)
+- Fix tunnels that could permanently escape connection manager monitoring. (#1752)
+- Fix a crash when reloading the SSH server's trusted keys. (#1787)
+- Fix hostmap corruption when a host has multiple overlay addresses. Each address now gets its own list instead of
+  a single shared chain, which also fixes two latent bugs on the add and makePrimary paths. (#1788, #1790)
+- Apply `remote_allow_list` IPv4 rules to 4-in-6 mapped addresses. (#1786)
+- Don't panic in the DNS server on a short or empty query name. (#1635)
+- Advance the replay window on relayed packets so a relay drops replayed frames instead of re-forwarding them. (#1751)
+- Fix a race in relay state handling. (#1753)
+- Lock replay window updates so concurrent readers can't corrupt it. (#1802)
+- Reject malformed handshakes more reliably, including invalid ed25519 key lengths. (#1601, #1756)
+- Properly handle `closetunnel` packets. (#1638)
+- Fix an IPv6 extension-header length overflow that could make the firewall parse the wrong protocol and ports. (#1789)
+- Fix relay re-establishment when a handshake arrives over a relay entry that a one-sided teardown left
+  `Disestablished`, which silently dropped every send until dead tunnel detection forced a re-handshake. (#1805)
+- Don't build new relay state on a tunnel that was just discarded. (#1796)
+- Don't delete the wrong pending hostinfo in the handshake manager. (#1811)
+- Don't call the packet reader after a UDP error on Darwin. (#1755)
+- Open the FreeBSD tun device non blocking. (#1666)
+
 ## [1.10.3] - 2026-02-06
 
 ### Security

Makefile

@@ -161,6 +161,10 @@ bin-pkcs11: BUILD_ARGS += -tags pkcs11
 bin-pkcs11: CGO_ENABLED = 1
 bin-pkcs11: bin
 
+# Build with the pprof debug server (serves on :6060). See startPprofServer.
+debug: BUILD_ARGS += -tags debug
+debug: bin
+
 bin:
 	go build $(BUILD_ARGS) -ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" -o ./nebula${NEBULA_CMD_SUFFIX} ${NEBULA_CMD_PATH}
 	go build $(BUILD_ARGS) -ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" -o ./nebula-cert${NEBULA_CMD_SUFFIX} ./cmd/nebula-cert
@@ -280,5 +284,5 @@ smoke-vagrant/%: bin-docker build/%/nebula
 	cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && ./smoke-vagrant.sh $*
 
 .FORCE:
-.PHONY: all all-linux all-freebsd all-openbsd all-netbsd all-darwin all-windows all-cross-linux all-cross-linux-arm all-cross-linux-mips all-cross-linux-other all-cross-darwin all-cross-windows bench bench-cpu bench-cpu-long bin build-test-mobile e2e e2ev e2evv e2evvv e2evvvv proto release service smoke-docker smoke-docker-race test test-cov-html smoke-vagrant/%
+.PHONY: all all-linux all-freebsd all-openbsd all-netbsd all-darwin all-windows all-cross-linux all-cross-linux-arm all-cross-linux-mips all-cross-linux-other all-cross-darwin all-cross-windows bench bench-cpu bench-cpu-long bin debug build-test-mobile e2e e2ev e2evv e2evvv e2evvvv proto release service smoke-docker smoke-docker-race test test-cov-html smoke-vagrant/%
 .DEFAULT_GOAL := bin

cmd/nebula/close_on_timer_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+//go:build linux && !android && !e2e_testing
+
+package main
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"net/netip"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"runtime"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula"
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
+	cert_test "github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// TestControlStopClosesOnTimer reproduces the dnclient lifecycle: nebula runs as
+// a library, and on a config update dnclient calls Stop() in-process to tear the
+// old instance down before starting a new one. This boots a real nebula (real
+// blocking UDP sockets, tun disabled), lets it run, then Stop()s it on a timer
+// and asserts it actually closes. If the reader goroutines parked in recvmmsg
+// don't wake on Close(), Wait() blocks forever and this fails with a goroutine
+// dump instead of relying on a process signal to unstick them.
+func TestControlStopClosesOnTimer(t *testing.T) {
+	l := test.NewLogger()
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+
+	before := time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)
+	after := time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
+	ca, _, caKey, caPEM := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, before, after, nil, nil, nil)
+	networks := []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")}
+	_, _, keyPEM, certPEM := cert_test.NewTestCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, ca, caKey, "close-on-timer", before, after, networks, nil, nil)
+
+	caPath := filepath.Join(dir, "ca.pem")
+	certPath := filepath.Join(dir, "cert.pem")
+	keyPath := filepath.Join(dir, "key.pem")
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(caPath, caPEM, 0o600))
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(certPath, certPEM, 0o600))
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(keyPath, keyPEM, 0o600))
+
+	// tun disabled so no device/root is needed; routines: 2 so we exercise the
+	// multi-socket (SO_REUSEPORT) teardown, which is where dnclient runs.
+	configBody := fmt.Sprintf(`
+pki:
+  ca: %s
+  cert: %s
+  key: %s
+listen:
+  host: 127.0.0.1
+  port: 0
+tun:
+  disabled: true
+firewall:
+  outbound:
+    - port: any
+      proto: any
+      host: any
+  inbound:
+    - port: any
+      proto: any
+      host: any
+routines: 2
+`, caPath, certPath, keyPath)
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "config.yml"), []byte(configBody), 0o600))
+
+	c := config.NewC(l)
+	require.NoError(t, c.Load(dir))
+
+	ctrl, err := nebula.Main(c, false, "close-on-timer", l, nil)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NoError(t, ctrl.Start())
+
+	// Run like a live nebula, then close on a timer, exactly as dnclient does.
+	<-time.NewTimer(5 * time.Second).C
+
+	stopped := make(chan struct{})
+	go func() {
+		ctrl.Stop() // closes the udp sockets (shutdown(2)) and the tun
+		ctrl.Wait() // blocks until every reader goroutine has returned
+		close(stopped)
+	}()
+
+	select {
+	case <-stopped:
+		t.Log("nebula closed cleanly on timer")
+	case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
+		buf := make([]byte, 1<<20)
+		n := runtime.Stack(buf, true)
+		t.Fatalf("nebula did NOT close within 10s of Stop(): a blocking reader never woke\n%s", buf[:n])
+	}
+}

connection_manager_test.go

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ func newTestLighthouse() *LightHouse {
 	lighthouses := []netip.Addr{}
 	staticList := map[netip.Addr]struct{}{}
 
+	lh.localAddrsFn = func(*LocalAllowList) []netip.Addr { return nil }
 	lh.lighthouses.Store(&lighthouses)
 	lh.staticList.Store(&staticList)
 

connection_state.go

@@ -2,15 +2,25 @@ package nebula
 
 import (
 	"encoding/json"
+	"log/slog"
 	"sync"
 	"sync/atomic"
 
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake"
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/noiseutil"
 )
 
-const ReplayWindow = 1024
+const ReplayWindow = 8192
+
+// sessionEpoch hands out a receiver-local ordinal to every ConnectionState at creation. The RX
+// staging sort (overlay/batch) orders packets by (epoch, message counter). A re-handshake never
+// rekeys an existing tunnel; it brings up a new hostinfo and ConnectionState with a counter space
+// starting near zero, while the old tunnel keeps decrypting until torn down. During that cutover
+// one flush batch can hold packets from both tunnels, and the epoch keeps the old tunnel's
+// packets sorted first.
+var sessionEpoch atomic.Uint64
 
 type ConnectionState struct {
 	eKey           noiseutil.CipherState
@@ -20,7 +30,10 @@ type ConnectionState struct {
 	initiator      bool
 	messageCounter atomic.Uint64
 	window         *Bits
+	decryptLock    sync.Mutex
 	writeLock      sync.Mutex
+	// epoch is this session's sessionEpoch ordinal. Immutable after creation.
+	epoch uint64
 }
 
 // newConnectionStateFromResult builds a fully-populated ConnectionState from a
@@ -35,6 +48,7 @@ func newConnectionStateFromResult(r *handshake.Result) *ConnectionState {
 		eKey:      noiseutil.NewCipherState(r.EKey, r.Cipher),
 		dKey:      noiseutil.NewCipherState(r.DKey, r.Cipher),
 		window:    NewBits(ReplayWindow),
+		epoch:     sessionEpoch.Add(1),
 	}
 	ci.messageCounter.Add(r.MessageIndex)
 	for i := uint64(1); i <= r.MessageIndex; i++ {
@@ -54,3 +68,54 @@ func (cs *ConnectionState) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
 func (cs *ConnectionState) Curve() cert.Curve {
 	return cs.myCert.Curve()
 }
+
+func (cs *ConnectionState) Decrypt(l *slog.Logger, messageCounter uint64, packet []byte, nb []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	cs.decryptLock.Lock()
+	result := cs.window.Check(l, messageCounter)
+	cs.decryptLock.Unlock()
+	if !result {
+		return nil, ErrAlreadySeen
+	}
+
+	out, err := cs.dKey.DecryptDanger(packet[header.Len:header.Len], packet[:header.Len], packet[header.Len:], messageCounter, nb)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	cs.decryptLock.Lock()
+	result = cs.window.Update(l, messageCounter)
+	cs.decryptLock.Unlock()
+	if !result {
+		return nil, ErrAlreadySeen
+	}
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+func (cs *ConnectionState) VerifyRelay(l *slog.Logger, messageCounter uint64, packet []byte, nb []byte) error {
+	cs.decryptLock.Lock()
+	result := cs.window.Check(l, messageCounter)
+	cs.decryptLock.Unlock()
+	if !result {
+		return ErrAlreadySeen
+	}
+
+	// The entire body is sent as AD, not encrypted.
+	// The packet consists of a 16-byte parsed Nebula header, Associated Data-protected payload, and a trailing 16-byte AEAD signature value.
+	// The packet is guaranteed to be at least 16 bytes at this point, b/c it got past the h.Parse() call above. If it's
+	// otherwise malformed (meaning, there is no trailing 16 byte AEAD value), then this will result in at worst a 0-length slice
+	// which will gracefully fail in the DecryptDanger call.
+	signedPayload := packet[:len(packet)-cs.dKey.Overhead()]
+	signatureValue := packet[len(packet)-cs.dKey.Overhead():]
+	_, err := cs.dKey.DecryptDanger(nil, signedPayload, signatureValue, messageCounter, nb)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	cs.decryptLock.Lock()
+	result = cs.window.Update(l, messageCounter)
+	cs.decryptLock.Unlock()
+	if !result {
+		return ErrAlreadySeen
+	}
+	return nil
+}

control.go

@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ type Control struct {
 	statsStart             func()
 	dnsStart               func()
 	lighthouseStart        func()
+	networkChangeStart     func(rebind func())
 	connectionManagerStart func(context.Context)
 }
 
@@ -104,6 +105,9 @@ func (c *Control) Start() error {
 	if c.dnsStart != nil {
 		go c.dnsStart()
 	}
+	if c.networkChangeStart != nil {
+		go c.networkChangeStart(c.RebindUDPServer)
+	}
 	if c.connectionManagerStart != nil {
 		go c.connectionManagerStart(c.ctx)
 	}
@@ -198,7 +202,11 @@ func (c *Control) RebindUDPServer() {
 		return
 	}
 
-	_ = c.f.outside.Rebind()
+	// A failure here means we are likely still pinned to the interface we came up on, so the rest of this is
+	// unlikely to help. Say so instead of silently carrying on as if we rebound.
+	if err := c.f.outside.Rebind(); err != nil {
+		c.l.Error("Failed to rebind udp socket", "error", err)
+	}
 
 	// Trigger a lighthouse update, useful for mobile clients that should have an update interval of 0
 	c.f.lightHouse.SendUpdate()

control_lifecycle_test.go

@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/batch"
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
@@ -30,9 +32,9 @@ func newFakeDevice() *fakeDevice {
 
 // Read blocks until Close like a real tun with no traffic, then reports EOF
 // the same way a closed device does
-func (d *fakeDevice) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
+func (d *fakeDevice) Read() ([]tio.Packet, error) {
 	<-d.closedCh
-	return 0, io.EOF
+	return nil, io.EOF
 }
 
 func (d *fakeDevice) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return len(p), nil }
@@ -49,10 +51,8 @@ func (d *fakeDevice) Activate() error                       { return nil }
 func (d *fakeDevice) Networks() []netip.Prefix              { return nil }
 func (d *fakeDevice) Name() string                          { return "fake" }
 func (d *fakeDevice) RoutesFor(netip.Addr) routing.Gateways { return nil }
-func (d *fakeDevice) SupportsMultiqueue() bool              { return false }
+
-func (d *fakeDevice) NewMultiQueueReader() (io.ReadWriteCloser, error) {
+func (d *fakeDevice) Queues(int) ([]tio.Queue, error) { return []tio.Queue{d}, nil }
-	return nil, errors.New("unsupported")
-}
 
 // newReadyControl hand-builds the minimum Control that Main would have
 // produced right before Start, including the construction token NewInterface
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ func newReadyControl(t *testing.T) (*Control, *fakeDevice, *fakeConn) {
 		inside:     dev,
 		outside:    conn,
 		writers:    []udp.Conn{conn},
-		readers:    make([]io.ReadWriteCloser, 1),
+		batchers:   make([]*batch.MultiCoalescer, 1),
 		routines:   1,
 		hostMap:    newHostMap(l),
 		lightHouse: lh,
@@ -109,7 +109,8 @@ func TestControl_StopBeforeStart(t *testing.T) {
 	require.NoError(t, c.Wait())
 
 	// A stopped control can never be started
-	require.ErrorIs(t, c.Start(), ErrAlreadyStopped)
+	err := c.Start()
+	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAlreadyStopped)
 
 	// A second Stop is a harmless no-op
 	c.Stop()
@@ -143,19 +144,29 @@ type fakeConn struct {
 	rebinds int
 }
 
-func (c *fakeConn) Rebind() error                            { c.rebinds++; return nil }
+func (c *fakeConn) Rebind() error                             { c.rebinds++; return nil }
-func (c *fakeConn) LocalAddr() (netip.AddrPort, error)       { return netip.AddrPort{}, nil }
+func (c *fakeConn) LocalAddr() (netip.AddrPort, error)        { return netip.AddrPort{}, nil }
-func (c *fakeConn) ListenOut(_ udp.EncReader) error          { return nil }
+func (c *fakeConn) ListenOut(_ udp.EncReader, _ func()) error { return nil }
-func (c *fakeConn) WriteTo(_ []byte, _ netip.AddrPort) error { return nil }
+func (c *fakeConn) WriteTo(_ []byte, _ netip.AddrPort) error  { return nil }
-func (c *fakeConn) ReloadConfig(_ *config.C)                 {}
+func (c *fakeConn) WriteBatch(bufs [][]byte, _ []netip.AddrPort) (int, error) {
-func (c *fakeConn) SupportsMultipleReaders() bool            { return true }
+	return len(bufs), nil
-func (c *fakeConn) Close() error                             { c.closed = true; return nil }
+}
+func (c *fakeConn) ReloadConfig(_ *config.C)      {}
+func (c *fakeConn) SupportsMultipleReaders() bool { return true }
+func (c *fakeConn) Close() error                  { c.closed = true; return nil }
 
 type multiqueueDevice struct {
 	*fakeDevice
 }
 
-func (d *multiqueueDevice) SupportsMultiqueue() bool { return true }
+// Queues claims multiqueue support but fails to open the second queue,
+// exercising the activation error path.
+func (d *multiqueueDevice) Queues(n int) ([]tio.Queue, error) {
+	if n > 1 {
+		return nil, errors.New("second queue failed to open")
+	}
+	return d.fakeDevice.Queues(n)
+}
 
 func TestControl_StartMultiqueueFailureReleases(t *testing.T) {
 	dev := &multiqueueDevice{fakeDevice: newFakeDevice()}
@@ -166,7 +177,7 @@ func TestControl_StartMultiqueueFailureReleases(t *testing.T) {
 		inside:   dev,
 		outside:  conn,
 		writers:  []udp.Conn{conn},
-		readers:  make([]io.ReadWriteCloser, 2),
+		batchers: make([]*batch.MultiCoalescer, 2),
 		routines: 2,
 		l:        test.NewLogger(),
 	}
@@ -181,7 +192,8 @@ func TestControl_StartMultiqueueFailureReleases(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	// The second reader fails to open, everything must be released
-	require.Error(t, c.Start())
+	err := c.Start()
+	require.Error(t, err)
 	assert.Equal(t, StateStopped, c.State())
 	assert.True(t, dev.closed, "the tun device should have been closed")
 	assert.True(t, conn.closed, "the udp socket should have been closed")
@@ -251,15 +263,18 @@ func TestControl_ConcurrentStopAndStart(t *testing.T) {
 	// panic and Wait must observe the final state
 	require.NoError(t, c.Wait())
 	assert.Equal(t, StateStopped, c.State())
-	require.ErrorIs(t, c.Start(), ErrAlreadyStopped)
+	err := c.Start()
+	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAlreadyStopped)
 }
 
 func TestControl_StartStopLifecycle(t *testing.T) {
 	c, dev, conn := newReadyControl(t)
 
-	require.NoError(t, c.Start())
+	err := c.Start()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
 	assert.Equal(t, StateStarted, c.State())
-	require.ErrorIs(t, c.Start(), ErrAlreadyStarted)
+	err = c.Start()
+	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAlreadyStarted)
 
 	// Stop must unpark the reader blocked in the device and release everything
 	c.Stop()
@@ -270,7 +285,8 @@ func TestControl_StartStopLifecycle(t *testing.T) {
 
 	// The reader drained off a closed device, that is not a fatal error
 	require.NoError(t, c.Wait())
-	require.ErrorIs(t, c.Start(), ErrAlreadyStopped)
+	err = c.Start()
+	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAlreadyStopped)
 }
 
 func TestControl_RebindIsGatedByState(t *testing.T) {
@@ -280,7 +296,8 @@ func TestControl_RebindIsGatedByState(t *testing.T) {
 	c.RebindUDPServer()
 	assert.Equal(t, 0, conn.rebinds, "rebind before start must be a no-op")
 
-	require.NoError(t, c.Start())
+	err := c.Start()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
 	c.RebindUDPServer()
 	assert.Equal(t, 1, conn.rebinds, "rebind while started must reach the conn")
 

control_tester.go

@@ -108,7 +108,19 @@ func (c *Control) GetVpnAddrs() []netip.Addr {
 }
 
 func (c *Control) GetUDPAddr() netip.AddrPort {
-	return c.f.outside.(*udp.TesterConn).Addr
+	return c.f.outside.(*udp.TesterConn).GetAddr()
+}
+
+// SetUDPAddr moves this node to a new underlay address, standing in for a laptop waking up on a different
+// network. Register the new address with the router as well or nothing will route back.
+func (c *Control) SetUDPAddr(addr netip.AddrPort) {
+	c.f.outside.(*udp.TesterConn).SetAddr(addr)
+}
+
+// SetLocalAddrsFn replaces underlay address discovery so a test can advertise its simulated address instead of
+// whatever this machine's NICs happen to be. Call it before Start, SendUpdate reads it from the update worker.
+func (c *Control) SetLocalAddrsFn(fn func(*LocalAllowList) []netip.Addr) {
+	c.f.lightHouse.localAddrsFn = fn
 }
 
 func (c *Control) KillPendingTunnel(vpnIp netip.Addr) bool {

cpupick/cpupick.go

@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+// Package cpupick chooses which CPUs the tun reader threads pin to when the
+// operator has not chosen for us (tun.cpu_affinity). The stock spread —
+// allowed[i] for routine i — has two failure modes this package exists to fix:
+//
+//   - every co-located nebula starts its spread at allowed[0], so N instances
+//     on one box stack their readers onto the same cores, and allowed[0] is
+//     usually CPU 0, the core housekeeping and default IRQ affinity already
+//     favor;
+//   - on heterogeneous CPUs (ARM big.LITTLE, Intel P/E hybrids, AMD compact
+//     cores) low IDs are not necessarily fast cores, and pinning an encrypt
+//     thread to an efficiency core caps that queue's throughput.
+//
+// Default instead returns a preference-ordered pin list: the allowed set
+// filtered to performance cores (when the platform distinguishes them and
+// enough remain for every routine), confined to a single NUMA node and spread
+// across distinct physical cores when the topology permits, CPU 0's physical
+// core demoted to last resort, and the order rotated by a stable per-instance
+// key so co-located instances spread instead of stacking.
+package cpupick
+
+import (
+	"log/slog"
+
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
+)
+
+// topology is the slice of machine layout arrange consults: the NUMA node
+// and the physical core behind each candidate CPU, plus which core CPU 0
+// lives on (zeroCore, -1 when unknown — tracked separately because CPU 0's
+// SMT sibling deserves demotion even when CPU 0 itself isn't a candidate).
+// Probed from sysfs on Linux; flatTopology stands in when the platform can't
+// say, which turns every topology rule into a no-op rather than a wrong
+// answer.
+type topology struct {
+	nodeOf   map[int]int
+	coreOf   map[int]int
+	zeroCore int
+}
+
+// flatTopology places every CPU on node 0 and on a physical core of its own.
+func flatTopology(cpus []int) topology {
+	t := topology{
+		nodeOf:   make(map[int]int, len(cpus)),
+		coreOf:   make(map[int]int, len(cpus)),
+		zeroCore: -1,
+	}
+	for i, c := range cpus {
+		t.nodeOf[c] = 0
+		t.coreOf[c] = i
+		if c == 0 {
+			t.zeroCore = i
+		}
+	}
+	return t
+}
+
+// Default computes the pin order for `routines` tun readers. key is any
+// stable per-instance value; the bound UDP port is ideal — distinct across
+// co-located instances, stable across restarts so benchmark runs stay
+// comparable. Returns nil when there is nothing useful to say (no affinity
+// support on this platform, lookup failure); callers keep their existing
+// fallback spread.
+func Default(routines int, key uint64, l *slog.Logger) []int {
+	allowed, err := util.AllowedCPUs()
+	if err != nil || len(allowed) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	perf, signal := perfCPUs(allowed)
+	cands := pickCandidates(allowed, perf, routines)
+	if len(cands) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	if len(perf) < routines {
+		signal = ""
+	}
+	cpus := arrange(cands, readTopology(cands), routines, splitmix64(key))
+	if l != nil {
+		l.Info("chose default pin CPUs for tun readers",
+			"cpus", cpus[:min(routines, len(cpus))],
+			"perfSignal", signal)
+	}
+	return cpus
+}
+
+// pickCandidates applies the enough-for-everyone guard: a perf filter that
+// leaves fewer candidates than routines is discarded — giving every reader
+// its own (possibly slow) core beats stacking two readers on a fast one.
+func pickCandidates(allowed, perf []int, routines int) []int {
+	if len(perf) < routines {
+		return allowed
+	}
+	return perf
+}
+
+// arrange turns the candidate set into the final pin order:
+//
+//  1. NUMA: when at least one node holds enough candidates for every
+//     routine, confine to one such node, chosen by the instance hash. The
+//     readers share hostmap and cipher state, so splitting one instance
+//     across nodes taxes every packet — and co-located instances that hash
+//     to different nodes stop competing entirely. When no node is big
+//     enough, span nodes rather than stack readers.
+//  2. Rotate the preferred candidates by the hash so instances spread.
+//  3. SMT: emit one thread per physical core before any of their siblings —
+//     two encrypt threads on one core split its execution units. Siblings
+//     still follow for the routines > cores case.
+//  4. CPU 0's whole physical core goes last: housekeeping and default IRQ
+//     noise on CPU 0 bleeds into its SMT sibling too. Within that tail the
+//     sibling precedes CPU 0 itself, which only catches the bleed-through.
+//
+// The rotation happens before the SMT pass so each instance's one-per-core
+// walk also starts at a different core, and CPU 0's core is excluded from
+// the rotation so no hash value can put it back at the front.
+func arrange(cands []int, topo topology, routines int, h uint64) []int {
+	byNode := map[int][]int{}
+	var nodes []int
+	for _, c := range cands {
+		n := topo.nodeOf[c]
+		if _, ok := byNode[n]; !ok {
+			nodes = append(nodes, n)
+		}
+		byNode[n] = append(byNode[n], c)
+	}
+	var eligible []int
+	for _, n := range nodes {
+		if len(byNode[n]) >= routines {
+			eligible = append(eligible, n)
+		}
+	}
+	if len(eligible) > 0 {
+		cands = byNode[eligible[int(h%uint64(len(eligible)))]]
+	}
+
+	// Split off CPU 0's core: its siblings tail the list, CPU 0 tails them.
+	preferred := make([]int, 0, len(cands))
+	var zeroTail []int
+	hasZero := false
+	for _, c := range cands {
+		switch {
+		case c == 0:
+			hasZero = true
+		case topo.zeroCore >= 0 && topo.coreOf[c] == topo.zeroCore:
+			zeroTail = append(zeroTail, c)
+		default:
+			preferred = append(preferred, c)
+		}
+	}
+	if hasZero {
+		zeroTail = append(zeroTail, 0)
+	}
+	if len(preferred) == 0 {
+		return zeroTail // CPU 0's core is all we have
+	}
+
+	// The node pick consumed the low hash bits; rotate by the high ones so
+	// the two choices stay independent.
+	off := int((h >> 32) % uint64(len(preferred)))
+	rot := make([]int, 0, len(preferred))
+	rot = append(rot, preferred[off:]...)
+	rot = append(rot, preferred[:off]...)
+
+	seenCore := make(map[int]bool, len(rot))
+	out := make([]int, 0, len(cands))
+	var siblings []int
+	for _, c := range rot {
+		g := topo.coreOf[c]
+		if seenCore[g] {
+			siblings = append(siblings, c)
+			continue
+		}
+		seenCore[g] = true
+		out = append(out, c)
+	}
+	out = append(out, siblings...)
+	out = append(out, zeroTail...)
+	return out
+}
+
+// splitmix64 decorrelates instance keys before the selection modulos: ports
+// on one box often share spacing (4242/4243, or round steps like +1000) that
+// raw key%len arithmetic would fold onto the same offset.
+func splitmix64(x uint64) uint64 {
+	x += 0x9e3779b97f4a7c15
+	x = (x ^ (x >> 30)) * 0xbf58476d1ce4e5b9
+	x = (x ^ (x >> 27)) * 0x94d049bb133111eb
+	return x ^ (x >> 31)
+}

cpupick/cpupick_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+package cpupick
+
+import (
+	"slices"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// pairTopo builds a topology where consecutive candidate pairs are SMT
+// siblings: (cpus[0],cpus[1]) share a core, (cpus[2],cpus[3]) the next, ...
+// All CPUs land on node 0.
+func pairTopo(cpus []int) topology {
+	t := topology{
+		nodeOf:   make(map[int]int, len(cpus)),
+		coreOf:   make(map[int]int, len(cpus)),
+		zeroCore: -1,
+	}
+	for i, c := range cpus {
+		t.nodeOf[c] = 0
+		t.coreOf[c] = i / 2
+		if c == 0 {
+			t.zeroCore = i / 2
+		}
+	}
+	return t
+}
+
+func TestArrangeDemotesZeroForEveryKey(t *testing.T) {
+	candidates := []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}
+	for key := range uint64(64) {
+		got := arrange(candidates, flatTopology(candidates), 4, splitmix64(key))
+		if len(got) != len(candidates) {
+			t.Fatalf("key %d: len=%d want %d", key, len(got), len(candidates))
+		}
+		if got[0] == 0 {
+			t.Errorf("key %d: CPU 0 at the front: %v", key, got)
+		}
+		if got[len(got)-1] != 0 {
+			t.Errorf("key %d: CPU 0 not demoted to last: %v", key, got)
+		}
+		sorted := slices.Clone(got)
+		slices.Sort(sorted)
+		if !slices.Equal(sorted, candidates) {
+			t.Errorf("key %d: not a permutation: %v", key, got)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestArrangeDemotesZeroSiblings(t *testing.T) {
+	// Pairs (0,1),(2,3),(4,5),(6,7): CPU 0's core — 0 and its sibling 1 —
+	// must tail the list, sibling ahead of 0 itself.
+	candidates := []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}
+	for key := range uint64(64) {
+		got := arrange(candidates, pairTopo(candidates), 2, splitmix64(key))
+		n := len(got)
+		if got[n-1] != 0 || got[n-2] != 1 {
+			t.Fatalf("key %d: tail = %v, want [... 1 0]", key, got)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestArrangeZeroSiblingWithoutZero(t *testing.T) {
+	// CPU 0 excluded (cpuset) but its sibling 1 remains: the sibling still
+	// tails the list when the topology knows which core CPU 0 lives on.
+	candidates := []int{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
+	topo := pairTopo([]int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5})
+	got := arrange(candidates, topo, 2, splitmix64(7))
+	if got[len(got)-1] != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("CPU 0's sibling not demoted: %v", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestArrangeRotatesByKey(t *testing.T) {
+	candidates := []int{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}
+	seen := map[int]bool{}
+	for key := range uint64(64) {
+		seen[arrange(candidates, flatTopology(candidates), 4, splitmix64(key))[0]] = true
+	}
+	// 64 hashed keys over 8 slots must hit more than one starting CPU, or
+	// co-located instances would all stack again.
+	if len(seen) < 2 {
+		t.Errorf("rotation never varied across keys: %v", seen)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestArrangeStableForSameKey(t *testing.T) {
+	candidates := []int{0, 2, 4, 6}
+	topo := flatTopology(candidates)
+	a := arrange(candidates, topo, 2, splitmix64(4242))
+	b := arrange(candidates, topo, 2, splitmix64(4242))
+	if !slices.Equal(a, b) {
+		t.Errorf("same key ordered differently: %v vs %v", a, b)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestArrangeZeroOnly(t *testing.T) {
+	if got := arrange([]int{0}, flatTopology([]int{0}), 1, splitmix64(7)); !slices.Equal(got, []int{0}) {
+		t.Errorf("sole CPU 0 must survive: %v", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestArrangeSMTSiblingsLast(t *testing.T) {
+	// Pairs (1,2),(3,4),(5,6),(7,8): the first four picks must cover four
+	// distinct physical cores before any sibling repeats.
+	candidates := []int{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}
+	topo := pairTopo(candidates)
+	for key := range uint64(16) {
+		got := arrange(candidates, topo, 4, splitmix64(key))
+		seen := map[int]bool{}
+		for _, c := range got[:4] {
+			g := topo.coreOf[c]
+			if seen[g] {
+				t.Fatalf("key %d: sibling before all cores covered: %v", key, got)
+			}
+			seen[g] = true
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestArrangeNUMAConfinesToOneNode(t *testing.T) {
+	// Two nodes of four; both fit routines=3, so the result must sit
+	// entirely inside one of them, and the hash must pick both across keys.
+	candidates := []int{1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 13}
+	topo := flatTopology(candidates)
+	for _, c := range []int{10, 11, 12, 13} {
+		topo.nodeOf[c] = 1
+	}
+	nodesSeen := map[int]bool{}
+	for key := range uint64(32) {
+		got := arrange(candidates, topo, 3, splitmix64(key))
+		if len(got) != 4 {
+			t.Fatalf("key %d: not confined to one node: %v", key, got)
+		}
+		n := topo.nodeOf[got[0]]
+		for _, c := range got {
+			if topo.nodeOf[c] != n {
+				t.Fatalf("key %d: spans nodes: %v", key, got)
+			}
+		}
+		nodesSeen[n] = true
+	}
+	if len(nodesSeen) != 2 {
+		t.Errorf("hash never spread instances across nodes: %v", nodesSeen)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestArrangeNUMASpansWhenNoNodeFits(t *testing.T) {
+	candidates := []int{1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 13}
+	topo := flatTopology(candidates)
+	for _, c := range []int{10, 11, 12, 13} {
+		topo.nodeOf[c] = 1
+	}
+	got := arrange(candidates, topo, 6, splitmix64(1))
+	if len(got) != len(candidates) {
+		t.Errorf("undersized nodes must span, got %v", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPickCandidates(t *testing.T) {
+	allowed := []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}
+	perf := []int{4, 5}
+
+	// Enough perf cores for every routine: only they are used.
+	if got := pickCandidates(allowed, perf, 2); !slices.Equal(got, perf) {
+		t.Errorf("perf filter not applied: %v", got)
+	}
+	// Perf filter too small for the routine count: discarded, everyone
+	// gets their own core from the full allowed set.
+	if got := pickCandidates(allowed, perf, 4); !slices.Equal(got, allowed) {
+		t.Errorf("undersized perf filter not discarded: %v", got)
+	}
+}

cpupick/perf_linux.go

@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+//go:build linux
+
+package cpupick
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// capacityKeepPct is the cpu_capacity admission threshold, relative to the
+// fastest allowed core. LITTLE cores are normalized to ~250-400 of the big
+// core's 1024 while mid cores sit at ~75%+, so half of max separates little
+// from the rest without splitting prime from mid on three-tier parts.
+const capacityKeepPct = 50
+
+// freqKeepPct is the cpuinfo_max_freq admission threshold. Favored-core
+// turbo skew is 2-4% and ARM mid-vs-prime ~12%, while E-cores, LITTLE
+// cores, and AMD compact cores all sit >= 20% below their siblings' max.
+const freqKeepPct = 85
+
+// perfCPUs partitions allowed into the subset that are "performance" cores,
+// consulting (in order of authority):
+//
+//  1. cpu_capacity — arch_topology's normalized per-CPU capacity, exposed on
+//     arm/arm64/riscv; the scheduler's own view of big vs LITTLE.
+//  2. /sys/devices/cpu_core/cpus — the Intel hybrid P-core PMU mask, present
+//     only on P/E parts (x86 has no cpu_capacity) and naming P cores outright.
+//  3. cpuinfo_max_freq — the cross-vendor fallback; catches AMD compact
+//     cores, which neither of the above covers.
+//
+// Returns allowed unchanged (signal "") when nothing distinguishes the
+// cores: homogeneous parts, VMs without cpufreq, sysfs unavailable.
+func perfCPUs(allowed []int) ([]int, string) {
+	return perfCPUsFrom("/sys/devices/system/cpu", "/sys/devices/cpu_core/cpus", allowed)
+}
+
+func perfCPUsFrom(cpuDir, intelCoreMask string, allowed []int) ([]int, string) {
+	if cpus, ok := byPerCPUValue(cpuDir, "cpu_capacity", allowed, capacityKeepPct); ok {
+		return cpus, "cpu_capacity"
+	}
+	if cpus, ok := byIntelCoreMask(intelCoreMask, allowed); ok {
+		return cpus, "intel_core_pmu"
+	}
+	if cpus, ok := byPerCPUValue(cpuDir, "cpufreq/cpuinfo_max_freq", allowed, freqKeepPct); ok {
+		return cpus, "max_freq"
+	}
+	return allowed, ""
+}
+
+// byPerCPUValue keeps the allowed CPUs whose per-CPU sysfs value is at least
+// keepPct percent of the maximum across allowed. Inconclusive (ok=false)
+// when any CPU is missing the file or when every value is equal.
+func byPerCPUValue(cpuDir, file string, allowed []int, keepPct int) ([]int, bool) {
+	vals := make([]int, len(allowed))
+	minV, maxV := 0, 0
+	for i, cpu := range allowed {
+		v, err := readIntFile(filepath.Join(cpuDir, fmt.Sprintf("cpu%d", cpu), file))
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, false
+		}
+		vals[i] = v
+		if i == 0 || v < minV {
+			minV = v
+		}
+		if v > maxV {
+			maxV = v
+		}
+	}
+	if minV == maxV {
+		return nil, false // homogeneous by this signal; try the next one
+	}
+	keep := make([]int, 0, len(allowed))
+	for i, cpu := range allowed {
+		if vals[i]*100 >= maxV*keepPct {
+			keep = append(keep, cpu)
+		}
+	}
+	return keep, true
+}
+
+// byIntelCoreMask keeps the allowed CPUs named by the hybrid P-core PMU
+// mask. Inconclusive when the file is absent (non-hybrid x86, other arches)
+// or no allowed CPU is in the mask (the process was deliberately confined
+// to E-cores; nothing useful to prefer within that).
+func byIntelCoreMask(maskPath string, allowed []int) ([]int, bool) {
+	b, err := os.ReadFile(maskPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+	set, err := parseCPUList(strings.TrimSpace(string(b)))
+	if err != nil || len(set) == 0 {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+	pcore := make(map[int]bool, len(set))
+	for _, c := range set {
+		pcore[c] = true
+	}
+	keep := make([]int, 0, len(allowed))
+	for _, cpu := range allowed {
+		if pcore[cpu] {
+			keep = append(keep, cpu)
+		}
+	}
+	if len(keep) == 0 {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+	return keep, true
+}
+
+// parseCPUList decodes the kernel's cpulist format ("0-7,16-23", "3") into
+// individual CPU IDs. Empty input yields an empty list.
+func parseCPUList(s string) ([]int, error) {
+	if s == "" {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	var out []int
+	for part := range strings.SplitSeq(s, ",") {
+		part = strings.TrimSpace(part)
+		if part == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+		lo, hi, isRange := strings.Cut(part, "-")
+		a, err := strconv.Atoi(lo)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("bad cpulist entry %q: %w", part, err)
+		}
+		if !isRange {
+			out = append(out, a)
+			continue
+		}
+		b, err := strconv.Atoi(hi)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("bad cpulist entry %q: %w", part, err)
+		}
+		if b < a || b-a > 8192 {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("bad cpulist range %q", part)
+		}
+		for v := a; v <= b; v++ {
+			out = append(out, v)
+		}
+	}
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+func readIntFile(path string) (int, error) {
+	b, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	return strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(string(b)))
+}

cpupick/perf_linux_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+//go:build linux
+
+package cpupick
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"slices"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// fakeSysfs builds a cpuDir tree with the given per-CPU file values.
+// A nil map for a file means "file absent on every CPU".
+func fakeSysfs(t *testing.T, capacity, maxFreq map[int]int) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	write := func(cpu int, rel string, v int) {
+		p := filepath.Join(dir, fmt.Sprintf("cpu%d", cpu), rel)
+		if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(p), 0o755); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if err := os.WriteFile(p, fmt.Appendf(nil, "%d\n", v), 0o644); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	for cpu, v := range capacity {
+		write(cpu, "cpu_capacity", v)
+	}
+	for cpu, v := range maxFreq {
+		write(cpu, "cpufreq/cpuinfo_max_freq", v)
+	}
+	return dir
+}
+
+func writeCoreMask(t *testing.T, mask string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	p := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "cpus")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(p, []byte(mask+"\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return p
+}
+
+func TestPerfCPUsBigLittleCapacity(t *testing.T) {
+	// 4 big (1024) + 4 LITTLE (~290): capacity is authoritative on ARM.
+	dir := fakeSysfs(t, map[int]int{
+		0: 1024, 1: 1024, 2: 1024, 3: 1024,
+		4: 290, 5: 290, 6: 290, 7: 290,
+	}, nil)
+	got, signal := perfCPUsFrom(dir, filepath.Join(dir, "nope"), []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7})
+	if signal != "cpu_capacity" {
+		t.Fatalf("signal = %q", signal)
+	}
+	if !slices.Equal(got, []int{0, 1, 2, 3}) {
+		t.Errorf("got %v", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPerfCPUsThreeTierKeepsMid(t *testing.T) {
+	// prime (1024) + mid (~780) + little (~280): 50% keeps prime+mid.
+	dir := fakeSysfs(t, map[int]int{
+		0: 280, 1: 280, 2: 280, 3: 280,
+		4: 780, 5: 780, 6: 780,
+		7: 1024,
+	}, nil)
+	got, _ := perfCPUsFrom(dir, filepath.Join(dir, "nope"), []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7})
+	if !slices.Equal(got, []int{4, 5, 6, 7}) {
+		t.Errorf("got %v", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPerfCPUsIntelHybridMask(t *testing.T) {
+	// No cpu_capacity on x86; the P-core PMU mask decides.
+	dir := fakeSysfs(t, nil, nil)
+	mask := writeCoreMask(t, "0-7")
+	got, signal := perfCPUsFrom(dir, mask, []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11})
+	if signal != "intel_core_pmu" {
+		t.Fatalf("signal = %q", signal)
+	}
+	if !slices.Equal(got, []int{0, 1, 2, 3}) {
+		t.Errorf("got %v", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPerfCPUsIntelMaskDisjointFallsThrough(t *testing.T) {
+	// Confined to E-cores only: the mask can't help, and equal freqs below
+	// mean nothing else distinguishes them either -> allowed unchanged.
+	dir := fakeSysfs(t, nil, map[int]int{8: 4300000, 9: 4300000})
+	mask := writeCoreMask(t, "0-7")
+	got, signal := perfCPUsFrom(dir, mask, []int{8, 9})
+	if signal != "" || !slices.Equal(got, []int{8, 9}) {
+		t.Errorf("got %v signal %q", got, signal)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPerfCPUsMaxFreqCompactCores(t *testing.T) {
+	// AMD-style compact cores: no capacity, no Intel mask; 3.3 vs 5.7 GHz.
+	dir := fakeSysfs(t, nil, map[int]int{
+		0: 5700000, 1: 5700000, 2: 3300000, 3: 3300000,
+	})
+	got, signal := perfCPUsFrom(dir, filepath.Join(dir, "nope"), []int{0, 1, 2, 3})
+	if signal != "max_freq" {
+		t.Fatalf("signal = %q", signal)
+	}
+	if !slices.Equal(got, []int{0, 1}) {
+		t.Errorf("got %v", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPerfCPUsFavoredCoreSkewKept(t *testing.T) {
+	// Turbo Boost Max favored cores run a few percent hot; they must not
+	// shrink the candidate set to one or two cores.
+	dir := fakeSysfs(t, nil, map[int]int{
+		0: 5800000, 1: 5700000, 2: 5700000, 3: 5600000,
+	})
+	got, _ := perfCPUsFrom(dir, filepath.Join(dir, "nope"), []int{0, 1, 2, 3})
+	if !slices.Equal(got, []int{0, 1, 2, 3}) {
+		t.Errorf("favored-core skew filtered CPUs: %v", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPerfCPUsHomogeneousInconclusive(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := fakeSysfs(t, nil, map[int]int{0: 3000000, 1: 3000000})
+	got, signal := perfCPUsFrom(dir, filepath.Join(dir, "nope"), []int{0, 1})
+	if signal != "" || !slices.Equal(got, []int{0, 1}) {
+		t.Errorf("got %v signal %q", got, signal)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPerfCPUsNoSysfs(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	got, signal := perfCPUsFrom(dir, filepath.Join(dir, "nope"), []int{0, 1, 2})
+	if signal != "" || !slices.Equal(got, []int{0, 1, 2}) {
+		t.Errorf("got %v signal %q", got, signal)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParseCPUList(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		in      string
+		want    []int
+		wantErr bool
+	}{
+		{"0-3", []int{0, 1, 2, 3}, false},
+		{"0-1,16-17", []int{0, 1, 16, 17}, false},
+		{"5", []int{5}, false},
+		{"", nil, false},
+		{"3-1", nil, true},
+		{"a-b", nil, true},
+		{"1,x", nil, true},
+	}
+	for _, c := range cases {
+		got, err := parseCPUList(c.in)
+		if (err != nil) != c.wantErr {
+			t.Errorf("%q: err=%v wantErr=%v", c.in, err, c.wantErr)
+			continue
+		}
+		if !c.wantErr && !slices.Equal(got, c.want) {
+			t.Errorf("%q: got %v want %v", c.in, got, c.want)
+		}
+	}
+}

cpupick/perf_other.go

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+//go:build !linux
+
+package cpupick
+
+// perfCPUs is Linux-only sysfs walking; elsewhere report "no distinction".
+// Default already returns nil off-Linux (util.AllowedCPUs has no answer
+// there), so this exists to keep the package compiling everywhere.
+func perfCPUs(allowed []int) ([]int, string) {
+	return allowed, ""
+}

cpupick/topo_linux.go

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+//go:build linux
+
+package cpupick
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// readTopology probes the NUMA node and physical-core layout of cpus from
+// sysfs. Anything sysfs won't say degrades toward flatTopology: an unknown
+// node becomes node 0, an unknown core becomes a core of its own — either
+// way the corresponding arrange rule becomes a no-op instead of a wrong
+// answer.
+func readTopology(cpus []int) topology {
+	return readTopologyFrom("/sys/devices/system/node", "/sys/devices/system/cpu", cpus)
+}
+
+func readTopologyFrom(nodeDir, cpuDir string, cpus []int) topology {
+	coreOf, zeroCore := coreGroups(cpuDir, cpus)
+	return topology{
+		nodeOf:   numaNodes(nodeDir, cpus),
+		coreOf:   coreOf,
+		zeroCore: zeroCore,
+	}
+}
+
+// numaNodes maps each cpu to its NUMA node via
+// /sys/devices/system/node/nodeN/cpulist. CPUs no node claims (or no node
+// dirs at all: VMs, non-NUMA kernels) land on node 0.
+func numaNodes(nodeDir string, cpus []int) map[int]int {
+	out := make(map[int]int, len(cpus))
+	for _, c := range cpus {
+		out[c] = 0
+	}
+	entries, err := os.ReadDir(nodeDir)
+	if err != nil {
+		return out
+	}
+	want := make(map[int]bool, len(cpus))
+	for _, c := range cpus {
+		want[c] = true
+	}
+	for _, e := range entries {
+		id, ok := strings.CutPrefix(e.Name(), "node")
+		if !ok {
+			continue
+		}
+		n, err := strconv.Atoi(id)
+		if err != nil {
+			continue // has_cpu, possible, ... share the prefix
+		}
+		b, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(nodeDir, e.Name(), "cpulist"))
+		if err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		list, err := parseCPUList(strings.TrimSpace(string(b)))
+		if err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		for _, c := range list {
+			if want[c] {
+				out[c] = n
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+// coreGroups maps each cpu to a dense physical-core id derived from its
+// (physical_package_id, core_id) pair — core_id alone repeats across
+// sockets. CPUs whose topology files are unreadable get a core of their own.
+// The second return is the group id of the core CPU 0 lives on, or -1 when
+// that can't be determined; CPU 0's own files are consulted even when 0 is
+// not a candidate, so its SMT siblings are recognized under cpusets that
+// exclude CPU 0 itself.
+func coreGroups(cpuDir string, cpus []int) (map[int]int, int) {
+	type pkgCore struct{ pkg, core int }
+	pairOf := func(cpu int) (pkgCore, bool) {
+		topoDir := filepath.Join(cpuDir, fmt.Sprintf("cpu%d", cpu), "topology")
+		pkg, err1 := readIntFile(filepath.Join(topoDir, "physical_package_id"))
+		core, err2 := readIntFile(filepath.Join(topoDir, "core_id"))
+		if err1 != nil || err2 != nil {
+			return pkgCore{}, false
+		}
+		return pkgCore{pkg, core}, true
+	}
+
+	ids := map[pkgCore]int{}
+	out := make(map[int]int, len(cpus))
+	next := 0
+	for _, cpu := range cpus {
+		k, ok := pairOf(cpu)
+		if !ok {
+			out[cpu] = next
+			next++
+			continue
+		}
+		id, ok := ids[k]
+		if !ok {
+			id = next
+			next++
+			ids[k] = id
+		}
+		out[cpu] = id
+	}
+
+	zeroCore := -1
+	if k, ok := pairOf(0); ok {
+		if id, ok := ids[k]; ok {
+			zeroCore = id
+		}
+	}
+	return out, zeroCore
+}

cpupick/topo_linux_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+//go:build linux
+
+package cpupick
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// fakeTopoSysfs builds nodeDir/cpuDir trees. nodes maps node id -> cpulist
+// string; cores maps cpu -> (package, core) pair.
+func fakeTopoSysfs(t *testing.T, nodes map[int]string, cores map[int][2]int) (string, string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	base := t.TempDir()
+	nodeDir := filepath.Join(base, "node")
+	cpuDir := filepath.Join(base, "cpu")
+	for n, list := range nodes {
+		d := filepath.Join(nodeDir, fmt.Sprintf("node%d", n))
+		if err := os.MkdirAll(d, 0o755); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(d, "cpulist"), []byte(list+"\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	for cpu, pc := range cores {
+		d := filepath.Join(cpuDir, fmt.Sprintf("cpu%d", cpu), "topology")
+		if err := os.MkdirAll(d, 0o755); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(d, "physical_package_id"), fmt.Appendf(nil, "%d\n", pc[0]), 0o644); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(d, "core_id"), fmt.Appendf(nil, "%d\n", pc[1]), 0o644); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	return nodeDir, cpuDir
+}
+
+func TestReadTopology(t *testing.T) {
+	// Two nodes; SMT pairs (0,4),(1,5) on node 0 and (2,6),(3,7) on node 1.
+	// core_id repeats across packages on purpose: the pair must disambiguate.
+	nodeDir, cpuDir := fakeTopoSysfs(t,
+		map[int]string{0: "0-1,4-5", 1: "2-3,6-7"},
+		map[int][2]int{
+			0: {0, 0}, 4: {0, 0}, 1: {0, 1}, 5: {0, 1},
+			2: {1, 0}, 6: {1, 0}, 3: {1, 1}, 7: {1, 1},
+		})
+	cpus := []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}
+	topo := readTopologyFrom(nodeDir, cpuDir, cpus)
+
+	for _, c := range []int{0, 1, 4, 5} {
+		if topo.nodeOf[c] != 0 {
+			t.Errorf("cpu %d on node %d, want 0", c, topo.nodeOf[c])
+		}
+	}
+	for _, c := range []int{2, 3, 6, 7} {
+		if topo.nodeOf[c] != 1 {
+			t.Errorf("cpu %d on node %d, want 1", c, topo.nodeOf[c])
+		}
+	}
+	pairs := [][2]int{{0, 4}, {1, 5}, {2, 6}, {3, 7}}
+	for _, p := range pairs {
+		if topo.coreOf[p[0]] != topo.coreOf[p[1]] {
+			t.Errorf("siblings %v not grouped: %d vs %d", p, topo.coreOf[p[0]], topo.coreOf[p[1]])
+		}
+	}
+	if topo.coreOf[0] == topo.coreOf[2] {
+		t.Error("cross-package cores with equal core_id must not merge")
+	}
+	if topo.zeroCore != topo.coreOf[0] {
+		t.Errorf("zeroCore = %d, want %d", topo.zeroCore, topo.coreOf[0])
+	}
+}
+
+func TestReadTopologyZeroCoreWithoutZeroCandidate(t *testing.T) {
+	// CPU 0 is not a candidate (cpuset excludes it) but its sibling 4 is:
+	// zeroCore must still identify their shared core.
+	nodeDir, cpuDir := fakeTopoSysfs(t,
+		map[int]string{0: "0-7"},
+		map[int][2]int{0: {0, 0}, 4: {0, 0}, 1: {0, 1}, 5: {0, 1}})
+	topo := readTopologyFrom(nodeDir, cpuDir, []int{1, 4, 5})
+	if topo.zeroCore < 0 || topo.coreOf[4] != topo.zeroCore {
+		t.Errorf("zeroCore = %d, coreOf[4] = %d; sibling of CPU 0 not identified", topo.zeroCore, topo.coreOf[4])
+	}
+	if topo.coreOf[1] == topo.zeroCore {
+		t.Error("cpu 1 wrongly grouped with CPU 0's core")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestReadTopologyMissingSysfs(t *testing.T) {
+	base := t.TempDir()
+	cpus := []int{0, 1, 2}
+	topo := readTopologyFrom(filepath.Join(base, "nope"), filepath.Join(base, "also-nope"), cpus)
+	seen := map[int]bool{}
+	for _, c := range cpus {
+		if topo.nodeOf[c] != 0 {
+			t.Errorf("cpu %d node = %d, want 0", c, topo.nodeOf[c])
+		}
+		if seen[topo.coreOf[c]] {
+			t.Errorf("cpu %d shares a fallback core group", c)
+		}
+		seen[topo.coreOf[c]] = true
+	}
+	if topo.zeroCore != -1 {
+		t.Errorf("zeroCore = %d, want -1 when unknown", topo.zeroCore)
+	}
+}

cpupick/topo_other.go

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+//go:build !linux
+
+package cpupick
+
+// readTopology has no sysfs to consult off Linux; the flat stand-in makes
+// arrange's NUMA and SMT rules no-ops. Default is already nil off Linux
+// (util.AllowedCPUs has no answer there) — this keeps the package compiling.
+func readTopology(cpus []int) topology {
+	return flatTopology(cpus)
+}

dns_server.go

@@ -97,8 +97,7 @@ func (d *dnsServer) reload(c *config.C, initial bool) error {
 	newAddr := getDnsServerAddr(c)
 
 	d.serverMu.Lock()
-	running := d.server
+	running := d.server != nil
-	runningStarted := d.started
 	sameAddr := d.addr == newAddr
 	d.addr = newAddr
 	d.enabled.Store(enabled)
@@ -112,7 +111,7 @@ func (d *dnsServer) reload(c *config.C, initial bool) error {
 	}
 
 	if !enabled {
-		if running != nil {
+		if running {
 			d.Stop()
 		}
 		// Drop any records that accumulated while enabled; a later re-enable
@@ -121,12 +120,12 @@ func (d *dnsServer) reload(c *config.C, initial bool) error {
 		return nil
 	}
 
-	if running == nil {
+	if !running {
 		// Was disabled (or never started); bring it up now.
 		go d.Start()
 	} else if !sameAddr {
-		d.shutdownServer(running, runningStarted, "reload")
+		// Stop clears the slot before shutting down, otherwise the Start below can find the dying server and refuse
-		// Old Start goroutine has now exited; bring up a fresh listener on the new address.
+		d.Stop()
 		go d.Start()
 	}
 
@@ -162,7 +161,9 @@ func (d *dnsServer) Start() {
 
 	started := make(chan struct{})
 	d.serverMu.Lock()
-	if d.ctx.Err() != nil {
+	// Re-check enabled under the lock, a disable that raced our check above snapshots the slot under it too.
+	// Two reloads in quick succession can both spawn a Start, the loser would orphan the live listener past Stop
+	if d.ctx.Err() != nil || d.server != nil || !d.enabled.Load() {
 		d.serverMu.Unlock()
 		return
 	}
@@ -200,6 +201,14 @@ func (d *dnsServer) Start() {
 		close(started)
 	}
 
+	// Release our slot, unless a reload already replaced us, so a dead listener can't block a future Start
+	d.serverMu.Lock()
+	if d.server == server {
+		d.server = nil
+		d.started = nil
+	}
+	d.serverMu.Unlock()
+
 	if err != nil {
 		d.l.Warn("Failed to run the DNS responder", "error", err)
 	}

dns_server_test.go

@@ -194,14 +194,51 @@ func TestDnsServer_reload_initial_serveDnsWithoutLighthouse(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestDnsServer_reload_sameAddr_noOp(t *testing.T) {
+	port := freeUDPPort(t)
 	ds, c := newTestDnsServer(t)
-	setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", "0", true, true)
+	setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", port, true, true)
-
 	require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, true))
-	// No server running yet, no addr change. Reload should not spawn anything.
+
+	go ds.Start()
+	waitForBind(t, ds)
+
+	ds.serverMu.Lock()
+	before := ds.server
+	ds.serverMu.Unlock()
+	require.NotNil(t, before)
+
+	// Same address, so the running listener must be left alone rather than rebuilt under live queries
 	require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, false))
 	assert.True(t, ds.enabled.Load())
-	assert.Nil(t, ds.server)
+
+	ds.serverMu.Lock()
+	after := ds.server
+	ds.serverMu.Unlock()
+	assert.Same(t, before, after, "a same-address reload must not restart the listener")
+
+	ds.Stop()
+}
+
+// The branch the old sameAddr test was accidentally hitting: enabled with nothing running means reload starts it.
+func TestDnsServer_reload_whenNotRunning_starts(t *testing.T) {
+	port := freeUDPPort(t)
+	ds, c := newTestDnsServer(t)
+	setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", port, true, true)
+
+	// initial only records config, it never starts anything
+	require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, true))
+	ds.serverMu.Lock()
+	assert.Nil(t, ds.server, "the initial reload must not start a listener")
+	ds.serverMu.Unlock()
+
+	require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, false))
+	waitForBind(t, ds)
+
+	ds.serverMu.Lock()
+	assert.NotNil(t, ds.server, "a reload with nothing running should bring DNS up")
+	ds.serverMu.Unlock()
+
+	ds.Stop()
 }
 
 func TestDnsServer_StartStop_lifecycle(t *testing.T) {
@@ -427,3 +464,168 @@ func waitFor(t *testing.T, cond func() bool) {
 	}
 	t.Fatal("timed out waiting for condition")
 }
+
+// Two reloads in quick succession, or a HUP before Control.Start, can race two Starts at the same listener.
+func TestDnsServer_Start_isIdempotent(t *testing.T) {
+	port := freeUDPPort(t)
+	ds, c := newTestDnsServer(t)
+	setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", port, true, true)
+	require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, true))
+
+	go ds.Start()
+	waitForBind(t, ds)
+
+	ds.serverMu.Lock()
+	first := ds.server
+	ds.serverMu.Unlock()
+	require.NotNil(t, first)
+
+	// If the second Start replaces the tracked server, Stop kills the wrong one and the port leaks
+	done := make(chan struct{})
+	go func() {
+		ds.Start()
+		close(done)
+	}()
+	select {
+	case <-done:
+	case <-time.After(time.Second * 5):
+		t.Fatal("second Start never returned")
+	}
+
+	ds.serverMu.Lock()
+	second := ds.server
+	ds.serverMu.Unlock()
+	assert.Same(t, first, second, "a second Start must not replace the running server")
+
+	// The real proof, after Stop the port must actually be free
+	ds.Stop()
+	waitFor(t, func() bool {
+		pc, err := net.ListenPacket("udp", "127.0.0.1:"+port)
+		if err != nil {
+			return false
+		}
+		_ = pc.Close()
+		return true
+	})
+}
+
+// An address change must actually end up listening on the new port. Start's guard refuses when a server is already
+// installed, so reload has to clear the slot before shutting the old one down.
+func TestDnsServer_reload_addrChange_restarts(t *testing.T) {
+	first := freeUDPPort(t)
+	second := freeUDPPort(t)
+
+	ds, c := newTestDnsServer(t)
+	setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", first, true, true)
+	require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, true))
+
+	go ds.Start()
+	waitForBind(t, ds)
+
+	// Cycle a few times, the failure this guards against depends on which goroutine wins serverMu
+	for i := range 8 {
+		want := second
+		if i%2 == 1 {
+			want = first
+		}
+		setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", want, true, true)
+		require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, false))
+		waitForBind(t, ds)
+
+		ds.serverMu.Lock()
+		srv := ds.server
+		ds.serverMu.Unlock()
+		require.NotNil(t, srv, "reload left DNS down instead of restarting it")
+		require.Equal(t, "127.0.0.1:"+want, srv.Addr, "reload should be serving the new address")
+	}
+
+	// Land back on second so the port assertions below are meaningful
+	setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", second, true, true)
+	require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, false))
+	waitForBind(t, ds)
+
+	// The old port must be released and the new one actually held
+	waitFor(t, func() bool {
+		pc, err := net.ListenPacket("udp", "127.0.0.1:"+first)
+		if err != nil {
+			return false
+		}
+		_ = pc.Close()
+		return true
+	})
+	_, err := net.ListenPacket("udp", "127.0.0.1:"+second)
+	require.Error(t, err, "the new address should be bound by the DNS responder")
+
+	ds.Stop()
+}
+
+// A listener that dies on its own must release the slot, or a later same-addr reload sees it as running and no-ops.
+func TestDnsServer_Start_bindFailure_releasesSlot(t *testing.T) {
+	port := freeUDPPort(t)
+	blocker, err := net.ListenPacket("udp", "127.0.0.1:"+port)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	ds, c := newTestDnsServer(t)
+	setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", port, true, true)
+	require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, true))
+
+	ds.Start() // returns once the bind fails
+
+	ds.serverMu.Lock()
+	assert.Nil(t, ds.server, "a listener that failed to bind must not stay parked in the slot")
+	ds.serverMu.Unlock()
+
+	// With the slot released, a reload can retry once the port frees up
+	require.NoError(t, blocker.Close())
+	require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, false))
+	waitForBind(t, ds)
+
+	ds.serverMu.Lock()
+	assert.NotNil(t, ds.server, "a same-addr reload should retry after a failed bind")
+	ds.serverMu.Unlock()
+
+	ds.Stop()
+}
+
+// A disable that lands while Start is between its unlocked check and the guard must not leave a listener behind.
+func TestDnsServer_Start_refusesWhenDisabledUnderLock(t *testing.T) {
+	port := freeUDPPort(t)
+	ds, c := newTestDnsServer(t)
+	setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", port, true, true)
+	require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, true))
+	require.True(t, ds.enabled.Load())
+
+	// Holding serverMu parks Start on the lock, the only way to land the disable in that window on purpose
+	ds.serverMu.Lock()
+
+	done := make(chan struct{})
+	go func() {
+		ds.Start()
+		close(done)
+	}()
+
+	select {
+	case <-done:
+		ds.serverMu.Unlock()
+		t.Fatal("Start returned early, the test never exercised the window")
+	case <-time.After(time.Millisecond * 100):
+	}
+
+	// The disable reload's critical section. It sees nothing running, so it never calls Stop.
+	ds.enabled.Store(false)
+	ds.serverMu.Unlock()
+
+	select {
+	case <-done:
+	case <-time.After(time.Second * 5):
+		t.Fatal("Start never returned")
+	}
+
+	ds.serverMu.Lock()
+	assert.Nil(t, ds.server, "Start must not install a listener a disable already cancelled")
+	ds.serverMu.Unlock()
+
+	pc, err := net.ListenPacket("udp", "127.0.0.1:"+port)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "an orphaned listener is still holding the port")
+	_ = pc.Close()
+}

e2e/handshakes_test.go

@@ -725,6 +725,70 @@ func TestReestablishRelays(t *testing.T) {
 
 }
 
+func TestRelayHandshakeOverDisestablishedEntry(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	// If them tears down the tunnel while me keeps Established relay state, me's next
+	// handshake flows through the relay with no fresh CreateRelayRequest and lands on
+	// them's Disestablished terminal relay entry. them must re-establish that entry, or
+	// its first transmit deletes its only relay and the tunnel is born transmit-dead:
+	// them can receive but every send is silently dropped.
+	ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
+	myControl, myVpnIpNet, _, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me     ", "10.128.0.1/24", m{"relay": m{"use_relays": true}})
+	relayControl, relayVpnIpNet, relayUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "relay  ", "10.128.0.128/24", m{"relay": m{"am_relay": true}})
+	theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "them   ", "10.128.0.2/24", m{"relay": m{"use_relays": true}})
+
+	// Teach my how to get to the relay and that their can be reached via the relay
+	myControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(relayVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), relayUdpAddr)
+	myControl.InjectRelays(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), []netip.Addr{relayVpnIpNet[0].Addr()})
+	relayControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirUdpAddr)
+
+	// Build a router so we don't have to reason who gets which packet
+	r := router.NewR(t, myControl, relayControl, theirControl)
+	defer r.RenderFlow()
+
+	// Start the servers
+	myControl.Start()
+	relayControl.Start()
+	theirControl.Start()
+
+	t.Log("Trigger a handshake from me to them via the relay")
+	myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
+
+	p := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
+	assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me"), p, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
+	oldIdx := myControl.GetHostInfoByVpnAddr(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), false).LocalIndex
+
+	t.Log("Close the tunnel on them only, marking their relay entry Disestablished")
+	theirControl.CloseTunnel(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), true)
+
+	t.Log("Re-handshake from me, riding the still-Established relay state")
+	myControl.ReHandshake(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr())
+	for {
+		h := myControl.GetHostInfoByVpnAddr(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), false)
+		if h != nil && h.LocalIndex != oldIdx && h.RemoteIndex != 0 {
+			break
+		}
+		r.RouteForAllExitFunc(func(*udp.Packet, *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
+			return router.RouteAndExit
+		})
+	}
+
+	hAtThem := theirControl.GetHostInfoByVpnAddr(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), false)
+	require.NotNil(t, hAtThem, "them should have completed the relayed handshake")
+	require.Equal(t, []netip.Addr{relayVpnIpNet[0].Addr()}, hAtThem.CurrentRelaysToMe, "them should know a relay for the new tunnel")
+
+	t.Log("Send from them to me; their only relay entry must survive the transmit")
+	theirControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them")))
+	require.Never(t, func() bool {
+		h := theirControl.GetHostInfoByVpnAddr(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), false)
+		return h == nil || len(h.CurrentRelaysToMe) == 0
+	}, time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond, "them deleted its only relay entry; the tunnel is permanently transmit-dead")
+
+	p = r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(myControl)
+	assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from them"), p, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
+	r.RenderHostmaps("Final hostmaps", myControl, relayControl, theirControl)
+}
+
 func TestStage1RaceRelays(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	//NOTE: this is a race between me and relay resulting in a full tunnel from me to them via relay

e2e/helpers_test.go

@@ -4,15 +4,13 @@
 package e2e
 
 import (
-	"io"
+	"log/slog"
 	"net/netip"
 	"os"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 
-	"log/slog"
-
 	"dario.cat/mergo"
 	"github.com/google/gopacket"
 	"github.com/google/gopacket/layers"
@@ -382,7 +380,7 @@ func getAddrs(ns []netip.Prefix) []netip.Addr {
 func NewTestLogger() *slog.Logger {
 	v := os.Getenv("TEST_LOGS")
 	if v == "" {
-		return slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil))
+		return slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)
 	}
 
 	level := slog.LevelInfo

e2e/rebind_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
+//go:build e2e_testing
+// +build e2e_testing
+
+package e2e
+
+import (
+	"net/netip"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula"
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/e2e/router"
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// reportedAddrs is what the lighthouse would hand a peer asking where vpnAddr is.
+func reportedAddrs(t *testing.T, lh *nebula.Control, vpnAddr netip.Addr) []netip.AddrPort {
+	t.Helper()
+	cm := lh.QueryLighthouse(vpnAddr)
+	if cm == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	var out []netip.AddrPort
+	for _, c := range *cm {
+		out = append(out, c.Reported...)
+		out = append(out, c.Learned...)
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+// waitForLighthouseMsg routes until a lighthouse message lands on lh, or gives up. Reports whether one arrived.
+func waitForLighthouseMsg(t *testing.T, r *router.R, lh *nebula.Control, wait time.Duration) bool {
+	t.Helper()
+	h := &header.H{}
+	return r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(wait, func(p *udp.Packet, c *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
+		if c != lh {
+			return router.KeepRouting
+		}
+		// Punches are a single byte and never parse, they are just not what we are after
+		if err := h.Parse(p.Data); err != nil {
+			return router.KeepRouting
+		}
+		if h.Type == header.LightHouse {
+			return router.RouteAndExit
+		}
+		return router.KeepRouting
+	})
+}
+
+// A laptop that changes networks has to tell the lighthouse promptly, otherwise the lighthouse keeps handing peers
+// the old address and their punches land nowhere. On a long lighthouse interval the only thing that closes that
+// window is the rebind, which on darwin the network change monitor drives. The e2e build compiles the monitor out,
+// so we call RebindUDPServer directly, which is the same thing the monitor does.
+func TestRebindSendsLighthouseUpdate(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
+
+	lhControl, lhVpnIpNet, lhUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "lh", "10.128.0.1/24", m{
+		"lighthouse": m{"am_lighthouse": true},
+	})
+
+	// 600s interval, so nothing scheduled can send an update during this test. A rebind is the only thing that can.
+	myControl, _, _, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "me", "10.128.0.2/24", m{
+		"lighthouse": m{
+			"hosts":    []any{lhVpnIpNet[0].Addr().String()},
+			"interval": 600,
+		},
+		"static_host_map": m{
+			lhVpnIpNet[0].Addr().String(): []any{lhUdpAddr.String()},
+		},
+	})
+
+	r := router.NewR(t, lhControl, myControl)
+	defer r.RenderFlow()
+
+	lhControl.Start()
+	myControl.Start()
+
+	// Let the startup registration finish, then clear everything it left behind
+	require.True(t, waitForLighthouseMsg(t, r, lhControl, time.Second*5), "expected an initial registration")
+	r.RouteFor(time.Millisecond * 400)
+
+	// Nothing should be talking to the lighthouse on its own now
+	require.False(t, waitForLighthouseMsg(t, r, lhControl, time.Millisecond*200),
+		"nothing should reach the lighthouse before the rebind")
+
+	myControl.RebindUDPServer()
+
+	assert.True(t, waitForLighthouseMsg(t, r, lhControl, time.Second*5),
+		"a rebind should push an update to the lighthouse rather than waiting out the interval")
+
+	lhControl.Stop()
+	myControl.Stop()
+}
+
+// The other half of a rebind: every live tunnel requeries the lighthouse on its next send. That query is what makes
+// the lighthouse tell the peer to punch toward our new address, which is the part that actually revives a tunnel
+// whose remote NAT state died while we were on a different network.
+func TestRebindRequeriesPeersOnNextSend(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
+
+	lhControl, lhVpnIpNet, lhUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "lh", "10.128.0.1/24", m{
+		"lighthouse": m{"am_lighthouse": true},
+	})
+
+	lhCfg := m{
+		"lighthouse": m{
+			"hosts":    []any{lhVpnIpNet[0].Addr().String()},
+			"interval": 600,
+			// Without this the peers advertise this machine's real addresses and then try to punch at them,
+			// which the router has no route for.
+			"local_allow_list": m{
+				"10.0.0.0/24": true,
+				"::/0":        false,
+			},
+		},
+		"static_host_map": m{
+			lhVpnIpNet[0].Addr().String(): []any{lhUdpAddr.String()},
+		},
+	}
+
+	myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "me", "10.128.0.2/24", lhCfg)
+	theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "them", "10.128.0.3/24", lhCfg)
+
+	r := router.NewR(t, lhControl, myControl, theirControl)
+	defer r.RenderFlow()
+
+	lhControl.Start()
+	myControl.Start()
+	theirControl.Start()
+	r.RouteFor(time.Millisecond * 500)
+
+	// Point the peers at each other directly, this test is about the rebind and not about lighthouse discovery
+	myControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirUdpAddr)
+	theirControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myUdpAddr)
+
+	myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("initial")))
+	r.RouteFor(time.Second)
+	require.NotNil(t, myControl.GetHostInfoByVpnAddr(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), false), "expected a tunnel to them")
+	r.RouteFor(time.Millisecond * 300)
+
+	// Assert on what the peer sees rather than on lighthouse traffic. A query for them makes the lighthouse send
+	// them a punch notification, which is the whole point. Our own update to the lighthouse sends them nothing,
+	// so this cannot be satisfied by the update the rebind itself pushes.
+	myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("quiet")))
+	require.False(t, waitForLighthouseMsg(t, r, theirControl, time.Millisecond*300),
+		"an ordinary send should not requery the lighthouse")
+
+	myControl.RebindUDPServer()
+	r.RouteFor(time.Millisecond * 300) // let the update the rebind itself sends pass by
+
+	myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("after rebind")))
+	assert.True(t, waitForLighthouseMsg(t, r, theirControl, time.Second*5),
+		"the first send after a rebind should requery the lighthouse, which then tells the peer to punch at us")
+
+	lhControl.Stop()
+	myControl.Stop()
+	theirControl.Stop()
+}
+
+// The scenario this whole thing exists for: a laptop sleeps at the office and wakes up at home on a new address.
+// Until it tells the lighthouse, the lighthouse keeps handing peers the office address, so their punches land
+// nowhere and the tunnel stays dead. On a long interval the rebind is the only thing that closes that window.
+func TestRebindAdvertisesNewAddressAfterMove(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
+
+	lhControl, lhVpnIpNet, lhUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "lh", "10.128.0.1/24", m{
+		"lighthouse": m{"am_lighthouse": true},
+	})
+
+	myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "me", "10.128.0.2/24", m{
+		"lighthouse": m{
+			"hosts":    []any{lhVpnIpNet[0].Addr().String()},
+			"interval": 600,
+		},
+		"static_host_map": m{
+			lhVpnIpNet[0].Addr().String(): []any{lhUdpAddr.String()},
+		},
+	})
+
+	// Advertise wherever we currently are rather than this machine's real NICs, read fresh each time so a move
+	// is picked up.
+	myControl.SetLocalAddrsFn(func(*nebula.LocalAllowList) []netip.Addr {
+		return []netip.Addr{myControl.GetUDPAddr().Addr()}
+	})
+
+	r := router.NewR(t, lhControl, myControl)
+	defer r.RenderFlow()
+
+	lhControl.Start()
+	myControl.Start()
+
+	require.True(t, waitForLighthouseMsg(t, r, lhControl, time.Second*5), "expected an initial registration")
+	r.RouteFor(time.Millisecond * 400)
+
+	require.Contains(t, reportedAddrs(t, lhControl, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr()), myUdpAddr,
+		"the lighthouse should know the address we started on")
+
+	// Wake up somewhere else
+	newAddr := netip.MustParseAddrPort("10.0.0.99:4242")
+	myControl.SetUDPAddr(newAddr)
+	r.AddRoute(newAddr.Addr(), newAddr.Port(), myControl)
+
+	// Nothing has told the lighthouse, and with interval 600 nothing scheduled will
+	r.RouteFor(time.Millisecond * 400)
+	require.NotContains(t, reportedAddrs(t, lhControl, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr()), newAddr,
+		"the lighthouse should still be handing out the old address before the rebind")
+
+	myControl.RebindUDPServer()
+	require.True(t, waitForLighthouseMsg(t, r, lhControl, time.Second*5), "expected an update after the rebind")
+	r.RouteFor(time.Millisecond * 400)
+
+	assert.Contains(t, reportedAddrs(t, lhControl, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr()), newAddr,
+		"after the rebind the lighthouse should hand peers our new address")
+
+	lhControl.Stop()
+	myControl.Stop()
+}

e2e/recovery_timing_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+//go:build e2e_testing
+// +build e2e_testing
+
+package e2e
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula"
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/e2e/router"
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
+)
+
+// TestRecoveryTiming measures how long a tunnel takes to come back after the peer stops accepting our traffic,
+// which is what a laptop waking on a new network looks like from the peer's side: its NAT has no state for where
+// we are now, so everything we send disappears.
+//
+// It is a measurement, not a pass/fail assertion. Recovery is timed to the moment the peer punches back at us,
+// since that is when its NAT opens and the tunnel is usable again.
+//
+//	go test -tags e2e_testing -v -run TestRecoveryTiming ./e2e/
+func TestRecoveryTiming(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name   string
+		rebind bool
+	}{
+		{"no trigger", false},
+		{"rebind counter", true},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			d, lost := measureRecovery(t, tc.rebind)
+			t.Logf("RESULT %-16s recovered in %-9v (%d packets lost)", tc.name, d.Round(time.Millisecond), lost)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// measureRecovery returns how long until the peer punched back, and how many of our packets died meanwhile. When
+// rebind is true we call RebindUDPServer once the tunnel goes dark, which is what the darwin network change
+// monitor does and what iOS has always done. When false, nothing tells nebula anything is wrong.
+func measureRecovery(t *testing.T, rebind bool) (time.Duration, int) {
+	t.Helper()
+	ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
+
+	lhControl, lhVpnIpNet, lhUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "lh", "10.128.0.1/24", m{
+		"lighthouse": m{"am_lighthouse": true},
+	})
+
+	peerCfg := m{
+		"lighthouse": m{
+			"hosts":    []any{lhVpnIpNet[0].Addr().String()},
+			"interval": 600,
+			"local_allow_list": m{
+				"10.0.0.0/24": true,
+				"::/0":        false,
+			},
+		},
+		"static_host_map": m{
+			lhVpnIpNet[0].Addr().String(): []any{lhUdpAddr.String()},
+		},
+	}
+
+	myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "me", "10.128.0.2/24", peerCfg)
+	theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "them", "10.128.0.3/24", peerCfg)
+
+	r := router.NewR(t, lhControl, myControl, theirControl)
+	defer r.RenderFlow()
+	defer func() {
+		lhControl.Stop()
+		myControl.Stop()
+		theirControl.Stop()
+	}()
+
+	lhControl.Start()
+	myControl.Start()
+	theirControl.Start()
+	r.RouteFor(time.Millisecond * 500)
+
+	myControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirUdpAddr)
+	theirControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myUdpAddr)
+
+	myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("establish")))
+	r.RouteFor(time.Second)
+	if myControl.GetHostInfoByVpnAddr(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), false) == nil {
+		t.Fatal("failed to establish the tunnel we are measuring")
+	}
+	r.RouteFor(time.Millisecond * 500)
+
+	// From here the peer's NAT has no state for us, everything we send it disappears
+	start := time.Now()
+	blackholed := 0
+	var recovered time.Duration
+
+	if rebind {
+		myControl.RebindUDPServer()
+	}
+
+	// Keep the tun busy the way someone retrying a stalled connection would
+	stop := make(chan struct{})
+	defer close(stop)
+	go func() {
+		tick := time.NewTicker(time.Millisecond * 200)
+		defer tick.Stop()
+		for {
+			select {
+			case <-stop:
+				return
+			case <-tick.C:
+				myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(
+					theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("retry")))
+			}
+		}
+	}()
+
+	r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(time.Second*30, func(p *udp.Packet, c *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
+		if c == theirControl && p.From == myControl.GetUDPAddr() {
+			blackholed++
+			return router.Drop
+		}
+
+		// The peer reaching us directly is the moment its NAT opened, whether that is a punch or a handshake
+		if c == myControl && p.From == theirUdpAddr {
+			recovered = time.Since(start)
+			return router.RouteAndExit
+		}
+
+		return router.KeepRouting
+	})
+
+	if recovered == 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("no recovery within 30s (%d packets blackholed)", blackholed)
+	}
+	return recovered, blackholed
+}

e2e/router/router.go

@@ -114,6 +114,28 @@ type packet struct {
 	packet *udp.Packet
 	tun    bool // a packet pulled off a tun device
 	rx     bool // the packet was received by a udp device
+
+	// h is the nebula header, parsed once when the packet is recorded. parseErr says why there isn't one, which
+	// the flow log reports rather than hiding. Punchy sends a single byte, so an unparseable packet is normal.
+	h        header.H
+	parseErr error
+}
+
+// fromAddr and toAddr are the addresses this packet actually travelled between. Reading them off the control
+// instead would misreport the whole history once a test moves a node. Tun packets are synthesized without
+// addresses, so they fall back to the control.
+func (p *packet) fromAddr() netip.AddrPort {
+	if p.tun || !p.packet.From.IsValid() {
+		return p.from.GetUDPAddr()
+	}
+	return p.packet.From
+}
+
+func (p *packet) toAddr() netip.AddrPort {
+	if p.tun || !p.packet.To.IsValid() {
+		return p.to.GetUDPAddr()
+	}
+	return p.packet.To
 }
 
 func (p *packet) WasReceived() {
@@ -131,6 +153,9 @@ const (
 	ExitNow ExitType = 1
 	// RouteAndExit routes this packet and exits immediately afterwards
 	RouteAndExit ExitType = 2
+	// Drop discards this packet without delivering it and keeps routing. Use it to simulate a blackhole, such as
+	// a restrictive NAT refusing traffic from an address it has not seen.
+	Drop ExitType = 3
 )
 
 type ExitFunc func(packet *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) ExitType
@@ -141,7 +166,9 @@ type ExitFunc func(packet *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) ExitType
 func NewR(t testing.TB, controls ...*nebula.Control) *R {
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
 
-	if err := os.MkdirAll("mermaid", 0755); err != nil {
+	// t.Name() contains a slash for subtests, so the flow log can land in a nested directory
+	fn := filepath.Join("mermaid", fmt.Sprintf("%s.md", t.Name()))
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(fn), 0755); err != nil {
 		panic(err)
 	}
 
@@ -152,7 +179,7 @@ func NewR(t testing.TB, controls ...*nebula.Control) *R {
 		outNat:       make(map[outNatKey]netip.AddrPort),
 		flow:         []flowEntry{},
 		ignoreFlows:  []ignoreFlow{},
-		fn:           filepath.Join("mermaid", fmt.Sprintf("%s.md", t.Name())),
+		fn:           fn,
 		t:            t,
 		cancelRender: cancel,
 	}
@@ -249,7 +276,7 @@ func (r *R) renderFlow() {
 			continue
 		}
 
-		addr := e.packet.from.GetUDPAddr()
+		addr := e.packet.fromAddr()
 		if _, ok := participants[addr]; ok {
 			continue
 		}
@@ -268,7 +295,6 @@ func (r *R) renderFlow() {
 	}
 
 	// Print packets
-	h := &header.H{}
 	for _, e := range r.flow {
 		if e.packet == nil {
 			//fmt.Fprintf(f, "    note over %s: %s\n", strings.Join(participantsVals, ", "), e.note)
@@ -280,21 +306,22 @@ func (r *R) renderFlow() {
 			fmt.Fprintln(f, r.formatUdpPacket(p))
 
 		} else {
-			if err := h.Parse(p.packet.Data); err != nil {
-				panic(err)
-			}
-
 			line := "--x"
 			if p.rx {
 				line = "->>"
 			}
 
-			fmt.Fprintf(f,
+			detail := fmt.Sprintf("%s(%s), index %v, counter: %v",
-				"    %s%s%s: %s(%s), index %v, counter: %v\n",
+				p.h.TypeName(), p.h.SubTypeName(), p.h.RemoteIndex, p.h.MessageCounter)
-				normalizeName(p.from.GetUDPAddr().String()),
+			if p.parseErr != nil {
+				detail = fmt.Sprintf("unparsed, %v (%d bytes)", p.parseErr, len(p.packet.Data))
+			}
+
+			fmt.Fprintf(f, "    %s%s%s: %s\n",
+				normalizeName(p.fromAddr().String()),
 				line,
-				normalizeName(p.to.GetUDPAddr().String()),
+				normalizeName(p.toAddr().String()),
-				h.TypeName(), h.SubTypeName(), h.RemoteIndex, h.MessageCounter,
+				detail,
 			)
 		}
 	}
@@ -408,29 +435,34 @@ func (r *R) unlockedInjectFlow(from, to *nebula.Control, p *udp.Packet, tun bool
 
 	r.renderHostmaps(fmt.Sprintf("Packet %v", len(r.flow)))
 
-	if len(r.ignoreFlows) > 0 {
+	var h header.H
-		var h header.H
+	var parseErr error
-		err := h.Parse(p.Data)
+	if !tun {
-		if err != nil {
+		parseErr = h.Parse(p.Data)
-			panic(err)
+	}
-		}
 
-		for _, i := range r.ignoreFlows {
+	// Decide before copying, the copy comes from a freelist and an ignored packet would never be released
-			if !tun {
+	for _, i := range r.ignoreFlows {
-				if i.messageType == h.Type && i.subType == h.Subtype {
+		if tun {
-					return nil
+			if i.tun.HasValue && i.tun.IsTrue {
-				}
-			} else if i.tun.HasValue && i.tun.IsTrue {
 				return nil
 			}
+			continue
+		}
+
+		// A packet we could not parse has no type to match against, so no rule can ignore it
+		if parseErr == nil && i.messageType == h.Type && i.subType == h.Subtype {
+			return nil
 		}
 	}
 
 	fp := &packet{
-		from:   from,
+		from:     from,
-		to:     to,
+		to:       to,
-		packet: p.Copy(),
+		packet:   p.Copy(),
-		tun:    tun,
+		tun:      tun,
+		h:        h,
+		parseErr: parseErr,
 	}
 
 	r.flow = append(r.flow, flowEntry{packet: fp})
@@ -660,6 +692,10 @@ func (r *R) RouteExitFunc(sender *nebula.Control, whatDo ExitFunc) {
 			p.Release()
 			return
 
+		case Drop:
+			// Record it so the flow log shows the attempt, but never hand it to the receiver
+			r.unlockedInjectFlow(sender, receiver, p, false)
+
 		case KeepRouting:
 			fp := r.unlockedInjectFlow(sender, receiver, p, false)
 			receiver.InjectUDPPacket(p)
@@ -690,6 +726,85 @@ func (r *R) RouteUntilAfterMsgType(sender *nebula.Control, msgType header.Messag
 	})
 }
 
+// RouteFor routes everything that shows up for the given duration and then returns. Use it to let a test settle
+// deterministically rather than sleeping and hoping: a single FlushAll races a completing handshake, which queues
+// more packets right behind it.
+func (r *R) RouteFor(d time.Duration) {
+	r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(d, func(*udp.Packet, *nebula.Control) ExitType {
+		return KeepRouting
+	})
+}
+
+// RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout is RouteForAllExitFunc with a deadline, reporting whether whatDo asked to exit
+// before time ran out. The unbounded version blocks forever on a quiet network, so this is what a test needs to
+// assert that something does NOT happen, or to route for a fixed settling period.
+func (r *R) RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(timeout time.Duration, whatDo ExitFunc) bool {
+	sc := make([]reflect.SelectCase, 0, len(r.controls)+1)
+	cm := make([]*nebula.Control, 0, len(r.controls))
+
+	for _, c := range r.controls {
+		sc = append(sc, reflect.SelectCase{
+			Dir:  reflect.SelectRecv,
+			Chan: reflect.ValueOf(c.GetUDPTxChan()),
+			Send: reflect.Value{},
+		})
+		cm = append(cm, c)
+	}
+
+	timer := time.NewTimer(timeout)
+	defer timer.Stop()
+	sc = append(sc, reflect.SelectCase{
+		Dir:  reflect.SelectRecv,
+		Chan: reflect.ValueOf(timer.C),
+		Send: reflect.Value{},
+	})
+
+	for {
+		x, rx, _ := reflect.Select(sc)
+		if x == len(cm) {
+			return false
+		}
+
+		r.Lock()
+		p := rx.Interface().(*udp.Packet)
+		receiver := r.getControl(cm[x].GetUDPAddr(), p.To, p)
+		if receiver == nil {
+			r.Unlock()
+			panic("Can't RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout for host: " + p.To.String())
+		}
+
+		e := whatDo(p, receiver)
+		switch e {
+		case ExitNow:
+			r.Unlock()
+			p.Release()
+			return true
+
+		case RouteAndExit:
+			fp := r.unlockedInjectFlow(cm[x], receiver, p, false)
+			receiver.InjectUDPPacket(p)
+			fp.WasReceived()
+			r.Unlock()
+			p.Release()
+			return true
+
+		case Drop:
+			// Record it so the flow log shows the attempt, but never hand it to the receiver
+			r.unlockedInjectFlow(cm[x], receiver, p, false)
+
+		case KeepRouting:
+			fp := r.unlockedInjectFlow(cm[x], receiver, p, false)
+			receiver.InjectUDPPacket(p)
+			fp.WasReceived()
+
+		default:
+			panic(fmt.Sprintf("Unknown exitFunc return: %v", e))
+		}
+		r.Unlock()
+		p.Release()
+	}
+}
+
 func (r *R) RouteForAllUntilAfterMsgTypeTo(receiver *nebula.Control, msgType header.MessageType, subType header.MessageSubType) {
 	h := &header.H{}
 	r.RouteForAllExitFunc(func(p *udp.Packet, r *nebula.Control) ExitType {
@@ -782,6 +897,10 @@ func (r *R) RouteForAllExitFunc(whatDo ExitFunc) {
 			p.Release()
 			return
 
+		case Drop:
+			// Record it so the flow log shows the attempt, but never hand it to the receiver
+			r.unlockedInjectFlow(cm[x], receiver, p, false)
+
 		case KeepRouting:
 			fp := r.unlockedInjectFlow(cm[x], receiver, p, false)
 			receiver.InjectUDPPacket(p)

examples/config.yml

@@ -131,6 +131,9 @@ listen:
   port: 4242
   # Sets the max number of packets to pull from the kernel for each syscall (under systems that support recvmmsg)
   # default is 64, does not support reload
+  # Note: on Linux with UDP GRO (kernel 5.10+), each receive slot is sized for a full 64KiB coalesced
+  # superpacket, so the receive scratch is batch * 64KiB per listening socket (~4MiB per routine at the
+  # default of 64). Lower this to trade peak per-syscall throughput for memory on constrained hosts.
   #batch: 64
   # Configure socket buffers for the udp side (outside), leave unset to use the system defaults. Values will be doubled by the kernel
   # Default is net.core.rmem_default and net.core.wmem_default (/proc/sys/net/core/rmem_default and /proc/sys/net/core/rmem_default)
@@ -146,6 +149,14 @@ listen:
   # Default true; set to false to leave WDF in charge of inbound decisions on the listener port. Not reloadable.
   #windows_bypass_wdf: true
 
+  # On macOS only
+  # macOS scopes the udp socket to the interface it was created on, so moving between networks (wifi to wired,
+  # office to home) leaves Nebula sending out an interface that no longer has a route. When true, Nebula watches
+  # the routing socket and rebinds the listener once the change settles.
+  # iOS does not use this, the host app drives the same rebind itself.
+  # Default true. Not reloadable.
+  #rebind_on_network_change: true
+
   # By default, Nebula replies to packets it has no tunnel for with a "recv_error" packet. This packet helps speed up reconnection
   # in the case that Nebula on either side did not shut down cleanly. This response can be abused as a way to discover if Nebula is running
   # on a host though. This option lets you configure if you want to send "recv_error" packets always, never, or only to private network remotes.
@@ -254,6 +265,25 @@ tun:
   # Default MTU for every packet, safe setting is (and the default) 1300 for internet based traffic
   mtu: 1300
 
+  # Linux only. pin_threads pins each tun reader/encrypt OS thread to a single CPU. This keeps every goroutine's
+  # batched sends flowing through one XPS-selected NIC TX ring, so packets within a flow stay ordered on the wire
+  # instead of being sprayed across multiple TX rings and reordered. Not reloadable. Coerced to false if routines <= 1.
+  #pin_threads: true
+
+  # Linux only. cpu_affinity overrides which CPUs the tun reader threads pin to: a list of CPU IDs, one per routine
+  # (see the top-level `routines` setting). Lists shorter than `routines` are modulo-cycled across the queues; extra
+  # entries are ignored. IDs must be within the process's allowed CPU set, so this respects taskset / cgroup cpusets;
+  # a non-integer or not-allowed entry disables the override and falls back to spreading queues across the allowed
+  # CPUs. Only meaningful while pin_threads is true. Not reloadable.
+  # When unset, the default spread prefers performance cores on heterogeneous CPUs (ARM big.LITTLE, Intel P/E
+  # hybrids, AMD compact cores), keeps all readers on one NUMA node and on distinct physical cores when the
+  # topology allows (SMT siblings last), leaves CPU 0's physical core as a last resort, and rotates its starting
+  # point per instance (keyed by the bound UDP port) so co-located nebulas don't stack their readers onto the
+  # same cores.
+  #cpu_affinity:
+  #  - 2
+  #  - 4
+
   # Route based MTU overrides, you have known vpn ip paths that can support larger MTUs you can increase/decrease them here
   routes:
     #- mtu: 8800

examples/service_scripts/nebula.service

@@ -8,6 +8,15 @@ Before=sshd.service
 Type=notify
 NotifyAccess=main
 SyslogIdentifier=nebula
+
+# Uncomment to run as an unprivileged user with only CAP_NET_ADMIN. Requires a
+# nebula user that owns the config directory. Add CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE to both
+# lines if any listener (lighthouse DNS, listen.port, stats, sshd) binds <1024.
+#User=nebula
+#Group=nebula
+#CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_NET_ADMIN
+#AmbientCapabilities=CAP_NET_ADMIN
+
 ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
 ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/nebula -config /etc/nebula/config.yml
 Restart=always

firewall/cache.go

@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ import (
 	"log/slog"
 	"sync/atomic"
 	"time"
+
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/logging"
 )
 
 // ConntrackCache is used as a local routine cache to know if a given flow
@@ -56,8 +58,8 @@ func (c *ConntrackCacheTicker) Get() ConntrackCache {
 	if tick := c.cacheTick.Load(); tick != c.cacheV {
 		c.cacheV = tick
 		if ll := len(c.cache); ll > 0 {
-			if c.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
+			if c.l.Enabled(context.Background(), logging.LevelTrace) {
-				c.l.Debug("resetting conntrack cache", "len", ll)
+				c.l.Log(context.Background(), logging.LevelTrace, "resetting conntrack cache", "len", ll)
 			}
 			c.cache = make(ConntrackCache, ll)
 		}

firewall/cache_test.go

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/logging"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 )
@@ -30,27 +31,27 @@ func newFixedTicker(t *testing.T, l *slog.Logger, cacheLen int) *ConntrackCacheT
 
 func TestConntrackCacheTicker_Get_TextFormat(t *testing.T) {
 	buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
-	l := test.NewLoggerWithOutputAndLevel(buf, slog.LevelDebug)
+	l := test.NewLoggerWithOutputAndLevel(buf, logging.LevelTrace)
 
 	c := newFixedTicker(t, l, 3)
 	c.Get()
 
-	assert.Equal(t, "level=DEBUG msg=\"resetting conntrack cache\" len=3\n", buf.String())
+	assert.Equal(t, "level=DEBUG-4 msg=\"resetting conntrack cache\" len=3\n", buf.String())
 }
 
 func TestConntrackCacheTicker_Get_JSONFormat(t *testing.T) {
 	buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
-	l := test.NewJSONLoggerWithOutput(buf, slog.LevelDebug)
+	l := test.NewJSONLoggerWithOutput(buf, logging.LevelTrace)
 
 	c := newFixedTicker(t, l, 2)
 	c.Get()
 
-	assert.JSONEq(t, `{"level":"DEBUG","msg":"resetting conntrack cache","len":2}`, strings.TrimSpace(buf.String()))
+	assert.JSONEq(t, `{"level":"DEBUG-4","msg":"resetting conntrack cache","len":2}`, strings.TrimSpace(buf.String()))
 }
 
-func TestConntrackCacheTicker_Get_QuietBelowDebug(t *testing.T) {
+func TestConntrackCacheTicker_Get_QuietBelowTrace(t *testing.T) {
 	buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
-	l := test.NewLoggerWithOutputAndLevel(buf, slog.LevelInfo)
+	l := test.NewLoggerWithOutputAndLevel(buf, slog.LevelDebug)
 
 	c := newFixedTicker(t, l, 5)
 	c.Get()
@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ func TestConntrackCacheTicker_Get_QuietBelowDebug(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestConntrackCacheTicker_Get_QuietWhenCacheEmpty(t *testing.T) {
 	buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
-	l := test.NewLoggerWithOutputAndLevel(buf, slog.LevelDebug)
+	l := test.NewLoggerWithOutputAndLevel(buf, logging.LevelTrace)
 
 	c := newFixedTicker(t, l, 0)
 	c.Get()

firewall/packet.go

@@ -65,3 +65,12 @@ func (fp Packet) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
 		"Fragment":   fp.Fragment,
 	})
 }
+
+// ParsedPacket is a Packet plus the parse byproducts the RX path reuses
+type ParsedPacket struct {
+	Packet
+	IPHdrLen int
+	// FragAny reports any fragmentation at all: MF flag or nonzero offset for IPv4, a fragment extension header for IPv6.
+	// Distinct from Packet.Fragment, which is true only for NON-FIRST fragments
+	FragAny bool
+}

go.mod

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 module github.com/slackhq/nebula
 
-go 1.25.0
+go 1.26.0
 
 require (
 	dario.cat/mergo v1.0.2
@@ -24,12 +24,12 @@ require (
 	github.com/vishvananda/netlink v1.3.1
 	go.uber.org/goleak v1.3.0
 	go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.4
-	golang.org/x/crypto v0.53.0
+	golang.org/x/crypto v0.54.0
 	golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20230725093048-515e97ebf090
-	golang.org/x/net v0.56.0
+	golang.org/x/net v0.57.0
-	golang.org/x/sync v0.21.0
+	golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0
-	golang.org/x/sys v0.46.0
+	golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0
-	golang.org/x/term v0.44.0
+	golang.org/x/term v0.45.0
 	golang.zx2c4.com/wintun v0.0.0-20230126152724-0fa3db229ce2
 	golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard v0.0.0-20230325221338-052af4a8072b
 	golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/windows v1.0.1

go.sum

@@ -162,8 +162,8 @@ golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190308221718-c2843e01d9a2/go.mod h1:djNgcEr1/C05ACk
 golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20191011191535-87dc89f01550/go.mod h1:yigFU9vqHzYiE8UmvKecakEJjdnWj3jj499lnFckfCI=
 golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20200622213623-75b288015ac9/go.mod h1:LzIPMQfyMNhhGPhUkYOs5KpL4U8rLKemX1yGLhDgUto=
 golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20210322153248-0c34fe9e7dc2/go.mod h1:T9bdIzuCu7OtxOm1hfPfRQxPLYneinmdGuTeoZ9dtd4=
-golang.org/x/crypto v0.53.0 h1:QZ4Muo8THX6CizN2vPPd5fBGHyogrdK9fG4wLPFUsto=
+golang.org/x/crypto v0.54.0 h1:YLIA59K4fiNzHzjnZt2tUJQjQtUWfWbeHBqKtk3eScw=
-golang.org/x/crypto v0.53.0/go.mod h1:DNLU434OwVakk9PzuwV8w62mAJpRJL3vsgcfp4Qnsio=
+golang.org/x/crypto v0.54.0/go.mod h1:KWL8ny2AZdGR2cWmzeHrp2azQPGogOv+HeQaVEXC2dk=
 golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20230725093048-515e97ebf090 h1:Di6/M8l0O2lCLc6VVRWhgCiApHV8MnQurBnFSHsQtNY=
 golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20230725093048-515e97ebf090/go.mod h1:FXUEEKJgO7OQYeo8N01OfiKP8RXMtf6e8aTskBGqWdc=
 golang.org/x/lint v0.0.0-20200302205851-738671d3881b/go.mod h1:3xt1FjdF8hUf6vQPIChWIBhFzV8gjjsPE/fR3IyQdNY=
@@ -182,8 +182,8 @@ golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20200226121028-0de0cce0169b/go.mod h1:z5CRVTTTmAJ677TzLL
 golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20200625001655-4c5254603344/go.mod h1:/O7V0waA8r7cgGh81Ro3o1hOxt32SMVPicZroKQ2sZA=
 golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20201021035429-f5854403a974/go.mod h1:sp8m0HH+o8qH0wwXwYZr8TS3Oi6o0r6Gce1SSxlDquU=
 golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20210226172049-e18ecbb05110/go.mod h1:m0MpNAwzfU5UDzcl9v0D8zg8gWTRqZa9RBIspLL5mdg=
-golang.org/x/net v0.56.0 h1:Rw8j/hFzGvJUZwNBXnAtf5sVDVt+65SK2C7IxCxZt5o=
+golang.org/x/net v0.57.0 h1:K5+3DljvIuDG9/Jv9rvyMywYNFCQ9RSUY6OOTTkT+tE=
-golang.org/x/net v0.56.0/go.mod h1:D3Ku6r+V6JROoZK144D2XfMHFcMq/0zSfLelVTCFKec=
+golang.org/x/net v0.57.0/go.mod h1:KpXc8iv+r3XplLAG/f7Jsf9RPszJzdR0f58q9vGOuEU=
 golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.0.0-20190226205417-e64efc72b421/go.mod h1:gOpvHmFTYa4IltrdGE7lF6nIHvwfUNPOp7c8zoXwtLw=
 golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20181108010431-42b317875d0f/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
 golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20181221193216-37e7f081c4d4/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
@@ -191,8 +191,8 @@ golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20190423024810-112230192c58/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJ
 golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20190911185100-cd5d95a43a6e/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
 golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20201020160332-67f06af15bc9/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
 golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20201207232520-09787c993a3a/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
-golang.org/x/sync v0.21.0 h1:HLII4xRRTtCRkxYp4HNFF0Js/Og6q2i++KXbg0gHCwM=
+golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0 h1:SZjpbeLmrCk4xhRSZFNZW5gFUeCeFgjekvI/+gfScek=
-golang.org/x/sync v0.21.0/go.mod h1:9xrNwdLfx4jkKbNva9FpL6vEN7evnE43NNNJQ2LF3+0=
+golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0/go.mod h1:9xrNwdLfx4jkKbNva9FpL6vEN7evnE43NNNJQ2LF3+0=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20180905080454-ebe1bf3edb33/go.mod h1:STP8DvDyc/dI5b8T5hshtkjS+E42TnysNCUPdjciGhY=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20181116152217-5ac8a444bdc5/go.mod h1:STP8DvDyc/dI5b8T5hshtkjS+E42TnysNCUPdjciGhY=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20190215142949-d0b11bdaac8a/go.mod h1:STP8DvDyc/dI5b8T5hshtkjS+E42TnysNCUPdjciGhY=
@@ -208,11 +208,11 @@ golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20210124154548-22da62e12c0c/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7w
 golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20210603081109-ebe580a85c40/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.2.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.10.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
-golang.org/x/sys v0.46.0 h1:noSf2Fq6F8DBgS+LysIkx7rIExoNHJsxOAtPp4rthXw=
+golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0 h1:o7XGOvZQCADBQQ4Y7VNq2dRWQR7JmOUW8Kxx4ZsNgWs=
-golang.org/x/sys v0.46.0/go.mod h1:4GL1E5IUh+htKOUEOaiffhrAeqysfVGipDYzABqnCmw=
+golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0/go.mod h1:4GL1E5IUh+htKOUEOaiffhrAeqysfVGipDYzABqnCmw=
 golang.org/x/term v0.0.0-20201126162022-7de9c90e9dd1/go.mod h1:bj7SfCRtBDWHUb9snDiAeCFNEtKQo2Wmx5Cou7ajbmo=
-golang.org/x/term v0.44.0 h1:0rLvDRCtNj0gZkyIXhCyOb2OAzEhLVqc4B+hrsBhrmc=
+golang.org/x/term v0.45.0 h1:NwWyBmoJCbfTHpxrWoZ9C6/VxOf7ic219I8xZZFdrf0=
-golang.org/x/term v0.44.0/go.mod h1:7ze4MdzUzLXpSAoFP1H0bOI9aXDqveSvatT5vKcFh2Y=
+golang.org/x/term v0.45.0/go.mod h1:9aqxs0blBcrm/n0L9QW0aRVD+ktan8ssZromtqJC43w=
 golang.org/x/text v0.3.0/go.mod h1:NqM8EUOU14njkJ3fqMW+pc6Ldnwhi/IjpwHt7yyuwOQ=
 golang.org/x/text v0.3.2/go.mod h1:bEr9sfX3Q8Zfm5fL9x+3itogRgK3+ptLWKqgva+5dAk=
 golang.org/x/text v0.3.3/go.mod h1:5Zoc/QRtKVWzQhOtBMvqHzDpF6irO9z98xDceosuGiQ=

handshake_manager.go

@@ -295,7 +295,13 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleOutbound(vpnIp netip.Addr, lighthouseTriggered
 		hm.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Handshake, hh.machine.Subtype(), 1)
 		err := hm.outside.WriteTo(stage0, addr)
 		if err != nil {
-			hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Error("Failed to send handshake message",
+			// These repeat every attempt, so match the success log below and only shout when the remotes changed
+			level := slog.LevelDebug
+			if remotesHaveChanged {
+				level = slog.LevelError
+			}
+
+			hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Log(context.Background(), level, "Failed to send handshake message",
 				"udpAddr", addr,
 				"initiatorIndex", hostinfo.localIndexId,
 				"handshake", hsFields,
@@ -529,7 +535,9 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo *HostInfo) {
 
 func (hm *HandshakeManager) unlockedDeleteHostInfo(hostinfo *HostInfo) {
 	for _, addr := range hostinfo.vpnAddrs {
-		delete(hm.vpnIps, addr)
+		if cur, ok := hm.vpnIps[addr]; ok && cur.hostinfo == hostinfo {
+			delete(hm.vpnIps, addr)
+		}
 	}
 
 	if len(hm.vpnIps) == 0 {
@@ -967,6 +975,9 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) continueHandshake(via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostIn
 		nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
 		out := make([]byte, mtu)
 		for _, cp := range hh.packetStore {
+			// TODO: use a SendBatch here. Each callback lands in
+			// sendNoMetrics -> WriteTo: one syscall per cached packet,
+			// where one sendmmsg could flush the whole store.
 			cp.callback(cp.messageType, cp.messageSubType, hostinfo, cp.packet, nb, out)
 		}
 		f.cachedPacketMetrics.sent.Inc(int64(len(hh.packetStore)))
@@ -1077,8 +1088,8 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) sendHandshakeResponse(via ViaSender, msg []byte, hos
 		hostinfo.relayState.InsertRelayTo(via.relayHI.vpnAddrs[0])
 		// We received a valid handshake on this relay, so make sure the relay
 		// state reflects that, in case it had been marked Disestablished.
-		via.relayHI.relayState.UpdateRelayForByIdxState(via.remoteIdx, Established)
+		via.relayHI.relayState.UpdateRelayForByIdxState(via.relay.LocalIndex, Established)
-		f.SendVia(via.relayHI, via.relay, msg, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu), false)
+		f.SendVia(via.relayHI, via.relay, msg, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu), false, 0)
 		f.l.Info("Handshake message sent", append(logFields, "relay", via.relayHI.vpnAddrs[0])...)
 	}
 }

handshake_manager_test.go

@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ func (mw *mockEncWriter) SendMessageToVpnAddr(_ header.MessageType, _ header.Mes
 	return
 }
 
-func (mw *mockEncWriter) SendVia(_ *HostInfo, _ *Relay, _, _, _ []byte, _ bool) {
+func (mw *mockEncWriter) SendVia(via *HostInfo, relay *Relay, ad, nb, out []byte, nocopy bool, q int) {
 	return
 }
 

header/header.go

@@ -190,13 +190,18 @@ func SubTypeName(t MessageType, s MessageSubType) string {
 }
 
 func IsValidSubType(t MessageType, s MessageSubType) bool {
-	if n, ok := subTypeMap[t]; ok {
+	switch t {
-		if _, ok := (*n)[s]; ok {
+	case Message:
-			return true
+		return s == MessageNone || s == MessageRelay
-		}
+	case Handshake:
+		return s == HandshakeIXPSK0
+	case Test:
+		return s == TestReply || s == TestRequest
+	case Control, CloseTunnel, RecvError, LightHouse:
+		return s == 0
+	default:
+		return false
 	}
-
-	return false
 }
 
 // NewHeader turns bytes into a header

header/header_test.go

@@ -102,6 +102,57 @@ func TestTypeMap(t *testing.T) {
 	}, subTypeMap)
 }
 
+// mapIsValidSubType is the pre-refactor, map-driven definition of a valid
+// subtype. IsValidSubType was reimplemented as an explicit switch; this keeps
+// the original behavior around so we can prove the switch is equivalent to it.
+func mapIsValidSubType(t MessageType, s MessageSubType) bool {
+	if n, ok := subTypeMap[t]; ok {
+		if _, ok := (*n)[s]; ok {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func TestIsValidSubType(t *testing.T) {
+	// Explicit intent table: documents exactly which subtypes are valid so the
+	// test stays meaningful even if both the switch and subTypeMap change.
+	assert.True(t, IsValidSubType(Message, MessageNone))
+	assert.True(t, IsValidSubType(Message, MessageRelay))
+	assert.False(t, IsValidSubType(Message, 2))
+
+	assert.True(t, IsValidSubType(Handshake, HandshakeIXPSK0))
+	// HandshakeXXPSK0 is defined but not a wire-valid subtype.
+	assert.False(t, IsValidSubType(Handshake, HandshakeXXPSK0))
+
+	assert.True(t, IsValidSubType(Test, TestRequest))
+	assert.True(t, IsValidSubType(Test, TestReply))
+	assert.False(t, IsValidSubType(Test, 2))
+
+	// These types only ever carry subtype 0.
+	for _, mt := range []MessageType{Control, CloseTunnel, RecvError, LightHouse} {
+		assert.True(t, IsValidSubType(mt, 0), "type %d subtype 0 should be valid", mt)
+		assert.False(t, IsValidSubType(mt, 1), "type %d subtype 1 should be invalid", mt)
+	}
+
+	// Unknown/unassigned types are never valid.
+	assert.False(t, IsValidSubType(99, 0))
+
+	// Exhaustive proof of equivalence with the original map-driven logic across
+	// the entire (type, subtype) input space.
+	for ti := 0; ti <= 0xff; ti++ {
+		for si := 0; si <= 0xff; si++ {
+			mt, mst := MessageType(ti), MessageSubType(si)
+			assert.Equalf(t, mapIsValidSubType(mt, mst), IsValidSubType(mt, mst),
+				"IsValidSubType(%d, %d) diverged from map-driven definition", ti, si)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// H method must delegate to the package function.
+	assert.True(t, (&H{Type: Test, Subtype: TestReply}).IsValidSubType())
+	assert.False(t, (&H{Type: Handshake, Subtype: HandshakeXXPSK0}).IsValidSubType())
+}
+
 func TestHeader_String(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Equal(
 		t,

hostmap.go

@@ -287,7 +287,6 @@ type HostInfo struct {
 type ViaSender struct {
 	UdpAddr   netip.AddrPort
 	relayHI   *HostInfo // relayHI is the host info object of the relay
-	remoteIdx uint32    // remoteIdx is the index included in the header of the received packet
 	relay     *Relay    // relay contains the rest of the relay information, including the PeerIP of the host trying to communicate with us.
 	IsRelayed bool      // IsRelayed is true if the packet was sent through a relay
 }
@@ -544,6 +543,17 @@ func (hm *HostMap) unlockedDeleteHostInfo(hostinfo *HostInfo) bool {
 	return final
 }
 
+func (hm *HostMap) QueryIndexCached(index uint32, cache map[uint32]*HostInfo) *HostInfo {
+	if out, ok := cache[index]; ok {
+		return out
+	}
+	out := hm.QueryIndex(index)
+	if out != nil {
+		cache[index] = out
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
 func (hm *HostMap) QueryIndex(index uint32) *HostInfo {
 	hm.RLock()
 	if h, ok := hm.Indexes[index]; ok {

inside.go

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package nebula
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"io"
 	"log/slog"
 	"net/netip"
 
@@ -9,10 +10,24 @@ import (
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/iputil"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/noiseutil"
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/batch"
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
 )
 
-func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(packet []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, nb, out []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
+func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(pkt tio.Packet, fwPacket *firewall.ParsedPacket, nb []byte, sendBatch *batch.SendBatch, rejectBuf []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
+	// borrowed: pkt.Bytes is owned by the originating tio.Queue and is
+	// only valid until the next Read on that queue. Every consumer below
+	// (parse, self-forward, handshake cache, sendInsideMessage) reads it
+	// synchronously; do not retain pkt outside this call. If a future
+	// caller needs to keep the packet, use pkt.Clone() to detach it from
+	// the borrow.
+	//
+	// pkt.Bytes is either one IP datagram (GSO zero) or a TSO/USO
+	// superpacket. In both cases the L3+L4 headers at the start describe
+	// the same 5-tuple every segment will share, so a single newPacket /
+	// firewall check covers the whole superpacket.
+	packet := pkt.Bytes
 	err := newPacket(packet, false, fwPacket)
 	if err != nil {
 		if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
@@ -37,7 +52,14 @@ func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(packet []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet
 		// routes packets from the Nebula addr to the Nebula addr through the Nebula
 		// TUN device.
 		if immediatelyForwardToSelf {
-			_, err := f.readers[q].Write(packet)
+			// Write copies into the kernel queue synchronously, so seg's lifetime ends at return.
+			// A self-forwarded superpacket would be re-handed to the
+			// kernel as one giant blob; segment first so the loopback
+			// path sees one IP datagram per Write.
+			err := tio.SegmentSuperpacket(pkt, func(seg []byte) error {
+				_, werr := f.queues[q].Write(seg)
+				return werr
+			})
 			if err != nil {
 				f.l.Error("Failed to forward to tun", "error", err)
 			}
@@ -52,12 +74,24 @@ func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(packet []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet
 		return
 	}
 
-	hostinfo, ready := f.getOrHandshakeConsiderRouting(fwPacket, func(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) {
+	hostinfo, ready := f.getOrHandshakeConsiderRouting(&fwPacket.Packet, func(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) {
-		hh.cachePacket(f.l, header.Message, 0, packet, f.sendMessageNow, f.cachedPacketMetrics)
+		// borrowed: SegmentSuperpacket builds each segment in the kernel-supplied pkt
+		// bytes underneath. cachePacket explicitly copies its argument (handshake_manager.go cachePacket),
+		// so retaining segments past the loop is safe.
+		err := tio.SegmentSuperpacket(pkt, func(seg []byte) error {
+			hh.cachePacket(f.l, header.Message, 0, seg, f.sendMessageNow, f.cachedPacketMetrics)
+			return nil
+		})
+		if err != nil && f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
+			f.l.Debug("Failed to segment superpacket for handshake cache",
+				"error", err,
+				"vpnAddr", fwPacket.RemoteAddr,
+			)
+		}
 	})
 
 	if hostinfo == nil {
-		f.rejectInside(packet, out, q)
+		f.rejectInside(packet, rejectBuf, q)
 		if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
 			f.l.Debug("dropping outbound packet, vpnAddr not in our vpn networks or in unsafe networks",
 				"vpnAddr", fwPacket.RemoteAddr,
@@ -71,12 +105,11 @@ func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(packet []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet
 		return
 	}
 
-	dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(*fwPacket, false, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), localCache)
+	dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(fwPacket.Packet, false, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), localCache)
 	if dropReason == nil {
-		f.sendNoMetrics(header.Message, 0, hostinfo.ConnectionState, hostinfo, netip.AddrPort{}, packet, nb, out, q)
+		f.sendInsideMessage(hostinfo, pkt, nb, sendBatch)
-
 	} else {
-		f.rejectInside(packet, out, q)
+		f.rejectInside(packet, rejectBuf, q)
 		if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
 			hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("dropping outbound packet",
 				"fwPacket", fwPacket,
@@ -86,6 +119,125 @@ func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(packet []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet
 	}
 }
 
+func (f *Interface) sendInsideEncrypt(hostinfo *HostInfo, ci *ConnectionState, seg, scratch, nb []byte) []byte {
+	if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
+		ci.writeLock.Lock()
+	}
+	c := ci.messageCounter.Add(1)
+
+	out := header.Encode(scratch, header.Version, header.Message, 0, hostinfo.remoteIndexId, c)
+
+	out, encErr := ci.eKey.EncryptDanger(out, out, seg, c, nb)
+	if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
+		ci.writeLock.Unlock()
+	}
+	if encErr != nil {
+		hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to encrypt outgoing packet",
+			"error", encErr,
+			"udpAddr", hostinfo.GetRemote(),
+			"counter", c,
+		)
+		// Skip this segment; the rest of the superpacket can still go out. TCP will retransmit anything we drop here.
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	return out
+}
+
+// sendInsideMessage encrypts a firewall-approved inside packet (or every
+// segment of a TSO/USO superpacket) into the caller's batch slot for
+// later sendmmsg flush. Segmentation is fused with encryption here so the
+// kernel-supplied superpacket bytes never get written into a separate
+// scratch arena: SegmentSuperpacket builds each segment's plaintext in
+// segScratch[:segLen] in turn, and we encrypt directly into a fresh SendBatch slot.
+func (f *Interface) sendInsideMessage(hostinfo *HostInfo, pkt tio.Packet, nb []byte, sendBatch *batch.SendBatch) {
+	ci := hostinfo.ConnectionState
+	if ci.eKey == nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	// One traffic-out mark covers every segment of the superpacket; doing it
+	// per segment in sendInsideEncrypt paid an atomic store up to ~45 extra
+	// times per TSO packet, inside writeLock under boring crypto.
+	f.connectionManager.Out(hostinfo)
+
+	remote := hostinfo.GetRemote()
+	if hostinfo.lastRebindCount != f.rebindCount {
+		//NOTE: there is an update hole if a tunnel isn't used and exactly 256 rebinds occur before the tunnel is
+		// finally used again. This tunnel would eventually be torn down and recreated if this action didn't help.
+		f.lightHouse.QueryServer(hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0])
+		hostinfo.lastRebindCount = f.rebindCount
+		if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
+			hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("Lighthouse update triggered for punch due to rebind counter",
+				"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
+			)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if !remote.IsValid() { //the relay path
+		//first, find our relay hostinfo:
+		var relayHostInfo *HostInfo
+		var relay *Relay
+		var err error
+		for _, relayIP := range hostinfo.relayState.CopyRelayIps() {
+			relayHostInfo, relay, err = f.hostMap.QueryVpnAddrsRelayFor(hostinfo.vpnAddrs, relayIP)
+			if err != nil {
+				hostinfo.relayState.DeleteRelay(relayIP)
+				hostinfo.logger(f.l).Info("sendNoMetrics failed to find HostInfo",
+					"relay", relayIP,
+					"error", err,
+				)
+				continue
+			}
+			break
+		}
+		if relayHostInfo == nil || relay == nil {
+			//failure already logged
+			return
+		}
+
+		err = tio.SegmentSuperpacket(pkt, func(seg []byte) error {
+			//relay header + header + plaintext + AEAD tag (16 bytes for both AES-GCM and ChaCha20-Poly1305) + relay tag
+			scratch := sendBatch.Reserve(header.Len + header.Len + len(seg) + 16 + 16)
+
+			innerPacket := f.sendInsideEncrypt(hostinfo, ci, seg, scratch[header.Len:], nb)
+			if innerPacket == nil {
+				return nil
+			}
+
+			//now we need to do a relay-encrypt:
+			toSend, err := f.prepareSendVia(relayHostInfo, relay, innerPacket, nb, scratch, true)
+			if err != nil {
+				//already logged
+				return nil
+			}
+
+			sendBatch.Commit(toSend, relayHostInfo.GetRemote())
+			return nil
+		})
+		if err != nil {
+			hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to segment superpacket for relay send", "error", err)
+		}
+		return
+	}
+
+	err := tio.SegmentSuperpacket(pkt, func(seg []byte) error {
+		// header + plaintext + AEAD tag (16 bytes for both AES-GCM and ChaCha20-Poly1305)
+		scratch := sendBatch.Reserve(header.Len + len(seg) + 16)
+
+		out := f.sendInsideEncrypt(hostinfo, ci, seg, scratch, nb)
+		if out == nil {
+			return nil
+		}
+
+		sendBatch.Commit(out, remote)
+		return nil
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to segment superpacket for send", "error", err)
+	}
+}
+
 func (f *Interface) rejectInside(packet []byte, out []byte, q int) {
 	if !f.firewall.OutboundSendReject {
 		return
@@ -96,33 +248,36 @@ func (f *Interface) rejectInside(packet []byte, out []byte, q int) {
 		return
 	}
 
-	_, err := f.readers[q].Write(out)
+	_, err := f.queues[q].Write(out)
 	if err != nil {
 		f.l.Error("Failed to write to tun", "error", err)
 	}
 }
 
-func (f *Interface) rejectOutside(packet []byte, ci *ConnectionState, hostinfo *HostInfo, nb, out []byte, q int) {
+func (f *Interface) rejectOutside(packet []byte, ci *ConnectionState, hostinfo *HostInfo, nb, rejectBuf []byte, q int) {
 	if !f.firewall.InboundSendReject {
 		return
 	}
 
-	out = iputil.CreateRejectPacket(packet, out)
+	// split rejectBuf to make sure we have room to write the plaintext rejection, then encrypt it, without trampling anything
+	// we can't re-use packet, if we need to send an icmp reject, it won't be long enough.
+	half := len(rejectBuf) / 2
+	encryptBuf := rejectBuf[0:0:half] //the first half of rejectBuf's capacity, len set to 0
+	buildBuf := rejectBuf[half:]
+
+	out := iputil.CreateRejectPacket(packet, buildBuf)
 	if len(out) == 0 {
 		return
 	}
 
 	if len(out) > iputil.MaxRejectPacketSize {
 		if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelInfo) {
-			f.l.Info("rejectOutside: packet too big, not sending",
+			f.l.Info("rejectOutside: packet too big, not sending", "packet", packet, "outPacket", out)
-				"packet", packet,
-				"outPacket", out,
-			)
 		}
 		return
 	}
 
-	f.sendNoMetrics(header.Message, 0, ci, hostinfo, netip.AddrPort{}, out, nb, packet, q)
+	f.sendNoMetrics(header.Message, 0, ci, hostinfo, netip.AddrPort{}, out, nb, encryptBuf, q)
 }
 
 // Handshake will attempt to initiate a tunnel with the provided vpn address. This is a no-op if the tunnel is already established or being established
@@ -216,7 +371,7 @@ func (f *Interface) getOrHandshakeConsiderRouting(fwPacket *firewall.Packet, cac
 }
 
 func (f *Interface) sendMessageNow(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, hostinfo *HostInfo, p, nb, out []byte) {
-	fp := &firewall.Packet{}
+	fp := &firewall.ParsedPacket{}
 	err := newPacket(p, false, fp)
 	if err != nil {
 		f.l.Warn("error while parsing outgoing packet for firewall check", "error", err)
@@ -224,7 +379,7 @@ func (f *Interface) sendMessageNow(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubTyp
 	}
 
 	// check if packet is in outbound fw rules
-	dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(*fp, false, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), nil)
+	dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(fp.Packet, false, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), nil)
 	if dropReason != nil {
 		if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
 			f.l.Debug("dropping cached packet",
@@ -275,21 +430,13 @@ func (f *Interface) sendTo(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, ci *C
 	f.sendNoMetrics(t, st, ci, hostinfo, remote, p, nb, out, 0)
 }
 
-// SendVia sends a payload through a Relay tunnel. No authentication or encryption is done
+func (f *Interface) prepareSendVia(via *HostInfo,
-// to the payload for the ultimate target host, making this a useful method for sending
-// handshake messages to peers through relay tunnels.
-// via is the HostInfo through which the message is relayed.
-// ad is the plaintext data to authenticate, but not encrypt
-// nb is a buffer used to store the nonce value, re-used for performance reasons.
-// out is a buffer used to store the result of the Encrypt operation
-// q indicates which writer to use to send the packet.
-func (f *Interface) SendVia(via *HostInfo,
 	relay *Relay,
 	ad,
 	nb,
 	out []byte,
 	nocopy bool,
-) {
+) ([]byte, error) {
 	if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
 		// NOTE: for goboring AESGCMTLS we need to lock because of the nonce check
 		via.ConnectionState.writeLock.Lock()
@@ -311,7 +458,7 @@ func (f *Interface) SendVia(via *HostInfo,
 			"headerLen", len(out),
 			"cipherOverhead", via.ConnectionState.eKey.Overhead(),
 		)
-		return
+		return nil, io.ErrShortBuffer
 	}
 
 	// The header bytes are written to the 'out' slice; Grow the slice to hold the header and associated data payload.
@@ -331,13 +478,31 @@ func (f *Interface) SendVia(via *HostInfo,
 	}
 	if err != nil {
 		via.logger(f.l).Info("Failed to EncryptDanger in sendVia", "error", err)
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	f.connectionManager.RelayUsed(relay.LocalIndex)
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+// SendVia sends a payload through a Relay tunnel. No authentication or encryption is done
+// to the payload for the ultimate target host, making this a useful method for sending
+// handshake messages to peers through relay tunnels.
+// via is the HostInfo through which the message is relayed.
+// ad is the plaintext data to authenticate, but not encrypt
+// nb is a buffer used to store the nonce value, re-used for performance reasons.
+// out is a buffer used to store the result of the Encrypt operation
+// q indicates which writer to use to send the packet.
+func (f *Interface) SendVia(via *HostInfo, relay *Relay, ad, nb, out []byte, nocopy bool, q int) {
+	toSend, err := f.prepareSendVia(via, relay, ad, nb, out, nocopy)
+	if err != nil {
+		// already logged by prepareSendVia
 		return
 	}
-	err = f.writers[0].WriteTo(out, via.GetRemote())
+
+	err = f.writers[q].WriteTo(toSend, via.GetRemote())
 	if err != nil {
 		via.logger(f.l).Info("Failed to WriteTo in sendVia", "error", err)
 	}
-	f.connectionManager.RelayUsed(relay.LocalIndex)
 }
 
 func (f *Interface) sendNoMetrics(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, ci *ConnectionState, hostinfo *HostInfo, remote netip.AddrPort, p, nb, out []byte, q int) {
@@ -408,7 +573,7 @@ func (f *Interface) sendNoMetrics(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType
 		if err != nil {
 			hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to write outgoing packet",
 				"error", err,
-				"udpAddr", remote,
+				"udpAddr", hr,
 			)
 		}
 	} else {
@@ -423,7 +588,7 @@ func (f *Interface) sendNoMetrics(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType
 				)
 				continue
 			}
-			f.SendVia(relayHostInfo, relay, out, nb, fullOut[:header.Len+len(out)], true)
+			f.SendVia(relayHostInfo, relay, out, nb, fullOut[:header.Len+len(out)], true, q)
 			break
 		}
 	}

interface.go

@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
-	"io"
 	"log/slog"
 	"net/netip"
+	"runtime"
 	"slices"
 	"sync"
 	"sync/atomic"
@@ -14,12 +14,15 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
 	"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
 
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay"
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/batch"
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
 )
 
@@ -49,7 +52,19 @@ type InterfaceConfig struct {
 	reQueryWait     time.Duration
 
 	ConntrackCacheTimeout time.Duration
-	l                     *slog.Logger
+
+	// CpuAffinity, when non-empty, names the CPUs each TUN reader goroutine
+	// should pin to. Queue i pins to CpuAffinity[i % len(CpuAffinity)] —
+	// shorter lists than `routines` cycle. Empty list keeps the default
+	// pin-to-(i % NumCPU) behavior. Only consulted when PinThreads is true.
+	CpuAffinity []int
+	// PinThreads controls whether each TUN reader OS thread is pinned to a
+	// single CPU (via tun.pin_threads, default true). Pinning keeps each
+	// goroutine's sendmmsg on one XPS-selected NIC TX ring so per-flow
+	// packets stay ordered on the wire.
+	PinThreads bool
+
+	l *slog.Logger
 }
 
 type Interface struct {
@@ -73,7 +88,16 @@ type Interface struct {
 	routines              int
 	disconnectInvalid     atomic.Bool
 	closed                atomic.Bool
-	relayManager          *relayManager
+	// cpuAffinity, when non-empty, names the CPUs each TUN reader goroutine
+	// should pin to. Queue i pins to cpuAffinity[i % len(cpuAffinity)].
+	// Empty falls back to the default pin-to-(allowed CPU) behavior.
+	// Only consulted when pinThreads is true.
+	cpuAffinity []int
+	// pinThreads controls whether listenIn pins each TUN reader OS thread to
+	// a CPU at all (tun.pin_threads, default true). When false, threads are
+	// left free to migrate as on stock nebula.
+	pinThreads   bool
+	relayManager *relayManager
 
 	tryPromoteEvery atomic.Uint32
 	reQueryEvery    atomic.Uint32
@@ -90,8 +114,14 @@ type Interface struct {
 
 	ctx     context.Context
 	writers []udp.Conn
-	readers []io.ReadWriteCloser
+	queues  []tio.Queue
-	wg      sync.WaitGroup
+	// batchers is one per tun queue, wrapping queues[i]. readOutsidePackets
+	// commits plaintext into the batcher; the plaintext is decrypted
+	// in place inside the UDP receive buffers, so listenOut must call Flush
+	// at the end of each UDP recvmmsg batch, before those buffers are
+	// reused (every udp.Conn ListenOut guarantees that ordering).
+	batchers []*batch.MultiCoalescer
+	wg       sync.WaitGroup
 
 	// fatalErr holds the first unexpected reader error that caused shutdown.
 	// nil means "no fatal error" (yet)
@@ -102,18 +132,13 @@ type Interface struct {
 	metricHandshakes    metrics.Histogram
 	messageMetrics      *MessageMetrics
 	cachedPacketMetrics *cachedPacketMetrics
+	metricTxDropped     metrics.Counter
 
 	l *slog.Logger
 }
 
 type EncWriter interface {
-	SendVia(via *HostInfo,
+	SendVia(via *HostInfo, relay *Relay, ad, nb, out []byte, nocopy bool, q int)
-		relay *Relay,
-		ad,
-		nb,
-		out []byte,
-		nocopy bool,
-	)
 	SendMessageToVpnAddr(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, vpnAddr netip.Addr, p, nb, out []byte)
 	SendMessageToHostInfo(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, hostinfo *HostInfo, p, nb, out []byte)
 	Handshake(vpnAddr netip.Addr)
@@ -172,6 +197,10 @@ func NewInterface(ctx context.Context, c *InterfaceConfig) (*Interface, error) {
 		return nil, errors.New("no connection manager")
 	}
 
+	if c.routines <= 1 {
+		c.PinThreads = false //pinning is not useful unless there's more than one tun reader
+	}
+
 	cs := c.pki.getCertState()
 	ifce := &Interface{
 		ctx:                   ctx,
@@ -189,7 +218,7 @@ func NewInterface(ctx context.Context, c *InterfaceConfig) (*Interface, error) {
 		routines:              c.routines,
 		version:               c.version,
 		writers:               make([]udp.Conn, c.routines),
-		readers:               make([]io.ReadWriteCloser, c.routines),
+		batchers:              make([]*batch.MultiCoalescer, c.routines),
 		myVpnNetworks:         cs.myVpnNetworks,
 		myVpnNetworksTable:    cs.myVpnNetworksTable,
 		myVpnAddrs:            cs.myVpnAddrs,
@@ -198,8 +227,11 @@ func NewInterface(ctx context.Context, c *InterfaceConfig) (*Interface, error) {
 		relayManager:          c.relayManager,
 		connectionManager:     c.connectionManager,
 		conntrackCacheTimeout: c.ConntrackCacheTimeout,
+		cpuAffinity:           c.CpuAffinity,
+		pinThreads:            c.PinThreads,
 
 		metricHandshakes: metrics.GetOrRegisterHistogram("handshakes", nil, metrics.NewExpDecaySample(1028, 0.015)),
+		metricTxDropped:  metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("udp.tx.dropped", nil),
 		messageMetrics:   c.MessageMetrics,
 		cachedPacketMetrics: &cachedPacketMetrics{
 			sent:    metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("hostinfo.cached_packets.sent", nil),
@@ -240,25 +272,36 @@ func (f *Interface) activate() error {
 		"boringcrypto", boringEnabled(),
 	)
 
-	if f.routines > 1 {
+	if f.routines > 1 && !f.outside.SupportsMultipleReaders() {
-		if !f.inside.SupportsMultiqueue() || !f.outside.SupportsMultipleReaders() {
+		f.routines = 1
-			f.routines = 1
+		f.l.Warn("multiple udp readers are not supported on this platform, falling back to a single routine")
-			f.l.Warn("routines is not supported on this platform, falling back to a single routine")
-		}
 	}
 
+	// Prepare the tun queues. A device that can't open that many hands back
+	// fewer (a single queue on platforms without multiqueue support) and we
+	// size the reader routines to what we actually got.
+	queues, err := f.inside.Queues(f.routines)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if len(queues) < f.routines {
+		// TODO: this clamp is only safe because it is unreachable when the
+		// udp side has multiple readers (linux Queues opens exactly n or
+		// errors; every other platform already clamped routines to 1 above).
+		// If a platform ever returns fewer queues than routines with
+		// SO_REUSEPORT sockets already bound, the surplus sockets get no
+		// listenOut and the kernel blackholes every flow it hashes to them —
+		// fail loudly or close the extra sockets instead.
+		f.l.Warn("tun multiqueue is not supported on this platform, falling back to fewer routines",
+			"requested", f.routines, "opened", len(queues))
+		f.routines = len(queues)
+	}
+	f.queues = queues
+
 	metrics.GetOrRegisterGauge("routines", nil).Update(int64(f.routines))
 
-	// Prepare n tun queues
+	for i := range f.queues {
-	var reader io.ReadWriteCloser = f.inside
+		f.batchers[i] = batch.NewMultiCoalescer(f.queues[i], f.l)
-	for i := 0; i < f.routines; i++ {
-		if i > 0 {
-			reader, err = f.inside.NewMultiQueueReader()
-			if err != nil {
-				return err
-			}
-		}
-		f.readers[i] = reader
 	}
 
 	// On error the caller owns the cleanup, Control.Start cancels the service context
@@ -281,7 +324,7 @@ func (f *Interface) run() {
 	// Launch n queues to read packets from tun dev
 	for i := 0; i < f.routines; i++ {
 		f.wg.Go(func() {
-			f.listenIn(f.readers[i], i)
+			f.listenIn(f.queues[i], i)
 		})
 	}
 
@@ -306,6 +349,31 @@ func (f *Interface) onFatal(err error) {
 	}
 }
 
+type rxContext struct {
+	q       int
+	scratch []byte
+	// nb is a re-usable nonce buffer for decrypt calls to use
+	nb           []byte
+	h            *header.H
+	fwPacket     *firewall.ParsedPacket
+	hostmapCache map[uint32]*HostInfo
+	lhh          *LightHouseHandler
+	ctCache      *firewall.ConntrackCacheTicker
+}
+
+func newRxContext(f *Interface, q int) *rxContext {
+	return &rxContext{
+		q:            q,
+		scratch:      make([]byte, mtu),
+		nb:           make([]byte, 12, 12),
+		h:            &header.H{},
+		fwPacket:     &firewall.ParsedPacket{},
+		hostmapCache: map[uint32]*HostInfo{},
+		lhh:          f.lightHouse.NewRequestHandler(),
+		ctCache:      firewall.NewConntrackCacheTicker(f.ctx, f.l, f.conntrackCacheTimeout),
+	}
+}
+
 func (f *Interface) listenOut(i int) {
 	var li udp.Conn
 	if i > 0 {
@@ -314,16 +382,20 @@ func (f *Interface) listenOut(i int) {
 		li = f.outside
 	}
 
-	ctCache := firewall.NewConntrackCacheTicker(f.ctx, f.l, f.conntrackCacheTimeout)
+	rxc := newRxContext(f, i)
-	lhh := f.lightHouse.NewRequestHandler()
-	plaintext := make([]byte, udp.MTU)
-	h := &header.H{}
-	fwPacket := &firewall.Packet{}
-	nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
 
-	err := li.ListenOut(func(fromUdpAddr netip.AddrPort, payload []byte) {
+	listener := func(fromUdpAddr netip.AddrPort, payload []byte) {
-		f.readOutsidePackets(ViaSender{UdpAddr: fromUdpAddr}, plaintext[:0], payload, h, fwPacket, lhh, nb, i, ctCache.Get())
+		f.readOutsidePackets(ViaSender{UdpAddr: fromUdpAddr}, payload, rxc)
-	})
+	}
+
+	flusher := func() {
+		if err := f.batchers[i].Flush(); err != nil {
+			f.l.Error("Failed to flush tun coalescer", "error", err)
+		}
+		clear(rxc.hostmapCache)
+	}
+
+	err := li.ListenOut(listener, flusher)
 
 	// An error after teardown began is shutdown noise, the closed flag covers resources
 	// Close releases itself and the cancelled ctx covers ones torn down by their owners
@@ -336,16 +408,42 @@ func (f *Interface) listenOut(i int) {
 	f.l.Debug("underlay reader is done", "reader", i)
 }
 
-func (f *Interface) listenIn(reader io.ReadWriteCloser, i int) {
+func (f *Interface) pinThisThread(i int) {
-	packet := make([]byte, mtu)
+	var cpu int
-	out := make([]byte, mtu)
+	if n := len(f.cpuAffinity); n > 0 {
-	fwPacket := &firewall.Packet{}
+		// Explicit tun.cpu_affinity list wins; parseCpuAffinity already
+		// validated the entries against the allowed CPU set.
+		cpu = f.cpuAffinity[i%n]
+	} else if allowed, err := util.AllowedCPUs(); err == nil && len(allowed) > 0 {
+		// Default: spread queues across the CPUs we're actually allowed to
+		// run on. Under a cpuset/taskset mask these aren't 0..NumCPU-1, so
+		// i % NumCPU would pick unrunnable IDs and every pin would fail.
+		cpu = allowed[i%len(allowed)]
+	} else {
+		cpu = i % runtime.NumCPU()
+	}
+	if err := util.PinThreadToCPU(cpu); err != nil {
+		f.l.Warn("failed to pin tun reader to CPU", "queue", i, "cpu", cpu, "err", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func (f *Interface) listenIn(queue tio.Queue, i int) {
+	// Pinning this thread (and goroutine) to a single CPU keeps every sendmmsg from this goroutine going through the
+	// same TX ring on the nic, so the wire sees per-flow order. Skip entirely when tun.pin_threads is false.
+	if f.pinThreads {
+		f.pinThisThread(i)
+	}
+
+	rejectBuf := make([]byte, mtu)
+	arenaSize := batch.SendBatchCap * (udp.MTU + 32)
+	sb := batch.NewSendBatch(f.writers[i], batch.SendBatchCap, arenaSize)
+	fwPacket := &firewall.ParsedPacket{}
 	nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
 
 	conntrackCache := firewall.NewConntrackCacheTicker(f.ctx, f.l, f.conntrackCacheTimeout)
 
 	for {
-		n, err := reader.Read(packet)
+		pkts, err := queue.Read()
 		if err != nil {
 			// Same shutdown noise handling as listenOut
 			if !f.closed.Load() && f.ctx.Err() == nil {
@@ -355,12 +453,35 @@ func (f *Interface) listenIn(reader io.ReadWriteCloser, i int) {
 			break
 		}
 
-		f.consumeInsidePacket(packet[:n], fwPacket, nb, out, i, conntrackCache.Get())
+		for _, pkt := range pkts {
+			f.consumeInsidePacket(pkt, fwPacket, nb, sb, rejectBuf, i, conntrackCache.Get())
+			// Flush incrementally once a full sendmmsg batch has
+			// accumulated so the first packets of a deep read drain
+			// hit the wire while the rest are still being encrypted.
+			if sb.Len() >= batch.SendBatchCap {
+				f.flushSendBatch(sb, i)
+			}
+		}
+		f.flushSendBatch(sb, i)
 	}
 
 	f.l.Debug("overlay reader is done", "reader", i)
 }
 
+// flushSendBatch drains sb to the underlay and accounts for anything it could not deliver. A shortfall means
+// specific destinations were undeliverable (a stale remote, a reject rule), which the backend logs per peer at
+// debug; here it is only a counter, so one unreachable peer cannot spam a log line per batch.
+func (f *Interface) flushSendBatch(sb *batch.SendBatch, q int) {
+	queued := sb.Len()
+	written, err := sb.Flush()
+	if err != nil {
+		f.l.Error("Failed to write outgoing batch", "error", err, "writer", q)
+	}
+	if dropped := queued - written; dropped > 0 {
+		f.metricTxDropped.Inc(int64(dropped))
+	}
+}
+
 func (f *Interface) RegisterConfigChangeCallbacks(c *config.C) {
 	c.RegisterReloadCallback(f.reloadFirewall)
 	c.RegisterReloadCallback(f.reloadSendRecvError)

iputil/packet.go

@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ func ipv4CreateRejectTCPPacket(packet []byte, out []byte) []byte {
 }
 
 func ipv6CreateRejectPacket(packet []byte, out []byte) []byte {
-	proto, offset, isFragment := ipv6FindUpperProtocol(packet)
+	proto, offset, isFragment := IPv6FindUpperProtocol(packet)
 	if isFragment {
 		return nil
 	}
@@ -333,11 +333,34 @@ func ipv6CreateRejectTCPPacket(packet []byte, out []byte, offset int) []byte {
 	return out
 }
 
-func ipv6FindUpperProtocol(packet []byte) (nextHeader uint8, offset int, isFragment bool) {
+// maxIPv6ExtHeaders caps the extension-header walk in IPv6FindUpperProtocol.
+// RFC 8200 legal chains are shorter (each header at most once, Destination
+// Options at most twice), so the cap only bites crafted packets, which would
+// otherwise make us walk their whole payload 8 bytes at a time.
+const maxIPv6ExtHeaders = 8
+
+// IPv6FindUpperProtocol walks packet's IPv6 extension-header chain and
+// returns the terminal (upper-layer) protocol number, the byte offset where
+// that protocol's header begins, and whether the packet is a non-first
+// fragment. It steps over Hop-by-Hop (0), Routing (43), Fragment (44),
+// AH (51), and Destination Options (60); anything else — including ESP,
+// whose payload is encrypted — terminates the walk.
+//
+// For a non-first fragment, nextHeader still names the flow's upper
+// protocol (copied from the fragment header) but offset points at fragment
+// payload, not a real transport header: consult isFragment before
+// dereferencing offset. If the chain is truncated, over-long, or the packet
+// is shorter than an IPv6 header, the walk stops early and nextHeader is
+// whatever it stopped on (59, IPPROTO_NONE, for the too-short case) —
+// callers treat any non-transport result as unclassifiable.
+func IPv6FindUpperProtocol(packet []byte) (nextHeader uint8, offset int, isFragment bool) {
+	if len(packet) < ipv6.HeaderLen {
+		return 59, 0, false // IPPROTO_NONE: nothing to classify
+	}
 	nextHeader = packet[6]
 	offset = ipv6.HeaderLen
 
-	for {
+	for range maxIPv6ExtHeaders {
 		switch nextHeader {
 		case 0, 43, 60: // Hop-by-Hop, Routing, Destination
 			if len(packet) < offset+2 {
@@ -367,6 +390,7 @@ func ipv6FindUpperProtocol(packet []byte) (nextHeader uint8, offset int, isFragm
 			return nextHeader, offset, isFragment
 		}
 	}
+	return nextHeader, offset, isFragment
 }
 
 func CreateICMPEchoResponse(packet, out []byte) []byte {

iputil/packet_test.go

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 package iputil
 
 import (
+	"bytes"
 	"encoding/binary"
 	"net"
 	"testing"
@@ -179,6 +180,46 @@ func Test_CreateRejectPacket_NoICMPError(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// Test_CreateRejectPacket_RespectsCap ensures it is impossible for
+// an oversized ICMPv6 reject to overwrite the neighbor segment's bytes.
+func Test_CreateRejectPacket_RespectsCap(t *testing.T) {
+	src := net.ParseIP("fd00::1")
+	dst := net.ParseIP("fd00::2")
+
+	// Inner IPv6 UDP packet. An ICMPv6 reject copies the whole inner packet
+	// plus a 48-byte header (40 IPv6 + 8 ICMPv6), so it needs 48 more bytes
+	// than the inner packet length.
+	inner := makeIPv6Packet(src, dst, 17, make([]byte, 20))
+
+	// The ciphertext scratch reused as the reject buffer is the received
+	// datagram: 16-byte Nebula header + inner + 16-byte AEAD tag. That is only
+	// 32 bytes of slack, so a full ICMPv6 reject overruns it by 16 bytes.
+	const nebulaOverhead = 32
+	segLen := len(inner) + nebulaOverhead
+
+	// Shared backing row laid out as [segment][neighbor's 16-byte Nebula header].
+	const neighborHdr = 16
+	sentinel := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xAB}, neighborHdr)
+
+	// Uncapped: the slice's capacity reaches into the neighbor, reproducing
+	// the overrun that silently drops the neighbor packet.
+	backing := make([]byte, segLen+neighborHdr)
+	copy(backing[segLen:], sentinel)
+	reject := CreateRejectPacket(inner, backing[:segLen])
+	assert.NotNil(t, reject, "uncapped buffer reaches into the neighbor, so the reject is built")
+	assert.NotEqual(t, sentinel, backing[segLen:segLen+neighborHdr],
+		"without the cap the oversized reject overruns into the neighbor segment")
+
+	// Capped (the fix): cap==len, so the builder cannot exceed the segment. The
+	// reject does not fit, so it is refused rather than corrupting the neighbor.
+	backing = make([]byte, segLen+neighborHdr)
+	copy(backing[segLen:], sentinel)
+	reject = CreateRejectPacket(inner, backing[:segLen:segLen])
+	assert.Nil(t, reject, "capped segment is 16 bytes too small for a full ICMPv6 reject, so it is refused")
+	assert.Equal(t, sentinel, backing[segLen:segLen+neighborHdr],
+		"capped segment must leave the neighbor untouched")
+}
+
 func makeIPv6Packet(src, dst net.IP, nextHeader uint8, payload []byte) []byte {
 	b := make([]byte, ipv6.HeaderLen+len(payload))
 	b[0] = ipv6.Version << 4
@@ -474,3 +515,121 @@ func TestCreateICMPEchoResponse_IPv6_NotICMPv6(t *testing.T) {
 	result := CreateICMPEchoResponse(packet, out)
 	assert.Nil(t, result)
 }
+
+func TestIPv6FindUpperProtocol(t *testing.T) {
+	src := net.ParseIP("fd00::1")
+	dst := net.ParseIP("fd00::2")
+
+	// extHdr builds one 8-byte-unit extension header: next, hdrExtLen
+	// ((extra+1)*8 bytes total), padded to size.
+	extHdr := func(next uint8, extra int) []byte {
+		b := make([]byte, (extra+1)*8)
+		b[0] = next
+		b[1] = uint8(extra)
+		return b
+	}
+
+	t.Run("no extension headers", func(t *testing.T) {
+		for _, proto := range []uint8{6, 17, 58} {
+			nh, offset, frag := IPv6FindUpperProtocol(makeIPv6Packet(src, dst, proto, make([]byte, 20)))
+			assert.Equal(t, proto, nh)
+			assert.Equal(t, ipv6.HeaderLen, offset)
+			assert.False(t, frag)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("hop-by-hop then TCP", func(t *testing.T) {
+		payload := append(extHdr(6, 0), make([]byte, 20)...)
+		nh, offset, frag := IPv6FindUpperProtocol(makeIPv6Packet(src, dst, 0, payload))
+		assert.Equal(t, uint8(6), nh)
+		assert.Equal(t, ipv6.HeaderLen+8, offset)
+		assert.False(t, frag)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("chained headers honor length units", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Hop-by-Hop (8B) -> Dest Options (16B) -> Routing (8B) -> UDP.
+		payload := extHdr(60, 0)
+		payload = append(payload, extHdr(43, 1)...)
+		payload = append(payload, extHdr(17, 0)...)
+		payload = append(payload, make([]byte, 8)...)
+		nh, offset, frag := IPv6FindUpperProtocol(makeIPv6Packet(src, dst, 0, payload))
+		assert.Equal(t, uint8(17), nh)
+		assert.Equal(t, ipv6.HeaderLen+8+16+8, offset)
+		assert.False(t, frag)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("AH length is in 4-byte units plus 2", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// AH payload-len byte 4 -> (4+2)*4 = 24 bytes on the wire.
+		ah := make([]byte, 24)
+		ah[0] = 6
+		ah[1] = 4
+		payload := append(ah, make([]byte, 20)...)
+		nh, offset, frag := IPv6FindUpperProtocol(makeIPv6Packet(src, dst, 51, payload))
+		assert.Equal(t, uint8(6), nh)
+		assert.Equal(t, ipv6.HeaderLen+24, offset)
+		assert.False(t, frag)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("first fragment walks to the transport header", func(t *testing.T) {
+		frag := make([]byte, 8)
+		frag[0] = 17
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(frag[2:4], 0x0001) // offset 0, M=1
+		payload := append(frag, make([]byte, 8)...)
+		nh, offset, isFrag := IPv6FindUpperProtocol(makeIPv6Packet(src, dst, 44, payload))
+		assert.Equal(t, uint8(17), nh)
+		assert.Equal(t, ipv6.HeaderLen+8, offset)
+		assert.False(t, isFrag, "first fragment carries the real transport header")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("non-first fragment is flagged", func(t *testing.T) {
+		frag := make([]byte, 8)
+		frag[0] = 17
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(frag[2:4], 1<<3) // offset 1, M=0
+		payload := append(frag, make([]byte, 8)...)
+		nh, _, isFrag := IPv6FindUpperProtocol(makeIPv6Packet(src, dst, 44, payload))
+		assert.Equal(t, uint8(17), nh, "fragment header still names the flow's L4")
+		assert.True(t, isFrag, "offset points at fragment payload, not a header")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("ESP terminates the walk", func(t *testing.T) {
+		nh, offset, frag := IPv6FindUpperProtocol(makeIPv6Packet(src, dst, 50, make([]byte, 16)))
+		assert.Equal(t, uint8(50), nh)
+		assert.Equal(t, ipv6.HeaderLen, offset)
+		assert.False(t, frag)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("unknown protocol terminates the walk", func(t *testing.T) {
+		nh, offset, _ := IPv6FindUpperProtocol(makeIPv6Packet(src, dst, 132, make([]byte, 16))) // SCTP
+		assert.Equal(t, uint8(132), nh)
+		assert.Equal(t, ipv6.HeaderLen, offset)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("truncated extension header stops the walk", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Next header says Hop-by-Hop but the packet ends at the IPv6 header.
+		nh, offset, frag := IPv6FindUpperProtocol(makeIPv6Packet(src, dst, 0, nil))
+		assert.Equal(t, uint8(0), nh, "unresolvable chain returns the extension header it stopped on")
+		assert.Equal(t, ipv6.HeaderLen, offset)
+		assert.False(t, frag)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("crafted over-long chain hits the cap", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// Ten chained Hop-by-Hop headers, then TCP. Illegal per RFC 8200
+		// (Hop-by-Hop may only appear first); the cap must stop the walk
+		// before it resolves rather than crawling arbitrary crafted chains.
+		var payload []byte
+		for i := 0; i < 9; i++ {
+			payload = append(payload, extHdr(0, 0)...)
+		}
+		payload = append(payload, extHdr(6, 0)...)
+		payload = append(payload, make([]byte, 20)...)
+		nh, _, _ := IPv6FindUpperProtocol(makeIPv6Packet(src, dst, 0, payload))
+		assert.Equal(t, uint8(0), nh, "walk must stop at the cap, not resolve to TCP")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("packet shorter than an IPv6 header", func(t *testing.T) {
+		nh, offset, frag := IPv6FindUpperProtocol(make([]byte, 39))
+		assert.Equal(t, uint8(59), nh) // IPPROTO_NONE
+		assert.Equal(t, 0, offset)
+		assert.False(t, frag)
+	})
+}

lighthouse.go

@@ -36,6 +36,10 @@ type LightHouse struct {
 	myVpnNetworksTable *bart.Lite
 	punchy             *Punchy
 
+	// localAddrsFn enumerates the underlay addresses we advertise. It is a field so tests can supply simulated
+	// addresses rather than whatever this machine's NICs happen to be. Set it before Start.
+	localAddrsFn func(*LocalAllowList) []netip.Addr
+
 	// Local cache of answers from light houses
 	// map of vpn addr to answers
 	addrMap map[netip.Addr]*RemoteList
@@ -107,6 +111,10 @@ func NewLightHouseFromConfig(ctx context.Context, l *slog.Logger, c *config.C, c
 		queryChan:          make(chan netip.Addr, c.GetUint32("handshakes.query_buffer", 64)),
 		l:                  l,
 	}
+	h.localAddrsFn = func(al *LocalAllowList) []netip.Addr {
+		return localAddrs(h.l, al)
+	}
+
 	lighthouses := make([]netip.Addr, 0)
 	h.lighthouses.Store(&lighthouses)
 	staticList := make(map[netip.Addr]struct{})
@@ -918,7 +926,7 @@ func (lh *LightHouse) SendUpdate() {
 	}
 
 	lal := lh.GetLocalAllowList()
-	for _, e := range localAddrs(lh.l, lal) {
+	for _, e := range lh.localAddrsFn(lal) {
 		if lh.myVpnNetworksTable.Contains(e) {
 			continue
 		}

lighthouse_test.go

@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ type testEncWriter struct {
 	protocolVersion cert.Version
 }
 
-func (tw *testEncWriter) SendVia(via *HostInfo, relay *Relay, ad, nb, out []byte, nocopy bool) {
+func (tw *testEncWriter) SendVia(via *HostInfo, relay *Relay, ad, nb, out []byte, nocopy bool, q int) {
 }
 func (tw *testEncWriter) Handshake(vpnIp netip.Addr) {
 }

main.go

@@ -6,11 +6,14 @@ import (
 	"log/slog"
 	"net"
 	"net/netip"
+	"os"
 	"runtime/debug"
+	"slices"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cpupick"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/sshd"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
@@ -33,6 +36,9 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
 		buildVersion = moduleVersion()
 	}
 
+	// Debug builds (-tags debug) serve pprof on :6060; a no-op otherwise.
+	startPprofServer(ctx, l)
+
 	// Print the config if in test, the exit comes later
 	if configTest {
 		b, err := yaml.Marshal(c.Settings)
@@ -161,7 +167,13 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
 
 		for i := 0; i < routines; i++ {
 			l.Info("listening", "addr", netip.AddrPortFrom(listenHost, uint16(port)))
-			udpServer, err := udp.NewListener(l, listenHost, port, routines > 1, c.GetInt("listen.batch", 64))
+			batchSize := c.GetInt("listen.batch", 64)
+			if batchSize < 1 {
+				oldBatch := batchSize
+				batchSize = 1
+				l.Warn("listen.batch size is invalid", "provided", oldBatch, "overridden to", batchSize)
+			}
+			udpServer, err := udp.NewListener(l, listenHost, port, routines > 1, batchSize)
 			if err != nil {
 				return nil, util.NewContextualError("Failed to open udp listener", m{"queue": i}, err)
 			}
@@ -210,6 +222,21 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
 		l.Warn("Failed to start DNS responder", "error", err)
 	}
 
+	pinThreads := c.GetBool("tun.pin_threads", true)
+	cpuAffinity := parseCpuAffinity(c, l, routines)
+	if pinThreads && routines > 1 && len(cpuAffinity) == 0 && !configTest {
+		// The operator didn't choose pin CPUs, so pick a default set that
+		// prefers performance cores and doesn't stack co-located instances
+		// onto allowed[0]. The bound UDP port keys the per-instance spread:
+		// distinct across instances sharing a box, stable across restarts.
+		// A nil result keeps listenIn's stock allowed[i] fallback.
+		key := uint64(os.Getpid())
+		if ap, err := udpConns[0].LocalAddr(); err == nil && ap.Port() != 0 {
+			key = uint64(ap.Port())
+		}
+		cpuAffinity = cpupick.Default(routines, key, l)
+	}
+
 	ifConfig := &InterfaceConfig{
 		HostMap:               hostMap,
 		Inside:                tun,
@@ -231,6 +258,8 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
 		relayManager:          NewRelayManager(ctx, l, hostMap, c),
 		punchy:                punchy,
 		ConntrackCacheTimeout: conntrackCacheTimeout,
+		CpuAffinity:           cpuAffinity,
+		PinThreads:            pinThreads,
 		l:                     l,
 	}
 
@@ -268,6 +297,8 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
 
 	attachCommands(l, c, ssh, ifce)
 
+	networkChanges := udp.NewNetworkChangeMonitor(ctx, l, c)
+
 	return &Control{
 		state:                  StateReady,
 		f:                      ifce,
@@ -278,10 +309,75 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
 		statsStart:             stats.Start,
 		dnsStart:               ds.Start,
 		lighthouseStart:        lightHouse.StartUpdateWorker,
+		networkChangeStart:     networkChanges.Start,
 		connectionManagerStart: connManager.Start,
 	}, nil
 }
 
+// parseCpuAffinity reads `tun.cpu_affinity` from the config — a list of
+// integer CPU IDs, one per TUN reader goroutine. Empty / unset returns nil
+// (listenIn falls back to spreading queues across the allowed CPU set).
+// Length mismatch with `routines` is a warning, not an error: shorter lists
+// are modulo-cycled across queues, longer lists' tail is ignored. Invalid
+// entries (non-integer, or a CPU ID we're not allowed to run on) are also a
+// warning and disable the override entirely so we don't silently pin to the
+// wrong CPU. Entries are validated against the process's current affinity
+// mask (util.AllowedCPUs) rather than 0..NumCPU-1: under a cgroup cpuset or
+// taskset the runnable IDs are frequently not that contiguous range, and
+// pinning to an unrunnable ID always fails. If the allowed set can't be
+// determined we fall back to a plain non-negative check.
+func parseCpuAffinity(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, routines int) []int {
+	raw := c.Get("tun.cpu_affinity")
+	if raw == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	rv, ok := raw.([]any)
+	if !ok {
+		l.Warn("tun.cpu_affinity must be a list of integers; ignoring", "value", raw)
+		return nil
+	}
+	// allowed is the set of CPU IDs we're actually permitted to run on. A nil
+	// slice (unsupported platform or lookup error) means "can't tell", so we
+	// only apply the weaker non-negative check in that case.
+	allowed, err := util.AllowedCPUs()
+	if err != nil {
+		l.Warn("could not determine allowed CPUs; validating tun.cpu_affinity against non-negative only", "error", err)
+		allowed = nil
+	}
+	cpus := make([]int, 0, len(rv))
+	for i, e := range rv {
+		var cpu int
+		switch v := e.(type) {
+		case int:
+			cpu = v
+		case int64:
+			cpu = int(v)
+		case float64:
+			cpu = int(v)
+		default:
+			l.Warn("tun.cpu_affinity entry not an integer; ignoring affinity",
+				"index", i, "value", e)
+			return nil
+		}
+		if cpu < 0 {
+			l.Warn("tun.cpu_affinity entry out of range; ignoring affinity",
+				"index", i, "cpu", cpu)
+			return nil
+		}
+		if len(allowed) > 0 && !slices.Contains(allowed, cpu) {
+			l.Warn("tun.cpu_affinity entry not in allowed CPU set; ignoring affinity",
+				"index", i, "cpu", cpu, "allowed", allowed)
+			return nil
+		}
+		cpus = append(cpus, cpu)
+	}
+	if len(cpus) != routines {
+		l.Warn("tun.cpu_affinity length doesn't match routines; queues will modulo-cycle through the list",
+			"affinity_len", len(cpus), "routines", routines)
+	}
+	return cpus
+}
+
 func moduleVersion() string {
 	info, ok := debug.ReadBuildInfo()
 	if !ok {

main_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+package nebula
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+)
+
+func TestParseCpuAffinity(t *testing.T) {
+	l := test.NewLogger()
+
+	// newConfig returns a config.C with tun.cpu_affinity set to v. A nil v
+	// leaves the key unset.
+	newConfig := func(v any) *config.C {
+		c := config.NewC(l)
+		if v != nil {
+			c.Settings["tun"] = map[string]any{"cpu_affinity": v}
+		}
+		return c
+	}
+
+	// unset -> nil (listenIn falls back to spreading across the allowed set)
+	assert.Nil(t, parseCpuAffinity(newConfig(nil), l, 1))
+
+	// Pick a CPU we're actually allowed to run on so a valid list survives
+	// validation regardless of the host's affinity mask.
+	allowed, _ := util.AllowedCPUs()
+	validCPU := 0
+	if len(allowed) > 0 {
+		validCPU = allowed[0]
+	}
+
+	// valid list -> parsed through unchanged
+	assert.Equal(t, []int{validCPU, validCPU}, parseCpuAffinity(newConfig([]any{validCPU, validCPU}), l, 2))
+
+	// a negative entry is out of range on every platform -> disables the override
+	assert.Nil(t, parseCpuAffinity(newConfig([]any{validCPU, -1}), l, 2))
+
+	// a non-integer entry -> disables the override
+	assert.Nil(t, parseCpuAffinity(newConfig([]any{validCPU, "not-a-cpu"}), l, 2))
+
+	// a CPU id outside the allowed set -> disables the override. Only assertable
+	// where we can enumerate the allowed set (e.g. linux); 1<<20 is far beyond
+	// any representable CPU id so it can never be in the mask.
+	if len(allowed) > 0 {
+		assert.Nil(t, parseCpuAffinity(newConfig([]any{1 << 20}), l, 1))
+	}
+}

noiseutil/cipher_state_test.go

@@ -164,3 +164,48 @@ func TestCipherStateNilSafety(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Empty(t, out)
 	assert.Equal(t, 0, cc.Overhead())
 }
+
+func TestCipherStateAESGCMInPlaceDecrypt(t *testing.T) {
+	enc, dec := buildCipherStates(t, CipherAESGCM)
+	inPlaceDecrypt(t, NewCipherStateAESGCM(enc), NewCipherStateAESGCM(dec))
+}
+
+func TestCipherStateChaChaPolyInPlaceDecrypt(t *testing.T) {
+	enc, dec := buildCipherStates(t, noise.CipherChaChaPoly)
+	inPlaceDecrypt(t, NewCipherStateChaChaPoly(enc), NewCipherStateChaChaPoly(dec))
+}
+
+func inPlaceDecrypt(t *testing.T, enc, dec CipherState) {
+	t.Helper()
+	const hdrLen = 16
+	plaintext := []byte("in-place decrypt should replace the ciphertext bytes")
+	nb := make([]byte, 12)
+
+	// packet = [16-byte header | ciphertext+tag], like a nebula Message.
+	packet := make([]byte, hdrLen, hdrLen+len(plaintext)+enc.Overhead())
+	for i := range packet {
+		packet[i] = byte(i)
+	}
+	packet, err := enc.EncryptDanger(packet, packet[:hdrLen], plaintext, 1, nb)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	// Simulate a GRO row: [packet | next segment]. A failed auth on packet
+	// may zero packet's plaintext region but must not touch the header, the
+	// tag, or the neighboring segment.
+	neighbor := []byte("next coalesced segment, must stay intact")
+	row := append(append([]byte(nil), packet...), neighbor...)
+	tampered := row[:len(packet)]
+	tampered[hdrLen] ^= 0x01
+	_, err = dec.DecryptDanger(tampered[hdrLen:hdrLen], tampered[:hdrLen], tampered[hdrLen:], 1, nb)
+	require.Error(t, err)
+	assert.Equal(t, packet[:hdrLen], tampered[:hdrLen], "failed auth must not touch the header")
+	assert.Equal(t, packet[len(packet)-dec.Overhead():], tampered[len(tampered)-dec.Overhead():],
+		"failed auth must not touch the tag")
+	assert.Equal(t, neighbor, row[len(packet):], "failed auth must not touch the next segment")
+
+	out, err := dec.DecryptDanger(packet[hdrLen:hdrLen], packet[:hdrLen], packet[hdrLen:], 1, nb)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Equal(t, plaintext, out)
+	// The plaintext must be IN the packet buffer, not a fresh allocation.
+	assert.Equal(t, &packet[hdrLen], &out[0], "plaintext must alias the packet buffer")
+}

outside.go

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/batch"
 	"golang.org/x/net/ipv4"
 )
 
@@ -22,7 +23,11 @@ const (
 
 var ErrOutOfWindow = errors.New("out of window packet")
 
-func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte, h *header.H, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, lhf *LightHouseHandler, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
+// readOutsidePackets processes one received underlay packet.
+// Message payloads are decrypted IN PLACE, so packet must stay untouched
+// by the caller until the batcher for queue q has been flushed
+func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, packet []byte, rxc *rxContext) {
+	h := rxc.h
 	err := h.Parse(packet)
 	if err != nil {
 		// Hole punch packets are 0 or 1 byte big, so lets ignore printing those errors
@@ -90,7 +95,7 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte,
 	if isMessageRelay {
 		hostinfo = f.hostMap.QueryRelayIndex(h.RemoteIndex)
 	} else {
-		hostinfo = f.hostMap.QueryIndex(h.RemoteIndex)
+		hostinfo = f.hostMap.QueryIndexCached(h.RemoteIndex, rxc.hostmapCache)
 	}
 
 	// At this point we should have a valid existing tunnel, verify and send
@@ -102,27 +107,32 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte,
 		return
 	}
 
+	if len(packet) < header.Len+hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead() {
+		f.messageMetrics.RxInvalid(1)
+		if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
+			f.l.Debug("packet too small", "from", via, "length", len(packet))
+		}
+		return
+	}
+
 	// All remaining packets are encrypted
-	ci := hostinfo.ConnectionState
-	if !ci.window.Check(f.l, h.MessageCounter) {
-		return
-	}
-
-	// Relay packets are special
 	if isMessageRelay {
-		f.handleOutsideRelayPacket(hostinfo, via, out, packet, h, fwPacket, lhf, nb, q, localCache)
+		// Relay packets are special, this branch should always early-return
-
+		err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.VerifyRelay(f.l, h.MessageCounter, packet, rxc.nb)
+		if err != nil {
+			if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
+				hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("Failed to verify relay packet", "error", err, "from", via, "header", h)
+			}
+			return
+		}
+		f.handleOutsideRelayPacket(hostinfo, via, packet, rxc)
 		return
 	}
 
-	out, err = f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out, packet, h, nb)
+	out, err := hostinfo.ConnectionState.Decrypt(f.l, h.MessageCounter, packet, rxc.nb)
 	if err != nil {
 		if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
-			hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("Failed to decrypt packet",
+			hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("Failed to decrypt packet", "error", err, "from", via, "header", h)
-				"error", err,
-				"from", via,
-				"header", h,
-			)
 		}
 		return
 	}
@@ -135,7 +145,7 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte,
 	case header.Message:
 		switch h.Subtype {
 		case header.MessageNone:
-			f.handleOutsideMessagePacket(hostinfo, out, packet, fwPacket, nb, q, localCache)
+			f.handleOutsideMessagePacket(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out, rxc)
 		default:
 			hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("IsValidSubType was true, but unexpected message subtype seen", "from", via, "header", h)
 			return
@@ -143,15 +153,23 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte,
 
 	case header.LightHouse:
 		//TODO: assert via is not relayed
-		lhf.HandleRequest(via.UdpAddr, hostinfo.vpnAddrs, out, f)
+		rxc.lhh.HandleRequest(via.UdpAddr, hostinfo.vpnAddrs, out, f)
 
 	case header.Test:
 		switch h.Subtype {
 		case header.TestReply:
 			// No-op, useful for the Roaming and connectionManager side-effects above
 		case header.TestRequest:
-			//recycle the input packet ciphertext as our output buffer
+			const maxCipherOverhead = 16 //todo we use this too often, needs a real importable const
-			f.send(header.Test, header.TestReply, ci, hostinfo, out, nb, packet)
+			const maxOverhead = header.Len + header.Len + maxCipherOverhead + maxCipherOverhead
+			if maxOverhead+len(out) > len(rxc.scratch) {
+				// A reply that cannot fit in scratch is dropped no matter the log level.
+				if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
+					hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("dropping oversized test request", "payloadLen", len(out), "from", via)
+				}
+				return
+			}
+			f.send(header.Test, header.TestReply, hostinfo.ConnectionState, hostinfo, out, rxc.nb, rxc.scratch[:0])
 		default:
 			hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("IsValidSubType was true, but unexpected test subtype seen", "from", via, "header", h)
 			return
@@ -169,28 +187,10 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte,
 	}
 }
 
-func (f *Interface) handleOutsideRelayPacket(hostinfo *HostInfo, via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte, h *header.H, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, lhf *LightHouseHandler, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
+func (f *Interface) handleOutsideRelayPacket(hostinfo *HostInfo, via ViaSender, packet []byte, rxc *rxContext) {
-	// The entire body is sent as AD, not encrypted.
+	h := rxc.h
-	// The packet consists of a 16-byte parsed Nebula header, Associated Data-protected payload, and a trailing 16-byte AEAD signature value.
+	// Successfully validated the thing. Get rid of the Relay header and the AEAD tag
-	// The packet is guaranteed to be at least 16 bytes at this point, b/c it got past the h.Parse() call above. If it's
+	signedPayload := packet[header.Len : len(packet)-hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead()]
-	// otherwise malformed (meaning, there is no trailing 16 byte AEAD value), then this will result in at worst a 0-length slice
-	// which will gracefully fail in the DecryptDanger call.
-	signedPayload := packet[:len(packet)-hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead()]
-	signatureValue := packet[len(packet)-hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead():]
-	var err error
-	out, err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.DecryptDanger(out, signedPayload, signatureValue, h.MessageCounter, nb)
-	if err != nil {
-		return
-	}
-	// Advance the replay window now that the frame is authenticated
-	if !hostinfo.ConnectionState.window.Update(f.l, h.MessageCounter) {
-		if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
-			hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("dropping out of window relay packet", "header", h)
-		}
-		return
-	}
-	// Successfully validated the thing. Get rid of the Relay header.
-	signedPayload = signedPayload[header.Len:]
 	// Pull the Roaming parts up here, and return in all call paths.
 	f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, via)
 	// Track usage of both the HostInfo and the Relay for the received & authenticated packet
@@ -201,9 +201,7 @@ func (f *Interface) handleOutsideRelayPacket(hostinfo *HostInfo, via ViaSender,
 	if !ok {
 		// The only way this happens is if hostmap has an index to the correct HostInfo, but the HostInfo is missing
 		// its internal mapping. This should never happen.
-		hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("HostInfo missing remote relay index",
+		hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("HostInfo missing remote relay index", "relayRemoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex)
-			"relayRemoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex,
-		)
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -214,11 +212,10 @@ func (f *Interface) handleOutsideRelayPacket(hostinfo *HostInfo, via ViaSender,
 		via = ViaSender{
 			UdpAddr:   via.UdpAddr,
 			relayHI:   hostinfo,
-			remoteIdx: relay.RemoteIndex,
 			relay:     relay,
 			IsRelayed: true,
 		}
-		f.readOutsidePackets(via, out[:0], signedPayload, h, fwPacket, lhf, nb, q, localCache)
+		f.readOutsidePackets(via, signedPayload, rxc)
 	case ForwardingType:
 		// Find the target HostInfo relay object
 		targetHI, targetRelay, err := f.hostMap.QueryVpnAddrsRelayFor(hostinfo.vpnAddrs, relay.PeerAddr)
@@ -235,9 +232,11 @@ func (f *Interface) handleOutsideRelayPacket(hostinfo *HostInfo, via ViaSender,
 		if targetRelay.State == Established {
 			switch targetRelay.Type {
 			case ForwardingType:
-				// Forward this packet through the relay tunnel
+				// Forward this packet through the relay tunnel, rebuilding it in place.
-				// Find the target HostInfo
+				// Encode overwrites the old outer header, and the new AEAD tag lands where the old one was
-				f.SendVia(targetHI, targetRelay, signedPayload, nb, out, false)
+				fwdBuf := packet[:0]
+				//todo it would potentially be nice to batch these
+				f.SendVia(targetHI, targetRelay, signedPayload, rxc.nb, fwdBuf, true, rxc.q)
 			case TerminalType:
 				hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Unexpected Relay Type of Terminal")
 				return
@@ -318,7 +317,11 @@ var (
 )
 
 // newPacket validates and parses the interesting bits for the firewall out of the ip and sub protocol headers
-func newPacket(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.Packet) error {
+func newPacket(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.ParsedPacket) error {
+	// fp is reused across packets; reset the parse byproducts so an early-error return cannot
+	// leak the previous packet's offsets.
+	fp.IPHdrLen = 0
+	fp.FragAny = false
 	if len(data) < 1 {
 		return ErrPacketTooShort
 	}
@@ -333,7 +336,7 @@ func newPacket(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.Packet) error {
 	return ErrUnknownIPVersion
 }
 
-func parseV6(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.Packet) error {
+func parseV6(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.ParsedPacket) error {
 	dataLen := len(data)
 	if dataLen < ipv6.HeaderLen {
 		return ErrIPv6PacketTooShort
@@ -359,6 +362,7 @@ func parseV6(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.Packet) error {
 		switch proto {
 		case layers.IPProtocolESP, layers.IPProtocolNoNextHeader:
 			fp.Protocol = uint8(proto)
+			fp.IPHdrLen = offset
 			fp.RemotePort = 0
 			fp.LocalPort = 0
 			fp.Fragment = false
@@ -369,6 +373,7 @@ func parseV6(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.Packet) error {
 				return ErrIPv6PacketTooShort
 			}
 			fp.Protocol = uint8(proto)
+			fp.IPHdrLen = offset
 			fp.LocalPort = 0 //incoming vs outgoing doesn't matter for icmpv6
 			icmptype := data[offset+1]
 			switch icmptype {
@@ -386,6 +391,9 @@ func parseV6(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.Packet) error {
 			}
 
 			fp.Protocol = uint8(proto)
+			// offset is the L4 header start: 40 for a plain packet, past the extension chain
+			// otherwise. The coalescer only accepts 40.
+			fp.IPHdrLen = offset
 			if incoming {
 				fp.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[offset : offset+2])
 				fp.LocalPort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[offset+2 : offset+4])
@@ -403,6 +411,9 @@ func parseV6(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.Packet) error {
 				return ErrIPv6PacketTooShort
 			}
 
+			// A fragment shape the coalescer must not touch either way, first fragment included.
+			fp.FragAny = true
+
 			// Check if this is the first fragment
 			fragmentOffset := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[offset+2:offset+4]) &^ uint16(0x7) // Remove the reserved and M flag bits
 			if fragmentOffset != 0 {
@@ -444,7 +455,7 @@ func parseV6(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.Packet) error {
 	return ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload
 }
 
-func parseV4(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.Packet) error {
+func parseV4(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.ParsedPacket) error {
 	// Do we at least have an ipv4 header worth of data?
 	if len(data) < ipv4.HeaderLen {
 		return ErrIPv4PacketTooShort
@@ -461,6 +472,10 @@ func parseV4(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.Packet) error {
 	// Check if this is the second or further fragment of a fragmented packet.
 	flagsfrags := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[6:8])
 	fp.Fragment = (flagsfrags & 0x1FFF) != 0
+	// Any fragmentation at all (MF or offset): first fragments have readable ports for the
+	// firewall but must never be coalesced.
+	fp.FragAny = (flagsfrags & 0x3fff) != 0
+	fp.IPHdrLen = ihl
 
 	// Firewall handles protocol checks
 	fp.Protocol = data[9]
@@ -504,45 +519,23 @@ func parseV4(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.Packet) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-func (f *Interface) decrypt(hostinfo *HostInfo, mc uint64, out []byte, packet []byte, h *header.H, nb []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+func (f *Interface) handleOutsideMessagePacket(hostinfo *HostInfo, messageCounter uint64, out []byte, rxc *rxContext) {
-	var err error
+	err := newPacket(out, true, rxc.fwPacket)
-	out, err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.DecryptDanger(out, packet[:header.Len], packet[header.Len:], mc, nb)
 	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
+		hostinfo.logger(f.l).Warn("Error while validating inbound packet", "error", err, "packet", out)
-	}
-
-	if !hostinfo.ConnectionState.window.Update(f.l, mc) {
-		return nil, ErrOutOfWindow
-	}
-
-	return out, nil
-}
-
-func (f *Interface) handleOutsideMessagePacket(hostinfo *HostInfo, out []byte, packet []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
-	err := newPacket(out, true, fwPacket)
-	if err != nil {
-		hostinfo.logger(f.l).Warn("Error while validating inbound packet",
-			"error", err,
-			"packet", out,
-		)
 		return
 	}
 
-	dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(*fwPacket, true, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), localCache)
+	dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(rxc.fwPacket.Packet, true, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), rxc.ctCache.Get())
 	if dropReason != nil {
-		// NOTE: We give `packet` as the `out` here since we already decrypted from it and we don't need it anymore
+		f.rejectOutside(out, hostinfo.ConnectionState, hostinfo, rxc.nb, rxc.scratch, rxc.q)
-		// This gives us a buffer to build the reject packet in
-		f.rejectOutside(out, hostinfo.ConnectionState, hostinfo, nb, packet, q)
 		if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
-			hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("dropping inbound packet",
+			hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("dropping inbound packet", "fwPacket", rxc.fwPacket, "reason", dropReason)
-				"fwPacket", fwPacket,
-				"reason", dropReason,
-			)
 		}
 		return
 	}
 
-	_, err = f.readers[q].Write(out)
+	err = f.batchers[rxc.q].Commit(out, batch.SortKey{Epoch: hostinfo.ConnectionState.epoch, Counter: messageCounter}, rxc.fwPacket)
 	if err != nil {
 		f.l.Error("Failed to write to tun", "error", err)
 	}

outside_test.go

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ import (
 )
 
 func Test_newPacket(t *testing.T) {
-	p := &firewall.Packet{}
+	p := &firewall.ParsedPacket{}
 
 	// length fails
 	err := newPacket([]byte{}, true, p)
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ func Test_newPacket(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func Test_newPacket_v6(t *testing.T) {
-	p := &firewall.Packet{}
+	p := &firewall.ParsedPacket{}
 
 	// invalid ipv6
 	ip := layers.IPv6{
@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ func Test_newPacket_v6(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func Test_newPacket_ipv6Fragment(t *testing.T) {
-	p := &firewall.Packet{}
+	p := &firewall.ParsedPacket{}
 
 	ip := &layers.IPv6{
 		Version:    6,
@@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ func BenchmarkParseV6(b *testing.B) {
 	secondFrag = append(secondFrag, fragHeader...)
 	secondFrag = append(secondFrag, []byte{0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef}...)
 
-	fp := &firewall.Packet{}
+	fp := &firewall.ParsedPacket{}
 
 	b.Run("Normal", func(b *testing.B) {
 		for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
@@ -649,7 +649,7 @@ func serializeAH(ah *layers.IPSecAH) []byte {
 // host OS parses the real header, a firewall port/proto bypass. The fix makes parseV6 land
 // on the same offset the host does.
 func Test_newPacket_v6ExtHeaderOverflow(t *testing.T) {
-	p := &firewall.Packet{}
+	p := &firewall.ParsedPacket{}
 
 	const (
 		hdrLen      = 40              // IPv6 header
@@ -675,3 +675,88 @@ func Test_newPacket_v6ExtHeaderOverflow(t *testing.T) {
 	// the host delivers to, not the forged 443 at the overflowed offset.
 	assert.Equal(t, uint16(22), p.LocalPort, "firewall must parse the real transport header, not the overflowed offset")
 }
+
+// Test_newPacket_parsedFields pins the ParsedPacket byproducts the RX
+// batcher consumes: IPHdrLen (the true L4 offset) and FragAny (any fragment
+// shape at all — unlike Packet.Fragment, which is port-oriented and true
+// only for non-first fragments).
+func Test_newPacket_parsedFields(t *testing.T) {
+	p := &firewall.ParsedPacket{}
+
+	// Plain IPv4 TCP, IHL 20: L4 offset 20, no fragment shape.
+	v4 := make([]byte, 28)
+	v4[0] = 0x45
+	v4[9] = firewall.ProtoTCP
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(v4[6:8], 0x4000) // DF only
+	require.NoError(t, newPacket(v4, true, p))
+	assert.Equal(t, 20, p.IPHdrLen)
+	assert.False(t, p.FragAny)
+	assert.False(t, p.Fragment)
+
+	// IPv4 first fragment (MF set, offset 0): the firewall can read ports
+	// (Fragment false) but the coalescer must not touch it (FragAny true).
+	ff := make([]byte, 28)
+	ff[0] = 0x45
+	ff[9] = firewall.ProtoUDP
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(ff[6:8], 0x2000) // MF, offset 0
+	require.NoError(t, newPacket(ff, true, p))
+	assert.False(t, p.Fragment)
+	assert.True(t, p.FragAny)
+	assert.Equal(t, 20, p.IPHdrLen)
+
+	// IPv4 non-first fragment (nonzero offset): both flags set.
+	nf := make([]byte, 28)
+	nf[0] = 0x45
+	nf[9] = firewall.ProtoUDP
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(nf[6:8], 0x00b9)
+	require.NoError(t, newPacket(nf, true, p))
+	assert.True(t, p.Fragment)
+	assert.True(t, p.FragAny)
+
+	// IPv4 with options (IHL 24): IPHdrLen tracks the real L4 offset.
+	opts := make([]byte, 32)
+	opts[0] = 0x46
+	opts[9] = firewall.ProtoTCP
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(opts[6:8], 0x4000)
+	require.NoError(t, newPacket(opts, true, p))
+	assert.Equal(t, 24, p.IPHdrLen)
+	assert.False(t, p.FragAny)
+
+	// Plain IPv6 TCP: L4 at 40.
+	v6 := make([]byte, 60)
+	v6[0] = 0x60
+	v6[6] = firewall.ProtoTCP
+	require.NoError(t, newPacket(v6, true, p))
+	assert.Equal(t, 40, p.IPHdrLen)
+	assert.False(t, p.FragAny)
+
+	// IPv6 hop-by-hop then TCP: IPHdrLen lands past the extension header.
+	hbh := make([]byte, 60)
+	hbh[0] = 0x60
+	hbh[6] = 0 // hop-by-hop
+	hbh[40] = firewall.ProtoTCP
+	hbh[41] = 0 // HdrExtLen 0 -> 8-byte header
+	require.NoError(t, newPacket(hbh, true, p))
+	assert.Equal(t, 48, p.IPHdrLen)
+	assert.False(t, p.FragAny)
+
+	// IPv6 first fragment: terminal proto resolved, FragAny set, Fragment not.
+	f6 := make([]byte, 60)
+	f6[0] = 0x60
+	f6[6] = 44 // fragment extension header
+	f6[40] = firewall.ProtoUDP
+	require.NoError(t, newPacket(f6, true, p))
+	assert.True(t, p.FragAny)
+	assert.False(t, p.Fragment)
+	assert.Equal(t, uint8(firewall.ProtoUDP), p.Protocol)
+
+	// IPv6 non-first fragment: both set, walk stops at the fragment header.
+	f6n := make([]byte, 60)
+	f6n[0] = 0x60
+	f6n[6] = 44
+	f6n[40] = firewall.ProtoUDP
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(f6n[42:44], 0x0008)
+	require.NoError(t, newPacket(f6n, true, p))
+	assert.True(t, p.Fragment)
+	assert.True(t, p.FragAny)
+}

overlay/batch/batch.go

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+package batch
+
+// SortKey identifies a packet's position in its sender's transmission order.
+// Epoch is a receiver-local ordinal for the tunnel (ConnectionState) that decrypted the packet:
+// a re-handshake replaces the tunnel outright and the replacement's epoch is higher,
+// so the old tunnel's packets sort first during the cutover overlap.
+// Counter is the packet's AEAD message counter within that tunnel.
+type SortKey struct {
+	Epoch   uint64
+	Counter uint64
+}

overlay/batch/checksum_seed_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+package batch
+
+import (
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"math/rand"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// The checksum-seeding helpers feed the virtio NEEDS_CSUM contract: the L4
+// checksum field is pre-loaded with the folded (not inverted) pseudo-header
+// sum, and the kernel later adds the L4 byte sum and inverts. A wrong seed
+// produces packets every receiver silently drops, with nothing failing on
+// our side — so these tests check the helpers against an independent
+// RFC 1071 reference built from explicit pseudo-header bytes, never against
+// the production checksum code.
+
+// refSum accumulates big-endian 16-bit words of b (odd tail zero-padded)
+// into a wide one's-complement accumulator.
+func refSum(b []byte) uint64 {
+	var s uint64
+	for i := 0; i+1 < len(b); i += 2 {
+		s += uint64(b[i])<<8 | uint64(b[i+1])
+	}
+	if len(b)%2 == 1 {
+		s += uint64(b[len(b)-1]) << 8
+	}
+	return s
+}
+
+// refFold folds a wide one's-complement accumulator to 16 bits.
+func refFold(s uint64) uint16 {
+	for s>>16 != 0 {
+		s = s&0xffff + s>>16
+	}
+	return uint16(s)
+}
+
+func TestFoldOnceNoInvertEdgeCases(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []uint32{
+		0, 1, 0xffff,
+		0x10000,    // single carry
+		0x1fffe,    // 0xffff + 0xffff: carry produces another 0xffff
+		0xffff0000, // high half only
+		0xfffeffff, // fold yields 0x1fffd: needs a second fold
+		0xffffffff, // worst case
+		0x00010001, // simple two-word
+	}
+	for _, c := range cases {
+		want := refFold(uint64(c))
+		if got := foldOnceNoInvert(c); got != want {
+			t.Errorf("foldOnceNoInvert(%#x) = %#x, want %#x", c, got, want)
+		}
+		// Folding a folded value must be a no-op.
+		if got := foldOnceNoInvert(uint32(foldOnceNoInvert(c))); got != foldOnceNoInvert(c) {
+			t.Errorf("foldOnceNoInvert not idempotent at %#x", c)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPseudoSumIPv4MatchesReference(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		name     string
+		src, dst [4]byte
+		proto    byte
+		l4Len    int
+	}{
+		{"simple", [4]byte{10, 0, 0, 1}, [4]byte{10, 0, 0, 2}, 6, 20},
+		{"zero-len", [4]byte{192, 168, 1, 1}, [4]byte{192, 168, 1, 2}, 17, 0},
+		{"max-len", [4]byte{1, 2, 3, 4}, [4]byte{5, 6, 7, 8}, 6, 65535},
+		{"carry-heavy", [4]byte{255, 255, 255, 255}, [4]byte{255, 255, 255, 254}, 17, 65535},
+		{"broadcastish", [4]byte{255, 255, 255, 255}, [4]byte{255, 255, 255, 255}, 255, 65535},
+	}
+	for _, c := range cases {
+		t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			// RFC 793 pseudo-header: src(4) dst(4) zero(1) proto(1) len(2).
+			ph := make([]byte, 12)
+			copy(ph[0:4], c.src[:])
+			copy(ph[4:8], c.dst[:])
+			ph[9] = c.proto
+			binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(ph[10:12], uint16(c.l4Len))
+			want := refFold(refSum(ph))
+
+			got := foldOnceNoInvert(pseudoSumIPv4(c.src[:], c.dst[:], c.proto, c.l4Len))
+			if got != want {
+				t.Errorf("fold(pseudoSumIPv4) = %#x, want %#x", got, want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPseudoSumIPv6MatchesReference(t *testing.T) {
+	ones := func(b byte) (a [16]byte) {
+		for i := range a {
+			a[i] = b
+		}
+		return
+	}
+	cases := []struct {
+		name     string
+		src, dst [16]byte
+		proto    byte
+		l4Len    int
+	}{
+		{"simple", [16]byte{0xfe, 0x80, 15: 1}, [16]byte{0xfe, 0x80, 15: 2}, 6, 20},
+		{"zero-len", [16]byte{0x20, 0x01, 15: 9}, [16]byte{0x20, 0x01, 15: 8}, 17, 0},
+		{"max-u16-len", ones(0xff), ones(0xfe), 6, 65535},
+		{"len-past-u16", ones(0xff), ones(0xff), 17, 0x12345}, // exercises the 32-bit split
+	}
+	for _, c := range cases {
+		t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			// RFC 8200 pseudo-header: src(16) dst(16) len(4) zero(3) next(1).
+			ph := make([]byte, 40)
+			copy(ph[0:16], c.src[:])
+			copy(ph[16:32], c.dst[:])
+			binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(ph[32:36], uint32(c.l4Len))
+			ph[39] = c.proto
+			want := refFold(refSum(ph))
+
+			got := foldOnceNoInvert(pseudoSumIPv6(c.src[:], c.dst[:], c.proto, c.l4Len))
+			if got != want {
+				t.Errorf("fold(pseudoSumIPv6) = %#x, want %#x", got, want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIPv4HdrChecksumMatchesReference(t *testing.T) {
+	rng := rand.New(rand.NewSource(0x1791))
+	for _, hdrLen := range []int{20, 24, 40, 60} {
+		for trial := 0; trial < 200; trial++ {
+			hdr := make([]byte, hdrLen)
+			rng.Read(hdr)
+			hdr[0] = 0x40 | byte(hdrLen/4)
+			hdr[10], hdr[11] = 0, 0 // checksum field zeroed, as the contract requires
+
+			want := ^refFold(refSum(hdr))
+			got := ipv4HdrChecksum(hdr)
+			if got != want {
+				t.Fatalf("ipv4HdrChecksum(len=%d trial=%d) = %#x, want %#x", hdrLen, trial, got, want)
+			}
+
+			// Receiver-side property: with the checksum stored, the full
+			// header must sum to all-ones.
+			binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[10:12], got)
+			if v := refFold(refSum(hdr)); v != 0xffff {
+				t.Fatalf("stored checksum does not validate: full-header fold = %#x", v)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestChecksumSeedReceiverAcceptance is the end-to-end property the helpers
+// exist for: seed the TCP checksum field with fold(pseudoSum), do what the
+// kernel's NEEDS_CSUM completion does (one's-complement sum over the L4
+// bytes including the seed, then invert, then store), and verify the result
+// the way a receiver does (pseudo-header + L4 must sum to all-ones).
+func TestChecksumSeedReceiverAcceptance(t *testing.T) {
+	rng := rand.New(rand.NewSource(0x1826))
+	for trial := 0; trial < 200; trial++ {
+		src := [4]byte{byte(rng.Intn(256)), byte(rng.Intn(256)), byte(rng.Intn(256)), byte(rng.Intn(256))}
+		dst := [4]byte{byte(rng.Intn(256)), byte(rng.Intn(256)), byte(rng.Intn(256)), byte(rng.Intn(256))}
+		payLen := rng.Intn(1500)
+		l4 := make([]byte, 20+payLen)
+		rng.Read(l4)
+
+		// Seed exactly as flushSlot does.
+		seed := foldOnceNoInvert(pseudoSumIPv4(src[:], dst[:], 6, len(l4)))
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(l4[16:18], seed)
+
+		// Kernel NEEDS_CSUM completion: sum the L4 region (seed included,
+		// which is equivalent to summing with the field zeroed and folding
+		// the seed in), invert, store.
+		final := ^refFold(refSum(l4[:16]) + uint64(seed) + refSum(l4[18:]))
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(l4[16:18], final)
+
+		// Receiver validation.
+		ph := make([]byte, 12)
+		copy(ph[0:4], src[:])
+		copy(ph[4:8], dst[:])
+		ph[9] = 6
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(ph[10:12], uint16(len(l4)))
+		if v := refFold(refSum(ph) + refSum(l4)); v != 0xffff {
+			t.Fatalf("trial %d: receiver rejects packet: fold = %#x (seed=%#x final=%#x payLen=%d)",
+				trial, v, seed, final, payLen)
+		}
+	}
+}

overlay/batch/coalesce_core.go

@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+package batch
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/binary"
+)
+
+// flowKey identifies a transport flow by {src, dst, sport, dport, family}.
+// Comparable, so map lookups and linear scans over the slot list stay tight.
+// Shared by the TCP and UDP coalescers; each coalescer keeps its own
+// openSlots map, so a TCP and UDP flow on the same 5-tuple-without-proto never alias.
+type flowKey struct {
+	src, dst     [16]byte
+	sport, dport uint16
+	isV6         bool
+}
+
+// initialSlots is the starting capacity of the slot pool.
+// One flow per packet is the worst case,
+// so this matches a typical carrier-side recvmmsg batch on the UDP socket.
+const initialSlots = 64
+
+// parseIPAt validates the IP header for lane parsing. newPacket already resolved the L4 protocol
+// and offset for the firewall, so there is no proto sniff here; the caller's ipHdrLen is
+// cross-checked instead. A plain header (v4 IHL 20, v6 exactly 40) is the only coalesceable
+// shape. The v6 check is load-bearing: it rejects extension-header packets whose L4 is not at
+// byte 40.
+//
+// The prologues fill fk's addresses and family in place (ports belong to the L4 parser; fk must
+// be zero on entry so the v4 path leaves src[4:]/dst[4:] clear for map equality) and return pkt
+// trimmed to the IP-declared length. The receiver-as-out-pointer shape is deliberate: these
+// functions are too big to inline, and returning structs by value put five 64-byte copies on the
+// per-packet path.
+func (fk *flowKey) parseIPAt(pkt []byte, ipHdrLen int) ([]byte, bool) {
+	if len(pkt) < 20 {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+	switch pkt[0] >> 4 {
+	case 4:
+		if ipHdrLen != 20 {
+			return nil, false
+		}
+		return fk.parseIPv4Prologue(pkt)
+	case 6:
+		if ipHdrLen != 40 || len(pkt) < 40 {
+			return nil, false
+		}
+		return fk.parseIPv6Prologue(pkt)
+	}
+	return nil, false
+}
+
+// parseIPv4Prologue is the shared IPv4 tail of the prologue entries; the caller has verified
+// len(pkt) >= 20 and the version.
+func (fk *flowKey) parseIPv4Prologue(pkt []byte) ([]byte, bool) {
+	ihl := int(pkt[0]&0x0f) * 4
+	if ihl != 20 {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+	// Reject any fragmentation (MF or nonzero offset). The dispatcher already gated FragAny; kept
+	// as defense in depth, since a fragment folded into a superpacket would corrupt reassembly.
+	if binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[6:8])&0x3fff != 0 {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+	totalLen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[2:4]))
+	if totalLen > len(pkt) || totalLen < ihl {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+	fk.isV6 = false
+	copy(fk.src[:4], pkt[12:16])
+	copy(fk.dst[:4], pkt[16:20])
+	return pkt[:totalLen], true
+}
+
+// parseIPv6Prologue is the shared IPv6 tail; the caller has verified len(pkt) >= 40, the version,
+// and that the L4 header sits at byte 40.
+func (fk *flowKey) parseIPv6Prologue(pkt []byte) ([]byte, bool) {
+	payloadLen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[4:6]))
+	if 40+payloadLen > len(pkt) {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+	fk.isV6 = true
+	copy(fk.src[:], pkt[8:24])
+	copy(fk.dst[:], pkt[24:40])
+	return pkt[:40+payloadLen], true
+}
+
+// ipHeadersMatch compares the IP portion of two packet header prefixes for
+// byte-for-byte equality on every field that must be identical across coalesced segments.
+// Size/IPID/IPCsum are masked out.
+// The full DSCP/ECN byte (IPv4 ToS / IPv6 traffic class) is compared, matching Linux kernel GRO:
+// segments with differing ECN codepoints must not coalesce,
+// otherwise ORing e.g. ECT(0) with ECT(1) would fabricate a false CE (congestion) mark or mark a Not-ECT flow as ECN-capable.
+//
+// The transport (L4) portion of the header is checked separately by the per-protocol matcher.
+func ipHeadersMatch(a, b []byte, isV6 bool) bool {
+	if isV6 {
+		// IPv6: [0:4] = version/TC/flow label (TC[1:0] is ECN, so the full TC byte must match),
+		// [6:40] = next_hdr/hop + src + dst. Skip [4:6] payload_len.
+		return bytes.Equal(a[:4], b[:4]) && bytes.Equal(a[6:40], b[6:40])
+	}
+	// IPv4: [0:2] = version/IHL + DSCP|ECN (full ECN byte must match),
+	// [6:10] = flags/fragoff/TTL/proto, [12:20] = src+dst.
+	// Skip [2:4] total len, [4:6] id, [10:12] csum.
+	return bytes.Equal(a[:2], b[:2]) && bytes.Equal(a[6:10], b[6:10]) && bytes.Equal(a[12:20], b[12:20])
+}
+
+// ipv4FlagDF is the Don't Fragment bit in the IPv4 flags byte (header byte 6).
+const ipv4FlagDF = 0x40
+
+// ipv4CanCoalesceID reports whether an IPv4 packet whose header starts at
+// nextHdr may join a chain whose seed header is seedHdr as segment index seg
+// (the seed is segment 0). Kernel GSO re-stamps outgoing segment IDs as
+// seed_id+n, so coalescing is only transparent when that re-stamp is either
+// harmless (DF set: RFC 6864 atomic datagrams, the ID carries no meaning) or
+// reproduces the original IDs exactly (DF clear + IDs already sequential —
+// the same admission rule kernel GRO applies). Without this, a DF=0 sender
+// with non-sequential IDs (e.g. OpenBSD's randomized IDs) could have IDs
+// rewritten into ranges that collide across superpackets, corrupting
+// reassembly if the packets are fragmented after the TUN write.
+//
+// DF itself is guaranteed uniform across a chain by ipHeadersMatch (byte 6
+// is inside its compared range), so checking the seed's copy suffices.
+func ipv4CanCoalesceID(seedHdr, nextHdr []byte, seg int) bool {
+	if seedHdr[6]&ipv4FlagDF != 0 {
+		return true
+	}
+	expect := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(seedHdr[4:6]) + uint16(seg)
+	return binary.BigEndian.Uint16(nextHdr[4:6]) == expect
+}
+
+// Arena is an injectable byte-slab that hands out non-overlapping borrowed
+// slices via Reserve and releases them in bulk via Reset.
+type Arena struct {
+	buf []byte
+}
+
+// NewArena returns an Arena with a pre-allocated backing of the given capacity.
+func NewArena(capacity int) *Arena {
+	return &Arena{buf: make([]byte, 0, capacity)}
+}
+
+// Reserve hands out a non-overlapping sz-byte slice from the arena.
+// If the request doesn't fit the current backing, a fresh, larger backing is allocated.
+// Already-borrowed slices reference the old backing and remain valid until Reset.
+func (a *Arena) Reserve(sz int) []byte {
+	if len(a.buf)+sz > cap(a.buf) {
+		newCap := max(cap(a.buf)*2, sz)
+		a.buf = make([]byte, 0, newCap)
+	}
+	start := len(a.buf)
+	a.buf = a.buf[:start+sz]
+	return a.buf[start : start+sz : start+sz]
+}
+
+// Reset releases every slice handed out since the last Reset.
+// Callers must not use any previously-borrowed slice after this returns.
+// The underlying backing array is retained so subsequent Reserves don't re-allocate.
+func (a *Arena) Reset() {
+	a.buf = a.buf[:0]
+}

overlay/batch/dispatch_bench_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+package batch
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
+)
+
+// stagePackets builds the stagedPacket entries Commit would have produced, so dispatch benchmarks
+// bypass staging and the sort entirely.
+func stagePackets(pkts [][]byte) []stagedPacket {
+	staged := make([]stagedPacket, len(pkts))
+	for i, p := range pkts {
+		pp := testPP(p)
+		staged[i] = stagedPacket{
+			pkt:      p,
+			key:      SortKey{Epoch: 1, Counter: uint64(i + 1)},
+			proto:    pp.Protocol,
+			fragAny:  pp.FragAny,
+			ipHdrLen: uint16(pp.IPHdrLen),
+		}
+	}
+	return staged
+}
+
+func flushLanes(b *testing.B, m *MultiCoalescer) {
+	b.Helper()
+	if m.tcp != nil {
+		if err := m.tcp.Flush(); err != nil {
+			b.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	if m.udp != nil {
+		if err := m.udp.Flush(); err != nil {
+			b.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	if err := m.pt.Flush(); err != nil {
+		b.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
+// runDispatchBench measures dispatch plus the per-batch lane flush: the post-sort half of the
+// batcher, which is where the production profile concentrates.
+func runDispatchBench(b *testing.B, pkts [][]byte, batchSize int) {
+	b.Helper()
+	m := NewMultiCoalescer(nopTunWriter{}, test.NewLogger())
+	staged := stagePackets(pkts)
+	b.ReportAllocs()
+	b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkts[0])))
+	b.ResetTimer()
+	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+		if err := m.dispatch(staged[i%len(staged)]); err != nil {
+			b.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if (i+1)%batchSize == 0 {
+			flushLanes(b, m)
+		}
+	}
+	b.StopTimer()
+	flushLanes(b, m)
+}
+
+// BenchmarkDispatchSingleFlow is the bulk steady state: every packet past the seed appends.
+func BenchmarkDispatchSingleFlow(b *testing.B) {
+	runDispatchBench(b, buildTCPv4BulkFlow(tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200), tcpCoalesceMaxSegs)
+}
+
+// BenchmarkDispatchInterleaved16 stresses the openSlots map: 16 flows round-robined defeats the
+// lastSlot cache on every packet.
+func BenchmarkDispatchInterleaved16(b *testing.B) {
+	pkts := buildTCPv4Interleaved(16, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
+	runDispatchBench(b, pkts, len(pkts))
+}
+
+// BenchmarkDispatchAckHeavy alternates MSS data with pure ACKs on one flow — the RX shape of a
+// bidirectional transfer (the peer's data and its ACKs of our data share the tunnel direction).
+func BenchmarkDispatchAckHeavy(b *testing.B) {
+	pay := make([]byte, 1200)
+	var pkts [][]byte
+	seq := uint32(1000)
+	for range tcpCoalesceMaxSegs / 2 {
+		pkts = append(pkts, buildTCPv4(seq, tcpAck, pay))
+		seq += uint32(len(pay))
+		pkts = append(pkts, buildTCPv4(seq, tcpAck, nil))
+	}
+	runDispatchBench(b, pkts, len(pkts))
+}
+
+// BenchmarkDispatchUDPFlow is the QUIC-ish bulk UDP shape.
+func BenchmarkDispatchUDPFlow(b *testing.B) {
+	pay := make([]byte, 1200)
+	pkts := make([][]byte, udpCoalesceMaxSegs)
+	for i := range pkts {
+		pkts[i] = buildUDPv4(2000, 443, pay)
+	}
+	runDispatchBench(b, pkts, len(pkts))
+}
+
+// BenchmarkDispatchSeedHeavy sets PSH on every packet so each one seeds and immediately closes
+// its own slot — the small-write RPC shape, and the upper bound on what the seed path (including
+// the parsedTCP-to-slot field transfer) can cost.
+func BenchmarkDispatchSeedHeavy(b *testing.B) {
+	pay := make([]byte, 1200)
+	pkts := make([][]byte, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs)
+	seq := uint32(1000)
+	for i := range pkts {
+		pkts[i] = buildTCPv4(seq, tcpAckPsh, pay)
+		seq += uint32(len(pay))
+	}
+	runDispatchBench(b, pkts, len(pkts))
+}

overlay/batch/lane_entry_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+package batch
+
+//TODO refactor this away
+// This file holds the lanes' self-parsing Commit entries and the proto-checking parsers behind
+// them. Production traffic enters the lanes only through MultiCoalescer.dispatch and the At
+// parsers; these wrappers reproduce that path (including seal-all on unparseable shapes) on top
+// of a local parse, so tests and benches can drive one lane with nothing but a packet.
+
+// parseIPPrologue resolves the IP version, requires the L4 protocol to match wantProto (6 TCP,
+// 17 UDP), and defers to the shared per-version cores. Returns the trimmed packet and the L4
+// offset; fk must be zero on entry and is filled in place.
+func (fk *flowKey) parseIPPrologue(pkt []byte, wantProto byte) ([]byte, int, bool) {
+	if len(pkt) < 20 {
+		return nil, 0, false
+	}
+	switch pkt[0] >> 4 {
+	case 4:
+		if pkt[9] != wantProto {
+			return nil, 0, false
+		}
+		trimmed, ok := fk.parseIPv4Prologue(pkt)
+		return trimmed, 20, ok
+	case 6:
+		if len(pkt) < 40 {
+			return nil, 0, false
+		}
+		if pkt[6] != wantProto {
+			return nil, 0, false
+		}
+		trimmed, ok := fk.parseIPv6Prologue(pkt)
+		return trimmed, 40, ok
+	}
+	return nil, 0, false
+}
+
+// parseBase extracts the flow key and IP/TCP offsets for any TCP packet, admissible for
+// coalescing or not. Returns false for non-TCP or malformed input.
+func (p *parsedTCP) parseBase(pkt []byte) bool {
+	trimmed, ipHdrLen, ok := p.fk.parseIPPrologue(pkt, ipProtoTCP)
+	if !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+	return p.parseTail(trimmed, ipHdrLen)
+}
+
+// parseBase extracts the flow key and IP/UDP offsets for a UDP packet.
+func (p *parsedUDP) parseBase(pkt []byte) bool {
+	trimmed, ipHdrLen, ok := p.fk.parseIPPrologue(pkt, ipProtoUDP)
+	if !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+	return p.parseTail(trimmed, ipHdrLen)
+}
+
+// Commit borrows pkt. The caller must keep pkt valid until the next Flush.
+func (c *TCPCoalescer) Commit(pkt []byte) error {
+	var info parsedTCP
+	if !info.parseBase(pkt) {
+		// Unparseable: flow key unknown, seal everything so later data cannot emit ahead of it.
+		c.sealAllOpen()
+		c.addVerbatim(pkt)
+		return nil
+	}
+	return c.commitParsed(pkt, &info)
+}
+
+// Commit borrows pkt. The caller must keep pkt valid until the next Flush.
+func (c *UDPCoalescer) Commit(pkt []byte) error {
+	var info parsedUDP
+	if !info.parseBase(pkt) {
+		c.sealAllOpen()
+		c.addVerbatim(pkt)
+		return nil
+	}
+	return c.commitParsed(pkt, &info)
+}

overlay/batch/multi_coalesce.go

@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+package batch
+
+import (
+	"cmp"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"log/slog"
+	"slices"
+
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
+)
+
+// MultiCoalescer stages plaintext packets with their (epoch, counter) sort keys and, at Flush,
+// replays them in sender-transmission order into lane-specific batchers selected by L4 protocol.
+//
+// Sorting before dispatch keeps the ordering story simple: each lane consumes packets in
+// transmission order, builds slots in that order, and emits them in creation order. Wire reorder
+// inside a flush batch is repaired here, before it can fragment a lane's coalesce chains, so the
+// lanes carry no reorder-repair machinery.
+//
+// The contract is per-tunnel transmission order within each lane, with two exceptions: a pure TCP
+// ACK may be overtaken by later same-flow data (it does not close the flow's open chain; a late
+// ACK is just a stale ACK), and an unparseable shape seals every open chain in its lane (its flow
+// is unknown) and rides the lane as an in-lane verbatim, still in transmission order. Routing
+// follows the flow: a flow's non-coalesceable shapes ride its protocol lane rather than falling
+// to the later-flushed pt lane.
+//
+// Cross-lane order (TCP vs UDP vs everything else) is not preserved.
+type MultiCoalescer struct {
+	tcp *TCPCoalescer
+	udp *UDPCoalescer
+	pt  *Passthrough
+
+	// staged holds this batch's packets and sort keys until Flush. Borrowed: the caller keeps
+	// each pkt alive until Flush returns.
+	staged []stagedPacket
+}
+
+// stagedPacket carries the scalars dispatch needs from the firewall's ParsedPacket, copied by
+// value: pp is reused by the caller per packet and must not be retained past Commit.
+type stagedPacket struct {
+	pkt      []byte
+	key      SortKey
+	proto    byte
+	fragAny  bool
+	ipHdrLen uint16
+}
+
+// NewMultiCoalescer builds a multi-lane batcher over w, based on available protocol support. The
+// staging sort applies even when no GSO lane is available: passthrough-only platforms still get
+// transmission-order repair.
+func NewMultiCoalescer(w io.Writer, l *slog.Logger) *MultiCoalescer {
+	m := &MultiCoalescer{
+		pt:     NewPassthrough(w),
+		staged: make([]stagedPacket, 0, initialSlots),
+	}
+	m.tcp = NewTCPCoalescer(w, l)
+	m.udp = NewUDPCoalescer(w)
+	return m
+}
+
+// Commit stages pkt for the next Flush; dispatch is deferred so it runs on packets already in
+// transmission order. key carries the packet's tunnel epoch and message counter. pkt is borrowed:
+// the caller must keep it valid until the next Flush and not re-use it, and Flush may patch a
+// coalesced packet's headers in place. pp is the firewall's parse of pkt and is borrowed only
+// for this call, so the fields dispatch needs are copied here.
+func (m *MultiCoalescer) Commit(pkt []byte, key SortKey, pp *firewall.ParsedPacket) error {
+	m.staged = append(m.staged, stagedPacket{
+		pkt:      pkt,
+		key:      key,
+		proto:    pp.Protocol,
+		fragAny:  pp.FragAny,
+		ipHdrLen: uint16(pp.IPHdrLen),
+	})
+	return nil
+}
+
+// compareStaged orders staged packets by (epoch, counter)
+func compareStaged(a, b stagedPacket) int {
+	if c := cmp.Compare(a.key.Epoch, b.key.Epoch); c != 0 {
+		return c
+	}
+	return cmp.Compare(a.key.Counter, b.key.Counter)
+}
+
+// dispatch routes one staged packet to its protocol lane (see commitStaged), or to the verbatim
+// passthrough when the lane has no GSO support.
+func (m *MultiCoalescer) dispatch(sp stagedPacket) error {
+	switch sp.proto {
+	case ipProtoTCP:
+		if m.tcp != nil {
+			return m.tcp.commitStaged(sp)
+		}
+	case ipProtoUDP:
+		if m.udp != nil {
+			return m.udp.commitStaged(sp)
+		}
+	}
+	return m.pt.enqueue(sp.pkt)
+}
+
+// Flush sorts the staged batch into transmission order, replays it into the lanes, then flushes each lane.
+// Drains everything and returns the joined errors; one bad packet does not hold up the rest.
+// After Flush returns, committed payload slices may be recycled.
+func (m *MultiCoalescer) Flush() error {
+	// Arrival order is already almost sorted (reorder is the exception), which pdqsort detects
+	// and handles in near-linear time.
+	slices.SortFunc(m.staged, compareStaged)
+
+	var errs []error
+	for _, sp := range m.staged {
+		if err := m.dispatch(sp); err != nil {
+			errs = append(errs, err)
+		}
+	}
+	clear(m.staged) // drop borrowed pkt refs
+	m.staged = m.staged[:0]
+
+	if m.tcp != nil {
+		if err := m.tcp.Flush(); err != nil {
+			errs = append(errs, err)
+		}
+	}
+	if m.udp != nil {
+		if err := m.udp.Flush(); err != nil {
+			errs = append(errs, err)
+		}
+	}
+	if err := m.pt.Flush(); err != nil {
+		errs = append(errs, err)
+	}
+	return errors.Join(errs...)
+}

overlay/batch/multi_coalesce_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,437 @@
+package batch
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"io"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
+)
+
+// keySeq hands out SortKeys with ascending counters in a fixed epoch, for
+// tests where commit order IS transmission order.
+type keySeq struct {
+	epoch, counter uint64
+}
+
+func (k *keySeq) next() SortKey {
+	k.counter++
+	return SortKey{Epoch: k.epoch, Counter: k.counter}
+}
+
+// newTestMultiCoalescer builds a batcher over w.
+func newTestMultiCoalescer(tb testing.TB, w io.Writer) *MultiCoalescer {
+	tb.Helper()
+	return NewMultiCoalescer(w, test.NewLogger())
+}
+
+// TestMultiCoalescerRoutesByProto confirms TCP/UDP/other land in the right
+// lane: TCP and UDP get coalesced when their lanes are enabled, anything
+// else (ICMP here) falls through to plain Write.
+func TestMultiCoalescerRoutesByProto(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
+	m := newTestMultiCoalescer(t, w)
+	k := &keySeq{epoch: 1}
+
+	tcpPay := make([]byte, 1200)
+	udpPay := make([]byte, 1200)
+	icmp := make([]byte, 28)
+	icmp[0] = 0x45
+	icmp[2] = 0
+	icmp[3] = 28
+	icmp[9] = 1
+
+	if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, tcpPay), k.next(), testPP(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, tcpPay))); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4(2200, tcpAck, tcpPay), k.next(), testPP(buildTCPv4(2200, tcpAck, tcpPay))); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := m.Commit(buildUDPv4(2000, 53, udpPay), k.next(), testPP(buildUDPv4(2000, 53, udpPay))); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := m.Commit(buildUDPv4(2000, 53, udpPay), k.next(), testPP(buildUDPv4(2000, 53, udpPay))); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := m.Commit(icmp, k.next(), testPP(icmp)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// 1 TCP super (2 segments) + 1 UDP super (2 segments) = 2 gso writes.
+	if len(w.gsoWrites) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("want 2 gso writes (one TCP + one UDP), got %d", len(w.gsoWrites))
+	}
+	if len(w.writes) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("want 1 plain write (ICMP), got %d", len(w.writes))
+	}
+}
+
+// TestMultiCoalescerRestoresTransmissionOrder is the core staging-sort
+// property: packets committed out of counter order (wire reorder inside one
+// flush batch) are replayed into the lanes in transmission order, so the
+// reorder never fragments the coalesce chain — one superpacket, in seq
+// order, exactly as if the wire had never reordered. The retransmit shape
+// falls out of the same key: a retransmit carries a lower seq but a HIGHER
+// counter (it was encrypted later), so it emits after the data it trails.
+func TestMultiCoalescerRestoresTransmissionOrder(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
+	m := newTestMultiCoalescer(t, w)
+	pay := make([]byte, 1200)
+
+	// Transmission order: seq 1000 (c1), 2200 (c2), 3400 (c3).
+	// Arrival order: 3400, 1000, 2200.
+	if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4(3400, tcpAck, pay), SortKey{Epoch: 1, Counter: 3}, testPP(buildTCPv4(3400, tcpAck, pay))); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, pay), SortKey{Epoch: 1, Counter: 1}, testPP(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, pay))); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4(2200, tcpAck, pay), SortKey{Epoch: 1, Counter: 2}, testPP(buildTCPv4(2200, tcpAck, pay))); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(w.gsoWrites) != 1 || len(w.writes) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("want 1 gso write (unfragmented chain), got gso=%d plain=%d", len(w.gsoWrites), len(w.writes))
+	}
+	g := w.gsoWrites[0]
+	if len(g.pays) != 3 {
+		t.Fatalf("segs=%d want 3", len(g.pays))
+	}
+	const ipHdrLen = 20
+	if seedSeq := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(g.hdr[ipHdrLen+4 : ipHdrLen+8]); seedSeq != 1000 {
+		t.Errorf("seed seq=%d want 1000", seedSeq)
+	}
+
+	// Retransmit: seq 1000 again but counter 4 — sorts after seq 4600 (c3).
+	w.writes, w.gsoWrites, w.order = nil, nil, nil
+	if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, pay), SortKey{Epoch: 1, Counter: 4}, testPP(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, pay))); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4(4600, tcpAck, pay), SortKey{Epoch: 1, Counter: 3}, testPP(buildTCPv4(4600, tcpAck, pay))); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(w.writes) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("want 2 plain writes, got %d (gso=%d)", len(w.writes), len(w.gsoWrites))
+	}
+	first := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(w.writes[0][24:28])
+	second := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(w.writes[1][24:28])
+	if first != 4600 || second != 1000 {
+		t.Fatalf("emission (%d, %d), want (4600, 1000): retransmit must not overtake in-flight data", first, second)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestMultiCoalescerRestoresOrderAcrossFlows scrambles two interleaved flows;
+// the staging sort must repair each flow into one superpacket without any
+// cross-flow contamination.
+func TestMultiCoalescerRestoresOrderAcrossFlows(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
+	m := newTestMultiCoalescer(t, w)
+	pay := make([]byte, 1200)
+
+	// Transmission: A.100 (c1), B.500 (c2), A.1300 (c3), B.1700 (c4).
+	// Arrival: A.1300, B.1700, A.100, B.500.
+	if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4Ports(1000, 2000, 1300, tcpAck, pay), SortKey{Epoch: 1, Counter: 3}, testPP(buildTCPv4Ports(1000, 2000, 1300, tcpAck, pay))); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4Ports(3000, 2000, 1700, tcpAck, pay), SortKey{Epoch: 1, Counter: 4}, testPP(buildTCPv4Ports(3000, 2000, 1700, tcpAck, pay))); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4Ports(1000, 2000, 100, tcpAck, pay), SortKey{Epoch: 1, Counter: 1}, testPP(buildTCPv4Ports(1000, 2000, 100, tcpAck, pay))); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4Ports(3000, 2000, 500, tcpAck, pay), SortKey{Epoch: 1, Counter: 2}, testPP(buildTCPv4Ports(3000, 2000, 500, tcpAck, pay))); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(w.gsoWrites) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("want 2 gso writes (one per flow), got %d (plain=%d)", len(w.gsoWrites), len(w.writes))
+	}
+	for i, g := range w.gsoWrites {
+		if len(g.pays) != 2 {
+			t.Errorf("gso[%d] segs=%d want 2", i, len(g.pays))
+		}
+		const ipHdrLen = 20
+		seedSeq := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(g.hdr[ipHdrLen+4 : ipHdrLen+8])
+		sport := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(g.hdr[ipHdrLen : ipHdrLen+2])
+		switch sport {
+		case 1000:
+			if seedSeq != 100 {
+				t.Errorf("flow A seed seq=%d want 100", seedSeq)
+			}
+		case 3000:
+			if seedSeq != 500 {
+				t.Errorf("flow B seed seq=%d want 500", seedSeq)
+			}
+		default:
+			t.Errorf("unexpected sport %d", sport)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestMultiCoalescerEpochOrdersAcrossRehandshake: a re-handshake replaces
+// the tunnel, and the replacement's counter space starts near zero — raw
+// counter order would emit the new tunnel's packets first while the old
+// tunnel's backlog is still arriving. The epoch key must dominate:
+// everything from the old tunnel emits before anything from the new one.
+func TestMultiCoalescerEpochOrdersAcrossRehandshake(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
+	m := newTestMultiCoalescer(t, w)
+	pay := make([]byte, 1200)
+
+	// New session's first data arrives before the old session's last data.
+	if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4(2200, tcpAck, pay), SortKey{Epoch: 8, Counter: 1}, testPP(buildTCPv4(2200, tcpAck, pay))); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, pay), SortKey{Epoch: 7, Counter: 9_000_000}, testPP(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, pay))); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// Same flow, contiguous seq, identical headers: after the epoch sort the
+	// two segments append into one superpacket seeded by the OLD session's
+	// packet.
+	if len(w.gsoWrites) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("want 1 gso write, got %d (plain=%d)", len(w.gsoWrites), len(w.writes))
+	}
+	const ipHdrLen = 20
+	if seedSeq := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(w.gsoWrites[0].hdr[ipHdrLen+4 : ipHdrLen+8]); seedSeq != 1000 {
+		t.Errorf("seed seq=%d want 1000 (old session first)", seedSeq)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestMultiCoalescerNoUSOFallsThrough verifies that on a queue without USO
+// (older kernel: TSO but no GSO_UDP_L4) the UDP lane never comes up and UDP
+// packets still reach the kernel via verbatim rather than being lost.
+func TestMultiCoalescerNoUSOFallsThrough(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true, noUSO: true}
+	m := newTestMultiCoalescer(t, w)
+	k := &keySeq{epoch: 1}
+	if m.udp != nil {
+		t.Fatal("UDP lane must not come up without USO")
+	}
+
+	if err := m.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, make([]byte, 800)), k.next(), testPP(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, make([]byte, 800)))); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := m.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, make([]byte, 800)), k.next(), testPP(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, make([]byte, 800)))); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(w.gsoWrites) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("UDP must NOT be coalesced when USO disabled, got %d gso writes", len(w.gsoWrites))
+	}
+	if len(w.writes) != 2 {
+		t.Errorf("UDP must pass through as 2 plain writes, got %d", len(w.writes))
+	}
+}
+
+// TestMultiCoalescerNoOffloadsStillSorts covers a queue that can't offload
+// anything. Both lane constructors refuse, so every packet rides the
+// verbatim lane — but the staging sort still applies, so emission follows
+// transmission order even without GSO.
+func TestMultiCoalescerNoOffloadsStillSorts(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: false}
+	m := newTestMultiCoalescer(t, w)
+	if m.tcp != nil || m.udp != nil {
+		t.Fatal("no lane may come up without offloads")
+	}
+	pkts := [][]byte{
+		buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, make([]byte, 1200)),
+		buildUDPv4(1000, 53, make([]byte, 800)),
+		buildTCPv4(2200, tcpAck, make([]byte, 1200)),
+	}
+	// Committed in reverse transmission order; keys carry the truth.
+	for i := len(pkts) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
+		if err := m.Commit(pkts[i], SortKey{Epoch: 1, Counter: uint64(i + 1)}, testPP(pkts[i])); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(w.gsoWrites) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("no GSO writes possible, got %d", len(w.gsoWrites))
+	}
+	if len(w.writes) != len(pkts) {
+		t.Fatalf("want %d plain writes, got %d", len(pkts), len(w.writes))
+	}
+	// One lane for everything means the sorted order survives end to end.
+	for i, want := range pkts {
+		if !bytes.Equal(w.writes[i], want) {
+			t.Errorf("write %d out of order or corrupt", i)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// buildUDPv6Fragment builds an IPv6 packet whose extension chain is a
+// single fragment header (NH=44) naming UDP as the terminal protocol —
+// a first fragment (offset 0, MF set) carrying the UDP header and a
+// partial payload.
+func buildUDPv6Fragment(sport, dport uint16, payload []byte) []byte {
+	const ipHdrLen = 40
+	const fragHdrLen = 8
+	const udpHdrLen = 8
+	total := ipHdrLen + fragHdrLen + udpHdrLen + len(payload)
+	pkt := make([]byte, total)
+
+	pkt[0] = 0x60
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(total-ipHdrLen))
+	pkt[6] = 44 // fragment extension header
+	pkt[7] = 64
+	pkt[8] = 0xfe
+	pkt[9] = 0x80
+	pkt[23] = 1
+	pkt[24] = 0xfe
+	pkt[25] = 0x80
+	pkt[39] = 2
+
+	pkt[40] = ipProtoUDP                              // fragment's next header
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[42:44], 0x0001)    // offset 0, MF set
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(pkt[44:48], 0x1badf00) // identification
+
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[48:50], sport)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[50:52], dport)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[52:54], uint16(udpHdrLen+len(payload)))
+	copy(pkt[56:], payload)
+	return pkt
+}
+
+// TestMultiCoalescerIPv6FragmentStaysInLane locks in extension-header
+// routing: a fragment whose chain terminates in UDP must ride the UDP lane
+// as an in-lane verbatim — emitted ahead of later same-flow datagrams —
+// not the verbatim lane, which flushes after every coalescer lane and
+// would reorder it behind data that arrived after it.
+func TestMultiCoalescerIPv6FragmentStaysInLane(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
+	m := newTestMultiCoalescer(t, w)
+	k := &keySeq{epoch: 1}
+
+	if err := m.Commit(buildUDPv6Fragment(2000, 53, make([]byte, 512)), k.next(), testPP(buildUDPv6Fragment(2000, 53, make([]byte, 512)))); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := m.Commit(buildUDPv6(2000, 53, make([]byte, 800)), k.next(), testPP(buildUDPv6(2000, 53, make([]byte, 800)))); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := m.Commit(buildUDPv6(2000, 53, make([]byte, 800)), k.next(), testPP(buildUDPv6(2000, 53, make([]byte, 800)))); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(w.writes) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("want the fragment as 1 plain write, got %d", len(w.writes))
+	}
+	if len(w.gsoWrites) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("want the two whole datagrams coalesced into 1 gso write, got %d", len(w.gsoWrites))
+	}
+	// Transmission order was fragment-then-data; same-lane routing must keep it.
+	if w.order[0] != "write" {
+		t.Fatalf("fragment must be emitted before later data (in-lane verbatim), order=%v", w.order)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestMultiCoalescerFragmentSealsUDPChains: an unparseable datagram
+// (fragment) seals every open UDP chain, so datagrams from before and after
+// it land in separate superpackets and the fragment holds its transmission-
+// order position between them.
+func TestMultiCoalescerFragmentSealsUDPChains(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
+	m := newTestMultiCoalescer(t, w)
+	k := &keySeq{epoch: 1}
+
+	if err := m.Commit(buildUDPv6(2000, 53, make([]byte, 800)), k.next(), testPP(buildUDPv6(2000, 53, make([]byte, 800)))); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := m.Commit(buildUDPv6(2000, 53, make([]byte, 800)), k.next(), testPP(buildUDPv6(2000, 53, make([]byte, 800)))); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := m.Commit(buildUDPv6Fragment(2000, 53, make([]byte, 512)), k.next(), testPP(buildUDPv6Fragment(2000, 53, make([]byte, 512)))); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := m.Commit(buildUDPv6(2000, 53, make([]byte, 800)), k.next(), testPP(buildUDPv6(2000, 53, make([]byte, 800)))); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := m.Commit(buildUDPv6(2000, 53, make([]byte, 800)), k.next(), testPP(buildUDPv6(2000, 53, make([]byte, 800)))); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(w.gsoWrites) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("want 2 gso writes (chains sealed around the fragment), got %d", len(w.gsoWrites))
+	}
+	if len(w.writes) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("want the fragment as 1 plain write, got %d", len(w.writes))
+	}
+	want := []string{"gso", "write", "gso"}
+	if len(w.order) != 3 || w.order[0] != want[0] || w.order[1] != want[1] || w.order[2] != want[2] {
+		t.Fatalf("emission order = %v, want %v", w.order, want)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestMultiCoalescerNoTSOFallsThrough mirrors the no-TSO case.
+func TestMultiCoalescerNoTSOFallsThrough(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true, noTSO: true}
+	m := newTestMultiCoalescer(t, w)
+	k := &keySeq{epoch: 1}
+	if m.tcp != nil {
+		t.Fatal("TCP lane must not come up without TSO")
+	}
+
+	pay := make([]byte, 1200)
+	if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, pay), k.next(), testPP(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, pay))); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4(2200, tcpAck, pay), k.next(), testPP(buildTCPv4(2200, tcpAck, pay))); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(w.gsoWrites) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("TCP must NOT be coalesced when TSO disabled, got %d gso writes", len(w.gsoWrites))
+	}
+	if len(w.writes) != 2 {
+		t.Errorf("TCP must pass through as 2 plain writes, got %d", len(w.writes))
+	}
+}
+
+// testPP derives the ParsedPacket newPacket would produce for the packet
+// shapes the tests build: plain v4/v6, v4 with options or fragment bits set,
+// and the single-fragment-header v6 shape from buildUDPv6Fragment. Anything
+// unrecognizable stays zero (proto 0 routes to the passthrough lane).
+func testPP(pkt []byte) *firewall.ParsedPacket {
+	pp := &firewall.ParsedPacket{}
+	if len(pkt) < 20 {
+		return pp
+	}
+	switch pkt[0] >> 4 {
+	case 4:
+		pp.Protocol = pkt[9]
+		pp.IPHdrLen = int(pkt[0]&0x0f) * 4
+		pp.FragAny = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[6:8])&0x3fff != 0
+	case 6:
+		pp.Protocol = pkt[6]
+		pp.IPHdrLen = 40
+		if pp.Protocol == 44 { // fragment extension header
+			pp.Protocol = pkt[40]
+			pp.IPHdrLen = 48
+			pp.FragAny = true
+		}
+	}
+	return pp
+}

overlay/batch/passthrough.go

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+package batch
+
+import (
+	"io"
+)
+
+// Passthrough is MultiCoalescer's verbatim lane: no batching, packets are written at Flush in the
+// order enqueued.
+type Passthrough struct {
+	out   io.Writer
+	slots [][]byte
+}
+
+func NewPassthrough(w io.Writer) *Passthrough {
+	return &Passthrough{
+		out:   w,
+		slots: make([][]byte, 0, 128),
+	}
+}
+
+// enqueue accepts one packet, already sorted into transmission order by dispatch.
+func (p *Passthrough) enqueue(pkt []byte) error {
+	p.slots = append(p.slots, pkt)
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (p *Passthrough) Flush() error {
+	var firstErr error
+	for _, s := range p.slots {
+		_, err := p.out.Write(s)
+		if err != nil && firstErr == nil {
+			firstErr = err
+		}
+	}
+	clear(p.slots)
+	p.slots = p.slots[:0]
+	return firstErr
+}

overlay/batch/tcp_coalesce.go

@@ -0,0 +1,472 @@
+package batch
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"io"
+	"log/slog"
+
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
+)
+
+// ipProtoTCP is the IANA protocol number for TCP. Defined here to help Windows out.
+const ipProtoTCP = 6
+
+// tcpCoalesceBufSize caps total bytes per superpacket. Mirrors the kernel's
+// sk_gso_max_size of ~64KiB; anything beyond this would be rejected anyway.
+const tcpCoalesceBufSize = 65535
+
+// tcpCoalesceMaxSegs caps how many segments we'll coalesce into a single
+// superpacket. Keeping this well below the kernel's TSO ceiling bounds latency.
+const tcpCoalesceMaxSegs = 64
+
+// coalesceSlot is one entry in the coalescer's ordered event queue. A verbatim slot holds a single
+// borrowed packet emitted as-is (pure ACK, non-admissible TCP, unparseable, or oversize seed); a
+// non-verbatim slot is an in-progress coalesced superpacket. payIovs are borrowed slices of the
+// caller's plaintext buffers; the caller must keep them alive until Flush.
+type coalesceSlot struct {
+	verbatim bool
+	// rawPkt is borrowed: the whole packet for verbatim slots, the seed packet for coalesce
+	// slots. A slot that never grows past one segment is emitted from rawPkt so its original
+	// (already valid) L4 checksum ships DATA_VALID instead of making the kernel recompute it.
+	// A multi-segment slot's superpacket header is rawPkt's, patched in place at flush.
+	rawPkt []byte
+
+	fk       flowKey
+	hdrLen   int
+	ipHdrLen int
+	isV6     bool
+	gsoSize  int
+	numSeg   int
+	totalPay int
+	nextSeq  uint32
+	payIovs  [][]byte
+}
+
+// TCPCoalescer accumulates adjacent in-flow TCP data segments across multiple concurrent flows and
+// emits each flow's run as a single TSO superpacket via tio.GSOWriter. Input must be in sender
+// transmission order (MultiCoalescer sorts by (epoch, counter) before dispatch); slots are emitted
+// in creation order, so emission reproduces transmission order except for the pure-ACK case in
+// commitParsed. Owns no locks; one coalescer per TUN write queue.
+type TCPCoalescer struct {
+	w tio.GSOWriter
+
+	// slots is the ordered event queue. Flush walks it once and emits each
+	// entry as either a WriteGSO (coalesced) or a w.Write (verbatim).
+	slots []*coalesceSlot
+	// openSlots maps a flow key to its open slot so new segments can extend an in-progress
+	// superpacket in O(1). Removal is what closes a chain: on PSH or a short last segment, on a
+	// non-admissible packet for the flow, or in Flush.
+	openSlots map[flowKey]*coalesceSlot
+	// lastSlot caches the most recently touched open slot. Bulk traffic
+	// arrives in same-flow runs (single-flow steady state, or GRO bursts
+	// under multi-flow), so comparing the incoming key against the cached
+	// slot's own fk lets the hot path skip the map lookup (and the aeshash
+	// of a 38-byte key) for the length of each run.
+	// Kept in lockstep with openSlots: nil whenever the slot it pointed
+	// at is removed.
+	lastSlot *coalesceSlot
+	pool     []*coalesceSlot // free list for reuse
+	l        *slog.Logger
+}
+
+// NewTCPCoalescer wraps w, returning nil if w can't accept GSO_TCP writes.
+func NewTCPCoalescer(w io.Writer, l *slog.Logger) *TCPCoalescer {
+	gw, ok := tio.SupportsGSO(w, tio.GSOProtoTCP)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return &TCPCoalescer{
+		w:         gw,
+		slots:     make([]*coalesceSlot, 0, initialSlots),
+		openSlots: make(map[flowKey]*coalesceSlot, initialSlots),
+		pool:      make([]*coalesceSlot, 0, initialSlots),
+		l:         l,
+	}
+}
+
+// parsedTCP holds the fields extracted from a single parse so later steps
+// (admission, slot lookup, canAppend) don't re-walk the header.
+type parsedTCP struct {
+	fk       flowKey
+	ipHdrLen int
+	hdrLen   int
+	payLen   int
+	seq      uint32
+	flags    byte
+}
+
+// parseAt extracts the flow key and IP/TCP offsets for a packet the dispatcher already knows is
+// TCP; ipHdrLen is the upstream-resolved L4 offset (see flowKey.parseIPAt). p must be zero on
+// entry and is filled in place; see flowKey.parseIPAt for why. Returns false for malformed input
+// or any shape that must not coalesce (IPv4 options/fragmentation, IPv6 extension headers).
+func (p *parsedTCP) parseAt(pkt []byte, ipHdrLen int) bool {
+	trimmed, ok := p.fk.parseIPAt(pkt, ipHdrLen)
+	if !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+	return p.parseTail(trimmed, ipHdrLen)
+}
+
+// parseTail layers the TCP-header parse on a validated IP prologue. pkt is the trimmed packet;
+// fk's addresses are already filled.
+func (p *parsedTCP) parseTail(pkt []byte, ipHdrLen int) bool {
+	if len(pkt) < ipHdrLen+20 {
+		return false
+	}
+	tcpOff := int(pkt[ipHdrLen+12]>>4) * 4
+	if tcpOff < 20 || tcpOff > 60 {
+		return false
+	}
+	if len(pkt) < ipHdrLen+tcpOff {
+		return false
+	}
+	p.ipHdrLen = ipHdrLen
+	p.hdrLen = ipHdrLen + tcpOff
+	p.payLen = len(pkt) - p.hdrLen
+	p.fk.sport = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[ipHdrLen : ipHdrLen+2])
+	p.fk.dport = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[ipHdrLen+2 : ipHdrLen+4])
+	p.seq = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(pkt[ipHdrLen+4 : ipHdrLen+8])
+	p.flags = pkt[ipHdrLen+13]
+	return true
+}
+
+// TCP flag bits (byte 13 of the TCP header). Only the bits the coalescer consults are named;
+// FIN/SYN/RST/URG/CWR are rejected by the negative mask in commitParsed.
+const (
+	tcpFlagPsh = 0x08
+	tcpFlagAck = 0x10
+	tcpFlagEce = 0x40
+)
+
+// sealAllOpen closes every open coalesce chain. Called for unparseable packets: the flow key is
+// unknown, so any open chain could otherwise absorb later data and emit it ahead of this packet.
+func (c *TCPCoalescer) sealAllOpen() {
+	clear(c.openSlots)
+	c.lastSlot = nil
+}
+
+// sealFlow closes fk's open chain, if any, keeping lastSlot in lockstep. The len guard skips
+// hashing the 38-byte key when no chains are open (e.g. ack-dominant queues).
+func (c *TCPCoalescer) sealFlow(fk flowKey) {
+	if len(c.openSlots) == 0 {
+		return
+	}
+	if last := c.lastSlot; last != nil && last.fk == fk {
+		c.lastSlot = nil
+	}
+	delete(c.openSlots, fk)
+}
+
+// commitStaged commits one staged packet dispatch routed to this lane. A shape the lane cannot
+// coalesce (any fragmentation, unparseable header) seals every open chain
+// and rides the lane as an in-lane verbatim, still in transmission order.
+func (c *TCPCoalescer) commitStaged(sp stagedPacket) error {
+	if sp.fragAny {
+		c.sealAllOpen()
+		c.addVerbatim(sp.pkt)
+		return nil
+	}
+	var info parsedTCP
+	if !info.parseAt(sp.pkt, int(sp.ipHdrLen)) {
+		c.sealAllOpen()
+		c.addVerbatim(sp.pkt)
+		return nil
+	}
+	return c.commitParsed(sp.pkt, &info)
+}
+
+// commitParsed commits one parsed TCP packet. The caller (dispatch, via parseAt) supplies a
+// valid parse so the header is not re-walked here.
+func (c *TCPCoalescer) commitParsed(pkt []byte, info *parsedTCP) error {
+	// Admission: only ACK, ACK|PSH, ACK|ECE, ACK|PSH|ECE may ride a coalesce chain. CWR marks a
+	// one-shot congestion transition the receiver must observe at a segment boundary. NB: AccECN
+	// reuses CWR as ACE counter bits; revisit this check if inner hosts adopt AccECN.
+	if info.flags&tcpFlagAck == 0 || info.flags&^(tcpFlagAck|tcpFlagPsh|tcpFlagEce) != 0 {
+		// SYN/FIN/RST/URG/CWR must be observed in sequence. Seal the flow's open slot so later
+		// in-flow packets cannot extend it and emit ahead of this verbatim.
+		c.sealFlow(info.fk)
+		c.addVerbatim(pkt)
+		return nil
+	}
+	if info.payLen == 0 {
+		// Pure ACK: no ordering obligation toward the flow's data. Delivering it after
+		// later-transmitted data only makes it a stale ACK, which receivers ignore. Not sealing
+		// keeps a bidirectional flow's data run coalescing across interleaved peer ACKs, matching
+		// kernel GRO. This is the only place emission deviates from transmission order.
+		c.addVerbatim(pkt)
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// Cached-slot fast path. Arrival isn't per-packet interleaved even with
+	// many flows: wire-side GRO delivers runs of same-flow packets
+	// (deliverSegments splits a superdatagram into up to 64), so the cache
+	// hits for the length of each run and a miss costs one fk compare
+	// before the map lookup carries the weight.
+	var open *coalesceSlot
+	if last := c.lastSlot; last != nil && last.fk == info.fk {
+		open = last
+	} else {
+		open = c.openSlots[info.fk]
+	}
+	if open != nil {
+		if c.canAppend(open, pkt, info) {
+			if c.appendPayload(open, pkt, info) {
+				// Chain closed (PSH or short segment): stop extending it.
+				c.sealFlow(info.fk)
+			} else {
+				c.lastSlot = open
+			}
+			return nil
+		}
+		// Can't extend (seq gap from upstream loss, header change, or a full
+		// chain): evict it from openSlots and fall through to seed a fresh slot.
+		c.sealFlow(info.fk)
+	}
+	c.seed(pkt, info)
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (c *TCPCoalescer) Flush() error {
+	var first error
+	for _, s := range c.slots {
+		var err error
+		if s.verbatim || s.numSeg == 1 {
+			// A slot that never grew is byte-identical to its seed packet; ship the original so
+			// its valid checksum rides the DATA_VALID path instead of a kernel software csum.
+			// rawPkt is only mutated once numSeg >= 2 (PSH propagate, flush patches), so it is
+			// pristine here.
+			_, err = c.w.Write(s.rawPkt)
+		} else {
+			err = c.flushSlot(s)
+		}
+		if err != nil && first == nil {
+			first = err
+		}
+		c.release(s)
+	}
+	clear(c.slots)
+	c.slots = c.slots[:0]
+	clear(c.openSlots)
+	c.lastSlot = nil
+
+	return first
+}
+
+func (c *TCPCoalescer) addVerbatim(pkt []byte) {
+	s := c.take()
+	s.verbatim = true
+	s.rawPkt = pkt
+	c.slots = append(c.slots, s)
+}
+
+func (c *TCPCoalescer) seed(pkt []byte, info *parsedTCP) {
+	if info.hdrLen+info.payLen > tcpCoalesceBufSize {
+		// Pathological shape that can't ride a superpacket; emit as-is. No chain for this flow can
+		// be open here (commitParsed evicts before seeding), so sealFlow is defense in depth
+		// against a stale cache entry absorbing later data.
+		c.sealFlow(info.fk)
+		c.addVerbatim(pkt)
+		return
+	}
+	s := c.take()
+	s.verbatim = false
+	// rawPkt serves the numSeg==1 fast path in Flush, is the header source for canAppend, and is
+	// the superpacket header flushSlot patches in place.
+	s.rawPkt = pkt
+	s.hdrLen = info.hdrLen
+	s.ipHdrLen = info.ipHdrLen
+	s.isV6 = info.fk.isV6
+	s.fk = info.fk
+	s.gsoSize = info.payLen
+	s.numSeg = 1
+	s.totalPay = info.payLen
+	s.nextSeq = info.seq + uint32(info.payLen)
+	s.payIovs = append(s.payIovs[:0], pkt[info.hdrLen:info.hdrLen+info.payLen])
+	c.slots = append(c.slots, s)
+	if info.flags&tcpFlagPsh == 0 {
+		c.openSlots[info.fk] = s
+		c.lastSlot = s
+	} else {
+		// PSH on the seed closes the chain immediately; it is never registered as open.
+		// Drop any stale entry for this flow too (defense in depth, unreachable if lastSlot's lockstep invariant holds).
+		c.sealFlow(info.fk)
+	}
+}
+
+// canAppend reports whether info's packet extends the slot's seed: same header shape and stable
+// contents, adjacent seq, not oversized. A closed chain never reaches here; closing removes the
+// slot from openSlots, the only path in. The header fields read from rawPkt are always pristine:
+// the only pre-flush mutation is the PSH propagate, which also closes the chain.
+func (c *TCPCoalescer) canAppend(s *coalesceSlot, pkt []byte, info *parsedTCP) bool {
+	if info.hdrLen != s.hdrLen {
+		return false
+	}
+	if info.seq != s.nextSeq {
+		return false
+	}
+	if s.numSeg >= tcpCoalesceMaxSegs {
+		return false
+	}
+	if info.payLen > s.gsoSize {
+		return false
+	}
+	if s.hdrLen+s.totalPay+info.payLen > tcpCoalesceBufSize {
+		return false
+	}
+	// ECE state must be stable across a burst.
+	// Receivers expect the flag set on every segment of a CE-echoing window or none.
+	seedFlags := s.rawPkt[s.ipHdrLen+13]
+	if (seedFlags^info.flags)&tcpFlagEce != 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+	if !s.isV6 && !ipv4CanCoalesceID(s.rawPkt, pkt, s.numSeg) {
+		return false
+	}
+	if !headersMatch(s.rawPkt[:s.hdrLen], pkt[:info.hdrLen], s.isV6, s.ipHdrLen) {
+		return false
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+// appendPayload folds info's packet into s and reports whether the chain is now closed: the
+// segment was sub-gsoSize (kernel TSO allows only the final segment to be short) or carried PSH.
+// The caller must deregister a closed slot from openSlots.
+func (c *TCPCoalescer) appendPayload(s *coalesceSlot, pkt []byte, info *parsedTCP) bool {
+	s.payIovs = append(s.payIovs, pkt[info.hdrLen:info.hdrLen+info.payLen])
+	s.numSeg++
+	s.totalPay += info.payLen
+	s.nextSeq = info.seq + uint32(info.payLen)
+	if info.flags&tcpFlagPsh != 0 {
+		// Propagate PSH into the seed header so kernel TSO sets it on the last segment. Mutating
+		// rawPkt is safe: PSH also closes the chain, so no admission check re-reads this header.
+		s.rawPkt[s.ipHdrLen+13] |= tcpFlagPsh
+	}
+	return info.payLen < s.gsoSize || info.flags&tcpFlagPsh != 0
+}
+
+func (c *TCPCoalescer) take() *coalesceSlot {
+	if n := len(c.pool); n > 0 {
+		s := c.pool[n-1]
+		c.pool[n-1] = nil
+		c.pool = c.pool[:n-1]
+		return s
+	}
+	return &coalesceSlot{}
+}
+
+func (c *TCPCoalescer) release(s *coalesceSlot) {
+	clear(s.payIovs)
+	*s = coalesceSlot{payIovs: s.payIovs[:0]}
+	c.pool = append(c.pool, s)
+}
+
+// flushSlot patches the superpacket header in place in rawPkt (total length, IPv4 header
+// checksum, pseudo-header checksum seed) and calls WriteGSO. The slot is released right after,
+// so nothing re-reads the patched header. Does not remove the slot from c.slots.
+func (c *TCPCoalescer) flushSlot(s *coalesceSlot) error {
+	total := s.hdrLen + s.totalPay
+	l4Len := total - s.ipHdrLen
+	hdr := s.rawPkt[:s.hdrLen]
+
+	if s.isV6 {
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[4:6], uint16(l4Len))
+	} else {
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[2:4], uint16(total))
+		hdr[10] = 0
+		hdr[11] = 0
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[10:12], ipv4HdrChecksum(hdr[:s.ipHdrLen]))
+	}
+
+	var psum uint32
+	if s.isV6 {
+		psum = pseudoSumIPv6(hdr[8:24], hdr[24:40], ipProtoTCP, l4Len)
+	} else {
+		psum = pseudoSumIPv4(hdr[12:16], hdr[16:20], ipProtoTCP, l4Len)
+	}
+	tcsum := s.ipHdrLen + 16
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[tcsum:tcsum+2], foldOnceNoInvert(psum))
+
+	return c.w.WriteGSO(hdr[:s.ipHdrLen], hdr[s.ipHdrLen:], s.payIovs, tio.GSOProtoTCP)
+}
+
+// headersMatch compares two IP+TCP header prefixes for byte-for-byte
+// equality on every field that must be identical across coalesced
+// segments. Size/IPID/IPCsum/seq/flags/tcpCsum are masked out.
+func headersMatch(a, b []byte, isV6 bool, ipHdrLen int) bool {
+	if len(a) != len(b) {
+		return false
+	}
+	if !ipHeadersMatch(a, b, isV6) {
+		return false
+	}
+	// TCP: compare [0:4] ports, [8:13] ack+dataoff, [14:16] window,
+	// [18:tcpHdrLen] options (incl. urgent).
+	tcp := ipHdrLen
+	if !bytes.Equal(a[tcp:tcp+4], b[tcp:tcp+4]) {
+		return false
+	}
+	if !bytes.Equal(a[tcp+8:tcp+13], b[tcp+8:tcp+13]) {
+		return false
+	}
+	if !bytes.Equal(a[tcp+14:tcp+16], b[tcp+14:tcp+16]) {
+		return false
+	}
+	if !bytes.Equal(a[tcp+18:], b[tcp+18:]) {
+		return false
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+// ipv4HdrChecksum computes the IPv4 header checksum over hdr (which must
+// already have its checksum field zeroed) and returns the folded/inverted
+// 16-bit value to store.
+func ipv4HdrChecksum(hdr []byte) uint16 {
+	var sum uint32
+	for i := 0; i+1 < len(hdr); i += 2 {
+		sum += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(hdr[i : i+2]))
+	}
+	if len(hdr)%2 == 1 {
+		sum += uint32(hdr[len(hdr)-1]) << 8
+	}
+	for sum>>16 != 0 {
+		sum = (sum & 0xffff) + (sum >> 16)
+	}
+	return ^uint16(sum)
+}
+
+// pseudoSumIPv4 / pseudoSumIPv6 build the L4 pseudo-header partial sum
+// expected by the virtio NEEDS_CSUM kernel path: the 32-bit accumulator
+// before folding. proto selects the L4 (TCP or UDP); the UDP coalescer
+// reuses these helpers.
+func pseudoSumIPv4(src, dst []byte, proto byte, l4Len int) uint32 {
+	var sum uint32
+	sum += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(src[0:2]))
+	sum += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(src[2:4]))
+	sum += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(dst[0:2]))
+	sum += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(dst[2:4]))
+	sum += uint32(proto)
+	sum += uint32(l4Len)
+	return sum
+}
+
+func pseudoSumIPv6(src, dst []byte, proto byte, l4Len int) uint32 {
+	var sum uint32
+	for i := 0; i < 16; i += 2 {
+		sum += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(src[i : i+2]))
+		sum += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(dst[i : i+2]))
+	}
+	sum += uint32(l4Len >> 16)
+	sum += uint32(l4Len & 0xffff)
+	sum += uint32(proto)
+	return sum
+}
+
+// foldOnceNoInvert folds the 32-bit accumulator to 16 bits and returns it unchanged (no one's complement).
+// This is what virtio NEEDS_CSUM wants in the L4 checksum field
+func foldOnceNoInvert(sum uint32) uint16 {
+	for sum>>16 != 0 {
+		sum = (sum & 0xffff) + (sum >> 16)
+	}
+	return uint16(sum)
+}

overlay/batch/tcp_coalesce_bench_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+package batch
+
+import (
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
+)
+
+// nopTunWriter is a zero-alloc tio.GSOWriter for benchmarks. Discards
+// everything but satisfies the interface the coalescer detects.
+type nopTunWriter struct{}
+
+func (nopTunWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return len(p), nil }
+func (nopTunWriter) WriteGSO(hdr []byte, transportHdr []byte, pays [][]byte, _ tio.GSOProto) error {
+	return nil
+}
+func (nopTunWriter) Capabilities() tio.Capabilities {
+	return tio.Capabilities{TSO: true, USO: true}
+}
+
+// buildTCPv4BulkFlow returns a slice of N adjacent ACK-only TCP segments
+// on a single 5-tuple, each carrying payloadLen bytes. Seq numbers are
+// contiguous so every packet is coalesceable onto the previous one.
+func buildTCPv4BulkFlow(n, payloadLen int) [][]byte {
+	pkts := make([][]byte, n)
+	pay := make([]byte, payloadLen)
+	seq := uint32(1000)
+	for i := range n {
+		pkts[i] = buildTCPv4(seq, tcpAck, pay)
+		seq += uint32(payloadLen)
+	}
+	return pkts
+}
+
+// buildTCPv4Interleaved returns nFlows * perFlow packets with per-flow
+// seq continuity but round-robin across flows — worst case for any
+// "last-slot" cache.
+func buildTCPv4Interleaved(nFlows, perFlow, payloadLen int) [][]byte {
+	pay := make([]byte, payloadLen)
+	seqs := make([]uint32, nFlows)
+	for i := range seqs {
+		seqs[i] = uint32(1000 + i*1000000)
+	}
+	pkts := make([][]byte, 0, nFlows*perFlow)
+	for range perFlow {
+		for f := range nFlows {
+			sport := uint16(10000 + f)
+			pkts = append(pkts, buildTCPv4Ports(sport, 2000, seqs[f], tcpAck, pay))
+			seqs[f] += uint32(payloadLen)
+		}
+	}
+	return pkts
+}
+
+// buildTCPv4RunInterleaved returns nFlows*perFlow packets delivered in
+// runs of runLen per flow — the arrival pattern wire-side GRO actually
+// produces (deliverSegments splits each superdatagram into up to 64
+// same-flow packets back to back). Contrast with buildTCPv4Interleaved's
+// per-packet round-robin, the adversarial worst case for a last-slot cache.
+func buildTCPv4RunInterleaved(nFlows, perFlow, runLen, payloadLen int) [][]byte {
+	pay := make([]byte, payloadLen)
+	seqs := make([]uint32, nFlows)
+	for i := range seqs {
+		seqs[i] = uint32(1000 + i*1000000)
+	}
+	pkts := make([][]byte, 0, nFlows*perFlow)
+	for done := 0; done < perFlow; done += runLen {
+		for f := range nFlows {
+			sport := uint16(10000 + f)
+			for range runLen {
+				pkts = append(pkts, buildTCPv4Ports(sport, 2000, seqs[f], tcpAck, pay))
+				seqs[f] += uint32(payloadLen)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return pkts
+}
+
+// buildICMPv4 returns a minimal non-TCP packet that takes the verbatim
+// branch in Commit.
+func buildICMPv4() []byte {
+	pkt := make([]byte, 28)
+	pkt[0] = 0x45
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[2:4], 28)
+	pkt[9] = 1 // ICMP
+	copy(pkt[12:16], []byte{10, 0, 0, 1})
+	copy(pkt[16:20], []byte{10, 0, 0, 2})
+	return pkt
+}
+
+// runCommitBench drives Commit over pkts batchSize at a time, flushing
+// between batches, and reports per-packet cost.
+func runCommitBench(b *testing.B, pkts [][]byte, batchSize int) {
+	b.Helper()
+	c := newTestTCPCoalescer(b, nopTunWriter{})
+	b.ReportAllocs()
+	b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkts[0])))
+	b.ResetTimer()
+	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+		pkt := pkts[i%len(pkts)]
+		if err := c.Commit(pkt); err != nil {
+			b.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if (i+1)%batchSize == 0 {
+			if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
+				b.Fatal(err)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	// Drain any trailing partial batch so slot state doesn't leak across runs.
+	_ = c.Flush()
+}
+
+// BenchmarkCommitSingleFlow is the bulk-TCP steady state: one flow,
+// contiguous seq, 1200-byte payloads. Every packet past the seed should
+// append onto the open slot. This is the case we most care about.
+func BenchmarkCommitSingleFlow(b *testing.B) {
+	pkts := buildTCPv4BulkFlow(tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
+	runCommitBench(b, pkts, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs)
+}
+
+// BenchmarkCommitInterleaved4 has 4 concurrent bulk flows round-robined.
+// A single-entry fast-path cache will miss on every packet; an N-way
+// cache or map lookup carries the weight.
+func BenchmarkCommitInterleaved4(b *testing.B) {
+	pkts := buildTCPv4Interleaved(4, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
+	runCommitBench(b, pkts, len(pkts))
+}
+
+// BenchmarkCommitInterleaved16 stresses the map at higher flow counts.
+func BenchmarkCommitInterleaved16(b *testing.B) {
+	pkts := buildTCPv4Interleaved(16, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
+	runCommitBench(b, pkts, len(pkts))
+}
+
+// BenchmarkCommitRunInterleaved4 is 4 concurrent flows arriving in
+// GRO-burst runs of 16 — the realistic multi-flow pattern. A last-slot
+// cache hits for the length of each run; the per-packet round-robin
+// benches above are its worst case.
+func BenchmarkCommitRunInterleaved4(b *testing.B) {
+	pkts := buildTCPv4RunInterleaved(4, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 16, 1200)
+	runCommitBench(b, pkts, len(pkts))
+}
+
+// BenchmarkCommitPassthrough exercises the non-TCP branch: parseBase
+// bails early and addVerbatim is the only work.
+func BenchmarkCommitPassthrough(b *testing.B) {
+	pkt := buildICMPv4()
+	pkts := make([][]byte, 64)
+	for i := range pkts {
+		pkts[i] = pkt
+	}
+	runCommitBench(b, pkts, 64)
+}
+
+// BenchmarkCommitNonCoalesceableTCP sends SYN|ACK packets on one flow.
+// Each packet takes the "TCP but not admissible" branch which does a
+// map delete + verbatim. Measures the seal-without-slot cost.
+func BenchmarkCommitNonCoalesceableTCP(b *testing.B) {
+	pay := make([]byte, 0)
+	pkts := make([][]byte, 64)
+	for i := range pkts {
+		pkts[i] = buildTCPv4(uint32(1000+i), tcpSyn|tcpAck, pay)
+	}
+	runCommitBench(b, pkts, 64)
+}
+
+// runMultiCommitBench drives MultiCoalescer.Commit with in-order keys, so
+// it includes the staging sort's already-sorted fast path plus the
+// dispatch-time parse — the full steady-state cost of the batcher. The
+// ParsedPackets are precomputed: in production they fall out of the
+// firewall's newPacket, which this bench does not model.
+func runMultiCommitBench(b *testing.B, pkts [][]byte, batchSize int) {
+	b.Helper()
+	m := NewMultiCoalescer(nopTunWriter{}, test.NewLogger())
+	pps := make([]*firewall.ParsedPacket, len(pkts))
+	for i, p := range pkts {
+		pps[i] = testPP(p)
+	}
+	b.ReportAllocs()
+	b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkts[0])))
+	b.ResetTimer()
+	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+		j := i % len(pkts)
+		if err := m.Commit(pkts[j], SortKey{Epoch: 1, Counter: uint64(i + 1)}, pps[j]); err != nil {
+			b.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if (i+1)%batchSize == 0 {
+			if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
+				b.Fatal(err)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	_ = m.Flush()
+}
+
+// BenchmarkMultiCommitSingleFlow is the multi-lane analogue of
+// BenchmarkCommitSingleFlow — same workload but routed through the
+// dispatcher. The delta vs the single-lane bench measures dispatcher
+// overhead.
+func BenchmarkMultiCommitSingleFlow(b *testing.B) {
+	pkts := buildTCPv4BulkFlow(tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
+	runMultiCommitBench(b, pkts, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs)
+}
+
+// BenchmarkMultiCommitInterleaved4 mirrors BenchmarkCommitInterleaved4
+// through the dispatcher.
+func BenchmarkMultiCommitInterleaved4(b *testing.B) {
+	pkts := buildTCPv4Interleaved(4, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
+	runMultiCommitBench(b, pkts, len(pkts))
+}

overlay/batch/tx_batch.go

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+package batch
+
+import "net/netip"
+
+const SendBatchCap = 128
+
+// batchWriter is the minimal subset of udp.Conn needed by SendBatch to flush.
+type batchWriter interface {
+	WriteBatch(bufs [][]byte, addrs []netip.AddrPort) (int, error)
+}
+
+// SendBatch accumulates encrypted UDP packets and flushes them via WriteBatch.
+// One SendBatch is owned by each listenIn goroutine; no locking is needed.
+// Slots are backed by an Arena (see its docs)
+type SendBatch struct {
+	out   batchWriter
+	bufs  [][]byte
+	dsts  []netip.AddrPort
+	arena *Arena
+}
+
+// NewSendBatch makes a SendBatch with batchCap slots and an arenaSize byte buffer for slices to back those slots
+func NewSendBatch(out batchWriter, batchCap, arenaSize int) *SendBatch {
+	return &SendBatch{
+		out:   out,
+		bufs:  make([][]byte, 0, batchCap),
+		dsts:  make([]netip.AddrPort, 0, batchCap),
+		arena: NewArena(arenaSize),
+	}
+}
+
+func (b *SendBatch) Reserve(sz int) []byte {
+	return b.arena.Reserve(sz)
+}
+
+// Len reports how many packets are queued for the next Flush. Callers use
+// it to flush incrementally once a full sendmmsg batch has accumulated,
+// bounding how long the first packet of a large read batch waits.
+func (b *SendBatch) Len() int { return len(b.bufs) }
+
+func (b *SendBatch) Commit(pkt []byte, dst netip.AddrPort) {
+	b.bufs = append(b.bufs, pkt)
+	b.dsts = append(b.dsts, dst)
+}
+
+// Flush writes every queued packet and reports how many actually went out. A short count means some destinations
+// were undeliverable; the batch is drained either way.
+func (b *SendBatch) Flush() (int, error) {
+	var err error
+	written := 0
+	if len(b.bufs) > 0 {
+		written, err = b.out.WriteBatch(b.bufs, b.dsts)
+	}
+	clear(b.bufs)
+	b.bufs = b.bufs[:0]
+	b.dsts = b.dsts[:0]
+	b.arena.Reset()
+	return written, err
+}

overlay/batch/tx_batch_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+package batch
+
+import (
+	"net/netip"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+type fakeBatchWriter struct {
+	bufs  [][]byte
+	addrs []netip.AddrPort
+}
+
+func (w *fakeBatchWriter) WriteBatch(bufs [][]byte, addrs []netip.AddrPort) (int, error) {
+	// Snapshot — SendBatch.Flush nils its slot pointers right after WriteBatch
+	// returns, so tests must capture data before that happens.
+	w.bufs = make([][]byte, len(bufs))
+	for i, b := range bufs {
+		cp := make([]byte, len(b))
+		copy(cp, b)
+		w.bufs[i] = cp
+	}
+	w.addrs = append(w.addrs[:0], addrs...)
+	return len(bufs), nil
+}
+
+func TestSendBatchReserveCommitFlush(t *testing.T) {
+	fw := &fakeBatchWriter{}
+	b := NewSendBatch(fw, 4, 32)
+
+	ap := netip.MustParseAddrPort("10.0.0.1:4242")
+	for i := 0; i < 4; i++ {
+		slot := b.Reserve(32)
+		if cap(slot) != 32 {
+			t.Fatalf("slot %d: cap=%d want 32", i, cap(slot))
+		}
+		pkt := append(slot[:0], byte(i), byte(i+1), byte(i+2))
+		b.Commit(pkt, ap)
+	}
+	if _, err := b.Flush(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Flush: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(fw.bufs) != 4 {
+		t.Fatalf("WriteBatch got %d bufs want 4", len(fw.bufs))
+	}
+	for i, buf := range fw.bufs {
+		if len(buf) != 3 || buf[0] != byte(i) {
+			t.Errorf("buf %d: %x", i, buf)
+		}
+		if fw.addrs[i] != ap {
+			t.Errorf("addr %d: got %v want %v", i, fw.addrs[i], ap)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Flush again with nothing committed — should be a no-op.
+	fw.bufs = nil
+	if _, err := b.Flush(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("empty Flush: %v", err)
+	}
+	if fw.bufs != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("empty Flush triggered WriteBatch")
+	}
+
+	// Reuse after Flush.
+	slot := b.Reserve(32)
+	if cap(slot) != 32 {
+		t.Fatalf("after Flush Reserve wrong cap: %d", cap(slot))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSendBatchSlotsDoNotOverlap(t *testing.T) {
+	fw := &fakeBatchWriter{}
+	b := NewSendBatch(fw, 3, 8)
+	ap := netip.MustParseAddrPort("10.0.0.1:80")
+
+	for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
+		s := b.Reserve(8)
+		pkt := append(s[:0], byte(0xA0+i), byte(0xB0+i))
+		b.Commit(pkt, ap)
+	}
+	if _, err := b.Flush(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Flush: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	for i, buf := range fw.bufs {
+		if buf[0] != byte(0xA0+i) || buf[1] != byte(0xB0+i) {
+			t.Errorf("slot %d corrupted: %x", i, buf)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSendBatchGrowPreservesCommitted(t *testing.T) {
+	fw := &fakeBatchWriter{}
+	// Tiny initial backing forces a grow on the second Reserve.
+	b := NewSendBatch(fw, 1, 4)
+	ap := netip.MustParseAddrPort("10.0.0.1:80")
+
+	s1 := b.Reserve(4)
+	pkt1 := append(s1[:0], 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44)
+	b.Commit(pkt1, ap)
+
+	s2 := b.Reserve(8) // exceeds remaining cap, triggers grow
+	pkt2 := append(s2[:0], 0xA, 0xB, 0xC, 0xD, 0xE)
+	b.Commit(pkt2, ap)
+
+	// pkt1 must still be intact even though backing reallocated.
+	if pkt1[0] != 0x11 || pkt1[3] != 0x44 {
+		t.Fatalf("first packet corrupted by grow: %x", pkt1)
+	}
+
+	if _, err := b.Flush(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Flush: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(fw.bufs) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("got %d bufs want 2", len(fw.bufs))
+	}
+	if fw.bufs[0][0] != 0x11 || fw.bufs[0][3] != 0x44 {
+		t.Errorf("first packet on the wire: %x", fw.bufs[0])
+	}
+	if fw.bufs[1][0] != 0xA || fw.bufs[1][4] != 0xE {
+		t.Errorf("second packet on the wire: %x", fw.bufs[1])
+	}
+}

overlay/batch/udp_coalesce.go

@@ -0,0 +1,345 @@
+package batch
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"io"
+
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
+)
+
+// ipProtoUDP is the IANA protocol number for UDP.
+const ipProtoUDP = 17
+
+// udpCoalesceBufSize caps total bytes per UDP superpacket. Mirrors the
+// kernel's gso_max_size; payloads beyond this are emitted as-is.
+const udpCoalesceBufSize = 65535
+
+// udpCoalesceMaxSegs caps how many segments we'll coalesce. Kernel UDP-GSO
+// accepts up to 64 segments per skb (UDP_MAX_SEGMENTS); stay under that.
+const udpCoalesceMaxSegs = 64
+
+// udpSlot is one entry in the UDPCoalescer's ordered event queue.
+type udpSlot struct {
+	verbatim bool
+	// rawPkt is borrowed: the whole packet for verbatim slots, the seed
+	// packet for coalesce slots. A coalesce slot that never grows past one
+	// segment is emitted from rawPkt so its original (already valid) L4
+	// checksum ships DATA_VALID instead of making the kernel recompute it.
+	// A multi-segment slot's superpacket header is rawPkt's, patched in place at flush.
+	rawPkt []byte
+
+	fk       flowKey
+	hdrLen   int
+	ipHdrLen int
+	isV6     bool
+	gsoSize  int // per-segment UDP payload length
+	numSeg   int
+	totalPay int
+	payIovs  [][]byte
+}
+
+// UDPCoalescer accumulates adjacent in-flow UDP datagrams across multiple
+// concurrent flows and emits each flow's run as a single GSO_UDP_L4 superpacket via tio.GSOWriter.
+// Preserves the in-flow order of packets as they are Commit-ed
+//
+// Owns no locks; one coalescer per TUN write queue.
+type UDPCoalescer struct {
+	w         tio.GSOWriter
+	slots     []*udpSlot
+	openSlots map[flowKey]*udpSlot
+	// lastSlot caches the most recently touched open slot; see the
+	// TCPCoalescer field of the same name. Single-flow QUIC bulk is the
+	// dominant USO workload, and multi-flow arrival comes in GRO runs, so
+	// the fk compare beats the map's 38-byte key hash on most packets.
+	// Kept in lockstep with openSlots: nil whenever the slot it pointed at
+	// is removed.
+	lastSlot *udpSlot
+	pool     []*udpSlot
+}
+
+func NewUDPCoalescer(w io.Writer) *UDPCoalescer {
+	gw, ok := tio.SupportsGSO(w, tio.GSOProtoUDP)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return &UDPCoalescer{
+		w:         gw,
+		slots:     make([]*udpSlot, 0, initialSlots),
+		openSlots: make(map[flowKey]*udpSlot, initialSlots),
+		pool:      make([]*udpSlot, 0, initialSlots),
+	}
+}
+
+// parsedUDP holds the fields extracted from a single parse so later steps
+// (admission, slot lookup, canAppend) don't re-walk the header.
+type parsedUDP struct {
+	fk       flowKey
+	ipHdrLen int
+	hdrLen   int // ipHdrLen + 8
+	payLen   int
+}
+
+// parseAt extracts the flow key and IP/UDP offsets for a packet the dispatcher already knows is
+// UDP; ipHdrLen is the upstream-resolved L4 offset (see flowKey.parseIPAt). p must be zero on
+// entry and is filled in place. Returns false for malformed input or any shape that must not
+// coalesce (IPv4 options/fragmentation, IPv6 extension headers).
+func (p *parsedUDP) parseAt(pkt []byte, ipHdrLen int) bool {
+	trimmed, ok := p.fk.parseIPAt(pkt, ipHdrLen)
+	if !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+	return p.parseTail(trimmed, ipHdrLen)
+}
+
+// parseTail layers the UDP-header parse on a validated IP prologue. pkt is the trimmed packet;
+// fk's addresses are already filled.
+func (p *parsedUDP) parseTail(pkt []byte, ipHdrLen int) bool {
+	if len(pkt) < ipHdrLen+8 {
+		return false
+	}
+	// UDP `length` field: must equal IP-derived length-of-UDP-header-plus-payload.
+	udpLen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[ipHdrLen+4 : ipHdrLen+6]))
+	if udpLen < 8 || udpLen > len(pkt)-ipHdrLen {
+		return false
+	}
+	p.ipHdrLen = ipHdrLen
+	p.hdrLen = ipHdrLen + 8
+	p.payLen = udpLen - 8
+	p.fk.sport = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[ipHdrLen : ipHdrLen+2])
+	p.fk.dport = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[ipHdrLen+2 : ipHdrLen+4])
+	return true
+}
+
+// sealFlow closes fk's open chain, if any, keeping lastSlot in lockstep. The len guard skips
+// hashing the 38-byte key when no chains are open.
+func (c *UDPCoalescer) sealFlow(fk flowKey) {
+	if len(c.openSlots) == 0 {
+		return
+	}
+	if last := c.lastSlot; last != nil && last.fk == fk {
+		c.lastSlot = nil
+	}
+	delete(c.openSlots, fk)
+}
+
+// commitStaged commits one staged packet dispatch routed to this lane. A shape the lane cannot
+// coalesce (any fragmentation, unparseable header) seals every open chain — its flow is unknown —
+// and rides the lane as an in-lane verbatim, still in transmission order.
+func (c *UDPCoalescer) commitStaged(sp stagedPacket) error {
+	if sp.fragAny {
+		c.sealAllOpen()
+		c.addVerbatim(sp.pkt)
+		return nil
+	}
+	var info parsedUDP
+	if !info.parseAt(sp.pkt, int(sp.ipHdrLen)) {
+		c.sealAllOpen()
+		c.addVerbatim(sp.pkt)
+		return nil
+	}
+	return c.commitParsed(sp.pkt, &info)
+}
+
+// commitParsed commits one parsed UDP packet. The caller (dispatch, via parseAt) supplies a
+// valid parse so the header is not re-walked here.
+func (c *UDPCoalescer) commitParsed(pkt []byte, info *parsedUDP) error {
+	// A zero-length UDP datagram (length == 8) is legal and must reach the TUN, but cannot be
+	// coalesced.
+	if info.payLen == 0 {
+		c.sealFlow(info.fk)
+		c.addVerbatim(pkt)
+		return nil
+	}
+	// Cached-slot fast path; see the TCPCoalescer equivalent.
+	var open *udpSlot
+	if last := c.lastSlot; last != nil && last.fk == info.fk {
+		open = last
+	} else {
+		open = c.openSlots[info.fk]
+	}
+	if open != nil {
+		if c.canAppend(open, pkt, info) {
+			if c.appendPayload(open, pkt, info) {
+				// Chain closed (short segment): stop extending it.
+				c.sealFlow(info.fk)
+			} else {
+				c.lastSlot = open
+			}
+			return nil
+		}
+		// Can't extend: evict it from openSlots and fall through to seed a
+		// fresh slot.
+		c.sealFlow(info.fk)
+	}
+	c.seed(pkt, info)
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (c *UDPCoalescer) Flush() error {
+	var first error
+	for _, s := range c.slots {
+		var err error
+		if s.verbatim || s.numSeg == 1 {
+			// A slot that never grew is byte-identical to the packet it was
+			// seeded from; ship the original so its valid checksum rides the
+			// DATA_VALID path instead of paying a kernel software csum.
+			_, err = c.w.Write(s.rawPkt)
+		} else {
+			err = c.flushSlot(s)
+		}
+		if err != nil && first == nil {
+			first = err
+		}
+		c.release(s)
+	}
+	clear(c.slots)
+	c.slots = c.slots[:0]
+	clear(c.openSlots)
+	c.lastSlot = nil
+	return first
+}
+
+// sealAllOpen closes every open coalesce chain. Called for unparseable packets: the flow key is
+// unknown, so any open chain could otherwise absorb later data and emit it ahead of this packet.
+func (c *UDPCoalescer) sealAllOpen() {
+	clear(c.openSlots)
+	c.lastSlot = nil
+}
+
+func (c *UDPCoalescer) addVerbatim(pkt []byte) {
+	s := c.take()
+	s.verbatim = true
+	s.rawPkt = pkt
+	c.slots = append(c.slots, s)
+}
+
+func (c *UDPCoalescer) seed(pkt []byte, info *parsedUDP) {
+	if info.hdrLen+info.payLen > udpCoalesceBufSize {
+		// Pathological shape that can't ride a superpacket; emit as-is. No chain for this flow can
+		// be open here (commitParsed evicts before seeding), so sealFlow is defense in depth
+		// against a stale cache entry absorbing later data.
+		c.sealFlow(info.fk)
+		c.addVerbatim(pkt)
+		return
+	}
+	s := c.take()
+	s.verbatim = false
+	// rawPkt serves the numSeg==1 fast path in Flush, is the header source for canAppend, and is
+	// the superpacket header flushSlot patches in place.
+	s.rawPkt = pkt
+	s.hdrLen = info.hdrLen
+	s.ipHdrLen = info.ipHdrLen
+	s.isV6 = info.fk.isV6
+	s.fk = info.fk
+	s.gsoSize = info.payLen
+	s.numSeg = 1
+	s.totalPay = info.payLen
+	s.payIovs = append(s.payIovs[:0], pkt[info.hdrLen:info.hdrLen+info.payLen])
+	c.slots = append(c.slots, s)
+	c.openSlots[info.fk] = s
+	c.lastSlot = s
+}
+
+// canAppend reports whether info's packet extends the slot's seed.
+// Kernel UDP-GSO requires every segment except possibly the last to be
+// exactly gsoSize, and the last may be shorter (≤ gsoSize).
+func (c *UDPCoalescer) canAppend(s *udpSlot, pkt []byte, info *parsedUDP) bool {
+	if info.hdrLen != s.hdrLen {
+		return false
+	}
+	if s.numSeg >= udpCoalesceMaxSegs {
+		return false
+	}
+	if info.payLen > s.gsoSize {
+		return false
+	}
+	if s.hdrLen+s.totalPay+info.payLen > udpCoalesceBufSize {
+		return false
+	}
+	// Header reads use rawPkt, which is never mutated before flush. A closed chain never reaches
+	// here; closing removes the slot from openSlots, the only path in.
+	if !s.isV6 && !ipv4CanCoalesceID(s.rawPkt, pkt, s.numSeg) {
+		return false
+	}
+	if !udpHeadersMatch(s.rawPkt[:s.hdrLen], pkt[:info.hdrLen], s.isV6, s.ipHdrLen) {
+		return false
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+// appendPayload folds info's packet into s and reports whether the chain is now closed: kernel
+// UDP-GSO requires every segment but the last to be exactly gsoSize, so a short segment must be
+// the final one. The caller must deregister a closed slot from openSlots.
+func (c *UDPCoalescer) appendPayload(s *udpSlot, pkt []byte, info *parsedUDP) bool {
+	s.payIovs = append(s.payIovs, pkt[info.hdrLen:info.hdrLen+info.payLen])
+	s.numSeg++
+	s.totalPay += info.payLen
+	return info.payLen < s.gsoSize
+}
+
+func (c *UDPCoalescer) take() *udpSlot {
+	if n := len(c.pool); n > 0 {
+		s := c.pool[n-1]
+		c.pool[n-1] = nil
+		c.pool = c.pool[:n-1]
+		return s
+	}
+	return &udpSlot{}
+}
+
+func (c *UDPCoalescer) release(s *udpSlot) {
+	// Reset every field, identity ones included; see TCPCoalescer.release.
+	clear(s.payIovs)
+	*s = udpSlot{payIovs: s.payIovs[:0]}
+	c.pool = append(c.pool, s)
+}
+
+// flushSlot patches the IP header total length / IPv6 payload length and
+// the UDP length to the *total* across all coalesced segments, then seeds
+// the UDP checksum field with the pseudo-header partial (single-fold, not
+// inverted) per virtio NEEDS_CSUM. The patches land in place in rawPkt; the
+// slot is released right after, so nothing re-reads the patched header.
+func (c *UDPCoalescer) flushSlot(s *udpSlot) error {
+	hdr := s.rawPkt[:s.hdrLen]
+	total := s.hdrLen + s.totalPay // full IP+UDP+all_payloads bytes
+	l4Len := total - s.ipHdrLen    // total UDP (8 + sum of payloads)
+
+	if s.isV6 {
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[4:6], uint16(l4Len))
+	} else {
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[2:4], uint16(total))
+		hdr[10] = 0
+		hdr[11] = 0
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[10:12], ipv4HdrChecksum(hdr[:s.ipHdrLen]))
+	}
+
+	// UDP length field (offset 4 inside the UDP header) = total UDP size.
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[s.ipHdrLen+4:s.ipHdrLen+6], uint16(l4Len))
+
+	var psum uint32
+	if s.isV6 {
+		psum = pseudoSumIPv6(hdr[8:24], hdr[24:40], ipProtoUDP, l4Len)
+	} else {
+		psum = pseudoSumIPv4(hdr[12:16], hdr[16:20], ipProtoUDP, l4Len)
+	}
+	udpCsumOff := s.ipHdrLen + 6
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[udpCsumOff:udpCsumOff+2], foldOnceNoInvert(psum))
+
+	return c.w.WriteGSO(hdr[:s.ipHdrLen], hdr[s.ipHdrLen:], s.payIovs, tio.GSOProtoUDP)
+}
+
+// udpHeadersMatch compares two IP+UDP header prefixes for byte-equality on
+// every field that must be identical across coalesced segments
+func udpHeadersMatch(a, b []byte, isV6 bool, ipHdrLen int) bool {
+	if len(a) != len(b) {
+		return false
+	}
+	if !ipHeadersMatch(a, b, isV6) {
+		return false
+	}
+	// UDP: compare sport+dport ([0:4]). Skip length [4:6] and checksum [6:8]:
+	// length varies (we rewrite at flush) and the checksum will be redone.
+	udp := ipHdrLen
+	return bytes.Equal(a[udp:udp+4], b[udp:udp+4])
+}

overlay/batch/udp_coalesce_bench_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+package batch
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// buildUDPv4BulkFlow returns n equal-size datagrams on one flow — the
+// steady state for single-flow QUIC bulk, the workload USO exists for.
+func buildUDPv4BulkFlow(n, payloadLen int) [][]byte {
+	pay := make([]byte, payloadLen)
+	pkts := make([][]byte, n)
+	for i := range pkts {
+		pkts[i] = buildUDPv4(40000, 443, pay)
+	}
+	return pkts
+}
+
+// buildUDPv4RunInterleaved mirrors buildTCPv4RunInterleaved: nFlows*perFlow
+// datagrams arriving in GRO-burst runs of runLen per flow.
+func buildUDPv4RunInterleaved(nFlows, perFlow, runLen, payloadLen int) [][]byte {
+	pay := make([]byte, payloadLen)
+	pkts := make([][]byte, 0, nFlows*perFlow)
+	for done := 0; done < perFlow; done += runLen {
+		for f := range nFlows {
+			sport := uint16(40000 + f)
+			for range runLen {
+				pkts = append(pkts, buildUDPv4(sport, 443, pay))
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return pkts
+}
+
+// runUDPCommitBench drives UDPCoalescer.Commit over pkts batchSize at a
+// time, flushing between batches, and reports per-packet cost.
+func runUDPCommitBench(b *testing.B, pkts [][]byte, batchSize int) {
+	b.Helper()
+	c := newTestUDPCoalescer(b, nopTunWriter{})
+	b.ReportAllocs()
+	b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkts[0])))
+	b.ResetTimer()
+	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+		pkt := pkts[i%len(pkts)]
+		if err := c.Commit(pkt); err != nil {
+			b.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if (i+1)%batchSize == 0 {
+			if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
+				b.Fatal(err)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	_ = c.Flush()
+}
+
+// BenchmarkUDPCommitSingleFlow is the single-flow bulk steady state.
+func BenchmarkUDPCommitSingleFlow(b *testing.B) {
+	pkts := buildUDPv4BulkFlow(udpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
+	runUDPCommitBench(b, pkts, udpCoalesceMaxSegs)
+}
+
+// BenchmarkUDPCommitInterleaved4 is the adversarial per-packet round-robin.
+func BenchmarkUDPCommitInterleaved4(b *testing.B) {
+	pkts := buildUDPv4RunInterleaved(4, udpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1, 1200)
+	runUDPCommitBench(b, pkts, len(pkts))
+}
+
+// BenchmarkUDPCommitRunInterleaved4 is 4 flows in GRO-burst runs of 16.
+func BenchmarkUDPCommitRunInterleaved4(b *testing.B) {
+	pkts := buildUDPv4RunInterleaved(4, udpCoalesceMaxSegs, 16, 1200)
+	runUDPCommitBench(b, pkts, len(pkts))
+}

overlay/batch/udp_coalesce_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,536 @@
+package batch
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"io"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// buildUDPv4 builds a minimal IPv4+UDP packet with the given payload and ports.
+func buildUDPv4(sport, dport uint16, payload []byte) []byte {
+	const ipHdrLen = 20
+	const udpHdrLen = 8
+	total := ipHdrLen + udpHdrLen + len(payload)
+	pkt := make([]byte, total)
+
+	pkt[0] = 0x45
+	pkt[1] = 0x00
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[2:4], uint16(total))
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], 0)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[6:8], 0x4000)
+	pkt[8] = 64
+	pkt[9] = ipProtoUDP
+	copy(pkt[12:16], []byte{10, 0, 0, 1})
+	copy(pkt[16:20], []byte{10, 0, 0, 2})
+
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[20:22], sport)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[22:24], dport)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[24:26], uint16(udpHdrLen+len(payload)))
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[26:28], 0)
+
+	copy(pkt[28:], payload)
+	return pkt
+}
+
+// buildUDPv6 builds a minimal IPv6+UDP packet.
+func buildUDPv6(sport, dport uint16, payload []byte) []byte {
+	const ipHdrLen = 40
+	const udpHdrLen = 8
+	total := ipHdrLen + udpHdrLen + len(payload)
+	pkt := make([]byte, total)
+
+	pkt[0] = 0x60
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(udpHdrLen+len(payload)))
+	pkt[6] = ipProtoUDP
+	pkt[7] = 64
+	pkt[8] = 0xfe
+	pkt[9] = 0x80
+	pkt[23] = 1
+	pkt[24] = 0xfe
+	pkt[25] = 0x80
+	pkt[39] = 2
+
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[40:42], sport)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[42:44], dport)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[44:46], uint16(udpHdrLen+len(payload)))
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[46:48], 0)
+
+	copy(pkt[48:], payload)
+	return pkt
+}
+
+// newTestUDPCoalescer builds a coalescer over w and fails the test if w can't
+// do USO. See newTestTCPCoalescer.
+func newTestUDPCoalescer(tb testing.TB, w io.Writer) *UDPCoalescer {
+	tb.Helper()
+	c := NewUDPCoalescer(w)
+	if c == nil {
+		tb.Fatal("NewUDPCoalescer: writer does not support USO")
+	}
+	return c
+}
+
+// TestNewUDPCoalescerRefusesWhenGSOUnavailable mirrors the TCP precondition:
+// no USO, no coalescer.
+func TestNewUDPCoalescerRefusesWhenGSOUnavailable(t *testing.T) {
+	if c := NewUDPCoalescer(&fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: false}); c != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("want nil for a non-USO writer, got %v", c)
+	}
+	if c := NewUDPCoalescer(&plainOnlyWriter{}); c != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("want nil for a plain writer, got %v", c)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestUDPCoalescerNonUDPPassthrough(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
+	c := newTestUDPCoalescer(t, w)
+	// ICMP packet
+	pkt := make([]byte, 28)
+	pkt[0] = 0x45
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[2:4], 28)
+	pkt[9] = 1
+	copy(pkt[12:16], []byte{10, 0, 0, 1})
+	copy(pkt[16:20], []byte{10, 0, 0, 2})
+	if err := c.Commit(pkt); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(w.writes) != 1 || len(w.gsoWrites) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("ICMP must pass through unchanged: writes=%d gso=%d", len(w.writes), len(w.gsoWrites))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestUDPCoalescerSeedThenFlushAlone(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
+	c := newTestUDPCoalescer(t, w)
+	pkt := buildUDPv4(1000, 53, make([]byte, 800))
+	if err := c.Commit(pkt); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// A slot that never grew past one datagram flushes as a plain Write of
+	// the original packet bytes: the original (already valid) checksum
+	// ships via the DATA_VALID path, so the kernel does no csum work.
+	// WriteGSO is reserved for slots that actually coalesced (>=2 segs).
+	if len(w.writes) != 1 || len(w.gsoWrites) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("single-seg flush: writes=%d gso=%d", len(w.writes), len(w.gsoWrites))
+	}
+	if !bytes.Equal(w.writes[0], pkt) {
+		t.Errorf("plain write not byte-identical to committed packet: got %d bytes want %d", len(w.writes[0]), len(pkt))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestUDPCoalescerCoalescesEqualSized(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
+	c := newTestUDPCoalescer(t, w)
+	pay := make([]byte, 1200)
+	for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
+		if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, pay)); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(w.gsoWrites) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("want 1 gso write, got %d (plain=%d)", len(w.gsoWrites), len(w.writes))
+	}
+	g := w.gsoWrites[0]
+	if g.gsoSize != 1200 {
+		t.Errorf("gsoSize=%d want 1200", g.gsoSize)
+	}
+	if len(g.pays) != 3 {
+		t.Errorf("pay count=%d want 3", len(g.pays))
+	}
+	if g.csumStart != 20 {
+		t.Errorf("csumStart=%d want 20", g.csumStart)
+	}
+	// IP totalLen and UDP length must be the TOTAL across all segments —
+	// the kernel's ip_rcv_core trims skbs to iph->tot_len, so a per-segment
+	// value would silently drop everything but the first segment. Total =
+	// IP(20) + UDP(8) + 3*1200 = 3628.
+	gotTotalLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(g.hdr[2:4])
+	if gotTotalLen != 3628 {
+		t.Errorf("ipv4 total_len=%d want 3628 (must be total across segments)", gotTotalLen)
+	}
+	gotUDPLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(g.hdr[20+4 : 20+6])
+	if gotUDPLen != 8+3*1200 {
+		t.Errorf("udp len=%d want %d", gotUDPLen, 8+3*1200)
+	}
+}
+
+// Last segment may be shorter, sealing the chain.
+func TestUDPCoalescerShortLastSegmentSeals(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
+	c := newTestUDPCoalescer(t, w)
+	full := make([]byte, 1200)
+	tail := make([]byte, 600)
+	if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, full)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, full)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, tail)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// A 4th packet, even same-sized, must NOT join — chain is sealed.
+	if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, full)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// The sealed 3-datagram chain is a real superpacket; the re-seed stays
+	// single-segment and flushes as a plain write of the original packet.
+	if len(w.gsoWrites) != 1 || len(w.writes) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("want 1 gso (sealed) + 1 plain (new seed), got gso=%d plain=%d", len(w.gsoWrites), len(w.writes))
+	}
+	if len(w.gsoWrites[0].pays) != 3 {
+		t.Errorf("super: want 3 pays, got %d", len(w.gsoWrites[0].pays))
+	}
+	if got, want := len(w.writes[0]), 20+8+1200; got != want {
+		t.Errorf("re-seed plain write len=%d want %d", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+// A larger-than-gsoSize packet cannot extend the slot — it reseeds.
+func TestUDPCoalescerLargerThanSeedReseeds(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
+	c := newTestUDPCoalescer(t, w)
+	if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, make([]byte, 800))); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, make([]byte, 1200))); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// Both seeds stay single-segment → two plain writes in arrival order.
+	if len(w.writes) != 2 || len(w.gsoWrites) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("want 2 separate plain writes, got writes=%d gso=%d", len(w.writes), len(w.gsoWrites))
+	}
+	for i, want := range []int{20 + 8 + 800, 20 + 8 + 1200} {
+		if len(w.writes[i]) != want {
+			t.Errorf("write %d len=%d want %d", i, len(w.writes[i]), want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// Different 5-tuples must not coalesce.
+func TestUDPCoalescerDifferentFlowsKeepSeparate(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
+	c := newTestUDPCoalescer(t, w)
+	pay := make([]byte, 800)
+	if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, pay)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(2000, 53, pay)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, pay)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(2000, 53, pay)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// Two flows × 2 datagrams each = 2 superpackets of 2 segments.
+	if len(w.gsoWrites) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("want 2 gso writes (one per flow), got %d", len(w.gsoWrites))
+	}
+	for i, g := range w.gsoWrites {
+		if len(g.pays) != 2 {
+			t.Errorf("super %d: want 2 pays, got %d", i, len(g.pays))
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// Caps at udpCoalesceMaxSegs.
+func TestUDPCoalescerCapsAtMaxSegs(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
+	c := newTestUDPCoalescer(t, w)
+	pay := make([]byte, 100)
+	for i := 0; i < udpCoalesceMaxSegs+5; i++ {
+		if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, pay)); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// First superpacket holds udpCoalesceMaxSegs segments; the spillover
+	// reseeds a new one.
+	if len(w.gsoWrites) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("want 2 gso writes (cap then reseed), got %d", len(w.gsoWrites))
+	}
+	if len(w.gsoWrites[0].pays) != udpCoalesceMaxSegs {
+		t.Errorf("first super: pays=%d want %d", len(w.gsoWrites[0].pays), udpCoalesceMaxSegs)
+	}
+	if len(w.gsoWrites[1].pays) != 5 {
+		t.Errorf("second super: pays=%d want 5", len(w.gsoWrites[1].pays))
+	}
+}
+
+// Differing IP ECN codepoints must not coalesce: udpHeadersMatch compares
+// the full ToS byte (matching kernel GRO). A CE-marked datagram mid-run
+// seals the Not-ECT chain and reseeds; the trailing Not-ECT datagram
+// reseeds again. All three stay single-segment, so each ships as a plain
+// write of its original bytes, keeping its own codepoint.
+func TestUDPCoalescerDifferingECNReseeds(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
+	c := newTestUDPCoalescer(t, w)
+	pay := make([]byte, 800)
+	pkt0 := buildUDPv4(1000, 53, pay) // ECN=00 (Not-ECT)
+	pkt1 := buildUDPv4(1000, 53, pay)
+	pkt1[1] = 0x03                    // CE
+	pkt2 := buildUDPv4(1000, 53, pay) // ECN=00 again
+	for _, p := range [][]byte{pkt0, pkt1, pkt2} {
+		if err := c.Commit(p); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(w.writes) != 3 || len(w.gsoWrites) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("want 3 separate plain writes (differing ECN), got writes=%d gso=%d", len(w.writes), len(w.gsoWrites))
+	}
+	wantECN := []byte{0x00, 0x03, 0x00}
+	for i, p := range w.writes {
+		if got := p[1] & 0x03; got != wantECN[i] {
+			t.Errorf("write %d ECN=%#x want %#x", i, got, wantECN[i])
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// IPv6 path: same flow, equal-sized → coalesced.
+func TestUDPCoalescerIPv6Coalesces(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
+	c := newTestUDPCoalescer(t, w)
+	pay := make([]byte, 1200)
+	for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
+		if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv6(1000, 53, pay)); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(w.gsoWrites) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("want 1 gso write, got %d", len(w.gsoWrites))
+	}
+	g := w.gsoWrites[0]
+	if !g.isV6 {
+		t.Errorf("expected v6 write")
+	}
+	if g.csumStart != 40 {
+		t.Errorf("csumStart=%d want 40", g.csumStart)
+	}
+	// IPv6 payload_len and UDP length must be TOTAL — kernel's
+	// ip6_rcv_core trims to payload_len + ipv6 hdr size. Total UDP = 8 +
+	// 3*1200 = 3608.
+	gotPlen := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(g.hdr[4:6])
+	if gotPlen != 8+3*1200 {
+		t.Errorf("ipv6 payload_len=%d want %d (must be total)", gotPlen, 8+3*1200)
+	}
+	gotUDPLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(g.hdr[40+4 : 40+6])
+	if gotUDPLen != 8+3*1200 {
+		t.Errorf("udp len=%d want %d", gotUDPLen, 8+3*1200)
+	}
+}
+
+// DSCP differences must reseed: udpHeadersMatch compares the full ToS byte.
+func TestUDPCoalescerDSCPMismatchReseeds(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
+	c := newTestUDPCoalescer(t, w)
+	pay := make([]byte, 800)
+	pkt0 := buildUDPv4(1000, 53, pay)
+	pkt1 := buildUDPv4(1000, 53, pay)
+	pkt1[1] = 0xb8 // EF DSCP, ECN=0
+	if err := c.Commit(pkt0); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Commit(pkt1); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// Both seeds stay single-segment → two plain writes, no gso.
+	if len(w.writes) != 2 || len(w.gsoWrites) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("want 2 separate plain writes (different DSCP), got writes=%d gso=%d", len(w.writes), len(w.gsoWrites))
+	}
+}
+
+// Fragmented IPv4 must not be coalesced.
+func TestUDPCoalescerFragmentedIPv4PassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
+	c := newTestUDPCoalescer(t, w)
+	pkt := buildUDPv4(1000, 53, make([]byte, 200))
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[6:8], 0x2000) // MF=1
+	if err := c.Commit(pkt); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(w.writes) != 1 || len(w.gsoWrites) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("frag must pass through plain, got writes=%d gso=%d", len(w.writes), len(w.gsoWrites))
+	}
+}
+
+// A zero-length UDP datagram (UDP length == 8, no payload) is legal and
+// must be delivered as a plain single datagram — never coalesced. Seeding
+// it into a GSO slot stores an empty payload iovec that panics WriteGSO
+// (index-out-of-range on &pay[0]); this is a remote DoS if we ever let it
+// reach the GSO path. Regression: must not panic and must be written.
+func TestUDPCoalescerZeroLengthPayloadPassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
+	c := newTestUDPCoalescer(t, w)
+	pkt := buildUDPv4(1000, 53, nil) // UDP length 8, zero payload
+	if err := c.Commit(pkt); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(w.writes) != 1 || len(w.gsoWrites) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("zero-length UDP must pass through plain, got writes=%d gso=%d", len(w.writes), len(w.gsoWrites))
+	}
+	if len(w.writes[0]) != len(pkt) {
+		t.Errorf("delivered %d bytes, want the whole %d-byte datagram", len(w.writes[0]), len(pkt))
+	}
+}
+
+// IPv6 zero-length UDP datagram: same verbatim contract as v4.
+func TestUDPCoalescerZeroLengthPayloadIPv6PassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
+	c := newTestUDPCoalescer(t, w)
+	pkt := buildUDPv6(1000, 53, nil) // UDP length 8, zero payload
+	if err := c.Commit(pkt); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(w.writes) != 1 || len(w.gsoWrites) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("zero-length IPv6 UDP must pass through plain, got writes=%d gso=%d", len(w.writes), len(w.gsoWrites))
+	}
+	if len(w.writes[0]) != len(pkt) {
+		t.Errorf("delivered %d bytes, want the whole %d-byte datagram", len(w.writes[0]), len(pkt))
+	}
+}
+
+// A zero-length datagram arriving mid-flow must seal the open chain so the
+// datagram after it seeds a fresh superpacket *after* the empty one on the
+// wire — per-flow arrival order (full, empty, full) must be preserved.
+func TestUDPCoalescerZeroLengthMidFlowSealsAndPreservesOrder(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
+	c := newTestUDPCoalescer(t, w)
+	full := make([]byte, 800)
+	if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, full)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, nil)); err != nil { // zero-length
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, full)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// The empty datagram sealed the first slot, so the trailing full packet
+	// can't join it. All three emit as plain writes (the two full datagrams
+	// stayed single-segment; the empty one is verbatim) in per-flow
+	// arrival order: full, empty, full.
+	if len(w.writes) != 3 || len(w.gsoWrites) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("want 3 plain writes, got gso=%d plain=%d", len(w.gsoWrites), len(w.writes))
+	}
+	for i, want := range []int{20 + 8 + 800, 20 + 8, 20 + 8 + 800} {
+		if len(w.writes[i]) != want {
+			t.Errorf("write %d len=%d want %d (order full, empty, full)", i, len(w.writes[i]), want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// IPv4 with options is not admissible (we require IHL=5).
+func TestUDPCoalescerIPv4WithOptionsPassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
+	c := newTestUDPCoalescer(t, w)
+	pkt := buildUDPv4(1000, 53, make([]byte, 200))
+	pkt[0] = 0x46 // IHL = 6 (24-byte IPv4 header — has options)
+	if err := c.Commit(pkt); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(w.writes) != 1 || len(w.gsoWrites) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("ipv4-with-options must pass through plain, got writes=%d gso=%d", len(w.writes), len(w.gsoWrites))
+	}
+}
+
+// TestUDPCoalescerNonAtomicSequentialIDsCoalesce mirrors the TCP rule: DF
+// clear is fine as long as the IDs already run seed+1 per datagram, so
+// kernel USO's re-stamp reproduces them.
+func TestUDPCoalescerNonAtomicSequentialIDsCoalesce(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
+	c := newTestUDPCoalescer(t, w)
+	pay := make([]byte, 1200)
+
+	for i := range 2 {
+		pkt := buildUDPv4(40000, 443, pay)
+		setIPv4ID(pkt, uint16(40+i), false)
+		if err := c.Commit(pkt); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(w.gsoWrites) != 1 || len(w.gsoWrites[0].pays) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("sequential-ID DF=0 datagrams must coalesce: gso=%d", len(w.gsoWrites))
+	}
+}
+
+// TestUDPCoalescerNonAtomicIDGapReseeds: an ID jump on a DF=0 flow breaks
+// the chain; each datagram stays a single-segment slot and flushes as a
+// plain write that keeps its own (meaningful) ID.
+func TestUDPCoalescerNonAtomicIDGapReseeds(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
+	c := newTestUDPCoalescer(t, w)
+	pay := make([]byte, 1200)
+
+	p1 := buildUDPv4(40000, 443, pay)
+	setIPv4ID(p1, 40, false)
+	p2 := buildUDPv4(40000, 443, pay)
+	setIPv4ID(p2, 50, false)
+
+	if err := c.Commit(p1); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Commit(p2); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(w.writes) != 2 || len(w.gsoWrites) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("ID gap on DF=0 must reseed: writes=%d gso=%d", len(w.writes), len(w.gsoWrites))
+	}
+	for i, want := range []uint16{40, 50} {
+		if id := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(w.writes[i][4:6]); id != want {
+			t.Errorf("write %d: ID=%d want %d (must be preserved)", i, id, want)
+		}
+	}
+}

overlay/checksum/checksum_amd64.go

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+package checksum
+
+import (
+	"golang.org/x/sys/cpu"
+	gvisorchecksum "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/tcpip/checksum"
+)
+
+//go:noescape
+func checksumAVX2(buf []byte, initial uint16) uint16
+
+var hasAVX2 = cpu.X86.HasAVX2
+
+// Checksum computes the RFC 1071 ones-complement sum of buf, seeded with
+// initial. It is a drop-in replacement for gvisor's checksum.Checksum that
+// dispatches to a hand-written AVX2 routine on amd64 CPUs that support it,
+// falling back to gvisor's pure-Go implementation otherwise. The result
+// matches gvisor's bit-for-bit for any buffer length and initial seed.
+func Checksum(buf []byte, initial uint16) uint16 {
+	if hasAVX2 {
+		return checksumAVX2(buf, initial)
+	}
+	return gvisorchecksum.Checksum(buf, initial)
+}

overlay/checksum/checksum_amd64.s

@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+#include "textflag.h"
+
+// func checksumAVX2(buf []byte, initial uint16) uint16
+//
+// Computes the RFC 1071 ones-complement sum of buf, seeded with initial.
+//
+// Algorithm: sum the buffer treating it as a stream of uint32s in machine
+// (little-endian) byte order, accumulating into 64-bit lanes (top 32 bits
+// hold cross-add carries — at 1 byte / lane / iter we have 32 bits of
+// headroom which is far more than the 16 KB/64 KB max practical inputs).
+// At the end we fold to 16 bits and byte-swap once to recover the on-wire
+// (big-endian) result. RFC 1071 §1.2.B byte-order independence makes this
+// equivalent to summing as 16-bit big-endian words.
+//
+// The ymm accumulators (Y4..Y7) hold 4 uint64 lanes each = 16 parallel
+// partial sums. The main loop loads 64 bytes per iter as four 16-byte
+// chunks, zero-extending each chunk's four uint32s into a ymm via
+// VPMOVZXDQ-from-memory, then VPADDQ into a separate accumulator per
+// chunk to break the dep chain. After the vector loop the lane sums are
+// horizontally reduced and merged with a scalar accumulator that handles
+// the trailing 0..63 bytes plus the (byte-swapped) initial seed.
+TEXT ·checksumAVX2(SB), NOSPLIT, $0-34
+	MOVQ    buf_base+0(FP), SI
+	MOVQ    buf_len+8(FP), CX
+	MOVWQZX initial+24(FP), AX
+
+	// Pre-byteswap initial into the LE-summing space so it merges directly
+	// with the rest of the accumulator. The final fold's bswap16 will undo
+	// this and convert the whole result back to BE.
+	XCHGB AH, AL
+
+	CMPQ CX, $32
+	JLT  scalar_tail
+
+	VPXOR Y4, Y4, Y4
+	VPXOR Y5, Y5, Y5
+	VPXOR Y6, Y6, Y6
+	VPXOR Y7, Y7, Y7
+
+	CMPQ CX, $64
+	JLT  loop32
+
+loop64:
+	VPMOVZXDQ (SI), Y0
+	VPMOVZXDQ 16(SI), Y1
+	VPMOVZXDQ 32(SI), Y2
+	VPMOVZXDQ 48(SI), Y3
+	VPADDQ    Y0, Y4, Y4
+	VPADDQ    Y1, Y5, Y5
+	VPADDQ    Y2, Y6, Y6
+	VPADDQ    Y3, Y7, Y7
+	ADDQ      $64, SI
+	SUBQ      $64, CX
+	CMPQ      CX, $64
+	JGE       loop64
+
+loop32:
+	CMPQ      CX, $32
+	JLT       reduce_vec
+	VPMOVZXDQ (SI), Y0
+	VPMOVZXDQ 16(SI), Y1
+	VPADDQ    Y0, Y4, Y4
+	VPADDQ    Y1, Y5, Y5
+	ADDQ      $32, SI
+	SUBQ      $32, CX
+	JMP       loop32
+
+reduce_vec:
+	// Combine the four ymm accumulators into Y4.
+	VPADDQ Y5, Y4, Y4
+	VPADDQ Y7, Y6, Y6
+	VPADDQ Y6, Y4, Y4
+
+	// Horizontally reduce Y4's four uint64 lanes to a single scalar.
+	VEXTRACTI128 $1, Y4, X5
+	VPADDQ       X5, X4, X4
+	VPSHUFD      $0x4e, X4, X5
+	VPADDQ       X5, X4, X4
+	VMOVQ        X4, R8
+	VZEROUPPER
+
+	ADDQ R8, AX
+	ADCQ $0, AX
+
+scalar_tail:
+	// Handle remaining 0..63 bytes (or the entire buffer if it was < 32).
+	CMPQ CX, $8
+	JLT  tail4
+
+loop8:
+	ADDQ (SI), AX
+	ADCQ $0, AX
+	ADDQ $8, SI
+	SUBQ $8, CX
+	CMPQ CX, $8
+	JGE  loop8
+
+tail4:
+	CMPQ CX, $4
+	JLT  tail2
+	MOVL (SI), R8
+	ADDQ R8, AX
+	ADCQ $0, AX
+	ADDQ $4, SI
+	SUBQ $4, CX
+
+tail2:
+	CMPQ    CX, $2
+	JLT     tail1
+	MOVWQZX (SI), R8
+	ADDQ    R8, AX
+	ADCQ    $0, AX
+	ADDQ    $2, SI
+	SUBQ    $2, CX
+
+tail1:
+	TESTQ   CX, CX
+	JZ      fold
+	MOVBQZX (SI), R8
+	ADDQ    R8, AX
+	ADCQ    $0, AX
+
+fold:
+	// Fold the 64-bit accumulator to 16 bits via four rounds, mirroring
+	// gvisor's reduce(). Each pair (split, add) halves the live width;
+	// the truncation steps absorb the single bit that may be left over
+	// after each add so the next round's bound holds.
+
+	// 64 → 33 bits.
+	MOVQ AX, R8
+	SHRQ $32, R8
+	MOVL AX, AX
+	ADDQ R8, AX
+
+	// 33 → 32 bits. AX += (AX>>32); truncate to 32. AX is now ≤ 0xFFFF_FFFF.
+	MOVQ AX, R8
+	SHRQ $32, R8
+	ADDQ R8, AX
+	MOVL AX, AX
+
+	// 32 → 17 bits.
+	MOVQ    AX, R8
+	SHRQ    $16, R8
+	MOVWQZX AX, AX
+	ADDQ    R8, AX
+
+	// 17 → 16 bits. AX += (AX>>16); the trailing MOVW truncates bit 16.
+	MOVQ AX, R8
+	SHRQ $16, R8
+	ADDQ R8, AX
+
+	// AX low 16 bits hold the 16-bit sum in machine (LE) byte order; flip
+	// to big-endian to match the gvisor API contract.
+	XCHGB AH, AL
+
+	MOVW AX, ret+32(FP)
+	RET

overlay/checksum/checksum_arm64.go

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+package checksum
+
+//go:noescape
+func checksumNEON(buf []byte, initial uint16) uint16
+
+// Checksum computes the RFC 1071 ones-complement sum of buf, seeded with
+// initial. It is a drop-in replacement for gvisor's checksum.Checksum
+// that dispatches to a hand-written NEON routine. NEON is mandatory in
+// armv8 so no feature check is needed.
+func Checksum(buf []byte, initial uint16) uint16 {
+	return checksumNEON(buf, initial)
+}

overlay/checksum/checksum_arm64.s

@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+#include "textflag.h"
+
+// func checksumNEON(buf []byte, initial uint16) uint16
+//
+// Mirrors the algorithm in checksum_amd64.s: sum the buffer treating it as
+// a stream of uint32s in machine (little-endian) byte order, accumulating
+// into 64-bit lanes that have ample carry headroom; fold and byte-swap once
+// at the very end to recover the on-wire (big-endian) result.
+//
+// Each loop iteration loads 64 bytes via VLD1.P into V0..V3 (4 Q regs).
+// VUADDW takes the low two uint32 lanes of a Q reg, zero-extends them to
+// uint64, and adds them into a 2×uint64 accumulator; VUADDW2 does the same
+// for the high two lanes. Four ymm-equivalent accumulators (V8..V11) get
+// updated twice per iter to break the dep chain. Tail bytes go through a
+// scalar ADCS chain seeded with the byte-swapped initial.
+TEXT ·checksumNEON(SB), NOSPLIT, $0-34
+	MOVD  buf_base+0(FP), R0
+	MOVD  buf_len+8(FP), R1
+	MOVHU initial+24(FP), R2
+
+	// Pre-byteswap initial into the LE-summing space so it merges directly
+	// with the rest of the accumulator.
+	REV16W R2, R2
+
+	MOVD ZR, R3 // scalar accumulator
+
+	CMP $32, R1
+	BLT scalar_tail
+
+	VEOR V8.B16, V8.B16, V8.B16
+	VEOR V9.B16, V9.B16, V9.B16
+	VEOR V10.B16, V10.B16, V10.B16
+	VEOR V11.B16, V11.B16, V11.B16
+
+	CMP $64, R1
+	BLT loop16_init
+
+loop64:
+	VLD1.P  64(R0), [V0.B16, V1.B16, V2.B16, V3.B16]
+	VUADDW  V0.S2, V8.D2, V8.D2
+	VUADDW2 V0.S4, V9.D2, V9.D2
+	VUADDW  V1.S2, V10.D2, V10.D2
+	VUADDW2 V1.S4, V11.D2, V11.D2
+	VUADDW  V2.S2, V8.D2, V8.D2
+	VUADDW2 V2.S4, V9.D2, V9.D2
+	VUADDW  V3.S2, V10.D2, V10.D2
+	VUADDW2 V3.S4, V11.D2, V11.D2
+	SUB     $64, R1, R1
+	CMP     $64, R1
+	BGE     loop64
+
+loop16_init:
+	CMP $16, R1
+	BLT reduce_vec
+
+loop16:
+	VLD1.P  16(R0), [V0.B16]
+	VUADDW  V0.S2, V8.D2, V8.D2
+	VUADDW2 V0.S4, V9.D2, V9.D2
+	SUB     $16, R1, R1
+	CMP     $16, R1
+	BGE     loop16
+
+reduce_vec:
+	// Combine the four accumulators into V8.
+	VADD V9.D2, V8.D2, V8.D2
+	VADD V11.D2, V10.D2, V10.D2
+	VADD V10.D2, V8.D2, V8.D2
+
+	// Horizontal-add the two lanes of V8.D2 into a single uint64.
+	VADDP V8.D2, V8.D2, V8.D2
+	VMOV  V8.D[0], R8
+
+	ADDS R8, R3, R3
+	ADC  ZR, R3, R3
+
+scalar_tail:
+	CMP $8, R1
+	BLT tail4
+
+loop8:
+	MOVD.P 8(R0), R8
+	ADDS   R8, R3, R3
+	ADC    ZR, R3, R3
+	SUB    $8, R1, R1
+	CMP    $8, R1
+	BGE    loop8
+
+tail4:
+	CMP    $4, R1
+	BLT    tail2
+	MOVWU.P 4(R0), R8
+	ADDS   R8, R3, R3
+	ADC    ZR, R3, R3
+	SUB    $4, R1, R1
+
+tail2:
+	CMP    $2, R1
+	BLT    tail1
+	MOVHU.P 2(R0), R8
+	ADDS   R8, R3, R3
+	ADC    ZR, R3, R3
+	SUB    $2, R1, R1
+
+tail1:
+	CBZ R1, fold
+	MOVBU (R0), R8
+	ADDS  R8, R3, R3
+	ADC   ZR, R3, R3
+
+fold:
+	// Merge the byte-swapped initial into our LE-form accumulator.
+	ADDS R2, R3, R3
+	ADC  ZR, R3, R3
+
+	// 64 → 33 bits.
+	LSR $32, R3, R8
+	AND $0xffffffff, R3, R3
+	ADD R8, R3, R3
+
+	// 33 → 32 (truncate after adding bit 32 back).
+	LSR $32, R3, R8
+	ADD R8, R3, R3
+	AND $0xffffffff, R3, R3
+
+	// 32 → 17.
+	LSR $16, R3, R8
+	AND $0xffff, R3, R3
+	ADD R8, R3, R3
+
+	// 17 → 16 (truncation absorbs bit 16 below).
+	LSR $16, R3, R8
+	ADD R8, R3, R3
+
+	// AX low 16 bits hold the 16-bit sum in machine (LE) byte order; flip
+	// to big-endian to match the gvisor API contract. REV16W swaps bytes
+	// within each 16-bit halfword of the low 32 bits, so it acts as a
+	// 16-bit byte-swap on the live low 16.
+	REV16W R3, R3
+	AND    $0xffff, R3, R3
+
+	MOVH R3, ret+32(FP)
+	RET

overlay/checksum/checksum_fallback.go

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+//go:build !amd64 && !arm64
+
+package checksum
+
+import gvisorchecksum "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/tcpip/checksum"
+
+// Checksum delegates to gvisor on architectures without a hand-written body.
+func Checksum(buf []byte, initial uint16) uint16 {
+	return gvisorchecksum.Checksum(buf, initial)
+}

overlay/checksum/checksum_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
+package checksum
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"math/rand/v2"
+	"testing"
+
+	gvisorchecksum "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/tcpip/checksum"
+)
+
+// archImpl names one checksum function under test. The per-arch
+// export_*_test.go files enumerate the hand-written implementations so the
+// suite compares each one against gvisor directly, regardless of which one
+// the public Checksum dispatches to on the running CPU. Testing only the
+// dispatcher was tautological wherever it resolved to the gvisor fallback
+// (non-AVX2 amd64, fallback architectures) — gvisor compared with itself,
+// assembly untested, suite green.
+type archImpl struct {
+	name      string
+	fn        func([]byte, uint16) uint16
+	available bool
+}
+
+// implsUnderTest is the public dispatcher plus every arch implementation.
+func implsUnderTest() []archImpl {
+	return append([]archImpl{{name: "dispatch", fn: Checksum, available: true}}, archImpls...)
+}
+
+// requireAvailable skips loudly when the running CPU can't execute an
+// implementation — visible in test output, unlike the old silent tautology.
+func requireAvailable(t *testing.T, impl archImpl) {
+	t.Helper()
+	if !impl.available {
+		t.Skipf("%s not supported on this CPU; its assembly is NOT tested in this run", impl.name)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestChecksumMatchesGvisor walks lengths from 0 to 4096, with several initial
+// seeds and a handful of starting alignments, asserting that each local
+// implementation matches gvisor's reference bit-for-bit.
+func TestChecksumMatchesGvisor(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, impl := range implsUnderTest() {
+		t.Run(impl.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			requireAvailable(t, impl)
+			rng := rand.New(rand.NewPCG(1, 2))
+			const padFront = 16
+
+			// Random pool large enough for the longest case + alignment slop.
+			pool := make([]byte, 4096+padFront)
+			for i := range pool {
+				pool[i] = byte(rng.Uint32())
+			}
+
+			seeds := []uint16{0, 0x0001, 0xabcd, 0xffff, 0x1234, 0xfedc}
+			offsets := []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 15, 16}
+
+			for length := 0; length <= 4096; length++ {
+				for _, seed := range seeds {
+					for _, off := range offsets {
+						if off+length > len(pool) {
+							continue
+						}
+						buf := pool[off : off+length]
+						want := gvisorchecksum.Checksum(buf, seed)
+						got := impl.fn(buf, seed)
+						if got != want {
+							t.Fatalf("len=%d off=%d seed=%#x: got %#04x want %#04x",
+								length, off, seed, got, want)
+						}
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestChecksumPatternedBuffers exercises specific byte patterns that have
+// historically tripped up checksum implementations: all-zero, all-0xff,
+// alternating, and ascending sequences.
+func TestChecksumPatternedBuffers(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, impl := range implsUnderTest() {
+		t.Run(impl.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			requireAvailable(t, impl)
+			for length := 0; length <= 256; length++ {
+				patterns := map[string][]byte{
+					"zeros":       make([]byte, length),
+					"ones":        bytes(length, 0xff),
+					"alternating": pattern(length, []byte{0xa5, 0x5a}),
+					"ascending":   ascending(length),
+				}
+				for name, buf := range patterns {
+					for _, seed := range []uint16{0, 0xffff, 0x8000} {
+						want := gvisorchecksum.Checksum(buf, seed)
+						got := impl.fn(buf, seed)
+						if got != want {
+							t.Fatalf("%s len=%d seed=%#x: got %#04x want %#04x",
+								name, length, seed, got, want)
+						}
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func bytes(n int, v byte) []byte {
+	b := make([]byte, n)
+	for i := range b {
+		b[i] = v
+	}
+	return b
+}
+
+func pattern(n int, p []byte) []byte {
+	b := make([]byte, n)
+	for i := range b {
+		b[i] = p[i%len(p)]
+	}
+	return b
+}
+
+func ascending(n int) []byte {
+	b := make([]byte, n)
+	for i := range b {
+		b[i] = byte(i)
+	}
+	return b
+}
+
+// TestChecksumTailPaths targets every combination of (SIMD body iterations,
+// trailing tail bytes) the asm handlers walk through. The tail handlers
+// peel off 8 → 4 → 2 → 1 byte chunks in turn; this test exercises each by
+// constructing lengths of the form 64*k + tail for tail ∈ [0, 63] and a
+// representative spread of k values, including k=0 (no main loop, all tail)
+// and k=1 (one main loop iter, then tail). It's explicit coverage for
+// payload sizes that are odd, not divisible by 4, by 8, or by 32.
+func TestChecksumTailPaths(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, impl := range implsUnderTest() {
+		t.Run(impl.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			requireAvailable(t, impl)
+			rng := rand.New(rand.NewPCG(42, 17))
+			const padFront = 16
+			const maxK = 8
+
+			pool := make([]byte, 64*maxK+padFront+64)
+			for i := range pool {
+				pool[i] = byte(rng.Uint32())
+			}
+
+			seeds := []uint16{0, 0xffff, 0xabcd}
+			offsets := []int{0, 1, 3, 7, 15} // mix of aligned and odd starts
+
+			for k := 0; k <= maxK; k++ {
+				for tail := 0; tail < 64; tail++ {
+					length := 64*k + tail
+					for _, seed := range seeds {
+						for _, off := range offsets {
+							if off+length > len(pool) {
+								continue
+							}
+							buf := pool[off : off+length]
+							want := gvisorchecksum.Checksum(buf, seed)
+							got := impl.fn(buf, seed)
+							if got != want {
+								t.Fatalf("k=%d tail=%d (len=%d) off=%d seed=%#x: got %#04x want %#04x",
+									k, tail, length, off, seed, got, want)
+							}
+						}
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// BenchmarkChecksumTailSizes covers payload sizes that aren't clean multiples
+// of the SIMD body's 32-byte (amd64) or 16-byte (arm64) chunks, so the tail
+// handler is meaningfully on the hot path. Sizes are picked to either exercise
+// every tail branch (tiny lengths) or sit slightly off realistic packet
+// boundaries (e.g. 1499 = MTU − 1).
+func BenchmarkChecksumTailSizes(b *testing.B) {
+	sizes := []int{
+		1, 3, 7, 15, 31, // sub-SIMD; entire work is scalar tail
+		33, 35, 47, 63, // one loop32 + assorted tails
+		65, 95, 127, // one loop64 + assorted tails
+		1447, 1471, 1499, 1501, // around MTU
+		8191, 8193, // around USO
+		65531, 65533, // near the kernel max
+	}
+	for _, size := range sizes {
+		buf := make([]byte, size)
+		for i := range buf {
+			buf[i] = byte(i)
+		}
+		b.Run(fmt.Sprintf("size=%d/local", size), func(b *testing.B) {
+			b.SetBytes(int64(size))
+			for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+				_ = Checksum(buf, 0)
+			}
+		})
+		b.Run(fmt.Sprintf("size=%d/gvisor", size), func(b *testing.B) {
+			b.SetBytes(int64(size))
+			for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+				_ = gvisorchecksum.Checksum(buf, 0)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// BenchmarkChecksum compares the local Checksum to gvisor's at sizes that
+// match real traffic: a TCP/IP header (60), a typical MSS (1448), a typical
+// USO size (8192), and the kernel's max GSO superpacket (65535).
+func BenchmarkChecksum(b *testing.B) {
+	for _, size := range []int{60, 1448, 8192, 65535} {
+		buf := make([]byte, size)
+		for i := range buf {
+			buf[i] = byte(i)
+		}
+		b.Run(fmt.Sprintf("size=%d/local", size), func(b *testing.B) {
+			b.SetBytes(int64(size))
+			for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+				_ = Checksum(buf, 0)
+			}
+		})
+		b.Run(fmt.Sprintf("size=%d/gvisor", size), func(b *testing.B) {
+			b.SetBytes(int64(size))
+			for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+				_ = gvisorchecksum.Checksum(buf, 0)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

overlay/checksum/export_amd64_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+package checksum
+
+// archImpls exposes every hand-written implementation on this architecture
+// so the tests exercise them directly, independent of what the public
+// Checksum dispatches to on the running CPU. Without this, running the
+// suite on a non-AVX2 machine compared gvisor against itself and left the
+// assembly untested — silently. available=false makes the test skip loudly
+// instead.
+var archImpls = []archImpl{
+	{name: "avx2", fn: checksumAVX2, available: hasAVX2},
+}

overlay/checksum/export_arm64_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+package checksum
+
+// archImpls exposes every hand-written implementation on this architecture
+// for direct testing; see export_amd64_test.go for the rationale. NEON is
+// mandatory in armv8, so it is always available.
+var archImpls = []archImpl{
+	{name: "neon", fn: checksumNEON, available: true},
+}

overlay/checksum/export_fallback_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+//go:build !amd64 && !arm64
+
+package checksum
+
+// No hand-written implementations on this architecture; the dispatcher is
+// pure gvisor and there is nothing separate to test.
+var archImpls []archImpl

overlay/device.go

@@ -4,15 +4,25 @@ import (
 	"io"
 	"net/netip"
 
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
 )
 
+// defaultBatchBufSize is the per-Queue scratch size for Read on backends
+// that don't do TSO segmentation. 65535 covers any single IP packet.
+const defaultBatchBufSize = 65535
+
 type Device interface {
-	io.ReadWriteCloser
+	io.Closer
 	Activate() error
 	Networks() []netip.Prefix
 	Name() string
 	RoutesFor(netip.Addr) routing.Gateways
-	SupportsMultiqueue() bool
+	// Queues returns the device's packet queues, opening additional ones as
-	NewMultiQueueReader() (io.ReadWriteCloser, error)
+	// needed until there are n. Platforms without multiqueue support return
+	// their single queue regardless of n, so callers must size reader loops
+	// to len(result), not n; implementations never return more than n. An
+	// error means a queue that should have opened could not; the caller owns
+	// cleanup via Close. Called once, during interface activation.
+	Queues(n int) ([]tio.Queue, error)
 }

overlay/overlaytest/noop.go

@@ -3,10 +3,9 @@
 package overlaytest
 
 import (
-	"errors"
-	"io"
 	"net/netip"
 
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
 )
 
@@ -31,20 +30,16 @@ func (NoopTun) Name() string {
 	return "noop"
 }
 
-func (NoopTun) Read([]byte) (int, error) {
+func (NoopTun) Read() ([]tio.Packet, error) {
-	return 0, nil
+	return nil, nil
 }
 
 func (NoopTun) Write([]byte) (int, error) {
 	return 0, nil
 }
 
-func (NoopTun) SupportsMultiqueue() bool {
+func (NoopTun) Queues(int) ([]tio.Queue, error) {
-	return false
+	return []tio.Queue{NoopTun{}}, nil
-}
-
-func (NoopTun) NewMultiQueueReader() (io.ReadWriteCloser, error) {
-	return nil, errors.New("unsupported")
 }
 
 func (NoopTun) Close() error {

overlay/tio/blockon_linux.go

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+//go:build linux && !android
+// +build linux,!android
+
+package tio
+
+import (
+	"os"
+
+	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
+)
+
+// blockOn parks the calling goroutine until fd is ready or shutdownFd signals teardown.
+// (events is POLLIN for reads, POLLOUT for writes)
+// It builds the pollfd array on the stack every call, so concurrent callers on the same Queue never share Revents storage.
+//
+// Returns os.ErrClosed when shutdown was signaled (POLLIN on shutdownFd)
+// or either fd reported a problem condition (POLLHUP|POLLNVAL|POLLERR).
+func blockOn(fd, shutdownFd int32, events int16) error {
+	const problemFlags = unix.POLLHUP | unix.POLLNVAL | unix.POLLERR
+	pfds := [2]unix.PollFd{
+		{Fd: fd, Events: events},
+		{Fd: shutdownFd, Events: unix.POLLIN},
+	}
+	var err error
+	for {
+		_, err = unix.Poll(pfds[:], -1)
+		if err != unix.EINTR {
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	tunEvents := pfds[0].Revents
+	shutdownEvents := pfds[1].Revents
+	// Check err before trusting the potentially bogus bits we just got.
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if shutdownEvents&(unix.POLLIN|problemFlags) != 0 {
+		return os.ErrClosed
+	}
+	if tunEvents&problemFlags != 0 {
+		return os.ErrClosed
+	}
+	return nil
+}

overlay/tio/queueset_gso_linux.go

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+//go:build linux && !android
+// +build linux,!android
+
+package tio
+
+import (
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"log/slog"
+	"sync/atomic"
+
+	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
+)
+
+type offloadQueueSet struct {
+	pq []*Offload
+	// pqi is exactly the same as pq, but stored as the interface type
+	pqi        []Queue
+	shutdownFd int
+	// usoEnabled is true when newTun successfully negotiated TUN_F_USO4|6 with the kernel.
+	// Queues created by Add inherit this and surface it via Offload.USOSupported so coalescers can gate USO emission.
+	usoEnabled bool
+	closed     atomic.Bool
+	// l is handed to each queue for its bad-vnet-header drop logging.
+	l *slog.Logger
+}
+
+// NewOffloadQueueSet creates a QueueSet that uses virtio_net_hdr to do TSO segmentation.
+// usoEnabled tells downstream queues whether the kernel agreed to deliver/accept GSO_UDP_L4 superpackets.
+func NewOffloadQueueSet(usoEnabled bool, l *slog.Logger) (QueueSet, error) {
+	shutdownFd, err := unix.Eventfd(0, unix.EFD_NONBLOCK|unix.EFD_CLOEXEC)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create eventfd: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	out := &offloadQueueSet{
+		pq:         []*Offload{},
+		pqi:        []Queue{},
+		shutdownFd: shutdownFd,
+		usoEnabled: usoEnabled,
+		l:          l,
+	}
+
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+func (c *offloadQueueSet) Queues() []Queue {
+	return c.pqi
+}
+
+func (c *offloadQueueSet) Add(fd int) error {
+	if c.closed.Load() {
+		return errors.New("queue set already closed")
+	}
+	x, err := newOffload(fd, c.shutdownFd, c.usoEnabled, c.l)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	c.pq = append(c.pq, x)
+	c.pqi = append(c.pqi, x)
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (c *offloadQueueSet) wakeForShutdown() error {
+	var buf [8]byte
+	binary.NativeEndian.PutUint64(buf[:], 1)
+	_, err := unix.Write(c.shutdownFd, buf[:])
+	return err
+}
+
+func (c *offloadQueueSet) Close() error {
+	if c.closed.Swap(true) {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	errs := []error{}
+
+	// Signal all readers blocked in poll to wake up and exit.
+	// They observe POLLIN on the shutdown eventfd and return os.ErrClosed.
+	if err := c.wakeForShutdown(); err != nil {
+		errs = append(errs, err)
+	}
+
+	// Close the per-queue tun fds; this also unblocks any in-flight reads.
+	for _, x := range c.pq {
+		if err := x.Close(); err != nil {
+			errs = append(errs, err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Close the shutdown eventfd last: every reader's pollfd set references it,
+	// so it must outlive the wake + per-queue teardown above.
+	if err := unix.Close(c.shutdownFd); err != nil {
+		errs = append(errs, err)
+	}
+	c.shutdownFd = -1
+
+	return errors.Join(errs...)
+}

overlay/tio/queueset_poll_linux.go

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+//go:build linux && !android
+// +build linux,!android
+
+package tio
+
+import (
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"sync/atomic"
+
+	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
+)
+
+type pollQueueSet struct {
+	pq []*Poll
+	// pqi is exactly the same as pq, but stored as the interface type
+	pqi        []Queue
+	shutdownFd int
+	closed     atomic.Bool
+}
+
+func NewPollQueueSet() (QueueSet, error) {
+	shutdownFd, err := unix.Eventfd(0, unix.EFD_NONBLOCK|unix.EFD_CLOEXEC)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create eventfd: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	out := &pollQueueSet{
+		pq:         []*Poll{},
+		pqi:        []Queue{},
+		shutdownFd: shutdownFd,
+	}
+
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+func (c *pollQueueSet) Queues() []Queue {
+	return c.pqi
+}
+
+func (c *pollQueueSet) Add(fd int) error {
+	if c.closed.Load() {
+		return errors.New("queue set already closed")
+	}
+	x, err := newPoll(fd, c.shutdownFd)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	c.pq = append(c.pq, x)
+	c.pqi = append(c.pqi, x)
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (c *pollQueueSet) wakeForShutdown() error {
+	var buf [8]byte
+	binary.NativeEndian.PutUint64(buf[:], 1)
+	_, err := unix.Write(int(c.shutdownFd), buf[:])
+	return err
+}
+
+func (c *pollQueueSet) Close() error {
+	if c.closed.Swap(true) {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	errs := []error{}
+
+	// Signal all readers blocked in poll to wake up and exit.
+	// They observe POLLIN on the shutdown eventfd and return os.ErrClosed.
+	if err := c.wakeForShutdown(); err != nil {
+		errs = append(errs, err)
+	}
+
+	// Close the per-queue tun fds; this also unblocks any in-flight reads.
+	for _, x := range c.pq {
+		if err := x.Close(); err != nil {
+			errs = append(errs, err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Close the shutdown eventfd last: every reader's pollfd set references it,
+	// so it must outlive the wake + per-queue teardown above.
+	if err := unix.Close(c.shutdownFd); err != nil {
+		errs = append(errs, err)
+	}
+	c.shutdownFd = -1
+
+	return errors.Join(errs...)
+}

overlay/tio/segment_bench_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+//go:build linux && !android && !e2e_testing
+
+package tio
+
+import "testing"
+
+// fakeBatch stands in for batch.TxBatcher inside the bench — same shape
+// of pointer-capturing closure that sendInsideMessage builds.
+type fakeBatch struct{ buf [65536]byte }
+
+func (b *fakeBatch) Reserve(sz int) []byte { return b.buf[:sz] }
+func (b *fakeBatch) Commit([]byte)         {}
+
+type fakeHostInfo struct {
+	remoteIndexId uint32
+	counter       uint64
+}
+type fakeIface struct {
+	rebindCount uint8
+	hi          *fakeHostInfo
+}
+
+// BenchmarkSegmentSuperpacketAllocsTSO measures allocation per
+// SegmentSuperpacket call when a closure captures pointer-bearing
+// receivers — the realistic shape of sendInsideMessage's closure.
+func BenchmarkSegmentSuperpacketAllocsTSO(b *testing.B) {
+	const mss = 1400
+	const numSeg = 32
+	pkt := buildTSOv6(mss*numSeg, mss)
+	gso := GSOInfo{
+		Size:      mss,
+		HdrLen:    60, // 40 (IPv6) + 20 (TCP)
+		CsumStart: 40,
+		Proto:     GSOProtoTCP,
+	}
+	p := Packet{Bytes: pkt, GSO: gso}
+
+	hi := &fakeHostInfo{remoteIndexId: 0xdeadbeef}
+	f := &fakeIface{rebindCount: 7, hi: hi}
+	fb := &fakeBatch{}
+
+	// SegmentSuperpacket consumes pkt destructively; refresh from a master
+	// copy each iter (matches the production pattern where every TUN read
+	// hands the segmenter a fresh kernel-supplied buffer).
+	master := append([]byte(nil), pkt...)
+	work := make([]byte, len(pkt))
+	p.Bytes = work
+
+	b.ReportAllocs()
+	b.ResetTimer()
+	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+		copy(work, master)
+		err := SegmentSuperpacket(p, func(seg []byte) error {
+			out := fb.Reserve(16 + len(seg) + 16)
+			out[0] = byte(f.rebindCount)
+			out[1] = byte(hi.counter)
+			hi.counter++
+			fb.Commit(out)
+			return nil
+		})
+		if err != nil {
+			b.Fatalf("SegmentSuperpacket: %v", err)
+		}
+	}
+}

overlay/tio/segment_other.go

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+//go:build !linux || android
+
+package tio
+
+import "fmt"
+
+func protoFromGSOType(_ uint8) (GSOProto, error) {
+	return 0, fmt.Errorf("GSO unsupported")
+}
+
+func SegmentSuperpacket(pkt Packet, fn func(seg []byte) error) error {
+	if pkt.GSO.IsSuperpacket() {
+		return fmt.Errorf("tio: GSO superpacket on platform without segmentation support")
+	}
+	return fn(pkt.Bytes)
+}

overlay/tio/single.go

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+package tio
+
+import "io"
+
+// singleQueue adapts a legacy one-datagram-per-Read source into a Queue.
+// Read fills a private scratch buffer and returns exactly one Packet whose
+// Bytes borrow from that buffer, valid only until the next Read, per the Queue contract.
+// Single-reader like every Queue; Write is exactly as safe for concurrent use as the underlying source's Write.
+type singleQueue struct {
+	rw     io.ReadWriter
+	closer io.Closer // nil: Close is a no-op (the source is shared and owned elsewhere)
+	buf    []byte
+	ret    [1]Packet
+}
+
+// NewSingleQueue wraps a one-datagram-per-Read ReadWriteCloser (a legacy tun device) into a Queue.
+// bufSize is the per-queue read scratch size and must be at least the largest datagram the source can return.
+// Close closes rwc.
+func NewSingleQueue(rwc io.ReadWriteCloser, bufSize int) Queue {
+	return &singleQueue{rw: rwc, closer: rwc, buf: make([]byte, bufSize)}
+}
+
+// NewSingleQueueNoClose is NewSingleQueue for a source owned by someone else,
+// e.g. several queues sharing one device. Close on the returned Queue is a
+// no-op so one queue can't tear the shared source out from under its
+// siblings; the owner remains responsible for closing the source itself.
+func NewSingleQueueNoClose(rw io.ReadWriter, bufSize int) Queue {
+	return &singleQueue{rw: rw, buf: make([]byte, bufSize)}
+}
+
+func (q *singleQueue) Read() ([]Packet, error) {
+	n, err := q.rw.Read(q.buf)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	q.ret[0] = Packet{Bytes: q.buf[:n]}
+	return q.ret[:], nil
+}
+
+func (q *singleQueue) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
+	return q.rw.Write(p)
+}
+
+func (q *singleQueue) Close() error {
+	if q.closer == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return q.closer.Close()
+}

overlay/tio/tio.go

@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+package tio
+
+import (
+	"io"
+)
+
+// QueueSet holds one or many Queue objects and helps close them in an orderly way.
+type QueueSet interface {
+	io.Closer
+	Queues() []Queue
+
+	// Add takes a tun fd, adds it to the set, and prepares it for use as a Queue.
+	Add(fd int) error
+}
+
+// Capabilities advertises which kernel offload features a Queue successfully negotiated.
+// Callers consult this to decide which coalescers to wire onto the write path.
+type Capabilities struct {
+	// TSO means the FD was opened with IFF_VNET_HDR and the kernel agreed to TUN_F_TSO4|TSO6,
+	// and WriteGSO with GSOProtoTCP is safe.
+	TSO bool
+	// USO means the kernel additionally agreed to TUN_F_USO4|USO6,
+	// so WriteGSO with GSOProtoUDP is safe. Linux ≥ 6.2.
+	USO bool
+}
+
+// Queue is a readable/writable Poll queue.
+// Concurrency contract: a single read goroutine drives Read; plain Write is safe for concurrent callers;
+// WriteGSO (on Queues that implement GSOWriter) is single-writer per queue.
+//
+// Close on an individual Queue does NOT unblock a Read parked in poll — closing an fd
+// never wakes its pollers. Orderly teardown goes through the owning QueueSet's Close,
+// which first signals a shared shutdown eventfd every reader polls alongside its own fd.
+// That eventfd is a set-wide kill switch: once signaled, every Queue in the set returns
+// os.ErrClosed from Read, so it cannot be used to stop a single Queue.
+type Queue interface {
+	io.Closer
+
+	// Read returns one or more packets.
+	// The returned Packet.Bytes slices are borrowed from the Queue's internal buffer and are only valid
+	// until the next Read or Close on this Queue.
+	// A Packet may carry a GSO/USO superpacket (see GSOInfo)
+	// Single-reader only: not safe for concurrent Reads (it reuses per-queue rx scratch each call).
+	Read() ([]Packet, error)
+
+	// Write emits a single packet on the plaintext (outside→inside) delivery path.
+	// Safe for concurrent use.
+	Write(p []byte) (int, error)
+}
+
+// Packet is the unit Queue.Read returns.
+// Bytes points into the queue's internal buffer and is only valid until the next Read or Close on the queue that produced it.
+// GSO is the zero value for an already-segmented IP datagram;
+// when non-zero it describes a kernel-supplied TSO/USO superpacket the caller must segment before consuming.
+type Packet struct {
+	Bytes []byte
+	GSO   GSOInfo
+}
+
+// GSOInfo describes a kernel-supplied superpacket sitting in Packet.Bytes.
+// The zero value means Bytes is one regular IP datagram and no segmentation is required.
+type GSOInfo struct {
+	// Size is the GSO segment size: max payload bytes per segment
+	// (== TCP MSS for TSO, == UDP payload chunk for USO). Zero means not a superpacket.
+	Size uint16
+	// HdrLen is the total L3+L4 header length within Bytes (already corrected via correctHdrLen, so safe to slice on).
+	HdrLen uint16
+	// CsumStart is the L4 header offset inside Bytes (== L3 header length).
+	CsumStart uint16
+	// Proto picks the L4 protocol (TCP or UDP) so the segmenter knows which checksum/header layout to apply.
+	Proto GSOProto
+}
+
+// IsSuperpacket reports whether g describes a multi-segment GSO/USO
+// superpacket that needs segmentation before its bytes can be encrypted and sent on the wire.
+func (g GSOInfo) IsSuperpacket() bool { return g.Size > 0 }
+
+// Clone returns a Packet whose Bytes is a freshly allocated copy of p.Bytes,
+// safe to retain past the next Read or Close on the originating Queue.
+// GSO metadata is copied verbatim.
+// Use this only when a caller needs the data to outlive the borrowed-slice contract.
+func (p Packet) Clone() Packet {
+	if p.Bytes == nil {
+		return p
+	}
+	cp := make([]byte, len(p.Bytes))
+	copy(cp, p.Bytes)
+	return Packet{Bytes: cp, GSO: p.GSO}
+}
+
+// CapsProvider is an optional interface implemented by Queues that negotiate kernel offload features at open time.
+// Callers pick a write-path coalescer based on the result.
+// Queues that don't implement it are treated as having no offload capability.
+type CapsProvider interface {
+	Capabilities() Capabilities
+}
+
+// GSOProto selects the L4 protocol for a GSO superpacket.
+// Determines which VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_* type the writer stamps and which checksum offset
+// inside the transport header virtio NEEDS_CSUM expects.
+type GSOProto uint8
+
+const (
+	GSOProtoUnknown GSOProto = iota
+	GSOProtoTCP
+	GSOProtoUDP
+)
+
+// GSOWriter is implemented by Queues that can emit a TCP or UDP superpacket
+// assembled from a header prefix plus one or more borrowed payload fragments,
+// in a single vectored write (writev with a leading virtio_net_hdr).
+// This lets the coalescer avoid copying payload bytes between the caller's decrypt buffer and the TUN.
+// Backends without GSO support do not implement this interface and coalescing is skipped.
+//
+// hdr contains the IPv4/IPv6 header prefix (mutable: callers will have filled in total length and IP csum).
+// transportHdr is the TCP or UDP header
+// (mutable: the L4 checksum field must hold the pseudo-header partial, single-fold not inverted, per virtio NEEDS_CSUM semantics).
+// pays are non-overlapping payload fragments whose concatenation is the full superpacket payload.
+// They are read-only from the writer's perspective and must remain valid until the call returns.
+// Every segment in pays except possibly the last must be exactly the same size.
+// proto picks the L4 protocol so the writer knows which gsoType / CsumOffset to set.
+//
+// Callers should also consult CapsProvider (via SupportsGSO) for the per-protocol negotiated capability:
+// USO may not have been negotiated even when TSO was.
+type GSOWriter interface {
+	io.Writer
+	CapsProvider
+	WriteGSO(hdr []byte, transportHdr []byte, pays [][]byte, proto GSOProto) error
+}
+
+// SupportsGSO reports whether w implements GSOWriter and the underlying
+// queue advertises the negotiated capability for `want`.
+func SupportsGSO(w io.Writer, want GSOProto) (GSOWriter, bool) {
+	gw, ok := w.(GSOWriter)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+	caps := gw.Capabilities()
+	switch want {
+	case GSOProtoTCP:
+		return gw, caps.TSO
+	case GSOProtoUDP:
+		return gw, caps.USO
+	default:
+		return gw, false
+	}
+}

overlay/tio/tio_gso_linux.go

@@ -0,0 +1,417 @@
+//go:build linux && !android
+// +build linux,!android
+
+package tio
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"log/slog"
+	"os"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"syscall"
+	"unsafe"
+
+	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
+
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio/virtio"
+)
+
+const maxSuperpacketLen = 65535
+
+// tunRxBufSize is the per-Read worst-case footprint inside rxBuf: one kernel-supplied packet body, which is at most ~64 KiB.
+// Segmentation happens at encrypt time on a per-routine MTU-sized scratch
+// (see SegmentSuperpacket), so rxBuf only holds raw kernel-supplied bytes.
+// We round up to give margin for the drain headroom check below.
+const tunRxBufSize = 64 * 1024
+
+// tunRxBufCap is the total size we allocate for the per-reader rx buffer.
+// Each drain iteration consumes up to tunRxBufSize of headroom for the kernel-supplied bytes.
+// Sized to eight such iterations so a single poll wake can drain several TSO/USO superpackets under bulk load,
+// amortizing the wake and giving the sendmmsg planner longer same-destination runs.
+// Hold latency stays bounded because listenIn flushes its send batch incrementally rather than only at end-of-drain.
+const tunRxBufCap = tunRxBufSize * 8
+
+// tunDrainCap caps how many packets a single Read will accumulate via the post-wake drain loop.
+// Sized to soak up a burst of small ACKs while bounding how much work a single caller holds before handing off.
+const tunDrainCap = 64
+
+// gsoMaxIovs caps the iovec budget WriteGSO assembles per call:
+// 3 fixed entries (virtio_net_hdr, IP hdr, transport hdr), plus up to gsoMaxIovs-3 payload fragments.
+// Sized comfortably above the typical kernel GSO segment cap (Linux UDP_GRO is 64)
+// so realistic coalesced bursts never touch the limit.
+// iovecs are tiny (16 bytes), so the entire scratch is 4 KiB.
+// WriteGSO returns an error rather than reallocating when a caller exceeds this budget.
+const gsoMaxIovs = 256
+
+// validVnetHdr is the 10-byte virtio_net_hdr we prepend to every non-GSO TUN write.
+// Only flag set is VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_DATA_VALID. Note the tun write path
+// (__virtio_net_hdr_to_skb) ignores this bit — only the virtio-net driver's RX
+// helper honors it — so packets land CHECKSUM_NONE and the stack verifies the
+// L4 checksum anyway. What matters here is what the header does NOT say:
+// no NEEDS_CSUM, so the kernel is never asked to finish a checksum.
+// All packets that reach the plain Write paths already carry a valid L4 checksum.
+var validVnetHdr = [virtio.Size]byte{unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_DATA_VALID}
+
+// Offload wraps a TUN file descriptor with poll-based reads. The FD provided will be changed to non-blocking.
+// A shared eventfd allows Close to wake all readers blocked in poll.
+//
+// Field order is deliberate: the read-mostly fds and the writer-owned GSO scratch fill
+// the first cache line, and the state the reader mutates per packet (rxOff, pending,
+// readIovs) all sits after it, so per-packet reader stores never invalidate the line
+// concurrent Write callers load fd from.
+type Offload struct {
+	fd         int
+	shutdownFd int
+	// usoEnabled records whether the kernel agreed to TUN_F_USO* on this FD,
+	// so writers can decide whether emitting GSO_UDP_L4 superpackets is safe.
+	usoEnabled bool
+	closed     atomic.Bool
+
+	// gsoHdrBuf is a per-queue 10-byte scratch for the virtio_net_hdr emitted
+	// by WriteGSO. Kept separate from the read-only package-level validVnetHdr
+	// so non-GSO Writes can ship that constant directly while WriteGSO
+	// rewrites this scratch on every call.
+	gsoHdrBuf [virtio.Size]byte
+	// gsoIovs is the writev iovec scratch for WriteGSO. Pre-sized to
+	// gsoMaxIovs at construction; never grown. WriteGSO returns an error
+	// (and drops the call) if a caller hands it more fragments than fit.
+	gsoIovs []unix.Iovec
+
+	rxBuf   []byte   // backing store for kernel-handed packets read this drain
+	rxOff   int      // cursor into rxBuf for the current Read drain
+	pending []Packet // packets returned from the most recent Read
+
+	// readVnetScratch holds the 10-byte virtio_net_hdr split off the front of
+	// every TUN read via readv(2). Decoupling the header from the packet body
+	// lets us read the body directly into rxBuf at the current rxOff with
+	// no userspace copy on the GSO_NONE fast path.
+	readVnetScratch [virtio.Size]byte
+	// readIovs is the readv(2) iovec scratch wired once at construction,
+	// iovec[0] points at readVnetScratch
+	// iovec[1].Base/Len is updated per read to address the current rxBuf slot.
+	readIovs [2]unix.Iovec
+
+	// l is only consulted on the rare bad-vnet-header drop path; it lives
+	// after the hot state on purpose. May be nil (tests); drops go unlogged then.
+	l *slog.Logger
+}
+
+func newOffload(fd int, shutdownFd int, usoEnabled bool, l *slog.Logger) (*Offload, error) {
+	if err := unix.SetNonblock(fd, true); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to set tun fd non-blocking: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	out := &Offload{
+		fd:         fd,
+		shutdownFd: shutdownFd,
+		usoEnabled: usoEnabled,
+		closed:     atomic.Bool{},
+		l:          l,
+
+		rxBuf:   make([]byte, tunRxBufCap),
+		gsoIovs: make([]unix.Iovec, 2, gsoMaxIovs),
+	}
+
+	out.gsoIovs[0].Base = &out.gsoHdrBuf[0]
+	out.gsoIovs[0].SetLen(virtio.Size)
+
+	// readIovs[0] is wired once to the virtio_net_hdr scratch; per-read we
+	// only repoint readIovs[1] at the next rxBuf slot (see readPacket).
+	out.readIovs[0].Base = &out.readVnetScratch[0]
+	out.readIovs[0].SetLen(virtio.Size)
+
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+func (r *Offload) blockOnRead() error {
+	return blockOn(int32(r.fd), int32(r.shutdownFd), unix.POLLIN)
+}
+
+func (r *Offload) blockOnWrite() error {
+	return blockOn(int32(r.fd), int32(r.shutdownFd), unix.POLLOUT)
+}
+
+// readPacket issues a single readv(2), splitting the virtio_net_hdr off into readVnetScratch
+// and reading the packet body directly into rxBuf at the current rxOff.
+// Returns the body length (zero virtio header bytes, just the IP packet/superpacket).
+// block controls whether EAGAIN is retried via poll: the initial read of a drain blocks; subsequent drain reads do not.
+func (r *Offload) readPacket(block bool) (int, error) {
+	for {
+		r.readIovs[1].Base = &r.rxBuf[r.rxOff]
+		r.readIovs[1].SetLen(len(r.rxBuf) - r.rxOff)
+		n, _, errno := syscall.Syscall(unix.SYS_READV, uintptr(r.fd), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&r.readIovs[0])), uintptr(len(r.readIovs)))
+		if errno == 0 {
+			if int(n) < virtio.Size {
+				return 0, fmt.Errorf("tun read shorter than virtio_net_hdr: %d bytes", n)
+			}
+			return int(n) - virtio.Size, nil
+		}
+		if errno == unix.EAGAIN {
+			if !block {
+				return 0, errno
+			}
+			if err := r.blockOnRead(); err != nil {
+				return 0, err
+			}
+			continue
+		}
+		if errno == unix.EINTR {
+			continue
+		}
+		if errno == unix.EBADF {
+			return 0, os.ErrClosed
+		}
+		return 0, errno
+	}
+}
+
+// Read returns one or more packets from the tun.
+// Each Packet either carries a single ready-to-use IP datagram (GSO zero) or a TSO/USO superpacket plus the GSOInfo a caller needs to segment it (see SegmentSuperpacket).
+// The first read blocks via poll; once the fd is known readable we drain additional packets non-blocking until:
+//   - the kernel queue is empty (EAGAIN)
+//   - we've collected tunDrainCap packets,
+//   - or we're out of rxBuf headroom.
+//
+// This amortizes the poll wake over bursts of small packets (e.g. TCP ACKs).
+// Packet.Bytes slices point into the Offload's internal buffer and are only valid until the next Read or Close on this Queue.
+func (r *Offload) Read() ([]Packet, error) {
+	r.pending = r.pending[:0]
+	r.rxOff = 0
+
+	// Initial (blocking) read.
+	// Retry on decode errors so a single bad packet does not stall the reader.
+	for {
+		n, err := r.readPacket(true)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		if err := r.decodeRead(n); err != nil {
+			// Drop and read again. A bad packet should not kill the reader,
+			// but a systematic decode failure must not be invisible either.
+			r.logDroppedRead(err)
+			continue
+		}
+		break
+	}
+
+	// Drain: non-blocking reads until the kernel queue is empty, the drain
+	// cap is reached, or rxBuf no longer has room for another worst-case
+	// kernel-supplied packet (tunRxBufSize).
+	for len(r.pending) < tunDrainCap && tunRxBufCap-r.rxOff >= tunRxBufSize {
+		n, err := r.readPacket(false)
+		if err != nil {
+			// EAGAIN / EINTR / anything else: stop draining. We already
+			// have a valid batch from the first read.
+			break
+		}
+		if n <= 0 {
+			break
+		}
+		if err := r.decodeRead(n); err != nil {
+			// Drop this packet and stop the drain; we'd rather hand off
+			// what we have than keep spinning here.
+			r.logDroppedRead(err)
+			break
+		}
+	}
+
+	return r.pending, nil
+}
+
+// logDroppedRead reports a tun packet dropped for a bad/unsupported virtio
+// header. Debug-gated so the happy path never pays for attribute assembly.
+func (r *Offload) logDroppedRead(err error) {
+	if r.l != nil && r.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
+		r.l.Debug("dropping tun packet with bad virtio header", "error", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// decodeRead processes the packet sitting in rxBuf at rxOff (length pktLen).
+// The bytes stay in rxBuf:
+//   - for GSO_NONE we slice them as a regular IP datagram (running finishChecksum if NEEDS_CSUM is set);
+//   - for TSO/USO superpackets we attach the corrected GSO metadata, so the caller can segment lazily at encrypt time.
+//
+// rxOff advances by pktLen on success
+func (r *Offload) decodeRead(pktLen int) error {
+	if pktLen <= 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("short tun read: %d", pktLen)
+	}
+	var hdr virtio.Hdr
+	hdr.Decode(r.readVnetScratch[:])
+
+	body := r.rxBuf[r.rxOff : r.rxOff+pktLen]
+
+	if hdr.GSOType() == unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE {
+		if hdr.Flags&unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM != 0 {
+			if err := virtio.FinishChecksum(body, hdr); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+		}
+		r.pending = append(r.pending, Packet{Bytes: body})
+		r.rxOff += pktLen
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	if err := virtio.CheckValid(body, hdr); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := virtio.CorrectHdrLen(body, &hdr); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	proto, err := protoFromGSOType(hdr.GSOType())
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	r.pending = append(r.pending, Packet{
+		Bytes: body,
+		GSO: GSOInfo{
+			Size:      hdr.GSOSize,
+			HdrLen:    hdr.HdrLen,
+			CsumStart: hdr.CsumStart,
+			Proto:     proto,
+		},
+	})
+	r.rxOff += pktLen
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (r *Offload) Write(buf []byte) (int, error) {
+	if len(buf) == 0 {
+		return 0, nil
+	}
+	iovs := [2]unix.Iovec{
+		{Base: &validVnetHdr[0]},
+		{Base: &buf[0]},
+	}
+	iovs[0].SetLen(virtio.Size)
+	iovs[1].SetLen(len(buf))
+	return r.rawWrite(unsafe.Slice(&iovs[0], 2))
+}
+
+func (r *Offload) rawWrite(iovs []unix.Iovec) (int, error) {
+	for {
+		n, _, errno := syscall.Syscall(unix.SYS_WRITEV, uintptr(r.fd), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&iovs[0])), uintptr(len(iovs)))
+		if errno == 0 {
+			if int(n) < virtio.Size {
+				return 0, io.ErrShortWrite
+			}
+			return int(n) - virtio.Size, nil
+		}
+		if errno == unix.EAGAIN {
+			if err := r.blockOnWrite(); err != nil {
+				return 0, err
+			}
+			continue
+		}
+		if errno == unix.EINTR {
+			continue
+		}
+		if errno == unix.EBADF {
+			return 0, os.ErrClosed
+		}
+		return 0, errno
+	}
+}
+
+// Capabilities reports the offload features negotiated for this Queue. TSO
+// is always true for Offload (we only construct it on IFF_VNET_HDR FDs);
+// USO is true only when the kernel agreed to TUN_F_USO4|6 at open time (Linux ≥ 6.2).
+func (r *Offload) Capabilities() Capabilities {
+	return Capabilities{TSO: true, USO: r.usoEnabled}
+}
+
+func (r *Offload) WriteGSO(hdr []byte, transportHdr []byte, pays [][]byte, proto GSOProto) error {
+	if len(pays) == 0 {
+		// There are no payload fragments. There is nothing to send.
+		return nil
+	}
+	var csumOff uint16 // csumOff is the offset of the L4 checksum field in transportHdr
+	switch proto {
+	case GSOProtoUDP:
+		csumOff = 6
+	case GSOProtoTCP:
+		csumOff = 16
+	default:
+		return fmt.Errorf("unknown GSO proto: %d", proto)
+	}
+	// Incorrect geometry must cause an error, not a silent drop.
+	// No sane packet should ever make it inside this branch.
+	if len(hdr) == 0 || len(transportHdr) < int(csumOff)+2 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("tio: WriteGSO header too short: ip=%d transport=%d (csum field at %d)", len(hdr), len(transportHdr), csumOff)
+	}
+	// Make the iovec array: [virtio_hdr, hdr, transportHdr, pays...].
+	// The constructor attaches r.gsoIovs[0] to gsoHdrBuf. That entry does not change.
+	need := 3 + len(pays)
+	if need > cap(r.gsoIovs) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("tio: WriteGSO needs %d iovecs but cap is %d", need, cap(r.gsoIovs))
+	}
+	r.gsoIovs = r.gsoIovs[:need]
+	r.gsoIovs[1].Base = &hdr[0]
+	r.gsoIovs[1].SetLen(len(hdr))
+	r.gsoIovs[2].Base = &transportHdr[0]
+	r.gsoIovs[2].SetLen(len(transportHdr))
+
+	segSize := len(pays[0])
+	total := len(hdr) + len(transportHdr)
+	for i, p := range pays {
+		if len(p) == 0 {
+			// The coalescers route zero-payload packets down the non-GSO path,
+			// so an empty fragment means the caller's accounting is broken.
+			return fmt.Errorf("tio: WriteGSO empty payload fragment %d of %d", i, len(pays))
+		} else if len(p) > segSize || (len(p) < segSize && i != len(pays)-1) {
+			// all segments must be the same size, except for the last one
+			return fmt.Errorf("tio: WriteGSO fragment %d is %dB, want %dB segments (only the last may be shorter)", i, len(p), segSize)
+		}
+		total += len(p)
+		r.gsoIovs[3+i].Base = &p[0]
+		r.gsoIovs[3+i].SetLen(len(p))
+	}
+	// This check keeps `total` in the uint16 range. Anything larger would wrap around and cause trouble.
+	if total > maxSuperpacketLen {
+		return fmt.Errorf("tio: WriteGSO superpacket %dB exceeds %d", total, maxSuperpacketLen)
+	}
+
+	// A single segment ships as a plain checksummed packet (GSO_NONE, size 0).
+	// Multiple segments carry the real GSO type and segSize, which the loop
+	// above verified is the size of every fragment except possibly the last.
+	gsoType := uint8(unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE)
+	if len(pays) > 1 {
+		gsoType = gsoTypeFromProto(proto, hdr[0]>>4)
+		if gsoType == unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE {
+			// gsoTypeFromProto only yields GSO_NONE for a bogus IP version nibble.
+			// A multi-segment superpacket must carry a real GSO type, or the kernel would deliver it as a single jumbo packet.
+			return fmt.Errorf("tio: WriteGSO IP version %d is not GSO-capable", hdr[0]>>4)
+		}
+	}
+	var gsoSize uint16
+	if gsoType != unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE {
+		gsoSize = uint16(segSize)
+	}
+	virtio.EncodeHeader(
+		r.gsoHdrBuf[:],
+		unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM,   /*flags*/
+		gsoType,                            /*gsoType*/
+		uint16(len(hdr)+len(transportHdr)), /*hdrLen*/
+		gsoSize,                            /*gsoSize*/
+		uint16(len(hdr)),                   /*csumStart*/
+		csumOff,                            /*csumOffset*/
+	)
+
+	_, err := r.rawWrite(r.gsoIovs)
+	return err
+}
+
+func (r *Offload) Close() error {
+	if r.closed.Swap(true) {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// shutdownFd is owned by the container, so we should not close it
+	// Close the underlying fd but do NOT null r.fd: a reader may still be loading it in readPacket, and mutating the field would race that load.
+	// That reader gets EBADF -> os.ErrClosed on its next syscall. A reader already parked in
+	// poll is NOT woken by this close; only the QueueSet's shutdown eventfd wake does that (see Queue.Close docs).
+	// closed.Swap already guarantees we only close once.
+	return unix.Close(r.fd)
+}

overlay/tio/tio_poll_linux.go

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+//go:build linux && !android
+// +build linux,!android
+
+package tio
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"sync/atomic"
+
+	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
+)
+
+type Poll struct {
+	fd         int
+	shutdownFd int
+	closed     atomic.Bool
+
+	readBuf  []byte
+	batchRet [1]Packet
+}
+
+// newPoll wraps an existing tun fd.
+// On failure it does NOT close fd: the caller owns fd and is the sole closer
+// (see pollQueueSet.Add callers in overlay/tun_linux.go, which unix.Close on Add error).
+// This matches the newOffload convention and keeps closes at exactly one on every path.
+func newPoll(fd int, shutdownFd int) (*Poll, error) {
+	if err := unix.SetNonblock(fd, true); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to set Poll device as nonblocking: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	out := &Poll{
+		fd:         fd,
+		shutdownFd: shutdownFd,
+		readBuf:    make([]byte, 65535), // largest possible size Linux permits
+	}
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+// blockOnRead waits until the Poll fd is readable or shutdown has been signaled.
+// Returns os.ErrClosed if Close was called.
+func (t *Poll) blockOnRead() error {
+	return blockOn(int32(t.fd), int32(t.shutdownFd), unix.POLLIN)
+}
+
+func (t *Poll) blockOnWrite() error {
+	return blockOn(int32(t.fd), int32(t.shutdownFd), unix.POLLOUT)
+}
+
+// TODO: port Offload's post-wake drain loop here so one poll wake amortizes
+// over a burst (up to tunDrainCap packets) instead of paying a syscall and a
+// wake per packet. Hosts on the TUNSETOFFLOAD-failure fallback or a tun.fd
+// config currently lose that batching. blockOn and the EAGAIN plumbing are
+// already shared; kept one-packet-per-Read for now to preserve behavior.
+func (t *Poll) Read() ([]Packet, error) {
+	n, err := t.readOne(t.readBuf)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	t.batchRet[0] = Packet{Bytes: t.readBuf[:n]}
+	return t.batchRet[:], nil
+}
+
+func (t *Poll) readOne(to []byte) (int, error) {
+	for {
+		n, errno := unix.Read(t.fd, to)
+		if errno == nil {
+			return n, nil
+		}
+		switch errno {
+		case unix.EAGAIN:
+			if err := t.blockOnRead(); err != nil {
+				return 0, err
+			}
+		case unix.EINTR:
+			// retry
+		case unix.EBADF:
+			return 0, os.ErrClosed
+		default:
+			return 0, errno
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// Write is safe for concurrent use
+func (t *Poll) Write(from []byte) (int, error) {
+	for {
+		n, errno := unix.Write(t.fd, from)
+		if errno == nil {
+			return n, nil
+		}
+		switch errno {
+		case unix.EAGAIN:
+			if err := t.blockOnWrite(); err != nil {
+				return 0, err
+			}
+		case unix.EINTR:
+			// retry
+		case unix.EBADF:
+			return 0, os.ErrClosed
+		default:
+			return 0, errno
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func (t *Poll) Close() error {
+	if t.closed.Swap(true) {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// shutdownFd is owned by the container, so we should not close it
+	// Close the underlying fd but do NOT null t.fd: a reader may still be loading it in readOne, and mutating the field would race that load.
+	// That reader gets EBADF -> os.ErrClosed on its next syscall. A reader already parked in
+	// poll is NOT woken by this close; only the QueueSet's shutdown eventfd wake does that (see Queue.Close docs).
+	// closed.Swap already guarantees we only close once.
+	return unix.Close(t.fd)
+}

overlay/tio/tun_file_linux_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+//go:build linux && !android && !e2e_testing
+// +build linux,!android,!e2e_testing
+
+package tio
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"log/slog"
+	"os"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
+)
+
+// newReadPipe returns a read fd. The matching write fd is registered for cleanup.
+// The caller takes ownership of the read fd (pass it into a QueueSet).
+func newReadPipe(t *testing.T) int {
+	t.Helper()
+	var fds [2]int
+	if err := unix.Pipe2(fds[:], unix.O_CLOEXEC); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("pipe2: %v", err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = unix.Close(fds[1]) })
+	return fds[0]
+}
+
+func TestPoll_WakeForShutdown_WakesFriends(t *testing.T) {
+	pipe1 := newReadPipe(t)
+	pipe2 := newReadPipe(t)
+	parent, err := NewPollQueueSet()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NoError(t, parent.Add(pipe1))
+	require.NoError(t, parent.Add(pipe2))
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		_ = unix.Close(pipe1)
+		_ = unix.Close(pipe2)
+	})
+
+	readers := parent.Queues()
+	errs := make([]error, len(readers))
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	for i, r := range readers {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func(i int, r Queue) {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			_, errs[i] = r.Read()
+		}(i, r)
+	}
+
+	time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
+
+	if err := parent.Close(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Close: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	done := make(chan struct{})
+	go func() { wg.Wait(); close(done) }()
+	select {
+	case <-done:
+	case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("readers did not wake")
+	}
+
+	for i, err := range errs {
+		if !errors.Is(err, os.ErrClosed) {
+			t.Errorf("reader %d: expected os.ErrClosed, got %v", i, err)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestPoll_ConcurrentWrite_NoRace hammers a single Poll queue from two writer
+// goroutines while a reader drains the other end of the pipe. The writers
+// overflow the pipe buffer, so both repeatedly park in blockOnWrite at the same
+// time — the exact scenario that raced on the old shared writePoll member
+// array. Run under -race; a shared-array regression trips the detector here.
+func TestPoll_ConcurrentWrite_NoRace(t *testing.T) {
+	var fds [2]int
+	require.NoError(t, unix.Pipe2(fds[:], unix.O_CLOEXEC))
+	readFd, writeFd := fds[0], fds[1]
+
+	shutdownFd, err := unix.Eventfd(0, unix.EFD_NONBLOCK|unix.EFD_CLOEXEC)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = unix.Close(shutdownFd) })
+
+	p, err := newPoll(writeFd, shutdownFd)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	const writers = 2
+	const perWriter = 4000
+	payload := make([]byte, 100)
+	total := writers * perWriter * len(payload)
+
+	// Reader: drain the read end (blocking) until every writer's bytes are
+	// consumed, so the writers keep making progress rather than wedging on a
+	// permanently full pipe.
+	readDone := make(chan struct{})
+	go func() {
+		defer close(readDone)
+		buf := make([]byte, 4096)
+		got := 0
+		for got < total {
+			n, rerr := unix.Read(readFd, buf)
+			got += n
+			if rerr != nil {
+				if rerr == unix.EINTR {
+					continue
+				}
+				return
+			}
+			if n == 0 { // EOF
+				return
+			}
+		}
+	}()
+
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	for w := 0; w < writers; w++ {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func() {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			for i := 0; i < perWriter; i++ {
+				if _, werr := p.Write(payload); werr != nil {
+					t.Errorf("write: %v", werr)
+					return
+				}
+			}
+		}()
+	}
+	wg.Wait()
+
+	select {
+	case <-readDone:
+	case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("reader did not drain")
+	}
+
+	require.NoError(t, p.Close())
+	_ = unix.Close(readFd)
+}
+
+// TestPoll_NewPoll_DoesNotCloseFdOnFailure pins the ownership rule: when
+// newPoll fails, it must leave fd open so the caller (pollQueueSet.Add's
+// callers in tun_linux.go) is the sole closer. If newPoll also closed fd,
+// the poll path would double-close on Add error. We force the failure with
+// an O_PATH descriptor: fcntl(F_SETFL) — which SetNonblock performs — is not
+// permitted on O_PATH fds and fails with EBADF, while the fd itself stays
+// open so we can observe that newPoll left it alone.
+func TestPoll_NewPoll_DoesNotCloseFdOnFailure(t *testing.T) {
+	fd, err := unix.Open("/", unix.O_PATH|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = unix.Close(fd) })
+
+	p, err := newPoll(fd, 1)
+	require.Error(t, err, "SetNonblock on an O_PATH fd should fail")
+	require.Nil(t, p)
+
+	// If newPoll had closed fd, F_GETFD would report it closed. It staying
+	// open proves newPoll left the fd for the caller to close exactly once.
+	require.True(t, fdOpen(t, fd), "newPoll must not close fd on failure; caller is the sole closer")
+}
+
+func TestPoll_Close_Idempotent(t *testing.T) {
+	tf, err := newPoll(newReadPipe(t), 1)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	if err := tf.Close(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("first Close: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := tf.Close(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("second Close should be a no-op, got %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// fdOpen reports whether fd currently refers to an open file description.
+// A closed (or never-allocated) fd makes F_GETFD fail with EBADF.
+func fdOpen(t *testing.T, fd int) bool {
+	t.Helper()
+	_, err := unix.FcntlInt(uintptr(fd), unix.F_GETFD, 0)
+	if err == nil {
+		return true
+	}
+	if errors.Is(err, unix.EBADF) {
+		return false
+	}
+	t.Fatalf("unexpected fcntl(F_GETFD) error on fd %d: %v", fd, err)
+	return false
+}
+
+// TestPollQueueSet_Close_ClosesShutdownFd is the regression test for the
+// leaked shutdown eventfd: the container that owns shutdownFd must close it in
+// Close, and a second Close must be a safe no-op.
+func TestPollQueueSet_Close_ClosesShutdownFd(t *testing.T) {
+	qs, err := NewPollQueueSet()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	c, ok := qs.(*pollQueueSet)
+	require.True(t, ok)
+	require.NoError(t, qs.Add(newReadPipe(t)))
+
+	shutdownFd := c.shutdownFd
+	require.True(t, fdOpen(t, shutdownFd), "shutdown eventfd should be open before Close")
+
+	require.NoError(t, qs.Close())
+	require.False(t, fdOpen(t, shutdownFd), "shutdown eventfd should be closed after Close")
+
+	// Second Close must not touch fds (shutdownFd is now -1) and must return nil.
+	require.NoError(t, qs.Close())
+}
+
+// TestOffloadQueueSet_Close_ClosesShutdownFd mirrors the poll regression test
+// for the GSO/offload queueset.
+func TestOffloadQueueSet_Close_ClosesShutdownFd(t *testing.T) {
+	qs, err := NewOffloadQueueSet(false, slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	c, ok := qs.(*offloadQueueSet)
+	require.True(t, ok)
+	require.NoError(t, qs.Add(newReadPipe(t)))
+
+	shutdownFd := c.shutdownFd
+	require.True(t, fdOpen(t, shutdownFd), "shutdown eventfd should be open before Close")
+
+	require.NoError(t, qs.Close())
+	require.False(t, fdOpen(t, shutdownFd), "shutdown eventfd should be closed after Close")
+
+	// Second Close must not touch fds (shutdownFd is now -1) and must return nil.
+	require.NoError(t, qs.Close())
+}

overlay/tio/tun_linux_offload.go

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+//go:build linux && !android
+// +build linux,!android
+
+package tio
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+
+	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
+
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio/virtio"
+)
+
+// protoFromGSOType maps a virtio_net_hdr gsoType to the GSOProto value the
+// segment-time helpers use. Returns an error for GSO_NONE or any unknown
+// value. The caller should only invoke this on a confirmed superpacket.
+func protoFromGSOType(t uint8) (GSOProto, error) {
+	switch t &^ unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN {
+	case unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4, unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6:
+		return GSOProtoTCP, nil
+	case unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP_L4:
+		return GSOProtoUDP, nil
+	default:
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("unsupported virtio gso type: %d", t)
+	}
+}
+
+// gsoTypeFromProto is the reverse of protoFromGSOType
+func gsoTypeFromProto(proto GSOProto, ipVer uint8) uint8 {
+	switch {
+	case proto == GSOProtoUDP && (ipVer == 4 || ipVer == 6):
+		return unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP_L4
+	case ipVer == 6:
+		return unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6
+	case ipVer == 4:
+		return unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4
+	default:
+		return unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE
+	}
+}
+
+// SegmentSuperpacket invokes fn once per segment of pkt.
+// For non-GSO pkts fn is called once with pkt.Bytes.
+// For GSO/USO superpackets, fn is called once per segment with a slice of pkt.Bytes holding that segment's plaintext
+// (a freshly-patched L3+L4 header sliced in front of the original payload chunk).
+// This slicing is destructive: pkt is consumed by this call.
+// Aborts and returns the first error from fn or from per-segment construction.
+func SegmentSuperpacket(pkt Packet, fn func(seg []byte) error) error {
+	if !pkt.GSO.IsSuperpacket() {
+		return fn(pkt.Bytes)
+	}
+	switch pkt.GSO.Proto {
+	case GSOProtoTCP:
+		return virtio.SegmentTCP(pkt.Bytes, pkt.GSO.HdrLen, pkt.GSO.CsumStart, pkt.GSO.Size, fn)
+	case GSOProtoUDP:
+		return virtio.SegmentUDP(pkt.Bytes, pkt.GSO.HdrLen, pkt.GSO.CsumStart, pkt.GSO.Size, fn)
+	default:
+		return fmt.Errorf("unsupported gso proto: %d", pkt.GSO.Proto)
+	}
+}

overlay/tio/virtio/header_linux.go

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+//go:build linux && !android
+// +build linux,!android
+
+package virtio
+
+import (
+	"encoding/binary"
+
+	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
+)
+
+// Size is the on-wire length of struct virtio_net_hdr the kernel
+// prepends/expects on a TUN opened with IFF_VNET_HDR (TUNSETVNETHDRSZ
+// not set).
+const Size = 10
+
+// Hdr is the Go view of the legacy virtio_net_hdr.
+type Hdr struct {
+	Flags      uint8
+	gsoType    uint8 //private to avoid mistakes wrt the 0x80 VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN flag, ORed with the other "GSO types"
+	HdrLen     uint16
+	GSOSize    uint16
+	CsumStart  uint16
+	CsumOffset uint16
+}
+
+func NewHeader(flags, gsoType uint8, hdrLen, gsoSize, csumStart, csumOffset uint16) Hdr {
+	return Hdr{
+		Flags:      flags,
+		gsoType:    gsoType,
+		HdrLen:     hdrLen,
+		GSOSize:    gsoSize,
+		CsumStart:  csumStart,
+		CsumOffset: csumOffset,
+	}
+}
+
+// Decode reads a virtio_net_hdr in host byte order (TUN default; we never
+// call TUNSETVNETLE so the kernel matches our endianness).
+func (h *Hdr) Decode(b []byte) {
+	h.Flags = b[0]
+	h.gsoType = b[1]
+	h.HdrLen = binary.NativeEndian.Uint16(b[2:4])
+	h.GSOSize = binary.NativeEndian.Uint16(b[4:6])
+	h.CsumStart = binary.NativeEndian.Uint16(b[6:8])
+	h.CsumOffset = binary.NativeEndian.Uint16(b[8:10])
+}
+
+func EncodeHeader(b []byte, flags, gsoType uint8, hdrLen, gsoSize, csumStart, csumOffset uint16) {
+	b[0] = flags
+	b[1] = gsoType
+	binary.NativeEndian.PutUint16(b[2:4], hdrLen)
+	binary.NativeEndian.PutUint16(b[4:6], gsoSize)
+	binary.NativeEndian.PutUint16(b[6:8], csumStart)
+	binary.NativeEndian.PutUint16(b[8:10], csumOffset)
+}
+
+// Encode is the inverse of Decode: writes the virtio_net_hdr fields into b
+// (must be at least Size bytes). Used to emit a TSO superpacket on egress.
+func (h *Hdr) Encode(b []byte) {
+	EncodeHeader(b, h.Flags, h.gsoType, h.HdrLen, h.GSOSize, h.CsumStart, h.CsumOffset)
+}
+
+// GSOType returns gsoType with the ECN-flag masked out
+func (h *Hdr) GSOType() uint8 {
+	return h.gsoType &^ unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN
+}
+
+func (h *Hdr) HasECNFlag() bool {
+	return h.gsoType&unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN != 0
+}
+
+func (h *Hdr) SetGSOType(x uint8) {
+	h.gsoType = x
+}

overlay/tio/virtio/header_other.go

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+//go:build !linux || android
+
+package virtio

overlay/tio/virtio/segment_linux.go

@@ -0,0 +1,441 @@
+//go:build linux && !android
+// +build linux,!android
+
+// Package virtio implements the pure validation, header-correction, and
+// per-segment slicing logic for kernel-supplied TSO/USO superpackets on
+// IFF_VNET_HDR TUN devices. It is FD-free and depends only on the byte
+// layout of the virtio_net_hdr and the IP/TCP/UDP headers it describes,
+// so it can be unit-tested in isolation from the tio Queue runtime.
+package virtio
+
+import (
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+
+	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
+
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/checksum"
+)
+
+// Protocol header size bounds used to validate / cap kernel-supplied offsets.
+const (
+	ipv4HeaderMinLen = 20 // IHL=5, no options
+	ipv4HeaderMaxLen = 60 // IHL=15, max options
+	ipv6FixedLen     = 40 // IPv6 base header; extensions would extend this
+	tcpHeaderMinLen  = 20 // data-offset=5, no options
+	tcpHeaderMaxLen  = 60 // data-offset=15, max options
+)
+
+// maxSegHdrLen bounds the L3+L4 header we snapshot before stamping each segment.
+// The largest header the segmenter supports is IPv4 (max IHL 60) plus TCP (max data-offset 60) = 120 bytes
+const maxSegHdrLen = ipv4HeaderMaxLen + tcpHeaderMaxLen // 120
+
+// Byte offsets inside an IPv4 header.
+const (
+	ipv4TotalLenOff = 2
+	ipv4IDOff       = 4
+	ipv4ChecksumOff = 10
+	ipv4SrcOff      = 12
+	ipv4AddrsEnd    = 20 // end of dst address (ipv4SrcOff + 2*4)
+)
+
+// Byte offsets inside an IPv6 header.
+const (
+	ipv6PayloadLenOff = 4
+	ipv6SrcOff        = 8
+	ipv6AddrsEnd      = 40 // end of dst address (ipv6SrcOff + 2*16)
+)
+
+// Byte offsets inside a TCP header (relative to its start, i.e. csumStart).
+const (
+	tcpSeqOff      = 4
+	tcpDataOffOff  = 12 // upper nibble is header len in 32-bit words
+	tcpFlagsOff    = 13
+	tcpChecksumOff = 16
+)
+
+// UDP header is fixed at 8 bytes: {sport, dport, length, checksum}.
+const (
+	udpHeaderLen   = 8
+	udpLengthOff   = 4
+	udpChecksumOff = 6
+)
+
+var errPacketTooShort = errors.New("packet too short")
+
+// tcpFinPshMask is cleared on every segment except the last of a TSO burst.
+const tcpFinPshMask = 0x09 // FIN(0x01) | PSH(0x08)
+
+// tcpCwrFlag is cleared on every segment except the first.
+// Per RFC 3168 §6.1.2 the CWR bit signals a one-shot transition (the sender just halved its window)
+// and must appear on the first segment of a TSO burst only.
+const tcpCwrFlag = 0x80
+
+// CheckValid rejects packets whose virtio_net_hdr/IP combination would
+// cause a downstream miscompute. The TUN should never emit RSC_INFO and
+// the GSO type must agree with the IP version nibble.
+func CheckValid(pkt []byte, hdr Hdr) error {
+	if hdr.Flags&unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_RSC_INFO != 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("virtio RSC_INFO flag not supported on TUN reads")
+	}
+	if len(pkt) < ipv4HeaderMinLen {
+		return errPacketTooShort
+	}
+	ipVersion := pkt[0] >> 4
+	if ipVersion == 6 && len(pkt) < ipv6FixedLen {
+		return errPacketTooShort
+	}
+
+	gsoType := hdr.GSOType()
+	if gsoType != unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE && hdr.GSOSize == 0 {
+		// A GSO type with no segment size would dodge IsSuperpacket() downstream and
+		// travel as a plain jumbo datagram with an unfinished checksum.
+		return fmt.Errorf("virtio GSO type %#x with zero gso_size", hdr.gsoType)
+	}
+	if hdr.HasECNFlag() && !(gsoType == unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4 || gsoType == unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("virtio GSO_ECN qualifier on non-TCP GSO type %#x", hdr.gsoType)
+	}
+	switch gsoType {
+	case unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4:
+		if ipVersion != 4 {
+			return fmt.Errorf("invalid IP version %d for GSO type %d", ipVersion, hdr.gsoType)
+		}
+	case unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6:
+		if ipVersion != 6 {
+			return fmt.Errorf("invalid IP version %d for GSO type %d", ipVersion, hdr.gsoType)
+		}
+	case unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP_L4:
+		// USO carries either v4 or v6; the leading nibble disambiguates.
+		if !(ipVersion == 4 || ipVersion == 6) {
+			return fmt.Errorf("invalid IP version %d for GSO type %d", ipVersion, hdr.gsoType)
+		}
+	default:
+		if !(ipVersion == 6 || ipVersion == 4) {
+			return fmt.Errorf("invalid IP version %d for GSO type %d", ipVersion, hdr.gsoType)
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// CorrectHdrLen rewrites hdr.HdrLen based on the actual transport header length read out of pkt.
+// The kernel's hdr.HdrLen on the FORWARD path can be the length of the entire first packet, so we don't trust it.
+func CorrectHdrLen(pkt []byte, hdr *Hdr) error {
+	// Thank you wireguard-go for documenting these edge-cases
+	// Don't trust hdr.hdrLen from the kernel as it can be equal to the length
+	// of the entire first packet when the kernel is handling it as part of a FORWARD path.
+	// Instead, parse the transport header length and add it onto csumStart, which is synonymous for IP header length.
+
+	if hdr.GSOType() == unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP_L4 {
+		hdr.HdrLen = hdr.CsumStart + 8
+	} else {
+		if len(pkt) <= int(hdr.CsumStart+tcpDataOffOff) {
+			return errors.New("packet is too short")
+		}
+
+		tcpHLen := uint16(pkt[hdr.CsumStart+tcpDataOffOff] >> 4 * 4)
+		if tcpHLen < tcpHeaderMinLen || tcpHLen > tcpHeaderMaxLen {
+			return fmt.Errorf("tcp header len is invalid: %d", tcpHLen)
+		}
+		hdr.HdrLen = hdr.CsumStart + tcpHLen
+	}
+
+	if len(pkt) < int(hdr.HdrLen) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("length of packet (%d) < virtioNetHdr.HdrLen (%d)", len(pkt), hdr.HdrLen)
+	}
+
+	if hdr.HdrLen < hdr.CsumStart {
+		return fmt.Errorf("virtioNetHdr.HdrLen (%d) < virtioNetHdr.CsumStart (%d)", hdr.HdrLen, hdr.CsumStart)
+	}
+	cSumAt := int(hdr.CsumStart + hdr.CsumOffset)
+	if cSumAt+1 >= len(pkt) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("end of checksum offset (%d) exceeds packet length (%d)", cSumAt+1, len(pkt))
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// segCount returns how many segments a payload of payLen bytes splits into at gsoSize,
+// with a floor of one so a header-only superpacket still yields a single segment.
+func segCount(payLen, gsoSize int) int {
+	n := (payLen + gsoSize - 1) / gsoSize
+	if n == 0 {
+		return 1
+	}
+	return n
+}
+
+// basePseudoSum folds the part of the L4 pseudo-header sum that is identical
+// for every segment: the source and destination addresses plus the protocol
+// number. The per-segment L4 length is added by the caller inside the loop.
+func basePseudoSum(pkt []byte, isV4 bool, proto uint32) uint32 {
+	if isV4 {
+		return uint32(checksum.Checksum(pkt[ipv4SrcOff:ipv4AddrsEnd], 0)) + proto
+	}
+	return uint32(checksum.Checksum(pkt[ipv6SrcOff:ipv6AddrsEnd], 0)) + proto
+}
+
+// baseIPv4HdrSum folds the IPv4 header checksum over the fields that stay constant across segments.
+// csumStart is the L3 header length, which bounds a valid IHL.
+func baseIPv4HdrSum(pkt []byte, csumStart int) (uint32, error) {
+	ihl := int(pkt[0]&0x0f) * 4
+	if ihl < ipv4HeaderMinLen || ihl > csumStart {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("bad IPv4 IHL: %d", ihl)
+	}
+	// total_len, the ID, and the checksum field itself are excluded: all three are rewritten per segment.
+	sum := uint32(checksum.Checksum(pkt[:ihl], 0))
+	sum += uint32(^binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[ipv4TotalLenOff : ipv4TotalLenOff+2]))
+	sum += uint32(^binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[ipv4ChecksumOff : ipv4ChecksumOff+2]))
+	sum += uint32(^binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[ipv4IDOff : ipv4IDOff+2]))
+	sum = (sum & 0xffff) + (sum >> 16)
+	sum = (sum & 0xffff) + (sum >> 16)
+	return sum, nil
+}
+
+// baseTCPHdrSum folds the TCP header checksum over everything the segment loop does not rewrite
+func baseTCPHdrSum(pkt []byte, csumStart, headerLen int) uint32 {
+	seq := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(pkt[csumStart+tcpSeqOff : csumStart+tcpSeqOff+4])
+	flags := uint16(pkt[csumStart+tcpFlagsOff])
+
+	sum := uint32(checksum.Checksum(pkt[csumStart:headerLen], 0))
+	sum += uint32(^uint16(seq >> 16))
+	sum += uint32(^uint16(seq))
+	sum += uint32(^flags)
+	sum += uint32(^binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[csumStart+tcpChecksumOff : csumStart+tcpChecksumOff+2]))
+	sum = (sum & 0xffff) + (sum >> 16)
+	sum = (sum & 0xffff) + (sum >> 16)
+	return sum
+}
+
+// SegmentTCP walks a TSO superpacket pkt, yielding each segment as a slice into pkt.
+// Per-segment plaintext is laid out by stamping a copy of the original L3+L4 header into pkt at offset i*gsoSize,
+// where it sits immediately before that segment's payload chunk in the original buffer.
+// pkt is consumed by this call and must not be inspected by the caller after the final yield.
+func SegmentTCP(pkt []byte, hdrLenU, csumStartU, gsoSizeU uint16, yield func(seg []byte) error) error {
+	if gsoSizeU == 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("gso_size is zero")
+	}
+	if csumStartU == 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("csum_start is zero")
+	}
+
+	headerLen := int(hdrLenU)
+	csumStart := int(csumStartU)
+	if headerLen > maxSegHdrLen {
+		return fmt.Errorf("header len %d exceeds max %d", headerLen, maxSegHdrLen)
+	}
+	isV4 := pkt[0]>>4 == 4
+
+	tcpHdrLen := int(pkt[csumStart+tcpDataOffOff]>>4) * 4
+	payLen := len(pkt) - headerLen
+	gsoSize := int(gsoSizeU)
+	numSeg := segCount(payLen, gsoSize)
+
+	origSeq := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(pkt[csumStart+tcpSeqOff : csumStart+tcpSeqOff+4])
+	origFlags := pkt[csumStart+tcpFlagsOff]
+
+	baseProtoSum := basePseudoSum(pkt, isV4, unix.IPPROTO_TCP)
+	baseTcpHdrSum := baseTCPHdrSum(pkt, csumStart, headerLen)
+
+	var origIPID uint16
+	var baseIPHdrSum uint32
+	if isV4 {
+		origIPID = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[ipv4IDOff : ipv4IDOff+2])
+		var err error
+		// TSO bumps the ID per segment, so it stays out of the base sum.
+		baseIPHdrSum, err = baseIPv4HdrSum(pkt, csumStart)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Snapshot the pristine L3+L4 header once. '
+	// Every segment's header is stamped from this copy, so overlapping stamps (gsoSize < headerLen) can never corrupt the source.
+	var savedHdr [maxSegHdrLen]byte
+	copy(savedHdr[:headerLen], pkt[:headerLen])
+
+	for i := 0; i < numSeg; i++ {
+		segStart := i * gsoSize
+		segEnd := segStart + gsoSize
+		if segEnd > payLen {
+			segEnd = payLen
+		}
+		segPayLen := segEnd - segStart
+		segLen := headerLen + segPayLen
+		headerOff := i * gsoSize
+
+		// Stamp the header into place immediately before this segment's payload, sourced from the snapshot.
+		// The per-segment patches below overwrite the variable fields. (seq/flags/cksum/totalLen/id)
+		if i > 0 {
+			// Iter 0's header is already at pkt[:headerLen] (identical to savedHdr), so only i >= 1 needs the stamp
+			copy(pkt[headerOff:headerOff+headerLen], savedHdr[:headerLen])
+		}
+		seg := pkt[headerOff : headerOff+segLen]
+
+		segSeq := origSeq + uint32(segStart)
+		segFlags := origFlags
+		if i != 0 {
+			segFlags &^= tcpCwrFlag
+		}
+		if i != numSeg-1 {
+			segFlags &^= tcpFinPshMask
+		}
+		totalLen := segLen
+
+		if isV4 {
+			segID := origIPID + uint16(i)
+			binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[ipv4TotalLenOff:ipv4TotalLenOff+2], uint16(totalLen))
+			binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[ipv4IDOff:ipv4IDOff+2], segID)
+			ipSum := baseIPHdrSum + uint32(totalLen) + uint32(segID)
+			binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[ipv4ChecksumOff:ipv4ChecksumOff+2], foldComplement(ipSum))
+		} else {
+			binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[ipv6PayloadLenOff:ipv6PayloadLenOff+2], uint16(headerLen-ipv6FixedLen+segPayLen))
+		}
+
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(seg[csumStart+tcpSeqOff:csumStart+tcpSeqOff+4], segSeq)
+		seg[csumStart+tcpFlagsOff] = segFlags
+
+		tcpLen := tcpHdrLen + segPayLen
+		// Payload bytes still live at their original offset in pkt.
+		// The header slide above only writes into pkt[i*GSOSize : i*GSOSize+header], which is the tail of seg_{i-1}'s payload (already consumed)
+		// and never overlaps seg_i's own payload at pkt[header+i*GSOSize : header+(i+1)*GSOSize].
+		paySum := uint32(checksum.Checksum(pkt[headerLen+segStart:headerLen+segEnd], 0))
+		wide := uint64(baseTcpHdrSum) + uint64(paySum) + uint64(baseProtoSum)
+		wide += uint64(segSeq) + uint64(segFlags) + uint64(tcpLen)
+		wide = (wide & 0xffffffff) + (wide >> 32)
+		wide = (wide & 0xffffffff) + (wide >> 32)
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[csumStart+tcpChecksumOff:csumStart+tcpChecksumOff+2], foldComplement(uint32(wide)))
+
+		if err := yield(seg); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// SegmentUDP walks a USO superpacket, stamping a per-segment-patched copy of the original L3+L4 header
+// into pkt at offset i*GSOSize and yielding pkt[i*GSOSize:i*GSOSize+segLen] to the caller.
+// Per-segment patches are total_len + IPv4 csum (or IPv6 payload_len) plus the UDP length and checksum.
+// pkt is consumed destructively.
+func SegmentUDP(pkt []byte, hdrLenU, csumStartU, gsoSizeU uint16, yield func(seg []byte) error) error {
+	if gsoSizeU == 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("gso_size is zero")
+	}
+	if csumStartU == 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("csum_start is zero")
+	}
+
+	isV4 := pkt[0]>>4 == 4
+	headerLen := int(hdrLenU)
+	csumStart := int(csumStartU)
+	if headerLen > maxSegHdrLen {
+		return fmt.Errorf("header len %d exceeds max %d", headerLen, maxSegHdrLen)
+	}
+	if headerLen-csumStart != udpHeaderLen {
+		return fmt.Errorf("udp header len mismatch: %d", headerLen-csumStart)
+	}
+
+	payLen := len(pkt) - headerLen
+	gsoSize := int(gsoSizeU)
+	numSeg := segCount(payLen, gsoSize)
+
+	baseProtoSum := basePseudoSum(pkt, isV4, unix.IPPROTO_UDP)
+
+	var origIPID uint16
+	var baseIPHdrSum uint32
+	if isV4 {
+		origIPID = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[ipv4IDOff : ipv4IDOff+2])
+		var err error
+		// Software UDP GSO bumps the ID per segment just like TSO
+		// (inet_gso_segment's fixed-ID case is TCP-only), so it stays out of the base sum.
+		baseIPHdrSum, err = baseIPv4HdrSum(pkt, csumStart)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Snapshot the pristine L3+L4 header once and stamp every segment from it
+	var savedHdr [maxSegHdrLen]byte
+	copy(savedHdr[:headerLen], pkt[:headerLen])
+
+	for i := 0; i < numSeg; i++ {
+		segStart := i * gsoSize
+		segEnd := segStart + gsoSize
+		if segEnd > payLen {
+			segEnd = payLen
+		}
+		segPayLen := segEnd - segStart
+		segLen := headerLen + segPayLen
+		headerOff := i * gsoSize
+
+		if i > 0 {
+			copy(pkt[headerOff:headerOff+headerLen], savedHdr[:headerLen])
+		}
+		seg := pkt[headerOff : headerOff+segLen]
+
+		totalLen := segLen
+		udpLen := udpHeaderLen + segPayLen
+
+		if isV4 {
+			segID := origIPID + uint16(i)
+			binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[ipv4TotalLenOff:ipv4TotalLenOff+2], uint16(totalLen))
+			binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[ipv4IDOff:ipv4IDOff+2], segID)
+			ipSum := baseIPHdrSum + uint32(totalLen) + uint32(segID)
+			binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[ipv4ChecksumOff:ipv4ChecksumOff+2], foldComplement(ipSum))
+		} else {
+			binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[ipv6PayloadLenOff:ipv6PayloadLenOff+2], uint16(headerLen-ipv6FixedLen+segPayLen))
+		}
+
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[csumStart+udpLengthOff:csumStart+udpLengthOff+2], uint16(udpLen))
+
+		// Sum the UDP header (length just written, checksum zeroed) together with
+		// this segment's payload in one pass, seeded with the pseudo-header sum.
+		seg[csumStart+udpChecksumOff], seg[csumStart+udpChecksumOff+1] = 0, 0
+		pseudo := baseProtoSum + uint32(udpLen)
+		pseudo = (pseudo & 0xffff) + (pseudo >> 16)
+		pseudo = (pseudo & 0xffff) + (pseudo >> 16)
+		csum := ^checksum.Checksum(seg[csumStart:], uint16(pseudo))
+		if csum == 0 {
+			csum = 0xffff
+		}
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[csumStart+udpChecksumOff:csumStart+udpChecksumOff+2], csum)
+
+		if err := yield(seg); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// FinishChecksum computes the L4 checksum for a non-GSO packet that the kernel handed us with NEEDS_CSUM set.
+// CsumStart / CsumOffset point at the 16-bit checksum field.
+// We zero it, fold a full sum from the partial one that the kernel provided, and store the result.
+func FinishChecksum(seg []byte, hdr Hdr) error {
+	cs := int(hdr.CsumStart)
+	co := int(hdr.CsumOffset)
+	if cs+co+2 > len(seg) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("csum offsets out of range: start=%d offset=%d len=%d", cs, co, len(seg))
+	}
+	// The kernel stores a partial pseudo-header sum at [cs+co:]; sum over the
+	// L4 region starting at cs, folding the prior partial in as the seed.
+	partial := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(seg[cs+co : cs+co+2])
+	seg[cs+co] = 0
+	seg[cs+co+1] = 0
+	csum := ^checksum.Checksum(seg[cs:], partial)
+	// RFC 768: UDP transmits a computed zero as all ones, since all-zero is the reserved "no checksum" value.
+	if co == udpChecksumOff && csum == 0 {
+		csum = 0xffff
+	}
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[cs+co:cs+co+2], csum)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// foldComplement folds a 32-bit one's-complement partial sum to 16 bits and
+// complements it, yielding the on-wire Internet checksum value.
+func foldComplement(sum uint32) uint16 {
+	sum = (sum & 0xffff) + (sum >> 16)
+	sum = (sum & 0xffff) + (sum >> 16)
+	return ^uint16(sum)
+}

overlay/tio/virtio/segment_linux_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,602 @@
+//go:build linux && !android
+// +build linux,!android
+
+package virtio
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"testing"
+
+	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
+
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/checksum"
+)
+
+// verifyChecksum confirms that the one's-complement sum across b, seeded with
+// a folded pseudo-header sum, equals all-ones (a valid on-wire checksum).
+// A corrupted header stamped into a segment makes this fail even when the
+// checksum field itself was computed from the (pristine) base sums, because
+// the bytes the receiver would sum no longer match what was checksummed.
+func verifyChecksum(b []byte, pseudo uint16) bool {
+	return checksum.Checksum(b, pseudo) == 0xffff
+}
+
+// pseudoHeaderIPv4 folds the TCP/UDP pseudo-header sum from a segment's own
+// address and length fields, used to independently verify its L4 checksum.
+func pseudoHeaderIPv4(src, dst []byte, proto byte, l4Len int) uint16 {
+	s := uint32(checksum.Checksum(src, 0)) + uint32(checksum.Checksum(dst, 0))
+	s += uint32(proto) + uint32(l4Len)
+	s = (s & 0xffff) + (s >> 16)
+	s = (s & 0xffff) + (s >> 16)
+	return uint16(s)
+}
+
+// buildTCPv4Super constructs a synthetic IPv4/TCP TSO superpacket with a
+// payload of payLen bytes and returns it alongside the header fields the
+// segmenter needs. The header is a fixed 40 bytes (20 IPv4 + 20 TCP).
+func buildTCPv4Super(payLen int) (pkt []byte, hdrLen, csumStart uint16) {
+	const ipLen = 20
+	const tcpLen = 20
+	pkt = make([]byte, ipLen+tcpLen+payLen)
+
+	// IPv4 header.
+	pkt[0] = 0x45 // version 4, IHL 5
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[2:4], uint16(ipLen+tcpLen+payLen))
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], 0x4242) // ID
+	pkt[8] = 64                                  // TTL
+	pkt[9] = unix.IPPROTO_TCP
+	copy(pkt[12:16], []byte{10, 0, 0, 1}) // src
+	copy(pkt[16:20], []byte{10, 0, 0, 2}) // dst
+
+	// TCP header.
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[20:22], 12345) // sport
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[22:24], 80)    // dport
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(pkt[24:28], 10000) // seq
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(pkt[28:32], 20000) // ack
+	pkt[32] = 0x50                                // data offset 5 words
+	pkt[33] = 0x18                                // ACK | PSH
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[34:36], 65535) // window
+
+	for i := 0; i < payLen; i++ {
+		pkt[ipLen+tcpLen+i] = byte(i & 0xff)
+	}
+	return pkt, ipLen + tcpLen, ipLen
+}
+
+// buildUDPv4Super constructs a synthetic IPv4/UDP USO superpacket with a
+// payload of payLen bytes. Header is a fixed 28 bytes (20 IPv4 + 8 UDP).
+func buildUDPv4Super(payLen int) (pkt []byte, hdrLen, csumStart uint16) {
+	const ipLen = 20
+	const udpLen = 8
+	pkt = make([]byte, ipLen+udpLen+payLen)
+
+	pkt[0] = 0x45
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[2:4], uint16(ipLen+udpLen+payLen))
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], 0x4242)
+	pkt[8] = 64
+	pkt[9] = unix.IPPROTO_UDP
+	copy(pkt[12:16], []byte{10, 0, 0, 1})
+	copy(pkt[16:20], []byte{10, 0, 0, 2})
+
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[20:22], 12345) // sport
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[22:24], 53)    // dport
+
+	for i := 0; i < payLen; i++ {
+		pkt[ipLen+udpLen+i] = byte(i & 0xff)
+	}
+	return pkt, ipLen + udpLen, ipLen
+}
+
+// collectTCP segments a fresh copy of pkt and returns each segment as an
+// independent slice so assertions can run after segmentation completes.
+func collectTCP(t *testing.T, pkt []byte, hdrLen, csumStart, gsoSize uint16) [][]byte {
+	t.Helper()
+	work := append([]byte(nil), pkt...)
+	var out [][]byte
+	err := SegmentTCP(work, hdrLen, csumStart, gsoSize, func(seg []byte) error {
+		out = append(out, append([]byte(nil), seg...))
+		return nil
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("SegmentTCP: %v", err)
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+func collectUDP(t *testing.T, pkt []byte, hdrLen, csumStart, gsoSize uint16) [][]byte {
+	t.Helper()
+	work := append([]byte(nil), pkt...)
+	var out [][]byte
+	err := SegmentUDP(work, hdrLen, csumStart, gsoSize, func(seg []byte) error {
+		out = append(out, append([]byte(nil), seg...))
+		return nil
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("SegmentUDP: %v", err)
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+// TestSegmentTCPHeaderNotCorrupted is the regression test for the in-place
+// header-slide bug: when gsoSize < headerLen the old code stamped each
+// segment's header from pkt[:headerLen], which had already been overwritten
+// by the previous segment's overlapping stamp, so segments 2..n carried a
+// corrupted header (garbage src/dst/ports/seq). Every segment must instead
+// carry the ORIGINAL constant header fields with correct per-segment seq.
+func TestSegmentTCPHeaderNotCorrupted(t *testing.T) {
+	const origSeq = 10000
+	cases := []struct {
+		name    string
+		payLen  int
+		gsoSize uint16
+	}{
+		// gsoSize (8) < headerLen (40): the bug's trigger. Even split.
+		{"small-gso-even", 40, 8},
+		// gsoSize (8) < headerLen (40) with a short final segment.
+		{"small-gso-odd-tail", 44, 8},
+		// gsoSize (100) >= headerLen (40): the normal path, must still work.
+		{"normal-gso", 250, 100},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range cases {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			pkt, hdrLen, csumStart := buildTCPv4Super(tc.payLen)
+			gso := int(tc.gsoSize)
+			wantSeg := (tc.payLen + gso - 1) / gso
+			segs := collectTCP(t, pkt, hdrLen, csumStart, tc.gsoSize)
+			if len(segs) != wantSeg {
+				t.Fatalf("got %d segments, want %d", len(segs), wantSeg)
+			}
+
+			off := 0
+			for i, seg := range segs {
+				// Constant header fields must be identical to the original in
+				// EVERY segment. These are exactly the bytes the old code
+				// corrupted in segments 2..n.
+				if got := seg[0]; got != 0x45 {
+					t.Errorf("seg %d: version/IHL byte=%#x want 0x45", i, got)
+				}
+				if seg[9] != unix.IPPROTO_TCP {
+					t.Errorf("seg %d: proto=%d want %d", i, seg[9], unix.IPPROTO_TCP)
+				}
+				if !bytes.Equal(seg[12:16], []byte{10, 0, 0, 1}) {
+					t.Errorf("seg %d: src=%v want [10 0 0 1]", i, seg[12:16])
+				}
+				if !bytes.Equal(seg[16:20], []byte{10, 0, 0, 2}) {
+					t.Errorf("seg %d: dst=%v want [10 0 0 2]", i, seg[16:20])
+				}
+				if sport := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(seg[20:22]); sport != 12345 {
+					t.Errorf("seg %d: sport=%d want 12345", i, sport)
+				}
+				if dport := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(seg[22:24]); dport != 80 {
+					t.Errorf("seg %d: dport=%d want 80", i, dport)
+				}
+				if ack := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(seg[28:32]); ack != 20000 {
+					t.Errorf("seg %d: ack=%d want 20000", i, ack)
+				}
+				if seg[32] != 0x50 {
+					t.Errorf("seg %d: data-offset byte=%#x want 0x50", i, seg[32])
+				}
+
+				// Per-segment seq must advance by the payload offset.
+				segStart := i * gso
+				if seq := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(seg[24:28]); seq != uint32(origSeq+segStart) {
+					t.Errorf("seg %d: seq=%d want %d", i, seq, origSeq+segStart)
+				}
+
+				// Payload bytes must be the original contiguous slice.
+				segPayLen := len(seg) - int(hdrLen)
+				wantPay := make([]byte, segPayLen)
+				for k := 0; k < segPayLen; k++ {
+					wantPay[k] = byte((off + k) & 0xff)
+				}
+				if !bytes.Equal(seg[hdrLen:], wantPay) {
+					t.Errorf("seg %d: payload mismatch", i)
+				}
+				off += segPayLen
+
+				// End-to-end: the stamped header must checksum-verify. A
+				// corrupted header fails here because the written checksum was
+				// derived from the pristine header.
+				if !verifyChecksum(seg[:20], 0) {
+					t.Errorf("seg %d: bad IPv4 header checksum", i)
+				}
+				psum := pseudoHeaderIPv4(seg[12:16], seg[16:20], unix.IPPROTO_TCP, len(seg)-20)
+				if !verifyChecksum(seg[20:], psum) {
+					t.Errorf("seg %d: bad TCP checksum", i)
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestCorrectHdrLenChecksumBound guards the checksum-field bounds check in
+// CorrectHdrLen. The checksum field sits at CsumStart+CsumOffset, so the check
+// must be computed from CsumStart+CsumOffset — NOT CsumStart+CsumStart, a
+// regression that doubled CsumStart and thus over-tightened the bound (since
+// CsumOffset, 6 for UDP / 16 for TCP, is always < CsumStart >= 20). That bogus
+// bound spuriously rejected valid small USO superpackets in decodeRead.
+func TestCorrectHdrLenChecksumBound(t *testing.T) {
+	// A valid IPv4 USO superpacket: 20B IPv4 + 8B UDP + two 6-byte segments
+	// (payload 12) = 40 bytes total. CsumStart=20, CsumOffset=6, so the UDP
+	// checksum field lives at bytes 26..27, comfortably inside the 40-byte
+	// packet. The OLD formula computed cSumAt = CsumStart+CsumStart = 40 and
+	// rejected on cSumAt+1 (41) >= len(pkt) (40); the fix (CsumStart+CsumOffset
+	// = 26) accepts. This case FAILS against the CsumStart+CsumStart regression.
+	t.Run("valid-small-uso-accepted", func(t *testing.T) {
+		pkt, _, csumStart := buildUDPv4Super(12) // total len 40
+		hdr := NewHeader(
+			unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM, /*flags*/
+			unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP_L4,   /*gsoType*/
+			0,                                /*hdrLen*/
+			6,                                /*gsoSize: two 6-byte segments*/
+			csumStart,                        /*csumStart*/
+			6,                                /*csumOffset*/
+		)
+		if err := CorrectHdrLen(pkt, &hdr); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("CorrectHdrLen rejected a valid 40-byte USO superpacket: %v", err)
+		}
+		if hdr.HdrLen != csumStart+udpHeaderLen {
+			t.Errorf("HdrLen = %d, want %d", hdr.HdrLen, csumStart+udpHeaderLen)
+		}
+	})
+
+	// A genuinely-too-short packet: CsumStart=20, CsumOffset=6 means the
+	// checksum field would end at byte 27, but the packet is only 25 bytes
+	// (CsumStart+CsumOffset+2 = 28 > 25). CorrectHdrLen must still reject it.
+	t.Run("too-short-rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
+		pkt := make([]byte, 25)
+		pkt[0] = 0x45 // IPv4, IHL 5
+		hdr := NewHeader(
+			unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM, /*flags*/
+			unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP_L4,   /*gsoType*/
+			0,                                /*hdrLen*/
+			6,                                /*gsoSize*/
+			20,                               /*csumStart*/
+			6,                                /*csumOffset*/
+		)
+		if err := CorrectHdrLen(pkt, &hdr); err == nil {
+			t.Fatalf("CorrectHdrLen accepted a too-short (25-byte) packet")
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+// TestSegmentUDPHeaderNotCorrupted is the USO counterpart: SegmentUDP performs
+// the same header stamp and must be correct when gsoSize < headerLen.
+func TestSegmentUDPHeaderNotCorrupted(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		name    string
+		payLen  int
+		gsoSize uint16
+	}{
+		{"small-gso-even", 40, 8},
+		{"small-gso-odd-tail", 44, 8},
+		{"normal-gso", 250, 100},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range cases {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			pkt, hdrLen, csumStart := buildUDPv4Super(tc.payLen)
+			gso := int(tc.gsoSize)
+			wantSeg := (tc.payLen + gso - 1) / gso
+			segs := collectUDP(t, pkt, hdrLen, csumStart, tc.gsoSize)
+			if len(segs) != wantSeg {
+				t.Fatalf("got %d segments, want %d", len(segs), wantSeg)
+			}
+
+			off := 0
+			for i, seg := range segs {
+				if got := seg[0]; got != 0x45 {
+					t.Errorf("seg %d: version/IHL byte=%#x want 0x45", i, got)
+				}
+				if seg[9] != unix.IPPROTO_UDP {
+					t.Errorf("seg %d: proto=%d want %d", i, seg[9], unix.IPPROTO_UDP)
+				}
+				if !bytes.Equal(seg[12:16], []byte{10, 0, 0, 1}) {
+					t.Errorf("seg %d: src=%v want [10 0 0 1]", i, seg[12:16])
+				}
+				if !bytes.Equal(seg[16:20], []byte{10, 0, 0, 2}) {
+					t.Errorf("seg %d: dst=%v want [10 0 0 2]", i, seg[16:20])
+				}
+				if sport := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(seg[20:22]); sport != 12345 {
+					t.Errorf("seg %d: sport=%d want 12345", i, sport)
+				}
+				if dport := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(seg[22:24]); dport != 53 {
+					t.Errorf("seg %d: dport=%d want 53", i, dport)
+				}
+				// Software UDP GSO bumps the IPv4 ID per segment just like TSO
+				// (inet_gso_segment's fixed-ID case is TCP-only).
+				if id := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(seg[4:6]); id != 0x4242+uint16(i) {
+					t.Errorf("seg %d: ip id=%#x want %#x", i, id, 0x4242+uint16(i))
+				}
+
+				segPayLen := len(seg) - int(hdrLen)
+				if udpLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(seg[24:26]); udpLen != uint16(8+segPayLen) {
+					t.Errorf("seg %d: udp len=%d want %d", i, udpLen, 8+segPayLen)
+				}
+
+				wantPay := make([]byte, segPayLen)
+				for k := 0; k < segPayLen; k++ {
+					wantPay[k] = byte((off + k) & 0xff)
+				}
+				if !bytes.Equal(seg[hdrLen:], wantPay) {
+					t.Errorf("seg %d: payload mismatch", i)
+				}
+				off += segPayLen
+
+				if !verifyChecksum(seg[:20], 0) {
+					t.Errorf("seg %d: bad IPv4 header checksum", i)
+				}
+				psum := pseudoHeaderIPv4(seg[12:16], seg[16:20], unix.IPPROTO_UDP, len(seg)-20)
+				if !verifyChecksum(seg[20:], psum) {
+					t.Errorf("seg %d: bad UDP checksum", i)
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// buildUDPv4Single constructs a single IPv4/UDP datagram with the checksum field pre-loaded with the folded
+// pseudo-header sum, which is how a NEEDS_CSUM (CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) packet arrives from the tun.
+func buildUDPv4Single(payload []byte) (pkt []byte, hdr Hdr) {
+	const ipLen, udpLen = 20, 8
+	pkt = make([]byte, ipLen+udpLen+len(payload))
+
+	pkt[0] = 0x45
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[2:4], uint16(len(pkt)))
+	pkt[8] = 64
+	pkt[9] = unix.IPPROTO_UDP
+	copy(pkt[12:16], []byte{10, 0, 0, 1})
+	copy(pkt[16:20], []byte{10, 0, 0, 2})
+
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[ipLen:ipLen+2], 12345)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[ipLen+2:ipLen+4], 53)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[ipLen+4:ipLen+6], uint16(udpLen+len(payload)))
+	copy(pkt[ipLen+udpLen:], payload)
+
+	pseudo := pseudoHeaderIPv4(pkt[12:16], pkt[16:20], unix.IPPROTO_UDP, udpLen+len(payload))
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[ipLen+udpChecksumOff:ipLen+udpChecksumOff+2], pseudo)
+
+	return pkt, NewHeader(unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM, unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE, 0, 0, ipLen, udpChecksumOff)
+}
+
+// TestFinishChecksumUDPZeroStoresAllOnes pins RFC 768: a UDP checksum that computes to zero goes on the wire as
+// 0xffff, because all-zero is the reserved "no checksum" encoding that IPv6 rejects outright.
+func TestFinishChecksumUDPZeroStoresAllOnes(t *testing.T) {
+	var payload []byte
+	for i := 0; i < 0x10000; i++ {
+		p := []byte{byte(i >> 8), byte(i)}
+		pkt, hdr := buildUDPv4Single(p)
+		cs, co := int(hdr.CsumStart), int(hdr.CsumOffset)
+		partial := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[cs+co : cs+co+2])
+		pkt[cs+co], pkt[cs+co+1] = 0, 0
+		if ^checksum.Checksum(pkt[cs:], partial) == 0 {
+			payload = p
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	if payload == nil {
+		t.Fatal("no 2-byte payload produced a zero checksum")
+	}
+
+	pkt, hdr := buildUDPv4Single(payload)
+	if err := FinishChecksum(pkt, hdr); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("FinishChecksum: %v", err)
+	}
+	off := int(hdr.CsumStart) + int(hdr.CsumOffset)
+	if got := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[off : off+2]); got != 0xffff {
+		t.Fatalf("stored %#04x, want 0xffff for a UDP checksum that folds to zero", got)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestFinishChecksumTCPZeroPreserved is the other half of the protocol split: zero is a legal TCP checksum and must
+// be stored as-is, so the UDP rewrite must not fire on a TCP csum_offset.
+func TestFinishChecksumTCPZeroPreserved(t *testing.T) {
+	const cs, co = 20, tcpChecksumOff
+
+	// Seed the partial so the completed checksum lands on zero, the case the UDP path rewrites.
+	seg := make([]byte, cs+co+2)
+	for i := range seg[cs:] {
+		seg[cs+i] = byte(i * 7)
+	}
+	var partial uint16
+	for i := 0; i <= 0xffff; i++ {
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[cs+co:cs+co+2], uint16(i))
+		probe := append([]byte(nil), seg...)
+		probe[cs+co], probe[cs+co+1] = 0, 0
+		if ^checksum.Checksum(probe[cs:], uint16(i)) == 0 {
+			partial = uint16(i)
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[cs+co:cs+co+2], partial)
+
+	hdr := NewHeader(unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM, unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE, 0, 0, cs, co)
+	if err := FinishChecksum(seg, hdr); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("FinishChecksum: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(seg[cs+co : cs+co+2]); got != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("stored %#04x, want 0x0000 (zero is a legal TCP checksum)", got)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestFinishChecksumUDPValidates confirms the ordinary path still produces a checksum a receiver accepts.
+func TestFinishChecksumUDPValidates(t *testing.T) {
+	payload := []byte("the definitive tun offloads branch")
+	pkt, hdr := buildUDPv4Single(payload)
+	if err := FinishChecksum(pkt, hdr); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("FinishChecksum: %v", err)
+	}
+	pseudo := pseudoHeaderIPv4(pkt[12:16], pkt[16:20], unix.IPPROTO_UDP, 8+len(payload))
+	if !verifyChecksum(pkt[hdr.CsumStart:], pseudo) {
+		t.Fatal("completed UDP checksum does not validate")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestCheckValidMasksGSOECN: GSO_ECN is a qualifier bit the kernel ORs
+// into gso_type for TSO superpackets with CWR set. CheckValid must
+// validate an ECN-qualified type as its base type — previously TCPV4|ECN
+// fell into the default case and skipped the IP-version agreement check.
+// The qualifier is TCP-only, so it must be rejected on UDP_L4.
+func TestCheckValidMasksGSOECN(t *testing.T) {
+	v4pkt, _, _ := buildTCPv4Super(100)
+	v6pkt := make([]byte, len(v4pkt))
+	copy(v6pkt, v4pkt)
+	v6pkt[0] = 0x60 // claim IPv6
+
+	cases := []struct {
+		name    string
+		pkt     []byte
+		gsoType uint8
+		wantErr bool
+	}{
+		{"tcpv4-ecn-v4", v4pkt, unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4 | unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN, false},
+		{"tcpv4-ecn-v6-mismatch", v6pkt, unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4 | unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN, true},
+		{"tcpv6-ecn-v4-mismatch", v4pkt, unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6 | unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN, true},
+		{"udp-l4-ecn-rejected", v4pkt, unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP_L4 | unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN, true},
+		{"tcpv4-plain-v4", v4pkt, unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4, false},
+		{"tcpv4-plain-v6-mismatch", v6pkt, unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4, true},
+	}
+	for _, tc := range cases {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			err := CheckValid(tc.pkt, NewHeader(0, tc.gsoType, 0, 100, 0, 0))
+			if tc.wantErr && err == nil {
+				t.Errorf("CheckValid(gsoType=%#x) = nil, want error", tc.gsoType)
+			}
+			if !tc.wantErr && err != nil {
+				t.Errorf("CheckValid(gsoType=%#x) = %v, want nil", tc.gsoType, err)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestCheckValidRejectsZeroGSOSize: a GSO-typed header with gso_size=0 must be
+// rejected. It would produce a Packet whose GSOInfo.IsSuperpacket() is false,
+// dodging both segmentation and FinishChecksum on its way downstream.
+func TestCheckValidRejectsZeroGSOSize(t *testing.T) {
+	v4pkt, _, _ := buildTCPv4Super(100)
+	if err := CheckValid(v4pkt, NewHeader(0, unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4, 0, 0, 0, 0)); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("CheckValid accepted a GSO-typed header with gso_size=0")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestFoldComplementMatchesReference checks the segmenter's fold-and-invert
+// against an independent RFC 1071 reference fold, hitting the carry edge
+// cases (values whose first fold produces another carry).
+func TestFoldComplementMatchesReference(t *testing.T) {
+	refFold := func(s uint64) uint16 {
+		for s>>16 != 0 {
+			s = s&0xffff + s>>16
+		}
+		return uint16(s)
+	}
+	cases := []uint32{
+		0, 1, 0xffff,
+		0x10000,    // single carry
+		0x1fffe,    // 0xffff + 0xffff: carry produces another 0xffff
+		0xffff0000, // high half only
+		0xfffeffff, // first fold yields another carry
+		0xffffffff, // worst case
+	}
+	for _, c := range cases {
+		if got, want := foldComplement(c), ^refFold(uint64(c)); got != want {
+			t.Errorf("foldComplement(%#x) = %#x, want %#x", c, got, want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// referenceBaseIPv4HdrSum and referenceBaseTCPHdrSum are the straightforward
+// implementations that baseIPv4HdrSum/baseTCPHdrSum replaced: copy the header
+// into scratch, zero the fields the segment loop rewrites, sum. The production
+// versions instead sum in place and subtract those fields via one's-complement
+// arithmetic, which is faster but far less obvious — particularly for the TCP
+// flags byte, which is only half of a 16-bit word. These references exist so
+// that trade is checked rather than asserted.
+func referenceBaseIPv4HdrSum(pkt []byte, ihl int) uint32 {
+	var ipTmp [ipv4HeaderMaxLen]byte
+	copy(ipTmp[:ihl], pkt[:ihl])
+	ipTmp[ipv4TotalLenOff], ipTmp[ipv4TotalLenOff+1] = 0, 0
+	ipTmp[ipv4ChecksumOff], ipTmp[ipv4ChecksumOff+1] = 0, 0
+	ipTmp[ipv4IDOff], ipTmp[ipv4IDOff+1] = 0, 0
+	return uint32(checksum.Checksum(ipTmp[:ihl], 0))
+}
+
+func referenceBaseTCPHdrSum(pkt []byte, csumStart, headerLen int) uint32 {
+	tcpLen := headerLen - csumStart
+	var tmp [tcpHeaderMaxLen]byte
+	copy(tmp[:tcpLen], pkt[csumStart:headerLen])
+	tmp[tcpSeqOff], tmp[tcpSeqOff+1], tmp[tcpSeqOff+2], tmp[tcpSeqOff+3] = 0, 0, 0, 0
+	tmp[tcpFlagsOff] = 0
+	tmp[tcpChecksumOff], tmp[tcpChecksumOff+1] = 0, 0
+	return uint32(checksum.Checksum(tmp[:tcpLen], 0))
+}
+
+// randSeed is a tiny deterministic PRNG so this test needs no imports beyond
+// what the file already has and reproduces identically on every run.
+func randByte(state *uint32) byte {
+	*state = *state*1664525 + 1013904223
+	return byte(*state >> 24)
+}
+
+func TestBaseSumsMatchZeroingReference(t *testing.T) {
+	state := uint32(12345)
+
+	t.Run("ipv4", func(t *testing.T) {
+		for ihl := ipv4HeaderMinLen; ihl <= ipv4HeaderMaxLen; ihl += 4 {
+			for iter := 0; iter < 5000; iter++ {
+				pkt := make([]byte, ihl)
+				for i := range pkt {
+					pkt[i] = randByte(&state)
+				}
+				pkt[0] = byte(0x40 | (ihl / 4))
+
+				want := referenceBaseIPv4HdrSum(pkt, ihl)
+				got, err := baseIPv4HdrSum(pkt, ihl)
+				if err != nil {
+					t.Fatalf("ihl=%d: %v", ihl, err)
+				}
+				// Compare the value that reaches the wire: the raw partial
+				// sums may legally differ by one's-complement -0 vs +0.
+				for _, tl := range []uint32{20, 1500, 65535} {
+					for _, id := range []uint32{0, 0x4242, 0xffff} {
+						if a, b := foldComplement(want+tl+id), foldComplement(got+tl+id); a != b {
+							t.Fatalf("ihl=%d tl=%d id=%d: %#04x != %#04x", ihl, tl, id, a, b)
+						}
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("tcp", func(t *testing.T) {
+		const csumStart = 20
+		for dataOff := 5; dataOff <= 15; dataOff++ {
+			tcpLen := dataOff * 4
+			headerLen := csumStart + tcpLen
+			for iter := 0; iter < 5000; iter++ {
+				pkt := make([]byte, headerLen+64)
+				for i := range pkt {
+					pkt[i] = randByte(&state)
+				}
+				pkt[0] = 0x45
+				pkt[csumStart+tcpDataOffOff] = byte(dataOff << 4)
+
+				want := referenceBaseTCPHdrSum(pkt, csumStart, headerLen)
+				got := baseTCPHdrSum(pkt, csumStart, headerLen)
+				for _, seq := range []uint32{0, 1, 0x4242_4242, 0xffff_ffff} {
+					for _, fl := range []uint32{0x00, 0x10, 0x18, 0x19, 0xff} {
+						for _, l4 := range []uint32{20, 1460, 65535} {
+							a := foldComplement(want + seq + fl + l4)
+							b := foldComplement(got + seq + fl + l4)
+							if a != b {
+								t.Fatalf("dataOff=%d seq=%#x fl=%#x l4=%d: %#04x != %#04x",
+									dataOff, seq, fl, l4, a, b)
+							}
+						}
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	})
+}

overlay/tun_android.go

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
 )
@@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ func (t *tun) RoutesFor(ip netip.Addr) routing.Gateways {
 	return r
 }
 
-func (t tun) Activate() error {
+func (t *tun) Activate() error {
 	return nil
 }
 
@@ -96,10 +97,6 @@ func (t *tun) Name() string {
 	return "android"
 }
 
-func (t *tun) SupportsMultiqueue() bool {
+func (t *tun) Queues(int) ([]tio.Queue, error) {
-	return false
+	return []tio.Queue{tio.NewSingleQueue(t, defaultBatchBufSize)}, nil
-}
-
-func (t *tun) NewMultiQueueReader() (io.ReadWriteCloser, error) {
-	return nil, fmt.Errorf("TODO: multiqueue not implemented for android")
 }

overlay/tun_darwin.go

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ package overlay
 import (
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
-	"io"
 	"log/slog"
 	"net/netip"
 	"os"
@@ -16,6 +15,7 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
 	netroute "golang.org/x/net/route"
@@ -550,7 +550,9 @@ func (t *tun) Read(to []byte) (int, error) {
 	return n - 4, nil
 }
 
-// Write pushes one IP packet onto the utun device.
+// Write pushes one IP packet onto the utun device. Safe for concurrent use:
+// the AF prefix and iovecs are per-call stack state, and the fd write itself
+// serializes on the runtime's fd mutex (see the Queue contract in tio.go).
 func (t *tun) Write(from []byte) (int, error) {
 	if len(from) == 0 {
 		return 0, syscall.EIO
@@ -606,10 +608,6 @@ func (t *tun) Name() string {
 	return t.Device
 }
 
-func (t *tun) SupportsMultiqueue() bool {
+func (t *tun) Queues(int) ([]tio.Queue, error) {
-	return false
+	return []tio.Queue{tio.NewSingleQueue(t, defaultBatchBufSize)}, nil
-}
-
-func (t *tun) NewMultiQueueReader() (io.ReadWriteCloser, error) {
-	return nil, fmt.Errorf("TODO: multiqueue not implemented for darwin")
 }

overlay/tun_disabled.go

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/iputil"
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
 )
 
@@ -23,6 +24,23 @@ type disabledTun struct {
 	l  *slog.Logger
 }
 
+// Read hands the next queued packet to a reader, copying it into b. Reads
+// from concurrent queues are safe: the channel receive serializes them and
+// each queue copies into its own private scratch buffer.
+func (t *disabledTun) Read(b []byte) (int, error) {
+	r, ok := <-t.read
+	if !ok {
+		return 0, io.EOF
+	}
+
+	t.tx.Inc(1)
+	if t.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
+		t.l.Debug("Write payload", "raw", prettyPacket(r))
+	}
+
+	return copy(b, r), nil
+}
+
 func newDisabledTun(vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, queueLen int, metricsEnabled bool, l *slog.Logger) *disabledTun {
 	tun := &disabledTun{
 		vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
@@ -57,24 +75,6 @@ func (*disabledTun) Name() string {
 	return "disabled"
 }
 
-func (t *disabledTun) Read(b []byte) (int, error) {
-	r, ok := <-t.read
-	if !ok {
-		return 0, io.EOF
-	}
-
-	if len(r) > len(b) {
-		return 0, fmt.Errorf("packet larger than mtu: %d > %d bytes", len(r), len(b))
-	}
-
-	t.tx.Inc(1)
-	if t.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
-		t.l.Debug("Write payload", "raw", prettyPacket(r))
-	}
-
-	return copy(b, r), nil
-}
-
 func (t *disabledTun) handleICMPEchoRequest(b []byte) bool {
 	out := make([]byte, len(b))
 	out = iputil.CreateICMPEchoResponse(b, out)
@@ -106,12 +106,14 @@ func (t *disabledTun) Write(b []byte) (int, error) {
 	return len(b), nil
 }
 
-func (t *disabledTun) SupportsMultiqueue() bool {
+func (t *disabledTun) Queues(n int) ([]tio.Queue, error) {
-	return true
+	out := make([]tio.Queue, n)
-}
+	for i := range out {
-
+		// NoClose: the shared channel and metrics are owned by the
-func (t *disabledTun) NewMultiQueueReader() (io.ReadWriteCloser, error) {
+		// disabledTun; Close on the device tears them down once for everybody.
-	return t, nil
+		out[i] = tio.NewSingleQueueNoClose(t, defaultBatchBufSize)
+	}
+	return out, nil
 }
 
 func (t *disabledTun) Close() error {

overlay/tun_file_linux_test.go

@@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
-//go:build linux && !android && !e2e_testing
-// +build linux,!android,!e2e_testing
-
-package overlay
-
-import (
-	"errors"
-	"os"
-	"sync"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
-)
-
-// newReadPipe returns a read fd. The matching write fd is registered for cleanup.
-// The caller takes ownership of the read fd (pass it to newTunFd / newFriend).
-func newReadPipe(t *testing.T) int {
-	t.Helper()
-	var fds [2]int
-	if err := unix.Pipe2(fds[:], unix.O_CLOEXEC); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("pipe2: %v", err)
-	}
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = unix.Close(fds[1]) })
-	return fds[0]
-}
-
-func TestTunFile_WakeForShutdown_UnblocksRead(t *testing.T) {
-	tf, err := newTunFd(newReadPipe(t))
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("newTunFd: %v", err)
-	}
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = tf.Close() })
-
-	done := make(chan error, 1)
-	go func() {
-		_, err := tf.Read(make([]byte, 64))
-		done <- err
-	}()
-
-	// Verify Read is actually blocked in poll.
-	select {
-	case err := <-done:
-		t.Fatalf("Read returned before shutdown signal: %v", err)
-	case <-time.After(50 * time.Millisecond):
-	}
-
-	if err := tf.wakeForShutdown(); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("wakeForShutdown: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	select {
-	case err := <-done:
-		if !errors.Is(err, os.ErrClosed) {
-			t.Fatalf("expected os.ErrClosed, got %v", err)
-		}
-	case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("Read did not wake on shutdown")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestTunFile_WakeForShutdown_WakesFriends(t *testing.T) {
-	parent, err := newTunFd(newReadPipe(t))
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("newTunFd: %v", err)
-	}
-	friend, err := parent.newFriend(newReadPipe(t))
-	if err != nil {
-		_ = parent.Close()
-		t.Fatalf("newFriend: %v", err)
-	}
-	t.Cleanup(func() {
-		_ = friend.Close()
-		_ = parent.Close()
-	})
-
-	readers := []*tunFile{parent, friend}
-	errs := make([]error, len(readers))
-	var wg sync.WaitGroup
-	for i, r := range readers {
-		wg.Add(1)
-		go func(i int, r *tunFile) {
-			defer wg.Done()
-			_, errs[i] = r.Read(make([]byte, 64))
-		}(i, r)
-	}
-
-	time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
-
-	if err := parent.wakeForShutdown(); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("wakeForShutdown: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	done := make(chan struct{})
-	go func() { wg.Wait(); close(done) }()
-	select {
-	case <-done:
-	case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("readers did not wake")
-	}
-
-	for i, err := range errs {
-		if !errors.Is(err, os.ErrClosed) {
-			t.Errorf("reader %d: expected os.ErrClosed, got %v", i, err)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestTunFile_Close_Idempotent(t *testing.T) {
-	tf, err := newTunFd(newReadPipe(t))
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("newTunFd: %v", err)
-	}
-	if err := tf.Close(); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("first Close: %v", err)
-	}
-	if err := tf.Close(); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("second Close should be a no-op, got %v", err)
-	}
-}

overlay/tun_freebsd.go

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
 	"bytes"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
-	"io"
 	"io/fs"
 	"log/slog"
 	"net/netip"
@@ -20,7 +19,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
 
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
-
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
 	netroute "golang.org/x/net/route"
@@ -561,12 +560,8 @@ func (t *tun) Name() string {
 	return t.Device
 }
 
-func (t *tun) SupportsMultiqueue() bool {
+func (t *tun) Queues(int) ([]tio.Queue, error) {
-	return false
+	return []tio.Queue{tio.NewSingleQueue(t, defaultBatchBufSize)}, nil
-}
-
-func (t *tun) NewMultiQueueReader() (io.ReadWriteCloser, error) {
-	return nil, fmt.Errorf("TODO: multiqueue not implemented for freebsd")
 }
 
 func (t *tun) addRoutes(logErrors bool) error {

overlay/tun_ios.go

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
 	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
@@ -159,10 +160,6 @@ func (t *tun) Name() string {
 	return "iOS"
 }
 
-func (t *tun) SupportsMultiqueue() bool {
+func (t *tun) Queues(int) ([]tio.Queue, error) {
-	return false
+	return []tio.Queue{tio.NewSingleQueue(t, defaultBatchBufSize)}, nil
-}
-
-func (t *tun) NewMultiQueueReader() (io.ReadWriteCloser, error) {
-	return nil, fmt.Errorf("TODO: multiqueue not implemented for ios")
 }

overlay/tun_linux.go

@@ -4,9 +4,7 @@
 package overlay
 
 import (
-	"encoding/binary"
 	"fmt"
-	"io"
 	"log/slog"
 	"net"
 	"net/netip"
@@ -19,188 +17,25 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
+	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
 	"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
 	"github.com/vishvananda/netlink"
 	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
 )
 
-// tunFile wraps a TUN file descriptor with poll-based reads. The FD provided will be changed to non-blocking.
-// A shared eventfd allows Close to wake all readers blocked in poll.
-type tunFile struct {
-	fd         int
-	shutdownFd int
-	lastOne    bool
-	readPoll   [2]unix.PollFd
-	writePoll  [2]unix.PollFd
-	closed     bool
-}
-
-// newFriend makes a tunFile for a MultiQueueReader that copies the shutdown eventfd from the parent tun
-func (r *tunFile) newFriend(fd int) (*tunFile, error) {
-	if err := unix.SetNonblock(fd, true); err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to set tun fd non-blocking: %w", err)
-	}
-	return &tunFile{
-		fd:         fd,
-		shutdownFd: r.shutdownFd,
-		readPoll: [2]unix.PollFd{
-			{Fd: int32(fd), Events: unix.POLLIN},
-			{Fd: int32(r.shutdownFd), Events: unix.POLLIN},
-		},
-		writePoll: [2]unix.PollFd{
-			{Fd: int32(fd), Events: unix.POLLOUT},
-			{Fd: int32(r.shutdownFd), Events: unix.POLLIN},
-		},
-	}, nil
-}
-
-func newTunFd(fd int) (*tunFile, error) {
-	if err := unix.SetNonblock(fd, true); err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to set tun fd non-blocking: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	shutdownFd, err := unix.Eventfd(0, unix.EFD_NONBLOCK|unix.EFD_CLOEXEC)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create eventfd: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	out := &tunFile{
-		fd:         fd,
-		shutdownFd: shutdownFd,
-		lastOne:    true,
-		readPoll: [2]unix.PollFd{
-			{Fd: int32(fd), Events: unix.POLLIN},
-			{Fd: int32(shutdownFd), Events: unix.POLLIN},
-		},
-		writePoll: [2]unix.PollFd{
-			{Fd: int32(fd), Events: unix.POLLOUT},
-			{Fd: int32(shutdownFd), Events: unix.POLLIN},
-		},
-	}
-
-	return out, nil
-}
-
-func (r *tunFile) blockOnRead() error {
-	const problemFlags = unix.POLLHUP | unix.POLLNVAL | unix.POLLERR
-	var err error
-	for {
-		_, err = unix.Poll(r.readPoll[:], -1)
-		if err != unix.EINTR {
-			break
-		}
-	}
-	//always reset these!
-	tunEvents := r.readPoll[0].Revents
-	shutdownEvents := r.readPoll[1].Revents
-	r.readPoll[0].Revents = 0
-	r.readPoll[1].Revents = 0
-	//do the err check before trusting the potentially bogus bits we just got
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	if shutdownEvents&(unix.POLLIN|problemFlags) != 0 {
-		return os.ErrClosed
-	} else if tunEvents&problemFlags != 0 {
-		return os.ErrClosed
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-func (r *tunFile) blockOnWrite() error {
-	const problemFlags = unix.POLLHUP | unix.POLLNVAL | unix.POLLERR
-	var err error
-	for {
-		_, err = unix.Poll(r.writePoll[:], -1)
-		if err != unix.EINTR {
-			break
-		}
-	}
-	//always reset these!
-	tunEvents := r.writePoll[0].Revents
-	shutdownEvents := r.writePoll[1].Revents
-	r.writePoll[0].Revents = 0
-	r.writePoll[1].Revents = 0
-	//do the err check before trusting the potentially bogus bits we just got
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	if shutdownEvents&(unix.POLLIN|problemFlags) != 0 {
-		return os.ErrClosed
-	} else if tunEvents&problemFlags != 0 {
-		return os.ErrClosed
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-func (r *tunFile) Read(buf []byte) (int, error) {
-	for {
-		if n, err := unix.Read(r.fd, buf); err == nil {
-			return n, nil
-		} else if err == unix.EAGAIN {
-			if err = r.blockOnRead(); err != nil {
-				return 0, err
-			}
-			continue
-		} else if err == unix.EINTR {
-			continue
-		} else if err == unix.EBADF {
-			return 0, os.ErrClosed
-		} else {
-			return 0, err
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func (r *tunFile) Write(buf []byte) (int, error) {
-	for {
-		if n, err := unix.Write(r.fd, buf); err == nil {
-			return n, nil
-		} else if err == unix.EAGAIN {
-			if err = r.blockOnWrite(); err != nil {
-				return 0, err
-			}
-			continue
-		} else if err == unix.EINTR {
-			continue
-		} else if err == unix.EBADF {
-			return 0, os.ErrClosed
-		} else {
-			return 0, err
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func (r *tunFile) wakeForShutdown() error {
-	var buf [8]byte
-	binary.NativeEndian.PutUint64(buf[:], 1)
-	_, err := unix.Write(int(r.readPoll[1].Fd), buf[:])
-	return err
-}
-
-func (r *tunFile) Close() error {
-	if r.closed { // avoid closing more than once. Technically a fd could get re-used, which would be a problem
-		return nil
-	}
-	r.closed = true
-	if r.lastOne {
-		_ = unix.Close(r.shutdownFd)
-	}
-	return unix.Close(r.fd)
-}
-
 type tun struct {
-	*tunFile
+	readers      tio.QueueSet
-	readers     []*tunFile
+	closeLock    sync.Mutex
-	closeLock   sync.Mutex
+	Device       string
-	Device      string
+	vpnNetworks  []netip.Prefix
-	vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix
+	MaxMTU       int
-	MaxMTU      int
+	DefaultMTU   int
-	DefaultMTU  int
+	TXQueueLen   int
-	TXQueueLen  int
+	deviceIndex  int
-	deviceIndex int
+	ioctlFd      uintptr
-	ioctlFd     uintptr
+	vnetHdr      bool
+	offloadFlags uint
 
 	Routes                    atomic.Pointer[[]Route]
 	routeTree                 atomic.Pointer[bart.Table[routing.Gateways]]
@@ -239,56 +74,110 @@ type ifreqQLEN struct {
 }
 
 func newTunFromFd(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, deviceFd int, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix) (*tun, error) {
-	t, err := newTunGeneric(c, l, deviceFd, vpnNetworks)
+	// We don't know what flags the caller opened this fd with and can't turn
-	if err != nil {
+	// on IFF_VNET_HDR after TUNSETIFF, so skip offload on inherited fds.
-		return nil, err
+	return newTunGeneric(c, l, deviceFd, false, 0, vpnNetworks, "tun0")
+}
+
+// openTunDev opens /dev/net/tun, creating the device node first if it's
+// missing (docker containers occasionally omit it).
+func openTunDev() (int, error) {
+	fd, err := unix.Open("/dev/net/tun", os.O_RDWR, 0)
+	if err == nil {
+		return fd, nil
 	}
+	if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		return -1, err
+	}
+	if err = os.MkdirAll("/dev/net", 0755); err != nil {
+		return -1, fmt.Errorf("/dev/net/tun doesn't exist, failed to mkdir -p /dev/net: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err = unix.Mknod("/dev/net/tun", unix.S_IFCHR|0600, int(unix.Mkdev(10, 200))); err != nil {
+		return -1, fmt.Errorf("failed to create /dev/net/tun: %w", err)
+	}
+	fd, err = unix.Open("/dev/net/tun", os.O_RDWR, 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		return -1, fmt.Errorf("created /dev/net/tun, but still failed: %w", err)
+	}
+	return fd, nil
+}
 
-	t.Device = "tun0"
+// tunSetIff runs TUNSETIFF with the given flags and returns the kernel-chosen device name on success.
+func tunSetIff(fd int, name string, flags uint16) (string, error) {
+	var req ifReq
+	req.Flags = flags
+	copy(req.Name[:], name)
+	if err := ioctl(uintptr(fd), uintptr(unix.TUNSETIFF), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&req))); err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	return strings.Trim(string(req.Name[:]), "\x00"), nil
+}
 
-	return t, nil
+// tsoOffloadFlags are the TUN_F_* bits we ask the kernel to enable when a TSO-capable TUN is available.
+const tsoOffloadFlags = unix.TUN_F_CSUM | unix.TUN_F_TSO4 | unix.TUN_F_TSO6 | unix.TUN_F_TSO_ECN
+
+// usoAndTSOOffloadFlags adds UDP Segmentation Offload to tsoOffloadFlags.
+// Requires Linux >= 6.2; older kernels reject it and we fall back to TCP-only TSO
+const usoAndTSOOffloadFlags = tsoOffloadFlags | unix.TUN_F_USO4 | unix.TUN_F_USO6
+
+func offloadUSOEnabled(offloadFlags uint) bool {
+	return offloadFlags&(unix.TUN_F_USO4|unix.TUN_F_USO6) != 0
 }
 
 func newTun(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, multiqueue bool) (*tun, error) {
-	fd, err := unix.Open("/dev/net/tun", os.O_RDWR, 0)
+	// IFF_TUN_EXCL prevents us from attaching to an already-running tun
-	if err != nil {
+	baseFlags := uint16(unix.IFF_TUN | unix.IFF_NO_PI | unix.IFF_TUN_EXCL)
-		// If /dev/net/tun doesn't exist, try to create it (will happen in docker)
-		if os.IsNotExist(err) {
-			err = os.MkdirAll("/dev/net", 0755)
-			if err != nil {
-				return nil, fmt.Errorf("/dev/net/tun doesn't exist, failed to mkdir -p /dev/net: %w", err)
-			}
-			err = unix.Mknod("/dev/net/tun", unix.S_IFCHR|0600, int(unix.Mkdev(10, 200)))
-			if err != nil {
-				return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create /dev/net/tun: %w", err)
-			}
-
-			fd, err = unix.Open("/dev/net/tun", os.O_RDWR, 0)
-			if err != nil {
-				return nil, fmt.Errorf("created /dev/net/tun, but still failed: %w", err)
-			}
-		} else {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-	}
-
-	var req ifReq
-	req.Flags = uint16(unix.IFF_TUN | unix.IFF_NO_PI)
 	if multiqueue {
-		req.Flags |= unix.IFF_MULTI_QUEUE
+		baseFlags |= unix.IFF_MULTI_QUEUE
 	}
 	nameStr := c.GetString("tun.dev", "")
-	copy(req.Name[:], nameStr)
+
-	if err = ioctl(uintptr(fd), uintptr(unix.TUNSETIFF), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&req))); err != nil {
+	fd, err := openTunDev()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	vnetHdr := true
+
+	// First try to enable IFF_VNET_HDR via TUNSETIFF and negotiate TUN_F_* offloads
+	// We try TSO+USO first, fall back to TSO-only on kernels without USO (Linux < 6.2),
+	// and finally give up on virtio headers entirely and reopen as a plain TUN if neither offload mask is accepted.
+
+	// offloadFlags is the exact TUN_F_* mask the kernel accepted.
+	// We save it so addQueue can replay the identical device-wide mask on added queues
+	var offloadFlags uint
+	name, err := tunSetIff(fd, nameStr, baseFlags|unix.IFF_VNET_HDR)
+	if err != nil {
 		_ = unix.Close(fd)
-		return nil, &NameError{
+		vnetHdr = false
-			Name:       nameStr,
+	} else {
-			Underlying: err,
+		if err = ioctl(uintptr(fd), unix.TUNSETOFFLOAD, uintptr(usoAndTSOOffloadFlags)); err == nil {
+			offloadFlags = usoAndTSOOffloadFlags
+		} else if err = ioctl(uintptr(fd), unix.TUNSETOFFLOAD, uintptr(tsoOffloadFlags)); err == nil {
+			offloadFlags = tsoOffloadFlags
+		} else {
+			l.Warn("Failed to enable TUN offload (TSO); proceeding without virtio headers", "error", err)
+			_ = unix.Close(fd)
+			vnetHdr = false
 		}
 	}
-	name := strings.Trim(string(req.Name[:]), "\x00")
 
-	t, err := newTunGeneric(c, l, fd, vpnNetworks)
+	if !vnetHdr {
+		fd, err = openTunDev()
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		name, err = tunSetIff(fd, nameStr, baseFlags)
+		if err != nil {
+			_ = unix.Close(fd)
+			return nil, &NameError{Name: nameStr, Underlying: err}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if vnetHdr {
+		l.Info("TUN offload enabled", "tso", true, "uso", offloadUSOEnabled(offloadFlags))
+	}
+
+	t, err := newTunGeneric(c, l, fd, vnetHdr, offloadFlags, vpnNetworks, name)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
@@ -298,17 +187,37 @@ func newTun(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, multiqueue
 	return t, nil
 }
 
-// newTunGeneric does all the stuff common to different tun initialization paths. It will close your files on error.
+// newTunGeneric does all the stuff common to different tun initialization paths.
-func newTunGeneric(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, fd int, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix) (*tun, error) {
+// It will close your files on error.
-	tfd, err := newTunFd(fd)
+// offloadFlags is the TUN_F_* mask newTun negotiated (ignored when vnetHdr is false)
+func newTunGeneric(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, fd int, vnetHdr bool, offloadFlags uint, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, name string) (*tun, error) {
+	var qs tio.QueueSet
+	var err error
+	if vnetHdr {
+		qs, err = tio.NewOffloadQueueSet(offloadUSOEnabled(offloadFlags), l)
+	} else {
+		qs, err = tio.NewPollQueueSet()
+	}
+
 	if err != nil {
 		_ = unix.Close(fd)
 		return nil, err
 	}
+	err = qs.Add(fd)
+	if err != nil {
+		// Add only appends on success, so closing the set here can't
+		// double-close fd; it releases the set's shutdown eventfd.
+		_ = unix.Close(fd)
+		_ = qs.Close()
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
 	t := &tun{
-		tunFile:                   tfd,
+		Device:                    name,
-		readers:                   []*tunFile{tfd},
+		readers:                   qs,
 		closeLock:                 sync.Mutex{},
+		vnetHdr:                   vnetHdr,
+		offloadFlags:              offloadFlags,
 		vpnNetworks:               vpnNetworks,
 		TXQueueLen:                c.GetInt("tun.tx_queue", 500),
 		useSystemRoutes:           c.GetBool("tun.use_system_route_table", false),
@@ -406,36 +315,49 @@ func (t *tun) reload(c *config.C, initial bool) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-func (t *tun) SupportsMultiqueue() bool {
+// Queues opens additional kernel multiqueue fds until the device has n queues, then returns them all.
-	return true
+func (t *tun) Queues(n int) ([]tio.Queue, error) {
+	for len(t.readers.Queues()) < n {
+		if err := t.addQueue(); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+	return t.readers.Queues(), nil
 }
 
-func (t *tun) NewMultiQueueReader() (io.ReadWriteCloser, error) {
+// addQueue opens one more IFF_MULTI_QUEUE fd on the device and adds it to the queue set.
+func (t *tun) addQueue() error {
 	t.closeLock.Lock()
 	defer t.closeLock.Unlock()
 
 	fd, err := unix.Open("/dev/net/tun", os.O_RDWR, 0)
 	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
+		return err
 	}
 
-	var req ifReq
+	flags := uint16(unix.IFF_TUN | unix.IFF_NO_PI | unix.IFF_MULTI_QUEUE)
-	req.Flags = uint16(unix.IFF_TUN | unix.IFF_NO_PI | unix.IFF_MULTI_QUEUE)
+	if t.vnetHdr {
-	copy(req.Name[:], t.Device)
+		flags |= unix.IFF_VNET_HDR
-	if err = ioctl(uintptr(fd), uintptr(unix.TUNSETIFF), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&req))); err != nil {
+	}
+	if _, err = tunSetIff(fd, t.Device, flags); err != nil {
 		_ = unix.Close(fd)
-		return nil, err
+		return err
 	}
 
-	out, err := t.tunFile.newFriend(fd)
+	if t.vnetHdr {
+		if err = ioctl(uintptr(fd), unix.TUNSETOFFLOAD, uintptr(t.offloadFlags)); err != nil {
+			_ = unix.Close(fd)
+			return fmt.Errorf("failed to enable offload on multiqueue tun fd: %w", err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	err = t.readers.Add(fd)
 	if err != nil {
 		_ = unix.Close(fd)
-		return nil, err
+		return err
 	}
 
-	t.readers = append(t.readers, out)
+	return nil
-
-	return out, nil
 }
 
 func (t *tun) RoutesFor(ip netip.Addr) routing.Gateways {
@@ -603,6 +525,13 @@ func (t *tun) setDefaultRoute(cidr netip.Prefix) error {
 		Table:     unix.RT_TABLE_MAIN,
 		Type:      unix.RTN_UNICAST,
 	}
+	// Match the metric the kernel uses for its auto-installed connected route,
+	// so RouteReplace overwrites it in place instead of adding a second route at a worse metric.
+	// IPv6 connected routes are installed at metric 256 (IP6_RT_PRIO_KERN); IPv4 uses 0.
+	// Without this, the kernel route wins lookups and our MTU / AdvMSS / Features never apply on v6.
+	if cidr.Addr().Is6() {
+		nr.Priority = 256
+	}
 	err := netlink.RouteReplace(&nr)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.l.Warn("Failed to set default route MTU, retrying", "error", err, "cidr", cidr)
@@ -878,32 +807,10 @@ func (t *tun) Close() error {
 		t.routeChan = nil
 	}
 
-	// Signal all readers blocked in poll to wake up and exit
-	_ = t.tunFile.wakeForShutdown()
-
 	if t.ioctlFd > 0 {
 		_ = unix.Close(int(t.ioctlFd))
 		t.ioctlFd = 0
 	}
 
-	for i := range t.readers {
+	return t.readers.Close()
-		if i == 0 {
-			continue //we want to close the zeroth reader last
-		}
-		err := t.readers[i].Close()
-		if err != nil {
-			t.l.Error("error closing tun reader", "reader", i, "error", err)
-		} else {
-			t.l.Info("closed tun reader", "reader", i)
-		}
-	}
-
-	//this is t.readers[0] too
-	err := t.tunFile.Close()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.l.Error("error closing tun reader", "reader", 0, "error", err)
-	} else {
-		t.l.Info("closed tun reader", "reader", 0)
-	}
-	return err
 }