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17 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
JackDoan dfe94c6269 window 2026-04-30 12:16:52 -05:00
JackDoan 1c601d776a set PSH 2026-04-30 12:16:35 -05:00
JackDoan 17d8ebff93 window 2026-04-30 12:16:22 -05:00
JackDoan 612d3ef931 dead code 2026-04-29 12:57:04 -05:00
JackDoan 8282a629e5 robot fixes 2026-04-29 12:50:02 -05:00
JackDoan c62f27d4b4 slightly nicer contract? 2026-04-28 17:29:25 -05:00
JackDoan f5db77f214 checkpt 2026-04-28 17:29:25 -05:00
JackDoan b9a7d1edf3 less stateful 2026-04-28 17:29:25 -05:00
JackDoan d1ea33659a correctness 2026-04-28 17:29:25 -05:00
JackDoan 8fdd98f639 attempt to improve readability 2026-04-28 17:29:25 -05:00
JackDoan 45bc0fc055 be safer 2026-04-28 17:29:25 -05:00
JackDoan 24af30bd78 fix? 2026-04-28 17:29:25 -05:00
JackDoan 1d84b81032 fix interfaces 2026-04-28 17:29:25 -05:00
JackDoan b155f4b7e1 fix 2026-04-28 17:29:25 -05:00
JackDoan 194d58cd46 GRO
cruft

fix tests

haha yep faster

checksum speed

haha

save pennies

fix

typo!

checkpt

GSO again
2026-04-28 17:29:24 -05:00
JackDoan a476b1fa07 Remove WriteFromSelf 2026-04-28 10:56:57 -05:00
JackDoan 8b02b8128e better and batched tun interface 2026-04-28 10:39:57 -05:00
137 changed files with 3896 additions and 12540 deletions
-113
View File
@@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
name: Code-sign Windows binaries
description: >
Sign every .exe under a given path in place via the DefinedNet code-signer
Lambda. If `role` or `bucket` is empty, logs a notice and skips signing so
forks and dev branches without AWS access still produce usable builds.
inputs:
path:
description: "Directory whose .exe files should be signed in place"
required: true
role:
description: "IAM role ARN to assume via OIDC; empty disables signing"
required: false
default: ""
bucket:
description: "S3 staging bucket the code-signer Lambda reads from; empty disables signing"
required: false
default: ""
region:
description: "AWS region for the role and Lambda"
required: false
default: "us-east-2"
function-name:
description: "Code-signer Lambda function name"
required: false
default: "code-signer"
key-prefix:
description: "S3 key prefix the caller is authorized to write under"
required: false
default: "code-signing/slackhq/nebula"
runs:
using: composite
steps:
- name: Skip notice
if: inputs.role == '' || inputs.bucket == ''
shell: sh
run: echo "::notice::code-signer role or bucket not set; skipping code signing."
- name: Configure AWS credentials
if: inputs.role != '' && inputs.bucket != ''
uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v6
with:
role-to-assume: ${{ inputs.role }}
aws-region: ${{ inputs.region }}
# Default is 12 retries to ride out IAM trust-policy propagation; once
# the role is stable we want a real misconfiguration to fail fast.
retry-max-attempts: 5
- name: Sign .exe files
if: inputs.role != '' && inputs.bucket != ''
shell: sh
env:
SIGN_PATH: ${{ inputs.path }}
BUCKET: ${{ inputs.bucket }}
FUNCTION_NAME: ${{ inputs.function-name }}
KEY_PREFIX: ${{ inputs.key-prefix }}
run: |
set -eu
RUN="${GITHUB_RUN_ID}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT}"
find "$SIGN_PATH" -name '*.exe' -print | while read -r path
do
rel=${path#"$SIGN_PATH"/}
file=$(basename "$path")
name=${file%.exe}
prefix="${KEY_PREFIX}/${RUN}"
src="${prefix}/unsigned/${rel}"
dst="${prefix}/signed/${rel}"
echo "::group::Sign ${rel}"
echo "Uploading unsigned to s3://${BUCKET}/${src}"
aws s3 cp --no-progress "$path" "s3://${BUCKET}/${src}" >/dev/null
echo "Invoking ${FUNCTION_NAME} Lambda"
payload=$(jq -nc \
--arg s "$src" \
--arg d "$dst" \
--arg p "$name" \
'{source_key: $s, dest_key: $d, program_name: $p}')
meta=$(aws lambda invoke \
--function-name "$FUNCTION_NAME" \
--cli-binary-format raw-in-base64-out \
--payload "$payload" \
--output json \
/tmp/sign-resp.json)
if echo "$meta" | jq -e '.FunctionError != null' >/dev/null
then
echo "::endgroup::"
echo "::error::code-signer Lambda failed for ${rel}"
cat /tmp/sign-resp.json >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "Downloading signed back to ${path}"
aws s3 cp --no-progress "s3://${BUCKET}/${dst}" "$path" >/dev/null
aws s3 rm "s3://${BUCKET}/${src}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
aws s3 rm "s3://${BUCKET}/${dst}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
# Sanity-check the bytes we got back actually carry an Authenticode
# signature that this machine can validate end to end.
status=$(powershell -NoProfile -Command "(Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath '$path').Status" | tr -d '\r')
if [ "$status" != "Valid" ]
then
echo "::endgroup::"
echo "::error::${rel} signature status: ${status} (expected Valid)"
exit 1
fi
echo "Signed ${rel} (sha256=$(jq -r '.sha256' /tmp/sign-resp.json), status=${status})"
echo "::endgroup::"
done
+8 -18
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ jobs:
mv build/*.tar.gz release
- name: Upload artifacts
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
with:
name: linux-latest
path: release
@@ -32,9 +32,6 @@ jobs:
build-windows:
name: Build Windows
runs-on: windows-latest
permissions:
id-token: write
contents: read
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
@@ -57,15 +54,8 @@ jobs:
mkdir build\dist\windows
mv dist\windows\wintun build\dist\windows\
- name: Code-sign
uses: ./.github/actions/code-sign
with:
path: build
role: ${{ secrets.DEFINED_CODE_SIGNER_ROLE }}
bucket: ${{ secrets.DEFINED_CODE_SIGNER_BUCKET }}
- name: Upload artifacts
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
with:
name: windows-latest
path: build
@@ -85,7 +75,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Import certificates
if: env.HAS_SIGNING_CREDS == 'true'
uses: Apple-Actions/import-codesign-certs@v7
uses: Apple-Actions/import-codesign-certs@v6
with:
p12-file-base64: ${{ secrets.APPLE_DEVELOPER_CERTIFICATE_P12_BASE64 }}
p12-password: ${{ secrets.APPLE_DEVELOPER_CERTIFICATE_PASSWORD }}
@@ -114,7 +104,7 @@ jobs:
fi
- name: Upload artifacts
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
with:
name: darwin-latest
path: ./release/*
@@ -138,21 +128,21 @@ jobs:
- name: Download artifacts
if: ${{ env.HAS_DOCKER_CREDS == 'true' }}
uses: actions/download-artifact@v8
uses: actions/download-artifact@v7
with:
name: linux-latest
path: artifacts
- name: Login to Docker Hub
if: ${{ env.HAS_DOCKER_CREDS == 'true' }}
uses: docker/login-action@v4
uses: docker/login-action@v3
with:
username: ${{ vars.DOCKERHUB_USERNAME }}
password: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Set up Docker Buildx
if: ${{ env.HAS_DOCKER_CREDS == 'true' }}
uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v4
uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3
- name: Build and push images
if: ${{ env.HAS_DOCKER_CREDS == 'true' }}
@@ -173,7 +163,7 @@ jobs:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- name: Download artifacts
uses: actions/download-artifact@v8
uses: actions/download-artifact@v7
with:
path: artifacts
+16 -81
View File
@@ -14,18 +14,10 @@ on:
- 'go.sum'
jobs:
smoke-extra-libvirt:
smoke-extra:
if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/master' || contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'smoke-test-extra')
name: ${{ matrix.target }}
name: Run extra smoke tests
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
target:
- freebsd-amd64
- openbsd-amd64
- netbsd-amd64
- linux-amd64-ipv6disable
env:
VAGRANT_DEFAULT_PROVIDER: libvirt
steps:
@@ -48,85 +40,28 @@ jobs:
sudo chmod 666 /var/run/libvirt/libvirt-sock
vagrant plugin install vagrant-libvirt
- name: ${{ matrix.target }}
run: make smoke-vagrant/${{ matrix.target }}
- name: freebsd-amd64
run: make smoke-vagrant/freebsd-amd64
timeout-minutes: 30
- name: openbsd-amd64
run: make smoke-vagrant/openbsd-amd64
# linux-386 needs VirtualBox, which conflicts with KVM/libvirt -- isolated job.
smoke-extra-virtualbox:
if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/master' || contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'smoke-test-extra')
name: linux-386
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
env:
VAGRANT_DEFAULT_PROVIDER: virtualbox
steps:
- name: netbsd-amd64
run: make smoke-vagrant/netbsd-amd64
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- name: linux-amd64-ipv6disable
run: make smoke-vagrant/linux-amd64-ipv6disable
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
go-version: '1.25'
check-latest: true
- name: add hashicorp source
run: wget -O- https://apt.releases.hashicorp.com/gpg | gpg --dearmor | sudo tee /usr/share/keyrings/hashicorp-archive-keyring.gpg && echo "deb [signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/hashicorp-archive-keyring.gpg] https://apt.releases.hashicorp.com $(lsb_release -cs) main" | sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/hashicorp.list
- name: install vagrant and virtualbox
# linux-386 runs last because it requires disabling KVM to use VirtualBox,
# which prevents libvirt (used by the other tests) from working after this point.
- name: install virtualbox for i386 test
run: |
sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y vagrant virtualbox
sudo apt-get install -y virtualbox
sudo rmmod kvm_amd kvm_intel kvm 2>/dev/null || true
- name: linux-386
env:
VAGRANT_DEFAULT_PROVIDER: virtualbox
run: make smoke-vagrant/linux-386
timeout-minutes: 30
smoke-windows:
if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/master' || contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'smoke-test-extra')
name: Run windows smoke test
runs-on: windows-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
go-version: '1.25'
check-latest: true
# WSL2 + Ubuntu so the smoke can run a real linux peer with its own
# netns. iputils-ping is needed for the in-WSL ping check. WSL1 has no
# real kernel and would lack /dev/net/tun, so we have to force WSL2.
- uses: Vampire/setup-wsl@v3
with:
distribution: Ubuntu-24.04
additional-packages: iputils-ping iproute2
# Vampire/setup-wsl provisions WSL1 even when the WSL2 platform is present.
# Convert the distro to WSL2 explicitly before we try to use /dev/net/tun.
- name: convert distro to WSL2
shell: pwsh
run: |
wsl --set-version Ubuntu-24.04 2
wsl --shutdown
wsl --list --verbose
- name: build windows nebula
run: make bin-windows
- name: build linux nebula for WSL
shell: bash
env:
GOOS: linux
GOARCH: amd64
run: |
mkdir -p build/linux-amd64
go build -o build/linux-amd64/nebula ./cmd/nebula
- name: run smoke-windows
shell: pwsh
working-directory: ./.github/workflows/smoke
run: ./smoke-windows.ps1
timeout-minutes: 15
-272
View File
@@ -1,272 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env pwsh
# Windows smoke test for the nebula tun + UDP + NLM code paths.
#
# Topology:
# - lighthouse runs natively on the Windows host (wintun + windows UDP)
# - peer runs inside WSL2 (Linux build of nebula, /dev/net/tun)
#
# WSL2 gives us a real netns boundary so the loopback fast-path on Windows
# does not short-circuit the overlay -- when WSL pings the lighthouse VPN IP,
# Linux has no idea that IP is local to the Windows host, so the packet is
# forced through nebula. Same in reverse.
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
# wsl.exe emits UTF-16 LE by default which PowerShell reads as bytes, mangling
# every captured string. WSL_UTF8 makes wsl.exe emit UTF-8 instead.
$env:WSL_UTF8 = '1'
$RepoRoot = Resolve-Path "$PSScriptRoot\..\..\.."
$Nebula = Join-Path $RepoRoot 'nebula.exe'
$NebulaCert = Join-Path $RepoRoot 'nebula-cert.exe'
$NebulaLinux = Join-Path $RepoRoot 'build\linux-amd64\nebula'
if (-not (Test-Path $Nebula)) { throw "missing $Nebula; run 'make bin-windows' first" }
if (-not (Test-Path $NebulaCert)) { throw "missing $NebulaCert; run 'make bin-windows' first" }
if (-not (Test-Path $NebulaLinux)) { throw "missing $NebulaLinux; build the linux nebula first" }
# Matches the distro installed by Vampire/setup-wsl in smoke-extra.yml.
$Distro = 'Ubuntu-24.04'
$listed = (wsl --list --quiet 2>$null) -join "`n"
if ($listed -notmatch [regex]::Escape($Distro)) {
throw "WSL distro $Distro not registered. Got: $listed"
}
Write-Host "Using WSL distro: $Distro"
# Windows host as seen from inside WSL: WSL's default-route gateway. We extract
# it with a regex rather than awk fields so PowerShell does not eat any '$N'
# tokens, and tabs/double-spaces in `ip route` output do not confuse a cut.
$ipCmd = 'ip route show default | grep -oE "([0-9]+\.){3}[0-9]+" | head -1'
$WindowsIp = (wsl -d $Distro -- bash -c $ipCmd).Trim()
if (-not $WindowsIp) { throw "could not determine Windows host IP from WSL" }
Write-Host "Windows host IP from WSL: $WindowsIp"
$WorkDir = Join-Path $env:TEMP 'nebula-smoke-windows'
if (Test-Path $WorkDir) { Remove-Item -Recurse -Force $WorkDir }
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $WorkDir | Out-Null
$WslDir = '/tmp/nebula-smoke'
wsl -d $Distro -- bash -c "rm -rf $WslDir && mkdir -p $WslDir" | Out-Null
$DevName = 'nebula-smoke'
$Ip1 = '192.168.241.1'
$Ip2 = '192.168.241.2'
$Port = 4242
& $NebulaCert ca -name 'smoke-ca' -out-crt "$WorkDir\ca.crt" -out-key "$WorkDir\ca.key"
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "nebula-cert ca failed (exit $LASTEXITCODE)" }
& $NebulaCert sign -name 'lighthouse' -networks "$Ip1/24" -ca-crt "$WorkDir\ca.crt" -ca-key "$WorkDir\ca.key" -out-crt "$WorkDir\lighthouse.crt" -out-key "$WorkDir\lighthouse.key"
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "nebula-cert sign lighthouse failed (exit $LASTEXITCODE)" }
& $NebulaCert sign -name 'peer' -networks "$Ip2/24" -ca-crt "$WorkDir\ca.crt" -ca-key "$WorkDir\ca.key" -out-crt "$WorkDir\peer.crt" -out-key "$WorkDir\peer.key"
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "nebula-cert sign peer failed (exit $LASTEXITCODE)" }
# Windows lighthouse config.
@"
pki:
ca: $WorkDir\ca.crt
cert: $WorkDir\lighthouse.crt
key: $WorkDir\lighthouse.key
static_host_map: {}
lighthouse:
am_lighthouse: true
interval: 60
hosts: []
listen:
host: 0.0.0.0
port: $Port
tun:
disabled: false
dev: $DevName
drop_local_broadcast: false
drop_multicast: false
tx_queue: 500
mtu: 1300
network_category: private
logging:
level: info
format: text
firewall:
outbound_action: drop
inbound_action: drop
conntrack:
tcp_timeout: 12m
udp_timeout: 3m
default_timeout: 10m
outbound:
- port: any
proto: any
host: any
inbound:
- port: any
proto: any
host: any
"@ | Out-File -FilePath "$WorkDir\lighthouse.yml" -Encoding utf8
# WSL peer config (paths are POSIX, deliberately).
@"
pki:
ca: $WslDir/ca.crt
cert: $WslDir/peer.crt
key: $WslDir/peer.key
static_host_map:
"${Ip1}": ["${WindowsIp}:$Port"]
lighthouse:
am_lighthouse: false
interval: 60
hosts:
- "${Ip1}"
listen:
host: 0.0.0.0
port: 0
tun:
disabled: false
dev: nebula1
drop_local_broadcast: false
drop_multicast: false
tx_queue: 500
mtu: 1300
logging:
level: info
format: text
firewall:
outbound_action: drop
inbound_action: drop
conntrack:
tcp_timeout: 12m
udp_timeout: 3m
default_timeout: 10m
outbound:
- port: any
proto: any
host: any
inbound:
- port: any
proto: any
host: any
"@ | Out-File -FilePath "$WorkDir\peer.yml" -Encoding utf8
# Stage WSL artifacts. Convert Windows paths to WSL paths ourselves rather than
# calling `wslpath`, because PowerShell's argument-passing to external EXEs
# strips backslashes from path arguments in ways that are hard to escape around.
function ConvertTo-WslPath {
param([string]$WindowsPath)
if ($WindowsPath -notmatch '^([A-Za-z]):\\(.*)$') {
throw "cannot convert path to WSL: $WindowsPath"
}
return "/mnt/$($matches[1].ToLower())/$($matches[2].Replace('\','/'))"
}
$WslWorkDir = ConvertTo-WslPath $WorkDir
$WslNebulaPath = ConvertTo-WslPath $NebulaLinux
wsl -d $Distro -- bash -c "cp '$WslWorkDir/ca.crt' '$WslWorkDir/peer.crt' '$WslWorkDir/peer.key' '$WslWorkDir/peer.yml' $WslDir/ && cp '$WslNebulaPath' $WslDir/nebula && chmod +x $WslDir/nebula"
# Make sure WSL has tun support and /dev/net/tun is usable before starting
# nebula. Diagnostics first so a fail here points at the real problem (e.g.
# WSL1 distros do not have a real kernel and will not have tun).
Write-Host '=== WSL diagnostic ==='
wsl --version 2>&1 | Out-Host
wsl --list --verbose 2>&1 | Out-Host
wsl -d $Distro -u root -- uname -a | Out-Host
wsl -d $Distro -u root -- bash -c "modprobe tun 2>&1 || true; mkdir -p /dev/net; [ -c /dev/net/tun ] || mknod /dev/net/tun c 10 200; chmod 600 /dev/net/tun; ls -l /dev/net/tun"
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "failed to prepare /dev/net/tun in WSL (TUN support missing?)" }
# Deliberately no New-NetFirewallRule calls here -- nebula's windows_bypass_wdf
# feature is supposed to install WFP permit filters that let inbound traffic
# through Windows Defender Firewall on its own. If this smoke regresses, that
# feature regressed.
$lhOut = Join-Path $WorkDir 'lighthouse.out.log'
$lhErr = Join-Path $WorkDir 'lighthouse.err.log'
$lhProc = Start-Process -FilePath $Nebula -ArgumentList @('-config', "$WorkDir\lighthouse.yml") `
-PassThru -NoNewWindow `
-RedirectStandardOutput $lhOut `
-RedirectStandardError $lhErr
# Run nebula in WSL as root with no sudo + no shell wrapper. PowerShell's
# Start-Process arg quoting mangles `bash -c "..."` strings that contain
# spaces/redirections, so we skip bash entirely and let Start-Process do the
# stdout/stderr capture itself.
$peerOut = Join-Path $WorkDir 'peer.out.log'
$peerErr = Join-Path $WorkDir 'peer.err.log'
$peerProc = Start-Process -FilePath 'wsl' `
-ArgumentList @('-d', $Distro, '-u', 'root', '--', "$WslDir/nebula", '-config', "$WslDir/peer.yml") `
-PassThru -NoNewWindow `
-RedirectStandardOutput $peerOut `
-RedirectStandardError $peerErr
function Wait-Until {
param([scriptblock]$Predicate, [int]$TimeoutSec, [string]$What)
$deadline = (Get-Date).AddSeconds($TimeoutSec)
while ((Get-Date) -lt $deadline) {
if (& $Predicate) { return }
Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500
}
throw "timed out waiting for: $What"
}
try {
Wait-Until -TimeoutSec 30 -What "windows wintun adapter $DevName with NetworkCategory=Private" -Predicate {
if ($lhProc.HasExited) { throw "lighthouse exited (code $($lhProc.ExitCode)) before tun was ready" }
$p = Get-NetConnectionProfile -InterfaceAlias $DevName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$p -and ("$($p.NetworkCategory)" -ieq 'Private')
}
Write-Host "OK: $DevName NetworkCategory=Private"
Wait-Until -TimeoutSec 30 -What "WSL nebula1 with $Ip2" -Predicate {
if ($peerProc.HasExited) { throw "peer exited (code $($peerProc.ExitCode)) before tun was ready" }
$r = wsl -d $Distro -u root -- bash -c "ip -o addr show nebula1 2>/dev/null | grep -q 'inet $Ip2' && echo yes"
("$r").Trim() -eq 'yes'
}
Write-Host "OK: WSL nebula1 has $Ip2"
Wait-Until -TimeoutSec 30 -What "ping from WSL peer to windows lighthouse ($Ip1)" -Predicate {
if ($peerProc.HasExited) { throw "peer exited (code $($peerProc.ExitCode)) before ping succeeded" }
$r = wsl -d $Distro -u root -- bash -c "ping -c1 -W1 $Ip1 >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo OK"
("$r").Trim() -eq 'OK'
}
Write-Host "OK: WSL peer -> windows lighthouse"
Wait-Until -TimeoutSec 30 -What "ping from windows lighthouse to WSL peer ($Ip2)" -Predicate {
$null = & ping.exe -n 1 -w 1000 $Ip2
$LASTEXITCODE -eq 0
}
Write-Host "OK: windows lighthouse -> WSL peer"
Write-Host ''
Write-Host 'All smoke checks passed.'
}
catch {
Write-Host ''
Write-Host '=== lighthouse stdout ==='
Get-Content $lhOut -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Host
Write-Host '=== lighthouse stderr ==='
Get-Content $lhErr -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Host
Write-Host '=== peer stdout ==='
Get-Content $peerOut -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Host
Write-Host '=== peer stderr ==='
Get-Content $peerErr -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Host
Write-Host '=== nebula WFP filters ==='
# Dump nebula-installed filters so we can verify they got registered with
# the conditions we expect.
$wfpDump = Join-Path $WorkDir 'wfp.xml'
netsh wfp show filters file=$wfpDump 2>&1 | Out-Null
if (Test-Path $wfpDump) {
Select-String -Path $wfpDump -Pattern 'Nebula' -Context 0,80 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Host
}
throw
}
finally {
if (-not $lhProc.HasExited) {
Stop-Process -Id $lhProc.Id -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$lhProc.WaitForExit(5000) | Out-Null
}
wsl -d $Distro -u root -- bash -c "pkill -f $WslDir/nebula 2>/dev/null; true" | Out-Null
# pkill returns 1 when no match and wsl propagates that; the smoke is done
# so we don't want it to leak into the script's exit code.
$global:LASTEXITCODE = 0
if ($peerProc -and -not $peerProc.HasExited) {
Stop-Process -Id $peerProc.Id -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
}
}
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# -*- mode: ruby -*-
# vi: set ft=ruby :
Vagrant.configure("2") do |config|
config.vm.box = "DefinedNet/netbsd10"
config.vm.box = "generic/netbsd9"
config.vm.synced_folder "../build", "/nebula", type: "rsync"
end
+2 -2
View File
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Build test mobile
run: make build-test-mobile
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
with:
name: e2e packet flow linux-latest
path: e2e/mermaid/linux-latest
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ jobs:
- name: End 2 end
run: make e2evv
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
with:
name: e2e packet flow ${{ matrix.os }}
path: e2e/mermaid/${{ matrix.os }}
+34 -175
View File
@@ -2,42 +2,24 @@ package nebula
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"math"
mathbits "math/bits"
"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
)
const bitsPerWord = 64
// Bits is a sliding-window anti-replay tracker. The window is stored as a
// circular bitmap packed into uint64 words (8x denser than a []bool), so a
// length-N window costs N/8 bytes. length must be a power of two.
type Bits struct {
length uint64
lengthMask uint64
current uint64
bits []uint64
bits []bool
lostCounter metrics.Counter
dupeCounter metrics.Counter
outOfWindowCounter metrics.Counter
}
func NewBits(length uint64) *Bits {
if length == 0 || length&(length-1) != 0 {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("Bits length must be a power of two, got %d", length))
}
nWords := length / bitsPerWord
if nWords == 0 {
nWords = 1
}
func NewBits(bits uint64) *Bits {
b := &Bits{
length: length,
lengthMask: length - 1,
bits: make([]uint64, nWords),
length: bits,
bits: make([]bool, bits, bits),
current: 0,
lostCounter: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("network.packets.lost", nil),
dupeCounter: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("network.packets.duplicate", nil),
@@ -45,194 +27,71 @@ func NewBits(length uint64) *Bits {
}
// There is no counter value 0, mark it to avoid counting a lost packet later.
b.bits[0] = 1
b.bits[0] = true
b.current = 0
return b
}
func (b *Bits) get(i uint64) bool {
pos := i & b.lengthMask
//bit-shifting by 6 because i is a bit index, not a u64 index, and we need to find the u64 without bit in it
return b.bits[pos>>6]&(uint64(1)<<(pos&63)) != 0
}
func (b *Bits) set(i uint64) {
pos := i & b.lengthMask
b.bits[pos>>6] |= uint64(1) << (pos & 63)
}
// clearRange clears `count` bits starting at circular position `startPos`
// (already masked to [0, length)) and returns how many of them were set
// before the clear. count must be in [1, length].
func (b *Bits) clearRange(startPos, count uint64) uint64 {
wasSet := uint64(0)
if count >= b.length {
for _, w := range b.bits {
wasSet += uint64(mathbits.OnesCount64(w))
}
clear(b.bits)
return wasSet
}
pos := startPos
remaining := count
// handle the potential partial word before pos becomes u64 aligned
word := pos >> 6
bit := pos & 63
take := uint64(64) - bit
if take > remaining {
take = remaining
}
if take > b.length-pos {
take = b.length - pos
}
var mask uint64
if take == 64 {
mask = math.MaxUint64
} else {
mask = ((uint64(1) << take) - 1) << bit
}
wasSet += uint64(mathbits.OnesCount64(b.bits[word] & mask))
b.bits[word] &^= mask
remaining -= take
pos = (pos + take) & b.lengthMask
// Clear whole words, keeping track of the number of set bits
for remaining >= 64 {
word = pos >> 6
wasSet += uint64(mathbits.OnesCount64(b.bits[word]))
b.bits[word] = 0
remaining -= 64
pos = (pos + 64) & b.lengthMask
}
// Clear the remaining partial word
if remaining > 0 {
word = pos >> 6
mask = (uint64(1) << remaining) - 1
wasSet += uint64(mathbits.OnesCount64(b.bits[word] & mask))
b.bits[word] &^= mask
}
return wasSet
}
func (b *Bits) strictlyWithinWindow(i uint64) bool {
// Handle the case where the window hasn't slid yet. This avoids u64 underflow.
inWarmup := b.current < b.length
if i < b.length && inWarmup {
return true
}
// Next, if the packet is in-window, see if we've seen it before
if i > b.current-b.length {
return true
}
return false //not within window!
}
// Check returns true if i is within (or way out in front of) the window, and not a replay
func (b *Bits) Check(l *slog.Logger, i uint64) bool {
// If i is the next number, return true.
if i > b.current {
return true
}
if b.strictlyWithinWindow(i) {
return !b.get(i)
// If i is within the window, check if it's been set already.
if i > b.current-b.length || i < b.length && b.current < b.length {
return !b.bits[i%b.length]
}
// Not within the window
if l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
l.Debug("rejected a packet (top)", "current", b.current, "incoming", i)
l.Debug("rejected a packet (top)",
"current", b.current,
"incoming", i,
)
}
return false
}
// Update has three branches:
// - i == b.current+1: fast path; advance the cursor by one and lose-count
// the slot we just stomped (only past warmup; see the i > b.length guard
// below).
// - i > b.current+1: jump path; clear all slots between current and i
// (or up to a full window's worth, whichever is smaller) via clearRange,
// then mark i. Two arms here: a warmup arm that handles the very first
// window before the cursor has slid, and a steady-state arm that treats
// every cleared empty slot as a lost packet.
// - i <= b.current: in-window check for duplicates; out-of-window otherwise.
//
// NewBits seeds bits[0]=1 so counter 0 looks "received" — Update never
// clears that marker during warmup (clearRange skips position 0 when
// startPos=1), and once b.current >= b.length the marker is no longer
// consulted. The marker prevents a fictitious "lost" hit on the first real
// counter.
func (b *Bits) Update(l *slog.Logger, i uint64) bool {
// Fast path: i is the next expected counter. Split out so the function
// stays small and avoids paying for the slow paths' slog argument-build
// stack frame on every call. The bit read/test/write is inlined to
// touch the backing word once.
// If i is the next number, return true and update current.
if i == b.current+1 {
pos := i & b.lengthMask
word := pos >> 6
mask := uint64(1) << (pos & 63)
w := b.bits[word]
if i > b.length && w&mask == 0 {
// Check if the oldest bit was lost since we are shifting the window by 1 and occupying it with this counter
// The very first window can only be tracked as lost once we are on the 2nd window or greater
if b.bits[i%b.length] == false && i > b.length {
b.lostCounter.Inc(1)
}
b.bits[word] = w | mask
b.bits[i%b.length] = true
b.current = i
return true
}
return b.updateSlow(l, i)
}
// updateSlow handles jumps, in-window backfill, dupes, and out-of-window.
func (b *Bits) updateSlow(l *slog.Logger, i uint64) bool {
// If i is a jump, adjust the window, record lost, update current, and return true
if i > b.current {
end := i
if end > b.current+b.length {
end = b.current + b.length
}
count := end - b.current
startPos := (b.current + 1) & b.lengthMask
var lost int64
if b.current >= b.length {
// Steady state: every cleared slot is past warmup, so any unset
// bit we evict is a lost packet from the previous cycle.
wasSet := b.clearRange(startPos, count)
lost = int64(count) - int64(wasSet)
} else {
// Warmup (the very first window). Some cleared slots represent
// packets <= length where eviction is not "lost" in the usual
// sense. This branch is taken at most once per connection so we
// don't bother optimizing it.
for n := b.current + 1; n <= end; n++ {
if !b.get(n) && n > b.length {
lost++
}
lost := int64(0)
// Zero out the bits between the current and the new counter value, limited by the window size,
// since the window is shifting
for n := b.current + 1; n <= min(i, b.current+b.length); n++ {
if b.bits[n%b.length] == false && n > b.length {
lost++
}
b.clearRange(startPos, count)
b.bits[n%b.length] = false
}
// Anything past the new window can never be backfilled, so it's lost.
if i > b.current+b.length {
lost += int64(i - b.current - b.length)
}
// Only record any skipped packets as a result of the window moving further than the window length
// Any loss within the new window will be accounted for in future calls
lost += max(0, int64(i-b.current-b.length))
b.lostCounter.Inc(lost)
b.set(i)
b.bits[i%b.length] = true
b.current = i
return true
}
// If i is within the current window but below the current counter, check to see if it's a duplicate
if b.strictlyWithinWindow(i) {
pos := i & b.lengthMask
word := pos >> 6
mask := uint64(1) << (pos & 63)
w := b.bits[word]
if b.current == i || w&mask != 0 {
// If i is within the current window but below the current counter,
// Check to see if it's a duplicate
if i > b.current-b.length || i < b.length && b.current < b.length {
if b.current == i || b.bits[i%b.length] == true {
if l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
l.Debug("Receive window",
"accepted", false,
@@ -245,7 +104,7 @@ func (b *Bits) updateSlow(l *slog.Logger, i uint64) bool {
return false
}
b.bits[word] = w | mask
b.bits[i%b.length] = true
return true
}
+129 -276
View File
@@ -7,79 +7,61 @@ import (
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
)
// snapshot returns the bitmap as a []bool of length b.length, for readable
// test assertions against the now-packed []uint64 storage.
func (b *Bits) snapshot() []bool {
out := make([]bool, b.length)
for i := uint64(0); i < b.length; i++ {
out[i] = b.get(i)
}
return out
}
func TestBitsRequiresPowerOfTwo(t *testing.T) {
assert.Panics(t, func() { NewBits(10) })
assert.Panics(t, func() { NewBits(0) })
assert.NotPanics(t, func() { NewBits(1) })
assert.NotPanics(t, func() { NewBits(16) })
assert.NotPanics(t, func() { NewBits(1024) })
assert.NotPanics(t, func() { NewBits(16384) })
}
func TestBits(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
b := NewBits(16)
assert.EqualValues(t, 16, b.length)
b := NewBits(10)
// make sure it is the right size
assert.Len(t, b.bits, 10)
// This is initialized to zero - receive one. This should work.
assert.True(t, b.Check(l, 1))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 1))
assert.EqualValues(t, 1, b.current)
g := []bool{true, true, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false}
assert.Equal(t, g, b.snapshot())
g := []bool{true, true, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false}
assert.Equal(t, g, b.bits)
// Receive two
assert.True(t, b.Check(l, 2))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 2))
assert.EqualValues(t, 2, b.current)
g = []bool{true, true, true, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false}
assert.Equal(t, g, b.snapshot())
g = []bool{true, true, true, false, false, false, false, false, false, false}
assert.Equal(t, g, b.bits)
// Receive two again - it will fail
assert.False(t, b.Check(l, 2))
assert.False(t, b.Update(l, 2))
assert.EqualValues(t, 2, b.current)
// Jump ahead to 25, which clears the window and sets slot 25%16 = 9.
assert.True(t, b.Check(l, 25))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 25))
assert.EqualValues(t, 25, b.current)
g = []bool{false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, true, false, false, false, false, false, false}
assert.Equal(t, g, b.snapshot())
// Jump ahead to 15, which should clear everything and set the 6th element
assert.True(t, b.Check(l, 15))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 15))
assert.EqualValues(t, 15, b.current)
g = []bool{false, false, false, false, false, true, false, false, false, false}
assert.Equal(t, g, b.bits)
// Mark 24, which is in window (current 25, length 16, window covers [10,25]).
assert.True(t, b.Check(l, 24))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 24))
assert.EqualValues(t, 25, b.current)
g = []bool{false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, true, true, false, false, false, false, false, false}
assert.Equal(t, g, b.snapshot())
// Mark 14, which is allowed because it is in the window
assert.True(t, b.Check(l, 14))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 14))
assert.EqualValues(t, 15, b.current)
g = []bool{false, false, false, false, true, true, false, false, false, false}
assert.Equal(t, g, b.bits)
// Mark 5, not allowed because 5 <= current-length (25-16=9).
// Mark 5, which is not allowed because it is not in the window
assert.False(t, b.Check(l, 5))
assert.False(t, b.Update(l, 5))
assert.EqualValues(t, 25, b.current)
g = []bool{false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, true, true, false, false, false, false, false, false}
assert.Equal(t, g, b.snapshot())
assert.EqualValues(t, 15, b.current)
g = []bool{false, false, false, false, true, true, false, false, false, false}
assert.Equal(t, g, b.bits)
// Make sure we handle wrapping around once to the same slot. With
// length=16, packets 1 and 17 share slot 1.
b = NewBits(16)
// make sure we handle wrapping around once to the current position
b = NewBits(10)
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 1))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 17))
assert.Equal(t, []bool{false, true, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false}, b.snapshot())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 11))
assert.Equal(t, []bool{false, true, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false}, b.bits)
// Walk through a few windows in order
b = NewBits(16)
b = NewBits(10)
for i := uint64(1); i <= 100; i++ {
assert.True(t, b.Check(l, i), "Error while checking %v", i)
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, i), "Error while updating %v", i)
@@ -90,31 +72,24 @@ func TestBits(t *testing.T) {
func TestBitsLargeJumps(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
// length=16. Update(55) from current=0:
// warmup, per-bit loop sees no n>16 with unset bits (slot 0 was set by
// NewBits and gets re-evaluated when n=16; n=16 is not strictly > 16),
// so the loop contributes 0. The jump exceeds the window so we record
// 55 - 0 - 16 = 39 packets fell out the back.
b := NewBits(16)
b := NewBits(10)
b.lostCounter.Clear()
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 55))
assert.Equal(t, int64(39), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Update(100): clears 16 slots starting at slot 56%16=8. Only slot 7 (for
// packet 55) was set, so 16 - 1 = 15 evicted slots had unset bits.
// Plus 100 - 55 - 16 = 29 packets fell past the window. Total 44.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 100))
assert.Equal(t, int64(39+44), b.lostCounter.Count())
b = NewBits(10)
b.lostCounter.Clear()
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 55)) // We saw packet 55 and can still track 45,46,47,48,49,50,51,52,53,54
assert.Equal(t, int64(45), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Update(200): same shape: 16 - 1 = 15 evicted unset, plus 200 - 100 - 16 = 84 past window. Total 99.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 200))
assert.Equal(t, int64(39+44+99), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 100)) // We saw packet 55 and 100 and can still track 90,91,92,93,94,95,96,97,98,99
assert.Equal(t, int64(89), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 200)) // We saw packet 55, 100, and 200 and can still track 190,191,192,193,194,195,196,197,198,199
assert.Equal(t, int64(188), b.lostCounter.Count())
}
func TestBitsDupeCounter(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
b := NewBits(16)
b := NewBits(10)
b.lostCounter.Clear()
b.dupeCounter.Clear()
b.outOfWindowCounter.Clear()
@@ -139,117 +114,120 @@ func TestBitsDupeCounter(t *testing.T) {
func TestBitsOutOfWindowCounter(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
b := NewBits(16)
b := NewBits(10)
b.lostCounter.Clear()
b.dupeCounter.Clear()
b.outOfWindowCounter.Clear()
// Jump to 20 (warmup branch + 4 past-window packets).
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 20))
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.outOfWindowCounter.Count())
// 9 single-step advances, each evicts a slot whose bit was cleared during
// the jump above and whose value was never seen, so each contributes 1
// to lostCounter.
for n := uint64(21); n <= 29; n++ {
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, n))
}
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 21))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 22))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 23))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 24))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 25))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 26))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 27))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 28))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 29))
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.outOfWindowCounter.Count())
// 0 is below current-length (29-16=13) so it falls outside the window.
assert.False(t, b.Update(l, 0))
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.outOfWindowCounter.Count())
// 4 from the Update(20) jump + 9 from 21..29.
assert.Equal(t, int64(13), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.Equal(t, int64(19), b.lostCounter.Count()) // packet 0 wasn't lost
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.dupeCounter.Count())
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.outOfWindowCounter.Count())
}
func TestBitsLostCounter(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
b := NewBits(16)
b := NewBits(10)
b.lostCounter.Clear()
b.dupeCounter.Clear()
b.outOfWindowCounter.Clear()
// Walk 20..29 like the original, just with a bigger window. Same
// reasoning as TestBitsOutOfWindowCounter: 4 past-window from Update(20),
// then 9 more from the unit advances.
for n := uint64(20); n <= 29; n++ {
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, n))
}
assert.Equal(t, int64(13), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 20))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 21))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 22))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 23))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 24))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 25))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 26))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 27))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 28))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 29))
assert.Equal(t, int64(19), b.lostCounter.Count()) // packet 0 wasn't lost
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.dupeCounter.Count())
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.outOfWindowCounter.Count())
b = NewBits(16)
b = NewBits(10)
b.lostCounter.Clear()
b.dupeCounter.Clear()
b.outOfWindowCounter.Clear()
// Update(15) clears the warmup window (no lost), sets slot 15.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 15))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 9))
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Update(16): slot 0 was already set (NewBits seeded it), and 16 is not
// strictly > length, so nothing is recorded as lost.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 16))
// 10 will set 0 index, 0 was already set, no lost packets
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 10))
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Update(17): we jumped straight from 0 to 15, so slot 1 was cleared
// (and never re-set). 17 > 16 is past warmup, so packet 1 is recorded lost.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 17))
// 11 will set 1 index, 1 was missed, we should see 1 packet lost
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 11))
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Now let's fill in the window, should end up with 8 lost packets
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 12))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 13))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 14))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 15))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 16))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 17))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 18))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 19))
assert.Equal(t, int64(8), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Fill in 18..30 in single steps. Each i evicts slot i%16. Slots 2..14
// were all cleared during Update(15), and we never re-set any of them,
// so each i in 18..30 is a fresh lost packet — 13 more.
for n := uint64(18); n <= 30; n++ {
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, n))
}
assert.Equal(t, int64(14), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Jump ahead by a window size
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 29))
assert.Equal(t, int64(8), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Now lets walk ahead normally through the window, the missed packets should fill in
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 30))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 31))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 32))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 33))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 34))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 35))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 36))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 37))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 38))
// 39 packets tracked, 22 seen, 17 lost
assert.Equal(t, int64(17), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Jump ahead by exactly one window size.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 46))
// end = min(46, 30+16) = 46, count = 16, all slots cleared. Before the
// jump every slot 0..15 had been set (Update(15), (16), (17), 18..30),
// so wasSet=16 and 46 == current+length means no past-window slack:
// lost contribution = 0.
assert.Equal(t, int64(14), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Walk 47..55. The Update(46) jump cleared every slot, so only slot 14
// (for packet 46) is set when we start. Each subsequent unit step lands
// on a slot that was cleared and is past warmup, so it counts as lost.
// 9 more = 23.
for n := uint64(47); n <= 55; n++ {
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, n))
}
assert.Equal(t, int64(23), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Jump ahead by two windows: clears the window plus past-window loss.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 87))
// current=55, length=16. end = min(87, 71) = 71. count=16, all slots
// cleared. Slots set before the clear are slots 14,15,0..7 (10 total).
// Lost from clear = 16 - 10 = 6. Past window: 87 - 55 - 16 = 16. +22.
assert.Equal(t, int64(45), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Jump ahead by 2 windows, should have recording 1 full window missing
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 58))
assert.Equal(t, int64(27), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Now lets walk ahead normally through the window, the missed packets should fill in from this window
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 59))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 60))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 61))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 62))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 63))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 64))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 65))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 66))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 67))
// 68 packets tracked, 32 seen, 36 missed
assert.Equal(t, int64(36), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.dupeCounter.Count())
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.outOfWindowCounter.Count())
}
func TestBitsLostCounterIssue1(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
b := NewBits(16)
b := NewBits(10)
b.lostCounter.Clear()
b.dupeCounter.Clear()
b.outOfWindowCounter.Clear()
// Receive 4, backfill 1, then 9, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 (skip 8), 10, 11, 14.
// Then jump to 25 — slot 25%16=9 is being evicted, but it had been set
// (we received packet 9), so no spurious lost increment. The original
// regression was about double-counting a missing packet when its slot
// got cleared on a jump. With the jump path now using clearRange's
// word-level wasSet count, the same semantics hold.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 4))
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 1))
@@ -266,7 +244,7 @@ func TestBitsLostCounterIssue1(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 7))
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Skip packet 8.
// assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 8))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 10))
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 11))
@@ -274,23 +252,9 @@ func TestBitsLostCounterIssue1(t *testing.T) {
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 14))
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Jump to 25. With length=16, slot 25%16=9 corresponds to packet 9
// (which we DID receive), so its bit is set and no lost++ from that
// eviction. The trace below shows the only loss is packet 8.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 25))
// current was 14, i=25. end=min(25,30)=25. count=11. startPos=15.
// steady? current=14<16, so warmup branch: per-bit n=15..25, count those
// with !get(n) AND n>16. n=17..25 are >16. Among slots 17%16=1..25%16=9
// did we set slots 1..9 (packets 1..9)? Yes for all but slot 8 (packet 8
// was skipped). n=24 maps to slot 8 which is FALSE → lost++. All other
// n in 17..25 map to slots that are set. n=16 is not strictly > 16. So
// lost = 1.
// Issue seems to be here, we reset missing packet 8 to false here and don't increment the lost counter
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 19))
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Fill in 12, 13, 15, 16. Each is below current=25 (in-window). 16 must
// recheck slot 0 — it was set by NewBits and then cleared by the
// Update(25) jump, so 16 backfills cleanly.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 12))
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 13))
@@ -299,140 +263,29 @@ func TestBitsLostCounterIssue1(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 16))
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 17))
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 18))
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 20))
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 21))
// We missed packet 8 above and that loss is still recorded once, never
// double-counted, never zeroed.
// We missed packet 8 above
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.dupeCounter.Count())
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.outOfWindowCounter.Count())
}
// TestBitsWarmupOvershoot exercises the jump path's warmup arm with an
// overshoot past one full window. NewBits leaves current=0 with only slot 0
// "set" by the marker. Jumping straight to length+k must (a) clear every
// slot the jump straddles, (b) count only past-window slack (not the
// in-window slots, which never had a "lost" tenant during warmup), and
// (c) leave the cursor at the new counter so subsequent unit advances
// count from steady state. The marker bit at slot 0 is irrelevant once
// current >= length.
func TestBitsWarmupOvershoot(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
b := NewBits(16)
b.lostCounter.Clear()
// Jump from current=0 to i=20 (length=16, overshoot=4).
// Warmup arm: counts slots in [1..16] where bit unset and n>length.
// Only n=16 was unset and >length: but slot 16%16=0 is the marker,
// so b.get(16) reads bits[0]=1 and skips. Result: 0 lost from the loop.
// Past-window: i - current - length = 20 - 0 - 16 = 4 lost.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 20))
assert.Equal(t, int64(4), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.Equal(t, uint64(20), b.current)
// Steady state now (current=20 >= length=16). Unit advance to 21
// stomps slot 21%16=5, which was cleared by the jump and not reset,
// so this is +1 lost.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 21))
assert.Equal(t, int64(5), b.lostCounter.Count())
}
// TestBitsCheckAcrossWarmupBoundary pins the underflow trick in Check's
// in-window clause. While in warmup, b.current-b.length underflows uint64
// to a huge value so the first OR-clause is always false; the second
// clause (i < length && current < length) carries the in-window check.
// Once current >= length the regimes flip cleanly.
func TestBitsCheckAcrossWarmupBoundary(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
b := NewBits(16)
// Warmup: current=0. Check(0) must read the marker (set) and return false.
assert.False(t, b.Check(l, 0), "marker slot should look already-received")
// Warmup: any 0 < i < length is in-window and unset → accepted.
for i := uint64(1); i < 16; i++ {
assert.True(t, b.Check(l, i), "warmup in-window i=%d should be accepted", i)
}
// Warmup: i >= length but > current is "next number" so accepted.
assert.True(t, b.Check(l, 16))
assert.True(t, b.Check(l, 1_000_000))
// Cross into steady state.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 100))
// Now current=100, length=16. In-window range is [85..100].
// 84 is just outside: the underflow clause activates; 84 > 100-16=84 is false.
// And the warmup clause is false (current >= length). So out of window.
assert.False(t, b.Check(l, 84))
// 85 sits at the boundary. 85 > 84 is true → in window, unset → accept.
assert.True(t, b.Check(l, 85))
// 100 is current itself; not strictly greater, in-window, but already set.
assert.False(t, b.Check(l, 100))
// Way out: clearly out of window.
assert.False(t, b.Check(l, 50))
}
// TestBitsMarkerInvariant verifies the seeded bits[0]=1 marker behaves
// correctly across warmup and beyond. Update should never clear the marker
// during warmup (clearRange skips position 0 when startPos=1), and once
// current >= length the marker is no longer consulted by Check/Update on
// the live path — but it must still report counter 0 as a duplicate while
// we are in warmup.
func TestBitsMarkerInvariant(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
b := NewBits(8)
// Counter 0 is the seeded marker; Check sees it as already received.
assert.False(t, b.Check(l, 0))
// Update(0) at current=0 hits the duplicate branch.
b.dupeCounter.Clear()
assert.False(t, b.Update(l, 0))
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.dupeCounter.Count())
// Walk forward through warmup; the marker must remain set.
for n := uint64(1); n <= 7; n++ {
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, n))
}
// Position 0 (the marker) should still read as set because we never
// cleared it; Update(0) still looks like a duplicate.
assert.False(t, b.Check(l, 0))
// Cross into steady state with a unit advance to 8: pos=0, evicts the
// marker bit. The lost-counter guard (i > b.length) is false (8 == 8),
// so this advance does NOT charge a lost packet — exactly what the
// marker is there to prevent.
b.lostCounter.Clear()
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 8))
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.lostCounter.Count())
// The slot at pos 0 is now occupied by counter 8.
assert.False(t, b.Check(l, 8))
}
// BenchmarkBitsUpdateInOrder is the steady-state hot path: each call is
// i == current+1.
func BenchmarkBitsUpdateInOrder(b *testing.B) {
l := test.NewLogger()
z := NewBits(16384)
func BenchmarkBits(b *testing.B) {
z := NewBits(10)
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
z.Update(l, uint64(n)+1)
}
}
for i := range z.bits {
z.bits[i] = true
}
for i := range z.bits {
z.bits[i] = false
}
// BenchmarkBitsUpdateReorder simulates light reorder within the window:
// every other packet arrives one slot behind its predecessor (forces the
// in-window backfill branch).
func BenchmarkBitsUpdateReorder(b *testing.B) {
l := test.NewLogger()
z := NewBits(16384)
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
base := uint64(n) * 2
z.Update(l, base+2)
z.Update(l, base+1)
}
}
// BenchmarkBitsUpdateLargeJumps stresses the clearRange word-level path.
func BenchmarkBitsUpdateLargeJumps(b *testing.B) {
l := test.NewLogger()
z := NewBits(16384)
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
z.Update(l, uint64(n+1)*1000)
}
}
-4
View File
@@ -217,10 +217,6 @@ func (ncp *CAPool) verify(c Certificate, now time.Time, certFp string, signerFp
return nil, err
}
if signer.Certificate.Curve() != c.Curve() {
return nil, ErrCurveMismatch
}
if signer.Certificate.Expired(now) {
return nil, ErrRootExpired
}
-28
View File
@@ -654,31 +654,3 @@ func TestCertificateV2_Verify_Subnets(t *testing.T) {
_, err = caPool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), c)
require.NoError(t, err)
}
func TestCertificateV2_CurveMismatch(t *testing.T) {
caIp1 := mustParsePrefixUnmapped("10.0.0.0/16")
caIp2 := mustParsePrefixUnmapped("192.168.0.0/24")
ca, _, caKey, _ := NewTestCaCert(Version2, Curve_P256, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), []netip.Prefix{caIp1, caIp2}, nil, []string{"test"})
caPem, err := ca.MarshalPEM()
require.NoError(t, err)
caPool := NewCAPool()
b, err := caPool.AddCAFromPEM(caPem)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, b)
// ip is outside the network
cIp1 := mustParsePrefixUnmapped("10.0.0.1/24")
c, _, _, _ := NewTestCert(Version2, Curve_P256, ca, caKey, "test", time.Now(), time.Now().Add(5*time.Minute), []netip.Prefix{cIp1}, nil, []string{"test"})
fp, _ := c.Fingerprint()
_, err = caPool.verify(c, time.Now(), fp, c.Issuer())
require.NoError(t, err)
//
c2 := c.(*certificateV2)
c2.curve = Curve_CURVE25519
fp, _ = c.Fingerprint()
_, err = caPool.verify(c, time.Now(), fp, c.Issuer())
require.Error(t, err)
}
-3
View File
@@ -112,9 +112,6 @@ func (c *certificateV1) CheckSignature(key []byte) bool {
}
switch c.details.curve {
case Curve_CURVE25519:
if len(key) != ed25519.PublicKeySize {
return false //avoids a panic internal to ed25519
}
return ed25519.Verify(key, b, c.signature)
case Curve_P256:
pubKey, err := ecdsa.ParseUncompressedPublicKey(elliptic.P256(), key)
-3
View File
@@ -151,9 +151,6 @@ func (c *certificateV2) CheckSignature(key []byte) bool {
switch c.curve {
case Curve_CURVE25519:
if len(key) != ed25519.PublicKeySize {
return false //avoids a panic internal to ed25519
}
return ed25519.Verify(key, b, c.signature)
case Curve_P256:
pubKey, err := ecdsa.ParseUncompressedPublicKey(elliptic.P256(), key)
-1
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ var (
ErrCaNotFound = errors.New("could not find ca for the certificate")
ErrUnknownVersion = errors.New("certificate version unrecognized")
ErrCertPubkeyPresent = errors.New("certificate has unexpected pubkey present")
ErrCurveMismatch = errors.New("certificate curve does not match CA")
ErrInvalidPEMBlock = errors.New("input did not contain a valid PEM encoded block")
ErrInvalidPEMCertificateBanner = errors.New("bytes did not contain a proper certificate banner")
-52
View File
@@ -163,55 +163,3 @@ func P256Keypair() ([]byte, []byte) {
pubkey := privkey.PublicKey()
return pubkey.Bytes(), privkey.Bytes()
}
// DummyCert is a minimal cert.Certificate implementation for testing error paths.
type DummyCert struct {
Version_ cert.Version
Curve_ cert.Curve
Groups_ []string
IsCA_ bool
Issuer_ string
Name_ string
Networks_ []netip.Prefix
NotAfter_ time.Time
NotBefore_ time.Time
PublicKey_ []byte
Signature_ []byte
UnsafeNetworks_ []netip.Prefix
}
func (d *DummyCert) Version() cert.Version { return d.Version_ }
func (d *DummyCert) Curve() cert.Curve { return d.Curve_ }
func (d *DummyCert) Groups() []string { return d.Groups_ }
func (d *DummyCert) IsCA() bool { return d.IsCA_ }
func (d *DummyCert) Issuer() string { return d.Issuer_ }
func (d *DummyCert) Name() string { return d.Name_ }
func (d *DummyCert) Networks() []netip.Prefix { return d.Networks_ }
func (d *DummyCert) NotAfter() time.Time { return d.NotAfter_ }
func (d *DummyCert) NotBefore() time.Time { return d.NotBefore_ }
func (d *DummyCert) PublicKey() []byte { return d.PublicKey_ }
func (d *DummyCert) Signature() []byte { return d.Signature_ }
func (d *DummyCert) UnsafeNetworks() []netip.Prefix { return d.UnsafeNetworks_ }
func (d *DummyCert) Fingerprint() (string, error) { return "", nil }
func (d *DummyCert) CheckSignature(key []byte) bool { return false }
func (d *DummyCert) MarshalForHandshakes() ([]byte, error) { return nil, nil }
func (d *DummyCert) MarshalPEM() ([]byte, error) { return nil, nil }
func (d *DummyCert) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) { return nil, nil }
func (d *DummyCert) Marshal() ([]byte, error) { return nil, nil }
func (d *DummyCert) String() string { return "dummy" }
func (d *DummyCert) Copy() cert.Certificate { return d }
func (d *DummyCert) VerifyPrivateKey(c cert.Curve, k []byte) error { return nil }
func (d *DummyCert) Expired(time.Time) bool { return false }
func (d *DummyCert) MarshalPublicKeyPEM() []byte { return nil }
func (d *DummyCert) PublicKeyPEM() []byte { return nil }
// NewTestCAPool creates a CAPool from the given CA certificates, panicking on error.
func NewTestCAPool(cas ...cert.Certificate) *cert.CAPool {
pool := cert.NewCAPool()
for _, ca := range cas {
if err := pool.AddCA(ca); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
}
return pool
}
+42 -12
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
@@ -44,16 +45,19 @@ type connectionManager struct {
inactivityTimeout atomic.Int64
dropInactive atomic.Bool
metricsTxPunchy metrics.Counter
l *slog.Logger
}
func newConnectionManagerFromConfig(l *slog.Logger, c *config.C, hm *HostMap, p *Punchy) *connectionManager {
cm := &connectionManager{
hostMap: hm,
l: l,
punchy: p,
relayUsed: make(map[uint32]struct{}),
relayUsedLock: &sync.RWMutex{},
hostMap: hm,
l: l,
punchy: p,
relayUsed: make(map[uint32]struct{}),
relayUsedLock: &sync.RWMutex{},
metricsTxPunchy: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("messages.tx.punchy", nil),
}
cm.reload(c, true)
@@ -365,7 +369,7 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) makeTrafficDecision(localIndex uint32, now time.Tim
if !outTraffic {
// Send a punch packet to keep the NAT state alive
cm.punchy.SendPunch(hostinfo)
cm.sendPunch(hostinfo)
}
return decision, hostinfo, primary
@@ -396,16 +400,17 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) makeTrafficDecision(localIndex uint32, now time.Tim
// If we aren't sending or receiving traffic then its an unused tunnel and we don't to test the tunnel.
// Just maintain NAT state if configured to do so.
cm.punchy.SendPunch(hostinfo)
cm.sendPunch(hostinfo)
cm.trafficTimer.Add(hostinfo.localIndexId, cm.checkInterval)
return doNothing, nil, nil
}
// We aren't receiving traffic but we are sending it. The outbound
// traffic itself refreshes the primary remote's NAT state; this
// fans out to non-primary remotes, but only if target_all_remotes
// is configured.
cm.punchy.SendPunchToAll(hostinfo)
if cm.punchy.GetTargetEverything() {
// This is similar to the old punchy behavior with a slight optimization.
// We aren't receiving traffic but we are sending it, punch on all known
// ips in case we need to re-prime NAT state
cm.sendPunch(hostinfo)
}
if cm.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(cm.l).Debug("Tunnel status",
@@ -507,6 +512,31 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) isInvalidCertificate(now time.Time, hostinfo *HostI
}
}
func (cm *connectionManager) sendPunch(hostinfo *HostInfo) {
if !cm.punchy.GetPunch() {
// Punching is disabled
return
}
if cm.intf.lightHouse.IsAnyLighthouseAddr(hostinfo.vpnAddrs) {
// Do not punch to lighthouses, we assume our lighthouse update interval is good enough.
// In the event the update interval is not sufficient to maintain NAT state then a publicly available lighthouse
// would lose the ability to notify us and punchy.respond would become unreliable.
return
}
if cm.punchy.GetTargetEverything() {
hostinfo.remotes.ForEach(cm.hostMap.GetPreferredRanges(), func(addr netip.AddrPort, preferred bool) {
cm.metricsTxPunchy.Inc(1)
cm.intf.outside.WriteTo([]byte{1}, addr)
})
} else if hostinfo.remote.IsValid() {
cm.metricsTxPunchy.Inc(1)
cm.intf.outside.WriteTo([]byte{1}, hostinfo.remote)
}
}
func (cm *connectionManager) tryRehandshake(hostinfo *HostInfo) {
cs := cm.intf.pki.getCertState()
curCrt := hostinfo.ConnectionState.myCert
+15 -10
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/overlaytest"
@@ -46,7 +47,7 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest(t *testing.T) {
initiatingVersion: cert.Version1,
privateKey: []byte{},
v1Cert: &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1},
v1Credential: nil,
v1HandshakeBytes: []byte{},
}
lh := newTestLighthouse()
@@ -64,7 +65,7 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest(t *testing.T) {
// Create manager
conf := config.NewC(test.NewLogger())
punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf, nil)
punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf)
nc := newConnectionManagerFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf, hostMap, punchy)
nc.intf = ifce
p := []byte("")
@@ -79,6 +80,7 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest(t *testing.T) {
}
hostinfo.ConnectionState = &ConnectionState{
myCert: &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1},
H: &noise.HandshakeState{},
}
nc.hostMap.unlockedAddHostInfo(hostinfo, ifce)
@@ -128,7 +130,7 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest2(t *testing.T) {
initiatingVersion: cert.Version1,
privateKey: []byte{},
v1Cert: &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1},
v1Credential: nil,
v1HandshakeBytes: []byte{},
}
lh := newTestLighthouse()
@@ -146,7 +148,7 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest2(t *testing.T) {
// Create manager
conf := config.NewC(test.NewLogger())
punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf, nil)
punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf)
nc := newConnectionManagerFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf, hostMap, punchy)
nc.intf = ifce
p := []byte("")
@@ -161,6 +163,7 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest2(t *testing.T) {
}
hostinfo.ConnectionState = &ConnectionState{
myCert: &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1},
H: &noise.HandshakeState{},
}
nc.hostMap.unlockedAddHostInfo(hostinfo, ifce)
@@ -212,7 +215,7 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManager_DisconnectInactive(t *testing.T) {
initiatingVersion: cert.Version1,
privateKey: []byte{},
v1Cert: &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1},
v1Credential: nil,
v1HandshakeBytes: []byte{},
}
lh := newTestLighthouse()
@@ -233,7 +236,7 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManager_DisconnectInactive(t *testing.T) {
conf.Settings["tunnels"] = map[string]any{
"drop_inactive": true,
}
punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf, nil)
punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf)
nc := newConnectionManagerFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf, hostMap, punchy)
assert.True(t, nc.dropInactive.Load())
nc.intf = ifce
@@ -246,6 +249,7 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManager_DisconnectInactive(t *testing.T) {
}
hostinfo.ConnectionState = &ConnectionState{
myCert: &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1},
H: &noise.HandshakeState{},
}
nc.hostMap.unlockedAddHostInfo(hostinfo, ifce)
@@ -336,9 +340,9 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest_DisconnectInvalid(t *testing.T) {
cachedPeerCert, err := ncp.VerifyCertificate(now.Add(time.Second), peerCert)
cs := &CertState{
privateKey: []byte{},
v1Cert: &dummyCert{},
v1Credential: nil,
privateKey: []byte{},
v1Cert: &dummyCert{},
v1HandshakeBytes: []byte{},
}
lh := newTestLighthouse()
@@ -358,7 +362,7 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest_DisconnectInvalid(t *testing.T) {
// Create manager
conf := config.NewC(test.NewLogger())
punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf, nil)
punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf)
nc := newConnectionManagerFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf, hostMap, punchy)
nc.intf = ifce
ifce.connectionManager = nc
@@ -368,6 +372,7 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest_DisconnectInvalid(t *testing.T) {
ConnectionState: &ConnectionState{
myCert: &dummyCert{},
peerCert: cachedPeerCert,
H: &noise.HandshakeState{},
},
}
nc.hostMap.unlockedAddHostInfo(hostinfo, ifce)
+53 -19
View File
@@ -1,20 +1,23 @@
package nebula
import (
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/noiseutil"
)
const ReplayWindow = 8192
const ReplayWindow = 1024 //todo I've started seeing out-of-window messages in testing?
type ConnectionState struct {
eKey noiseutil.CipherState
dKey noiseutil.CipherState
eKey *NebulaCipherState
dKey *NebulaCipherState
H *noise.HandshakeState
myCert cert.Certificate
peerCert *cert.CachedCertificate
initiator bool
@@ -23,24 +26,55 @@ type ConnectionState struct {
writeLock sync.Mutex
}
// newConnectionStateFromResult builds a fully-populated ConnectionState from a
// completed handshake.Result. It seeds messageCounter and the replay window so
// that the post-handshake message indices already used on the wire don't count
// as missed traffic in the data plane.
func newConnectionStateFromResult(r *handshake.Result) *ConnectionState {
func NewConnectionState(cs *CertState, crt cert.Certificate, initiator bool, pattern noise.HandshakePattern) (*ConnectionState, error) {
var dhFunc noise.DHFunc
switch crt.Curve() {
case cert.Curve_CURVE25519:
dhFunc = noise.DH25519
case cert.Curve_P256:
if cs.pkcs11Backed {
dhFunc = noiseutil.DHP256PKCS11
} else {
dhFunc = noiseutil.DHP256
}
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid curve: %s", crt.Curve())
}
var ncs noise.CipherSuite
if cs.cipher == "chachapoly" {
ncs = noise.NewCipherSuite(dhFunc, noise.CipherChaChaPoly, noise.HashSHA256)
} else {
ncs = noise.NewCipherSuite(dhFunc, noiseutil.CipherAESGCM, noise.HashSHA256)
}
static := noise.DHKey{Private: cs.privateKey, Public: crt.PublicKey()}
hs, err := noise.NewHandshakeState(noise.Config{
CipherSuite: ncs,
Random: rand.Reader,
Pattern: pattern,
Initiator: initiator,
StaticKeypair: static,
//NOTE: These should come from CertState (pki.go) when we finally implement it
PresharedKey: []byte{},
PresharedKeyPlacement: 0,
})
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("NewConnectionState: %s", err)
}
// The queue and ready params prevent a counter race that would happen when
// sending stored packets and simultaneously accepting new traffic.
ci := &ConnectionState{
myCert: r.MyCert,
initiator: r.Initiator,
peerCert: r.RemoteCert,
eKey: noiseutil.NewCipherState(r.EKey, r.Cipher),
dKey: noiseutil.NewCipherState(r.DKey, r.Cipher),
H: hs,
initiator: initiator,
window: NewBits(ReplayWindow),
myCert: crt,
}
ci.messageCounter.Add(r.MessageIndex)
for i := uint64(1); i <= r.MessageIndex; i++ {
ci.window.Update(nil, i)
}
return ci
// always start the counter from 2, as packet 1 and packet 2 are handshake packets.
ci.messageCounter.Add(2)
return ci, nil
}
func (cs *ConnectionState) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
-114
View File
@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
package nebula
import (
"net/netip"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
ct "github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// runTestHandshake runs a complete IX handshake between two freshly-built
// peers and returns the initiator and responder Results. Used to produce
// real cipher states for tests that need to exercise post-handshake glue.
func runTestHandshake(t *testing.T) (initR, respR *handshake.Result) {
t.Helper()
ca, _, caKey, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
caPool := ct.NewTestCAPool(ca)
makeCreds := func(name string, networks []netip.Prefix) handshake.GetCredentialFunc {
c, _, rawKey, _ := ct.NewTestCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, ca, caKey,
name, ca.NotBefore(), ca.NotAfter(), networks, nil, nil,
)
priv, _, _, err := cert.UnmarshalPrivateKeyFromPEM(rawKey)
require.NoError(t, err)
hsBytes, err := c.MarshalForHandshakes()
require.NoError(t, err)
ncs := noise.NewCipherSuite(noise.DH25519, noise.CipherChaChaPoly, noise.HashSHA256)
cred := handshake.NewCredential(c, hsBytes, priv, ncs)
return func(v cert.Version) *handshake.Credential {
if v == cert.Version2 {
return cred
}
return nil
}
}
verifier := func(c cert.Certificate) (*cert.CachedCertificate, error) {
return caPool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), c)
}
initCreds := makeCreds("initiator", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")})
respCreds := makeCreds("responder", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.2/24")})
initM, err := handshake.NewMachine(
cert.Version2, initCreds, verifier,
func() (uint32, error) { return 1000, nil },
true, header.HandshakeIXPSK0,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
respM, err := handshake.NewMachine(
cert.Version2, respCreds, verifier,
func() (uint32, error) { return 2000, nil },
false, header.HandshakeIXPSK0,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
msg1, err := initM.Initiate(nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
resp, respR, err := respM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg1)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, respR)
_, initR, err = initM.ProcessPacket(nil, resp)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, initR)
return initR, respR
}
func TestNewConnectionStateFromResult(t *testing.T) {
initR, respR := runTestHandshake(t)
t.Run("initiator", func(t *testing.T) {
ci := newConnectionStateFromResult(initR)
assert.True(t, ci.initiator)
assert.Equal(t, initR.MyCert, ci.myCert)
assert.Equal(t, initR.RemoteCert, ci.peerCert)
assert.NotNil(t, ci.eKey)
assert.NotNil(t, ci.dKey)
// IX has 2 handshake messages; the next data-plane send is counter=3.
assert.Equal(t, uint64(2), ci.messageCounter.Load(),
"messageCounter must equal Result.MessageIndex so the next send is N+1")
// Both handshake counters must be marked seen so they don't appear lost.
// Check returns false if an index has already been recorded.
assert.False(t, ci.window.Check(nil, 1), "counter 1 must already be seen")
assert.False(t, ci.window.Check(nil, 2), "counter 2 must already be seen")
// Counter 3 is the next data-plane message and must NOT be pre-marked.
assert.True(t, ci.window.Check(nil, 3), "counter 3 must not be pre-seeded")
})
t.Run("responder", func(t *testing.T) {
ci := newConnectionStateFromResult(respR)
assert.False(t, ci.initiator)
assert.Equal(t, respR.MyCert, ci.myCert)
assert.Equal(t, respR.RemoteCert, ci.peerCert)
assert.NotNil(t, ci.eKey)
assert.NotNil(t, ci.dKey)
assert.Equal(t, uint64(2), ci.messageCounter.Load())
})
}
+60 -12
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ package nebula
import (
"net/netip"
"github.com/google/gopacket"
"github.com/google/gopacket/layers"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
@@ -20,9 +22,7 @@ func (c *Control) WaitForType(msgType header.MessageType, subType header.Message
panic(err)
}
pipeTo.InjectUDPPacket(p)
match := h.Type == msgType && h.Subtype == subType
p.Release()
if match {
if h.Type == msgType && h.Subtype == subType {
return
}
}
@@ -38,9 +38,7 @@ func (c *Control) WaitForTypeByIndex(toIndex uint32, msgType header.MessageType,
panic(err)
}
pipeTo.InjectUDPPacket(p)
match := h.RemoteIndex == toIndex && h.Type == msgType && h.Subtype == subType
p.Release()
if match {
if h.RemoteIndex == toIndex && h.Type == msgType && h.Subtype == subType {
return
}
}
@@ -92,15 +90,65 @@ func (c *Control) GetTunTxChan() <-chan []byte {
return c.f.inside.(*overlay.TestTun).TxPackets
}
// InjectUDPPacket injects a packet into the udp side. We copy internally so the caller keeps ownership of p.
// The copy comes from the freelist so steady-state alloc is zero.
// InjectUDPPacket will inject a packet into the udp side of nebula
func (c *Control) InjectUDPPacket(p *udp.Packet) {
c.f.outside.(*udp.TesterConn).Send(p.Copy())
c.f.outside.(*udp.TesterConn).Send(p)
}
// InjectTunPacket pushes an IP packet onto the tun interface.
func (c *Control) InjectTunPacket(packet []byte) {
c.f.inside.(*overlay.TestTun).Send(packet)
// InjectTunUDPPacket puts a udp packet on the tun interface. Using UDP here because it's a simpler protocol
func (c *Control) InjectTunUDPPacket(toAddr netip.Addr, toPort uint16, fromAddr netip.Addr, fromPort uint16, data []byte) {
serialize := make([]gopacket.SerializableLayer, 0)
var netLayer gopacket.NetworkLayer
if toAddr.Is6() {
if !fromAddr.Is6() {
panic("Cant send ipv6 to ipv4")
}
ip := &layers.IPv6{
Version: 6,
NextHeader: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
SrcIP: fromAddr.Unmap().AsSlice(),
DstIP: toAddr.Unmap().AsSlice(),
}
serialize = append(serialize, ip)
netLayer = ip
} else {
if !fromAddr.Is4() {
panic("Cant send ipv4 to ipv6")
}
ip := &layers.IPv4{
Version: 4,
TTL: 64,
Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
SrcIP: fromAddr.Unmap().AsSlice(),
DstIP: toAddr.Unmap().AsSlice(),
}
serialize = append(serialize, ip)
netLayer = ip
}
udp := layers.UDP{
SrcPort: layers.UDPPort(fromPort),
DstPort: layers.UDPPort(toPort),
}
err := udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(netLayer)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
buffer := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
opt := gopacket.SerializeOptions{
ComputeChecksums: true,
FixLengths: true,
}
serialize = append(serialize, &udp, gopacket.Payload(data))
err = gopacket.SerializeLayers(buffer, opt, serialize...)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
c.f.inside.(*overlay.TestTun).Send(buffer.Bytes())
}
func (c *Control) GetVpnAddrs() []netip.Addr {
+12 -24
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ func makeHandshakePacket(from, to netip.AddrPort, subtype header.MessageSubType,
}
func TestHandshakeRetransmitDuplicate(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Verify the responder correctly handles receiving the same msg1 multiple times
// (retransmission). The duplicate goes through CheckAndComplete -> ErrAlreadySeen
// and the cached response is resent.
@@ -47,7 +46,7 @@ func TestHandshakeRetransmitDuplicate(t *testing.T) {
defer r.RenderFlow()
t.Log("Trigger handshake from me to them")
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi")))
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi"))
t.Log("Grab my msg1")
msg1 := myControl.GetFromUDP(true)
@@ -79,7 +78,6 @@ func TestHandshakeRetransmitDuplicate(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestHandshakeTruncatedPacketRecovery(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Verify that a truncated handshake packet is ignored and the real
// packet can still complete the handshake.
@@ -97,7 +95,7 @@ func TestHandshakeTruncatedPacketRecovery(t *testing.T) {
defer r.RenderFlow()
t.Log("Trigger handshake")
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi")))
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi"))
t.Log("Get msg1 and deliver to responder")
msg1 := myControl.GetFromUDP(true)
@@ -128,7 +126,6 @@ func TestHandshakeTruncatedPacketRecovery(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestHandshakeOrphanedMsg2Dropped(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// A msg2 arriving with no matching pending index should be silently dropped
// with no response sent and no state changes.
@@ -146,7 +143,7 @@ func TestHandshakeOrphanedMsg2Dropped(t *testing.T) {
defer r.RenderFlow()
t.Log("Complete a normal handshake")
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi")))
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi"))
r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
assertTunnel(t, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
@@ -171,7 +168,6 @@ func TestHandshakeOrphanedMsg2Dropped(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestHandshakeUnknownMessageCounter(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// A handshake packet with an unexpected message counter should be silently
// dropped with no side effects and no UDP response.
@@ -203,7 +199,6 @@ func TestHandshakeUnknownMessageCounter(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestHandshakeUnknownSubtype(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// A handshake packet with an unknown subtype should be silently dropped.
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
@@ -229,7 +224,6 @@ func TestHandshakeUnknownSubtype(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestHandshakeLateResponse(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// After a handshake times out, a late response should be silently ignored
// with no new tunnels created.
@@ -248,7 +242,7 @@ func TestHandshakeLateResponse(t *testing.T) {
theirControl.Start()
t.Log("Trigger handshake from me")
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi")))
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi"))
t.Log("Grab msg1 but don't deliver")
msg1 := myControl.GetFromUDP(true)
@@ -279,7 +273,6 @@ func TestHandshakeLateResponse(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestHandshakeSelfConnectionRejected(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Verify that a node rejects a handshake containing its own VPN IP in the
// peer cert. We do this by sending the initiator's own msg1 back to itself.
@@ -292,7 +285,7 @@ func TestHandshakeSelfConnectionRejected(t *testing.T) {
myControl.Start()
t.Log("Trigger handshake from me")
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(netip.MustParseAddr("10.128.0.2"), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi")))
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(netip.MustParseAddr("10.128.0.2"), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi"))
msg1 := myControl.GetFromUDP(true)
t.Log("Drain any handshake retransmits before injecting")
@@ -328,7 +321,6 @@ func TestHandshakeSelfConnectionRejected(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestHandshakeMessageCounter0Dropped(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// MessageCounter=0 is not a valid handshake message and should be dropped.
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
@@ -349,7 +341,6 @@ func TestHandshakeMessageCounter0Dropped(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestHandshakeRemoteAllowList(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Verify that a handshake from a blocked underlay IP is dropped with no
// response and no state changes. Then verify the same packet from an
// allowed IP succeeds.
@@ -375,7 +366,7 @@ func TestHandshakeRemoteAllowList(t *testing.T) {
defer r.RenderFlow()
t.Log("Trigger handshake from them")
theirControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi")))
theirControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi"))
msg1 := theirControl.GetFromUDP(true)
t.Log("Rewrite the source to a blocked IP and inject")
@@ -408,7 +399,6 @@ func TestHandshakeRemoteAllowList(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestHandshakeAlreadySeenPreferredRemote(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// When a duplicate msg1 arrives via ErrAlreadySeen, verify the tunnel
// remains functional and hostmap index count is stable.
@@ -426,7 +416,7 @@ func TestHandshakeAlreadySeenPreferredRemote(t *testing.T) {
defer r.RenderFlow()
t.Log("Complete a normal handshake via the router")
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi")))
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi"))
r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
assertTunnel(t, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
@@ -437,7 +427,7 @@ func TestHandshakeAlreadySeenPreferredRemote(t *testing.T) {
originalRemote := hi.CurrentRemote
t.Log("Re-trigger traffic to cause a new handshake attempt (ErrAlreadySeen)")
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("roam")))
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("roam"))
r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
t.Log("Verify tunnel still works")
@@ -455,7 +445,6 @@ func TestHandshakeAlreadySeenPreferredRemote(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestHandshakeWrongResponderPacketStore(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Verify that when the wrong host responds, the cached packets are
// transferred to the new handshake, the evil tunnel is closed, evil's
// address is blocked, and the correct tunnel is eventually established.
@@ -475,8 +464,8 @@ func TestHandshakeWrongResponderPacketStore(t *testing.T) {
evilControl.Start()
t.Log("Send multiple packets to them (cached during handshake)")
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("packet1")))
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("packet2")))
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("packet1"))
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("packet2"))
t.Log("Route until evil tunnel is closed")
h := &header.H{}
@@ -519,7 +508,6 @@ func TestHandshakeWrongResponderPacketStore(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestHandshakeRelayComplete(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Verify that a relay handshake completes correctly and relay state is
// properly maintained on all three nodes.
@@ -540,7 +528,7 @@ func TestHandshakeRelayComplete(t *testing.T) {
theirControl.Start()
t.Log("Trigger handshake via relay")
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi via relay")))
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi via relay"))
p := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi via relay"), p, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
@@ -568,7 +556,7 @@ func TestHandshakeRelayComplete(t *testing.T) {
}
// NOTE: Relay V1 cert + IPv6 rejection is not tested here because
// BuildTunUDPPacket from a V4 node to a V6 address panics in the test
// InjectTunUDPPacket from a V4 node to a V6 address panics in the test
// framework. The check is in handshake_manager.go handleOutbound relay
// logic (lines ~304-313): if the relay host has a V1 cert and either
// address is IPv6, the relay is skipped.
+30 -67
View File
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ import (
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/e2e/router"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
@@ -40,22 +39,11 @@ func BenchmarkHotPath(b *testing.B) {
r.CancelFlowLogs()
assertTunnel(b, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
// Pre-build the IP packet bytes once so the bench measures the data plane,
// not gopacket SerializeLayers overhead.
prebuilt := BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
// EnableFanIn switches the router to a 0-alloc routing path. Required
// for hot-path benchmarks; would conflict with GetFromUDP-using tests.
r.EnableFanIn()
b.ResetTimer()
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
myControl.InjectTunPacket(prebuilt)
// Release the TUN-side bytes back to the harness freelist; the bench
// just confirms a packet arrived, the contents aren't inspected.
overlay.ReleaseTunBuf(r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl))
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
_ = r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
}
myControl.Stop()
@@ -83,15 +71,11 @@ func BenchmarkHotPathRelay(b *testing.B) {
theirControl.Start()
assertTunnel(b, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirControl, myControl, r)
prebuilt := BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
r.EnableFanIn()
b.ResetTimer()
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
myControl.InjectTunPacket(prebuilt)
overlay.ReleaseTunBuf(r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl))
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
_ = r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
}
myControl.Stop()
@@ -100,7 +84,6 @@ func BenchmarkHotPathRelay(b *testing.B) {
}
func TestGoodHandshake(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me", "10.128.0.1/24", nil)
theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "them", "10.128.0.2/24", nil)
@@ -113,7 +96,7 @@ func TestGoodHandshake(t *testing.T) {
theirControl.Start()
t.Log("Send a udp packet through to begin standing up the tunnel, this should come out the other side")
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
t.Log("Have them consume my stage 0 packet. They have a tunnel now")
theirControl.InjectUDPPacket(myControl.GetFromUDP(true))
@@ -151,7 +134,6 @@ func TestGoodHandshake(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestGoodHandshakeNoOverlap(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "me", "10.128.0.1/24", nil)
theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "them", "2001::69/24", nil) //look ma, cross-stack!
@@ -187,7 +169,6 @@ func TestGoodHandshakeNoOverlap(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestWrongResponderHandshake(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me", "10.128.0.100/24", nil)
@@ -207,7 +188,7 @@ func TestWrongResponderHandshake(t *testing.T) {
evilControl.Start()
t.Log("Start the handshake process, we will route until we see the evil tunnel closed")
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
h := &header.H{}
r.RouteForAllExitFunc(func(p *udp.Packet, c *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
@@ -264,7 +245,6 @@ func TestWrongResponderHandshake(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestWrongResponderHandshakeStaticHostMap(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "them", "10.128.0.99/24", nil)
@@ -289,7 +269,7 @@ func TestWrongResponderHandshakeStaticHostMap(t *testing.T) {
evilControl.Start()
t.Log("Start the handshake process, we will route until we see the evil tunnel closed")
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
h := &header.H{}
r.RouteForAllExitFunc(func(p *udp.Packet, c *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
@@ -347,7 +327,6 @@ func TestWrongResponderHandshakeStaticHostMap(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestStage1Race(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// This tests ensures that two hosts handshaking with each other at the same time will allow traffic to flow
// But will eventually collapse down to a single tunnel
@@ -368,8 +347,8 @@ func TestStage1Race(t *testing.T) {
theirControl.Start()
t.Log("Trigger a handshake to start on both me and them")
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
theirControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them")))
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
theirControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them"))
t.Log("Get both stage 1 handshake packets")
myHsForThem := myControl.GetFromUDP(true)
@@ -428,7 +407,6 @@ func TestStage1Race(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestUncleanShutdownRaceLoser(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me ", "10.128.0.1/24", nil)
theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "them", "10.128.0.2/24", nil)
@@ -446,7 +424,7 @@ func TestUncleanShutdownRaceLoser(t *testing.T) {
theirControl.Start()
r.Log("Trigger a handshake from me to them")
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
p := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me"), p, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
@@ -457,7 +435,7 @@ func TestUncleanShutdownRaceLoser(t *testing.T) {
myHostmap.Indexes = map[uint32]*nebula.HostInfo{}
myHostmap.RemoteIndexes = map[uint32]*nebula.HostInfo{}
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me again")))
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me again"))
p = r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me again"), p, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
@@ -478,7 +456,6 @@ func TestUncleanShutdownRaceLoser(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestUncleanShutdownRaceWinner(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me ", "10.128.0.1/24", nil)
theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "them", "10.128.0.2/24", nil)
@@ -496,7 +473,7 @@ func TestUncleanShutdownRaceWinner(t *testing.T) {
theirControl.Start()
r.Log("Trigger a handshake from me to them")
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
p := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me"), p, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
@@ -508,7 +485,7 @@ func TestUncleanShutdownRaceWinner(t *testing.T) {
theirHostmap.Indexes = map[uint32]*nebula.HostInfo{}
theirHostmap.RemoteIndexes = map[uint32]*nebula.HostInfo{}
theirControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them again")))
theirControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them again"))
p = r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(myControl)
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from them again"), p, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
r.RenderHostmaps("Derp hostmaps", myControl, theirControl)
@@ -530,7 +507,6 @@ func TestUncleanShutdownRaceWinner(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRelays(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, _, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me ", "10.128.0.1/24", m{"relay": m{"use_relays": true}})
relayControl, relayVpnIpNet, relayUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "relay ", "10.128.0.128/24", m{"relay": m{"am_relay": true}})
@@ -551,7 +527,7 @@ func TestRelays(t *testing.T) {
theirControl.Start()
t.Log("Trigger a handshake from me to them via the relay")
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
p := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
r.Log("Assert the tunnel works")
@@ -560,7 +536,6 @@ func TestRelays(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRelaysDontCareAboutIps(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, _, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "me ", "10.128.0.1/24", m{"relay": m{"use_relays": true}})
relayControl, relayVpnIpNet, relayUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "relay ", "2001::9999/24", m{"relay": m{"am_relay": true}})
@@ -581,7 +556,7 @@ func TestRelaysDontCareAboutIps(t *testing.T) {
theirControl.Start()
t.Log("Trigger a handshake from me to them via the relay")
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
p := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
r.Log("Assert the tunnel works")
@@ -590,7 +565,6 @@ func TestRelaysDontCareAboutIps(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestReestablishRelays(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, _, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me ", "10.128.0.1/24", m{"relay": m{"use_relays": true}})
relayControl, relayVpnIpNet, relayUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "relay ", "10.128.0.128/24", m{"relay": m{"am_relay": true}})
@@ -611,14 +585,14 @@ func TestReestablishRelays(t *testing.T) {
theirControl.Start()
t.Log("Trigger a handshake from me to them via the relay")
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
p := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
r.Log("Assert the tunnel works")
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me"), p, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
t.Log("Ensure packet traversal from them to me via the relay")
theirControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them")))
theirControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them"))
p = r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(myControl)
r.Log("Assert the tunnel works")
@@ -633,7 +607,7 @@ func TestReestablishRelays(t *testing.T) {
for curIndexes >= start {
curIndexes = len(myControl.GetHostmap().Indexes)
r.Logf("Wait for the dead index to go away:start=%v indexes, current=%v indexes", start, curIndexes)
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me should fail")))
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me should fail"))
r.RouteForAllExitFunc(func(p *udp.Packet, c *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
return router.RouteAndExit
@@ -650,7 +624,7 @@ func TestReestablishRelays(t *testing.T) {
myControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(relayVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), relayUdpAddr)
myControl.InjectRelays(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), []netip.Addr{relayVpnIpNet[0].Addr()})
relayControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirUdpAddr)
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
p = r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
r.Log("Assert the tunnel works")
@@ -685,7 +659,7 @@ func TestReestablishRelays(t *testing.T) {
t.Log("Assert the tunnel works the other way, too")
for {
t.Log("RouteForAllUntilTxTun")
theirControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them")))
theirControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them"))
p = r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(myControl)
r.Log("Assert the tunnel works")
@@ -722,7 +696,6 @@ func TestReestablishRelays(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestStage1RaceRelays(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
//NOTE: this is a race between me and relay resulting in a full tunnel from me to them via relay
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me ", "10.128.0.1/24", m{"relay": m{"use_relays": true}})
@@ -755,8 +728,8 @@ func TestStage1RaceRelays(t *testing.T) {
assertTunnel(t, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), relayVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirControl, relayControl, r)
r.Log("Trigger a handshake from both them and me via relay to them and me")
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
theirControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them")))
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
theirControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them"))
r.Log("Wait for a packet from them to me")
p := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(myControl)
@@ -770,7 +743,6 @@ func TestStage1RaceRelays(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestStage1RaceRelays2(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
//NOTE: this is a race between me and relay resulting in a full tunnel from me to them via relay
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me ", "10.128.0.1/24", m{"relay": m{"use_relays": true}})
@@ -803,8 +775,8 @@ func TestStage1RaceRelays2(t *testing.T) {
assertTunnel(t, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), relayVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirControl, relayControl, r)
r.Log("Trigger a handshake from both them and me via relay to them and me")
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
theirControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them")))
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
theirControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them"))
//r.RouteUntilAfterMsgType(myControl, header.Control, header.MessageNone)
//r.RouteUntilAfterMsgType(theirControl, header.Control, header.MessageNone)
@@ -847,7 +819,6 @@ func TestStage1RaceRelays2(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRehandshakingRelays(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, _, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me ", "10.128.0.1/24", m{"relay": m{"use_relays": true}})
relayControl, relayVpnIpNet, relayUdpAddr, relayConfig := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "relay ", "10.128.0.128/24", m{"relay": m{"am_relay": true}})
@@ -868,7 +839,7 @@ func TestRehandshakingRelays(t *testing.T) {
theirControl.Start()
t.Log("Trigger a handshake from me to them via the relay")
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
p := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
r.Log("Assert the tunnel works")
@@ -951,7 +922,6 @@ func TestRehandshakingRelays(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRehandshakingRelaysPrimary(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// This test is the same as TestRehandshakingRelays but one of the terminal types is a primary swap winner
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, _, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me ", "10.128.0.128/24", m{"relay": m{"use_relays": true}})
@@ -973,7 +943,7 @@ func TestRehandshakingRelaysPrimary(t *testing.T) {
theirControl.Start()
t.Log("Trigger a handshake from me to them via the relay")
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
p := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
r.Log("Assert the tunnel works")
@@ -1056,7 +1026,6 @@ func TestRehandshakingRelaysPrimary(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRehandshaking(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, myConfig := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me ", "10.128.0.2/24", nil)
theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, theirConfig := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "them", "10.128.0.1/24", nil)
@@ -1152,7 +1121,6 @@ func TestRehandshaking(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRehandshakingLoser(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// The purpose of this test is that the race loser renews their certificate and rehandshakes. The final tunnel
// Should be the one with the new certificate
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
@@ -1251,7 +1219,6 @@ func TestRehandshakingLoser(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRaceRegression(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// This test forces stage 1, stage 2, stage 1 to be received by me from them
// We had a bug where we were not finding the duplicate handshake and responding to the final stage 1 which
// caused a cross-linked hostinfo
@@ -1275,8 +1242,8 @@ func TestRaceRegression(t *testing.T) {
//them rx stage:2 initiatorIndex=120607833 responderIndex=4209862089
t.Log("Start both handshakes")
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
theirControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them")))
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
theirControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them"))
t.Log("Get both stage 1")
myStage1ForThem := myControl.GetFromUDP(true)
@@ -1312,7 +1279,6 @@ func TestRaceRegression(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestV2NonPrimaryWithLighthouse(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
lhControl, lhVpnIpNet, lhUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "lh ", "10.128.0.1/24, ff::1/64", m{"lighthouse": m{"am_lighthouse": true}})
@@ -1353,7 +1319,6 @@ func TestV2NonPrimaryWithLighthouse(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestV2NonPrimaryWithOffNetLighthouse(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
lhControl, lhVpnIpNet, lhUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "lh ", "2001::1/64", m{"lighthouse": m{"am_lighthouse": true}})
@@ -1394,7 +1359,6 @@ func TestV2NonPrimaryWithOffNetLighthouse(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestLighthouseUpdateOnReload(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
// Create the lighthouse
@@ -1470,7 +1434,6 @@ func TestLighthouseUpdateOnReload(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestGoodHandshakeUnsafeDest(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
unsafePrefix := "192.168.6.0/24"
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServerWithUdpAndUnsafeNetworks(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "spooky", "10.128.0.2/24", netip.MustParseAddrPort("10.64.0.2:4242"), unsafePrefix, nil)
@@ -1492,7 +1455,7 @@ func TestGoodHandshakeUnsafeDest(t *testing.T) {
theirControl.Start()
t.Log("Send a udp packet through to begin standing up the tunnel, this should come out the other side")
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(spookyDest, 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(spookyDest, 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
t.Log("Have them consume my stage 0 packet. They have a tunnel now")
theirControl.InjectUDPPacket(myControl.GetFromUDP(true))
@@ -1520,7 +1483,7 @@ func TestGoodHandshakeUnsafeDest(t *testing.T) {
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me"), myCachedPacket, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), spookyDest, 80, 80)
//reply
theirControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, spookyDest, 80, []byte("Hi from the spookyman")))
theirControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, spookyDest, 80, []byte("Hi from the spookyman"))
//wait for reply
theirControl.WaitForType(1, 0, myControl)
theirCachedPacket := myControl.GetFromTun(true)
+6 -59
View File
@@ -4,13 +4,15 @@
package e2e
import (
"log/slog"
"io"
"net/netip"
"os"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"log/slog"
"dario.cat/mergo"
"github.com/google/gopacket"
"github.com/google/gopacket/layers"
@@ -292,12 +294,12 @@ func deadline(t *testing.T, seconds time.Duration) doneCb {
func assertTunnel(t testing.TB, vpnIpA, vpnIpB netip.Addr, controlA, controlB *nebula.Control, r *router.R) {
// Send a packet from them to me
controlB.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(vpnIpA, 80, vpnIpB, 90, []byte("Hi from B")))
controlB.InjectTunUDPPacket(vpnIpA, 80, vpnIpB, 90, []byte("Hi from B"))
bPacket := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(controlA)
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from B"), bPacket, vpnIpB, vpnIpA, 90, 80)
// And once more from me to them
controlA.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(vpnIpB, 80, vpnIpA, 90, []byte("Hello from A")))
controlA.InjectTunUDPPacket(vpnIpB, 80, vpnIpA, 90, []byte("Hello from A"))
aPacket := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(controlB)
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hello from A"), aPacket, vpnIpA, vpnIpB, 90, 80)
}
@@ -380,7 +382,7 @@ func getAddrs(ns []netip.Prefix) []netip.Addr {
func NewTestLogger() *slog.Logger {
v := os.Getenv("TEST_LOGS")
if v == "" {
return slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)
return slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil))
}
level := slog.LevelInfo
@@ -406,58 +408,3 @@ func testLogLevelName() string {
}
return "info"
}
// BuildTunUDPPacket assembles an IP+UDP packet suitable for Control.InjectTunPacket.
// Using UDP here because it's a simpler protocol.
func BuildTunUDPPacket(toAddr netip.Addr, toPort uint16, fromAddr netip.Addr, fromPort uint16, data []byte) []byte {
serialize := make([]gopacket.SerializableLayer, 0)
var netLayer gopacket.NetworkLayer
if toAddr.Is6() {
if !fromAddr.Is6() {
panic("Cant send ipv6 to ipv4")
}
ip := &layers.IPv6{
Version: 6,
NextHeader: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
SrcIP: fromAddr.Unmap().AsSlice(),
DstIP: toAddr.Unmap().AsSlice(),
}
serialize = append(serialize, ip)
netLayer = ip
} else {
if !fromAddr.Is4() {
panic("Cant send ipv4 to ipv6")
}
ip := &layers.IPv4{
Version: 4,
TTL: 64,
Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
SrcIP: fromAddr.Unmap().AsSlice(),
DstIP: toAddr.Unmap().AsSlice(),
}
serialize = append(serialize, ip)
netLayer = ip
}
udp := layers.UDP{
SrcPort: layers.UDPPort(fromPort),
DstPort: layers.UDPPort(toPort),
}
if err := udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(netLayer); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
buffer := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
opt := gopacket.SerializeOptions{
ComputeChecksums: true,
FixLengths: true,
}
serialize = append(serialize, &udp, gopacket.Payload(data))
if err := gopacket.SerializeLayers(buffer, opt, serialize...); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
return buffer.Bytes()
}
-47
View File
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
//go:build e2e_testing
// +build e2e_testing
package e2e
import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/e2e/router"
"go.uber.org/goleak"
)
// TestNoGoroutineLeaks brings up two nebula instances, completes a tunnel,
// stops both, and asserts no goroutines leak past the shutdown. goleak's
// retry mechanism gives the wg.Wait()-driven goroutines a moment to drain
// before failing the assertion.
//
// Intentionally NOT t.Parallel()'d: concurrent tests would have their own
// goroutines running and trip the assertion.
func TestNoGoroutineLeaks(t *testing.T) {
defer goleak.VerifyNone(t)
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me", "10.128.0.1/24", nil)
theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "them", "10.128.0.2/24", nil)
myControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirUdpAddr)
theirControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myUdpAddr)
myControl.Start()
theirControl.Start()
r := router.NewR(t, myControl, theirControl)
assertTunnel(t, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
myControl.Stop()
theirControl.Stop()
r.RenderFlow()
// Settle period: Stop() is non-blocking; the wg-driven goroutines need
// a moment to drain. goleak retries internally too, but a short explicit
// settle reduces flakes when the suite is busy.
time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
}
+54 -188
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import (
"regexp"
"sort"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -25,19 +24,6 @@ import (
"golang.org/x/exp/maps"
)
// outNatKey is the (from, to) pair used by outNat. Comparable struct, so it works as a map key without the
// allocation cost of a string-concat key.
type outNatKey struct {
from, to netip.AddrPort
}
// fannedPacket pairs a UDP TX packet with its source control so the router can route it after popping from
// the fan-in channel.
type fannedPacket struct {
from *nebula.Control
pkt *udp.Packet
}
type R struct {
// Simple map of the ip:port registered on a control to the control
// Basically a router, right?
@@ -48,28 +34,12 @@ type R struct {
// A last used map, if an inbound packet hit the inNat map then
// all return packets should use the same last used inbound address for the outbound sender
outNat map[outNatKey]netip.AddrPort
// map[from address + ":" + to address] => ip:port to rewrite in the udp packet to receiver
outNat map[string]netip.AddrPort
// A map of vpn ip to the nebula control it belongs to
vpnControls map[netip.Addr]*nebula.Control
// Cached select infrastructure for RouteForAllUntilTxTun.
// The controls map is immutable after NewR so the cases are good for the test lifetime.
// We only rebuild if a different receiver is asked.
selRecvCtl *nebula.Control
selCases []reflect.SelectCase
selCtls []*nebula.Control
// Optional fan-in mode for hot-path benchmarks: one forwarder goroutine per control drains UDP TX into udpFanIn,
// so RouteForAllUntilTxTun can do a fixed 2-way native select instead of paying reflect.Select per call.
// Off by default (would otherwise interleave with tests that use GetFromUDP directly on the same control).
// Enabled by EnableFanIn.
udpFanIn chan fannedPacket
stopFanIn chan struct{}
fanInWG sync.WaitGroup
fanInMu sync.Mutex
fanInOn atomic.Bool
ignoreFlows []ignoreFlow
flow []flowEntry
@@ -149,7 +119,7 @@ func NewR(t testing.TB, controls ...*nebula.Control) *R {
controls: make(map[netip.AddrPort]*nebula.Control),
vpnControls: make(map[netip.Addr]*nebula.Control),
inNat: make(map[netip.AddrPort]*nebula.Control),
outNat: make(map[outNatKey]netip.AddrPort),
outNat: make(map[string]netip.AddrPort),
flow: []flowEntry{},
ignoreFlows: []ignoreFlow{},
fn: filepath.Join("mermaid", fmt.Sprintf("%s.md", t.Name())),
@@ -183,10 +153,8 @@ func NewR(t testing.TB, controls ...*nebula.Control) *R {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case <-clockSource.C:
r.Lock()
r.renderHostmaps("clock tick")
r.renderFlow()
r.Unlock()
}
}
}()
@@ -212,21 +180,15 @@ func (r *R) AddRoute(ip netip.Addr, port uint16, c *nebula.Control) {
// RenderFlow renders the packet flow seen up until now and stops further automatic renders from happening.
func (r *R) RenderFlow() {
r.cancelRender()
r.Lock()
defer r.Unlock()
r.renderFlow()
}
// CancelFlowLogs stops flow logs from being tracked and destroys any logs already collected
func (r *R) CancelFlowLogs() {
r.cancelRender()
r.Lock()
r.flow = nil
r.Unlock()
}
// renderFlow writes the flow log to disk. Caller must hold r.Lock. renderFlow reads r.flow / r.additionalGraphs and
// the *packet pointers stashed inside, all of which are mutated under the same lock by routing paths.
func (r *R) renderFlow() {
if r.flow == nil {
return
@@ -472,157 +434,68 @@ func (r *R) RouteUntilTxTun(sender *nebula.Control, receiver *nebula.Control) []
panic("No control for udp tx " + a.String())
}
fp := r.unlockedInjectFlow(sender, c, p, false)
c.InjectUDPPacket(p) // copies internally; original is ours to release
c.InjectUDPPacket(p)
fp.WasReceived()
r.Unlock()
p.Release()
}
}
}
// RouteForAllUntilTxTun will route for everyone and return when a packet is seen on the receiver's tun.
// If a control's UDP TX address can't be matched to a registered control, we panic.
//
// For allocation-sensitive callers (hot-path benchmarks, in particular relay
// benches with 3+ controls), call EnableFanIn() first.
// RouteForAllUntilTxTun will route for everyone and return when a packet is seen on receivers tun
// If the router doesn't have the nebula controller for that address, we panic
func (r *R) RouteForAllUntilTxTun(receiver *nebula.Control) []byte {
if r.fanInOn.Load() {
return r.routeFanIn(receiver)
}
return r.routeReflect(receiver)
}
// routeFanIn is the alloc-free path used when EnableFanIn is in effect.
func (r *R) routeFanIn(receiver *nebula.Control) []byte {
tunTx := receiver.GetTunTxChan()
for {
select {
case p := <-tunTx:
r.Lock()
if r.flow != nil {
np := udp.Packet{Data: make([]byte, len(p))}
copy(np.Data, p)
r.unlockedInjectFlow(receiver, receiver, &np, true)
}
r.Unlock()
return p
case fp := <-r.udpFanIn:
r.routeUDP(fp.from, fp.pkt)
}
}
}
// routeReflect is the default reflect.Select-based path. Pays the boxing allocation per call but doesn't interfere
// with tests that pull packets directly from controls' UDP TX channels via GetFromUDP.
func (r *R) routeReflect(receiver *nebula.Control) []byte {
sc, cm := r.selectCasesFor(receiver)
for {
x, rx, _ := reflect.Select(sc)
if x == 0 {
p := rx.Interface().([]byte)
r.Lock()
if r.flow != nil {
np := udp.Packet{Data: make([]byte, len(p))}
copy(np.Data, p)
r.unlockedInjectFlow(cm[x], cm[x], &np, true)
}
r.Unlock()
return p
}
r.routeUDP(cm[x], rx.Interface().(*udp.Packet))
}
}
// EnableFanIn switches RouteForAllUntilTxTun to the alloc-free fan-in path.
// One forwarder goroutine per registered control drains UDP TX into a shared channel that RouteForAllUntilTxTun selects
// on alongside the receiver's TUN TX channel.
func (r *R) EnableFanIn() {
r.fanInMu.Lock()
defer r.fanInMu.Unlock()
if r.fanInOn.Load() {
return
}
r.udpFanIn = make(chan fannedPacket, 32)
r.stopFanIn = make(chan struct{})
for _, c := range r.controls {
r.startFanInWorker(c)
}
r.fanInOn.Store(true)
r.t.Cleanup(r.stopFanInWorkers)
}
// startFanInWorker spawns a goroutine that drains c's UDP TX into r.udpFanIn.
func (r *R) startFanInWorker(c *nebula.Control) {
r.fanInWG.Add(1)
udpTx := c.GetUDPTxChan()
go func() {
defer r.fanInWG.Done()
for {
select {
case <-r.stopFanIn:
return
case p := <-udpTx:
select {
case <-r.stopFanIn:
p.Release()
return
case r.udpFanIn <- fannedPacket{from: c, pkt: p}:
}
}
}
}()
}
// stopFanInWorkers signals the fan-in goroutines to exit and waits for them.
func (r *R) stopFanInWorkers() {
r.fanInMu.Lock()
wasOn := r.fanInOn.Swap(false)
r.fanInMu.Unlock()
if !wasOn {
return
}
close(r.stopFanIn)
r.fanInWG.Wait()
}
// routeUDP forwards a UDP TX packet from the named source control to the destination control derived from p.To,
// releasing the source packet after InjectUDPPacket has copied its bytes into a fresh pool slot.
func (r *R) routeUDP(from *nebula.Control, p *udp.Packet) {
r.Lock()
defer r.Unlock()
a := from.GetUDPAddr()
c := r.getControl(a, p.To, p)
if c == nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("No control for udp tx %s", p.To))
}
fp := r.unlockedInjectFlow(from, c, p, false)
c.InjectUDPPacket(p) // copies internally; original is ours to release
fp.WasReceived()
p.Release()
}
// selectCasesFor returns the SelectCase array used by routeReflect: one slot for the receiver's TUN TX channel followed
// by one per control's UDP TX channel. Cached for the test lifetime, only rebuilt if the receiver changes.
func (r *R) selectCasesFor(receiver *nebula.Control) ([]reflect.SelectCase, []*nebula.Control) {
r.Lock()
defer r.Unlock()
if r.selRecvCtl == receiver && r.selCases != nil {
return r.selCases, r.selCtls
}
sc := make([]reflect.SelectCase, len(r.controls)+1)
cm := make([]*nebula.Control, len(r.controls)+1)
sc[0] = reflect.SelectCase{Dir: reflect.SelectRecv, Chan: reflect.ValueOf(receiver.GetTunTxChan())}
cm[0] = receiver
i := 1
i := 0
sc[i] = reflect.SelectCase{
Dir: reflect.SelectRecv,
Chan: reflect.ValueOf(receiver.GetTunTxChan()),
Send: reflect.Value{},
}
cm[i] = receiver
i++
for _, c := range r.controls {
sc[i] = reflect.SelectCase{Dir: reflect.SelectRecv, Chan: reflect.ValueOf(c.GetUDPTxChan())}
sc[i] = reflect.SelectCase{
Dir: reflect.SelectRecv,
Chan: reflect.ValueOf(c.GetUDPTxChan()),
Send: reflect.Value{},
}
cm[i] = c
i++
}
r.selRecvCtl = receiver
r.selCases = sc
r.selCtls = cm
return sc, cm
for {
x, rx, _ := reflect.Select(sc)
r.Lock()
if x == 0 {
// we are the tun tx, we can exit
p := rx.Interface().([]byte)
np := udp.Packet{Data: make([]byte, len(p))}
copy(np.Data, p)
r.unlockedInjectFlow(cm[x], cm[x], &np, true)
r.Unlock()
return p
} else {
// we are a udp tx, route and continue
p := rx.Interface().(*udp.Packet)
a := cm[x].GetUDPAddr()
c := r.getControl(a, p.To, p)
if c == nil {
r.Unlock()
panic(fmt.Sprintf("No control for udp tx %s", p.To))
}
fp := r.unlockedInjectFlow(cm[x], c, p, false)
c.InjectUDPPacket(p)
fp.WasReceived()
}
r.Unlock()
}
}
// RouteExitFunc will call the whatDo func with each udp packet from sender.
@@ -649,7 +522,6 @@ func (r *R) RouteExitFunc(sender *nebula.Control, whatDo ExitFunc) {
switch e {
case ExitNow:
r.Unlock()
p.Release()
return
case RouteAndExit:
@@ -657,7 +529,6 @@ func (r *R) RouteExitFunc(sender *nebula.Control, whatDo ExitFunc) {
receiver.InjectUDPPacket(p)
fp.WasReceived()
r.Unlock()
p.Release()
return
case KeepRouting:
@@ -670,7 +541,6 @@ func (r *R) RouteExitFunc(sender *nebula.Control, whatDo ExitFunc) {
}
r.Unlock()
p.Release()
}
}
@@ -771,7 +641,6 @@ func (r *R) RouteForAllExitFunc(whatDo ExitFunc) {
switch e {
case ExitNow:
r.Unlock()
p.Release()
return
case RouteAndExit:
@@ -779,7 +648,6 @@ func (r *R) RouteForAllExitFunc(whatDo ExitFunc) {
receiver.InjectUDPPacket(p)
fp.WasReceived()
r.Unlock()
p.Release()
return
case KeepRouting:
@@ -791,7 +659,6 @@ func (r *R) RouteForAllExitFunc(whatDo ExitFunc) {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("Unknown exitFunc return: %v", e))
}
r.Unlock()
p.Release()
}
}
@@ -835,20 +702,19 @@ func (r *R) FlushAll() {
}
receiver.InjectUDPPacket(p)
r.Unlock()
p.Release()
}
}
// getControl performs or seeds NAT translation and returns the control for toAddr, p from fields may change
// This is an internal router function, the caller must hold the lock
func (r *R) getControl(fromAddr, toAddr netip.AddrPort, p *udp.Packet) *nebula.Control {
if newAddr, ok := r.outNat[outNatKey{from: fromAddr, to: toAddr}]; ok {
if newAddr, ok := r.outNat[fromAddr.String()+":"+toAddr.String()]; ok {
p.From = newAddr
}
c, ok := r.inNat[toAddr]
if ok {
r.outNat[outNatKey{from: c.GetUDPAddr(), to: fromAddr}] = toAddr
r.outNat[c.GetUDPAddr().String()+":"+fromAddr.String()] = toAddr
return c
}
-125
View File
@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
//go:build e2e_testing
// +build e2e_testing
package e2e
import (
"crypto/ed25519"
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/pem"
"net"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
)
func TestSSHDLifecycle(t *testing.T) {
// TestSSHDLifecycle exercises the in-process sshd through several config reloads and a Control.Stop.
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519,
time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute),
nil, nil, []string{},
)
hostKeyPEM := generateSSHHostKey(t)
clientSigner, clientAuthKey := generateSSHClientKey(t)
sshdAddr := allocLoopbackPort(t)
overrides := m{
"sshd": m{
"enabled": true,
"listen": sshdAddr,
"host_key": hostKeyPEM,
"authorized_users": []m{{
"user": "tester",
"keys": []string{clientAuthKey},
}},
},
}
control, _, _, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "sshd-test", "10.222.0.1/24", overrides)
control.Start()
t.Cleanup(func() { control.Stop() })
// sshd binds in a goroutine after Start returns; wait for it.
require.Eventually(t, func() bool { return canDial(sshdAddr) }, 2*time.Second, 25*time.Millisecond,
"sshd never started listening")
for i := 1; i <= 3; i++ {
out := sshExecReload(t, sshdAddr, clientSigner)
assert.Contains(t, out, "Reloading config", "reload cycle %d", i)
require.Eventually(t, func() bool { return canDial(sshdAddr) }, 2*time.Second, 25*time.Millisecond,
"sshd not listening after reload cycle %d", i)
}
control.Stop()
require.Eventually(t, func() bool { return !canDial(sshdAddr) }, 2*time.Second, 25*time.Millisecond,
"sshd still listening after Control.Stop")
}
func canDial(addr string) bool {
c, err := net.DialTimeout("tcp", addr, 100*time.Millisecond)
if err != nil {
return false
}
_ = c.Close()
return true
}
// allocLoopbackPort grabs an unused TCP port on 127.0.0.1, closes it, and returns the address. There
// is a small race between releasing the port and the sshd reclaiming it; in practice the OS keeps the
// port available long enough for the test to bind it.
func allocLoopbackPort(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
l, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
require.NoError(t, err)
addr := l.Addr().String()
require.NoError(t, l.Close())
return addr
}
func generateSSHHostKey(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
_, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
require.NoError(t, err)
block, err := ssh.MarshalPrivateKey(priv, "nebula-e2e-host")
require.NoError(t, err)
return string(pem.EncodeToMemory(block))
}
func generateSSHClientKey(t *testing.T) (ssh.Signer, string) {
t.Helper()
_, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
require.NoError(t, err)
signer, err := ssh.NewSignerFromKey(priv)
require.NoError(t, err)
auth := strings.TrimSpace(string(ssh.MarshalAuthorizedKey(signer.PublicKey())))
return signer, auth
}
func sshExecReload(t *testing.T, addr string, signer ssh.Signer) string {
t.Helper()
cfg := &ssh.ClientConfig{
User: "tester",
Auth: []ssh.AuthMethod{ssh.PublicKeys(signer)},
HostKeyCallback: ssh.InsecureIgnoreHostKey(),
Timeout: 2 * time.Second,
}
client, err := ssh.Dial("tcp", addr, cfg)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer client.Close()
sess, err := client.NewSession()
require.NoError(t, err)
defer sess.Close()
// reload tears the channel down before sending exit-status, so Output returns an error on the
// channel close. The output buffer still has whatever the reload callback wrote before that.
out, _ := sess.Output("reload")
return string(out)
}
+2 -8
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ import (
)
func TestDropInactiveTunnels(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// The goal of this test is to ensure the shortest inactivity timeout will close the tunnel on both sides
// under ideal conditions
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
@@ -64,7 +63,6 @@ func TestDropInactiveTunnels(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestCertUpgrade(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// The goal of this test is to ensure the shortest inactivity timeout will close the tunnel on both sides
// under ideal conditions
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
@@ -159,7 +157,6 @@ func TestCertUpgrade(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestCertDowngrade(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// The goal of this test is to ensure the shortest inactivity timeout will close the tunnel on both sides
// under ideal conditions
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
@@ -258,7 +255,6 @@ func TestCertDowngrade(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestCertMismatchCorrection(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// The goal of this test is to ensure the shortest inactivity timeout will close the tunnel on both sides
// under ideal conditions
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
@@ -326,7 +322,6 @@ func TestCertMismatchCorrection(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestCrossStackRelaysWork(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, _, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "me ", "10.128.0.1/24,fc00::1/64", m{"relay": m{"use_relays": true}})
relayControl, relayVpnIpNet, relayUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "relay ", "10.128.0.128/24,fc00::128/64", m{"relay": m{"am_relay": true}})
@@ -355,14 +350,14 @@ func TestCrossStackRelaysWork(t *testing.T) {
theirControl.Start()
t.Log("Trigger a handshake from me to them via the relay")
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnV6.Addr(), 80, myVpnV6.Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnV6.Addr(), 80, myVpnV6.Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
p := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
r.Log("Assert the tunnel works")
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me"), p, myVpnV6.Addr(), theirVpnV6.Addr(), 80, 80)
t.Log("reply?")
theirControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(myVpnV6.Addr(), 80, theirVpnV6.Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them")))
theirControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(myVpnV6.Addr(), 80, theirVpnV6.Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them"))
p = r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(myControl)
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from them"), p, theirVpnV6.Addr(), myVpnV6.Addr(), 80, 80)
@@ -374,7 +369,6 @@ func TestCrossStackRelaysWork(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestCloseTunnelAuthenticated(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me", "10.128.0.1/24", m{"tunnels": m{"drop_inactive": true, "inactivity_timeout": "5s"}})
theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "them", "10.128.0.2/24", m{"tunnels": m{"drop_inactive": true, "inactivity_timeout": "10m"}})
-124
View File
@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
package nebula
import (
"log/slog"
"testing"
)
func TestInnerECN(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
pkt []byte
want byte
}{
{"empty", nil, 0},
{"v4_NotECT", v4WithToS(0x00), 0x00},
{"v4_ECT0", v4WithToS(0x02), 0x02},
{"v4_ECT1", v4WithToS(0x01), 0x01},
{"v4_CE", v4WithToS(0x03), 0x03},
{"v4_DSCP_then_NotECT", v4WithToS(0x88 | 0x00), 0x00},
{"v4_DSCP_then_CE", v4WithToS(0x88 | 0x03), 0x03},
{"v6_NotECT", v6WithTC(0x00), 0x00},
{"v6_ECT0", v6WithTC(0x02), 0x02},
{"v6_CE", v6WithTC(0x03), 0x03},
{"v6_DSCP_then_CE", v6WithTC(0x88 | 0x03), 0x03},
{"unknown_version", []byte{0xa5, 0xff}, 0},
}
for _, c := range cases {
t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := innerECN(c.pkt)
if got != c.want {
t.Errorf("innerECN=0x%02x want 0x%02x", got, c.want)
}
})
}
}
// v4WithToS returns a 2-byte slice tall enough for innerECN: byte 0 carries
// version=4 in the high nibble, byte 1 is the full ToS so we exercise both
// the DSCP and ECN portions through the byte 1 mask.
func v4WithToS(tos byte) []byte {
return []byte{0x45, tos}
}
// v6WithTC builds a 2-byte slice that places a known traffic class value
// across bytes 0 (high nibble of TC) and 1 (low nibble of TC). innerECN
// extracts ECN as (b[1]>>4)&0x03, which corresponds to TC[1:0].
func v6WithTC(tc byte) []byte {
return []byte{0x60 | (tc>>4)&0x0f, (tc & 0x0f) << 4}
}
func TestApplyOuterECN(t *testing.T) {
silent := slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)
hi := &HostInfo{}
// Build a v4 packet helper with a given inner ECN field.
v4 := func(innerECN byte) []byte {
// 20-byte minimal IPv4 header with ToS = innerECN (DSCP zeroed).
return []byte{
0x45, innerECN, 0, 28,
0, 0, 0x40, 0,
64, 6, 0, 0,
10, 0, 0, 1,
10, 0, 0, 2,
}
}
// Build a v6 packet helper with a given inner ECN field. ECN occupies
// TC[1:0] which sit at byte 1 mask 0x30.
v6 := func(innerECN byte) []byte {
// 40-byte minimal IPv6 header with TC[1:0] = innerECN.
pkt := make([]byte, 40)
pkt[0] = 0x60 // version=6, TC[7:4]=0
pkt[1] = (innerECN & 0x03) << 4 // TC[3:0]: low 2 bits = ECN, top 2 = DSCP-low (0)
return pkt
}
type cell struct {
outer byte
inner byte
wantECN byte
wantSame bool // expect inner unchanged (true => verify the byte didn't move)
}
// RFC 6040 normal-mode combine table. Only outer==CE causes mutation.
table := []cell{
{ecnNotECT, ecnNotECT, ecnNotECT, true},
{ecnNotECT, ecnECT0, ecnECT0, true},
{ecnNotECT, ecnECT1, ecnECT1, true},
{ecnNotECT, ecnCE, ecnCE, true},
{ecnECT0, ecnNotECT, ecnNotECT, true},
{ecnECT0, ecnECT0, ecnECT0, true},
{ecnECT0, ecnECT1, ecnECT1, true},
{ecnECT0, ecnCE, ecnCE, true},
{ecnECT1, ecnNotECT, ecnNotECT, true},
{ecnECT1, ecnECT0, ecnECT0, true},
{ecnECT1, ecnECT1, ecnECT1, true},
{ecnECT1, ecnCE, ecnCE, true},
{ecnCE, ecnNotECT, ecnNotECT, true}, // legacy: log, leave alone
{ecnCE, ecnECT0, ecnCE, false}, // CE folded in
{ecnCE, ecnECT1, ecnCE, false},
{ecnCE, ecnCE, ecnCE, true},
}
for _, c := range table {
t.Run("v4", func(t *testing.T) {
pkt := v4(c.inner)
applyOuterECN(pkt, c.outer, hi, silent)
got := pkt[1] & 0x03
if got != c.wantECN {
t.Errorf("v4 outer=0x%02x inner=0x%02x: got 0x%02x want 0x%02x", c.outer, c.inner, got, c.wantECN)
}
})
t.Run("v6", func(t *testing.T) {
pkt := v6(c.inner)
applyOuterECN(pkt, c.outer, hi, silent)
got := (pkt[1] >> 4) & 0x03
if got != c.wantECN {
t.Errorf("v6 outer=0x%02x inner=0x%02x: got 0x%02x want 0x%02x", c.outer, c.inner, got, c.wantECN)
}
})
}
}
-30
View File
@@ -138,14 +138,6 @@ listen:
# max, net.core.rmem_max and net.core.wmem_max
#read_buffer: 10485760
#write_buffer: 10485760
# On Windows only
# When true, Nebula installs a WFP (Windows Filtering Platform) PERMIT filter scoped to UDP at the listener port.
# WFP sits below Windows Defender Firewall, so this lets peer handshakes reach Nebula's outside socket regardless
# of WDF's inbound rules.
# Default true; set to false to leave WDF in charge of inbound decisions on the listener port. Not reloadable.
#windows_bypass_wdf: true
# By default, Nebula replies to packets it has no tunnel for with a "recv_error" packet. This packet helps speed up reconnection
# in the case that Nebula on either side did not shut down cleanly. This response can be abused as a way to discover if Nebula is running
# on a host though. This option lets you configure if you want to send "recv_error" packets always, never, or only to private network remotes.
@@ -171,21 +163,17 @@ listen:
punchy:
# Continues to punch inbound/outbound at a regular interval to avoid expiration of firewall nat mappings
# This setting is reloadable.
punch: true
# respond means that a node you are trying to reach will connect back out to you if your hole punching fails
# this is extremely useful if one node is behind a difficult nat, such as a symmetric NAT
# Default is false
# This setting is reloadable.
#respond: true
# delays a punch response for misbehaving NATs, default is 1 second.
# This setting is reloadable.
#delay: 1s
# set the delay before attempting punchy.respond. Default is 5 seconds. respond must be true to take effect.
# This setting is reloadable.
#respond_delay: 5s
# Cipher allows you to choose between the available ciphers for your network. Options are chachapoly or aes
@@ -294,24 +282,6 @@ tun:
# metric: 100
# install: true
# On Windows only, sets the network category of the nebula interface. Without this, Windows often
# leaves the network as "Unidentified" and treats it as Public, which makes the host firewall more
# restrictive than you usually want for an overlay between trusted peers. Valid values:
# private - treat the nebula network as a private/trusted network (default)
# public - treat it as a public/untrusted network
# domain - treat it as a domain-authenticated network
# unset - leave whatever Windows decided alone
# Not reloadable.
#network_category: private
# On Windows only
# When true, Nebula installs a WFP (Windows Filtering Platform) PERMIT filter scoped to the nebula adapter LUID.
# WFP sits below Windows Defender Firewall, so this lets inbound traffic through regardless of WDF rules.
# Filters are auto-removed when the adapter goes away.
# See listen.windows_bypass_wdf for the matching control over inbound to nebula's outside UDP listener.
# Default true; set to false to leave WDF in charge of inbound decisions on the nebula interface. Not reloadable.
#windows_bypass_wdf: true
# On linux only, set to true to manage unsafe routes directly on the system route table with gateway routes instead of
# in nebula configuration files. Default false, not reloadable.
#use_system_route_table: false
+2 -4
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@ import (
"log/slog"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/logging"
)
// ConntrackCache is used as a local routine cache to know if a given flow
@@ -58,8 +56,8 @@ func (c *ConntrackCacheTicker) Get() ConntrackCache {
if tick := c.cacheTick.Load(); tick != c.cacheV {
c.cacheV = tick
if ll := len(c.cache); ll > 0 {
if c.l.Enabled(context.Background(), logging.LevelTrace) {
c.l.Log(context.Background(), logging.LevelTrace, "resetting conntrack cache", "len", ll)
if c.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
c.l.Debug("resetting conntrack cache", "len", ll)
}
c.cache = make(ConntrackCache, ll)
}
+7 -8
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/logging"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
)
@@ -31,27 +30,27 @@ func newFixedTicker(t *testing.T, l *slog.Logger, cacheLen int) *ConntrackCacheT
func TestConntrackCacheTicker_Get_TextFormat(t *testing.T) {
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
l := test.NewLoggerWithOutputAndLevel(buf, logging.LevelTrace)
l := test.NewLoggerWithOutputAndLevel(buf, slog.LevelDebug)
c := newFixedTicker(t, l, 3)
c.Get()
assert.Equal(t, "level=DEBUG-4 msg=\"resetting conntrack cache\" len=3\n", buf.String())
assert.Equal(t, "level=DEBUG msg=\"resetting conntrack cache\" len=3\n", buf.String())
}
func TestConntrackCacheTicker_Get_JSONFormat(t *testing.T) {
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
l := test.NewJSONLoggerWithOutput(buf, logging.LevelTrace)
l := test.NewJSONLoggerWithOutput(buf, slog.LevelDebug)
c := newFixedTicker(t, l, 2)
c.Get()
assert.JSONEq(t, `{"level":"DEBUG-4","msg":"resetting conntrack cache","len":2}`, strings.TrimSpace(buf.String()))
assert.JSONEq(t, `{"level":"DEBUG","msg":"resetting conntrack cache","len":2}`, strings.TrimSpace(buf.String()))
}
func TestConntrackCacheTicker_Get_QuietBelowTrace(t *testing.T) {
func TestConntrackCacheTicker_Get_QuietBelowDebug(t *testing.T) {
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
l := test.NewLoggerWithOutputAndLevel(buf, slog.LevelDebug)
l := test.NewLoggerWithOutputAndLevel(buf, slog.LevelInfo)
c := newFixedTicker(t, l, 5)
c.Get()
@@ -61,7 +60,7 @@ func TestConntrackCacheTicker_Get_QuietBelowTrace(t *testing.T) {
func TestConntrackCacheTicker_Get_QuietWhenCacheEmpty(t *testing.T) {
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
l := test.NewLoggerWithOutputAndLevel(buf, logging.LevelTrace)
l := test.NewLoggerWithOutputAndLevel(buf, slog.LevelDebug)
c := newFixedTicker(t, l, 0)
c.Get()
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1033,7 +1033,7 @@ func TestNewFirewallFromConfig(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
// Test a bad rule definition
c := &dummyCert{}
cs, err := newCertState(cert.Version2, nil, c, false, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, nil, "aes")
cs, err := newCertState(cert.Version2, nil, c, false, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
conf := config.NewC(test.NewLogger())
+2 -3
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ require (
github.com/armon/go-radix v1.0.0
github.com/cyberdelia/go-metrics-graphite v0.0.0-20161219230853-39f87cc3b432
github.com/flynn/noise v1.1.0
github.com/gaissmai/bart v0.26.1
github.com/gaissmai/bart v0.26.0
github.com/gogo/protobuf v1.3.2
github.com/google/gopacket v1.1.19
github.com/kardianos/service v1.2.4
@@ -22,11 +22,10 @@ require (
github.com/stefanberger/go-pkcs11uri v0.0.0-20230803200340-78284954bff6
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1
github.com/vishvananda/netlink v1.3.1
go.uber.org/goleak v1.3.0
go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.4
golang.org/x/crypto v0.50.0
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20230725093048-515e97ebf090
golang.org/x/net v0.53.0
golang.org/x/net v0.52.0
golang.org/x/sync v0.20.0
golang.org/x/sys v0.43.0
golang.org/x/term v0.42.0
+4 -4
View File
@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1 h1:vj9j/u1bqnvCEfJOwUhtlOARqs3+rkHYY13jYWTU97c
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38=
github.com/flynn/noise v1.1.0 h1:KjPQoQCEFdZDiP03phOvGi11+SVVhBG2wOWAorLsstg=
github.com/flynn/noise v1.1.0/go.mod h1:xbMo+0i6+IGbYdJhF31t2eR1BIU0CYc12+BNAKwUTag=
github.com/gaissmai/bart v0.26.1 h1:+w4rnLGNlA2GDVn382Tfe3jOsK5vOr5n4KmigJ9lbTo=
github.com/gaissmai/bart v0.26.1/go.mod h1:GREWQfTLRWz/c5FTOsIw+KkscuFkIV5t8Rp7Nd1Td5c=
github.com/gaissmai/bart v0.26.0 h1:xOZ57E9hJLBiQaSyeZa9wgWhGuzfGACgqp4BE77OkO0=
github.com/gaissmai/bart v0.26.0/go.mod h1:GREWQfTLRWz/c5FTOsIw+KkscuFkIV5t8Rp7Nd1Td5c=
github.com/go-kit/kit v0.8.0/go.mod h1:xBxKIO96dXMWWy0MnWVtmwkA9/13aqxPnvrjFYMA2as=
github.com/go-kit/kit v0.9.0/go.mod h1:xBxKIO96dXMWWy0MnWVtmwkA9/13aqxPnvrjFYMA2as=
github.com/go-kit/log v0.1.0/go.mod h1:zbhenjAZHb184qTLMA9ZjW7ThYL0H2mk7Q6pNt4vbaY=
@@ -182,8 +182,8 @@ golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20200226121028-0de0cce0169b/go.mod h1:z5CRVTTTmAJ677TzLL
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20200625001655-4c5254603344/go.mod h1:/O7V0waA8r7cgGh81Ro3o1hOxt32SMVPicZroKQ2sZA=
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20201021035429-f5854403a974/go.mod h1:sp8m0HH+o8qH0wwXwYZr8TS3Oi6o0r6Gce1SSxlDquU=
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20210226172049-e18ecbb05110/go.mod h1:m0MpNAwzfU5UDzcl9v0D8zg8gWTRqZa9RBIspLL5mdg=
golang.org/x/net v0.53.0 h1:d+qAbo5L0orcWAr0a9JweQpjXF19LMXJE8Ey7hwOdUA=
golang.org/x/net v0.53.0/go.mod h1:JvMuJH7rrdiCfbeHoo3fCQU24Lf5JJwT9W3sJFulfgs=
golang.org/x/net v0.52.0 h1:He/TN1l0e4mmR3QqHMT2Xab3Aj3L9qjbhRm78/6jrW0=
golang.org/x/net v0.52.0/go.mod h1:R1MAz7uMZxVMualyPXb+VaqGSa3LIaUqk0eEt3w36Sw=
golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.0.0-20190226205417-e64efc72b421/go.mod h1:gOpvHmFTYa4IltrdGE7lF6nIHvwfUNPOp7c8zoXwtLw=
golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20181108010431-42b317875d0f/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20181221193216-37e7f081c4d4/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
-57
View File
@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
package handshake
import (
"crypto/rand"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
)
// Credential holds everything needed to participate in a handshake
// at a given cert version. Version and Curve are read from Cert; the public
// half of the static keypair likewise comes from Cert.PublicKey().
type Credential struct {
Cert cert.Certificate // the certificate
Bytes []byte // pre-marshaled certificate bytes
privateKey []byte // static private key (public half lives in Cert)
cipherSuite noise.CipherSuite // pre-built cipher suite (DH + cipher + hash)
}
// NewCredential creates a Credential with all material needed for handshake
// participation. The cipherSuite should be pre-built by the caller with the
// appropriate DH function, cipher, and hash.
func NewCredential(
c cert.Certificate,
hsBytes []byte,
privateKey []byte,
cipherSuite noise.CipherSuite,
) *Credential {
return &Credential{
Cert: c,
Bytes: hsBytes,
privateKey: privateKey,
cipherSuite: cipherSuite,
}
}
// buildHandshakeState creates a noise.HandshakeState from this credential.
func (hc *Credential) buildHandshakeState(initiator bool, pattern noise.HandshakePattern) (*noise.HandshakeState, error) {
return noise.NewHandshakeState(noise.Config{
CipherSuite: hc.cipherSuite,
Random: rand.Reader,
Pattern: pattern,
Initiator: initiator,
StaticKeypair: noise.DHKey{Private: hc.privateKey, Public: hc.Cert.PublicKey()},
PresharedKey: []byte{},
PresharedKeyPlacement: 0,
})
}
// GetCredentialFunc returns the handshake credential for the given version,
// or nil if that version is not available.
//
// Implementations must return credentials drawn from a snapshot stable for
// the lifetime of any single Machine. The Machine may call this multiple
// times during a handshake (e.g. when negotiating to the peer's version)
// and assumes the underlying static keypair is consistent across calls.
type GetCredentialFunc func(v cert.Version) *Credential
-21
View File
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
package handshake
import "errors"
var (
ErrInitiateOnResponder = errors.New("initiate called on responder")
ErrInitiateAlreadyCalled = errors.New("initiate already called")
ErrInitiateNotCalled = errors.New("initiate must be called before ProcessPacket for initiators")
ErrPacketTooShort = errors.New("packet too short")
ErrPublicKeyMismatch = errors.New("public key mismatch between certificate and handshake")
ErrIncompleteHandshake = errors.New("handshake completed without receiving required content")
ErrMachineFailed = errors.New("handshake machine has failed")
ErrUnknownSubtype = errors.New("unknown handshake subtype")
ErrMissingContent = errors.New("expected handshake content but message was empty")
ErrUnexpectedContent = errors.New("received unexpected handshake content")
ErrIndexAllocation = errors.New("failed to allocate local index")
ErrNoCredential = errors.New("no handshake credential available for cert version")
ErrAsymmetricCipherKeys = errors.New("noise produced only one cipher key")
ErrMultiMessageUnsupported = errors.New("multi-message handshake patterns are not yet supported by the manager")
ErrSubtypeMismatch = errors.New("packet subtype does not match handshake machine subtype")
)
-29
View File
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
// This file documents the wire format the nebula handshake speaks. It is
// not run through protoc; the encoder/decoder in payload.go is hand-written
// against this shape directly to keep the parser narrow and panic-free.
//
// Any change to the wire format must be reflected here, and adding a new
// field requires updating MarshalPayload / unmarshalPayloadDetails together
// with the field-uniqueness and wire-type checks in those functions.
syntax = "proto3";
package nebula.handshake;
message NebulaHandshake {
NebulaHandshakeDetails Details = 1;
bytes Hmac = 2;
}
message NebulaHandshakeDetails {
bytes Cert = 1;
uint32 InitiatorIndex = 2;
uint32 ResponderIndex = 3;
// Cookie was reserved for an anti-DoS mechanism that was never
// implemented. No released version of nebula has ever populated it; the
// hand-written parser silently skips it on read.
uint64 Cookie = 4 [deprecated = true];
uint64 Time = 5;
uint32 CertVersion = 8;
// reserved for WIP multiport
reserved 6, 7;
}
-116
View File
@@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
package handshake
import (
"net/netip"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
ct "github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// testCertState holds cert material for a test peer.
type testCertState struct {
version cert.Version
creds map[cert.Version]*Credential
}
func (s *testCertState) getCredential(v cert.Version) *Credential {
return s.creds[v]
}
func newTestCertState(
t *testing.T, ca cert.Certificate, caKey []byte, name string, networks []netip.Prefix,
) *testCertState {
return newTestCertStateWithCipher(t, ca, caKey, name, networks, noise.CipherChaChaPoly)
}
func newTestCertStateWithCipher(
t *testing.T, ca cert.Certificate, caKey []byte, name string, networks []netip.Prefix,
cipher noise.CipherFunc,
) *testCertState {
t.Helper()
c, _, rawPrivKey, _ := ct.NewTestCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, ca, caKey,
name, ca.NotBefore(), ca.NotAfter(), networks, nil, nil,
)
priv, _, _, err := cert.UnmarshalPrivateKeyFromPEM(rawPrivKey)
require.NoError(t, err)
hsBytes, err := c.MarshalForHandshakes()
require.NoError(t, err)
ncs := noise.NewCipherSuite(noise.DH25519, cipher, noise.HashSHA256)
return &testCertState{
version: cert.Version2,
creds: map[cert.Version]*Credential{
cert.Version2: NewCredential(c, hsBytes, priv, ncs),
},
}
}
func testVerifier(pool *cert.CAPool) CertVerifier {
return func(c cert.Certificate) (*cert.CachedCertificate, error) {
return pool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), c)
}
}
func newTestMachine(
t *testing.T,
cs *testCertState,
verifier CertVerifier,
initiator bool,
localIndex uint32,
) *Machine {
t.Helper()
m, err := NewMachine(
cs.version, cs.getCredential,
verifier, func() (uint32, error) { return localIndex, nil },
initiator, header.HandshakeIXPSK0,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
return m
}
func initiateHandshake(
t *testing.T,
initCS *testCertState, initVerifier CertVerifier,
respCS *testCertState, respVerifier CertVerifier,
) (initM, respM *Machine, respResult *Result, resp []byte, err error) {
t.Helper()
initM = newTestMachine(t, initCS, initVerifier, true, 100)
msg1, merr := initM.Initiate(nil)
require.NoError(t, merr)
respM = newTestMachine(t, respCS, respVerifier, false, 200)
resp, respResult, err = respM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg1)
return
}
func doFullHandshake(
t *testing.T, initCS, respCS *testCertState, caPool *cert.CAPool,
) (initResult, respResult *Result) {
t.Helper()
v := testVerifier(caPool)
initM := newTestMachine(t, initCS, v, true, 1000)
respM := newTestMachine(t, respCS, v, false, 2000)
msg1, err := initM.Initiate(nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
resp, respResult, err := respM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg1)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, respResult)
require.NotEmpty(t, resp)
_, initResult, err = initM.ProcessPacket(nil, resp)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, initResult)
return initResult, respResult
}
-446
View File
@@ -1,446 +0,0 @@
package handshake
import (
"bytes"
"fmt"
"slices"
"time"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
)
// IndexAllocator is called by the Machine to allocate a local index for the
// handshake. It is called at most once, when the first outgoing message that
// carries a payload is built.
//
// Implementations MUST NOT return 0. Zero is reserved as a sentinel meaning
// "no index assigned" on the wire and in the payload-presence checks. If an
// allocator ever returned 0, a legitimate handshake's payload could be
// indistinguishable from an empty one and would be rejected.
type IndexAllocator func() (uint32, error)
// CertVerifier is called by the Machine after reconstructing the peer's
// certificate from the handshake. The verifier performs all validation
// (CA trust, expiry, policy checks, allow lists).
type CertVerifier func(cert.Certificate) (*cert.CachedCertificate, error)
// Result contains the results of a successful handshake.
// Returned by ProcessPacket when the handshake is complete.
type Result struct {
EKey *noise.CipherState
DKey *noise.CipherState
Cipher noise.CipherFunc // identifies which post-handshake CipherState the data plane should wrap EKey/DKey in
MyCert cert.Certificate
RemoteCert *cert.CachedCertificate
RemoteIndex uint32
LocalIndex uint32
HandshakeTime uint64
MessageIndex uint64 // number of messages exchanged during the handshake
Initiator bool
}
// Machine drives a Noise handshake through N messages. It handles Noise
// protocol operations, certificate reconstruction, and payload encoding.
// Certificate validation is delegated to the caller via CertVerifier.
//
// A Machine is not safe for concurrent use. The caller must ensure that
// Initiate and ProcessPacket are not called concurrently.
//
// Error contract: when ProcessPacket or Initiate returns an error, callers
// must check Failed() to decide what to do next. If Failed() is false the
// underlying noise state was not advanced (the packet was rejected before
// ReadMessage took effect, or the rejection is non-fatal like a stale
// retransmit) and the Machine can accept another packet. If Failed() is
// true the Machine is unrecoverable and the caller must abandon it.
type Machine struct {
hs *noise.HandshakeState
getCred GetCredentialFunc
allocIndex IndexAllocator
verifier CertVerifier
result *Result
msgs []msgFlags
myVersion cert.Version
subtype header.MessageSubType
indexAllocated bool
remoteCertSet bool
payloadSet bool
failed bool
}
// NewMachine creates a handshake state machine. The subtype determines both
// the noise pattern and the per-message content layout. The credential for
// `version` is fetched via getCred and used to seed the noise.HandshakeState.
// IndexAllocator is called lazily when the first outgoing payload is built.
func NewMachine(
version cert.Version,
getCred GetCredentialFunc,
verifier CertVerifier,
allocIndex IndexAllocator,
initiator bool,
subtype header.MessageSubType,
) (*Machine, error) {
info, err := subtypeInfoFor(subtype)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
cred := getCred(version)
if cred == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrNoCredential, version)
}
hs, err := cred.buildHandshakeState(initiator, info.pattern)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("build noise state: %w", err)
}
return &Machine{
hs: hs,
subtype: subtype,
msgs: info.msgs,
getCred: getCred,
allocIndex: allocIndex,
verifier: verifier,
myVersion: version,
result: &Result{
Initiator: initiator,
Cipher: cred.cipherSuite,
},
}, nil
}
// Failed returns true if the Machine is in an unrecoverable state.
func (m *Machine) Failed() bool {
return m.failed
}
// Subtype returns the handshake subtype this Machine was built for.
func (m *Machine) Subtype() header.MessageSubType {
return m.subtype
}
// MessageIndex returns the noise handshake message index, which equals the
// wire counter of the most recently sent or received message.
func (m *Machine) MessageIndex() int {
return m.hs.MessageIndex()
}
// requireComplete checks that both a peer cert and payload have been received.
// Marks the machine as failed if not.
func (m *Machine) requireComplete() error {
if !m.payloadSet || !m.remoteCertSet {
m.failed = true
return ErrIncompleteHandshake
}
return nil
}
// myMsgFlags returns the flags for the current outgoing message.
func (m *Machine) myMsgFlags() msgFlags {
idx := m.hs.MessageIndex()
if idx < len(m.msgs) {
return m.msgs[idx]
}
return msgFlags{}
}
// peerMsgFlags returns the flags for the message we just read.
func (m *Machine) peerMsgFlags() msgFlags {
idx := m.hs.MessageIndex() - 1
if idx >= 0 && idx < len(m.msgs) {
return m.msgs[idx]
}
return msgFlags{}
}
// Initiate produces the first handshake message. Only valid for initiators,
// and must be called exactly once before ProcessPacket.
//
// out is a destination buffer the message is appended to and returned. Pass
// nil to allocate fresh, or pass a re-used buffer sliced to length 0 (e.g.
// buf[:0]) with sufficient capacity to avoid allocation.
//
// An error return may not indicate a fatal condition, check Failed() to
// determine if the Machine can still be used.
func (m *Machine) Initiate(out []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if m.failed {
return nil, ErrMachineFailed
}
if !m.result.Initiator {
m.failed = true
return nil, ErrInitiateOnResponder
}
if m.hs.MessageIndex() != 0 {
m.failed = true
return nil, ErrInitiateAlreadyCalled
}
// At MessageIndex=0 with RemoteIndex still zero, buildResponse produces
// header counter 1 and remote index 0, which is what the initial message needs.
out, _, _, err := m.buildResponse(out)
if err != nil {
m.failed = true
return nil, err
}
return out, nil
}
// ProcessPacket handles an incoming handshake message. It advances the Noise
// state, validates the peer certificate via the verifier, and optionally
// produces a response.
//
// out is a destination buffer the response is appended to and returned. Pass
// nil to allocate fresh, or pass a re-used buffer sliced to length 0 (e.g.
// buf[:0]) with sufficient capacity to avoid allocation. The returned slice
// is nil when no outgoing message is produced (handshake complete on this
// side, or final message of a multi-message pattern).
//
// Returns a non-nil Result when the handshake is complete.
// An error return may not indicate a fatal condition, check Failed() to
// determine if the Machine can still be used.
func (m *Machine) ProcessPacket(out, packet []byte) ([]byte, *Result, error) {
if m.failed {
return nil, nil, ErrMachineFailed
}
if len(packet) < header.Len {
return nil, nil, ErrPacketTooShort
}
// Reject packets whose subtype doesn't match the one this Machine was
// built for. A pending handshake that suddenly receives a different
// subtype on its index is either a stray packet that matched by chance
// or a peer protocol violation; drop it without failing the Machine so
// the legitimate retransmit can still complete.
if header.MessageSubType(packet[1]) != m.subtype {
return nil, nil, ErrSubtypeMismatch
}
if m.result.Initiator && m.hs.MessageIndex() == 0 {
m.failed = true
return nil, nil, ErrInitiateNotCalled
}
// The (eKey, dKey) ordering here is correct for IX, where the initiator
// completes the handshake by reading the responder's stage-2 message.
// noise returns (cs1, cs2) where cs1 is the initiator->responder cipher.
// For 3-message patterns where a responder finishes by reading the final
// message, this ordering would be wrong; revisit when XX/pqIX lands.
msg, eKey, dKey, err := m.hs.ReadMessage(nil, packet[header.Len:])
if err != nil {
// Noise ReadMessage failed. The noise library checkpoints and rolls back
// on failure, so the Machine is still alive. The caller can retry with
// a different packet.
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("noise ReadMessage: %w", err)
}
// From here on, noise state has advanced. Any error is fatal.
flags := m.peerMsgFlags()
if err := m.processPayload(msg, flags); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
// If ReadMessage derived keys, the handshake is complete. Noise should
// always produce both keys together; asymmetry is a protocol invariant
// violation.
if eKey != nil || dKey != nil {
if eKey == nil || dKey == nil {
m.failed = true
return nil, nil, ErrAsymmetricCipherKeys
}
if err := m.requireComplete(); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
return nil, m.completed(eKey, dKey), nil
}
// ReadMessage didn't complete, produce the next outgoing message
out, dk, ek, err := m.buildResponse(out)
if err != nil {
m.failed = true
return nil, nil, err
}
if ek != nil || dk != nil {
if ek == nil || dk == nil {
m.failed = true
return nil, nil, ErrAsymmetricCipherKeys
}
if err := m.requireComplete(); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
return out, m.completed(ek, dk), nil
}
return out, nil, nil
}
func (m *Machine) completed(eKey, dKey *noise.CipherState) *Result {
m.result.EKey = eKey
m.result.DKey = dKey
m.result.MessageIndex = uint64(m.hs.MessageIndex())
return m.result
}
func (m *Machine) processPayload(msg []byte, flags msgFlags) error {
if len(msg) == 0 {
if flags.expectsPayload || flags.expectsCert {
m.failed = true
return ErrMissingContent
}
return nil
}
payload, err := UnmarshalPayload(msg)
if err != nil {
m.failed = true
return fmt.Errorf("unmarshal handshake: %w", err)
}
// Assert the payload contains exactly what we expect
hasPayloadData := payload.InitiatorIndex != 0 || payload.ResponderIndex != 0 || payload.Time != 0
if hasPayloadData != flags.expectsPayload {
m.failed = true
return ErrUnexpectedContent
}
hasCertData := len(payload.Cert) > 0
if hasCertData != flags.expectsCert {
m.failed = true
return ErrUnexpectedContent
}
// Process payload
if flags.expectsPayload {
if m.result.Initiator {
m.result.RemoteIndex = payload.ResponderIndex
} else {
m.result.RemoteIndex = payload.InitiatorIndex
}
m.result.HandshakeTime = payload.Time
m.payloadSet = true
}
// Process certificate
if flags.expectsCert {
if err := m.validateCert(payload); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
func (m *Machine) validateCert(payload Payload) error {
cred := m.getCred(m.myVersion)
if cred == nil {
m.failed = true
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrNoCredential, m.myVersion)
}
rc, err := cert.Recombine(
cert.Version(payload.CertVersion),
payload.Cert,
m.hs.PeerStatic(),
cred.Cert.Curve(),
)
if err != nil {
m.failed = true
return fmt.Errorf("recombine cert: %w", err)
}
if !bytes.Equal(rc.PublicKey(), m.hs.PeerStatic()) {
m.failed = true
return ErrPublicKeyMismatch
}
// Version negotiation, if the peer sent a different version and we have it, switch
if rc.Version() != m.myVersion {
if m.getCred(rc.Version()) != nil {
m.myVersion = rc.Version()
}
}
verified, err := m.verifier(rc)
if err != nil {
m.failed = true
return fmt.Errorf("verify cert: %w", err)
}
m.result.RemoteCert = verified
m.remoteCertSet = true
return nil
}
func (m *Machine) marshalOutgoing(flags msgFlags) ([]byte, error) {
if !flags.expectsPayload && !flags.expectsCert {
return nil, nil
}
var p Payload
if flags.expectsPayload {
if !m.indexAllocated {
index, err := m.allocIndex()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", ErrIndexAllocation, err)
}
m.result.LocalIndex = index
m.indexAllocated = true
}
if m.result.Initiator {
p.InitiatorIndex = m.result.LocalIndex
} else {
p.ResponderIndex = m.result.LocalIndex
p.InitiatorIndex = m.result.RemoteIndex
}
p.Time = uint64(time.Now().UnixNano())
}
if flags.expectsCert {
cred := m.getCred(m.myVersion)
if cred == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrNoCredential, m.myVersion)
}
p.Cert = cred.Bytes
p.CertVersion = uint32(cred.Cert.Version())
m.result.MyCert = cred.Cert
}
return MarshalPayload(nil, p), nil
}
func (m *Machine) buildResponse(out []byte) ([]byte, *noise.CipherState, *noise.CipherState, error) {
flags := m.myMsgFlags()
hsBytes, err := m.marshalOutgoing(flags)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, nil, err
}
// Extend out by header.Len to make room for the header. slices.Grow is a
// no-op when the cap is already sufficient (the zero-copy case where the
// caller passed a pre-sized buffer). header.Encode overwrites the new
// bytes, so they don't need to be zeroed.
start := len(out)
out = slices.Grow(out, header.Len)[:start+header.Len]
header.Encode(
out[start:],
header.Version, header.Handshake, m.subtype,
m.result.RemoteIndex,
uint64(m.hs.MessageIndex()+1),
)
// noise.WriteMessage appends the encrypted handshake message to out,
// reusing capacity when present.
//
// The (dKey, eKey) ordering here is correct for IX, where the responder
// completes the handshake by writing the stage-2 message. noise returns
// (cs1, cs2) where cs1 is the initiator->responder cipher (which is the
// responder's decrypt key). For 3-message patterns where an initiator
// finishes by writing the final message, this ordering would be wrong;
// revisit when XX/pqIX lands.
out, dKey, eKey, err := m.hs.WriteMessage(out, hsBytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("noise WriteMessage: %w", err)
}
return out, dKey, eKey, nil
}
-662
View File
@@ -1,662 +0,0 @@
package handshake
import (
"net/netip"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
ct "github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/noiseutil"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestMachineIXHappyPath(t *testing.T) {
ca, _, caKey, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
caPool := ct.NewTestCAPool(ca)
initCS := newTestCertState(t, ca, caKey, "initiator", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")})
respCS := newTestCertState(t, ca, caKey, "responder", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.2/24")})
initR, respR := doFullHandshake(t, initCS, respCS, caPool)
assert.Equal(t, "responder", initR.RemoteCert.Certificate.Name())
assert.Equal(t, "initiator", respR.RemoteCert.Certificate.Name())
assert.Equal(t, uint32(1000), initR.LocalIndex)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(2000), initR.RemoteIndex)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(2000), respR.LocalIndex)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(1000), respR.RemoteIndex)
assert.Equal(t, uint64(2), initR.MessageIndex, "IX has 2 messages")
assert.Equal(t, uint64(2), respR.MessageIndex, "IX has 2 messages")
ct1, err := initR.EKey.Encrypt(nil, nil, []byte("hello"))
require.NoError(t, err)
pt1, err := respR.DKey.Decrypt(nil, nil, ct1)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, []byte("hello"), pt1)
ct2, err := respR.EKey.Encrypt(nil, nil, []byte("world"))
require.NoError(t, err)
pt2, err := initR.DKey.Decrypt(nil, nil, ct2)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, []byte("world"), pt2)
}
func TestMachineInitiateErrors(t *testing.T) {
ca, _, caKey, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
caPool := ct.NewTestCAPool(ca)
cs := newTestCertState(t, ca, caKey, "test", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")})
v := testVerifier(caPool)
t.Run("initiate on responder", func(t *testing.T) {
m := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, false, 100)
_, err := m.Initiate(nil)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInitiateOnResponder)
assert.True(t, m.Failed())
})
t.Run("initiate called twice", func(t *testing.T) {
m := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, true, 100)
_, err := m.Initiate(nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
_, err = m.Initiate(nil)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInitiateAlreadyCalled)
assert.True(t, m.Failed())
})
t.Run("process packet before initiate on initiator", func(t *testing.T) {
m := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, true, 100)
_, _, err := m.ProcessPacket(nil, make([]byte, 100))
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInitiateNotCalled)
assert.True(t, m.Failed())
})
t.Run("calling failed machine", func(t *testing.T) {
m := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, false, 100)
_, err := m.Initiate(nil) // fails: responder
require.Error(t, err)
_, err = m.Initiate(nil) // fails: already failed
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrMachineFailed)
})
}
func TestMachineProcessPacketErrors(t *testing.T) {
ca, _, caKey, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
caPool := ct.NewTestCAPool(ca)
cs := newTestCertState(t, ca, caKey, "test", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")})
v := testVerifier(caPool)
t.Run("packet too short", func(t *testing.T) {
m := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, false, 100)
_, _, err := m.ProcessPacket(nil, []byte{1, 2, 3})
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrPacketTooShort)
assert.False(t, m.Failed(), "short packet should not kill machine")
})
t.Run("noise decryption failure is recoverable", func(t *testing.T) {
initCS := newTestCertState(t, ca, caKey, "init", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")})
initM := newTestMachine(t, initCS, v, true, 100)
msg1, err := initM.Initiate(nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
respM := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, false, 200)
resp, _, err := respM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg1)
require.NoError(t, err)
corrupted := make([]byte, len(resp))
copy(corrupted, resp)
for i := header.Len; i < len(corrupted); i++ {
corrupted[i] ^= 0xff
}
_, _, err = initM.ProcessPacket(nil, corrupted)
require.Error(t, err)
assert.False(t, initM.Failed(), "noise failure should be recoverable")
// And the machine should still complete a real handshake afterward.
_, result, err := initM.ProcessPacket(nil, resp)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, result, "initiator should complete on the legitimate response")
})
t.Run("invalid cert is fatal", func(t *testing.T) {
otherCA, _, otherCAKey, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
otherCS := newTestCertState(t, otherCA, otherCAKey, "other", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.2/24")})
initM := newTestMachine(t, otherCS, testVerifier(ct.NewTestCAPool(otherCA)), true, 100)
msg1, err := initM.Initiate(nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
respM := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, false, 200)
_, _, err = respM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg1)
require.Error(t, err)
assert.True(t, respM.Failed(), "cert validation failure should kill machine")
})
t.Run("subtype mismatch is recoverable", func(t *testing.T) {
initCS := newTestCertState(t, ca, caKey, "init", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")})
initM := newTestMachine(t, initCS, v, true, 100)
msg1, err := initM.Initiate(nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Mutate the subtype byte (offset 1 in the header) to a value the
// responder Machine wasn't built for.
bad := make([]byte, len(msg1))
copy(bad, msg1)
bad[1] = 0xff
respM := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, false, 200)
_, _, err = respM.ProcessPacket(nil, bad)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrSubtypeMismatch)
assert.False(t, respM.Failed(), "subtype mismatch should not kill the machine")
// And the machine should still complete a real handshake afterward.
resp, result, err := respM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg1)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, result, "responder should complete on the legitimate stage-1 packet")
assert.NotEmpty(t, resp, "responder should produce a stage-2 reply")
})
}
// TestMachineProcessPayload exercises processPayload's internal validation
// directly. Most of these failure modes can't be reached black-box once the
// subtype check at the top of ProcessPacket gates external callers, so we
// drive them by hand here for coverage.
func TestMachineProcessPayload(t *testing.T) {
ca, _, caKey, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
caPool := ct.NewTestCAPool(ca)
cs := newTestCertState(t, ca, caKey, "test", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")})
v := testVerifier(caPool)
t.Run("empty message with expects fails", func(t *testing.T) {
m := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, false, 100)
err := m.processPayload(nil, msgFlags{expectsPayload: true, expectsCert: true})
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrMissingContent)
assert.True(t, m.Failed())
})
t.Run("empty message with no expects passes", func(t *testing.T) {
m := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, false, 100)
err := m.processPayload(nil, msgFlags{})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, m.Failed())
})
t.Run("malformed protobuf is fatal", func(t *testing.T) {
m := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, false, 100)
err := m.processPayload([]byte{0xff, 0xff, 0xff}, msgFlags{expectsPayload: true, expectsCert: true})
require.Error(t, err)
assert.True(t, m.Failed())
})
t.Run("unexpected payload data is fatal", func(t *testing.T) {
m := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, false, 100)
// A payload with index data when none was expected.
bytes := MarshalPayload(nil, Payload{InitiatorIndex: 42, Time: 1})
err := m.processPayload(bytes, msgFlags{expectsPayload: false, expectsCert: false})
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrUnexpectedContent)
assert.True(t, m.Failed())
})
t.Run("unexpected cert data is fatal", func(t *testing.T) {
m := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, false, 100)
// A payload with cert when none was expected.
bytes := MarshalPayload(nil, Payload{Cert: []byte{1, 2, 3}, CertVersion: 2})
err := m.processPayload(bytes, msgFlags{expectsPayload: false, expectsCert: false})
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrUnexpectedContent)
assert.True(t, m.Failed())
})
t.Run("missing payload data when expected is fatal", func(t *testing.T) {
m := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, false, 100)
// Cert present, but no index/time fields.
bytes := MarshalPayload(nil, Payload{Cert: []byte{1, 2, 3}, CertVersion: 2})
err := m.processPayload(bytes, msgFlags{expectsPayload: true, expectsCert: true})
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrUnexpectedContent)
assert.True(t, m.Failed())
})
}
// TestMachineRequireComplete checks the fail-on-incomplete-handshake path
// directly. Like processPayload above this isn't reachable from a normal IX
// flow, so we drive it by hand.
func TestMachineRequireComplete(t *testing.T) {
ca, _, caKey, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
caPool := ct.NewTestCAPool(ca)
cs := newTestCertState(t, ca, caKey, "test", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")})
v := testVerifier(caPool)
t.Run("missing both fails", func(t *testing.T) {
m := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, false, 100)
err := m.requireComplete()
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIncompleteHandshake)
assert.True(t, m.Failed())
})
t.Run("payload only fails", func(t *testing.T) {
m := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, false, 100)
m.payloadSet = true
err := m.requireComplete()
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIncompleteHandshake)
assert.True(t, m.Failed())
})
t.Run("cert only fails", func(t *testing.T) {
m := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, false, 100)
m.remoteCertSet = true
err := m.requireComplete()
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIncompleteHandshake)
assert.True(t, m.Failed())
})
t.Run("both set passes", func(t *testing.T) {
m := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, false, 100)
m.payloadSet = true
m.remoteCertSet = true
err := m.requireComplete()
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, m.Failed())
})
}
func TestMachineAESCipher(t *testing.T) {
ca, _, caKey, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
caPool := ct.NewTestCAPool(ca)
initCS := newTestCertStateWithCipher(
t, ca, caKey, "init",
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")},
noiseutil.CipherAESGCM,
)
respCS := newTestCertStateWithCipher(
t, ca, caKey, "resp",
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.2/24")},
noiseutil.CipherAESGCM,
)
initR, respR := doFullHandshake(t, initCS, respCS, caPool)
ct1, err := initR.EKey.Encrypt(nil, nil, []byte("works"))
require.NoError(t, err)
pt1, err := respR.DKey.Decrypt(nil, nil, ct1)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, []byte("works"), pt1)
ct2, err := respR.EKey.Encrypt(nil, nil, []byte("back"))
require.NoError(t, err)
pt2, err := initR.DKey.Decrypt(nil, nil, ct2)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, []byte("back"), pt2)
}
func TestResultFields(t *testing.T) {
ca, _, caKey, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
caPool := ct.NewTestCAPool(ca)
initCS := newTestCertState(t, ca, caKey, "init", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")})
respCS := newTestCertState(t, ca, caKey, "resp", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.2/24")})
initR, respR := doFullHandshake(t, initCS, respCS, caPool)
assert.True(t, initR.Initiator)
assert.False(t, respR.Initiator)
assert.NotZero(t, initR.HandshakeTime)
assert.NotZero(t, respR.HandshakeTime)
assert.NotNil(t, initR.RemoteCert)
assert.NotNil(t, respR.RemoteCert)
}
func TestMachineBufferReuse(t *testing.T) {
ca, _, caKey, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
caPool := ct.NewTestCAPool(ca)
initCS := newTestCertState(t, ca, caKey, "init", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")})
respCS := newTestCertState(t, ca, caKey, "resp", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.2/24")})
v := testVerifier(caPool)
initM := newTestMachine(t, initCS, v, true, 1000)
respM := newTestMachine(t, respCS, v, false, 2000)
msg1, err := initM.Initiate(nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Run("response writes into provided buffer", func(t *testing.T) {
buf := make([]byte, 0, 4096)
resp, result, err := respM.ProcessPacket(buf, msg1)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, result)
assert.NotEmpty(t, resp, "response should have content")
assert.Equal(t, &buf[:1][0], &resp[:1][0],
"response should reuse the provided buffer's backing array")
})
t.Run("initiate writes into provided buffer", func(t *testing.T) {
initM2 := newTestMachine(t, initCS, v, true, 3000)
buf := make([]byte, 0, 4096)
msg, err := initM2.Initiate(buf)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotEmpty(t, msg, "initiate should have content")
assert.Equal(t, &buf[:1][0], &msg[:1][0],
"initiate should reuse the provided buffer's backing array")
})
t.Run("nil out still works", func(t *testing.T) {
initM2 := newTestMachine(t, initCS, v, true, 4000)
respM2 := newTestMachine(t, respCS, v, false, 5000)
msg1, err := initM2.Initiate(nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
resp, _, err := respM2.ProcessPacket(nil, msg1)
require.NoError(t, err)
out, result, err := initM2.ProcessPacket(nil, resp)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotNil(t, result)
assert.Nil(t, out, "initiator should have no response for IX msg2")
})
}
func TestMachineMsgIndexTracking(t *testing.T) {
ca, _, caKey, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
caPool := ct.NewTestCAPool(ca)
initCS := newTestCertState(t, ca, caKey, "init", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")})
respCS := newTestCertState(t, ca, caKey, "resp", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.2/24")})
v := testVerifier(caPool)
initM := newTestMachine(t, initCS, v, true, 100)
respM := newTestMachine(t, respCS, v, false, 200)
msg1, err := initM.Initiate(nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
resp1, result1, err := respM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg1)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotNil(t, result1)
_, result2, err := initM.ProcessPacket(nil, resp1)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotNil(t, result2)
}
func TestMachineThreeMessagePattern(t *testing.T) {
registerTestXXInfo(t)
// Use HandshakeXX (3 messages) to verify the Machine handles multi-message
// patterns correctly. XX flow:
// msg1 (I->R): [E] - payload only, no cert
// msg2 (R->I): [E, ee, S, es] - payload + cert
// msg3 (I->R): [S, se] - cert only (no payload, not first two)
ca, _, caKey, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
caPool := ct.NewTestCAPool(ca)
v := testVerifier(caPool)
initCS := newTestCertState(t, ca, caKey, "init", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")})
respCS := newTestCertState(t, ca, caKey, "resp", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.2/24")})
initM, err := NewMachine(
cert.Version2,
initCS.getCredential, v,
func() (uint32, error) { return 1000, nil },
true, header.HandshakeXXPSK0,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
respM, err := NewMachine(
cert.Version2,
respCS.getCredential, v,
func() (uint32, error) { return 2000, nil },
false, header.HandshakeXXPSK0,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
// msg1: initiator -> responder (E only, no cert)
msg1, err := initM.Initiate(nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotEmpty(t, msg1)
// Responder processes msg1, should not complete yet, should produce msg2
msg2, result, err := respM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg1)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Nil(t, result, "XX should not complete on msg1")
assert.NotEmpty(t, msg2, "responder should produce msg2")
// Initiator processes msg2: gets responder's cert, produces msg3, and
// completes (WriteMessage for msg3 derives keys)
msg3, initResult, err := initM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg2)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, initResult, "XX initiator should complete after reading msg2 and writing msg3")
assert.NotEmpty(t, msg3, "initiator should produce msg3")
assert.Equal(t, "resp", initResult.RemoteCert.Certificate.Name())
// Responder processes msg3: gets initiator's cert and completes
_, respResult, err := respM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg3)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, respResult, "XX responder should complete on msg3")
assert.Equal(t, "init", respResult.RemoteCert.Certificate.Name())
assert.Equal(t, uint64(3), initResult.MessageIndex, "XX has 3 messages")
assert.Equal(t, uint64(3), respResult.MessageIndex, "XX has 3 messages")
// Verify keys work
ct1, err := initResult.EKey.Encrypt(nil, nil, []byte("three messages"))
require.NoError(t, err)
pt1, err := respResult.DKey.Decrypt(nil, nil, ct1)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, []byte("three messages"), pt1)
}
// NOTE: ErrIncompleteHandshake is tested implicitly. It can't be triggered with
// IX since the cert is always in the payload. A 3-message pattern test (HybridIX)
// should exercise the case where cert arrives in msg3 and verify that completing
// without it fails.
func TestMachineExpiredCert(t *testing.T) {
ca, _, caKey, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519,
time.Now().Add(-24*time.Hour), time.Now().Add(24*time.Hour),
nil, nil, nil,
)
caPool := ct.NewTestCAPool(ca)
expCert, _, expKeyPEM, _ := ct.NewTestCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, ca, caKey,
"expired", time.Now().Add(-2*time.Hour), time.Now().Add(-1*time.Hour),
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")}, nil, nil,
)
expKey, _, _, err := cert.UnmarshalPrivateKeyFromPEM(expKeyPEM)
require.NoError(t, err)
expHsBytes, err := expCert.MarshalForHandshakes()
require.NoError(t, err)
ncs := noise.NewCipherSuite(noise.DH25519, noise.CipherChaChaPoly, noise.HashSHA256)
expiredCS := &testCertState{
version: cert.Version2,
creds: map[cert.Version]*Credential{
cert.Version2: NewCredential(expCert, expHsBytes, expKey, ncs),
},
}
respCS := newTestCertState(
t, ca, caKey, "responder",
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.2/24")},
)
_, respM, _, _, err := initiateHandshake(
t, expiredCS, testVerifier(caPool),
respCS, testVerifier(caPool),
)
require.ErrorContains(t, err, "verify cert")
assert.True(t, respM.Failed())
}
func TestMachineNoCertNetworks(t *testing.T) {
ca, _, caKey, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
caPool := ct.NewTestCAPool(ca)
caHsBytes, err := ca.MarshalForHandshakes()
require.NoError(t, err)
ncs := noise.NewCipherSuite(noise.DH25519, noise.CipherChaChaPoly, noise.HashSHA256)
noNetCS := &testCertState{
version: cert.Version2,
creds: map[cert.Version]*Credential{
cert.Version2: NewCredential(ca, caHsBytes, caKey, ncs),
},
}
respCS := newTestCertState(
t, ca, caKey, "responder",
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.2/24")},
)
_, respM, _, _, err := initiateHandshake(
t, noNetCS, testVerifier(caPool),
respCS, testVerifier(caPool),
)
require.Error(t, err)
assert.True(t, respM.Failed())
}
func TestMachineDifferentCAs(t *testing.T) {
ca1, _, caKey1, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
ca2, _, caKey2, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
initCS := newTestCertState(
t, ca1, caKey1, "init",
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")},
)
respCS := newTestCertState(
t, ca2, caKey2, "resp",
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.2/24")},
)
_, respM, _, _, err := initiateHandshake(
t, initCS, testVerifier(ct.NewTestCAPool(ca1)),
respCS, testVerifier(ct.NewTestCAPool(ca2)),
)
require.ErrorContains(t, err, "verify cert")
assert.True(t, respM.Failed())
}
func TestMachineVersionNegotiation(t *testing.T) {
ca1, _, caKey1, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
ca2, _, caKey2, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
caPool := ct.NewTestCAPool(ca1, ca2)
makeMultiVersionResp := func(t *testing.T) *testCertState {
t.Helper()
respCertV1, _, respKeyPEM, _ := ct.NewTestCert(
cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, ca1, caKey1, "resp",
ca1.NotBefore(), ca1.NotAfter(),
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.2/24")}, nil, nil,
)
respKey, _, _, _ := cert.UnmarshalPrivateKeyFromPEM(respKeyPEM)
respCertV2, _ := ct.NewTestCertDifferentVersion(respCertV1, cert.Version2, ca2, caKey2)
respHsV1, _ := respCertV1.MarshalForHandshakes()
respHsV2, _ := respCertV2.MarshalForHandshakes()
ncs := noise.NewCipherSuite(noise.DH25519, noise.CipherChaChaPoly, noise.HashSHA256)
return &testCertState{
version: cert.Version1,
creds: map[cert.Version]*Credential{
cert.Version1: NewCredential(respCertV1, respHsV1, respKey, ncs),
cert.Version2: NewCredential(respCertV2, respHsV2, respKey, ncs),
},
}
}
t.Run("responder matches initiator version", func(t *testing.T) {
initCS := newTestCertState(
t, ca2, caKey2, "init",
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")},
)
respCS := makeMultiVersionResp(t)
v := testVerifier(caPool)
initM, _, respResult, resp, err := initiateHandshake(
t, initCS, v,
respCS, v,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, respResult)
assert.Equal(t, cert.Version2, respResult.MyCert.Version(),
"responder should negotiate to initiator's version")
_, initResult, err := initM.ProcessPacket(nil, resp)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, initResult)
assert.Equal(t, cert.Version2, initResult.RemoteCert.Certificate.Version(),
"initiator should see V2 cert from responder")
})
t.Run("responder keeps version when no match available", func(t *testing.T) {
initCS := newTestCertState(
t, ca2, caKey2, "init",
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")},
)
respCert, _, respKeyPEM, _ := ct.NewTestCert(
cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, ca1, caKey1, "resp",
ca1.NotBefore(), ca1.NotAfter(),
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.2/24")}, nil, nil,
)
respKey, _, _, _ := cert.UnmarshalPrivateKeyFromPEM(respKeyPEM)
respHs, _ := respCert.MarshalForHandshakes()
ncs := noise.NewCipherSuite(noise.DH25519, noise.CipherChaChaPoly, noise.HashSHA256)
respCS := &testCertState{
version: cert.Version1,
creds: map[cert.Version]*Credential{
cert.Version1: NewCredential(respCert, respHs, respKey, ncs),
},
}
v := testVerifier(caPool)
_, _, respResult, _, err := initiateHandshake(
t, initCS, v,
respCS, v,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, respResult)
assert.Equal(t, cert.Version1, respResult.MyCert.Version(),
"responder should keep V1 when V2 not available")
})
}
-54
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@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
package handshake
import (
"fmt"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
)
// msgFlags tracks what application data a handshake message carries.
type msgFlags struct {
expectsPayload bool // message carries indexes and time
expectsCert bool // message carries the certificate
}
// subtypeInfo bundles the noise pattern with the per-message flags for a
// given handshake subtype.
type subtypeInfo struct {
pattern noise.HandshakePattern
msgs []msgFlags
}
// subtypeInfos defines the noise pattern and message content layout for each
// handshake subtype.
var subtypeInfos = map[header.MessageSubType]subtypeInfo{
// IX: 2 messages, both carry payload and cert
header.HandshakeIXPSK0: {
pattern: noise.HandshakeIX,
msgs: []msgFlags{
{expectsPayload: true, expectsCert: true},
{expectsPayload: true, expectsCert: true},
},
},
// XX: 3 messages
// msg1 (I->R): payload only
// msg2 (R->I): payload + cert
// msg3 (I->R): cert only
//header.HandshakeXXPSK0: {
// pattern: noise.HandshakeXX,
// msgs: []msgFlags{
// {expectsPayload: true, expectsCert: false},
// {expectsPayload: true, expectsCert: true},
// {expectsPayload: false, expectsCert: true},
// },
//},
}
func subtypeInfoFor(subtype header.MessageSubType) (subtypeInfo, error) {
if info, ok := subtypeInfos[subtype]; ok {
return info, nil
}
return subtypeInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: %d", ErrUnknownSubtype, subtype)
}
-63
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@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
package handshake
import (
"testing"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestSubtypeInfo(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("IX", func(t *testing.T) {
info, err := subtypeInfoFor(header.HandshakeIXPSK0)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, noise.HandshakeIX.Name, info.pattern.Name)
require.Len(t, info.msgs, 2)
// msg1: payload + cert
assert.True(t, info.msgs[0].expectsPayload)
assert.True(t, info.msgs[0].expectsCert)
// msg2: payload + cert
assert.True(t, info.msgs[1].expectsPayload)
assert.True(t, info.msgs[1].expectsCert)
})
t.Run("XX", func(t *testing.T) {
registerTestXXInfo(t)
info, err := subtypeInfoFor(header.HandshakeXXPSK0)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, noise.HandshakeXX.Name, info.pattern.Name)
require.Len(t, info.msgs, 3)
// msg1: payload only
assert.True(t, info.msgs[0].expectsPayload)
assert.False(t, info.msgs[0].expectsCert)
// msg2: payload + cert
assert.True(t, info.msgs[1].expectsPayload)
assert.True(t, info.msgs[1].expectsCert)
// msg3: cert only
assert.False(t, info.msgs[2].expectsPayload)
assert.True(t, info.msgs[2].expectsCert)
})
t.Run("unknown subtype returns error", func(t *testing.T) {
_, err := subtypeInfoFor(99)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrUnknownSubtype)
})
}
// registerTestXXInfo temporarily registers XX subtype info for testing.
func registerTestXXInfo(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
subtypeInfos[header.HandshakeXXPSK0] = subtypeInfo{
pattern: noise.HandshakeXX,
msgs: []msgFlags{
{expectsPayload: true, expectsCert: false},
{expectsPayload: true, expectsCert: true},
{expectsPayload: false, expectsCert: true},
},
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
delete(subtypeInfos, header.HandshakeXXPSK0)
})
}
-173
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@@ -1,173 +0,0 @@
package handshake
import (
"errors"
"math"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/encoding/protowire"
)
var (
errInvalidHandshakeMessage = errors.New("invalid handshake message")
errInvalidHandshakeDetails = errors.New("invalid handshake details")
)
// Payload represents the decoded fields of a handshake message.
// Wire format is protobuf-compatible with NebulaHandshake{Details: NebulaHandshakeDetails{...}}.
type Payload struct {
Cert []byte
InitiatorIndex uint32
ResponderIndex uint32
Time uint64
CertVersion uint32
}
// Proto field numbers for NebulaHandshakeDetails
const (
fieldCert = 1 // bytes
fieldInitiatorIndex = 2 // uint32
fieldResponderIndex = 3 // uint32
fieldTime = 5 // uint64
fieldCertVersion = 8 // uint32
)
// MarshalPayload encodes a handshake payload in protobuf wire format compatible
// with NebulaHandshake{Details: NebulaHandshakeDetails{...}}.
// Returns out (which may be nil), with the marshalled Payload appended to it.
func MarshalPayload(out []byte, p Payload) []byte {
var details []byte
if len(p.Cert) > 0 {
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldCert, protowire.BytesType)
details = protowire.AppendBytes(details, p.Cert)
}
if p.InitiatorIndex != 0 {
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldInitiatorIndex, protowire.VarintType)
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, uint64(p.InitiatorIndex))
}
if p.ResponderIndex != 0 {
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldResponderIndex, protowire.VarintType)
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, uint64(p.ResponderIndex))
}
if p.Time != 0 {
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldTime, protowire.VarintType)
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, p.Time)
}
if p.CertVersion != 0 {
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldCertVersion, protowire.VarintType)
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, uint64(p.CertVersion))
}
out = protowire.AppendTag(out, 1, protowire.BytesType)
out = protowire.AppendBytes(out, details)
return out
}
// UnmarshalPayload decodes a protobuf-encoded NebulaHandshake message.
func UnmarshalPayload(b []byte) (Payload, error) {
var p Payload
for len(b) > 0 {
num, typ, n := protowire.ConsumeTag(b)
if n < 0 {
return p, errInvalidHandshakeMessage
}
b = b[n:]
switch {
case num == 1 && typ == protowire.BytesType:
details, n := protowire.ConsumeBytes(b)
if n < 0 {
return p, errInvalidHandshakeMessage
}
b = b[n:]
if err := unmarshalPayloadDetails(&p, details); err != nil {
return p, err
}
default:
n := protowire.ConsumeFieldValue(num, typ, b)
if n < 0 {
return p, errInvalidHandshakeMessage
}
b = b[n:]
}
}
return p, nil
}
func unmarshalPayloadDetails(p *Payload, b []byte) error {
for len(b) > 0 {
num, typ, n := protowire.ConsumeTag(b)
if n < 0 {
return errInvalidHandshakeDetails
}
b = b[n:]
// For known field numbers, reject any non-matching wire type as a
// hard error rather than silently skipping. The caller will catch
// missing-field cases downstream, but a wire-type mismatch on a tag
// we know is a peer protocol violation worth flagging here.
// Repeated occurrences of a singular field follow proto3 last-wins.
switch num {
case fieldCert:
if typ != protowire.BytesType {
return errInvalidHandshakeDetails
}
v, n := protowire.ConsumeBytes(b)
if n < 0 {
return errInvalidHandshakeDetails
}
p.Cert = append([]byte(nil), v...)
b = b[n:]
case fieldInitiatorIndex:
if typ != protowire.VarintType {
return errInvalidHandshakeDetails
}
v, n := protowire.ConsumeVarint(b)
if n < 0 || v > math.MaxUint32 {
return errInvalidHandshakeDetails
}
p.InitiatorIndex = uint32(v)
b = b[n:]
case fieldResponderIndex:
if typ != protowire.VarintType {
return errInvalidHandshakeDetails
}
v, n := protowire.ConsumeVarint(b)
if n < 0 || v > math.MaxUint32 {
return errInvalidHandshakeDetails
}
p.ResponderIndex = uint32(v)
b = b[n:]
case fieldTime:
if typ != protowire.VarintType {
return errInvalidHandshakeDetails
}
v, n := protowire.ConsumeVarint(b)
if n < 0 {
return errInvalidHandshakeDetails
}
p.Time = v
b = b[n:]
case fieldCertVersion:
if typ != protowire.VarintType {
return errInvalidHandshakeDetails
}
v, n := protowire.ConsumeVarint(b)
if n < 0 || v > math.MaxUint32 {
return errInvalidHandshakeDetails
}
p.CertVersion = uint32(v)
b = b[n:]
default:
n := protowire.ConsumeFieldValue(num, typ, b)
if n < 0 {
return errInvalidHandshakeDetails
}
b = b[n:]
}
}
return nil
}
-361
View File
@@ -1,361 +0,0 @@
package handshake
import (
"bytes"
"math"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/encoding/protowire"
)
func TestPayloadRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("all fields set", func(t *testing.T) {
data := MarshalPayload(nil, Payload{
Cert: []byte("test-cert-bytes"),
CertVersion: 2,
InitiatorIndex: 12345,
ResponderIndex: 67890,
Time: 1234567890,
})
got, err := UnmarshalPayload(data)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, []byte("test-cert-bytes"), got.Cert)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(12345), got.InitiatorIndex)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(67890), got.ResponderIndex)
assert.Equal(t, uint64(1234567890), got.Time)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(2), got.CertVersion)
})
t.Run("minimal fields", func(t *testing.T) {
data := MarshalPayload(nil, Payload{InitiatorIndex: 1})
got, err := UnmarshalPayload(data)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(1), got.InitiatorIndex)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(0), got.ResponderIndex)
assert.Equal(t, uint64(0), got.Time)
assert.Nil(t, got.Cert)
})
t.Run("empty payload", func(t *testing.T) {
data := MarshalPayload(nil, Payload{})
got, err := UnmarshalPayload(data)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(0), got.InitiatorIndex)
})
t.Run("large cert bytes", func(t *testing.T) {
bigCert := make([]byte, 4096)
for i := range bigCert {
bigCert[i] = byte(i % 256)
}
data := MarshalPayload(nil, Payload{
Cert: bigCert,
CertVersion: 2,
InitiatorIndex: 999,
})
got, err := UnmarshalPayload(data)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, bigCert, got.Cert)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(999), got.InitiatorIndex)
})
t.Run("append to existing buffer", func(t *testing.T) {
prefix := []byte("prefix")
data := MarshalPayload(prefix, Payload{InitiatorIndex: 42})
assert.Equal(t, []byte("prefix"), data[:6])
got, err := UnmarshalPayload(data[6:])
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(42), got.InitiatorIndex)
})
}
func TestPayloadUnknownFields(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("unknown field in outer message is skipped", func(t *testing.T) {
// Marshal a normal payload then append an unknown field (field 99, varint)
data := MarshalPayload(nil, Payload{InitiatorIndex: 42})
data = protowire.AppendTag(data, 99, protowire.VarintType)
data = protowire.AppendVarint(data, 12345)
got, err := UnmarshalPayload(data)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(42), got.InitiatorIndex)
})
t.Run("unknown field in details is skipped", func(t *testing.T) {
// Build details with a known field + unknown field
var details []byte
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldInitiatorIndex, protowire.VarintType)
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, 77)
// Unknown field 50, varint
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, 50, protowire.VarintType)
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, 9999)
// Another known field after the unknown one
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldResponderIndex, protowire.VarintType)
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, 88)
// Wrap in outer message
var data []byte
data = protowire.AppendTag(data, 1, protowire.BytesType)
data = protowire.AppendBytes(data, details)
got, err := UnmarshalPayload(data)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(77), got.InitiatorIndex)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(88), got.ResponderIndex)
})
t.Run("reserved fields 6 and 7 are skipped", func(t *testing.T) {
// Fields 6 and 7 are reserved in the proto definition
var details []byte
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldInitiatorIndex, protowire.VarintType)
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, 100)
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, 6, protowire.VarintType)
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, 1)
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, 7, protowire.VarintType)
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, 2)
var data []byte
data = protowire.AppendTag(data, 1, protowire.BytesType)
data = protowire.AppendBytes(data, details)
got, err := UnmarshalPayload(data)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(100), got.InitiatorIndex)
})
}
func TestPayloadBytesConsumed(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("all bytes consumed on valid input", func(t *testing.T) {
original := Payload{
Cert: []byte("cert"),
CertVersion: 2,
InitiatorIndex: 100,
ResponderIndex: 200,
Time: 999,
}
data := MarshalPayload(nil, original)
got, err := UnmarshalPayload(data)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Re-marshal and compare — proves we consumed and reproduced all fields
remarshaled := MarshalPayload(nil, got)
assert.Equal(t, data, remarshaled)
})
}
// wrapDetails wraps raw detail bytes in the outer NebulaHandshake envelope
// so UnmarshalPayload can reach unmarshalPayloadDetails.
func wrapDetails(details []byte) []byte {
var out []byte
out = protowire.AppendTag(out, 1, protowire.BytesType)
out = protowire.AppendBytes(out, details)
return out
}
func TestPayloadUnmarshalErrors(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("nil input", func(t *testing.T) {
got, err := UnmarshalPayload(nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(0), got.InitiatorIndex)
})
t.Run("truncated outer tag", func(t *testing.T) {
_, err := UnmarshalPayload([]byte{0x80})
assert.Error(t, err)
})
t.Run("truncated outer details field", func(t *testing.T) {
_, err := UnmarshalPayload([]byte{0x0a, 0x64, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05})
assert.Error(t, err)
})
t.Run("truncated outer unknown field", func(t *testing.T) {
// Valid tag for unknown field 99 varint, but no value follows
var data []byte
data = protowire.AppendTag(data, 99, protowire.VarintType)
_, err := UnmarshalPayload(data)
assert.Error(t, err)
})
t.Run("truncated details tag", func(t *testing.T) {
_, err := UnmarshalPayload(wrapDetails([]byte{0x80}))
assert.Error(t, err)
})
t.Run("truncated cert bytes", func(t *testing.T) {
// Field 1 (cert), bytes type, length 10 but only 2 bytes
var details []byte
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldCert, protowire.BytesType)
details = append(details, 0x0a, 0x01, 0x02) // length 10, only 2 bytes
_, err := UnmarshalPayload(wrapDetails(details))
assert.Error(t, err)
})
t.Run("truncated initiator index varint", func(t *testing.T) {
var details []byte
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldInitiatorIndex, protowire.VarintType)
details = append(details, 0x80) // incomplete varint
_, err := UnmarshalPayload(wrapDetails(details))
assert.Error(t, err)
})
t.Run("truncated responder index varint", func(t *testing.T) {
var details []byte
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldResponderIndex, protowire.VarintType)
details = append(details, 0x80)
_, err := UnmarshalPayload(wrapDetails(details))
assert.Error(t, err)
})
t.Run("truncated time varint", func(t *testing.T) {
var details []byte
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldTime, protowire.VarintType)
details = append(details, 0x80)
_, err := UnmarshalPayload(wrapDetails(details))
assert.Error(t, err)
})
t.Run("truncated cert version varint", func(t *testing.T) {
var details []byte
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldCertVersion, protowire.VarintType)
details = append(details, 0x80)
_, err := UnmarshalPayload(wrapDetails(details))
assert.Error(t, err)
})
t.Run("truncated unknown field in details", func(t *testing.T) {
var details []byte
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, 50, protowire.VarintType)
details = append(details, 0x80) // incomplete varint
_, err := UnmarshalPayload(wrapDetails(details))
assert.Error(t, err)
})
t.Run("cert with wrong wire type rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
// fieldCert as Varint instead of Bytes.
var details []byte
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldCert, protowire.VarintType)
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, 42)
_, err := UnmarshalPayload(wrapDetails(details))
assert.Error(t, err)
})
t.Run("initiator index with wrong wire type rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
// fieldInitiatorIndex as Bytes instead of Varint.
var details []byte
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldInitiatorIndex, protowire.BytesType)
details = protowire.AppendBytes(details, []byte{1, 2, 3})
_, err := UnmarshalPayload(wrapDetails(details))
assert.Error(t, err)
})
t.Run("time with wrong wire type rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
var details []byte
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldTime, protowire.BytesType)
details = protowire.AppendBytes(details, []byte{1, 2, 3})
_, err := UnmarshalPayload(wrapDetails(details))
assert.Error(t, err)
})
t.Run("cert version with wrong wire type rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
var details []byte
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldCertVersion, protowire.BytesType)
details = protowire.AppendBytes(details, []byte{1, 2, 3})
_, err := UnmarshalPayload(wrapDetails(details))
assert.Error(t, err)
})
t.Run("repeated singular field follows proto3 last-wins", func(t *testing.T) {
// Per proto3, multiple instances of a singular field are accepted and
// the last value wins. We keep this behavior so that peers using
// alternative encoders aren't rejected.
var details []byte
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldInitiatorIndex, protowire.VarintType)
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, 1)
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldInitiatorIndex, protowire.VarintType)
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, 42)
got, err := UnmarshalPayload(wrapDetails(details))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(42), got.InitiatorIndex)
})
t.Run("initiator index varint overflow rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
var details []byte
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldInitiatorIndex, protowire.VarintType)
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, math.MaxUint32+1)
_, err := UnmarshalPayload(wrapDetails(details))
assert.Error(t, err)
})
t.Run("cert version varint overflow rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
var details []byte
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldCertVersion, protowire.VarintType)
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, math.MaxUint32+1)
_, err := UnmarshalPayload(wrapDetails(details))
assert.Error(t, err)
})
}
// FuzzPayload feeds arbitrary bytes through UnmarshalPayload to confirm it
// never panics, and for any input that parses cleanly, that re-marshal +
// re-parse is a fix-point. Inputs come from an authenticated peer (post-
// noise-decrypt), so the threat model is "valid peer behaving arbitrarily,"
// not "unauthenticated injection."
func FuzzPayload(f *testing.F) {
// Seed corpus with a handful of known-good shapes.
f.Add(MarshalPayload(nil, Payload{}))
f.Add(MarshalPayload(nil, Payload{Cert: []byte{1, 2, 3}, CertVersion: 2}))
f.Add(MarshalPayload(nil, Payload{InitiatorIndex: 42, Time: 1}))
f.Add(MarshalPayload(nil, Payload{
Cert: []byte("seed-cert"),
InitiatorIndex: 1,
ResponderIndex: 2,
Time: 3,
CertVersion: 2,
}))
f.Add([]byte{})
f.Add([]byte{0xff})
f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, data []byte) {
p1, err := UnmarshalPayload(data)
if err != nil {
return
}
// For any input that parses, re-marshaling and re-parsing must
// yield an equivalent Payload. This catches dispatch bugs (e.g.
// emitting a field on marshal that we don't accept on parse) and
// any non-idempotent parsing behavior.
b2 := MarshalPayload(nil, p1)
p2, err := UnmarshalPayload(b2)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("re-parse of self-marshaled payload failed: %v\nintermediate: %x\n", err, b2)
}
if !payloadsEqual(p1, p2) {
t.Fatalf("re-marshal not idempotent\nfirst: %+v\nsecond: %+v", p1, p2)
}
})
}
func payloadsEqual(a, b Payload) bool {
return bytes.Equal(a.Cert, b.Cert) &&
a.InitiatorIndex == b.InitiatorIndex &&
a.ResponderIndex == b.ResponderIndex &&
a.Time == b.Time &&
a.CertVersion == b.CertVersion
}
+813
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,813 @@
package nebula
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"log/slog"
"net/netip"
"time"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
)
// NOISE IX Handshakes
// This function constructs a handshake packet, but does not actually send it
// Sending is done by the handshake manager
func ixHandshakeStage0(f *Interface, hh *HandshakeHostInfo) bool {
err := f.handshakeManager.allocateIndex(hh)
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to generate index",
"error", err,
"vpnAddrs", hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"handshake", m{"stage": 0, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
return false
}
cs := f.pki.getCertState()
v := cs.initiatingVersion
if hh.initiatingVersionOverride != cert.VersionPre1 {
v = hh.initiatingVersionOverride
} else if v < cert.Version2 {
// If we're connecting to a v6 address we should encourage use of a V2 cert
for _, a := range hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs {
if a.Is6() {
v = cert.Version2
break
}
}
}
crt := cs.getCertificate(v)
if crt == nil {
f.l.Error("Unable to handshake with host because no certificate is available",
"vpnAddrs", hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"handshake", m{"stage": 0, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"certVersion", v,
)
return false
}
crtHs := cs.getHandshakeBytes(v)
if crtHs == nil {
f.l.Error("Unable to handshake with host because no certificate handshake bytes is available",
"vpnAddrs", hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"handshake", m{"stage": 0, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"certVersion", v,
)
return false
}
ci, err := NewConnectionState(cs, crt, true, noise.HandshakeIX)
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to create connection state",
"error", err,
"vpnAddrs", hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"handshake", m{"stage": 0, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"certVersion", v,
)
return false
}
hh.hostinfo.ConnectionState = ci
hs := &NebulaHandshake{
Details: &NebulaHandshakeDetails{
InitiatorIndex: hh.hostinfo.localIndexId,
Time: uint64(time.Now().UnixNano()),
Cert: crtHs,
CertVersion: uint32(v),
},
}
hsBytes, err := hs.Marshal()
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to marshal handshake message",
"error", err,
"vpnAddrs", hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"certVersion", v,
"handshake", m{"stage": 0, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
return false
}
h := header.Encode(make([]byte, header.Len), header.Version, header.Handshake, header.HandshakeIXPSK0, 0, 1)
msg, _, _, err := ci.H.WriteMessage(h, hsBytes)
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to call noise.WriteMessage",
"error", err,
"vpnAddrs", hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"handshake", m{"stage": 0, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
return false
}
// We are sending handshake packet 1, so we don't expect to receive
// handshake packet 1 from the responder
ci.window.Update(f.l, 1)
hh.hostinfo.HandshakePacket[0] = msg
hh.ready = true
return true
}
func ixHandshakeStage1(f *Interface, via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H) {
cs := f.pki.getCertState()
crt := cs.GetDefaultCertificate()
if crt == nil {
f.l.Error("Unable to handshake with host because no certificate is available",
"from", via,
"handshake", m{"stage": 0, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"certVersion", cs.initiatingVersion,
)
return
}
ci, err := NewConnectionState(cs, crt, false, noise.HandshakeIX)
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to create connection state",
"error", err,
"from", via,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
return
}
// Mark packet 1 as seen so it doesn't show up as missed
ci.window.Update(f.l, 1)
msg, _, _, err := ci.H.ReadMessage(nil, packet[header.Len:])
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to call noise.ReadMessage",
"error", err,
"from", via,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
return
}
hs := &NebulaHandshake{}
err = hs.Unmarshal(msg)
if err != nil || hs.Details == nil {
f.l.Error("Failed unmarshal handshake message",
"error", err,
"from", via,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
return
}
rc, err := cert.Recombine(cert.Version(hs.Details.CertVersion), hs.Details.Cert, ci.H.PeerStatic(), ci.Curve())
if err != nil {
f.l.Info("Handshake did not contain a certificate",
"error", err,
"from", via,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
return
}
remoteCert, err := f.pki.GetCAPool().VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), rc)
if err != nil {
fp, fperr := rc.Fingerprint()
if fperr != nil {
fp = "<error generating certificate fingerprint>"
}
attrs := []slog.Attr{
slog.Any("error", err),
slog.Any("from", via),
slog.Any("handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"}),
slog.Any("certVpnNetworks", rc.Networks()),
slog.String("certFingerprint", fp),
}
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
attrs = append(attrs, slog.Any("cert", rc))
}
// LogAttrs is intentional: attrs is a pre-built []slog.Attr slice that
// callers grow conditionally, which has no pair-form equivalent.
//nolint:sloglint
f.l.LogAttrs(context.Background(), slog.LevelInfo, "Invalid certificate from host", attrs...)
return
}
if !bytes.Equal(remoteCert.Certificate.PublicKey(), ci.H.PeerStatic()) {
f.l.Info("public key mismatch between certificate and handshake",
"from", via,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"cert", remoteCert,
)
return
}
if remoteCert.Certificate.Version() != ci.myCert.Version() {
// We started off using the wrong certificate version, lets see if we can match the version that was sent to us
myCertOtherVersion := cs.getCertificate(remoteCert.Certificate.Version())
if myCertOtherVersion == nil {
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
f.l.Debug("Might be unable to handshake with host due to missing certificate version",
"error", err,
"from", via,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"cert", remoteCert,
)
}
} else {
// Record the certificate we are actually using
ci.myCert = myCertOtherVersion
}
}
if len(remoteCert.Certificate.Networks()) == 0 {
f.l.Info("No networks in certificate",
"error", err,
"from", via,
"cert", remoteCert,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
return
}
certName := remoteCert.Certificate.Name()
certVersion := remoteCert.Certificate.Version()
fingerprint := remoteCert.Fingerprint
issuer := remoteCert.Certificate.Issuer()
vpnNetworks := remoteCert.Certificate.Networks()
anyVpnAddrsInCommon := false
vpnAddrs := make([]netip.Addr, len(vpnNetworks))
for i, network := range vpnNetworks {
if f.myVpnAddrsTable.Contains(network.Addr()) {
f.l.Error("Refusing to handshake with myself",
"vpnNetworks", vpnNetworks,
"from", via,
"certName", certName,
"certVersion", certVersion,
"fingerprint", fingerprint,
"issuer", issuer,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
return
}
vpnAddrs[i] = network.Addr()
if f.myVpnNetworksTable.Contains(network.Addr()) {
anyVpnAddrsInCommon = true
}
}
if !via.IsRelayed {
// We only want to apply the remote allow list for direct tunnels here
if !f.lightHouse.GetRemoteAllowList().AllowAll(vpnAddrs, via.UdpAddr.Addr()) {
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
f.l.Debug("lighthouse.remote_allow_list denied incoming handshake",
"vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
)
}
return
}
}
myIndex, err := generateIndex(f.l)
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to generate index",
"error", err,
"vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"certName", certName,
"certVersion", certVersion,
"fingerprint", fingerprint,
"issuer", issuer,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
return
}
hostinfo := &HostInfo{
ConnectionState: ci,
localIndexId: myIndex,
remoteIndexId: hs.Details.InitiatorIndex,
vpnAddrs: vpnAddrs,
HandshakePacket: make(map[uint8][]byte, 0),
lastHandshakeTime: hs.Details.Time,
relayState: RelayState{
relays: nil,
relayForByAddr: map[netip.Addr]*Relay{},
relayForByIdx: map[uint32]*Relay{},
},
}
msgRxL := f.l.With(
"vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"certName", certName,
"certVersion", certVersion,
"fingerprint", fingerprint,
"issuer", issuer,
"initiatorIndex", hs.Details.InitiatorIndex,
"responderIndex", hs.Details.ResponderIndex,
"remoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
if anyVpnAddrsInCommon {
msgRxL.Info("Handshake message received")
} else {
//todo warn if not lighthouse or relay?
msgRxL.Info("Handshake message received, but no vpnNetworks in common.")
}
hs.Details.ResponderIndex = myIndex
hs.Details.Cert = cs.getHandshakeBytes(ci.myCert.Version())
if hs.Details.Cert == nil {
msgRxL.Error("Unable to handshake with host because no certificate handshake bytes is available",
"myCertVersion", ci.myCert.Version(),
)
return
}
hs.Details.CertVersion = uint32(ci.myCert.Version())
// Update the time in case their clock is way off from ours
hs.Details.Time = uint64(time.Now().UnixNano())
hsBytes, err := hs.Marshal()
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to marshal handshake message",
"error", err,
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"certName", certName,
"certVersion", certVersion,
"fingerprint", fingerprint,
"issuer", issuer,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
return
}
nh := header.Encode(make([]byte, header.Len), header.Version, header.Handshake, header.HandshakeIXPSK0, hs.Details.InitiatorIndex, 2)
msg, dKey, eKey, err := ci.H.WriteMessage(nh, hsBytes)
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to call noise.WriteMessage",
"error", err,
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"certName", certName,
"certVersion", certVersion,
"fingerprint", fingerprint,
"issuer", issuer,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
return
} else if dKey == nil || eKey == nil {
f.l.Error("Noise did not arrive at a key",
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"certName", certName,
"certVersion", certVersion,
"fingerprint", fingerprint,
"issuer", issuer,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
return
}
hostinfo.HandshakePacket[0] = make([]byte, len(packet[header.Len:]))
copy(hostinfo.HandshakePacket[0], packet[header.Len:])
// Regardless of whether you are the sender or receiver, you should arrive here
// and complete standing up the connection.
hostinfo.HandshakePacket[2] = make([]byte, len(msg))
copy(hostinfo.HandshakePacket[2], msg)
// We are sending handshake packet 2, so we don't expect to receive
// handshake packet 2 from the initiator.
ci.window.Update(f.l, 2)
ci.peerCert = remoteCert
ci.dKey = NewNebulaCipherState(dKey)
ci.eKey = NewNebulaCipherState(eKey)
hostinfo.remotes = f.lightHouse.QueryCache(vpnAddrs)
if !via.IsRelayed {
hostinfo.SetRemote(via.UdpAddr)
}
hostinfo.buildNetworks(f.myVpnNetworksTable, remoteCert.Certificate)
existing, err := f.handshakeManager.CheckAndComplete(hostinfo, 0, f)
if err != nil {
switch err {
case ErrAlreadySeen:
// Update remote if preferred
if existing.SetRemoteIfPreferred(f.hostMap, via) {
// Send a test packet to ensure the other side has also switched to
// the preferred remote
f.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.Test, header.TestRequest, vpnAddrs[0], []byte(""), make([]byte, 12, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
}
msg = existing.HandshakePacket[2]
f.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Handshake, header.MessageSubType(msg[1]), 1)
if !via.IsRelayed {
err := f.outside.WriteTo(msg, via.UdpAddr)
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to send handshake message",
"vpnAddrs", existing.vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"cached", true,
"error", err,
)
} else {
f.l.Info("Handshake message sent",
"vpnAddrs", existing.vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"cached", true,
)
}
return
} else {
if via.relay == nil {
f.l.Error("Handshake send failed: both addr and via.relay are nil.")
return
}
hostinfo.relayState.InsertRelayTo(via.relayHI.vpnAddrs[0])
f.SendVia(via.relayHI, via.relay, msg, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu), false)
f.l.Info("Handshake message sent",
"vpnAddrs", existing.vpnAddrs,
"relay", via.relayHI.vpnAddrs[0],
"handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"cached", true,
)
return
}
case ErrExistingHostInfo:
// This means there was an existing tunnel and this handshake was older than the one we are currently based on
f.l.Info("Handshake too old",
"vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"certName", certName,
"certVersion", certVersion,
"oldHandshakeTime", existing.lastHandshakeTime,
"newHandshakeTime", hostinfo.lastHandshakeTime,
"fingerprint", fingerprint,
"issuer", issuer,
"initiatorIndex", hs.Details.InitiatorIndex,
"responderIndex", hs.Details.ResponderIndex,
"remoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
// Send a test packet to trigger an authenticated tunnel test, this should suss out any lingering tunnel issues
f.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.Test, header.TestRequest, vpnAddrs[0], []byte(""), make([]byte, 12, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
return
case ErrLocalIndexCollision:
// This means we failed to insert because of collision on localIndexId. Just let the next handshake packet retry
f.l.Error("Failed to add HostInfo due to localIndex collision",
"vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"certName", certName,
"certVersion", certVersion,
"fingerprint", fingerprint,
"issuer", issuer,
"initiatorIndex", hs.Details.InitiatorIndex,
"responderIndex", hs.Details.ResponderIndex,
"remoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"localIndex", hostinfo.localIndexId,
"collision", existing.vpnAddrs,
)
return
default:
// Shouldn't happen, but just in case someone adds a new error type to CheckAndComplete
// And we forget to update it here
f.l.Error("Failed to add HostInfo to HostMap",
"error", err,
"vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"certName", certName,
"certVersion", certVersion,
"fingerprint", fingerprint,
"issuer", issuer,
"initiatorIndex", hs.Details.InitiatorIndex,
"responderIndex", hs.Details.ResponderIndex,
"remoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
return
}
}
// Do the send
f.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Handshake, header.MessageSubType(msg[1]), 1)
if !via.IsRelayed {
err = f.outside.WriteTo(msg, via.UdpAddr)
log := f.l.With(
"vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"certName", certName,
"certVersion", certVersion,
"fingerprint", fingerprint,
"issuer", issuer,
"initiatorIndex", hs.Details.InitiatorIndex,
"responderIndex", hs.Details.ResponderIndex,
"remoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex,
"handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
if err != nil {
log.Error("Failed to send handshake", "error", err)
} else {
log.Info("Handshake message sent")
}
} else {
if via.relay == nil {
f.l.Error("Handshake send failed: both addr and via.relay are nil.")
return
}
hostinfo.relayState.InsertRelayTo(via.relayHI.vpnAddrs[0])
// I successfully received a handshake. Just in case I marked this tunnel as 'Disestablished', ensure
// it's correctly marked as working.
via.relayHI.relayState.UpdateRelayForByIdxState(via.remoteIdx, Established)
f.SendVia(via.relayHI, via.relay, msg, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu), false)
f.l.Info("Handshake message sent",
"vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs,
"relay", via.relayHI.vpnAddrs[0],
"certName", certName,
"certVersion", certVersion,
"fingerprint", fingerprint,
"issuer", issuer,
"initiatorIndex", hs.Details.InitiatorIndex,
"responderIndex", hs.Details.ResponderIndex,
"remoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex,
"handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
}
f.connectionManager.AddTrafficWatch(hostinfo)
hostinfo.remotes.RefreshFromHandshake(vpnAddrs)
// Don't wait for UpdateWorker
if f.lightHouse.IsAnyLighthouseAddr(vpnAddrs) {
f.lightHouse.TriggerUpdate()
}
return
}
func ixHandshakeStage2(f *Interface, via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostInfo, packet []byte, h *header.H) bool {
if hh == nil {
// Nothing here to tear down, got a bogus stage 2 packet
return true
}
hh.Lock()
defer hh.Unlock()
hostinfo := hh.hostinfo
if !via.IsRelayed {
// The vpnAddr we know about is the one we tried to handshake with, use it to apply the remote allow list.
if !f.lightHouse.GetRemoteAllowList().AllowAll(hostinfo.vpnAddrs, via.UdpAddr.Addr()) {
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
f.l.Debug("lighthouse.remote_allow_list denied incoming handshake",
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
)
}
return false
}
}
ci := hostinfo.ConnectionState
msg, eKey, dKey, err := ci.H.ReadMessage(nil, packet[header.Len:])
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to call noise.ReadMessage",
"error", err,
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"header", h,
)
// We don't want to tear down the connection on a bad ReadMessage because it could be an attacker trying
// to DOS us. Every other error condition after should to allow a possible good handshake to complete in the
// near future
return false
} else if dKey == nil || eKey == nil {
f.l.Error("Noise did not arrive at a key",
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
// This should be impossible in IX but just in case, if we get here then there is no chance to recover
// the handshake state machine. Tear it down
return true
}
hs := &NebulaHandshake{}
err = hs.Unmarshal(msg)
if err != nil || hs.Details == nil {
f.l.Error("Failed unmarshal handshake message",
"error", err,
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
// The handshake state machine is complete, if things break now there is no chance to recover. Tear down and start again
return true
}
rc, err := cert.Recombine(cert.Version(hs.Details.CertVersion), hs.Details.Cert, ci.H.PeerStatic(), ci.Curve())
if err != nil {
f.l.Info("Handshake did not contain a certificate",
"error", err,
"from", via,
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
return true
}
remoteCert, err := f.pki.GetCAPool().VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), rc)
if err != nil {
fp, err := rc.Fingerprint()
if err != nil {
fp = "<error generating certificate fingerprint>"
}
attrs := []slog.Attr{
slog.Any("error", err),
slog.Any("from", via),
slog.Any("vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs),
slog.Any("handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"}),
slog.String("certFingerprint", fp),
slog.Any("certVpnNetworks", rc.Networks()),
}
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
attrs = append(attrs, slog.Any("cert", rc))
}
// LogAttrs is intentional: attrs is a pre-built []slog.Attr slice that
// callers grow conditionally, which has no pair-form equivalent.
//nolint:sloglint
f.l.LogAttrs(context.Background(), slog.LevelInfo, "Invalid certificate from host", attrs...)
return true
}
if !bytes.Equal(remoteCert.Certificate.PublicKey(), ci.H.PeerStatic()) {
f.l.Info("public key mismatch between certificate and handshake",
"from", via,
"handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"cert", remoteCert,
)
return true
}
if len(remoteCert.Certificate.Networks()) == 0 {
f.l.Info("No networks in certificate",
"error", err,
"from", via,
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"cert", remoteCert,
"handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
return true
}
vpnNetworks := remoteCert.Certificate.Networks()
certName := remoteCert.Certificate.Name()
certVersion := remoteCert.Certificate.Version()
fingerprint := remoteCert.Fingerprint
issuer := remoteCert.Certificate.Issuer()
hostinfo.remoteIndexId = hs.Details.ResponderIndex
hostinfo.lastHandshakeTime = hs.Details.Time
// Store their cert and our symmetric keys
ci.peerCert = remoteCert
ci.dKey = NewNebulaCipherState(dKey)
ci.eKey = NewNebulaCipherState(eKey)
// Make sure the current udpAddr being used is set for responding
if !via.IsRelayed {
hostinfo.SetRemote(via.UdpAddr)
} else {
hostinfo.relayState.InsertRelayTo(via.relayHI.vpnAddrs[0])
}
correctHostResponded := false
anyVpnAddrsInCommon := false
vpnAddrs := make([]netip.Addr, len(vpnNetworks))
for i, network := range vpnNetworks {
vpnAddrs[i] = network.Addr()
if f.myVpnNetworksTable.Contains(network.Addr()) {
anyVpnAddrsInCommon = true
}
if hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0] == network.Addr() {
// todo is it more correct to see if any of hostinfo.vpnAddrs are in the cert? it should have len==1, but one day it might not?
correctHostResponded = true
}
}
// Ensure the right host responded
if !correctHostResponded {
f.l.Info("Incorrect host responded to handshake",
"intendedVpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"haveVpnNetworks", vpnNetworks,
"from", via,
"certName", certName,
"certVersion", certVersion,
"handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
// Release our old handshake from pending, it should not continue
f.handshakeManager.DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo)
// Create a new hostinfo/handshake for the intended vpn ip
//TODO is hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0] always the address to use?
f.handshakeManager.StartHandshake(hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0], func(newHH *HandshakeHostInfo) {
// Block the current used address
newHH.hostinfo.remotes = hostinfo.remotes
newHH.hostinfo.remotes.BlockRemote(via)
f.l.Info("Blocked addresses for handshakes",
"blockedUdpAddrs", newHH.hostinfo.remotes.CopyBlockedRemotes(),
"vpnNetworks", vpnNetworks,
"remotes", newHH.hostinfo.remotes.CopyAddrs(f.hostMap.GetPreferredRanges()),
)
// Swap the packet store to benefit the original intended recipient
newHH.packetStore = hh.packetStore
hh.packetStore = []*cachedPacket{}
// Finally, put the correct vpn addrs in the host info, tell them to close the tunnel, and return true to tear down
hostinfo.vpnAddrs = vpnAddrs
f.sendCloseTunnel(hostinfo)
})
return true
}
// Mark packet 2 as seen so it doesn't show up as missed
ci.window.Update(f.l, 2)
duration := time.Since(hh.startTime).Nanoseconds()
msgRxL := f.l.With(
"vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"certName", certName,
"certVersion", certVersion,
"fingerprint", fingerprint,
"issuer", issuer,
"initiatorIndex", hs.Details.InitiatorIndex,
"responderIndex", hs.Details.ResponderIndex,
"remoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex,
"handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"durationNs", duration,
"sentCachedPackets", len(hh.packetStore),
)
if anyVpnAddrsInCommon {
msgRxL.Info("Handshake message received")
} else {
//todo warn if not lighthouse or relay?
msgRxL.Info("Handshake message received, but no vpnNetworks in common.")
}
// Build up the radix for the firewall if we have subnets in the cert
hostinfo.vpnAddrs = vpnAddrs
hostinfo.buildNetworks(f.myVpnNetworksTable, remoteCert.Certificate)
// Complete our handshake and update metrics, this will replace any existing tunnels for the vpnAddrs here
f.handshakeManager.Complete(hostinfo, f)
f.connectionManager.AddTrafficWatch(hostinfo)
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("Sending stored packets",
"count", len(hh.packetStore),
)
}
if len(hh.packetStore) > 0 {
nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
out := make([]byte, mtu)
for _, cp := range hh.packetStore {
cp.callback(cp.messageType, cp.messageSubType, hostinfo, cp.packet, nb, out)
}
f.cachedPacketMetrics.sent.Inc(int64(len(hh.packetStore)))
}
hostinfo.remotes.RefreshFromHandshake(vpnAddrs)
f.metricHandshakes.Update(duration)
// Don't wait for UpdateWorker
if f.lightHouse.IsAnyLighthouseAddr(vpnAddrs) {
f.lightHouse.TriggerUpdate()
}
return false
}
+169 -605
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ import (
"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
)
@@ -23,18 +22,7 @@ const (
DefaultHandshakeTryInterval = time.Millisecond * 100
DefaultHandshakeRetries = 10
DefaultHandshakeTriggerBuffer = 64
// maxCachedPackets is how many unsent packets we'll buffer per pending
// handshake before dropping further ones.
maxCachedPackets = 100
// HandshakePacket map keys mirror the IX protocol stage convention:
// stage 0 = the initiator's first message (and what the responder
// receives, stripped of header)
// stage 2 = the responder's reply
// Other handshake patterns will need new keys when added.
handshakePacketStage0 uint8 = 0
handshakePacketStage2 uint8 = 2
DefaultUseRelays = true
)
var (
@@ -42,6 +30,7 @@ var (
tryInterval: DefaultHandshakeTryInterval,
retries: DefaultHandshakeRetries,
triggerBuffer: DefaultHandshakeTriggerBuffer,
useRelays: DefaultUseRelays,
}
)
@@ -49,6 +38,7 @@ type HandshakeConfig struct {
tryInterval time.Duration
retries int64
triggerBuffer int
useRelays bool
messageMetrics *MessageMetrics
}
@@ -86,11 +76,10 @@ type HandshakeHostInfo struct {
packetStore []*cachedPacket // A set of packets to be transmitted once the handshake completes
hostinfo *HostInfo
machine *handshake.Machine // The handshake state machine, set during stage 0 (initiator) or beginHandshake (responder multi-message)
}
func (hh *HandshakeHostInfo) cachePacket(l *slog.Logger, t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, packet []byte, f packetCallback, m *cachedPacketMetrics) {
if len(hh.packetStore) < maxCachedPackets {
if len(hh.packetStore) < 100 {
tempPacket := make([]byte, len(packet))
copy(tempPacket, packet)
@@ -148,18 +137,6 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) Run(ctx context.Context) {
}
func (hm *HandshakeManager) HandleIncoming(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H) {
// Gate on known handshake subtypes. Unknown subtypes (or future ones we
// don't yet support) are dropped here rather than silently routed through
// the IX path. Add a case when introducing a new pattern.
switch h.Subtype {
case header.HandshakeIXPSK0:
// supported
default:
hm.l.Debug("dropping handshake with unsupported subtype",
"from", via, "subtype", h.Subtype)
return
}
// First remote allow list check before we know the vpnIp
if !via.IsRelayed {
if !hm.lightHouse.GetRemoteAllowList().AllowUnknownVpnAddr(via.UdpAddr.Addr()) {
@@ -168,27 +145,19 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) HandleIncoming(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *head
}
}
// First message of a new handshake. The wire format requires RemoteIndex
// to be zero here (the initiator has no responder index to fill in yet),
// and generateIndex never allocates 0, so any non-zero RemoteIndex on a
// stage-1 packet is malformed or someone probing for an index collision.
// Drop without paying the cost of running noise on a pending Machine.
if h.MessageCounter == 1 {
if h.RemoteIndex != 0 {
hm.l.Debug("dropping stage-1 handshake with non-zero RemoteIndex",
"from", via, "remoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex)
return
}
hm.beginHandshake(via, packet, h)
return
}
switch h.Subtype {
case header.HandshakeIXPSK0:
switch h.MessageCounter {
case 1:
ixHandshakeStage1(hm.f, via, packet, h)
// Continuation message must match a pending handshake by index.
// Anything else is an orphaned packet (e.g., late retransmit after
// timeout) and is dropped.
if hh := hm.queryIndex(h.RemoteIndex); hh != nil {
hm.continueHandshake(via, hh, packet)
return
case 2:
newHostinfo := hm.queryIndex(h.RemoteIndex)
tearDown := ixHandshakeStage2(hm.f, via, newHostinfo, packet, h)
if tearDown && newHostinfo != nil {
hm.DeleteHostInfo(newHostinfo.hostinfo)
}
}
}
}
@@ -214,22 +183,13 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleOutbound(vpnIp netip.Addr, lighthouseTriggered
hostinfo := hh.hostinfo
// If we are out of time, clean up
if hh.counter >= hm.config.retries {
fields := []any{
hh.hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Info("Handshake timed out",
"udpAddrs", hh.hostinfo.remotes.CopyAddrs(hm.mainHostMap.GetPreferredRanges()),
"initiatorIndex", hh.hostinfo.localIndexId,
"remoteIndex", hh.hostinfo.remoteIndexId,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"durationNs", time.Since(hh.startTime).Nanoseconds(),
}
// hh.machine can be nil here if buildStage0Packet never succeeded
// (e.g., no certificate available). In that case there's no useful
// handshake metadata to log.
if hh.machine != nil {
fields = append(fields, "handshake", m{
"stage": uint64(hh.machine.MessageIndex()),
"style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, hh.machine.Subtype()),
})
}
hh.hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Info("Handshake timed out", fields...)
)
hm.metricTimedOut.Inc(1)
hm.DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo)
return
@@ -240,25 +200,12 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleOutbound(vpnIp netip.Addr, lighthouseTriggered
// Check if we have a handshake packet to transmit yet
if !hh.ready {
if !hm.buildStage0Packet(hh) {
if !ixHandshakeStage0(hm.f, hh) {
hm.OutboundHandshakeTimer.Add(vpnIp, hm.config.tryInterval*time.Duration(hh.counter))
return
}
}
// TODO: this hardcodes "always retransmit stage 0", which is correct for
// IX (the initiator only ever sends one packet, msg1) but wrong the
// moment a 3+ message pattern lands. The retry loop should resend the
// most recent outgoing message, not always stage 0. That implies
// HandshakeHostInfo tracking a single "currentOutbound" packet (bytes +
// header metadata) that gets replaced as the handshake progresses,
// instead of indexing into HandshakePacket.
stage0 := hostinfo.HandshakePacket[handshakePacketStage0]
hsFields := m{
"stage": uint64(hh.machine.MessageIndex()),
"style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, hh.machine.Subtype()),
}
// Get a remotes object if we don't already have one.
// This is mainly to protect us as this should never be the case
// NB ^ This comment doesn't jive. It's how the thing gets initialized.
@@ -292,13 +239,13 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleOutbound(vpnIp netip.Addr, lighthouseTriggered
// Send the handshake to all known ips, stage 2 takes care of assigning the hostinfo.remote based on the first to reply
var sentTo []netip.AddrPort
hostinfo.remotes.ForEach(hm.mainHostMap.GetPreferredRanges(), func(addr netip.AddrPort, _ bool) {
hm.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Handshake, hh.machine.Subtype(), 1)
err := hm.outside.WriteTo(stage0, addr)
hm.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Handshake, header.MessageSubType(hostinfo.HandshakePacket[0][1]), 1)
err := hm.outside.WriteTo(hostinfo.HandshakePacket[0], addr)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Error("Failed to send handshake message",
"udpAddr", addr,
"initiatorIndex", hostinfo.localIndexId,
"handshake", hsFields,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"error", err,
)
@@ -313,17 +260,156 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleOutbound(vpnIp netip.Addr, lighthouseTriggered
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Info("Handshake message sent",
"udpAddrs", sentTo,
"initiatorIndex", hostinfo.localIndexId,
"handshake", hsFields,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
} else if hm.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Debug("Handshake message sent",
"udpAddrs", sentTo,
"initiatorIndex", hostinfo.localIndexId,
"handshake", hsFields,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
}
hm.f.relayManager.StartRelays(hm.f, vpnIp, hostinfo, stage0)
if hm.config.useRelays && len(hostinfo.remotes.relays) > 0 {
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Info("Attempt to relay through hosts", "relays", hostinfo.remotes.relays)
// Send a RelayRequest to all known Relay IP's
for _, relay := range hostinfo.remotes.relays {
// Don't relay through the host I'm trying to connect to
if relay == vpnIp {
continue
}
// Don't relay to myself
if hm.f.myVpnAddrsTable.Contains(relay) {
continue
}
relayHostInfo := hm.mainHostMap.QueryVpnAddr(relay)
if relayHostInfo == nil || !relayHostInfo.remote.IsValid() {
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Info("Establish tunnel to relay target", "relay", relay.String())
hm.f.Handshake(relay)
continue
}
// Check the relay HostInfo to see if we already established a relay through
existingRelay, ok := relayHostInfo.relayState.QueryRelayForByIp(vpnIp)
if !ok {
// No relays exist or requested yet.
if relayHostInfo.remote.IsValid() {
idx, err := AddRelay(hm.l, relayHostInfo, hm.mainHostMap, vpnIp, nil, TerminalType, Requested)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Info("Failed to add relay to hostmap", "relay", relay.String(), "error", err)
}
m := NebulaControl{
Type: NebulaControl_CreateRelayRequest,
InitiatorRelayIndex: idx,
}
switch relayHostInfo.GetCert().Certificate.Version() {
case cert.Version1:
if !hm.f.myVpnAddrs[0].Is4() {
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Error("can not establish v1 relay with a v6 network because the relay is not running a current nebula version")
continue
}
if !vpnIp.Is4() {
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Error("can not establish v1 relay with a v6 remote network because the relay is not running a current nebula version")
continue
}
b := hm.f.myVpnAddrs[0].As4()
m.OldRelayFromAddr = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[:])
b = vpnIp.As4()
m.OldRelayToAddr = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[:])
case cert.Version2:
m.RelayFromAddr = netAddrToProtoAddr(hm.f.myVpnAddrs[0])
m.RelayToAddr = netAddrToProtoAddr(vpnIp)
default:
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Error("Unknown certificate version found while creating relay")
continue
}
msg, err := m.Marshal()
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Error("Failed to marshal Control message to create relay", "error", err)
} else {
hm.f.SendMessageToHostInfo(header.Control, 0, relayHostInfo, msg, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
hm.l.Info("send CreateRelayRequest",
"relayFrom", hm.f.myVpnAddrs[0],
"relayTo", vpnIp,
"initiatorRelayIndex", idx,
"relay", relay,
)
}
}
continue
}
switch existingRelay.State {
case Established:
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Info("Send handshake via relay", "relay", relay.String())
hm.f.SendVia(relayHostInfo, existingRelay, hostinfo.HandshakePacket[0], make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu), false)
case Disestablished:
// Mark this relay as 'requested'
relayHostInfo.relayState.UpdateRelayForByIpState(vpnIp, Requested)
fallthrough
case Requested:
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Info("Re-send CreateRelay request", "relay", relay.String())
// Re-send the CreateRelay request, in case the previous one was lost.
m := NebulaControl{
Type: NebulaControl_CreateRelayRequest,
InitiatorRelayIndex: existingRelay.LocalIndex,
}
switch relayHostInfo.GetCert().Certificate.Version() {
case cert.Version1:
if !hm.f.myVpnAddrs[0].Is4() {
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Error("can not establish v1 relay with a v6 network because the relay is not running a current nebula version")
continue
}
if !vpnIp.Is4() {
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Error("can not establish v1 relay with a v6 remote network because the relay is not running a current nebula version")
continue
}
b := hm.f.myVpnAddrs[0].As4()
m.OldRelayFromAddr = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[:])
b = vpnIp.As4()
m.OldRelayToAddr = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[:])
case cert.Version2:
m.RelayFromAddr = netAddrToProtoAddr(hm.f.myVpnAddrs[0])
m.RelayToAddr = netAddrToProtoAddr(vpnIp)
default:
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Error("Unknown certificate version found while creating relay")
continue
}
msg, err := m.Marshal()
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Error("Failed to marshal Control message to create relay", "error", err)
} else {
// This must send over the hostinfo, not over hm.Hosts[ip]
hm.f.SendMessageToHostInfo(header.Control, 0, relayHostInfo, msg, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
hm.l.Info("send CreateRelayRequest",
"relayFrom", hm.f.myVpnAddrs[0],
"relayTo", vpnIp,
"initiatorRelayIndex", existingRelay.LocalIndex,
"relay", relay,
)
}
case PeerRequested:
// PeerRequested only occurs in Forwarding relays, not Terminal relays, and this is a Terminal relay case.
fallthrough
default:
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Error("Relay unexpected state",
"vpnIp", vpnIp,
"state", existingRelay.State,
"relay", relay,
)
}
}
}
// If a lighthouse triggered this attempt then we are still in the timer wheel and do not need to re-add
if !lighthouseTriggered {
@@ -501,7 +587,7 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) Complete(hostinfo *HostInfo, f *Interface) {
// allocateIndex generates a unique localIndexId for this HostInfo
// and adds it to the pendingHostMap. Will error if we are unable to generate
// a unique localIndexId
func (hm *HandshakeManager) allocateIndex(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) (uint32, error) {
func (hm *HandshakeManager) allocateIndex(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) error {
hm.mainHostMap.RLock()
defer hm.mainHostMap.RUnlock()
hm.Lock()
@@ -510,7 +596,7 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) allocateIndex(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) (uint32, error)
for range 32 {
index, err := generateIndex(hm.l)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
return err
}
_, inPending := hm.indexes[index]
@@ -519,11 +605,11 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) allocateIndex(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) (uint32, error)
if !inMain && !inPending {
hh.hostinfo.localIndexId = index
hm.indexes[index] = hh
return index, nil
return nil
}
}
return 0, errors.New("failed to generate unique localIndexId")
return errors.New("failed to generate unique localIndexId")
}
func (hm *HandshakeManager) DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo *HostInfo) {
@@ -642,525 +728,3 @@ func generateIndex(l *slog.Logger) (uint32, error) {
func hsTimeout(tries int64, interval time.Duration) time.Duration {
return time.Duration(tries / 2 * ((2 * int64(interval)) + (tries-1)*int64(interval)))
}
// buildStage0Packet creates the initial handshake packet for the initiator.
func (hm *HandshakeManager) buildStage0Packet(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) bool {
cs := hm.f.pki.getCertState()
v := cs.DefaultVersion()
if hh.initiatingVersionOverride != cert.VersionPre1 {
v = hh.initiatingVersionOverride
} else if v < cert.Version2 {
for _, a := range hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs {
if a.Is6() {
v = cert.Version2
break
}
}
}
cred := cs.GetCredential(v)
if cred == nil {
hm.f.l.Error("Unable to handshake with host because no certificate is available",
"vpnAddrs", hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "certVersion", v)
return false
}
machine, err := handshake.NewMachine(
v, cs.GetCredential,
hm.certVerifier(), func() (uint32, error) { return hm.allocateIndex(hh) },
true, header.HandshakeIXPSK0,
)
if err != nil {
hm.f.l.Error("Failed to create handshake machine",
"vpnAddrs", hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "error", err)
return false
}
msg, err := machine.Initiate(nil)
if err != nil {
hm.f.l.Error("Failed to initiate handshake",
"vpnAddrs", hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "error", err)
return false
}
// hostinfo.ConnectionState stays nil until the handshake completes in
// continueHandshake. Pre-completion control surfaces guard with nil
// checks; the data plane never observes a pending hostinfo.
hh.hostinfo.HandshakePacket[handshakePacketStage0] = msg
hh.machine = machine
hh.ready = true
return true
}
// beginHandshake handles an incoming handshake packet that doesn't match any
// existing pending handshake. It creates a new responder Machine and processes
// the first message.
func (hm *HandshakeManager) beginHandshake(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H) {
f := hm.f
cs := f.pki.getCertState()
v := cs.DefaultVersion()
if cs.GetCredential(v) == nil {
f.l.Error("Unable to handshake with host because no certificate is available",
"from", via, "certVersion", v)
return
}
machine, err := handshake.NewMachine(
v, cs.GetCredential,
hm.certVerifier(), func() (uint32, error) { return generateIndex(f.l) },
false, header.HandshakeIXPSK0,
)
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to create handshake machine", "from", via, "error", err)
return
}
response, result, err := machine.ProcessPacket(nil, packet)
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to process handshake packet", "from", via, "error", err)
return
}
if result == nil {
// Multi-message pattern: the responder Machine would need to be
// registered in hm.indexes so a future inbound packet finds it via
// continueHandshake. The current manager doesn't do that yet, so
// fail loudly rather than silently dropping the in-flight handshake.
// TODO: support multi-message responder flows (XX, pqIX, etc.).
// See also the IX-shaped cipher key assignment in handshake.Machine.
f.l.Error("multi-message handshake responder is not supported",
"from", via, "error", handshake.ErrMultiMessageUnsupported)
return
}
remoteCert := result.RemoteCert
if remoteCert == nil {
f.l.Error("Handshake did not produce a peer certificate", "from", via)
return
}
// Validate peer identity
vpnAddrs, anyVpnAddrsInCommon, ok := hm.validatePeerCert(via, remoteCert)
if !ok {
return
}
hostinfo := &HostInfo{
ConnectionState: newConnectionStateFromResult(result),
localIndexId: result.LocalIndex,
remoteIndexId: result.RemoteIndex,
vpnAddrs: vpnAddrs,
HandshakePacket: make(map[uint8][]byte, 0),
lastHandshakeTime: result.HandshakeTime,
relayState: RelayState{
relays: nil,
relayForByAddr: map[netip.Addr]*Relay{},
relayForByIdx: map[uint32]*Relay{},
},
}
msg := "Handshake message received"
if !anyVpnAddrsInCommon {
msg = "Handshake message received, but no vpnNetworks in common."
}
f.l.Info(msg,
"vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"certName", remoteCert.Certificate.Name(),
"certVersion", remoteCert.Certificate.Version(),
"fingerprint", remoteCert.Fingerprint,
"issuer", remoteCert.Certificate.Issuer(),
"initiatorIndex", result.RemoteIndex,
"responderIndex", result.LocalIndex,
"handshake", m{"stage": uint64(machine.MessageIndex()), "style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, machine.Subtype())},
)
// packet aliases the listener's incoming buffer, so this copy must stay.
hostinfo.HandshakePacket[handshakePacketStage0] = make([]byte, len(packet[header.Len:]))
copy(hostinfo.HandshakePacket[handshakePacketStage0], packet[header.Len:])
// response was freshly allocated by ProcessPacket; safe to retain directly.
if response != nil {
hostinfo.HandshakePacket[handshakePacketStage2] = response
}
hostinfo.remotes = f.lightHouse.QueryCache(vpnAddrs)
if !via.IsRelayed {
hostinfo.SetRemote(via.UdpAddr)
}
hostinfo.buildNetworks(f.myVpnNetworksTable, remoteCert.Certificate)
existing, err := hm.CheckAndComplete(hostinfo, handshakePacketStage0, f)
if err != nil {
hm.handleCheckAndCompleteError(err, existing, hostinfo, via)
return
}
hm.sendHandshakeResponse(via, response, hostinfo, false)
f.connectionManager.AddTrafficWatch(hostinfo)
hostinfo.remotes.RefreshFromHandshake(vpnAddrs)
// Don't wait for UpdateWorker
if f.lightHouse.IsAnyLighthouseAddr(vpnAddrs) {
f.lightHouse.TriggerUpdate()
}
}
// continueHandshake feeds an incoming packet to an existing pending handshake Machine.
func (hm *HandshakeManager) continueHandshake(via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostInfo, packet []byte) {
f := hm.f
hh.Lock()
defer hh.Unlock()
// Re-verify hh is still tracked. Between queryIndex returning and us taking
// hh.Lock, handleOutbound may have timed out and deleted it. Once we hold
// hh.Lock no other deleter can race our index: handleOutbound also takes
// hh.Lock first, and handleRecvError targets a main-hostmap entry with a
// different localIndexId.
hm.RLock()
cur, ok := hm.indexes[hh.hostinfo.localIndexId]
hm.RUnlock()
if !ok || cur != hh {
return
}
hostinfo := hh.hostinfo
if !via.IsRelayed {
if !f.lightHouse.GetRemoteAllowList().AllowAll(hostinfo.vpnAddrs, via.UdpAddr.Addr()) {
f.l.Debug("lighthouse.remote_allow_list denied incoming handshake",
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "from", via)
return
}
}
machine := hh.machine
if machine == nil {
f.l.Error("No handshake machine available for continuation",
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "from", via)
hm.DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo)
return
}
response, result, err := machine.ProcessPacket(nil, packet)
if err != nil {
// Recoverable errors are routine noise, log at Debug. Fatal errors get a Warn.
if machine.Failed() {
f.l.Warn("Failed to process handshake packet, abandoning",
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "from", via, "error", err)
hm.DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo)
} else {
f.l.Debug("Failed to process handshake packet",
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "from", via, "error", err)
}
return
}
if response != nil {
hm.sendHandshakeResponse(via, response, hostinfo, false)
}
if result == nil {
return
}
// Handshake complete; build the ConnectionState now that we have keys and a verified peer cert.
hostinfo.ConnectionState = newConnectionStateFromResult(result)
remoteCert := result.RemoteCert
if remoteCert == nil {
f.l.Error("Handshake completed without peer certificate",
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "from", via)
hm.DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo)
return
}
vpnNetworks := remoteCert.Certificate.Networks()
hostinfo.remoteIndexId = result.RemoteIndex
hostinfo.lastHandshakeTime = result.HandshakeTime
if !via.IsRelayed {
hostinfo.SetRemote(via.UdpAddr)
} else {
hostinfo.relayState.InsertRelayTo(via.relayHI.vpnAddrs[0])
}
// Verify correct host responded (initiator check)
vpnAddrs := make([]netip.Addr, len(vpnNetworks))
correctHostResponded := false
anyVpnAddrsInCommon := false
for i, network := range vpnNetworks {
// inside.go drops self-routed packets at the firewall stage, but we'd
// rather not let a self-handshake complete in the first place: it
// wastes a hostmap slot, suppresses no log, and obscures routing
// misconfig. Explicit refusal here mirrors the responder-side check
// in validatePeerCert.
if f.myVpnAddrsTable.Contains(network.Addr()) {
f.l.Error("Refusing to handshake with myself",
"vpnNetworks", vpnNetworks,
"from", via,
"certName", remoteCert.Certificate.Name(),
"certVersion", remoteCert.Certificate.Version(),
"fingerprint", remoteCert.Fingerprint,
"issuer", remoteCert.Certificate.Issuer(),
"handshake", m{"stage": uint64(machine.MessageIndex()), "style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, machine.Subtype())},
)
hm.DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo)
return
}
vpnAddrs[i] = network.Addr()
if hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0] == network.Addr() {
correctHostResponded = true
}
if f.myVpnNetworksTable.Contains(network.Addr()) {
anyVpnAddrsInCommon = true
}
}
if !correctHostResponded {
f.l.Info("Incorrect host responded to handshake",
"intendedVpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"haveVpnNetworks", vpnNetworks,
"from", via,
"certName", remoteCert.Certificate.Name(),
"certVersion", remoteCert.Certificate.Version(),
"fingerprint", remoteCert.Fingerprint,
"issuer", remoteCert.Certificate.Issuer(),
"handshake", m{"stage": uint64(machine.MessageIndex()), "style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, machine.Subtype())},
)
hm.DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo)
hm.StartHandshake(hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0], func(newHH *HandshakeHostInfo) {
newHH.hostinfo.remotes = hostinfo.remotes
newHH.hostinfo.remotes.BlockRemote(via)
newHH.packetStore = hh.packetStore
hh.packetStore = []*cachedPacket{}
hostinfo.vpnAddrs = vpnAddrs
f.sendCloseTunnel(hostinfo)
})
return
}
duration := time.Since(hh.startTime).Nanoseconds()
msg := "Handshake message received"
if !anyVpnAddrsInCommon {
msg = "Handshake message received, but no vpnNetworks in common."
}
f.l.Info(msg,
"vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"certName", remoteCert.Certificate.Name(),
"certVersion", remoteCert.Certificate.Version(),
"fingerprint", remoteCert.Fingerprint,
"issuer", remoteCert.Certificate.Issuer(),
"initiatorIndex", result.LocalIndex,
"responderIndex", result.RemoteIndex,
"handshake", m{"stage": uint64(machine.MessageIndex()), "style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, machine.Subtype())},
"durationNs", duration,
"sentCachedPackets", len(hh.packetStore),
)
hostinfo.vpnAddrs = vpnAddrs
hostinfo.buildNetworks(f.myVpnNetworksTable, remoteCert.Certificate)
hm.Complete(hostinfo, f)
f.connectionManager.AddTrafficWatch(hostinfo)
if len(hh.packetStore) > 0 {
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("Sending stored packets", "count", len(hh.packetStore))
}
nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
out := make([]byte, mtu)
for _, cp := range hh.packetStore {
//todo use a sendbatcher
cp.callback(cp.messageType, cp.messageSubType, hostinfo, cp.packet, nb, out)
}
f.cachedPacketMetrics.sent.Inc(int64(len(hh.packetStore)))
}
hostinfo.remotes.RefreshFromHandshake(vpnAddrs)
f.metricHandshakes.Update(duration)
// Don't wait for UpdateWorker
if f.lightHouse.IsAnyLighthouseAddr(vpnAddrs) {
f.lightHouse.TriggerUpdate()
}
}
// validatePeerCert checks the peer certificate for self-connection and remote allow list.
// Returns the VPN addrs, whether any of them fall within one of our own VPN
// networks, and true if valid; false if rejected.
func (hm *HandshakeManager) validatePeerCert(via ViaSender, remoteCert *cert.CachedCertificate) ([]netip.Addr, bool, bool) {
f := hm.f
vpnNetworks := remoteCert.Certificate.Networks()
// The cert package rejects host certs with no networks at parse time, so
// reaching this state would mean an invariant was bypassed elsewhere.
// Refuse explicitly so downstream code (which indexes vpnAddrs[0]) can't
// panic if that invariant ever changes.
if len(vpnNetworks) == 0 {
f.l.Info("No networks in certificate",
"from", via, "cert", remoteCert)
return nil, false, false
}
vpnAddrs := make([]netip.Addr, len(vpnNetworks))
anyVpnAddrsInCommon := false
for i, network := range vpnNetworks {
if f.myVpnAddrsTable.Contains(network.Addr()) {
f.l.Error("Refusing to handshake with myself",
"vpnNetworks", vpnNetworks,
"from", via,
"certName", remoteCert.Certificate.Name(),
"certVersion", remoteCert.Certificate.Version(),
"fingerprint", remoteCert.Fingerprint,
"issuer", remoteCert.Certificate.Issuer(),
)
return nil, false, false
}
vpnAddrs[i] = network.Addr()
if f.myVpnNetworksTable.Contains(network.Addr()) {
anyVpnAddrsInCommon = true
}
}
if !via.IsRelayed {
if !f.lightHouse.GetRemoteAllowList().AllowAll(vpnAddrs, via.UdpAddr.Addr()) {
f.l.Debug("lighthouse.remote_allow_list denied incoming handshake",
"vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs, "from", via)
return nil, false, false
}
}
return vpnAddrs, anyVpnAddrsInCommon, true
}
// sendHandshakeResponse sends a handshake response via the appropriate transport.
// cached is true when msg is a stored response being retransmitted because
// the peer's stage-1 retransmit landed (the ErrAlreadySeen path); false on a
// fresh response.
func (hm *HandshakeManager) sendHandshakeResponse(via ViaSender, msg []byte, hostinfo *HostInfo, cached bool) {
if msg == nil {
return
}
f := hm.f
f.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Handshake, header.MessageSubType(msg[1]), 1)
// Common log fields. peerCert may be nil during intermediate
// multi-message flows (handshake hasn't completed yet); skip the cert
// block if so.
logFields := []any{
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"handshake", m{"stage": uint64(2), "style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, header.HandshakeIXPSK0)},
"cached", cached,
"initiatorIndex", hostinfo.remoteIndexId,
"responderIndex", hostinfo.localIndexId,
}
if peerCert := hostinfo.ConnectionState.peerCert; peerCert != nil {
logFields = append(logFields,
"certName", peerCert.Certificate.Name(),
"certVersion", peerCert.Certificate.Version(),
"fingerprint", peerCert.Fingerprint,
"issuer", peerCert.Certificate.Issuer(),
)
}
if !via.IsRelayed {
fields := append(logFields, "from", via)
err := f.outside.WriteTo(msg, via.UdpAddr)
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to send handshake message", append(fields, "error", err)...)
} else {
f.l.Info("Handshake message sent", fields...)
}
} else {
if via.relay == nil {
f.l.Error("Handshake send failed: both addr and via.relay are nil.")
return
}
hostinfo.relayState.InsertRelayTo(via.relayHI.vpnAddrs[0])
// We received a valid handshake on this relay, so make sure the relay
// state reflects that, in case it had been marked Disestablished.
via.relayHI.relayState.UpdateRelayForByIdxState(via.remoteIdx, Established)
f.SendVia(via.relayHI, via.relay, msg, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu), false)
f.l.Info("Handshake message sent", append(logFields, "relay", via.relayHI.vpnAddrs[0])...)
}
}
// handleCheckAndCompleteError handles errors from CheckAndComplete.
// This only fires from the responder-side beginHandshake path, after the
// peer cert has been validated and ConnectionState populated, so peerCert
// is always non-nil for the cases that log it.
func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleCheckAndCompleteError(err error, existing, hostinfo *HostInfo, via ViaSender) {
f := hm.f
peerCert := hostinfo.ConnectionState.peerCert
hsFields := m{"stage": uint64(1), "style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, header.HandshakeIXPSK0)}
switch err {
case ErrAlreadySeen:
if existing.SetRemoteIfPreferred(f.hostMap, via) {
f.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.Test, header.TestRequest, hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0], []byte(""), make([]byte, 12, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
}
// Resend the original response. The peer is committed to that response's
// ephemeral keys; a freshly-built one would have different keys and break
// the tunnel even though both sides "completed" the handshake.
if msg := existing.HandshakePacket[handshakePacketStage2]; msg != nil {
hm.sendHandshakeResponse(via, msg, existing, true)
}
case ErrExistingHostInfo:
f.l.Info("Handshake too old",
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"certName", peerCert.Certificate.Name(),
"certVersion", peerCert.Certificate.Version(),
"fingerprint", peerCert.Fingerprint,
"issuer", peerCert.Certificate.Issuer(),
"oldHandshakeTime", existing.lastHandshakeTime,
"newHandshakeTime", hostinfo.lastHandshakeTime,
"initiatorIndex", hostinfo.remoteIndexId,
"responderIndex", hostinfo.localIndexId,
"handshake", hsFields,
)
f.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.Test, header.TestRequest, hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0], []byte(""), make([]byte, 12, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
case ErrLocalIndexCollision:
f.l.Error("Failed to add HostInfo due to localIndex collision",
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"certName", peerCert.Certificate.Name(),
"certVersion", peerCert.Certificate.Version(),
"fingerprint", peerCert.Fingerprint,
"issuer", peerCert.Certificate.Issuer(),
"localIndex", hostinfo.localIndexId,
"initiatorIndex", hostinfo.remoteIndexId,
"responderIndex", hostinfo.localIndexId,
"handshake", hsFields,
)
default:
f.l.Error("Failed to add HostInfo to HostMap",
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"error", err,
"certName", peerCert.Certificate.Name(),
"certVersion", peerCert.Certificate.Version(),
"fingerprint", peerCert.Fingerprint,
"issuer", peerCert.Certificate.Issuer(),
"initiatorIndex", hostinfo.remoteIndexId,
"responderIndex", hostinfo.localIndexId,
"handshake", hsFields,
)
}
}
// certVerifier returns a CertVerifier that validates certs against the current CA pool.
func (hm *HandshakeManager) certVerifier() handshake.CertVerifier {
return func(c cert.Certificate) (*cert.CachedCertificate, error) {
return hm.f.pki.GetCAPool().VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), c)
}
}
+1 -136
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
@@ -28,7 +27,7 @@ func Test_NewHandshakeManagerVpnIp(t *testing.T) {
initiatingVersion: cert.Version1,
privateKey: []byte{},
v1Cert: &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1},
v1Credential: nil,
v1HandshakeBytes: []byte{},
}
blah := NewHandshakeManager(l, mainHM, lh, &udp.NoopConn{}, defaultHandshakeConfig)
@@ -101,137 +100,3 @@ func (mw *mockEncWriter) GetHostInfo(_ netip.Addr) *HostInfo {
func (mw *mockEncWriter) GetCertState() *CertState {
return &CertState{initiatingVersion: cert.Version2}
}
func TestValidatePeerCert(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
myNetwork := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")
myAddrTable := new(bart.Lite)
myAddrTable.Insert(netip.PrefixFrom(myNetwork.Addr(), myNetwork.Addr().BitLen()))
myNetTable := new(bart.Lite)
myNetTable.Insert(myNetwork.Masked())
newHM := func() *HandshakeManager {
hm := NewHandshakeManager(l, newHostMap(l), newTestLighthouse(), &udp.NoopConn{}, defaultHandshakeConfig)
hm.f = &Interface{
handshakeManager: hm,
pki: &PKI{},
l: l,
myVpnAddrsTable: myAddrTable,
myVpnNetworksTable: myNetTable,
lightHouse: hm.lightHouse,
}
return hm
}
cached := func(networks ...netip.Prefix) *cert.CachedCertificate {
return &cert.CachedCertificate{
Certificate: &dummyCert{name: "peer", networks: networks},
}
}
via := ViaSender{
UdpAddr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("198.51.100.7:4242"),
IsRelayed: true, // skip the remote allow list (covered separately)
}
t.Run("addr inside our networks sets anyVpnAddrsInCommon", func(t *testing.T) {
hm := newHM()
// 10.0.0.2 falls inside our 10.0.0.0/24
addrs, common, ok := hm.validatePeerCert(via, cached(netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.2/24")))
assert.True(t, ok)
assert.True(t, common)
assert.Equal(t, []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.2")}, addrs)
})
t.Run("addr outside our networks leaves anyVpnAddrsInCommon false", func(t *testing.T) {
hm := newHM()
addrs, common, ok := hm.validatePeerCert(via, cached(netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.1.5/24")))
assert.True(t, ok)
assert.False(t, common)
assert.Equal(t, []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.5")}, addrs)
})
t.Run("any matching network is enough", func(t *testing.T) {
hm := newHM()
addrs, common, ok := hm.validatePeerCert(via, cached(
netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.1.5/24"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.42/24"),
))
assert.True(t, ok)
assert.True(t, common)
assert.Len(t, addrs, 2)
})
t.Run("self-handshake is rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
hm := newHM()
// 10.0.0.1 is in myVpnAddrsTable
addrs, common, ok := hm.validatePeerCert(via, cached(netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")))
assert.False(t, ok)
assert.False(t, common)
assert.Nil(t, addrs)
})
t.Run("cert with no networks is rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
hm := newHM()
addrs, common, ok := hm.validatePeerCert(via, cached())
assert.False(t, ok)
assert.False(t, common)
assert.Nil(t, addrs)
})
}
func TestHandleIncomingDispatch(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
newHM := func() *HandshakeManager {
hm := NewHandshakeManager(l, newHostMap(l), newTestLighthouse(), &udp.NoopConn{}, defaultHandshakeConfig)
hm.f = &Interface{
handshakeManager: hm,
pki: &PKI{},
l: l,
}
return hm
}
via := ViaSender{
UdpAddr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("198.51.100.7:4242"),
IsRelayed: true, // bypass remote allow list
}
// A packet body of zero length is fine for these tests: dispatch is
// gated on header fields, and we assert that we never reach noise/cert
// processing for any of the malformed shapes here.
pkt := make([]byte, header.Len)
t.Run("unsupported subtype dropped", func(t *testing.T) {
hm := newHM()
h := &header.H{Type: header.Handshake, Subtype: header.MessageSubType(99), MessageCounter: 1}
hm.HandleIncoming(via, pkt, h)
assert.Empty(t, hm.indexes, "no pending handshake should be created")
})
t.Run("stage-1 with non-zero RemoteIndex dropped", func(t *testing.T) {
hm := newHM()
h := &header.H{
Type: header.Handshake,
Subtype: header.HandshakeIXPSK0,
RemoteIndex: 0xdeadbeef,
MessageCounter: 1,
}
hm.HandleIncoming(via, pkt, h)
assert.Empty(t, hm.indexes, "spoofed stage-1 must not create a pending machine")
})
t.Run("continuation with no matching pending index dropped", func(t *testing.T) {
hm := newHM()
h := &header.H{
Type: header.Handshake,
Subtype: header.HandshakeIXPSK0,
RemoteIndex: 0xcafef00d,
MessageCounter: 2,
}
hm.HandleIncoming(via, pkt, h)
assert.Empty(t, hm.indexes, "orphan stage-2 must not create state")
})
}
-14
View File
@@ -174,10 +174,6 @@ func (h *H) SubTypeName() string {
return SubTypeName(h.Type, h.Subtype)
}
func (h *H) IsValidSubType() bool {
return IsValidSubType(h.Type, h.Subtype)
}
// SubTypeName will transform a nebula message sub type into a human string
func SubTypeName(t MessageType, s MessageSubType) string {
if n, ok := subTypeMap[t]; ok {
@@ -189,16 +185,6 @@ func SubTypeName(t MessageType, s MessageSubType) string {
return "unknown"
}
func IsValidSubType(t MessageType, s MessageSubType) bool {
if n, ok := subTypeMap[t]; ok {
if _, ok := (*n)[s]; ok {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// NewHeader turns bytes into a header
func NewHeader(b []byte) (*H, error) {
h := new(H)
+53 -173
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package nebula
import (
"context"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/netip"
@@ -12,15 +11,9 @@ import (
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/noiseutil"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/batch"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/wire"
)
func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(pkt wire.TunPacket, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, nb []byte, sendBatch *batch.SendBatch, rejectBuf []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
// pkt.Bytes is either one IP datagram (GSO zero) or a TSO/USO
// superpacket. In both cases the L3+L4 headers at the start describe
// the same 5-tuple every segment will share, so a single newPacket /
// firewall check covers the whole superpacket.
packet := pkt.Bytes
func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(packet []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, nb []byte, sendBatch batch.TxBatcher, rejectBuf []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
err := newPacket(packet, false, fwPacket)
if err != nil {
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
@@ -45,10 +38,7 @@ func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(pkt wire.TunPacket, fwPacket *firewall.P
// routes packets from the Nebula addr to the Nebula addr through the Nebula
// TUN device.
if immediatelyForwardToSelf {
err := pkt.PerSegment(func(seg []byte) error {
_, werr := f.readers[q].Write(seg)
return werr
})
_, err := f.readers[q].Write(packet)
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to forward to tun", "error", err)
}
@@ -64,19 +54,7 @@ func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(pkt wire.TunPacket, fwPacket *firewall.P
}
hostinfo, ready := f.getOrHandshakeConsiderRouting(fwPacket, func(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) {
// borrowed: PerSegment builds each segment in the kernel-supplied pkt
// bytes underneath. cachePacket explicitly copies its argument (handshake_manager.go cachePacket),
// so retaining segments past the loop is safe.
err := pkt.PerSegment(func(seg []byte) error {
hh.cachePacket(f.l, header.Message, 0, seg, f.sendMessageNow, f.cachedPacketMetrics)
return nil
})
if err != nil && f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
f.l.Debug("Failed to segment superpacket for handshake cache",
"error", err,
"vpnAddr", fwPacket.RemoteAddr,
)
}
hh.cachePacket(f.l, header.Message, 0, packet, f.sendMessageNow, f.cachedPacketMetrics)
})
if hostinfo == nil {
@@ -96,7 +74,7 @@ func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(pkt wire.TunPacket, fwPacket *firewall.P
dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(*fwPacket, false, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), localCache)
if dropReason == nil {
f.sendInsideMessage(hostinfo, pkt, nb, sendBatch)
f.sendInsideMessage(hostinfo, packet, nb, sendBatch, rejectBuf, q)
} else {
f.rejectInside(packet, rejectBuf, q)
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
@@ -108,7 +86,31 @@ func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(pkt wire.TunPacket, fwPacket *firewall.P
}
}
func (f *Interface) sendInsideEncrypt(hostinfo *HostInfo, ci *ConnectionState, seg, scratch, nb []byte) []byte {
// sendInsideMessage encrypts a firewall-approved inside packet into the
// caller's batch slot for later sendmmsg flush. When hostinfo.remote is not
// valid we fall through to the relay slow path via the unbatched sendNoMetrics
// so relay behavior is unchanged.
func (f *Interface) sendInsideMessage(hostinfo *HostInfo, p, nb []byte, sendBatch batch.TxBatcher, rejectBuf []byte, q int) {
ci := hostinfo.ConnectionState
if ci.eKey == nil {
return
}
if !hostinfo.remote.IsValid() {
// Slow path: relay fallback. Reuse rejectBuf as the ciphertext
// scratch; sendNoMetrics arranges header space for SendVia.
f.sendNoMetrics(header.Message, 0, ci, hostinfo, netip.AddrPort{}, p, nb, rejectBuf, q)
return
}
scratch := sendBatch.Next()
if scratch == nil {
// Batch full: bypass batching and send this packet directly so we
// never drop traffic on over-subscribed iterations.
f.sendNoMetrics(header.Message, 0, ci, hostinfo, netip.AddrPort{}, p, nb, rejectBuf, q)
return
}
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
ci.writeLock.Lock()
}
@@ -117,38 +119,6 @@ func (f *Interface) sendInsideEncrypt(hostinfo *HostInfo, ci *ConnectionState, s
out := header.Encode(scratch, header.Version, header.Message, 0, hostinfo.remoteIndexId, c)
f.connectionManager.Out(hostinfo)
out, encErr := ci.eKey.EncryptDanger(out, out, seg, c, nb)
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
ci.writeLock.Unlock()
}
if encErr != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to encrypt outgoing packet",
"error", encErr,
"udpAddr", hostinfo.remote,
"counter", c,
)
// Skip this segment; the rest of the superpacket can still
// go out — TCP will retransmit anything we drop here.
return nil
}
return out
}
// sendInsideMessage encrypts a firewall-approved inside packet (or every
// segment of a TSO/USO superpacket) into the caller's batch slot for
// later sendmmsg flush. Segmentation is fused with encryption here so the
// kernel-supplied superpacket bytes never get written into a separate
// scratch arena: PerSegment builds each segment's plaintext in
// segScratch[:segLen] in turn, and we encrypt directly into a fresh
// SendBatch slot.
func (f *Interface) sendInsideMessage(hostinfo *HostInfo, pkt wire.TunPacket, nb []byte, sendBatch *batch.SendBatch) {
ci := hostinfo.ConnectionState
if ci.eKey == nil {
return
}
ecnEnabled := f.ecnEnabled.Load()
if hostinfo.lastRebindCount != f.rebindCount {
//NOTE: there is an update hole if a tunnel isn't used and exactly 256 rebinds occur before the tunnel is
// finally used again. This tunnel would eventually be torn down and recreated if this action didn't help.
@@ -161,94 +131,20 @@ func (f *Interface) sendInsideMessage(hostinfo *HostInfo, pkt wire.TunPacket, nb
}
}
if !hostinfo.remote.IsValid() { //the relay path
//first, find our relay hostinfo:
var relayHostInfo *HostInfo
var relay *Relay
var err error
for _, relayIP := range hostinfo.relayState.CopyRelayIps() {
relayHostInfo, relay, err = f.hostMap.QueryVpnAddrsRelayFor(hostinfo.vpnAddrs, relayIP)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.relayState.DeleteRelay(relayIP)
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Info("sendNoMetrics failed to find HostInfo",
"relay", relayIP,
"error", err,
)
continue
}
break
}
if relayHostInfo == nil || relay == nil {
//failure already logged
return
}
err = pkt.PerSegment(func(seg []byte) error {
//relay header + header + plaintext + AEAD tag (16 bytes for both AES-GCM and ChaCha20-Poly1305) + relay tag
scratch := sendBatch.Reserve(header.Len + header.Len + len(seg) + 16 + 16)
innerPacket := f.sendInsideEncrypt(hostinfo, ci, seg, scratch[header.Len:], nb)
if innerPacket == nil {
return nil
}
//now we need to do a relay-encrypt:
toSend, err := f.prepareSendVia(relayHostInfo, relay, innerPacket, nb, scratch, true)
if err != nil {
//already logged
return nil
}
var ecn byte
if ecnEnabled {
ecn = innerECN(seg)
}
sendBatch.Commit(toSend, relayHostInfo.remote, ecn)
return nil
})
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to segment superpacket for relay send", "error", err)
}
out, err := ci.eKey.EncryptDanger(out, out, p, c, nb)
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
ci.writeLock.Unlock()
}
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to encrypt outgoing packet",
"error", err,
"udpAddr", hostinfo.remote,
"counter", c,
)
return
}
err := pkt.PerSegment(func(seg []byte) error {
// header + plaintext + AEAD tag (16 bytes for both AES-GCM and ChaCha20-Poly1305)
scratch := sendBatch.Reserve(header.Len + len(seg) + 16)
out := f.sendInsideEncrypt(hostinfo, ci, seg, scratch, nb)
if out == nil {
return nil
}
var ecn byte
if ecnEnabled {
ecn = innerECN(seg)
}
sendBatch.Commit(out, hostinfo.remote, ecn)
return nil
})
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to segment superpacket for send",
"error", err,
)
}
}
// innerECN returns the 2-bit IP-level ECN codepoint of an inner IPv4 or IPv6
// packet, or 0 if pkt is too short or its IP version is unrecognized. Used at
// encap to copy the inner codepoint onto the outer carrier per RFC 6040.
func innerECN(pkt []byte) byte {
if len(pkt) < 2 {
return 0
}
switch pkt[0] >> 4 {
case 4:
return pkt[1] & 0x03
case 6:
return (pkt[1] >> 4) & 0x03
}
return 0
sendBatch.Commit(len(out), hostinfo.remote)
}
func (f *Interface) rejectInside(packet []byte, out []byte, q int) {
@@ -440,13 +336,21 @@ func (f *Interface) sendTo(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, ci *C
f.sendNoMetrics(t, st, ci, hostinfo, remote, p, nb, out, 0)
}
func (f *Interface) prepareSendVia(via *HostInfo,
// SendVia sends a payload through a Relay tunnel. No authentication or encryption is done
// to the payload for the ultimate target host, making this a useful method for sending
// handshake messages to peers through relay tunnels.
// via is the HostInfo through which the message is relayed.
// ad is the plaintext data to authenticate, but not encrypt
// nb is a buffer used to store the nonce value, re-used for performance reasons.
// out is a buffer used to store the result of the Encrypt operation
// q indicates which writer to use to send the packet.
func (f *Interface) SendVia(via *HostInfo,
relay *Relay,
ad,
nb,
out []byte,
nocopy bool,
) ([]byte, error) {
) {
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
// NOTE: for goboring AESGCMTLS we need to lock because of the nonce check
via.ConnectionState.writeLock.Lock()
@@ -468,7 +372,7 @@ func (f *Interface) prepareSendVia(via *HostInfo,
"headerLen", len(out),
"cipherOverhead", via.ConnectionState.eKey.Overhead(),
)
return nil, io.ErrShortBuffer
return
}
// The header bytes are written to the 'out' slice; Grow the slice to hold the header and associated data payload.
@@ -488,37 +392,13 @@ func (f *Interface) prepareSendVia(via *HostInfo,
}
if err != nil {
via.logger(f.l).Info("Failed to EncryptDanger in sendVia", "error", err)
return nil, err
}
f.connectionManager.RelayUsed(relay.LocalIndex)
return out, nil
}
// SendVia sends a payload through a Relay tunnel. No authentication or encryption is done
// to the payload for the ultimate target host, making this a useful method for sending
// handshake messages to peers through relay tunnels.
// via is the HostInfo through which the message is relayed.
// ad is the plaintext data to authenticate, but not encrypt
// nb is a buffer used to store the nonce value, re-used for performance reasons.
// out is a buffer used to store the result of the Encrypt operation.
// The write goes through writers[0] — SendVia is called from contexts
// without a per-queue index (handshake, async control paths).
func (f *Interface) SendVia(via *HostInfo,
relay *Relay,
ad,
nb,
out []byte,
nocopy bool,
) {
toSend, err := f.prepareSendVia(via, relay, ad, nb, out, nocopy)
if err != nil {
via.logger(f.l).Info("Failed to prepareSendVia", "error", err)
return
}
err = f.writers[0].WriteTo(toSend, via.remote)
err = f.writers[0].WriteTo(out, via.remote)
if err != nil {
via.logger(f.l).Info("Failed to WriteTo in sendVia", "error", err)
}
f.connectionManager.RelayUsed(relay.LocalIndex)
}
func (f *Interface) sendNoMetrics(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, ci *ConnectionState, hostinfo *HostInfo, remote netip.AddrPort, p, nb, out []byte, q int) {
+30 -88
View File
@@ -6,15 +6,12 @@ import (
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net/netip"
"runtime"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/wire"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
@@ -41,7 +38,6 @@ type InterfaceConfig struct {
DropLocalBroadcast bool
DropMulticast bool
routines int
batchSize int
MessageMetrics *MessageMetrics
version string
relayManager *relayManager
@@ -52,14 +48,7 @@ type InterfaceConfig struct {
reQueryWait time.Duration
ConntrackCacheTimeout time.Duration
// CpuAffinity, when non-empty, names the CPUs each TUN reader goroutine
// should pin to. Queue i pins to CpuAffinity[i % len(CpuAffinity)] —
// shorter lists than `routines` cycle. Empty list keeps the default
// pin-to-(i % NumCPU) behavior.
CpuAffinity []int
l *slog.Logger
l *slog.Logger
}
type Interface struct {
@@ -81,19 +70,9 @@ type Interface struct {
dropLocalBroadcast bool
dropMulticast bool
routines int
batchSize int
disconnectInvalid atomic.Bool
closed atomic.Bool
// cpuAffinity, when non-empty, names the CPUs each TUN reader goroutine
// should pin to. Queue i pins to cpuAffinity[i % len(cpuAffinity)].
// Empty falls back to the default pin-to-(i % NumCPU) behavior.
cpuAffinity []int
// ecnEnabled gates RFC 6040 underlay ECN propagation. When true,
// inside.go copies the inner ECN onto the outer carrier on encap and
// decryptToTun folds outer CE into the inner header on decap. Toggle
// via tunnels.ecn (default true).
ecnEnabled atomic.Bool
relayManager *relayManager
relayManager *relayManager
tryPromoteEvery atomic.Uint32
reQueryEvery atomic.Uint32
@@ -211,7 +190,6 @@ func NewInterface(ctx context.Context, c *InterfaceConfig) (*Interface, error) {
dropLocalBroadcast: c.DropLocalBroadcast,
dropMulticast: c.DropMulticast,
routines: c.routines,
batchSize: c.batchSize,
version: c.version,
writers: make([]udp.Conn, c.routines),
readers: make([]tio.Queue, c.routines),
@@ -224,7 +202,6 @@ func NewInterface(ctx context.Context, c *InterfaceConfig) (*Interface, error) {
relayManager: c.relayManager,
connectionManager: c.connectionManager,
conntrackCacheTimeout: c.ConntrackCacheTimeout,
cpuAffinity: c.CpuAffinity,
metricHandshakes: metrics.GetOrRegisterHistogram("handshakes", nil, metrics.NewExpDecaySample(1028, 0.015)),
messageMetrics: c.MessageMetrics,
@@ -283,18 +260,7 @@ func (f *Interface) activate() error {
}
f.readers = f.inside.Readers()
for i := range f.readers {
caps := f.readers[i].Capabilities()
if caps.TSO || caps.USO {
// Multi-lane: TCP gets coalesced when TSO is on, UDP when USO
// is on, everything else (and either lane disabled) falls
// through to passthrough so non-IP / non-TCP-UDP traffic still
// reaches the TUN.
arena := util.NewArena(max(f.batchSize, 1) * 65535)
f.batchers[i] = batch.NewMultiCoalescer(f.readers[i], f.l, arena, caps.TSO, caps.USO)
} else {
arena := util.NewArena(max(f.batchSize, 1) * udp.MTU)
f.batchers[i] = batch.NewPassthrough(f.readers[i], f.batchSize, arena)
}
f.batchers[i] = batch.NewTCPCoalescer(f.readers[i])
}
f.wg.Add(1) // for us to wait on Close() to return
@@ -356,12 +322,15 @@ func (f *Interface) listenOut(i int) {
fwPacket := &firewall.Packet{}
nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
listener := func(fromUdpAddr netip.AddrPort, payload []byte, meta udp.RxMeta) {
f.readOutsidePackets(ViaSender{UdpAddr: fromUdpAddr}, payload, h, fwPacket, lhh, nb, i, ctCache.Get(), meta)
coalescer := f.batchers[i]
listener := func(fromUdpAddr netip.AddrPort, payload []byte) {
plaintext := f.batchers[i].Reserve(len(payload))
f.readOutsidePackets(ViaSender{UdpAddr: fromUdpAddr}, plaintext[:0], payload, h, fwPacket, lhh, nb, i, ctCache.Get())
}
flusher := func() {
if err := f.batchers[i].Flush(); err != nil {
if err := coalescer.Flush(); err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to flush tun coalescer", "error", err)
}
}
@@ -376,57 +345,45 @@ func (f *Interface) listenOut(i int) {
f.l.Debug("underlay reader is done", "reader", i)
}
func (f *Interface) listenIn(reader tio.Queue, q int) {
// Pinning this thread (and goroutine) to a single CPU keeps every sendmmsg from this goroutine going through the
// same TX ring on the nic, so the wire sees per-flow order.
cpu := q % runtime.NumCPU()
if n := len(f.cpuAffinity); n > 0 {
cpu = f.cpuAffinity[q%n]
}
if err := util.PinThreadToCPU(cpu); err != nil {
f.l.Warn("failed to pin tun reader to CPU", "queue", q, "cpu", cpu, "err", err)
}
const bonusInfo = 16
bufferScale := udp.MTU + bonusInfo
numTunPackets := 1
caps := reader.Capabilities()
if caps.TSO || caps.USO {
bufferScale = 65535 + bonusInfo
numTunPackets = f.batchSize
}
func (f *Interface) listenIn(reader tio.Queue, i int) {
rejectBuf := make([]byte, mtu)
tunPackets := make([]wire.TunPacket, numTunPackets)
packetMem := make([]byte, bufferScale*numTunPackets)
arenaSize := batch.SendBatchCap * (udp.MTU + 32)
sb := batch.NewSendBatch(f.writers[q], batch.SendBatchCap, util.NewArena(arenaSize))
sb := batch.NewSendBatch(batch.SendBatchCap, udp.MTU+32)
fwPacket := &firewall.Packet{}
nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
conntrackCache := firewall.NewConntrackCacheTicker(f.ctx, f.l, f.conntrackCacheTimeout)
for {
n, err := reader.Read(tunPackets, packetMem)
pkts, err := reader.Read()
if err != nil {
if !f.closed.Load() {
f.l.Error("Error while reading outbound packet, closing", "error", err, "reader", q)
f.l.Error("Error while reading outbound packet, closing", "error", err, "reader", i)
f.onFatal(err)
}
break
}
ctCache := conntrackCache.Get()
for i := range n {
f.consumeInsidePacket(tunPackets[i], fwPacket, nb, sb, rejectBuf, q, ctCache)
sb.Reset()
for _, pkt := range pkts {
if sb.Len() >= sb.Cap() {
f.flushBatch(sb, i)
sb.Reset()
}
f.consumeInsidePacket(pkt, fwPacket, nb, sb, rejectBuf, i, conntrackCache.Get())
}
if err := sb.Flush(); err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to write outgoing batch", "error", err, "writer", q)
if sb.Len() > 0 {
f.flushBatch(sb, i)
}
}
f.l.Debug("overlay reader is done", "reader", q)
f.l.Debug("overlay reader is done", "reader", i)
}
func (f *Interface) flushBatch(sb batch.TxBatcher, q int) {
bufs, dsts := sb.Get()
if err := f.writers[q].WriteBatch(bufs, dsts); err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to write outgoing batch", "error", err, "writer", q)
}
}
func (f *Interface) RegisterConfigChangeCallbacks(c *config.C) {
@@ -435,7 +392,6 @@ func (f *Interface) RegisterConfigChangeCallbacks(c *config.C) {
c.RegisterReloadCallback(f.reloadAcceptRecvError)
c.RegisterReloadCallback(f.reloadDisconnectInvalid)
c.RegisterReloadCallback(f.reloadMisc)
c.RegisterReloadCallback(f.reloadEcn)
for _, udpConn := range f.writers {
c.RegisterReloadCallback(udpConn.ReloadConfig)
@@ -559,20 +515,6 @@ func (f *Interface) reloadMisc(c *config.C) {
}
}
// reloadEcn syncs Interface.ecnEnabled with the tunnels.ecn config knob.
// Default is enabled (RFC 6040 normal mode); set false on the rare path
// where an underlay middlebox rewrites or drops ECN bits unpredictably.
func (f *Interface) reloadEcn(c *config.C) {
initial := c.InitialLoad()
if initial || c.HasChanged("tunnels.ecn") {
v := c.GetBool("tunnels.ecn", true)
f.ecnEnabled.Store(v)
if !initial {
f.l.Info("tunnels.ecn changed", "enabled", v)
}
}
}
func (f *Interface) emitStats(ctx context.Context, i time.Duration) {
ticker := time.NewTicker(i)
defer ticker.Stop()
+46 -6
View File
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@ type LightHouse struct {
myVpnNetworks []netip.Prefix
myVpnNetworksTable *bart.Lite
punchConn udp.Conn
punchy *Punchy
// Local cache of answers from light houses
@@ -73,8 +75,9 @@ type LightHouse struct {
calculatedRemotes atomic.Pointer[bart.Table[[]*calculatedRemote]] // Maps VpnAddr to []*calculatedRemote
metrics *MessageMetrics
l *slog.Logger
metrics *MessageMetrics
metricHolepunchTx metrics.Counter
l *slog.Logger
}
// NewLightHouseFromConfig will build a Lighthouse struct from the values provided in the config object
@@ -102,6 +105,7 @@ func NewLightHouseFromConfig(ctx context.Context, l *slog.Logger, c *config.C, c
myVpnNetworksTable: cs.myVpnNetworksTable,
addrMap: make(map[netip.Addr]*RemoteList),
nebulaPort: nebulaPort,
punchConn: pc,
punchy: p,
updateTrigger: make(chan struct{}, 1),
queryChan: make(chan netip.Addr, c.GetUint32("handshakes.query_buffer", 64)),
@@ -114,6 +118,9 @@ func NewLightHouseFromConfig(ctx context.Context, l *slog.Logger, c *config.C, c
if c.GetBool("stats.lighthouse_metrics", false) {
h.metrics = newLighthouseMetrics()
h.metricHolepunchTx = metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("messages.tx.holepunch", nil)
} else {
h.metricHolepunchTx = metrics.NilCounter{}
}
err := h.reload(c, true)
@@ -1399,25 +1406,58 @@ func (lhh *LightHouseHandler) handleHostPunchNotification(n *NebulaMeta, fromVpn
return
}
empty := []byte{0}
punch := func(vpnPeer netip.AddrPort, logVpnAddr netip.Addr) {
if !vpnPeer.IsValid() {
return
}
go func() {
time.Sleep(lhh.lh.punchy.GetDelay())
lhh.lh.metricHolepunchTx.Inc(1)
lhh.lh.punchConn.WriteTo(empty, vpnPeer)
}()
if lhh.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
lhh.l.Debug("Punching",
"vpnPeer", vpnPeer,
"logVpnAddr", logVpnAddr,
)
}
}
remoteAllowList := lhh.lh.GetRemoteAllowList()
for _, a := range n.Details.V4AddrPorts {
b := protoV4AddrPortToNetAddrPort(a)
if remoteAllowList.Allow(detailsVpnAddr, b.Addr()) {
lhh.lh.punchy.Schedule(b, detailsVpnAddr)
punch(b, detailsVpnAddr)
}
}
for _, a := range n.Details.V6AddrPorts {
b := protoV6AddrPortToNetAddrPort(a)
if remoteAllowList.Allow(detailsVpnAddr, b.Addr()) {
lhh.lh.punchy.Schedule(b, detailsVpnAddr)
punch(b, detailsVpnAddr)
}
}
// This sends a nebula test packet to the host trying to contact us. In the case
// of a double nat or other difficult scenario, this may help establish
// a tunnel. ScheduleRespond is a no-op when punchy.respond is disabled.
lhh.lh.punchy.ScheduleRespond(detailsVpnAddr)
// a tunnel.
if lhh.lh.punchy.GetRespond() {
go func() {
time.Sleep(lhh.lh.punchy.GetRespondDelay())
if lhh.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
lhh.l.Debug("Sending a nebula test packet",
"vpnAddr", detailsVpnAddr,
)
}
//NOTE: we have to allocate a new output buffer here since we are spawning a new goroutine
// for each punchBack packet. We should move this into a timerwheel or a single goroutine
// managed by a channel.
w.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.Test, header.TestRequest, detailsVpnAddr, []byte(""), make([]byte, 12, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
}()
}
}
func protoAddrToNetAddr(addr *Addr) netip.Addr {
+9 -63
View File
@@ -5,10 +5,7 @@ import (
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/http"
_ "net/http/pprof"
"net/netip"
"runtime"
"runtime/debug"
"strings"
"time"
@@ -36,9 +33,6 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
buildVersion = moduleVersion()
}
//todo no merge
go http.ListenAndServe(":6060", nil)
// Print the config if in test, the exit comes later
if configTest {
b, err := yaml.Marshal(c.Settings)
@@ -61,7 +55,7 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
}
l.Info("Firewall started", "firewallHashes", fw.GetRuleHashes())
ssh, err := sshd.NewSSHServer(ctx, l.With("subsystem", "sshd"))
ssh, err := sshd.NewSSHServer(l.With("subsystem", "sshd"))
if err != nil {
return nil, util.ContextualizeIfNeeded("Error while creating SSH server", err)
}
@@ -176,7 +170,7 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
}
hostMap := NewHostMapFromConfig(l, c)
punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(l, c, udpConns[0])
punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(l, c)
connManager := newConnectionManagerFromConfig(l, c, hostMap, punchy)
lightHouse, err := NewLightHouseFromConfig(ctx, l, c, pki.getCertState(), udpConns[0], punchy)
if err != nil {
@@ -190,10 +184,14 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
messageMetrics = newMessageMetricsOnlyRecvError()
}
useRelays := c.GetBool("relay.use_relays", DefaultUseRelays) && !c.GetBool("relay.am_relay", false)
handshakeConfig := HandshakeConfig{
tryInterval: c.GetDuration("handshakes.try_interval", DefaultHandshakeTryInterval),
retries: int64(c.GetInt("handshakes.retries", DefaultHandshakeRetries)),
triggerBuffer: c.GetInt("handshakes.trigger_buffer", DefaultHandshakeTriggerBuffer),
tryInterval: c.GetDuration("handshakes.try_interval", DefaultHandshakeTryInterval),
retries: int64(c.GetInt("handshakes.retries", DefaultHandshakeRetries)),
triggerBuffer: c.GetInt("handshakes.trigger_buffer", DefaultHandshakeTriggerBuffer),
useRelays: useRelays,
messageMetrics: messageMetrics,
}
@@ -221,13 +219,11 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
DropLocalBroadcast: c.GetBool("tun.drop_local_broadcast", false),
DropMulticast: c.GetBool("tun.drop_multicast", false),
routines: routines,
batchSize: c.GetInt("listen.batch", 64),
MessageMetrics: messageMetrics,
version: buildVersion,
relayManager: NewRelayManager(ctx, l, hostMap, c),
punchy: punchy,
ConntrackCacheTimeout: conntrackCacheTimeout,
CpuAffinity: parseCpuAffinity(c, l, routines),
l: l,
}
@@ -245,12 +241,9 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
ifce.reloadDisconnectInvalid(c)
ifce.reloadSendRecvError(c)
ifce.reloadAcceptRecvError(c)
ifce.reloadEcn(c)
handshakeManager.f = ifce
go handshakeManager.Run(ctx)
punchy.Start(ctx, ifce, hostMap, lightHouse)
}
stats, err := newStatsServerFromConfig(ctx, l, c, buildVersion, configTest)
@@ -280,53 +273,6 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
}, nil
}
// parseCpuAffinity reads `tun.cpu_affinity` from the config — a list of
// integer CPU IDs, one per TUN reader goroutine. Empty / unset returns nil
// (listenIn falls back to its default `i % NumCPU` pinning). Length
// mismatch with `routines` is a warning, not an error: shorter lists are
// modulo-cycled across queues, longer lists' tail is ignored. Invalid
// entries (non-integer, out of range) are also a warning and disable the
// override entirely so we don't silently pin to the wrong CPU.
func parseCpuAffinity(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, routines int) []int {
raw := c.Get("tun.cpu_affinity")
if raw == nil {
return nil
}
rv, ok := raw.([]any)
if !ok {
l.Warn("tun.cpu_affinity must be a list of integers; ignoring", "value", raw)
return nil
}
nCPU := runtime.NumCPU()
cpus := make([]int, 0, len(rv))
for i, e := range rv {
var cpu int
switch v := e.(type) {
case int:
cpu = v
case int64:
cpu = int(v)
case float64:
cpu = int(v)
default:
l.Warn("tun.cpu_affinity entry not an integer; ignoring affinity",
"index", i, "value", e)
return nil
}
if cpu < 0 || cpu >= nCPU {
l.Warn("tun.cpu_affinity entry out of range; ignoring affinity",
"index", i, "cpu", cpu, "num_cpu", nCPU)
return nil
}
cpus = append(cpus, cpu)
}
if len(cpus) != routines {
l.Warn("tun.cpu_affinity length doesn't match routines; queues will modulo-cycle through the list",
"affinity_len", len(cpus), "routines", routines)
}
return cpus
}
func moduleVersion() string {
info, ok := debug.ReadBuildInfo()
if !ok {
-8
View File
@@ -13,8 +13,6 @@ type MessageMetrics struct {
rxUnknown metrics.Counter
txUnknown metrics.Counter
rxInvalid metrics.Counter
}
func (m *MessageMetrics) Rx(t header.MessageType, s header.MessageSubType, i int64) {
@@ -35,11 +33,6 @@ func (m *MessageMetrics) Tx(t header.MessageType, s header.MessageSubType, i int
}
}
}
func (m *MessageMetrics) RxInvalid(i int64) {
if m != nil && m.rxInvalid != nil {
m.rxInvalid.Inc(i)
}
}
func newMessageMetrics() *MessageMetrics {
gen := func(t string) [][]metrics.Counter {
@@ -63,7 +56,6 @@ func newMessageMetrics() *MessageMetrics {
rxUnknown: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("messages.rx.other", nil),
txUnknown: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("messages.tx.other", nil),
rxInvalid: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("messages.rx.invalid", nil),
}
}
+632 -45
View File
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ func (x NebulaControl_MessageType) String() string {
}
func (NebulaControl_MessageType) EnumDescriptor() ([]byte, []int) {
return fileDescriptor_2d65afa7693df5ef, []int{6, 0}
return fileDescriptor_2d65afa7693df5ef, []int{8, 0}
}
type NebulaMeta struct {
@@ -489,6 +489,142 @@ func (m *NebulaPing) GetTime() uint64 {
return 0
}
type NebulaHandshake struct {
Details *NebulaHandshakeDetails `protobuf:"bytes,1,opt,name=Details,proto3" json:"Details,omitempty"`
Hmac []byte `protobuf:"bytes,2,opt,name=Hmac,proto3" json:"Hmac,omitempty"`
}
func (m *NebulaHandshake) Reset() { *m = NebulaHandshake{} }
func (m *NebulaHandshake) String() string { return proto.CompactTextString(m) }
func (*NebulaHandshake) ProtoMessage() {}
func (*NebulaHandshake) Descriptor() ([]byte, []int) {
return fileDescriptor_2d65afa7693df5ef, []int{6}
}
func (m *NebulaHandshake) XXX_Unmarshal(b []byte) error {
return m.Unmarshal(b)
}
func (m *NebulaHandshake) XXX_Marshal(b []byte, deterministic bool) ([]byte, error) {
if deterministic {
return xxx_messageInfo_NebulaHandshake.Marshal(b, m, deterministic)
} else {
b = b[:cap(b)]
n, err := m.MarshalToSizedBuffer(b)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return b[:n], nil
}
}
func (m *NebulaHandshake) XXX_Merge(src proto.Message) {
xxx_messageInfo_NebulaHandshake.Merge(m, src)
}
func (m *NebulaHandshake) XXX_Size() int {
return m.Size()
}
func (m *NebulaHandshake) XXX_DiscardUnknown() {
xxx_messageInfo_NebulaHandshake.DiscardUnknown(m)
}
var xxx_messageInfo_NebulaHandshake proto.InternalMessageInfo
func (m *NebulaHandshake) GetDetails() *NebulaHandshakeDetails {
if m != nil {
return m.Details
}
return nil
}
func (m *NebulaHandshake) GetHmac() []byte {
if m != nil {
return m.Hmac
}
return nil
}
type NebulaHandshakeDetails struct {
Cert []byte `protobuf:"bytes,1,opt,name=Cert,proto3" json:"Cert,omitempty"`
InitiatorIndex uint32 `protobuf:"varint,2,opt,name=InitiatorIndex,proto3" json:"InitiatorIndex,omitempty"`
ResponderIndex uint32 `protobuf:"varint,3,opt,name=ResponderIndex,proto3" json:"ResponderIndex,omitempty"`
Cookie uint64 `protobuf:"varint,4,opt,name=Cookie,proto3" json:"Cookie,omitempty"`
Time uint64 `protobuf:"varint,5,opt,name=Time,proto3" json:"Time,omitempty"`
CertVersion uint32 `protobuf:"varint,8,opt,name=CertVersion,proto3" json:"CertVersion,omitempty"`
}
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) Reset() { *m = NebulaHandshakeDetails{} }
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) String() string { return proto.CompactTextString(m) }
func (*NebulaHandshakeDetails) ProtoMessage() {}
func (*NebulaHandshakeDetails) Descriptor() ([]byte, []int) {
return fileDescriptor_2d65afa7693df5ef, []int{7}
}
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) XXX_Unmarshal(b []byte) error {
return m.Unmarshal(b)
}
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) XXX_Marshal(b []byte, deterministic bool) ([]byte, error) {
if deterministic {
return xxx_messageInfo_NebulaHandshakeDetails.Marshal(b, m, deterministic)
} else {
b = b[:cap(b)]
n, err := m.MarshalToSizedBuffer(b)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return b[:n], nil
}
}
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) XXX_Merge(src proto.Message) {
xxx_messageInfo_NebulaHandshakeDetails.Merge(m, src)
}
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) XXX_Size() int {
return m.Size()
}
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) XXX_DiscardUnknown() {
xxx_messageInfo_NebulaHandshakeDetails.DiscardUnknown(m)
}
var xxx_messageInfo_NebulaHandshakeDetails proto.InternalMessageInfo
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) GetCert() []byte {
if m != nil {
return m.Cert
}
return nil
}
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) GetInitiatorIndex() uint32 {
if m != nil {
return m.InitiatorIndex
}
return 0
}
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) GetResponderIndex() uint32 {
if m != nil {
return m.ResponderIndex
}
return 0
}
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) GetCookie() uint64 {
if m != nil {
return m.Cookie
}
return 0
}
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) GetTime() uint64 {
if m != nil {
return m.Time
}
return 0
}
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) GetCertVersion() uint32 {
if m != nil {
return m.CertVersion
}
return 0
}
type NebulaControl struct {
Type NebulaControl_MessageType `protobuf:"varint,1,opt,name=Type,proto3,enum=nebula.NebulaControl_MessageType" json:"Type,omitempty"`
InitiatorRelayIndex uint32 `protobuf:"varint,2,opt,name=InitiatorRelayIndex,proto3" json:"InitiatorRelayIndex,omitempty"`
@@ -503,7 +639,7 @@ func (m *NebulaControl) Reset() { *m = NebulaControl{} }
func (m *NebulaControl) String() string { return proto.CompactTextString(m) }
func (*NebulaControl) ProtoMessage() {}
func (*NebulaControl) Descriptor() ([]byte, []int) {
return fileDescriptor_2d65afa7693df5ef, []int{6}
return fileDescriptor_2d65afa7693df5ef, []int{8}
}
func (m *NebulaControl) XXX_Unmarshal(b []byte) error {
return m.Unmarshal(b)
@@ -593,55 +729,65 @@ func init() {
proto.RegisterType((*V4AddrPort)(nil), "nebula.V4AddrPort")
proto.RegisterType((*V6AddrPort)(nil), "nebula.V6AddrPort")
proto.RegisterType((*NebulaPing)(nil), "nebula.NebulaPing")
proto.RegisterType((*NebulaHandshake)(nil), "nebula.NebulaHandshake")
proto.RegisterType((*NebulaHandshakeDetails)(nil), "nebula.NebulaHandshakeDetails")
proto.RegisterType((*NebulaControl)(nil), "nebula.NebulaControl")
}
func init() { proto.RegisterFile("nebula.proto", fileDescriptor_2d65afa7693df5ef) }
var fileDescriptor_2d65afa7693df5ef = []byte{
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0xe5, 0x9c, 0x85, 0x5c, 0x7c, 0x74, 0xa1, 0xc0, 0x54, 0x91, 0x43, 0xa4, 0x48, 0x93, 0xaa, 0xb7,
0xb9, 0x4a, 0xdb, 0x51, 0xbd, 0x2d, 0xa8, 0x72, 0x1a, 0x9a, 0xa0, 0x3b, 0x6c, 0x13, 0x70, 0x1a,
0x9a, 0x75, 0x61, 0x0c, 0x49, 0x43, 0xeb, 0x08, 0x34, 0x79, 0xe2, 0x1e, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x4f, 0xba,
0xa6, 0x11, 0x75, 0xe6, 0x89, 0xf8, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x9b, 0xa8, 0x11, 0xf5, 0x82, 0x59, 0x27, 0x00,
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0xb5, 0xf5, 0x15, 0x40, 0xde, 0xc6, 0xfb, 0xf6, 0xc8, 0x2a, 0xd4, 0x0b, 0x15, 0x1e, 0xd3, 0xc1,
0x9a, 0x7b, 0xc1, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x0f, 0x96, 0x60, 0x54, 0x0c, 0x16, 0x82, 0x76, 0xe3, 0xad, 0x68,
0xb2, 0x8f, 0x5c, 0x5b, 0xd6, 0xde, 0xd8, 0x08, 0xb1, 0x51, 0xc3, 0x03, 0x68, 0xc4, 0x97, 0x50,
0xb1, 0x7e, 0x84, 0x57, 0x71, 0xdd, 0x99, 0x1d, 0xb8, 0xd1, 0xc2, 0x5e, 0x52, 0xfc, 0x32, 0x9f,
0x51, 0x45, 0x5e, 0x9f, 0x9d, 0x0e, 0x32, 0xe6, 0xee, 0xa0, 0x8a, 0x26, 0x66, 0x2b, 0xdb, 0x91,
0x4d, 0x74, 0x88, 0x5c, 0x5b, 0x7f, 0x28, 0xd0, 0xaf, 0xd6, 0x09, 0xfa, 0x94, 0x86, 0x5c, 0xee,
0xd2, 0x21, 0x72, 0x8d, 0x47, 0xd0, 0x3b, 0x0b, 0x3c, 0xee, 0xd9, 0x9c, 0x85, 0x67, 0x81, 0x4b,
0x1f, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x77, 0xb2, 0x82, 0x47, 0x68, 0xb4, 0x66, 0x81, 0x4b, 0x13, 0x5e, 0xec, 0xe7,
0x4e, 0x16, 0xfb, 0xd0, 0x9c, 0x32, 0xb6, 0xf4, 0xa8, 0xa9, 0x49, 0x67, 0x92, 0x28, 0xf3, 0xab,
0x91, 0xfb, 0x85, 0x23, 0x68, 0x8b, 0x1e, 0x6e, 0x69, 0x18, 0x79, 0x2c, 0x30, 0x5b, 0xb2, 0x60,
0x31, 0x75, 0xae, 0xb5, 0x9a, 0x86, 0x7e, 0xae, 0xb5, 0x74, 0xa3, 0x65, 0xfd, 0x5a, 0x87, 0x6e,
0x7c, 0xb0, 0x29, 0x0b, 0x78, 0xc8, 0x7c, 0xfc, 0xa2, 0xf4, 0xdd, 0x3e, 0x2d, 0xbb, 0x96, 0x90,
0x2a, 0x3e, 0xdd, 0xe7, 0x70, 0x98, 0x1d, 0x4e, 0x0e, 0x4f, 0xf1, 0xdc, 0x55, 0x90, 0x50, 0x64,
0xc7, 0x2c, 0x28, 0x62, 0x07, 0xaa, 0x20, 0xfc, 0x0c, 0x7a, 0xe9, 0x38, 0xdf, 0x30, 0x79, 0xa9,
0xb5, 0xec, 0xe9, 0xd8, 0x41, 0x8a, 0xcf, 0xc2, 0x37, 0x21, 0x5b, 0x49, 0x76, 0x23, 0x63, 0xef,
0x61, 0x38, 0x86, 0x76, 0xb1, 0x70, 0xd5, 0x93, 0x53, 0x24, 0x64, 0xcf, 0x48, 0x56, 0x5c, 0xaf,
0x50, 0x94, 0x29, 0xd6, 0xec, 0xbf, 0xfe, 0x00, 0x7d, 0xc0, 0x69, 0x48, 0x6d, 0x4e, 0x25, 0x9f,
0xd0, 0x87, 0x0d, 0x8d, 0xb8, 0xa1, 0xe0, 0x47, 0x70, 0x58, 0xca, 0x0b, 0x4b, 0x22, 0x6a, 0xa8,
0xa7, 0xc7, 0xbf, 0x3d, 0x0f, 0x95, 0xa7, 0xe7, 0xa1, 0xf2, 0xd7, 0xf3, 0x50, 0xf9, 0xe5, 0x65,
0x58, 0x7b, 0x7a, 0x19, 0xd6, 0xfe, 0x7c, 0x19, 0xd6, 0x7e, 0x18, 0xdc, 0x7b, 0x7c, 0xb1, 0xb9,
0x1b, 0x3b, 0x6c, 0xf5, 0x26, 0xf2, 0x6d, 0x67, 0xb9, 0x78, 0x78, 0x13, 0xb7, 0x74, 0xd7, 0x94,
0x3f, 0xc2, 0xe3, 0x7f, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff, 0xea, 0x6f, 0xbc, 0x50, 0x18, 0x07, 0x00,
0x00,
}
func (m *NebulaMeta) Marshal() (dAtA []byte, err error) {
@@ -926,6 +1072,103 @@ func (m *NebulaPing) MarshalToSizedBuffer(dAtA []byte) (int, error) {
return len(dAtA) - i, nil
}
func (m *NebulaHandshake) Marshal() (dAtA []byte, err error) {
size := m.Size()
dAtA = make([]byte, size)
n, err := m.MarshalToSizedBuffer(dAtA[:size])
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return dAtA[:n], nil
}
func (m *NebulaHandshake) MarshalTo(dAtA []byte) (int, error) {
size := m.Size()
return m.MarshalToSizedBuffer(dAtA[:size])
}
func (m *NebulaHandshake) MarshalToSizedBuffer(dAtA []byte) (int, error) {
i := len(dAtA)
_ = i
var l int
_ = l
if len(m.Hmac) > 0 {
i -= len(m.Hmac)
copy(dAtA[i:], m.Hmac)
i = encodeVarintNebula(dAtA, i, uint64(len(m.Hmac)))
i--
dAtA[i] = 0x12
}
if m.Details != nil {
{
size, err := m.Details.MarshalToSizedBuffer(dAtA[:i])
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
i -= size
i = encodeVarintNebula(dAtA, i, uint64(size))
}
i--
dAtA[i] = 0xa
}
return len(dAtA) - i, nil
}
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) Marshal() (dAtA []byte, err error) {
size := m.Size()
dAtA = make([]byte, size)
n, err := m.MarshalToSizedBuffer(dAtA[:size])
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return dAtA[:n], nil
}
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) MarshalTo(dAtA []byte) (int, error) {
size := m.Size()
return m.MarshalToSizedBuffer(dAtA[:size])
}
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) MarshalToSizedBuffer(dAtA []byte) (int, error) {
i := len(dAtA)
_ = i
var l int
_ = l
if m.CertVersion != 0 {
i = encodeVarintNebula(dAtA, i, uint64(m.CertVersion))
i--
dAtA[i] = 0x40
}
if m.Time != 0 {
i = encodeVarintNebula(dAtA, i, uint64(m.Time))
i--
dAtA[i] = 0x28
}
if m.Cookie != 0 {
i = encodeVarintNebula(dAtA, i, uint64(m.Cookie))
i--
dAtA[i] = 0x20
}
if m.ResponderIndex != 0 {
i = encodeVarintNebula(dAtA, i, uint64(m.ResponderIndex))
i--
dAtA[i] = 0x18
}
if m.InitiatorIndex != 0 {
i = encodeVarintNebula(dAtA, i, uint64(m.InitiatorIndex))
i--
dAtA[i] = 0x10
}
if len(m.Cert) > 0 {
i -= len(m.Cert)
copy(dAtA[i:], m.Cert)
i = encodeVarintNebula(dAtA, i, uint64(len(m.Cert)))
i--
dAtA[i] = 0xa
}
return len(dAtA) - i, nil
}
func (m *NebulaControl) Marshal() (dAtA []byte, err error) {
size := m.Size()
dAtA = make([]byte, size)
@@ -1132,6 +1375,51 @@ func (m *NebulaPing) Size() (n int) {
return n
}
func (m *NebulaHandshake) Size() (n int) {
if m == nil {
return 0
}
var l int
_ = l
if m.Details != nil {
l = m.Details.Size()
n += 1 + l + sovNebula(uint64(l))
}
l = len(m.Hmac)
if l > 0 {
n += 1 + l + sovNebula(uint64(l))
}
return n
}
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) Size() (n int) {
if m == nil {
return 0
}
var l int
_ = l
l = len(m.Cert)
if l > 0 {
n += 1 + l + sovNebula(uint64(l))
}
if m.InitiatorIndex != 0 {
n += 1 + sovNebula(uint64(m.InitiatorIndex))
}
if m.ResponderIndex != 0 {
n += 1 + sovNebula(uint64(m.ResponderIndex))
}
if m.Cookie != 0 {
n += 1 + sovNebula(uint64(m.Cookie))
}
if m.Time != 0 {
n += 1 + sovNebula(uint64(m.Time))
}
if m.CertVersion != 0 {
n += 1 + sovNebula(uint64(m.CertVersion))
}
return n
}
func (m *NebulaControl) Size() (n int) {
if m == nil {
return 0
@@ -1948,6 +2236,305 @@ func (m *NebulaPing) Unmarshal(dAtA []byte) error {
}
return nil
}
func (m *NebulaHandshake) Unmarshal(dAtA []byte) error {
l := len(dAtA)
iNdEx := 0
for iNdEx < l {
preIndex := iNdEx
var wire uint64
for shift := uint(0); ; shift += 7 {
if shift >= 64 {
return ErrIntOverflowNebula
}
if iNdEx >= l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
b := dAtA[iNdEx]
iNdEx++
wire |= uint64(b&0x7F) << shift
if b < 0x80 {
break
}
}
fieldNum := int32(wire >> 3)
wireType := int(wire & 0x7)
if wireType == 4 {
return fmt.Errorf("proto: NebulaHandshake: wiretype end group for non-group")
}
if fieldNum <= 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("proto: NebulaHandshake: illegal tag %d (wire type %d)", fieldNum, wire)
}
switch fieldNum {
case 1:
if wireType != 2 {
return fmt.Errorf("proto: wrong wireType = %d for field Details", wireType)
}
var msglen int
for shift := uint(0); ; shift += 7 {
if shift >= 64 {
return ErrIntOverflowNebula
}
if iNdEx >= l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
b := dAtA[iNdEx]
iNdEx++
msglen |= int(b&0x7F) << shift
if b < 0x80 {
break
}
}
if msglen < 0 {
return ErrInvalidLengthNebula
}
postIndex := iNdEx + msglen
if postIndex < 0 {
return ErrInvalidLengthNebula
}
if postIndex > l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
if m.Details == nil {
m.Details = &NebulaHandshakeDetails{}
}
if err := m.Details.Unmarshal(dAtA[iNdEx:postIndex]); err != nil {
return err
}
iNdEx = postIndex
case 2:
if wireType != 2 {
return fmt.Errorf("proto: wrong wireType = %d for field Hmac", wireType)
}
var byteLen int
for shift := uint(0); ; shift += 7 {
if shift >= 64 {
return ErrIntOverflowNebula
}
if iNdEx >= l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
b := dAtA[iNdEx]
iNdEx++
byteLen |= int(b&0x7F) << shift
if b < 0x80 {
break
}
}
if byteLen < 0 {
return ErrInvalidLengthNebula
}
postIndex := iNdEx + byteLen
if postIndex < 0 {
return ErrInvalidLengthNebula
}
if postIndex > l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
m.Hmac = append(m.Hmac[:0], dAtA[iNdEx:postIndex]...)
if m.Hmac == nil {
m.Hmac = []byte{}
}
iNdEx = postIndex
default:
iNdEx = preIndex
skippy, err := skipNebula(dAtA[iNdEx:])
if err != nil {
return err
}
if (skippy < 0) || (iNdEx+skippy) < 0 {
return ErrInvalidLengthNebula
}
if (iNdEx + skippy) > l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
iNdEx += skippy
}
}
if iNdEx > l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
return nil
}
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) Unmarshal(dAtA []byte) error {
l := len(dAtA)
iNdEx := 0
for iNdEx < l {
preIndex := iNdEx
var wire uint64
for shift := uint(0); ; shift += 7 {
if shift >= 64 {
return ErrIntOverflowNebula
}
if iNdEx >= l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
b := dAtA[iNdEx]
iNdEx++
wire |= uint64(b&0x7F) << shift
if b < 0x80 {
break
}
}
fieldNum := int32(wire >> 3)
wireType := int(wire & 0x7)
if wireType == 4 {
return fmt.Errorf("proto: NebulaHandshakeDetails: wiretype end group for non-group")
}
if fieldNum <= 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("proto: NebulaHandshakeDetails: illegal tag %d (wire type %d)", fieldNum, wire)
}
switch fieldNum {
case 1:
if wireType != 2 {
return fmt.Errorf("proto: wrong wireType = %d for field Cert", wireType)
}
var byteLen int
for shift := uint(0); ; shift += 7 {
if shift >= 64 {
return ErrIntOverflowNebula
}
if iNdEx >= l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
b := dAtA[iNdEx]
iNdEx++
byteLen |= int(b&0x7F) << shift
if b < 0x80 {
break
}
}
if byteLen < 0 {
return ErrInvalidLengthNebula
}
postIndex := iNdEx + byteLen
if postIndex < 0 {
return ErrInvalidLengthNebula
}
if postIndex > l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
m.Cert = append(m.Cert[:0], dAtA[iNdEx:postIndex]...)
if m.Cert == nil {
m.Cert = []byte{}
}
iNdEx = postIndex
case 2:
if wireType != 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("proto: wrong wireType = %d for field InitiatorIndex", wireType)
}
m.InitiatorIndex = 0
for shift := uint(0); ; shift += 7 {
if shift >= 64 {
return ErrIntOverflowNebula
}
if iNdEx >= l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
b := dAtA[iNdEx]
iNdEx++
m.InitiatorIndex |= uint32(b&0x7F) << shift
if b < 0x80 {
break
}
}
case 3:
if wireType != 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("proto: wrong wireType = %d for field ResponderIndex", wireType)
}
m.ResponderIndex = 0
for shift := uint(0); ; shift += 7 {
if shift >= 64 {
return ErrIntOverflowNebula
}
if iNdEx >= l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
b := dAtA[iNdEx]
iNdEx++
m.ResponderIndex |= uint32(b&0x7F) << shift
if b < 0x80 {
break
}
}
case 4:
if wireType != 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("proto: wrong wireType = %d for field Cookie", wireType)
}
m.Cookie = 0
for shift := uint(0); ; shift += 7 {
if shift >= 64 {
return ErrIntOverflowNebula
}
if iNdEx >= l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
b := dAtA[iNdEx]
iNdEx++
m.Cookie |= uint64(b&0x7F) << shift
if b < 0x80 {
break
}
}
case 5:
if wireType != 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("proto: wrong wireType = %d for field Time", wireType)
}
m.Time = 0
for shift := uint(0); ; shift += 7 {
if shift >= 64 {
return ErrIntOverflowNebula
}
if iNdEx >= l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
b := dAtA[iNdEx]
iNdEx++
m.Time |= uint64(b&0x7F) << shift
if b < 0x80 {
break
}
}
case 8:
if wireType != 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("proto: wrong wireType = %d for field CertVersion", wireType)
}
m.CertVersion = 0
for shift := uint(0); ; shift += 7 {
if shift >= 64 {
return ErrIntOverflowNebula
}
if iNdEx >= l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
b := dAtA[iNdEx]
iNdEx++
m.CertVersion |= uint32(b&0x7F) << shift
if b < 0x80 {
break
}
}
default:
iNdEx = preIndex
skippy, err := skipNebula(dAtA[iNdEx:])
if err != nil {
return err
}
if (skippy < 0) || (iNdEx+skippy) < 0 {
return ErrInvalidLengthNebula
}
if (iNdEx + skippy) > l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
iNdEx += skippy
}
}
if iNdEx > l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
return nil
}
func (m *NebulaControl) Unmarshal(dAtA []byte) error {
l := len(dAtA)
iNdEx := 0
+15 -3
View File
@@ -60,9 +60,21 @@ message NebulaPing {
uint64 Time = 2;
}
// NebulaHandshake / NebulaHandshakeDetails moved to
// handshake/handshake.proto. The handshake package speaks that wire format
// directly via a hand-written encoder/decoder.
message NebulaHandshake {
NebulaHandshakeDetails Details = 1;
bytes Hmac = 2;
}
message NebulaHandshakeDetails {
bytes Cert = 1;
uint32 InitiatorIndex = 2;
uint32 ResponderIndex = 3;
uint64 Cookie = 4;
uint64 Time = 5;
uint32 CertVersion = 8;
// reserved for WIP multiport
reserved 6, 7;
}
message NebulaControl {
enum MessageType {
+73
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
package nebula
import (
"crypto/cipher"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
)
type endianness interface {
PutUint64(b []byte, v uint64)
}
var noiseEndianness endianness = binary.BigEndian
type NebulaCipherState struct {
c cipher.AEAD
}
func NewNebulaCipherState(s *noise.CipherState) *NebulaCipherState {
x := s.Cipher()
return &NebulaCipherState{c: x.(cipher.AEAD)}
}
// EncryptDanger encrypts and authenticates a given payload.
//
// out is a destination slice to hold the output of the EncryptDanger operation.
// - ad is additional data, which will be authenticated and appended to out, but not encrypted.
// - plaintext is encrypted, authenticated and appended to out.
// - n is a nonce value which must never be re-used with this key.
// - nb is a buffer used for temporary storage in the implementation of this call, which should
// be re-used by callers to minimize garbage collection.
func (s *NebulaCipherState) EncryptDanger(out, ad, plaintext []byte, n uint64, nb []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if s != nil {
// TODO: Is this okay now that we have made messageCounter atomic?
// Alternative may be to split the counter space into ranges
//if n <= s.n {
// return nil, errors.New("CRITICAL: a duplicate counter value was used")
//}
//s.n = n
nb[0] = 0
nb[1] = 0
nb[2] = 0
nb[3] = 0
noiseEndianness.PutUint64(nb[4:], n)
out = s.c.Seal(out, nb, plaintext, ad)
//l.Debugf("Encryption: outlen: %d, nonce: %d, ad: %s, plainlen %d", len(out), n, ad, len(plaintext))
return out, nil
} else {
return nil, errors.New("no cipher state available to encrypt")
}
}
func (s *NebulaCipherState) DecryptDanger(out, ad, ciphertext []byte, n uint64, nb []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if s != nil {
nb[0] = 0
nb[1] = 0
nb[2] = 0
nb[3] = 0
noiseEndianness.PutUint64(nb[4:], n)
return s.c.Open(out, nb, ciphertext, ad)
} else {
return []byte{}, nil
}
}
func (s *NebulaCipherState) Overhead() int {
if s != nil {
return s.c.Overhead()
}
return 0
}
-53
View File
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
package noiseutil
import (
"crypto/cipher"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
)
// CipherStateAESGCM is the data-plane wrapper for the AES-GCM AEAD cipher.
// AES-GCM uses big-endian nonce encoding per the Noise spec.
type CipherStateAESGCM struct {
c cipher.AEAD
}
// NewCipherStateAESGCM extracts the underlying AEAD from the post-handshake noise.CipherState.
// The caller is responsible for ensuring the noise cipher is actually AES-GCM,
// otherwise the type assertion still succeeds but the nonce endianness will be wrong on the wire.
func NewCipherStateAESGCM(s *noise.CipherState) *CipherStateAESGCM {
return &CipherStateAESGCM{c: s.Cipher().(cipher.AEAD)}
}
func (s *CipherStateAESGCM) EncryptDanger(out, ad, plaintext []byte, n uint64, nb []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if s == nil {
return nil, errors.New("no cipher state available to encrypt")
}
nb[0] = 0
nb[1] = 0
nb[2] = 0
nb[3] = 0
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(nb[4:], n)
return s.c.Seal(out, nb, plaintext, ad), nil
}
func (s *CipherStateAESGCM) DecryptDanger(out, ad, ciphertext []byte, n uint64, nb []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if s == nil {
return []byte{}, nil
}
nb[0] = 0
nb[1] = 0
nb[2] = 0
nb[3] = 0
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(nb[4:], n)
return s.c.Open(out, nb, ciphertext, ad)
}
func (s *CipherStateAESGCM) Overhead() int {
if s == nil {
return 0
}
return s.c.Overhead()
}
-52
View File
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
package noiseutil
import (
"crypto/cipher"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
)
// CipherStateChaChaPoly is the data-plane wrapper for the ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD cipher.
// ChaCha20-Poly1305 uses little-endian nonce encoding per the Noise spec.
type CipherStateChaChaPoly struct {
c cipher.AEAD
}
// NewCipherStateChaChaPoly extracts the underlying AEAD from the post-handshake noise.CipherState.
// The caller is responsible for ensuring the noise cipher is actually ChaCha20-Poly1305.
func NewCipherStateChaChaPoly(s *noise.CipherState) *CipherStateChaChaPoly {
return &CipherStateChaChaPoly{c: s.Cipher().(cipher.AEAD)}
}
func (s *CipherStateChaChaPoly) EncryptDanger(out, ad, plaintext []byte, n uint64, nb []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if s == nil {
return nil, errors.New("no cipher state available to encrypt")
}
nb[0] = 0
nb[1] = 0
nb[2] = 0
nb[3] = 0
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(nb[4:], n)
return s.c.Seal(out, nb, plaintext, ad), nil
}
func (s *CipherStateChaChaPoly) DecryptDanger(out, ad, ciphertext []byte, n uint64, nb []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if s == nil {
return []byte{}, nil
}
nb[0] = 0
nb[1] = 0
nb[2] = 0
nb[3] = 0
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(nb[4:], n)
return s.c.Open(out, nb, ciphertext, ad)
}
func (s *CipherStateChaChaPoly) Overhead() int {
if s == nil {
return 0
}
return s.c.Overhead()
}
-40
View File
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
package noiseutil
import (
"fmt"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
)
// CipherState is the post-handshake AEAD cipher used for the data plane.
// Each supported cipher has its own concrete implementation in this package with the nonce endianness hardcoded,
// so the encrypt/decrypt fast path avoids interface dispatch on the byte order.
type CipherState interface {
// EncryptDanger encrypts and authenticates a given payload.
//
// out is a destination slice to hold the output of the EncryptDanger operation.
// - ad is additional data, which will be authenticated and appended to out, but not encrypted.
// - plaintext is encrypted, authenticated and appended to out.
// - n is a nonce value which must never be re-used with this key.
// - nb is a scratch buffer used to assemble the nonce.
EncryptDanger(out, ad, plaintext []byte, n uint64, nb []byte) ([]byte, error)
// DecryptDanger authenticates and decrypts a given payload, with the same argument shape as EncryptDanger.
DecryptDanger(out, ad, ciphertext []byte, n uint64, nb []byte) ([]byte, error)
// Overhead returns the AEAD tag size, or 0 if the receiver is nil.
Overhead() int
}
// NewCipherState wraps the post-handshake noise.CipherState in the per-cipher type that matches cipherFunc.
// cipherFunc must be the same cipher used to build the noise CipherSuite that produced s.
func NewCipherState(s *noise.CipherState, cipherFunc noise.CipherFunc) CipherState {
switch cipherFunc.CipherName() {
case CipherAESGCM.CipherName():
return NewCipherStateAESGCM(s)
case noise.CipherChaChaPoly.CipherName():
return NewCipherStateChaChaPoly(s)
default:
panic(fmt.Sprintf("noiseutil: unsupported cipher %q", cipherFunc.CipherName()))
}
}
-222
View File
@@ -1,222 +0,0 @@
package noiseutil
import (
"testing"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestCipherStateAESGCMRoundtrip(t *testing.T) {
enc, dec := buildCipherStates(t, CipherAESGCM)
roundtrip(t, NewCipherStateAESGCM(enc), NewCipherStateAESGCM(dec))
}
func TestCipherStateChaChaPolyRoundtrip(t *testing.T) {
enc, dec := buildCipherStates(t, noise.CipherChaChaPoly)
roundtrip(t, NewCipherStateChaChaPoly(enc), NewCipherStateChaChaPoly(dec))
}
func TestNewCipherStateDispatch(t *testing.T) {
encA, _ := buildCipherStates(t, CipherAESGCM)
encC, _ := buildCipherStates(t, noise.CipherChaChaPoly)
assert.IsType(t, &CipherStateAESGCM{}, NewCipherState(encA, CipherAESGCM))
assert.IsType(t, &CipherStateChaChaPoly{}, NewCipherState(encC, noise.CipherChaChaPoly))
}
func TestNewCipherStateUnsupportedPanics(t *testing.T) {
enc, _ := buildCipherStates(t, CipherAESGCM)
assert.Panics(t, func() {
NewCipherState(enc, fakeCipher{})
})
}
type fakeCipher struct{}
func (fakeCipher) Cipher(k [32]byte) noise.Cipher { return nil }
func (fakeCipher) CipherName() string { return "Fake" }
// buildCipherStates runs an in-memory NN handshake with the requested cipher
// to produce a pair of post-handshake CipherStates that share keys.
func buildCipherStates(t *testing.T, c noise.CipherFunc) (*noise.CipherState, *noise.CipherState) {
t.Helper()
suite := noise.NewCipherSuite(noise.DH25519, c, noise.HashSHA256)
cfg := noise.Config{CipherSuite: suite, Pattern: noise.HandshakeNN}
cfg.Initiator = true
hsI, err := noise.NewHandshakeState(cfg)
require.NoError(t, err)
cfg.Initiator = false
hsR, err := noise.NewHandshakeState(cfg)
require.NoError(t, err)
msg, _, _, err := hsI.WriteMessage(nil, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
_, _, _, err = hsR.ReadMessage(nil, msg)
require.NoError(t, err)
msg, dR, _, err := hsR.WriteMessage(nil, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
_, eI, _, err := hsI.ReadMessage(nil, msg)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, eI)
require.NotNil(t, dR)
// noise returns (cs1, cs2) where cs1 is the initiator->responder cipher.
return eI, dR
}
func roundtrip(t *testing.T, enc, dec CipherState) {
t.Helper()
plaintext := []byte("nebula cipher state roundtrip")
ad := []byte("aad")
nb := make([]byte, 12)
ct, err := enc.EncryptDanger(nil, ad, plaintext, 1, nb)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotEqual(t, plaintext, ct)
pt, err := dec.DecryptDanger(nil, ad, ct, 1, nb)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, plaintext, pt)
// Wrong nonce must fail authentication.
_, err = dec.DecryptDanger(nil, ad, ct, 2, nb)
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, enc.Overhead(), dec.Overhead())
assert.Equal(t, 16, enc.Overhead())
}
func BenchmarkCipherStateEncryptAESGCM(b *testing.B) {
enc, _ := buildCipherStatesB(b, CipherAESGCM)
benchEncryptCipherState(b, NewCipherState(enc, CipherAESGCM))
}
func BenchmarkCipherStateEncryptChaChaPoly(b *testing.B) {
enc, _ := buildCipherStatesB(b, noise.CipherChaChaPoly)
benchEncryptCipherState(b, NewCipherState(enc, noise.CipherChaChaPoly))
}
func benchEncryptCipherState(b *testing.B, cs CipherState) {
plaintext := make([]byte, 1280)
ad := make([]byte, 16)
nb := make([]byte, 12)
out := make([]byte, 0, len(plaintext)+cs.Overhead())
b.ResetTimer()
b.ReportAllocs()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
var err error
out, err = cs.EncryptDanger(out[:0], ad, plaintext, uint64(i+1), nb)
if err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
}
}
func buildCipherStatesB(b *testing.B, c noise.CipherFunc) (*noise.CipherState, *noise.CipherState) {
b.Helper()
suite := noise.NewCipherSuite(noise.DH25519, c, noise.HashSHA256)
cfg := noise.Config{CipherSuite: suite, Pattern: noise.HandshakeNN}
cfg.Initiator = true
hsI, err := noise.NewHandshakeState(cfg)
if err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
cfg.Initiator = false
hsR, err := noise.NewHandshakeState(cfg)
if err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
msg, _, _, err := hsI.WriteMessage(nil, nil)
if err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
if _, _, _, err := hsR.ReadMessage(nil, msg); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
msg, dR, _, err := hsR.WriteMessage(nil, nil)
if err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
_, eI, _, err := hsI.ReadMessage(nil, msg)
if err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
return eI, dR
}
// TestDecryptDangerRelayShapeNoAlloc covers the AD-only relay path used in
// outside.go's handleOutsideRelayPacket: the body is AD, the trailing 16 bytes
// are the AEAD tag, the plaintext is empty, and the caller passes nil as the
// destination because it only needs the auth side-effect. The call must
// succeed, return an empty plaintext, and not allocate on the hot path.
func TestDecryptDangerRelayShapeNoAlloc(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
c noise.CipherFunc
wrap func(*noise.CipherState) CipherState
}{
{"AESGCM", CipherAESGCM, func(cs *noise.CipherState) CipherState { return NewCipherStateAESGCM(cs) }},
{"ChaChaPoly", noise.CipherChaChaPoly, func(cs *noise.CipherState) CipherState { return NewCipherStateChaChaPoly(cs) }},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
encCS, decCS := buildCipherStates(t, tc.c)
enc, dec := tc.wrap(encCS), tc.wrap(decCS)
ad := make([]byte, 1200) // typical relay packet body size
for i := range ad {
ad[i] = byte(i)
}
nb := make([]byte, 12)
// Build the "signature value" the way handleOutsideRelayPacket sees it:
// empty plaintext encrypted with the body as AD yields just the 16-byte tag.
tag, err := enc.EncryptDanger(nil, ad, nil, 1, nb)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, tag, dec.Overhead())
// Sanity: the relay-shaped call returns empty plaintext, no error.
out, err := dec.DecryptDanger(nil, ad, tag, 1, nb)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, out)
// Tampering with the AD must fail authentication.
ad[0] ^= 0xff
_, err = dec.DecryptDanger(nil, ad, tag, 1, nb)
require.Error(t, err)
ad[0] ^= 0xff
// The hot path must not allocate. AllocsPerRun does a warm-up run, so any
// one-time setup is excluded. Counter has to advance so the AEAD nonce is
// unique per call, but we don't care whether the auth succeeds — we only
// care about whether the call path allocates.
var counter uint64 = 2
allocs := testing.AllocsPerRun(100, func() {
_, _ = dec.DecryptDanger(nil, ad, tag, counter, nb)
counter++
})
assert.Equal(t, 0.0, allocs, "DecryptDanger(nil, ...) must not allocate")
})
}
}
func TestCipherStateNilSafety(t *testing.T) {
var aes *CipherStateAESGCM
_, err := aes.EncryptDanger(nil, nil, nil, 0, make([]byte, 12))
require.Error(t, err)
out, err := aes.DecryptDanger(nil, nil, nil, 0, make([]byte, 12))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, 0, aes.Overhead())
var cc *CipherStateChaChaPoly
_, err = cc.EncryptDanger(nil, nil, nil, 0, make([]byte, 12))
require.Error(t, err)
out, err = cc.DecryptDanger(nil, nil, nil, 0, make([]byte, 12))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, 0, cc.Overhead())
}
+218 -238
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import (
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
"golang.org/x/net/ipv4"
)
@@ -21,46 +20,23 @@ const (
minFwPacketLen = 4
)
var ErrOutOfWindow = errors.New("out of window packet")
func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, lhf *LightHouseHandler, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache, meta udp.RxMeta) {
func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte, h *header.H, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, lhf *LightHouseHandler, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
err := h.Parse(packet)
if err != nil {
// Hole punch packets are 0 or 1 byte big, so lets ignore printing those errors
// TODO: record metrics for rx holepunch/punchy packets?
if len(packet) > 1 {
f.messageMetrics.RxInvalid(1)
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
f.l.Debug("Error while parsing inbound packet",
"from", via,
"error", err,
"packet", packet,
)
}
}
return
}
if h.Version != header.Version {
f.messageMetrics.RxInvalid(1)
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
f.l.Debug("Unexpected header version received", "from", via)
}
return
}
// Check before processing to see if this is a expected type/subtype
if !h.IsValidSubType() {
f.messageMetrics.RxInvalid(1)
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
f.l.Debug("Unexpected packet received", "from", via)
f.l.Info("Error while parsing inbound packet",
"from", via,
"error", err,
"packet", packet,
)
}
return
}
//l.Error("in packet ", header, packet[HeaderLen:])
if !via.IsRelayed {
if f.myVpnNetworksTable.Contains(via.UdpAddr.Addr()) {
f.messageMetrics.RxInvalid(1)
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
f.l.Debug("Refusing to process double encrypted packet", "from", via)
}
@@ -68,194 +44,215 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H
}
}
// don't keep Rx metrics for message type, since you can see those in the tun metrics
if h.Type != header.Message {
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
}
// Unencrypted packets
switch h.Type {
case header.Handshake:
f.handshakeManager.HandleIncoming(via, packet, h)
return
case header.RecvError:
f.handleRecvError(via.UdpAddr, h)
return
}
// Relay packets are special
isMessageRelay := (h.Type == header.Message && h.Subtype == header.MessageRelay)
var hostinfo *HostInfo
if isMessageRelay {
// verify if we've seen this index before, otherwise respond to the handshake initiation
if h.Type == header.Message && h.Subtype == header.MessageRelay {
hostinfo = f.hostMap.QueryRelayIndex(h.RemoteIndex)
} else {
hostinfo = f.hostMap.QueryIndex(h.RemoteIndex)
}
// At this point we should have a valid existing tunnel, verify and send
// recvError if necessary
if hostinfo == nil || hostinfo.ConnectionState == nil {
if !via.IsRelayed {
f.maybeSendRecvError(via.UdpAddr, h.RemoteIndex)
}
return
var ci *ConnectionState
if hostinfo != nil {
ci = hostinfo.ConnectionState
}
// All remaining packets are encrypted
ci := hostinfo.ConnectionState
if !ci.window.Check(f.l, h.MessageCounter) {
return
}
// Relay packets are special
if isMessageRelay {
f.handleOutsideRelayPacket(hostinfo, via, packet, h, fwPacket, lhf, nb, q, localCache, meta)
return
}
out := f.batchers[q].Reserve(len(packet))[:0]
out, err = f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out, packet, h, nb)
if err != nil {
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("Failed to decrypt packet",
"error", err,
"from", via,
"header", h,
)
}
return
}
// Roam before we respond
f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, via)
f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo)
switch h.Type {
case header.Message:
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, via, h) {
return
}
switch h.Subtype {
case header.MessageNone:
f.handleOutsideMessagePacket(hostinfo, out, packet, fwPacket, nb, q, localCache, meta)
default:
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("IsValidSubType was true, but unexpected message subtype seen", "from", via, "header", h)
return
if !f.decryptToTun(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out, packet, fwPacket, nb, q, localCache) {
return
}
case header.MessageRelay:
// The entire body is sent as AD, not encrypted.
// The packet consists of a 16-byte parsed Nebula header, Associated Data-protected payload, and a trailing 16-byte AEAD signature value.
// The packet is guaranteed to be at least 16 bytes at this point, b/c it got past the h.Parse() call above. If it's
// otherwise malformed (meaning, there is no trailing 16 byte AEAD value), then this will result in at worst a 0-length slice
// which will gracefully fail in the DecryptDanger call.
signedPayload := packet[:len(packet)-hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead()]
signatureValue := packet[len(packet)-hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead():]
out, err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.DecryptDanger(out, signedPayload, signatureValue, h.MessageCounter, nb)
if err != nil {
return
}
// Successfully validated the thing. Get rid of the Relay header.
signedPayload = signedPayload[header.Len:]
// Pull the Roaming parts up here, and return in all call paths.
f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, via)
// Track usage of both the HostInfo and the Relay for the received & authenticated packet
f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo)
f.connectionManager.RelayUsed(h.RemoteIndex)
relay, ok := hostinfo.relayState.QueryRelayForByIdx(h.RemoteIndex)
if !ok {
// The only way this happens is if hostmap has an index to the correct HostInfo, but the HostInfo is missing
// its internal mapping. This should never happen.
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("HostInfo missing remote relay index",
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"remoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex,
)
return
}
switch relay.Type {
case TerminalType:
// If I am the target of this relay, process the unwrapped packet
// From this recursive point, all these variables are 'burned'. We shouldn't rely on them again.
via = ViaSender{
UdpAddr: via.UdpAddr,
relayHI: hostinfo,
remoteIdx: relay.RemoteIndex,
relay: relay,
IsRelayed: true,
}
f.readOutsidePackets(via, out[:0], signedPayload, h, fwPacket, lhf, nb, q, localCache)
return
case ForwardingType:
// Find the target HostInfo relay object
targetHI, targetRelay, err := f.hostMap.QueryVpnAddrsRelayFor(hostinfo.vpnAddrs, relay.PeerAddr)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Info("Failed to find target host info by ip",
"relayTo", relay.PeerAddr,
"error", err,
"hostinfo.vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
)
return
}
// If that relay is Established, forward the payload through it
if targetRelay.State == Established {
switch targetRelay.Type {
case ForwardingType:
// Forward this packet through the relay tunnel
// Find the target HostInfo
f.SendVia(targetHI, targetRelay, signedPayload, nb, out, false)
return
case TerminalType:
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Unexpected Relay Type of Terminal")
}
} else {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Info("Unexpected target relay state",
"relayTo", relay.PeerAddr,
"relayFrom", hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0],
"targetRelayState", targetRelay.State,
)
return
}
}
}
case header.LightHouse:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, via, h) {
return
}
d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out, packet, h, nb)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to decrypt lighthouse packet",
"error", err,
"from", via,
"packet", packet,
)
return
}
//TODO: assert via is not relayed
lhf.HandleRequest(via.UdpAddr, hostinfo.vpnAddrs, out, f)
lhf.HandleRequest(via.UdpAddr, hostinfo.vpnAddrs, d, f)
// Fallthrough to the bottom to record incoming traffic
case header.Test:
switch h.Subtype {
case header.TestReply:
// No-op, useful for the Roaming and connectionManager side-effects above
case header.TestRequest:
f.send(header.Test, header.TestReply, ci, hostinfo, out, nb, out)
default:
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("IsValidSubType was true, but unexpected test subtype seen", "from", via, "header", h)
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, via, h) {
return
}
d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out, packet, h, nb)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to decrypt test packet",
"error", err,
"from", via,
"packet", packet,
)
return
}
if h.Subtype == header.TestRequest {
// This testRequest might be from TryPromoteBest, so we should roam
// to the new IP address before responding
f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, via)
f.send(header.Test, header.TestReply, ci, hostinfo, d, nb, out)
}
// Fallthrough to the bottom to record incoming traffic
// Non encrypted messages below here, they should not fall through to avoid tracking incoming traffic since they
// are unauthenticated
case header.Handshake:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
f.handshakeManager.HandleIncoming(via, packet, h)
return
case header.RecvError:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
f.handleRecvError(via.UdpAddr, h)
return
case header.CloseTunnel:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, via, h) {
return
}
_, err = f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out, packet, h, nb)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to decrypt CloseTunnel packet",
"error", err,
"from", via,
"packet", packet,
)
return
}
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Info("Close tunnel received, tearing down.", "from", via)
f.closeTunnel(hostinfo)
return
case header.Control:
f.relayManager.HandleControlMsg(hostinfo, out, f)
default:
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("IsValidSubType was true, but unexpected message type seen", "from", via, "header", h)
}
}
func (f *Interface) handleOutsideRelayPacket(hostinfo *HostInfo, via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, lhf *LightHouseHandler, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache, meta udp.RxMeta) {
// The entire body is sent as AD, not encrypted.
// The packet consists of a 16-byte parsed Nebula header, Associated Data-protected payload, and a trailing 16-byte AEAD signature value.
// The packet is guaranteed to be at least 16 bytes at this point, b/c it got past the h.Parse() call above. If it's
// otherwise malformed (meaning, there is no trailing 16 byte AEAD value), then this will result in at worst a 0-length slice
// which will gracefully fail in the DecryptDanger call.
signedPayload := packet[:len(packet)-hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead()]
signatureValue := packet[len(packet)-hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead():]
// The decrypted output is empty (relay packets carry their payload as AD) and unused.
// The recursive readOutsidePackets call below operates on signedPayload. Passing
// nil avoids reserving an arena slot.
if _, err := hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.DecryptDanger(nil, signedPayload, signatureValue, h.MessageCounter, nb); err != nil {
return
}
// Successfully validated the thing. Get rid of the Relay header.
signedPayload = signedPayload[header.Len:]
// Pull the Roaming parts up here, and return in all call paths.
f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, via)
// Track usage of both the HostInfo and the Relay for the received & authenticated packet
f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo)
f.connectionManager.RelayUsed(h.RemoteIndex)
relay, ok := hostinfo.relayState.QueryRelayForByIdx(h.RemoteIndex)
if !ok {
// The only way this happens is if hostmap has an index to the correct HostInfo, but the HostInfo is missing
// its internal mapping. This should never happen.
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("HostInfo missing remote relay index",
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"remoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex,
)
return
}
switch relay.Type {
case TerminalType:
// If I am the target of this relay, process the unwrapped packet
// From this recursive point, all these variables are 'burned'. We shouldn't rely on them again.
via = ViaSender{
UdpAddr: via.UdpAddr,
relayHI: hostinfo,
remoteIdx: relay.RemoteIndex,
relay: relay,
IsRelayed: true,
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, via, h) {
return
}
f.readOutsidePackets(via, signedPayload, h, fwPacket, lhf, nb, q, localCache, meta)
case ForwardingType:
// Find the target HostInfo relay object
targetHI, targetRelay, err := f.hostMap.QueryVpnAddrsRelayFor(hostinfo.vpnAddrs, relay.PeerAddr)
d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out, packet, h, nb)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Info("Failed to find target host info by ip",
"relayTo", relay.PeerAddr,
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to decrypt Control packet",
"error", err,
"hostinfo.vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"packet", packet,
)
return
}
// If that relay is Established, forward the payload through it
if targetRelay.State == Established {
switch targetRelay.Type {
case ForwardingType:
// Forward this packet through the relay tunnel
// Find the target HostInfo //todo it would potentially be nice to batch these
out := f.batchers[q].Reserve(len(packet) + header.Len + hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead())[:0]
f.SendVia(targetHI, targetRelay, signedPayload, nb, out, false)
case TerminalType:
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Unexpected Relay Type of Terminal")
return
default:
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("Unexpected targetRelay Type", "from", via, "relayType", targetRelay.Type)
}
return
}
} else {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Info("Unexpected target relay state",
"relayTo", relay.PeerAddr,
"relayFrom", hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0],
"targetRelayState", targetRelay.State,
)
return
}
f.relayManager.HandleControlMsg(hostinfo, d, f)
default:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("Unexpected relay type", "from", via, "relayType", relay.Type)
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("Unexpected packet received", "from", via)
}
return
}
f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, via)
f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo)
}
// closeTunnel closes a tunnel locally, it does not send a closeTunnel packet to the remote
@@ -303,6 +300,23 @@ func (f *Interface) handleHostRoaming(hostinfo *HostInfo, via ViaSender) {
}
// handleEncrypted returns true if a packet should be processed, false otherwise
func (f *Interface) handleEncrypted(ci *ConnectionState, via ViaSender, h *header.H) bool {
// If connectionstate does not exist, send a recv error, if possible, to encourage a fast reconnect
if ci == nil {
if !via.IsRelayed {
f.maybeSendRecvError(via.UdpAddr, h.RemoteIndex)
}
return false
}
// If the window check fails, refuse to process the packet, but don't send a recv error
if !ci.window.Check(f.l, h.MessageCounter) {
return false
}
return true
}
var (
ErrPacketTooShort = errors.New("packet is too short")
ErrUnknownIPVersion = errors.New("packet is an unknown ip version")
@@ -509,74 +523,38 @@ func (f *Interface) decrypt(hostinfo *HostInfo, mc uint64, out []byte, packet []
}
if !hostinfo.ConnectionState.window.Update(f.l, mc) {
return nil, ErrOutOfWindow
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("dropping out of window packet", "header", h)
}
return nil, errors.New("out of window packet")
}
return out, nil
}
// 2-bit IP-level ECN codepoints (lower bits of IPv4 ToS / IPv6 TC).
const (
ecnNotECT = 0x00
ecnECT1 = 0x01
ecnECT0 = 0x02
ecnCE = 0x03
)
func (f *Interface) decryptToTun(hostinfo *HostInfo, messageCounter uint64, out []byte, packet []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) bool {
var err error
// applyOuterECN folds an outer CE mark from the underlay into the inner
// IP header per RFC 6040 normal mode. It mutates pkt[1] in place. Other
// codepoints are advisory only and leave the inner unchanged.
//
// Merge cases (outer × inner → action):
//
// outer != CE : no-op (inner is authoritative)
// outer == CE, inner Not-ECT : log; cannot propagate to a non-ECN host
// outer == CE, inner ECT/CE : rewrite inner ECN to CE
func applyOuterECN(pkt []byte, outerECN byte, hostinfo *HostInfo, l *slog.Logger) {
if outerECN&ecnCE != ecnCE || len(pkt) < 2 {
return
}
switch pkt[0] >> 4 {
case 4:
switch pkt[1] & 0x03 {
case ecnNotECT:
if l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(l).Debug("RFC 6040: outer CE on inner Not-ECT, leaving inner unchanged")
}
case ecnCE:
// Already CE.
default:
pkt[1] = (pkt[1] &^ 0x03) | ecnCE
}
case 6:
switch (pkt[1] >> 4) & 0x03 {
case ecnNotECT:
if l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(l).Debug("RFC 6040: outer CE on inner Not-ECT, leaving inner unchanged")
}
case ecnCE:
// Already CE.
default:
pkt[1] = (pkt[1] &^ 0x30) | (ecnCE << 4)
}
}
}
func (f *Interface) handleOutsideMessagePacket(hostinfo *HostInfo, out []byte, packet []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache, meta udp.RxMeta) {
// RFC 6040 normal-mode combine: fold any outer CE mark stamped by the
// underlay into the inner header before firewall + TUN write. Other
// outer codepoints are advisory only — we keep the inner unchanged.
if f.ecnEnabled.Load() {
applyOuterECN(out, meta.OuterECN, hostinfo, f.l)
out, err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.DecryptDanger(out, packet[:header.Len], packet[header.Len:], messageCounter, nb)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to decrypt packet", "error", err)
return false
}
err := newPacket(out, true, fwPacket)
err = newPacket(out, true, fwPacket)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Warn("Error while validating inbound packet",
"error", err,
"packet", out,
)
return
return false
}
if !hostinfo.ConnectionState.window.Update(f.l, messageCounter) {
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("dropping out of window packet", "fwPacket", fwPacket)
}
return false
}
dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(*fwPacket, true, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), localCache)
@@ -590,13 +568,15 @@ func (f *Interface) handleOutsideMessagePacket(hostinfo *HostInfo, out []byte, p
"reason", dropReason,
)
}
return
return false
}
f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo)
err = f.batchers[q].Commit(out)
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to write to tun", "error", err)
}
return true
}
func (f *Interface) maybeSendRecvError(endpoint netip.AddrPort, index uint32) {
+33
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
package batch
import "net/netip"
type RxBatcher interface {
// Reserve creates a pkt to borrow
Reserve(sz int) []byte
// Commit borrows pkt. The caller must keep pkt valid until the next Flush
Commit(pkt []byte) error
// Flush emits every queued packet in arrival order. Returns the
// first error observed; keeps draining so one bad packet doesn't hold up
// the rest. After Flush returns, borrowed payload slices may be recycled.
Flush() error
}
type TxBatcher interface {
// Next returns a zero-length slice with slotCap capacity over the next unused
// slot's backing bytes. The caller writes into the returned slice and then
// calls Commit with the final length and destination. Next returns nil when
// the batch is full.
Next() []byte
// Commit records the slot just returned by Next as a packet of length n
// destined for dst.
Commit(n int, dst netip.AddrPort)
// Reset clears committed slots; backing storage is retained for reuse.
Reset()
// Len returns the number of committed packets.
Len() int
// Cap returns the maximum number of slots in the batch.
Cap() int
// Get returns the buffers needed to send the batch
Get() ([][]byte, []netip.AddrPort)
}
-149
View File
@@ -1,149 +0,0 @@
package batch
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/binary"
)
// flowKey identifies a transport flow by {src, dst, sport, dport, family}.
// Comparable, so map lookups and linear scans over the slot list stay tight.
// Shared by the TCP and UDP coalescers; each coalescer keeps its own
// openSlots map, so a TCP and UDP flow on the same 5-tuple-without-proto
// never alias.
type flowKey struct {
src, dst [16]byte
sport, dport uint16
isV6 bool
}
// initialSlots is the starting capacity of the slot pool. One flow per
// packet is the worst case so this matches a typical carrier-side
// recvmmsg batch on the encrypted UDP socket.
const initialSlots = 64
// parsedIP is the IP-level result of parseIPPrologue. The caller layers
// L4-specific parsing (TCP / UDP) on top.
type parsedIP struct {
fk flowKey
ipHdrLen int
// pkt is the original buffer trimmed to the IP-declared total length.
// Anything below the IP layer (transport parsers) should slice into
// pkt rather than the unbounded original.
pkt []byte
}
// parseIPPrologue extracts the IP-level fields the coalescers care about:
// IHL/payload length, version, src/dst addresses, and the L4 protocol byte.
// Returns ok=false for malformed input, IPv4 with options or fragmentation,
// or IPv6 with extension headers (all rejected by both coalescers in
// identical ways before this refactor).
//
// On success, p.pkt is len-trimmed to the IP-declared length so callers
// don't have to repeat the trim. wantProto is the IANA protocol number to
// require (6 for TCP, 17 for UDP); ok=false for any other value.
func parseIPPrologue(pkt []byte, wantProto byte) (parsedIP, bool) {
var p parsedIP
if len(pkt) < 20 {
return p, false
}
v := pkt[0] >> 4
switch v {
case 4:
ihl := int(pkt[0]&0x0f) * 4
if ihl != 20 {
return p, false
}
if pkt[9] != wantProto {
return p, false
}
// Reject actual fragmentation (MF or non-zero frag offset).
if binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[6:8])&0x3fff != 0 {
return p, false
}
totalLen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[2:4]))
if totalLen > len(pkt) || totalLen < ihl {
return p, false
}
p.ipHdrLen = 20
p.fk.isV6 = false
copy(p.fk.src[:4], pkt[12:16])
copy(p.fk.dst[:4], pkt[16:20])
p.pkt = pkt[:totalLen]
case 6:
if len(pkt) < 40 {
return p, false
}
if pkt[6] != wantProto {
return p, false
}
payloadLen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[4:6]))
if 40+payloadLen > len(pkt) {
return p, false
}
p.ipHdrLen = 40
p.fk.isV6 = true
copy(p.fk.src[:], pkt[8:24])
copy(p.fk.dst[:], pkt[24:40])
p.pkt = pkt[:40+payloadLen]
default:
return p, false
}
return p, true
}
// ipHeadersMatch compares the IP portion of two packet header prefixes for
// byte-for-byte equality on every field that must be identical across
// coalesced segments. Size/IPID/IPCsum and the 2-bit IP-level ECN field are
// masked out — the appendPayload step merges CE into the seed.
//
// The transport (L4) portion of the header is checked separately by the
// per-protocol matcher.
func ipHeadersMatch(a, b []byte, isV6 bool) bool {
if isV6 {
// IPv6: byte 0 = version/TC[7:4], byte 1 = TC[3:0]/flow[19:16],
// bytes [2:4] = flow[15:0], [6:8] = next_hdr/hop, [8:40] = src+dst.
// ECN lives in TC[1:0] = byte 1 mask 0x30. Skip [4:6] payload_len.
if a[0] != b[0] {
return false
}
if a[1]&^0x30 != b[1]&^0x30 {
return false
}
if !bytes.Equal(a[2:4], b[2:4]) {
return false
}
if !bytes.Equal(a[6:40], b[6:40]) {
return false
}
return true
}
// IPv4: byte 0 = version/IHL, byte 1 = DSCP(6)|ECN(2),
// [6:10] flags/fragoff/TTL/proto, [12:20] src+dst.
// Skip [2:4] total len, [4:6] id, [10:12] csum.
if a[0] != b[0] {
return false
}
if a[1]&^0x03 != b[1]&^0x03 {
return false
}
if !bytes.Equal(a[6:10], b[6:10]) {
return false
}
if !bytes.Equal(a[12:20], b[12:20]) {
return false
}
return true
}
// mergeECNIntoSeed ORs the 2-bit IP-level ECN field of pkt's IP header
// onto the seed's IP header, so a CE mark on any coalesced segment
// propagates to the final superpacket. (CE is 0b11; ORing yields CE if
// any segment carried it.) Used by both TCP and UDP coalescers, so the
// invariant lives in one place.
func mergeECNIntoSeed(seedHdr, pktHdr []byte, isV6 bool) {
if isV6 {
seedHdr[1] |= pktHdr[1] & 0x30
} else {
seedHdr[1] |= pktHdr[1] & 0x03
}
}
-136
View File
@@ -1,136 +0,0 @@
package batch
import (
"errors"
"log/slog"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
)
// MultiCoalescer fans plaintext packets out to lane-specific batchers based
// on the IP/L4 protocol of the packet, sharing a single Reserve arena
// across lanes so the caller's allocation pattern is unchanged.
//
// Lanes are processed independently: the TCP coalescer only sees TCP, the
// UDP coalescer only sees UDP, and the passthrough lane handles everything
// else. Per-flow arrival order is preserved because a single 5-tuple only
// ever lands in one lane and each lane preserves its own slot order.
//
// Cross-lane order is NOT preserved across the TCP/UDP/passthrough split.
// This is acceptable because the carrier-side recvmmsg path already
// stable-sorts by (peer, message counter) before delivering plaintext
// here, so replay-window invariants are unaffected, and apps observe
// correct per-flow ordering — which is all the IP layer guarantees anyway.
// Do not "fix" this by interleaving lane outputs at flush time; that
// negates the entire point of coalescing (each lane needs to see runs of
// adjacent same-flow packets to coalesce them).
type MultiCoalescer struct {
tcp *TCPCoalescer
udp *UDPCoalescer
pt *Passthrough
// arena is shared across every lane (constructor hands the same
// *Arena to TCP, UDP, and Passthrough), so there's exactly one
// backing slab per MultiCoalescer instance. Each lane's Flush calls
// Reset; the resets are idempotent because Multi.Flush drains lanes
// sequentially and never Reserves in between, so a later lane's
// slots stay readable across an earlier lane's Reset (the underlying
// bytes are still alive — Reset only re-slices len to 0).
arena *util.Arena
}
// NewMultiCoalescer builds a multi-lane batcher. tcpEnabled lets the caller
// opt out of TCP coalescing (e.g. when the queue can't do TSO); udpEnabled
// likewise gates UDP coalescing (only enable when USO was negotiated).
// Either lane disabled redirects its traffic into the passthrough lane.
// arena is the single backing slab shared across every lane; the caller
// pre-sizes it via NewArena so the hot path never allocates.
func NewMultiCoalescer(w tio.Queue, l *slog.Logger, arena *util.Arena, tcpEnabled, udpEnabled bool) *MultiCoalescer {
m := &MultiCoalescer{
pt: NewPassthrough(w, initialSlots, arena),
arena: arena,
}
if tcpEnabled {
m.tcp = NewTCPCoalescer(w, l, arena)
}
if udpEnabled {
m.udp = NewUDPCoalescer(w, arena)
}
return m
}
func (m *MultiCoalescer) Reserve(sz int) []byte {
return m.arena.Reserve(sz)
}
// Commit dispatches pkt to the appropriate lane based on IP version + L4
// proto. Borrowed slice contract is identical to the single-lane batchers,
// pkt must remain valid until the next Flush.
//
// On the success path the IP/TCP-or-UDP parse happens here once and the
// parsed struct is handed to the lane via commitParsed so the lane doesn't
// re-walk the header.
func (m *MultiCoalescer) Commit(pkt []byte) error {
if len(pkt) < 20 {
return m.pt.Commit(pkt)
}
v := pkt[0] >> 4
var proto byte
switch v {
case 4:
proto = pkt[9]
case 6:
if len(pkt) < 40 {
return m.pt.Commit(pkt)
}
proto = pkt[6]
default:
return m.pt.Commit(pkt)
}
switch proto {
case ipProtoTCP:
if m.tcp != nil {
info, ok := parseTCPBase(pkt)
if !ok {
// Malformed/unsupported TCP shape (IP options, fragments, ...).
// Handle this via passthrough support in the TCP coalescer, to attempt to preserve flow order.
m.tcp.addPassthrough(pkt)
return nil
}
return m.tcp.commitParsed(pkt, info)
}
case ipProtoUDP:
if m.udp != nil {
info, ok := parseUDP(pkt)
if !ok {
m.udp.addPassthrough(pkt) //we could also m.pt.Commit() here I guess?
return nil
}
return m.udp.commitParsed(pkt, info)
}
}
return m.pt.Commit(pkt)
}
// Flush drains every lane in a fixed order: TCP, UDP, passthrough. Errors
// from a lane do not stop subsequent lanes from flushing, we keep
// draining and return the first observed error so a single bad packet
// doesn't strand the others.
func (m *MultiCoalescer) Flush() error {
var errs []error
if m.tcp != nil {
if err := m.tcp.Flush(); err != nil {
errs = append(errs, err)
}
}
if m.udp != nil {
if err := m.udp.Flush(); err != nil {
errs = append(errs, err)
}
}
if err := m.pt.Flush(); err != nil {
errs = append(errs, err)
}
return errors.Join(errs...)
}
-97
View File
@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
package batch
import (
"testing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
)
// TestMultiCoalescerRoutesByProto confirms TCP/UDP/other land in the right
// lane: TCP and UDP get coalesced when their lanes are enabled, anything
// else (ICMP here) falls through to plain Write.
func TestMultiCoalescerRoutesByProto(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
m := NewMultiCoalescer(w, test.NewLogger(), util.NewArena(0), true, true)
tcpPay := make([]byte, 1200)
udpPay := make([]byte, 1200)
icmp := make([]byte, 28)
icmp[0] = 0x45
icmp[2] = 0
icmp[3] = 28
icmp[9] = 1
if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, tcpPay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4(2200, tcpAck, tcpPay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Commit(buildUDPv4(2000, 53, udpPay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Commit(buildUDPv4(2000, 53, udpPay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Commit(icmp); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// 1 TCP super (2 segments) + 1 UDP super (2 segments) = 2 gso writes.
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 gso writes (one TCP + one UDP), got %d", len(w.gsoWrites))
}
if len(w.writes) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("want 1 plain write (ICMP), got %d", len(w.writes))
}
}
// TestMultiCoalescerDisabledUDPFallsThrough verifies that when the UDP lane
// is disabled (e.g. kernel doesn't support USO), UDP packets still reach
// the kernel via the passthrough lane rather than being lost.
func TestMultiCoalescerDisabledUDPFallsThrough(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
m := NewMultiCoalescer(w, test.NewLogger(), util.NewArena(0), true, false) // TSO on, USO off
if err := m.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, make([]byte, 800))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, make([]byte, 800))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 0 {
t.Errorf("UDP must NOT be coalesced when USO disabled, got %d gso writes", len(w.gsoWrites))
}
if len(w.writes) != 2 {
t.Errorf("UDP must pass through as 2 plain writes, got %d", len(w.writes))
}
}
// TestMultiCoalescerDisabledTCPFallsThrough mirrors the TSO=off case.
func TestMultiCoalescerDisabledTCPFallsThrough(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
m := NewMultiCoalescer(w, test.NewLogger(), util.NewArena(0), false, true) // TSO off, USO on
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4(2200, tcpAck, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 0 {
t.Errorf("TCP must NOT be coalesced when TSO disabled, got %d gso writes", len(w.gsoWrites))
}
if len(w.writes) != 2 {
t.Errorf("TCP must pass through as 2 plain writes, got %d", len(w.writes))
}
}
+23 -13
View File
@@ -3,28 +3,36 @@ package batch
import (
"io"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
)
// Passthrough is a RxBatcher that doesn't batch anything, it just accumulates and then sends packets.
type Passthrough struct {
out io.Writer
slots [][]byte
// arena is injected; see TCPCoalescer.arena for the contract.
arena *util.Arena
cursor int
out io.Writer
slots [][]byte
backing []byte
cursor int
}
func NewPassthrough(w io.Writer, slots int, arena *util.Arena) *Passthrough {
func NewPassthrough(w io.Writer) *Passthrough {
const baseNumSlots = 128
return &Passthrough{
out: w,
slots: make([][]byte, 0, slots),
arena: arena,
out: w,
slots: make([][]byte, 0, baseNumSlots),
backing: make([]byte, 0, baseNumSlots*udp.MTU),
}
}
func (p *Passthrough) Reserve(sz int) []byte {
return p.arena.Reserve(sz)
if len(p.backing)+sz > cap(p.backing) {
// Grow: allocate a fresh backing. Already-committed slices still
// reference the old array and remain valid until Flush drops them.
newCap := max(cap(p.backing)*2, sz)
p.backing = make([]byte, 0, newCap)
}
start := len(p.backing)
p.backing = p.backing[:start+sz]
return p.backing[start : start+sz : start+sz] //return zero length, sz-cap slice
}
func (p *Passthrough) Commit(pkt []byte) error {
@@ -40,8 +48,10 @@ func (p *Passthrough) Flush() error {
firstErr = err
}
}
clear(p.slots)
for i := range p.slots {
p.slots[i] = nil
}
p.slots = p.slots[:0]
p.arena.Reset()
p.backing = p.backing[:0]
return firstErr
}
-12
View File
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
package batch
type RxBatcher interface {
// Reserve creates a pkt to borrow
Reserve(sz int) []byte
// Commit borrows pkt. The caller must keep pkt valid until the next Flush
Commit(pkt []byte) error
// Flush emits every queued packet in arrival order. Returns the
// first error observed; keeps draining so one bad packet doesn't hold up
// the rest. After Flush returns, borrowed payload slices may be recycled.
Flush() error
}
+120 -357
View File
@@ -2,16 +2,10 @@ package batch
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/binary"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/netip"
"slices"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/wire"
)
// ipProtoTCP is the IANA protocol number for TCP. Hardcoded instead of
@@ -33,6 +27,18 @@ const tcpCoalesceMaxSegs = 64
// into. IPv6 (40) + TCP with full options (60) = 100 bytes.
const tcpCoalesceHdrCap = 100
// initialSlots is the starting capacity of the slot pool. One flow per
// packet is the worst case so this matches a typical UDP recvmmsg batch.
const initialSlots = 64
// flowKey identifies a TCP flow by {src, dst, sport, dport, family}.
// Comparable, so linear scans over the slot list stay tight.
type flowKey struct {
src, dst [16]byte
sport, dport uint16
isV6 bool
}
// coalesceSlot is one entry in the coalescer's ordered event queue. When
// passthrough is true the slot holds a single borrowed packet that must be
// emitted verbatim (non-TCP, non-admissible TCP, or oversize seed). When
@@ -77,33 +83,20 @@ type TCPCoalescer struct {
// removed from this map when they close (PSH or short-last-segment),
// when a non-admissible packet for that flow arrives, or in Flush.
openSlots map[flowKey]*coalesceSlot
// lastSlot caches the most recently touched open slot. Steady-state
// bulk traffic is dominated by a single flow, so comparing the
// incoming key against the cached slot's own fk lets the hot path
// skip the map lookup (and the aeshash of a 38-byte key) entirely.
// Kept in lockstep with openSlots: nil whenever the slot it pointed
// at is removed/sealed.
lastSlot *coalesceSlot
pool []*coalesceSlot // free list for reuse
pool []*coalesceSlot // free list for reuse
// arena is injected; the coalescer borrows slices from it via Reserve
// and tells it to release them via Reset on Flush. When wrapped in
// MultiCoalescer the same *Arena is shared with the other lanes so
// there's exactly one backing slab per Multi instance.
arena *util.Arena
l *slog.Logger
backing []byte
}
func NewTCPCoalescer(w tio.Queue, l *slog.Logger, arena *util.Arena) *TCPCoalescer {
func NewTCPCoalescer(w io.Writer) *TCPCoalescer {
c := &TCPCoalescer{
plainW: w,
slots: make([]*coalesceSlot, 0, initialSlots),
openSlots: make(map[flowKey]*coalesceSlot, initialSlots),
pool: make([]*coalesceSlot, 0, initialSlots),
arena: arena,
l: l,
backing: make([]byte, 0, initialSlots*65535),
}
if gw, ok := tio.SupportsGSO(w, wire.GSOProtoTCP); ok {
if gw, ok := w.(tio.GSOWriter); ok && gw.GSOSupported() {
c.gsoW = gw
}
return c
@@ -127,13 +120,51 @@ type parsedTCP struct {
// and IPv6 (no extension headers).
func parseTCPBase(pkt []byte) (parsedTCP, bool) {
var p parsedTCP
ip, ok := parseIPPrologue(pkt, ipProtoTCP)
if !ok {
if len(pkt) < 20 {
return p, false
}
v := pkt[0] >> 4
switch v {
case 4:
ihl := int(pkt[0]&0x0f) * 4
if ihl != 20 {
return p, false
}
if pkt[9] != ipProtoTCP {
return p, false
}
// Reject actual fragmentation (MF or non-zero frag offset).
if binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[6:8])&0x3fff != 0 {
return p, false
}
totalLen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[2:4]))
if totalLen > len(pkt) || totalLen < ihl {
return p, false
}
p.ipHdrLen = 20
p.fk.isV6 = false
copy(p.fk.src[:4], pkt[12:16])
copy(p.fk.dst[:4], pkt[16:20])
pkt = pkt[:totalLen]
case 6:
if len(pkt) < 40 {
return p, false
}
if pkt[6] != ipProtoTCP {
return p, false
}
payloadLen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[4:6]))
if 40+payloadLen > len(pkt) {
return p, false
}
p.ipHdrLen = 40
p.fk.isV6 = true
copy(p.fk.src[:], pkt[8:24])
copy(p.fk.dst[:], pkt[24:40])
pkt = pkt[:40+payloadLen]
default:
return p, false
}
pkt = ip.pkt
p.fk = ip.fk
p.ipHdrLen = ip.ipHdrLen
if len(pkt) < p.ipHdrLen+20 {
return p, false
@@ -155,32 +186,27 @@ func parseTCPBase(pkt []byte) (parsedTCP, bool) {
return p, true
}
// TCP flag bits (byte 13 of the TCP header). Only the bits actually consulted
// by the coalescer are named; FIN/SYN/RST/URG/CWR are rejected via the
// negative mask in coalesceable, not by name.
const (
tcpFlagPsh = 0x08
tcpFlagAck = 0x10
tcpFlagEce = 0x40
)
// coalesceable reports whether a parsed TCP segment is eligible for
// coalescing. Accepts ACK, ACK|PSH, ACK|ECE, ACK|PSH|ECE with a
// non-empty payload. CWR is excluded because it marks a one-shot
// congestion-window-reduced transition the receiver must observe at a
// segment boundary.
// coalescing. Accepts only ACK or ACK|PSH with a non-empty payload.
func (p parsedTCP) coalesceable() bool {
if p.flags&tcpFlagAck == 0 {
return false
}
if p.flags&^(tcpFlagAck|tcpFlagPsh|tcpFlagEce) != 0 {
const ack = 0x10
const psh = 0x08
if p.flags&^(ack|psh) != 0 || p.flags&ack == 0 {
return false
}
return p.payLen > 0
}
func (c *TCPCoalescer) Reserve(sz int) []byte {
return c.arena.Reserve(sz)
if len(c.backing)+sz > cap(c.backing) {
// Grow: allocate a fresh backing. Already-committed slices still
// reference the old array and remain valid until Flush drops them.
newCap := max(cap(c.backing)*2, sz)
c.backing = make([]byte, 0, newCap)
}
start := len(c.backing)
c.backing = c.backing[:start+sz]
return c.backing[start : start+sz : start+sz] //return zero length, sz-cap slice
}
// Commit borrows pkt. The caller must keep pkt valid until the next Flush,
@@ -191,77 +217,42 @@ func (c *TCPCoalescer) Commit(pkt []byte) error {
c.addPassthrough(pkt)
return nil
}
info, ok := parseTCPBase(pkt)
if !ok {
c.addPassthrough(pkt)
return nil
}
return c.commitParsed(pkt, info)
}
// commitParsed is the post-parse half of Commit. The caller must have
// already verified parseTCPBase succeeded (info is a valid TCP parse).
// Used by MultiCoalescer.Commit to avoid re-walking the IP/TCP header
// after the dispatcher has already done so.
func (c *TCPCoalescer) commitParsed(pkt []byte, info parsedTCP) error {
if c.gsoW == nil {
// Non-TCP or malformed — can't possibly collide with an open flow.
c.addPassthrough(pkt)
return nil
}
if !info.coalesceable() {
// TCP but not admissible (SYN/FIN/RST/URG/CWR or zero-payload).
// TCP but not admissible (SYN/FIN/RST/URG/CWR/ECE or zero-payload).
// Seal this flow's open slot so later in-flow packets don't extend
// it and accidentally reorder past this passthrough.
if last := c.lastSlot; last != nil && last.fk == info.fk {
c.lastSlot = nil
}
delete(c.openSlots, info.fk)
c.addPassthrough(pkt)
return nil
}
// Single-flow fast path: with only one open flow the cache hits every
// packet, and len(openSlots)==1 lets us skip the 38-byte fk compare
// when there are multiple flows in flight (where the hit rate would
// be ~0 and the compare is pure overhead).
var open *coalesceSlot
if last := c.lastSlot; last != nil && len(c.openSlots) == 1 && last.fk == info.fk {
open = last
} else {
open = c.openSlots[info.fk]
}
if open != nil {
if open := c.openSlots[info.fk]; open != nil {
if c.canAppend(open, pkt, info) {
c.appendPayload(open, pkt, info)
if open.psh {
delete(c.openSlots, info.fk)
c.lastSlot = nil
} else {
c.lastSlot = open
}
return nil
}
// Can't extend — seal it and fall through to seed a fresh slot.
delete(c.openSlots, info.fk)
if c.lastSlot == open {
c.lastSlot = nil
}
}
c.seed(pkt, info)
return nil
}
// Flush emits every queued event in (per-flow) seq order. Coalesced slots
// go out via WriteGSO; passthrough slots go out via plainW.Write.
// reorderForFlush first sorts each flow's slots into TCP-seq order within
// passthrough-bounded segments and merges contiguous adjacent slots, so
// any wire-side reorder that crossed an rxOrder batch boundary doesn't
// get amplified into kernel-visible reorder by the slot machinery.
// Returns the first error observed; keeps draining so one bad packet
// doesn't hold up the rest. After Flush returns, borrowed payload slices
// may be recycled.
// Flush emits every queued event in arrival order. Coalesced slots go out
// via WriteGSO; passthrough slots go out via plainW.Write. Returns the
// first error observed; keeps draining so one bad packet doesn't hold up
// the rest. After Flush returns, borrowed payload slices may be recycled.
func (c *TCPCoalescer) Flush() error {
c.reorderForFlush()
var first error
for _, s := range c.slots {
var err error
@@ -275,12 +266,15 @@ func (c *TCPCoalescer) Flush() error {
}
c.release(s)
}
clear(c.slots)
for i := range c.slots {
c.slots[i] = nil
}
c.slots = c.slots[:0]
clear(c.openSlots)
c.lastSlot = nil
for k := range c.openSlots {
delete(c.openSlots, k)
}
c.arena.Reset()
c.backing = c.backing[:0]
return first
}
@@ -309,17 +303,11 @@ func (c *TCPCoalescer) seed(pkt []byte, info parsedTCP) {
s.numSeg = 1
s.totalPay = info.payLen
s.nextSeq = info.seq + uint32(info.payLen)
s.psh = info.flags&tcpFlagPsh != 0
s.psh = info.flags&0x08 != 0
s.payIovs = append(s.payIovs[:0], pkt[info.hdrLen:info.hdrLen+info.payLen])
c.slots = append(c.slots, s)
if !s.psh {
c.openSlots[info.fk] = s
c.lastSlot = s
} else if last := c.lastSlot; last != nil && last.fk == info.fk {
// PSH-on-seed seals the slot immediately. Any prior cached open
// slot for this flow has just been sealed-and-replaced by this
// passthrough-shaped seed, so drop the cache too.
c.lastSlot = nil
}
}
@@ -345,12 +333,6 @@ func (c *TCPCoalescer) canAppend(s *coalesceSlot, pkt []byte, info parsedTCP) bo
if s.hdrLen+s.totalPay+info.payLen > tcpCoalesceBufSize {
return false
}
// ECE state must be stable across a burst — receivers expect the
// flag set on every segment of a CE-echoing window or none.
seedFlags := s.hdrBuf[s.ipHdrLen+13]
if (seedFlags^info.flags)&tcpFlagEce != 0 {
return false
}
if !headersMatch(s.hdrBuf[:s.hdrLen], pkt[:info.hdrLen], s.isV6, s.ipHdrLen) {
return false
}
@@ -362,15 +344,12 @@ func (c *TCPCoalescer) appendPayload(s *coalesceSlot, pkt []byte, info parsedTCP
s.numSeg++
s.totalPay += info.payLen
s.nextSeq = info.seq + uint32(info.payLen)
if info.flags&tcpFlagPsh != 0 {
if info.flags&0x08 != 0 {
// Propagate PSH into the seed header so kernel TSO sets it on the
// last segment. Without this the sender's push signal is dropped.
s.hdrBuf[s.ipHdrLen+13] |= tcpFlagPsh
s.hdrBuf[s.ipHdrLen+13] |= 0x08
}
// Merge IP-level CE marks into the seed: headersMatch ignores ECN, so
// this is the one place the signal is preserved.
mergeECNIntoSeed(s.hdrBuf[:s.ipHdrLen], pkt[:s.ipHdrLen], s.isV6)
if info.payLen < s.gsoSize || info.flags&tcpFlagPsh != 0 {
if info.payLen < s.gsoSize || info.flags&0x08 != 0 {
s.psh = true
}
}
@@ -388,7 +367,9 @@ func (c *TCPCoalescer) take() *coalesceSlot {
func (c *TCPCoalescer) release(s *coalesceSlot) {
s.passthrough = false
s.rawPkt = nil
clear(s.payIovs)
for i := range s.payIovs {
s.payIovs[i] = nil
}
s.payIovs = s.payIovs[:0]
s.numSeg = 0
s.totalPay = 0
@@ -421,19 +402,37 @@ func (c *TCPCoalescer) flushSlot(s *coalesceSlot) error {
tcsum := s.ipHdrLen + 16
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[tcsum:tcsum+2], foldOnceNoInvert(psum))
return c.gsoW.WriteGSO(hdr[:s.ipHdrLen], hdr[s.ipHdrLen:], s.payIovs, wire.GSOProtoTCP)
return c.gsoW.WriteGSO(hdr[:s.ipHdrLen], hdr[s.ipHdrLen:], s.payIovs)
}
// headersMatch compares two IP+TCP header prefixes for byte-for-byte
// equality on every field that must be identical across coalesced
// segments. Size/IPID/IPCsum/seq/flags/tcpCsum are masked out, as is the
// 2-bit IP-level ECN field — appendPayload merges CE into the seed.
// segments. Size/IPID/IPCsum/seq/flags/tcpCsum are masked out.
func headersMatch(a, b []byte, isV6 bool, ipHdrLen int) bool {
if len(a) != len(b) {
return false
}
if !ipHeadersMatch(a, b, isV6) {
return false
if isV6 {
// IPv6: bytes [0:4] = version/TC/flow-label, [6:8] = next_hdr/hop,
// [8:40] = src+dst. Skip [4:6] payload length.
if !bytes.Equal(a[0:4], b[0:4]) {
return false
}
if !bytes.Equal(a[6:40], b[6:40]) {
return false
}
} else {
// IPv4: [0:2] version/IHL/TOS, [6:10] flags/fragoff/TTL/proto,
// [12:20] src+dst. Skip [2:4] total len, [4:6] id, [10:12] csum.
if !bytes.Equal(a[0:2], b[0:2]) {
return false
}
if !bytes.Equal(a[6:10], b[6:10]) {
return false
}
if !bytes.Equal(a[12:20], b[12:20]) {
return false
}
}
// TCP: compare [0:4] ports, [8:13] ack+dataoff, [14:16] window,
// [18:tcpHdrLen] options (incl. urgent).
@@ -453,241 +452,6 @@ func headersMatch(a, b []byte, isV6 bool, ipHdrLen int) bool {
return true
}
// reorderForFlush neutralizes wire-side reorder that the rxOrder buffer
// couldn't catch (anything crossing a recvmmsg batch boundary). Without
// this pass a small wire reorder — counter 250 arriving in batch K when
// 200..249 are coming in batch K+1 — would seed an out-of-seq slot first
// and emit it ahead of the lower-seq slot, manifesting at the inner TCP
// receiver as a much larger reorder than the wire actually had.
//
// Two phases:
// 1. Sort each passthrough-bounded segment of c.slots by (flow, seq).
// Cross-flow ordering inside a segment isn't preserved (it never was
// and doesn't matter for any single flow's TCP correctness).
// 2. Sweep once and merge adjacent same-flow slots whose ranges are now
// contiguous AND whose tail is gsoSize-aligned. The tail constraint
// matters because the kernel TSO splitter chops at gsoSize from the
// start of the merged payload — a short segment in the middle would
// desynchronize every later segment.
//
// Passthrough slots act as barriers: the merge check skips them on either
// side, so a SYN/FIN/RST/CWR is never reordered relative to its flow's
// data.
func (c *TCPCoalescer) reorderForFlush() {
if len(c.slots) <= 1 {
return
}
runStart := 0
for i := 0; i <= len(c.slots); i++ {
if i < len(c.slots) && !c.slots[i].passthrough {
continue
}
c.sortRun(c.slots[runStart:i])
runStart = i + 1
}
out := c.slots[:0]
logged := false
for _, s := range c.slots {
if n := len(out); n > 0 {
prev := out[n-1]
if !prev.passthrough && !s.passthrough && prev.fk == s.fk {
// Same-flow neighbors after sort. If they aren't seq-
// contiguous it's a real gap — packets the wire reordered
// across batches, or actual loss before nebula. Log it so
// the operator can quantify how often it happens; the data
// itself still emits in seq order, kernel TCP handles the
// gap via its OOO queue.
if c.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
if prev.nextSeq != slotSeedSeq(s) {
logged = true
gap := int64(slotSeedSeq(s)) - int64(prev.nextSeq)
c.l.Debug("tcp coalesce: cross-slot seq gap",
"src", flowKeyAddr(s.fk, false),
"dst", flowKeyAddr(s.fk, true),
"sport", s.fk.sport,
"dport", s.fk.dport,
"prev_seed_seq", slotSeedSeq(prev),
"prev_next_seq", prev.nextSeq,
"this_seed_seq", slotSeedSeq(s),
"gap_bytes", gap,
"prev_seg_count", prev.numSeg,
"prev_total_pay", prev.totalPay,
)
}
}
if canMergeSlots(prev, s) {
mergeSlots(prev, s)
c.release(s)
continue
}
}
}
out = append(out, s)
}
if logged {
c.l.Warn("==== end of batch ====")
}
c.slots = out
}
// flowKeyAddr returns the src or dst address from fk as a netip.Addr for
// logging. Only used on the cold gap-log path so the netip allocation
// doesn't matter.
func flowKeyAddr(fk flowKey, dst bool) netip.Addr {
src := fk.src
if dst {
src = fk.dst
}
if fk.isV6 {
return netip.AddrFrom16(src)
}
var v4 [4]byte
copy(v4[:], src[:4])
return netip.AddrFrom4(v4)
}
// sortRun stable-sorts run by (flowKey, seedSeq) so each flow's slots
// cluster together in seq order, ready for the merge sweep. Stable so
// equal-key slots keep their original relative position (defensive — a
// duplicate seedSeq would already mean something's wrong upstream).
func (c *TCPCoalescer) sortRun(run []*coalesceSlot) {
if len(run) <= 1 {
return
}
// slices.SortStableFunc with a free, non-capturing comparator avoids the
// reflection + closure-escape allocations that sort.SliceStable forces.
slices.SortStableFunc(run, compareCoalesceSlots)
}
func compareCoalesceSlots(a, b *coalesceSlot) int {
if cmp := flowKeyCompare(a.fk, b.fk); cmp != 0 {
return cmp
}
aSeq, bSeq := slotSeedSeq(a), slotSeedSeq(b)
if aSeq == bSeq {
return 0
}
if tcpSeqLess(aSeq, bSeq) {
return -1
}
return 1
}
// slotSeedSeq returns the TCP seq of the slot's seed (first segment).
// nextSeq tracks the seq just past the last appended byte; subtracting
// totalPay walks back to the seed. uint32 wraparound is the right TCP
// arithmetic so no special-casing is needed.
func slotSeedSeq(s *coalesceSlot) uint32 {
return s.nextSeq - uint32(s.totalPay)
}
// tcpSeqLess reports whether a precedes b in TCP serial-number arithmetic
// (RFC 1323 §2.3). The signed int32 cast turns the modular subtraction
// into the right comparison even across the 2^32 wrap.
func tcpSeqLess(a, b uint32) bool {
return int32(a-b) < 0
}
// flowKeyCompare orders flowKeys deterministically. The exact ordering
// is irrelevant — only that same-flow slots cluster together so the
// post-sort sweep can merge contiguous pairs.
func flowKeyCompare(a, b flowKey) int {
// Cheap scalar fields first so most non-matching keys short-circuit
// without ever calling bytes.Compare. sport is the ephemeral port on
// egress flows and discriminates fastest. For matching keys (same
// flow), array equality on src/dst inlines to word-sized compares,
// so we only pay bytes.Compare when the arrays actually differ.
if a.sport != b.sport {
if a.sport < b.sport {
return -1
}
return 1
}
if a.dport != b.dport {
if a.dport < b.dport {
return -1
}
return 1
}
if a.dst != b.dst {
return bytes.Compare(a.dst[:], b.dst[:])
}
if a.src != b.src {
return bytes.Compare(a.src[:], b.src[:])
}
if a.isV6 != b.isV6 {
if !a.isV6 {
return -1
}
return 1
}
return 0
}
// canMergeSlots reports whether s can fold into prev as one merged TSO
// superpacket. Same flow, contiguous TCP byte range, equal gsoSize, and
// fits within the kernel TSO limits. The tail-of-prev check rejects any
// merge whose first slot ended on a sub-gsoSize segment — kernel TSO
// would split the merged skb at gsoSize boundaries from the start, so a
// short segment in the middle would corrupt every later segment. PSH and
// ECE state must agree across both slots: PSH is a semantic delimiter
// (preserving the sender's push boundary) and ECE state must be uniform
// across a window (the same rule canAppend enforces for in-flow appends).
//
// Note: a slot sealed by reorder (canAppend returned false on seq
// mismatch) keeps psh=false, so this restriction does not block the
// reorder-fix merge — only legitimate PSH-set seals.
func canMergeSlots(prev, s *coalesceSlot) bool {
if prev.psh {
return false
}
if prev.fk != s.fk {
return false
}
if prev.gsoSize != s.gsoSize {
return false
}
if prev.nextSeq != slotSeedSeq(s) {
return false
}
if prev.numSeg+s.numSeg > tcpCoalesceMaxSegs {
return false
}
if prev.hdrLen+prev.totalPay+s.totalPay > tcpCoalesceBufSize {
return false
}
if len(prev.payIovs[len(prev.payIovs)-1]) != prev.gsoSize {
return false
}
prevFlags := prev.hdrBuf[prev.ipHdrLen+13]
sFlags := s.hdrBuf[s.ipHdrLen+13]
if (prevFlags^sFlags)&tcpFlagEce != 0 {
return false
}
if !headersMatch(prev.hdrBuf[:prev.hdrLen], s.hdrBuf[:s.hdrLen], prev.isV6, prev.ipHdrLen) {
return false
}
return true
}
// mergeSlots folds src into dst in place: payIovs concatenated, counters
// and totals updated, PSH and IP-level CE bits OR'd into the seed header
// so neither the push signal nor a CE mark is lost. The seed header's
// seq, gsoSize, and fk are unchanged. Caller is responsible for releasing
// src (it's no longer in c.slots after this call).
func mergeSlots(dst, src *coalesceSlot) {
dst.payIovs = append(dst.payIovs, src.payIovs...)
dst.numSeg += src.numSeg
dst.totalPay += src.totalPay
dst.nextSeq = src.nextSeq
if src.psh {
dst.psh = true
dst.hdrBuf[dst.ipHdrLen+13] |= tcpFlagPsh
}
mergeECNIntoSeed(dst.hdrBuf[:dst.ipHdrLen], src.hdrBuf[:src.ipHdrLen], dst.isV6)
}
// ipv4HdrChecksum computes the IPv4 header checksum over hdr (which must
// already have its checksum field zeroed) and returns the folded/inverted
// 16-bit value to store.
@@ -705,10 +469,9 @@ func ipv4HdrChecksum(hdr []byte) uint16 {
return ^uint16(sum)
}
// pseudoSumIPv4 / pseudoSumIPv6 build the L4 pseudo-header partial sum
// pseudoSumIPv4 / pseudoSumIPv6 build the TCP pseudo-header partial sum
// expected by the virtio NEEDS_CSUM kernel path: the 32-bit accumulator
// before folding. proto selects the L4 (TCP or UDP); the UDP coalescer
// reuses these helpers.
// before folding.
func pseudoSumIPv4(src, dst []byte, proto byte, l4Len int) uint32 {
var sum uint32
sum += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(src[0:2]))
-244
View File
@@ -1,244 +0,0 @@
package batch
import (
"encoding/binary"
"runtime"
"testing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/wire"
)
// nopTunWriter is a zero-alloc tio.GSOWriter for benchmarks. Discards
// everything but satisfies the interface the coalescer detects.
type nopTunWriter struct{}
func (nopTunWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return len(p), nil }
func (nopTunWriter) Read(_ []wire.TunPacket, _ []byte) (int, error) { return 0, nil }
func (nopTunWriter) Close() error { return nil }
func (nopTunWriter) WriteGSO(hdr []byte, transportHdr []byte, pays [][]byte, _ wire.GSOProto) error {
return nil
}
func (nopTunWriter) Capabilities() tio.Capabilities {
return tio.Capabilities{TSO: true, USO: true}
}
// buildTCPv4BulkFlow returns a slice of N adjacent ACK-only TCP segments
// on a single 5-tuple, each carrying payloadLen bytes. Seq numbers are
// contiguous so every packet is coalesceable onto the previous one.
func buildTCPv4BulkFlow(n, payloadLen int) [][]byte {
pkts := make([][]byte, n)
pay := make([]byte, payloadLen)
seq := uint32(1000)
for i := range n {
pkts[i] = buildTCPv4(seq, tcpAck, pay)
seq += uint32(payloadLen)
}
return pkts
}
// buildTCPv4Interleaved returns nFlows * perFlow packets with per-flow
// seq continuity but round-robin across flows — worst case for any
// "last-slot" cache.
func buildTCPv4Interleaved(nFlows, perFlow, payloadLen int) [][]byte {
pay := make([]byte, payloadLen)
seqs := make([]uint32, nFlows)
for i := range seqs {
seqs[i] = uint32(1000 + i*1000000)
}
pkts := make([][]byte, 0, nFlows*perFlow)
for range perFlow {
for f := range nFlows {
sport := uint16(10000 + f)
pkts = append(pkts, buildTCPv4Ports(sport, 2000, seqs[f], tcpAck, pay))
seqs[f] += uint32(payloadLen)
}
}
return pkts
}
// buildICMPv4 returns a minimal non-TCP packet that takes the passthrough
// branch in Commit.
func buildICMPv4() []byte {
pkt := make([]byte, 28)
pkt[0] = 0x45
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[2:4], 28)
pkt[9] = 1 // ICMP
copy(pkt[12:16], []byte{10, 0, 0, 1})
copy(pkt[16:20], []byte{10, 0, 0, 2})
return pkt
}
// runCommitBench drives Commit over pkts batchSize at a time, flushing
// between batches, and reports per-packet cost.
func runCommitBench(b *testing.B, pkts [][]byte, batchSize int) {
b.Helper()
c := NewTCPCoalescer(nopTunWriter{}, test.NewLogger(), util.NewArena(0))
b.ReportAllocs()
b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkts[0])))
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
pkt := pkts[i%len(pkts)]
if err := c.Commit(pkt); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
if (i+1)%batchSize == 0 {
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
}
}
// Drain any trailing partial batch so slot state doesn't leak across runs.
_ = c.Flush()
}
// BenchmarkCommitSingleFlow is the bulk-TCP steady state: one flow,
// contiguous seq, 1200-byte payloads. Every packet past the seed should
// append onto the open slot. This is the case we most care about.
func BenchmarkCommitSingleFlow(b *testing.B) {
pkts := buildTCPv4BulkFlow(tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
runCommitBench(b, pkts, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs)
}
// BenchmarkCommitInterleaved4 has 4 concurrent bulk flows round-robined.
// A single-entry fast-path cache will miss on every packet; an N-way
// cache or map lookup carries the weight.
func BenchmarkCommitInterleaved4(b *testing.B) {
pkts := buildTCPv4Interleaved(4, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
runCommitBench(b, pkts, len(pkts))
}
// BenchmarkCommitInterleaved16 stresses the map at higher flow counts.
func BenchmarkCommitInterleaved16(b *testing.B) {
pkts := buildTCPv4Interleaved(16, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
runCommitBench(b, pkts, len(pkts))
}
// BenchmarkCommitPassthrough exercises the non-TCP branch: parseTCPBase
// bails early and addPassthrough is the only work.
func BenchmarkCommitPassthrough(b *testing.B) {
pkt := buildICMPv4()
pkts := make([][]byte, 64)
for i := range pkts {
pkts[i] = pkt
}
runCommitBench(b, pkts, 64)
}
// BenchmarkCommitNonCoalesceableTCP sends SYN|ACK packets on one flow.
// Each packet takes the "TCP but not admissible" branch which does a
// map delete + passthrough. Measures the seal-without-slot cost.
func BenchmarkCommitNonCoalesceableTCP(b *testing.B) {
pay := make([]byte, 0)
pkts := make([][]byte, 64)
for i := range pkts {
pkts[i] = buildTCPv4(uint32(1000+i), tcpSyn|tcpAck, pay)
}
runCommitBench(b, pkts, 64)
}
// runMultiCommitBench drives MultiCoalescer.Commit. The dispatcher does
// the IP/L4 parse once and passes the parsed struct to the lane, so this
// is the bench that shows the savings of skipping the lane's re-parse.
func runMultiCommitBench(b *testing.B, pkts [][]byte, batchSize int) {
b.Helper()
m := NewMultiCoalescer(nopTunWriter{}, test.NewLogger(), util.NewArena(0), true, true)
b.ReportAllocs()
b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkts[0])))
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
pkt := pkts[i%len(pkts)]
if err := m.Commit(pkt); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
if (i+1)%batchSize == 0 {
if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
}
}
_ = m.Flush()
}
// BenchmarkMultiCommitSingleFlow is the multi-lane analogue of
// BenchmarkCommitSingleFlow — same workload but routed through the
// dispatcher. The delta vs the single-lane bench measures dispatcher
// overhead.
func BenchmarkMultiCommitSingleFlow(b *testing.B) {
pkts := buildTCPv4BulkFlow(tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
runMultiCommitBench(b, pkts, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs)
}
// BenchmarkMultiCommitInterleaved4 mirrors BenchmarkCommitInterleaved4
// through the dispatcher.
func BenchmarkMultiCommitInterleaved4(b *testing.B) {
pkts := buildTCPv4Interleaved(4, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
runMultiCommitBench(b, pkts, len(pkts))
}
// flowKeyPair is one comparison input for the flowKeyCompare bench.
type flowKeyPair struct{ a, b flowKey }
// makeFlowKey builds an IPv4 flowKey from compact inputs.
func makeFlowKey(srcLow, dstLow uint32, sport, dport uint16) flowKey {
var fk flowKey
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(fk.src[12:16], srcLow)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(fk.dst[12:16], dstLow)
fk.sport = sport
fk.dport = dport
return fk
}
// flowKeyCases are the workload mixes flowKeyCompare sees in practice.
// - sameFlow: equal keys; tests the equal-path cost (sort runs hit this
// repeatedly when many segments share a flow).
// - sportDiffers: same src/dst/dport, different sport — the typical
// "sibling flows from one host to one server" pattern.
// - dstDiffers: same src/sport/dport, different dst — outbound to many
// servers from a fixed local port.
// - allDiffer: every field differs; worst case for short-circuiting.
func flowKeyCases() map[string][]flowKeyPair {
const n = 64
cases := map[string][]flowKeyPair{
"sameFlow": make([]flowKeyPair, n),
"sportDiffers": make([]flowKeyPair, n),
"dstDiffers": make([]flowKeyPair, n),
"allDiffer": make([]flowKeyPair, n),
}
for i := range n {
base := makeFlowKey(0x0a000001, 0x0a000002, 40000, 443)
cases["sameFlow"][i] = flowKeyPair{a: base, b: base}
cases["sportDiffers"][i] = flowKeyPair{
a: base,
b: makeFlowKey(0x0a000001, 0x0a000002, uint16(40001+i), 443),
}
cases["dstDiffers"][i] = flowKeyPair{
a: base,
b: makeFlowKey(0x0a000001, uint32(0x0a000002+i+1), 40000, 443),
}
cases["allDiffer"][i] = flowKeyPair{
a: makeFlowKey(uint32(0x0a000001+i), uint32(0x0a000002+i), uint16(40000+i), uint16(80+i)),
b: makeFlowKey(uint32(0x0b000001+i), uint32(0x0b000002+i), uint16(50000+i), uint16(443+i)),
}
}
return cases
}
// BenchmarkFlowKeyCompare measures flowKeyCompare across the workloads
// the sort step actually sees. Use this to compare reorderings.
func BenchmarkFlowKeyCompare(b *testing.B) {
for name, pairs := range flowKeyCases() {
b.Run(name, func(b *testing.B) {
b.ReportAllocs()
b.ResetTimer()
var sink int
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
p := pairs[i&(len(pairs)-1)]
sink += flowKeyCompare(p.a, p.b)
}
runtime.KeepAlive(sink)
})
}
}
+23 -468
View File
@@ -3,11 +3,6 @@ package batch
import (
"encoding/binary"
"testing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/wire"
)
// fakeTunWriter records plain Writes and WriteGSO calls without touching a
@@ -55,12 +50,7 @@ func (w *fakeTunWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
return len(p), nil
}
// Read and Close exist solely to satisfy tio.Queue; coalescer tests never
// invoke them.
func (w *fakeTunWriter) Read(_ []wire.TunPacket, _ []byte) (int, error) { return 0, nil }
func (w *fakeTunWriter) Close() error { return nil }
func (w *fakeTunWriter) WriteGSO(hdr []byte, transportHdr []byte, pays [][]byte, _ wire.GSOProto) error {
func (w *fakeTunWriter) WriteGSO(hdr []byte, transportHdr []byte, pays [][]byte) error {
hcopy := make([]byte, len(hdr)+len(transportHdr))
copy(hcopy, hdr)
copy(hcopy[len(hdr):], transportHdr)
@@ -85,9 +75,7 @@ func (w *fakeTunWriter) WriteGSO(hdr []byte, transportHdr []byte, pays [][]byte,
return nil
}
func (w *fakeTunWriter) Capabilities() tio.Capabilities {
return tio.Capabilities{TSO: w.gsoEnabled, USO: w.gsoEnabled}
}
func (w *fakeTunWriter) GSOSupported() bool { return w.gsoEnabled }
// buildTCPv4 constructs a minimal IPv4+TCP packet with the given payload,
// seq, and flags. Assumes no IP options and a 20-byte TCP header.
@@ -135,7 +123,7 @@ const (
func TestCoalescerPassthroughWhenGSOUnavailable(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: false}
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w, test.NewLogger(), util.NewArena(0))
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w)
pkt := buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, []byte("hello"))
if err := c.Commit(pkt); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
@@ -154,7 +142,7 @@ func TestCoalescerPassthroughWhenGSOUnavailable(t *testing.T) {
func TestCoalescerNonTCPPassthrough(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w, test.NewLogger(), util.NewArena(0))
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w)
pkt := make([]byte, 28)
pkt[0] = 0x45
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[2:4], 28)
@@ -174,7 +162,7 @@ func TestCoalescerNonTCPPassthrough(t *testing.T) {
func TestCoalescerSeedThenFlushAlone(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w, test.NewLogger(), util.NewArena(0))
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w)
pkt := buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, make([]byte, 1000))
if err := c.Commit(pkt); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
@@ -185,7 +173,7 @@ func TestCoalescerSeedThenFlushAlone(t *testing.T) {
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Single-segment flush goes through WriteGSO with GSO_NONE
// Single-segment flush now goes through WriteGSO with GSO_NONE
// (virtio NEEDS_CSUM lets the kernel fill in the L4 csum).
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 1 || len(w.writes) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("single-seg flush: writes=%d gso=%d", len(w.writes), len(w.gsoWrites))
@@ -201,7 +189,7 @@ func TestCoalescerSeedThenFlushAlone(t *testing.T) {
func TestCoalescerCoalescesAdjacentACKs(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w, test.NewLogger(), util.NewArena(0))
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w)
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
@@ -241,7 +229,7 @@ func TestCoalescerCoalescesAdjacentACKs(t *testing.T) {
func TestCoalescerRejectsSeqGap(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w, test.NewLogger(), util.NewArena(0))
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w)
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
@@ -252,7 +240,7 @@ func TestCoalescerRejectsSeqGap(t *testing.T) {
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Each packet flushes as its own single-segment WriteGSO.
// Each packet flushes as its own single-segment WriteGSO now.
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 2 || len(w.writes) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("seq gap: want 2 gso writes got writes=%d gso=%d", len(w.writes), len(w.gsoWrites))
}
@@ -260,7 +248,7 @@ func TestCoalescerRejectsSeqGap(t *testing.T) {
func TestCoalescerRejectsFlagMismatch(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w, test.NewLogger(), util.NewArena(0))
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w)
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
@@ -281,7 +269,7 @@ func TestCoalescerRejectsFlagMismatch(t *testing.T) {
func TestCoalescerRejectsFIN(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w, test.NewLogger(), util.NewArena(0))
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w)
fin := buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck|tcpFin, []byte("x"))
if err := c.Commit(fin); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
@@ -297,7 +285,7 @@ func TestCoalescerRejectsFIN(t *testing.T) {
func TestCoalescerShortLastSegmentClosesChain(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w, test.NewLogger(), util.NewArena(0))
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w)
full := make([]byte, 1200)
half := make([]byte, 500)
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, full)); err != nil {
@@ -332,7 +320,7 @@ func TestCoalescerShortLastSegmentClosesChain(t *testing.T) {
func TestCoalescerPSHFinalizesChain(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w, test.NewLogger(), util.NewArena(0))
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w)
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
@@ -362,7 +350,7 @@ func TestCoalescerPSHFinalizesChain(t *testing.T) {
// coalescer drops it the sender's push signal never reaches the receiver.
func TestCoalescerPropagatesPSHFromAppended(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w, test.NewLogger(), util.NewArena(0))
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w)
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
// Seed has no PSH; second segment carries PSH and seals the chain.
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, pay)); err != nil {
@@ -371,7 +359,7 @@ func TestCoalescerPropagatesPSHFromAppended(t *testing.T) {
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4(2200, tcpAckPsh, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
if err := c.Flush(0); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 1 {
@@ -390,7 +378,7 @@ func TestCoalescerPropagatesPSHFromAppended(t *testing.T) {
func TestCoalescerRejectsDifferentFlow(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w, test.NewLogger(), util.NewArena(0))
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w)
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
p1 := buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, pay)
p2 := buildTCPv4(2200, tcpAck, pay)
@@ -412,7 +400,7 @@ func TestCoalescerRejectsDifferentFlow(t *testing.T) {
func TestCoalescerRejectsIPOptions(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w, test.NewLogger(), util.NewArena(0))
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w)
pay := make([]byte, 500)
pkt := buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, pay)
// Bump IHL to 6 to simulate 4 bytes of IP options. Don't actually add
@@ -432,7 +420,7 @@ func TestCoalescerRejectsIPOptions(t *testing.T) {
func TestCoalescerCapBySegments(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w, test.NewLogger(), util.NewArena(0))
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w)
pay := make([]byte, 512)
seq := uint32(1000)
for i := 0; i < tcpCoalesceMaxSegs+5; i++ {
@@ -456,7 +444,7 @@ func TestCoalescerCapBySegments(t *testing.T) {
// flows coalesce independently in a single Flush.
func TestCoalescerMultipleFlowsInSameBatch(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w, test.NewLogger(), util.NewArena(0))
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w)
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
// Flow A: sport 1000. Flow B: sport 3000.
@@ -513,7 +501,7 @@ func TestCoalescerMultipleFlowsInSameBatch(t *testing.T) {
// writing passthrough packets synchronously.
func TestCoalescerPreservesArrivalOrder(t *testing.T) {
w := &orderedFakeWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w, test.NewLogger(), util.NewArena(0))
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w)
// Sequence: coalesceable TCP, ICMP (passthrough), coalesceable TCP on
// a different flow. Expected emit order: gso(X), plain(ICMP), gso(Y).
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
@@ -556,19 +544,12 @@ func (w *orderedFakeWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
return len(p), nil
}
// Read and Close exist solely to satisfy tio.Queue; order tests never
// invoke them.
func (w *orderedFakeWriter) Read(_ []wire.TunPacket, _ []byte) (int, error) { return 0, nil }
func (w *orderedFakeWriter) Close() error { return nil }
func (w *orderedFakeWriter) WriteGSO(hdr []byte, transportHdr []byte, pays [][]byte, _ wire.GSOProto) error {
func (w *orderedFakeWriter) WriteGSO(hdr []byte, transportHdr []byte, pays [][]byte) error {
w.events = append(w.events, "gso")
return nil
}
func (w *orderedFakeWriter) Capabilities() tio.Capabilities {
return tio.Capabilities{TSO: w.gsoEnabled, USO: w.gsoEnabled}
}
func (w *orderedFakeWriter) GSOSupported() bool { return w.gsoEnabled }
func stringSliceEq(a, b []string) bool {
if len(a) != len(b) {
@@ -586,7 +567,7 @@ func stringSliceEq(a, b []string) bool {
// packet (SYN) mid-flow only flushes its own flow, not others.
func TestCoalescerInterleavedFlowsPreserveOrdering(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w, test.NewLogger(), util.NewArena(0))
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w)
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
// Flow A two segments.
@@ -635,429 +616,3 @@ func TestCoalescerInterleavedFlowsPreserveOrdering(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("unexpected segment counts: %v (want 2 and 3)", segCounts)
}
}
// ECN test helpers and constants.
const (
tcpEce = 0x40
tcpCwr = 0x80
// 2-bit IP-level ECN codepoints (lower 2 bits of IPv4 ToS / IPv6 TC).
ecnNotECT = 0x00
ecnECT1 = 0x01
ecnECT0 = 0x02
ecnCE = 0x03
)
// buildTCPv4WithToS is buildTCPv4 with caller-specified IPv4 ToS so tests can
// drive DSCP and ECN bits.
func buildTCPv4WithToS(tos byte, seq uint32, flags byte, payload []byte) []byte {
pkt := buildTCPv4(seq, flags, payload)
pkt[1] = tos
return pkt
}
// buildTCPv6 mirrors buildTCPv4 for IPv6. tcLow is the low 4 bits of Traffic
// Class, which carries the ECN codepoint (mask 0x03) and the bottom 2 DSCP
// bits — enough to drive the ECN paths under test.
func buildTCPv6(tcLow byte, seq uint32, flags byte, payload []byte) []byte {
const ipHdrLen = 40
const tcpHdrLen = 20
pkt := make([]byte, ipHdrLen+tcpHdrLen+len(payload))
pkt[0] = 0x60 // version=6, TC[7:4]=0
pkt[1] = (tcLow & 0x0f) << 4 // TC[3:0] in high nibble; flow=0
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(tcpHdrLen+len(payload)))
pkt[6] = ipProtoTCP
pkt[7] = 64
copy(pkt[8:24], []byte{0xfd, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1})
copy(pkt[24:40], []byte{0xfd, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2})
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[40:42], 1000)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[42:44], 2000)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(pkt[44:48], seq)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(pkt[48:52], 12345)
pkt[52] = 0x50
pkt[53] = flags
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[54:56], 0xffff)
copy(pkt[60:], payload)
return pkt
}
// TestCoalescerCoalescesEceFlow confirms that ECN-Echo-marked ACKs (an
// ECN-aware flow under congestion) keep getting coalesced into a TSO
// superpacket instead of falling out to passthrough, and that the seed
// retains ECE on the wire.
func TestCoalescerCoalescesEceFlow(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w, test.NewLogger(), util.NewArena(0))
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
flags := byte(tcpAck | tcpEce)
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4(1000, flags, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4(2200, flags, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("want 1 gso write, got %d (plain=%d)", len(w.gsoWrites), len(w.writes))
}
g := w.gsoWrites[0]
if len(g.pays) != 2 {
t.Errorf("pay count=%d want 2", len(g.pays))
}
if seedFlags := g.hdr[20+13]; seedFlags&tcpEce == 0 {
t.Errorf("seed flags=0x%02x want ECE preserved", seedFlags)
}
}
// TestCoalescerCwrSealsFlow confirms that a CWR-bearing segment in the
// middle of a flow goes to passthrough and seals the open slot, so a later
// in-flow segment seeds a new slot rather than extending the prior burst.
func TestCoalescerCwrSealsFlow(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w, test.NewLogger(), util.NewArena(0))
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4(2200, tcpAck|tcpCwr, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4(3400, tcpAck, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.writes) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("want 1 plain write (CWR), got %d", len(w.writes))
}
// Two GSO writes: the first seed before CWR, and a fresh seed after.
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 gso writes, got %d", len(w.gsoWrites))
}
for i, g := range w.gsoWrites {
if len(g.pays) != 1 {
t.Errorf("gso %d pay count=%d want 1", i, len(g.pays))
}
}
}
// TestCoalescerEceMismatchReseeds confirms that toggling ECE mid-flow does
// not silently merge — receivers expect ECE either set on every segment of
// a CE-echoing window or none.
func TestCoalescerEceMismatchReseeds(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w, test.NewLogger(), util.NewArena(0))
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck|tcpEce, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4(2200, tcpAck, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 separate seeds, got %d gso writes", len(w.gsoWrites))
}
for i, g := range w.gsoWrites {
if len(g.pays) != 1 {
t.Errorf("gso %d pay count=%d want 1", i, len(g.pays))
}
}
}
// TestCoalescerMergesCEMark confirms that an ECT(0) burst with a single
// CE-marked packet still coalesces, and the merged superpacket carries CE.
func TestCoalescerMergesCEMark(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w, test.NewLogger(), util.NewArena(0))
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4WithToS(ecnECT0, 1000, tcpAck, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Router along the path stamped CE on this one.
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4WithToS(ecnCE, 2200, tcpAck, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4WithToS(ecnECT0, 3400, tcpAck, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("want 1 merged gso write, got %d (plain=%d)", len(w.gsoWrites), len(w.writes))
}
g := w.gsoWrites[0]
if len(g.pays) != 3 {
t.Errorf("pay count=%d want 3", len(g.pays))
}
if got := g.hdr[1] & 0x03; got != ecnCE {
t.Errorf("seed ECN=0x%02x want CE 0x%02x", got, ecnCE)
}
}
// TestCoalescerDscpMismatchReseeds confirms that the new ECN-mask in
// headersMatch did not also relax DSCP — different DSCP must still split.
func TestCoalescerDscpMismatchReseeds(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w, test.NewLogger(), util.NewArena(0))
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
// Same ECN (Not-ECT), different DSCP (0x10 vs 0x20 in upper 6 bits).
tosA := byte(0x10<<2) | ecnNotECT
tosB := byte(0x20<<2) | ecnNotECT
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4WithToS(tosA, 1000, tcpAck, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4WithToS(tosB, 2200, tcpAck, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 separate seeds (different DSCP), got %d", len(w.gsoWrites))
}
}
// TestCoalescerIPv6CoalescesEceFlow is the IPv6 analogue of
// TestCoalescerCoalescesEceFlow.
func TestCoalescerIPv6CoalescesEceFlow(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w, test.NewLogger(), util.NewArena(0))
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
flags := byte(tcpAck | tcpEce)
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv6(0, 1000, flags, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv6(0, 2200, flags, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("want 1 gso write, got %d", len(w.gsoWrites))
}
g := w.gsoWrites[0]
if seedFlags := g.hdr[40+13]; seedFlags&tcpEce == 0 {
t.Errorf("seed flags=0x%02x want ECE preserved", seedFlags)
}
}
// TestCoalescerSortsReorderedSeedsAndMerges feeds three same-flow MSS
// segments out of TCP-seq order (mimicking a wire reorder that escaped
// the rxOrder per-batch sort). Without the reorderForFlush sort+merge,
// each out-of-seq arrival would seed its own slot and the slots would
// emit in arrival order, producing a kernel-visible TCP reorder. With
// the sort+merge, the three slots are sorted by seq and folded back into
// one in-order TSO superpacket — same shape the receiver TCP would have
// seen had the wire never reordered.
func TestCoalescerSortsReorderedSeedsAndMerges(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w, test.NewLogger(), util.NewArena(0))
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
// Arrival order: seq 1000, 3400, 2200. The 3400 seeds a separate slot
// because 3400 != nextSeq=2200, then 2200 fails to extend the 3400 slot
// and seeds its own. Three slots end up in c.slots; reorderForFlush
// should sort them into [1000,2200,3400] and merge them back into one.
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4(3400, tcpAck, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4(2200, tcpAck, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("want 1 merged gso write got %d", len(w.gsoWrites))
}
g := w.gsoWrites[0]
if len(g.pays) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("merged segs=%d want 3", len(g.pays))
}
const ipHdrLen = 20
if seedSeq := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(g.hdr[ipHdrLen+4 : ipHdrLen+8]); seedSeq != 1000 {
t.Errorf("merged seed seq=%d want 1000 (lowest)", seedSeq)
}
}
// TestCoalescerSortAcrossFlowsMergesEachIndependently checks that two
// flows interleaved with reorder are each sorted-and-merged in isolation
// without any cross-flow contamination.
func TestCoalescerSortAcrossFlowsMergesEachIndependently(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w, test.NewLogger(), util.NewArena(0))
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
// Flow A (sport 1000) seq 100, 1300; flow B (sport 3000) seq 500, 1700.
// Arrival: A.1300, B.1700, A.100, B.500 — every flow reordered.
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4Ports(1000, 2000, 1300, tcpAck, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4Ports(3000, 2000, 1700, tcpAck, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4Ports(1000, 2000, 100, tcpAck, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4Ports(3000, 2000, 500, tcpAck, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 gso writes (one per flow merged), got %d", len(w.gsoWrites))
}
for i, g := range w.gsoWrites {
if len(g.pays) != 2 {
t.Errorf("gso[%d] segs=%d want 2", i, len(g.pays))
}
const ipHdrLen = 20
seedSeq := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(g.hdr[ipHdrLen+4 : ipHdrLen+8])
sport := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(g.hdr[ipHdrLen : ipHdrLen+2])
// Each flow's merged seed should be the LOWER of its two seqs.
switch sport {
case 1000:
if seedSeq != 100 {
t.Errorf("flow A seed seq=%d want 100", seedSeq)
}
case 3000:
if seedSeq != 500 {
t.Errorf("flow B seed seq=%d want 500", seedSeq)
}
default:
t.Errorf("unexpected sport %d", sport)
}
}
}
// TestCoalescerSortKeepsPSHBoundary verifies that a PSH-sealed slot is
// not folded into a later seq-contiguous slot — PSH placement is part of
// the wire signal and merging across it would shift the receiver's push
// boundary by an arbitrary number of segments.
func TestCoalescerSortKeepsPSHBoundary(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w, test.NewLogger(), util.NewArena(0))
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
// Seq 1000 (no PSH) + 2200 (PSH) → seal one slot with PSH set.
// Seq 3400 (no PSH) is contiguous to 3400 from seq 2200+1200; without
// the PSH check it would merge in.
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4(2200, tcpAckPsh, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4(3400, tcpAck, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 gso writes (PSH-sealed and fresh seed), got %d", len(w.gsoWrites))
}
}
// TestCoalescerSortKeepsPassthroughBarrier confirms a passthrough slot in
// the middle of the queue prevents the post-sort merge from folding
// across it. Reordered same-flow data on either side of the passthrough
// is sorted/merged independently.
func TestCoalescerSortKeepsPassthroughBarrier(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w, test.NewLogger(), util.NewArena(0))
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
// First two segments seed S1 (then a 3400 reorder seeds S2).
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4(3400, tcpAck, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Non-coalesceable packet (SYN+ACK) flushes S1's openSlots entry and
// becomes a passthrough barrier in c.slots.
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4(9999, tcpSyn|tcpAck, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Post-barrier same-flow data: should never end up before the SYN.
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv4(2200, tcpAck, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// We expect: gso(merged 1000+3400 ranges sorted but not contiguous so 2
// gso writes), plain(SYN), gso(2200 alone). The pre-barrier sort should
// land 1000 before 3400, and the post-barrier 2200 stays after the SYN.
if len(w.writes) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("want 1 plain SYN passthrough, got %d", len(w.writes))
}
}
// TestCoalescerIPv6MergesCEMark is the IPv6 analogue of
// TestCoalescerMergesCEMark. ECN bits live in TC[1:0] = byte 1 mask 0x30.
func TestCoalescerIPv6MergesCEMark(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewTCPCoalescer(w, test.NewLogger(), util.NewArena(0))
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
// tcLow is the low 4 bits of TC; ECN occupies the bottom 2 of those.
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv6(ecnECT0, 1000, tcpAck, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(buildTCPv6(ecnCE, 2200, tcpAck, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("want 1 merged gso write, got %d", len(w.gsoWrites))
}
g := w.gsoWrites[0]
// Byte 1 high nibble holds TC[3:0]; ECN is the low 2 bits of that nibble,
// which appears in byte 1 mask 0x30 (>>4 to read the codepoint value).
if got := (g.hdr[1] >> 4) & 0x03; got != ecnCE {
t.Errorf("seed v6 ECN=0x%02x want CE 0x%02x", got, ecnCE)
}
}
func TestSortRunZeroAllocs(t *testing.T) {
c := &TCPCoalescer{}
mk := func(srcByte byte, seq uint32, pay int) *coalesceSlot {
s := &coalesceSlot{nextSeq: seq + uint32(pay), totalPay: pay}
s.fk.src[0] = srcByte
return s
}
run := []*coalesceSlot{
mk(3, 5000, 100),
mk(1, 1000, 50),
mk(2, 2000, 75),
mk(1, 900, 50),
mk(3, 4900, 100),
mk(2, 1925, 75),
mk(1, 1050, 50),
mk(3, 5100, 100),
}
allocs := testing.AllocsPerRun(100, func() {
// Re-shuffle so each run actually does sorting work.
run[0], run[1], run[2], run[3] = run[3], run[2], run[1], run[0]
c.sortRun(run)
})
if allocs != 0 {
t.Fatalf("sortRun allocates %v times per run; want 0", allocs)
}
}
+40 -39
View File
@@ -1,60 +1,61 @@
package batch
import (
"net/netip"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
)
import "net/netip"
const SendBatchCap = 128
// batchWriter is the minimal subset of udp.Conn needed by SendBatch to flush.
type batchWriter interface {
WriteBatch(bufs [][]byte, addrs []netip.AddrPort, outerECNs []byte) error
}
// SendBatch accumulates encrypted UDP packets and flushes them via WriteBatch.
// SendBatch accumulates encrypted UDP packets for potential TX offloading.
// One SendBatch is owned by each listenIn goroutine; no locking is needed.
// Slot bytes are borrowed from the injected Arena and remain valid until
// Flush, which Resets the arena.
// The backing storage holds up to batchCap packets of slotCap bytes each;
// bufs and dsts are parallel slices of committed slots.
type SendBatch struct {
out batchWriter
bufs [][]byte
dsts []netip.AddrPort
ecns []byte
arena *util.Arena
bufs [][]byte
dsts []netip.AddrPort
backing []byte
slotCap int
batchCap int
nextSlot int
}
// NewSendBatch makes a SendBatch with batchCap slots backed by arena.
func NewSendBatch(out batchWriter, batchCap int, arena *util.Arena) *SendBatch {
func NewSendBatch(batchCap, slotCap int) *SendBatch {
return &SendBatch{
out: out,
bufs: make([][]byte, 0, batchCap),
dsts: make([]netip.AddrPort, 0, batchCap),
ecns: make([]byte, 0, batchCap),
arena: arena,
bufs: make([][]byte, 0, batchCap),
dsts: make([]netip.AddrPort, 0, batchCap),
backing: make([]byte, batchCap*slotCap),
slotCap: slotCap,
batchCap: batchCap,
}
}
func (b *SendBatch) Reserve(sz int) []byte {
return b.arena.Reserve(sz)
func (b *SendBatch) Next() []byte {
if b.nextSlot >= b.batchCap {
return nil
}
start := b.nextSlot * b.slotCap
return b.backing[start : start : start+b.slotCap] //set len to 0 but cap to slotCap
}
func (b *SendBatch) Commit(pkt []byte, dst netip.AddrPort, outerECN byte) {
b.bufs = append(b.bufs, pkt)
func (b *SendBatch) Commit(n int, dst netip.AddrPort) {
start := b.nextSlot * b.slotCap
b.bufs = append(b.bufs, b.backing[start:start+n])
b.dsts = append(b.dsts, dst)
b.ecns = append(b.ecns, outerECN)
b.nextSlot++
}
func (b *SendBatch) Flush() error {
var err error
if len(b.bufs) > 0 {
err = b.out.WriteBatch(b.bufs, b.dsts, b.ecns)
}
clear(b.bufs)
func (b *SendBatch) Reset() {
b.bufs = b.bufs[:0]
b.dsts = b.dsts[:0]
b.ecns = b.ecns[:0]
b.arena.Reset()
return err
b.nextSlot = 0
}
func (b *SendBatch) Len() int {
return len(b.bufs)
}
func (b *SendBatch) Cap() int {
return b.batchCap
}
func (b *SendBatch) Get() ([][]byte, []netip.AddrPort) {
return b.bufs, b.dsts
}
+33 -90
View File
@@ -3,124 +3,67 @@ package batch
import (
"net/netip"
"testing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
)
type fakeBatchWriter struct {
bufs [][]byte
addrs []netip.AddrPort
ecns []byte
}
func (w *fakeBatchWriter) WriteBatch(bufs [][]byte, addrs []netip.AddrPort, ecns []byte) error {
// Snapshot — SendBatch.Flush nils its slot pointers right after WriteBatch
// returns, so tests must capture data before that happens.
w.bufs = make([][]byte, len(bufs))
for i, b := range bufs {
cp := make([]byte, len(b))
copy(cp, b)
w.bufs[i] = cp
func TestSendBatchBookkeeping(t *testing.T) {
b := NewSendBatch(4, 32)
if b.Len() != 0 || b.Cap() != 4 {
t.Fatalf("fresh batch: len=%d cap=%d", b.Len(), b.Cap())
}
w.addrs = append(w.addrs[:0], addrs...)
w.ecns = append(w.ecns[:0], ecns...)
return nil
}
func TestSendBatchReserveCommitFlush(t *testing.T) {
fw := &fakeBatchWriter{}
b := NewSendBatch(fw, 4, util.NewArena(32))
ap := netip.MustParseAddrPort("10.0.0.1:4242")
for i := 0; i < 4; i++ {
slot := b.Reserve(32)
if cap(slot) != 32 {
t.Fatalf("slot %d: cap=%d want 32", i, cap(slot))
slot := b.Next()
if slot == nil {
t.Fatalf("slot %d: Next returned nil before cap", i)
}
pkt := append(slot[:0], byte(i), byte(i+1), byte(i+2))
b.Commit(pkt, ap, 0)
if cap(slot) != 32 || len(slot) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("slot %d: got len=%d cap=%d want len=0 cap=32", i, len(slot), cap(slot))
}
// Write a marker byte.
slot = append(slot, byte(i), byte(i+1), byte(i+2))
b.Commit(len(slot), ap)
}
if err := b.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Flush: %v", err)
if b.Next() != nil {
t.Fatalf("Next should return nil when full")
}
if len(fw.bufs) != 4 {
t.Fatalf("WriteBatch got %d bufs want 4", len(fw.bufs))
if b.Len() != 4 {
t.Fatalf("Len=%d want 4", b.Len())
}
for i, buf := range fw.bufs {
for i, buf := range b.bufs {
if len(buf) != 3 || buf[0] != byte(i) {
t.Errorf("buf %d: %x", i, buf)
}
if fw.addrs[i] != ap {
t.Errorf("addr %d: got %v want %v", i, fw.addrs[i], ap)
if b.dsts[i] != ap {
t.Errorf("dst %d: got %v want %v", i, b.dsts[i], ap)
}
}
// Flush again with nothing committed — should be a no-op.
fw.bufs = nil
if err := b.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("empty Flush: %v", err)
// Reset returns empty and Next works again.
b.Reset()
if b.Len() != 0 {
t.Fatalf("after Reset Len=%d want 0", b.Len())
}
if fw.bufs != nil {
t.Fatalf("empty Flush triggered WriteBatch")
}
// Reuse after Flush.
slot := b.Reserve(32)
if cap(slot) != 32 {
t.Fatalf("after Flush Reserve wrong cap: %d", cap(slot))
slot := b.Next()
if slot == nil || cap(slot) != 32 {
t.Fatalf("after Reset Next nil or wrong cap: %v cap=%d", slot == nil, cap(slot))
}
}
func TestSendBatchSlotsDoNotOverlap(t *testing.T) {
fw := &fakeBatchWriter{}
b := NewSendBatch(fw, 3, util.NewArena(8))
b := NewSendBatch(3, 8)
ap := netip.MustParseAddrPort("10.0.0.1:80")
// Fill three slots, each with its own sentinel byte.
for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
s := b.Reserve(8)
pkt := append(s[:0], byte(0xA0+i), byte(0xB0+i))
b.Commit(pkt, ap, 0)
}
if err := b.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Flush: %v", err)
s := b.Next()
s = append(s, byte(0xA0+i), byte(0xB0+i))
b.Commit(len(s), ap)
}
for i, buf := range fw.bufs {
for i, buf := range b.bufs {
if buf[0] != byte(0xA0+i) || buf[1] != byte(0xB0+i) {
t.Errorf("slot %d corrupted: %x", i, buf)
}
}
}
func TestSendBatchGrowPreservesCommitted(t *testing.T) {
fw := &fakeBatchWriter{}
// Tiny initial backing forces a grow on the second Reserve.
b := NewSendBatch(fw, 1, util.NewArena(4))
ap := netip.MustParseAddrPort("10.0.0.1:80")
s1 := b.Reserve(4)
pkt1 := append(s1[:0], 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44)
b.Commit(pkt1, ap, 0)
s2 := b.Reserve(8) // exceeds remaining cap, triggers grow
pkt2 := append(s2[:0], 0xA, 0xB, 0xC, 0xD, 0xE)
b.Commit(pkt2, ap, 0)
// pkt1 must still be intact even though backing reallocated.
if pkt1[0] != 0x11 || pkt1[3] != 0x44 {
t.Fatalf("first packet corrupted by grow: %x", pkt1)
}
if err := b.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Flush: %v", err)
}
if len(fw.bufs) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("got %d bufs want 2", len(fw.bufs))
}
if fw.bufs[0][0] != 0x11 || fw.bufs[0][3] != 0x44 {
t.Errorf("first packet on the wire: %x", fw.bufs[0])
}
if fw.bufs[1][0] != 0xA || fw.bufs[1][4] != 0xE {
t.Errorf("second packet on the wire: %x", fw.bufs[1])
}
}
-339
View File
@@ -1,339 +0,0 @@
package batch
import (
"encoding/binary"
"io"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/wire"
)
// ipProtoUDP is the IANA protocol number for UDP.
const ipProtoUDP = 17
// udpCoalesceBufSize caps total bytes per UDP superpacket. Mirrors the
// kernel's gso_max_size; payloads beyond this are emitted as-is.
const udpCoalesceBufSize = 65535
// udpCoalesceMaxSegs caps how many segments we'll coalesce. Kernel UDP-GSO
// accepts up to 64 segments per skb (UDP_MAX_SEGMENTS); stay under that.
const udpCoalesceMaxSegs = 64
// udpCoalesceHdrCap is the scratch space we copy a seed's IP+UDP header
// into. IPv6 (40) + UDP (8) = 48; round up for safety.
const udpCoalesceHdrCap = 64
// udpSlot is one entry in the UDPCoalescer's ordered event queue. Same
// passthrough-vs-coalesced shape as the TCP coalescer's slot, but no
// seq/PSH/CWR bookkeeping — UDP segments only need 5-tuple + length
// matching to coalesce.
type udpSlot struct {
passthrough bool
rawPkt []byte // borrowed when passthrough
fk flowKey
hdrBuf [udpCoalesceHdrCap]byte
hdrLen int
ipHdrLen int
isV6 bool
gsoSize int // per-segment UDP payload length
numSeg int
totalPay int
// sealed closes the chain: set when a sub-gsoSize segment is appended
// (kernel UDP-GSO requires every segment but the last to be exactly
// gsoSize) or when limits are hit. No further appends after.
sealed bool
payIovs [][]byte
}
// UDPCoalescer accumulates adjacent in-flow UDP datagrams across multiple
// concurrent flows and emits each flow's run as a single GSO_UDP_L4
// superpacket via tio.GSOWriter. Falls back to per-packet writes when the
// underlying writer doesn't support USO.
//
// All output — coalesced or not — is deferred until Flush so per-flow
// arrival order is preserved on the wire. Cross-flow order is NOT preserved
// across the TCP/UDP/passthrough split when this coalescer runs alongside
// others — see multi_coalesce.go. Per-flow order is preserved because a
// single 5-tuple only ever lands in one lane and each lane preserves its
// own slot order.
//
// Owns no locks; one coalescer per TUN write queue.
type UDPCoalescer struct {
plainW io.Writer
gsoW tio.GSOWriter // nil when the queue can't accept GSO_UDP_L4
slots []*udpSlot
openSlots map[flowKey]*udpSlot
pool []*udpSlot
// arena is injected; see TCPCoalescer.arena for the contract.
arena *util.Arena
}
// NewUDPCoalescer wraps w. The caller is responsible for only constructing
// this when the underlying Queue's Capabilities advertise USO; otherwise
// the kernel may reject GSO_UDP_L4 writes. If w does not implement
// tio.GSOWriter at all (single-packet Queue), the coalescer degrades to
// plain Writes — same defensive shape as the TCP coalescer.
func NewUDPCoalescer(w tio.Queue, arena *util.Arena) *UDPCoalescer {
c := &UDPCoalescer{
plainW: w,
slots: make([]*udpSlot, 0, initialSlots),
openSlots: make(map[flowKey]*udpSlot, initialSlots),
pool: make([]*udpSlot, 0, initialSlots),
arena: arena,
}
if gw, ok := tio.SupportsGSO(w, wire.GSOProtoUDP); ok {
c.gsoW = gw
}
return c
}
// parsedUDP holds the fields extracted from a single parse so later steps
// (admission, slot lookup, canAppend) don't re-walk the header.
type parsedUDP struct {
fk flowKey
ipHdrLen int
hdrLen int // ipHdrLen + 8
payLen int
}
// parseUDP extracts the flow key and IP/UDP offsets for a UDP packet.
// Returns ok=false for non-UDP, malformed, or unsupported header shapes
// (IPv4 with options/fragmentation, IPv6 with extension headers).
func parseUDP(pkt []byte) (parsedUDP, bool) {
var p parsedUDP
ip, ok := parseIPPrologue(pkt, ipProtoUDP)
if !ok {
return p, false
}
pkt = ip.pkt
p.fk = ip.fk
p.ipHdrLen = ip.ipHdrLen
if len(pkt) < p.ipHdrLen+8 {
return p, false
}
p.hdrLen = p.ipHdrLen + 8
// UDP `length` field: must equal IP-derived length-of-UDP-header-plus-payload.
udpLen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[p.ipHdrLen+4 : p.ipHdrLen+6]))
if udpLen < 8 || udpLen > len(pkt)-p.ipHdrLen {
return p, false
}
p.payLen = udpLen - 8
p.fk.sport = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[p.ipHdrLen : p.ipHdrLen+2])
p.fk.dport = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[p.ipHdrLen+2 : p.ipHdrLen+4])
return p, true
}
func (c *UDPCoalescer) Reserve(sz int) []byte {
return c.arena.Reserve(sz)
}
// Commit borrows pkt. The caller must keep pkt valid until the next Flush.
func (c *UDPCoalescer) Commit(pkt []byte) error {
if c.gsoW == nil {
c.addPassthrough(pkt)
return nil
}
info, ok := parseUDP(pkt)
if !ok {
c.addPassthrough(pkt)
return nil
}
return c.commitParsed(pkt, info)
}
// commitParsed is the post-parse half of Commit. The caller must have
// already verified parseUDP succeeded. Used by MultiCoalescer.Commit to
// avoid re-walking the IP/UDP header.
func (c *UDPCoalescer) commitParsed(pkt []byte, info parsedUDP) error {
if c.gsoW == nil {
c.addPassthrough(pkt)
return nil
}
if open := c.openSlots[info.fk]; open != nil {
if c.canAppend(open, pkt, info) {
c.appendPayload(open, pkt, info)
if open.sealed {
delete(c.openSlots, info.fk)
}
return nil
}
// Can't extend — seal it and fall through to seed a fresh slot.
delete(c.openSlots, info.fk)
}
c.seed(pkt, info)
return nil
}
func (c *UDPCoalescer) Flush() error {
var first error
for _, s := range c.slots {
var err error
if s.passthrough {
_, err = c.plainW.Write(s.rawPkt)
} else {
err = c.flushSlot(s)
}
if err != nil && first == nil {
first = err
}
c.release(s)
}
clear(c.slots)
c.slots = c.slots[:0]
clear(c.openSlots)
c.arena.Reset()
return first
}
func (c *UDPCoalescer) addPassthrough(pkt []byte) {
s := c.take()
s.passthrough = true
s.rawPkt = pkt
c.slots = append(c.slots, s)
}
func (c *UDPCoalescer) seed(pkt []byte, info parsedUDP) {
if info.hdrLen > udpCoalesceHdrCap || info.hdrLen+info.payLen > udpCoalesceBufSize {
c.addPassthrough(pkt)
return
}
s := c.take()
s.passthrough = false
s.rawPkt = nil
copy(s.hdrBuf[:], pkt[:info.hdrLen])
s.hdrLen = info.hdrLen
s.ipHdrLen = info.ipHdrLen
s.isV6 = info.fk.isV6
s.fk = info.fk
s.gsoSize = info.payLen
s.numSeg = 1
s.totalPay = info.payLen
s.sealed = false
s.payIovs = append(s.payIovs[:0], pkt[info.hdrLen:info.hdrLen+info.payLen])
c.slots = append(c.slots, s)
c.openSlots[info.fk] = s
}
// canAppend reports whether info's packet extends the slot's seed.
// Kernel UDP-GSO requires every segment except possibly the last to be
// exactly gsoSize, and the last may be shorter (≤ gsoSize).
func (c *UDPCoalescer) canAppend(s *udpSlot, pkt []byte, info parsedUDP) bool {
if s.sealed {
return false
}
if info.hdrLen != s.hdrLen {
return false
}
if s.numSeg >= udpCoalesceMaxSegs {
return false
}
if info.payLen > s.gsoSize {
return false
}
if s.hdrLen+s.totalPay+info.payLen > udpCoalesceBufSize {
return false
}
if !udpHeadersMatch(s.hdrBuf[:s.hdrLen], pkt[:info.hdrLen], s.isV6, s.ipHdrLen) {
return false
}
return true
}
func (c *UDPCoalescer) appendPayload(s *udpSlot, pkt []byte, info parsedUDP) {
s.payIovs = append(s.payIovs, pkt[info.hdrLen:info.hdrLen+info.payLen])
s.numSeg++
s.totalPay += info.payLen
// Merge IP-level CE marks into the seed (same trick TCP coalescer uses).
mergeECNIntoSeed(s.hdrBuf[:s.ipHdrLen], pkt[:s.ipHdrLen], s.isV6)
if info.payLen < s.gsoSize {
// Last-segment-can-be-shorter: this seals the chain.
s.sealed = true
}
}
func (c *UDPCoalescer) take() *udpSlot {
if n := len(c.pool); n > 0 {
s := c.pool[n-1]
c.pool[n-1] = nil
c.pool = c.pool[:n-1]
return s
}
return &udpSlot{}
}
func (c *UDPCoalescer) release(s *udpSlot) {
s.passthrough = false
s.rawPkt = nil
clear(s.payIovs)
s.payIovs = s.payIovs[:0]
s.numSeg = 0
s.totalPay = 0
s.sealed = false
c.pool = append(c.pool, s)
}
// flushSlot patches the IP header total length / IPv6 payload length and
// the UDP length to the *total* across all coalesced segments, then seeds
// the UDP checksum field with the pseudo-header partial (single-fold, not
// inverted) per virtio NEEDS_CSUM. The kernel's ip_rcv_core (v4) and
// ip6_rcv_core (v6) trim the skb to those length fields, so per-segment
// values would silently drop everything but the first segment. The kernel
// then walks each segment in __udp_gso_segment, recomputing per-segment
// uh->len / iph->tot_len / IPv6 plen and adjusting the checksum via
// `check = csum16_add(csum16_sub(uh->check, uh->len), newlen)` — meaning
// our seed's uh->check must be consistent with the seed's uh->len, which
// is what passing the total to both pseudoSum and the UDP length field
// guarantees.
func (c *UDPCoalescer) flushSlot(s *udpSlot) error {
hdr := s.hdrBuf[:s.hdrLen]
total := s.hdrLen + s.totalPay // full IP+UDP+all_payloads bytes
l4Len := total - s.ipHdrLen // total UDP (8 + sum of payloads)
if s.isV6 {
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[4:6], uint16(l4Len))
} else {
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[2:4], uint16(total))
hdr[10] = 0
hdr[11] = 0
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[10:12], ipv4HdrChecksum(hdr[:s.ipHdrLen]))
}
// UDP length field (offset 4 inside the UDP header) = total UDP size.
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[s.ipHdrLen+4:s.ipHdrLen+6], uint16(l4Len))
var psum uint32
if s.isV6 {
psum = pseudoSumIPv6(hdr[8:24], hdr[24:40], ipProtoUDP, l4Len)
} else {
psum = pseudoSumIPv4(hdr[12:16], hdr[16:20], ipProtoUDP, l4Len)
}
udpCsumOff := s.ipHdrLen + 6
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[udpCsumOff:udpCsumOff+2], foldOnceNoInvert(psum))
return c.gsoW.WriteGSO(hdr[:s.ipHdrLen], hdr[s.ipHdrLen:], s.payIovs, wire.GSOProtoUDP)
}
// udpHeadersMatch compares two IP+UDP header prefixes for byte-equality on
// every field that must be identical across coalesced segments. Length
// fields and the ECN bits in IP TOS/TC are masked out — appendPayload
// merges CE into the seed; flushSlot rewrites lengths.
func udpHeadersMatch(a, b []byte, isV6 bool, ipHdrLen int) bool {
if len(a) != len(b) {
return false
}
if !ipHeadersMatch(a, b, isV6) {
return false
}
// UDP: compare sport+dport ([0:4]). Skip length [4:6] and checksum [6:8] —
// length varies (we rewrite at flush) and the checksum will be redone.
udp := ipHdrLen
if a[udp] != b[udp] || a[udp+1] != b[udp+1] || a[udp+2] != b[udp+2] || a[udp+3] != b[udp+3] {
return false
}
return true
}
-385
View File
@@ -1,385 +0,0 @@
package batch
import (
"encoding/binary"
"testing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
)
// buildUDPv4 builds a minimal IPv4+UDP packet with the given payload and ports.
func buildUDPv4(sport, dport uint16, payload []byte) []byte {
const ipHdrLen = 20
const udpHdrLen = 8
total := ipHdrLen + udpHdrLen + len(payload)
pkt := make([]byte, total)
pkt[0] = 0x45
pkt[1] = 0x00
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[2:4], uint16(total))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], 0)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[6:8], 0x4000)
pkt[8] = 64
pkt[9] = ipProtoUDP
copy(pkt[12:16], []byte{10, 0, 0, 1})
copy(pkt[16:20], []byte{10, 0, 0, 2})
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[20:22], sport)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[22:24], dport)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[24:26], uint16(udpHdrLen+len(payload)))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[26:28], 0)
copy(pkt[28:], payload)
return pkt
}
// buildUDPv6 builds a minimal IPv6+UDP packet.
func buildUDPv6(sport, dport uint16, payload []byte) []byte {
const ipHdrLen = 40
const udpHdrLen = 8
total := ipHdrLen + udpHdrLen + len(payload)
pkt := make([]byte, total)
pkt[0] = 0x60
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(udpHdrLen+len(payload)))
pkt[6] = ipProtoUDP
pkt[7] = 64
pkt[8] = 0xfe
pkt[9] = 0x80
pkt[23] = 1
pkt[24] = 0xfe
pkt[25] = 0x80
pkt[39] = 2
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[40:42], sport)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[42:44], dport)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[44:46], uint16(udpHdrLen+len(payload)))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[46:48], 0)
copy(pkt[48:], payload)
return pkt
}
func TestUDPCoalescerPassthroughWhenGSOUnavailable(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: false}
c := NewUDPCoalescer(w, util.NewArena(0))
pkt := buildUDPv4(1000, 53, make([]byte, 100))
if err := c.Commit(pkt); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.writes) != 0 || len(w.gsoWrites) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("no Add-time writes: writes=%d gso=%d", len(w.writes), len(w.gsoWrites))
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.writes) != 1 || len(w.gsoWrites) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("want single plain write, got writes=%d gso=%d", len(w.writes), len(w.gsoWrites))
}
}
func TestUDPCoalescerNonUDPPassthrough(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewUDPCoalescer(w, util.NewArena(0))
// ICMP packet
pkt := make([]byte, 28)
pkt[0] = 0x45
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[2:4], 28)
pkt[9] = 1
copy(pkt[12:16], []byte{10, 0, 0, 1})
copy(pkt[16:20], []byte{10, 0, 0, 2})
if err := c.Commit(pkt); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.writes) != 1 || len(w.gsoWrites) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("ICMP must pass through unchanged: writes=%d gso=%d", len(w.writes), len(w.gsoWrites))
}
}
func TestUDPCoalescerSeedThenFlushAlone(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewUDPCoalescer(w, util.NewArena(0))
pkt := buildUDPv4(1000, 53, make([]byte, 800))
if err := c.Commit(pkt); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Single-segment flush goes through WriteGSO; the writer infers GSO_NONE
// from len(pays)==1 and the kernel fills in the UDP csum (NEEDS_CSUM).
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 1 || len(w.writes) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("single-seg flush: writes=%d gso=%d", len(w.writes), len(w.gsoWrites))
}
}
func TestUDPCoalescerCoalescesEqualSized(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewUDPCoalescer(w, util.NewArena(0))
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("want 1 gso write, got %d (plain=%d)", len(w.gsoWrites), len(w.writes))
}
g := w.gsoWrites[0]
if g.gsoSize != 1200 {
t.Errorf("gsoSize=%d want 1200", g.gsoSize)
}
if len(g.pays) != 3 {
t.Errorf("pay count=%d want 3", len(g.pays))
}
if g.csumStart != 20 {
t.Errorf("csumStart=%d want 20", g.csumStart)
}
// IP totalLen and UDP length must be the TOTAL across all segments —
// the kernel's ip_rcv_core trims skbs to iph->tot_len, so a per-segment
// value would silently drop everything but the first segment. Total =
// IP(20) + UDP(8) + 3*1200 = 3628.
gotTotalLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(g.hdr[2:4])
if gotTotalLen != 3628 {
t.Errorf("ipv4 total_len=%d want 3628 (must be total across segments)", gotTotalLen)
}
gotUDPLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(g.hdr[20+4 : 20+6])
if gotUDPLen != 8+3*1200 {
t.Errorf("udp len=%d want %d", gotUDPLen, 8+3*1200)
}
}
// Last segment may be shorter, sealing the chain.
func TestUDPCoalescerShortLastSegmentSeals(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewUDPCoalescer(w, util.NewArena(0))
full := make([]byte, 1200)
tail := make([]byte, 600)
if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, full)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, full)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, tail)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// A 4th packet, even same-sized, must NOT join — chain is sealed.
if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, full)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 gso writes (sealed + new seed), got %d", len(w.gsoWrites))
}
if len(w.gsoWrites[0].pays) != 3 {
t.Errorf("first super: want 3 pays, got %d", len(w.gsoWrites[0].pays))
}
if len(w.gsoWrites[1].pays) != 1 {
t.Errorf("second super: want 1 pay (re-seed), got %d", len(w.gsoWrites[1].pays))
}
}
// A larger-than-gsoSize packet cannot extend the slot — it reseeds.
func TestUDPCoalescerLargerThanSeedReseeds(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewUDPCoalescer(w, util.NewArena(0))
if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, make([]byte, 800))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, make([]byte, 1200))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 separate seeds, got %d", len(w.gsoWrites))
}
}
// Different 5-tuples must not coalesce.
func TestUDPCoalescerDifferentFlowsKeepSeparate(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewUDPCoalescer(w, util.NewArena(0))
pay := make([]byte, 800)
if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(2000, 53, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(2000, 53, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Two flows × 2 datagrams each = 2 superpackets of 2 segments.
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 gso writes (one per flow), got %d", len(w.gsoWrites))
}
for i, g := range w.gsoWrites {
if len(g.pays) != 2 {
t.Errorf("super %d: want 2 pays, got %d", i, len(g.pays))
}
}
}
// Caps at udpCoalesceMaxSegs.
func TestUDPCoalescerCapsAtMaxSegs(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewUDPCoalescer(w, util.NewArena(0))
pay := make([]byte, 100)
for i := 0; i < udpCoalesceMaxSegs+5; i++ {
if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// First superpacket holds udpCoalesceMaxSegs segments; the spillover
// reseeds a new one.
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 gso writes (cap then reseed), got %d", len(w.gsoWrites))
}
if len(w.gsoWrites[0].pays) != udpCoalesceMaxSegs {
t.Errorf("first super: pays=%d want %d", len(w.gsoWrites[0].pays), udpCoalesceMaxSegs)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites[1].pays) != 5 {
t.Errorf("second super: pays=%d want 5", len(w.gsoWrites[1].pays))
}
}
// CE marks on appended segments must be merged into the seed's IP TOS.
func TestUDPCoalescerMergesCEMark(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewUDPCoalescer(w, util.NewArena(0))
pay := make([]byte, 800)
pkt0 := buildUDPv4(1000, 53, pay) // ECN=00
pkt1 := buildUDPv4(1000, 53, pay)
pkt1[1] = 0x03 // CE
pkt2 := buildUDPv4(1000, 53, pay)
if err := c.Commit(pkt0); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(pkt1); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(pkt2); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("want 1 merged gso write, got %d (plain=%d)", len(w.gsoWrites), len(w.writes))
}
if w.gsoWrites[0].hdr[1]&0x03 != 0x03 {
t.Errorf("CE not merged into seed (tos=%#x)", w.gsoWrites[0].hdr[1])
}
}
// IPv6 path: same flow, equal-sized → coalesced.
func TestUDPCoalescerIPv6Coalesces(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewUDPCoalescer(w, util.NewArena(0))
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
if err := c.Commit(buildUDPv6(1000, 53, pay)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("want 1 gso write, got %d", len(w.gsoWrites))
}
g := w.gsoWrites[0]
if !g.isV6 {
t.Errorf("expected v6 write")
}
if g.csumStart != 40 {
t.Errorf("csumStart=%d want 40", g.csumStart)
}
// IPv6 payload_len and UDP length must be TOTAL — kernel's
// ip6_rcv_core trims to payload_len + ipv6 hdr size. Total UDP = 8 +
// 3*1200 = 3608.
gotPlen := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(g.hdr[4:6])
if gotPlen != 8+3*1200 {
t.Errorf("ipv6 payload_len=%d want %d (must be total)", gotPlen, 8+3*1200)
}
gotUDPLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(g.hdr[40+4 : 40+6])
if gotUDPLen != 8+3*1200 {
t.Errorf("udp len=%d want %d", gotUDPLen, 8+3*1200)
}
}
// DSCP differences must reseed (headers don't match outside ECN).
func TestUDPCoalescerDSCPMismatchReseeds(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewUDPCoalescer(w, util.NewArena(0))
pay := make([]byte, 800)
pkt0 := buildUDPv4(1000, 53, pay)
pkt1 := buildUDPv4(1000, 53, pay)
pkt1[1] = 0xb8 // EF DSCP, ECN=0
if err := c.Commit(pkt0); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Commit(pkt1); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 separate seeds (different DSCP), got %d", len(w.gsoWrites))
}
}
// Fragmented IPv4 must not be coalesced.
func TestUDPCoalescerFragmentedIPv4PassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewUDPCoalescer(w, util.NewArena(0))
pkt := buildUDPv4(1000, 53, make([]byte, 200))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[6:8], 0x2000) // MF=1
if err := c.Commit(pkt); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.writes) != 1 || len(w.gsoWrites) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("frag must pass through plain, got writes=%d gso=%d", len(w.writes), len(w.gsoWrites))
}
}
// IPv4 with options is not admissible (we require IHL=5).
func TestUDPCoalescerIPv4WithOptionsPassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
c := NewUDPCoalescer(w, util.NewArena(0))
pkt := buildUDPv4(1000, 53, make([]byte, 200))
pkt[0] = 0x46 // IHL = 6 (24-byte IPv4 header — has options)
if err := c.Commit(pkt); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.writes) != 1 || len(w.gsoWrites) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("ipv4-with-options must pass through plain, got writes=%d gso=%d", len(w.writes), len(w.gsoWrites))
}
}
-23
View File
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
package checksum
import (
"golang.org/x/sys/cpu"
gvisorchecksum "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/tcpip/checksum"
)
//go:noescape
func checksumAVX2(buf []byte, initial uint16) uint16
var hasAVX2 = cpu.X86.HasAVX2
// Checksum computes the RFC 1071 ones-complement sum of buf, seeded with
// initial. It is a drop-in replacement for gvisor's checksum.Checksum that
// dispatches to a hand-written AVX2 routine on amd64 CPUs that support it,
// falling back to gvisor's pure-Go implementation otherwise. The result
// matches gvisor's bit-for-bit for any buffer length and initial seed.
func Checksum(buf []byte, initial uint16) uint16 {
if hasAVX2 {
return checksumAVX2(buf, initial)
}
return gvisorchecksum.Checksum(buf, initial)
}
-157
View File
@@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
#include "textflag.h"
// func checksumAVX2(buf []byte, initial uint16) uint16
//
// Computes the RFC 1071 ones-complement sum of buf, seeded with initial.
//
// Algorithm: sum the buffer treating it as a stream of uint32s in machine
// (little-endian) byte order, accumulating into 64-bit lanes (top 32 bits
// hold cross-add carries at 1 byte / lane / iter we have 32 bits of
// headroom which is far more than the 16 KB/64 KB max practical inputs).
// At the end we fold to 16 bits and byte-swap once to recover the on-wire
// (big-endian) result. RFC 1071 §1.2.B byte-order independence makes this
// equivalent to summing as 16-bit big-endian words.
//
// The ymm accumulators (Y4..Y7) hold 4 uint64 lanes each = 16 parallel
// partial sums. The main loop loads 64 bytes per iter as four 16-byte
// chunks, zero-extending each chunk's four uint32s into a ymm via
// VPMOVZXDQ-from-memory, then VPADDQ into a separate accumulator per
// chunk to break the dep chain. After the vector loop the lane sums are
// horizontally reduced and merged with a scalar accumulator that handles
// the trailing 0..63 bytes plus the (byte-swapped) initial seed.
TEXT ·checksumAVX2(SB), NOSPLIT, $0-34
MOVQ buf_base+0(FP), SI
MOVQ buf_len+8(FP), CX
MOVWQZX initial+24(FP), AX
// Pre-byteswap initial into the LE-summing space so it merges directly
// with the rest of the accumulator. The final fold's bswap16 will undo
// this and convert the whole result back to BE.
XCHGB AH, AL
CMPQ CX, $32
JLT scalar_tail
VPXOR Y4, Y4, Y4
VPXOR Y5, Y5, Y5
VPXOR Y6, Y6, Y6
VPXOR Y7, Y7, Y7
CMPQ CX, $64
JLT loop32
loop64:
VPMOVZXDQ (SI), Y0
VPMOVZXDQ 16(SI), Y1
VPMOVZXDQ 32(SI), Y2
VPMOVZXDQ 48(SI), Y3
VPADDQ Y0, Y4, Y4
VPADDQ Y1, Y5, Y5
VPADDQ Y2, Y6, Y6
VPADDQ Y3, Y7, Y7
ADDQ $64, SI
SUBQ $64, CX
CMPQ CX, $64
JGE loop64
loop32:
CMPQ CX, $32
JLT reduce_vec
VPMOVZXDQ (SI), Y0
VPMOVZXDQ 16(SI), Y1
VPADDQ Y0, Y4, Y4
VPADDQ Y1, Y5, Y5
ADDQ $32, SI
SUBQ $32, CX
JMP loop32
reduce_vec:
// Combine the four ymm accumulators into Y4.
VPADDQ Y5, Y4, Y4
VPADDQ Y7, Y6, Y6
VPADDQ Y6, Y4, Y4
// Horizontally reduce Y4's four uint64 lanes to a single scalar.
VEXTRACTI128 $1, Y4, X5
VPADDQ X5, X4, X4
VPSHUFD $0x4e, X4, X5
VPADDQ X5, X4, X4
VMOVQ X4, R8
VZEROUPPER
ADDQ R8, AX
ADCQ $0, AX
scalar_tail:
// Handle remaining 0..63 bytes (or the entire buffer if it was < 32).
CMPQ CX, $8
JLT tail4
loop8:
ADDQ (SI), AX
ADCQ $0, AX
ADDQ $8, SI
SUBQ $8, CX
CMPQ CX, $8
JGE loop8
tail4:
CMPQ CX, $4
JLT tail2
MOVL (SI), R8
ADDQ R8, AX
ADCQ $0, AX
ADDQ $4, SI
SUBQ $4, CX
tail2:
CMPQ CX, $2
JLT tail1
MOVWQZX (SI), R8
ADDQ R8, AX
ADCQ $0, AX
ADDQ $2, SI
SUBQ $2, CX
tail1:
TESTQ CX, CX
JZ fold
MOVBQZX (SI), R8
ADDQ R8, AX
ADCQ $0, AX
fold:
// Fold the 64-bit accumulator to 16 bits via four rounds, mirroring
// gvisor's reduce(). Each pair (split, add) halves the live width;
// the truncation steps absorb the single bit that may be left over
// after each add so the next round's bound holds.
// 64 33 bits.
MOVQ AX, R8
SHRQ $32, R8
MOVL AX, AX
ADDQ R8, AX
// 33 32 bits. AX += (AX>>32); truncate to 32. AX is now ≤ 0xFFFF_FFFF.
MOVQ AX, R8
SHRQ $32, R8
ADDQ R8, AX
MOVL AX, AX
// 32 17 bits.
MOVQ AX, R8
SHRQ $16, R8
MOVWQZX AX, AX
ADDQ R8, AX
// 17 16 bits. AX += (AX>>16); the trailing MOVW truncates bit 16.
MOVQ AX, R8
SHRQ $16, R8
ADDQ R8, AX
// AX low 16 bits hold the 16-bit sum in machine (LE) byte order; flip
// to big-endian to match the gvisor API contract.
XCHGB AH, AL
MOVW AX, ret+32(FP)
RET
-12
View File
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
package checksum
//go:noescape
func checksumNEON(buf []byte, initial uint16) uint16
// Checksum computes the RFC 1071 ones-complement sum of buf, seeded with
// initial. It is a drop-in replacement for gvisor's checksum.Checksum
// that dispatches to a hand-written NEON routine. NEON is mandatory in
// armv8 so no feature check is needed.
func Checksum(buf []byte, initial uint16) uint16 {
return checksumNEON(buf, initial)
}
-143
View File
@@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
#include "textflag.h"
// func checksumNEON(buf []byte, initial uint16) uint16
//
// Mirrors the algorithm in checksum_amd64.s: sum the buffer treating it as
// a stream of uint32s in machine (little-endian) byte order, accumulating
// into 64-bit lanes that have ample carry headroom; fold and byte-swap once
// at the very end to recover the on-wire (big-endian) result.
//
// Each loop iteration loads 64 bytes via VLD1.P into V0..V3 (4 Q regs).
// VUADDW takes the low two uint32 lanes of a Q reg, zero-extends them to
// uint64, and adds them into a 2×uint64 accumulator; VUADDW2 does the same
// for the high two lanes. Four ymm-equivalent accumulators (V8..V11) get
// updated twice per iter to break the dep chain. Tail bytes go through a
// scalar ADCS chain seeded with the byte-swapped initial.
TEXT ·checksumNEON(SB), NOSPLIT, $0-34
MOVD buf_base+0(FP), R0
MOVD buf_len+8(FP), R1
MOVHU initial+24(FP), R2
// Pre-byteswap initial into the LE-summing space so it merges directly
// with the rest of the accumulator.
REV16W R2, R2
MOVD ZR, R3 // scalar accumulator
CMP $32, R1
BLT scalar_tail
VEOR V8.B16, V8.B16, V8.B16
VEOR V9.B16, V9.B16, V9.B16
VEOR V10.B16, V10.B16, V10.B16
VEOR V11.B16, V11.B16, V11.B16
CMP $64, R1
BLT loop16_init
loop64:
VLD1.P 64(R0), [V0.B16, V1.B16, V2.B16, V3.B16]
VUADDW V0.S2, V8.D2, V8.D2
VUADDW2 V0.S4, V9.D2, V9.D2
VUADDW V1.S2, V10.D2, V10.D2
VUADDW2 V1.S4, V11.D2, V11.D2
VUADDW V2.S2, V8.D2, V8.D2
VUADDW2 V2.S4, V9.D2, V9.D2
VUADDW V3.S2, V10.D2, V10.D2
VUADDW2 V3.S4, V11.D2, V11.D2
SUB $64, R1, R1
CMP $64, R1
BGE loop64
loop16_init:
CMP $16, R1
BLT reduce_vec
loop16:
VLD1.P 16(R0), [V0.B16]
VUADDW V0.S2, V8.D2, V8.D2
VUADDW2 V0.S4, V9.D2, V9.D2
SUB $16, R1, R1
CMP $16, R1
BGE loop16
reduce_vec:
// Combine the four accumulators into V8.
VADD V9.D2, V8.D2, V8.D2
VADD V11.D2, V10.D2, V10.D2
VADD V10.D2, V8.D2, V8.D2
// Horizontal-add the two lanes of V8.D2 into a single uint64.
VADDP V8.D2, V8.D2, V8.D2
VMOV V8.D[0], R8
ADDS R8, R3, R3
ADC ZR, R3, R3
scalar_tail:
CMP $8, R1
BLT tail4
loop8:
MOVD.P 8(R0), R8
ADDS R8, R3, R3
ADC ZR, R3, R3
SUB $8, R1, R1
CMP $8, R1
BGE loop8
tail4:
CMP $4, R1
BLT tail2
MOVWU.P 4(R0), R8
ADDS R8, R3, R3
ADC ZR, R3, R3
SUB $4, R1, R1
tail2:
CMP $2, R1
BLT tail1
MOVHU.P 2(R0), R8
ADDS R8, R3, R3
ADC ZR, R3, R3
SUB $2, R1, R1
tail1:
CBZ R1, fold
MOVBU (R0), R8
ADDS R8, R3, R3
ADC ZR, R3, R3
fold:
// Merge the byte-swapped initial into our LE-form accumulator.
ADDS R2, R3, R3
ADC ZR, R3, R3
// 64 33 bits.
LSR $32, R3, R8
AND $0xffffffff, R3, R3
ADD R8, R3, R3
// 33 32 (truncate after adding bit 32 back).
LSR $32, R3, R8
ADD R8, R3, R3
AND $0xffffffff, R3, R3
// 32 17.
LSR $16, R3, R8
AND $0xffff, R3, R3
ADD R8, R3, R3
// 17 16 (truncation absorbs bit 16 below).
LSR $16, R3, R8
ADD R8, R3, R3
// AX low 16 bits hold the 16-bit sum in machine (LE) byte order; flip
// to big-endian to match the gvisor API contract. REV16W swaps bytes
// within each 16-bit halfword of the low 32 bits, so it acts as a
// 16-bit byte-swap on the live low 16.
REV16W R3, R3
AND $0xffff, R3, R3
MOVH R3, ret+32(FP)
RET
-10
View File
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
//go:build !amd64 && !arm64
package checksum
import gvisorchecksum "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/tcpip/checksum"
// Checksum delegates to gvisor on architectures without a hand-written body.
func Checksum(buf []byte, initial uint16) uint16 {
return gvisorchecksum.Checksum(buf, initial)
}
-190
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@@ -1,190 +0,0 @@
package checksum
import (
"fmt"
"math/rand/v2"
"testing"
gvisorchecksum "gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/tcpip/checksum"
)
// TestChecksumMatchesGvisor walks lengths from 0 to 4096, with several initial
// seeds and a handful of starting alignments, asserting that our local
// Checksum matches gvisor's reference bit-for-bit.
func TestChecksumMatchesGvisor(t *testing.T) {
rng := rand.New(rand.NewPCG(1, 2))
const padFront = 16
// Random pool large enough for the longest case + alignment slop.
pool := make([]byte, 4096+padFront)
for i := range pool {
pool[i] = byte(rng.Uint32())
}
seeds := []uint16{0, 0x0001, 0xabcd, 0xffff, 0x1234, 0xfedc}
offsets := []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 15, 16}
for length := 0; length <= 4096; length++ {
for _, seed := range seeds {
for _, off := range offsets {
if off+length > len(pool) {
continue
}
buf := pool[off : off+length]
want := gvisorchecksum.Checksum(buf, seed)
got := Checksum(buf, seed)
if got != want {
t.Fatalf("len=%d off=%d seed=%#x: got %#04x want %#04x",
length, off, seed, got, want)
}
}
}
}
}
// TestChecksumPatternedBuffers exercises specific byte patterns that have
// historically tripped up checksum implementations: all-zero, all-0xff,
// alternating, and ascending sequences.
func TestChecksumPatternedBuffers(t *testing.T) {
for length := 0; length <= 256; length++ {
patterns := map[string][]byte{
"zeros": make([]byte, length),
"ones": bytes(length, 0xff),
"alternating": pattern(length, []byte{0xa5, 0x5a}),
"ascending": ascending(length),
}
for name, buf := range patterns {
for _, seed := range []uint16{0, 0xffff, 0x8000} {
want := gvisorchecksum.Checksum(buf, seed)
got := Checksum(buf, seed)
if got != want {
t.Fatalf("%s len=%d seed=%#x: got %#04x want %#04x",
name, length, seed, got, want)
}
}
}
}
}
func bytes(n int, v byte) []byte {
b := make([]byte, n)
for i := range b {
b[i] = v
}
return b
}
func pattern(n int, p []byte) []byte {
b := make([]byte, n)
for i := range b {
b[i] = p[i%len(p)]
}
return b
}
func ascending(n int) []byte {
b := make([]byte, n)
for i := range b {
b[i] = byte(i)
}
return b
}
// TestChecksumTailPaths targets every combination of (SIMD body iterations,
// trailing tail bytes) the asm handlers walk through. The tail handlers
// peel off 8 → 4 → 2 → 1 byte chunks in turn; this test exercises each by
// constructing lengths of the form 64*k + tail for tail ∈ [0, 63] and a
// representative spread of k values, including k=0 (no main loop, all tail)
// and k=1 (one main loop iter, then tail). It's explicit coverage for
// payload sizes that are odd, not divisible by 4, by 8, or by 32.
func TestChecksumTailPaths(t *testing.T) {
rng := rand.New(rand.NewPCG(42, 17))
const padFront = 16
const maxK = 8
pool := make([]byte, 64*maxK+padFront+64)
for i := range pool {
pool[i] = byte(rng.Uint32())
}
seeds := []uint16{0, 0xffff, 0xabcd}
offsets := []int{0, 1, 3, 7, 15} // mix of aligned and odd starts
for k := 0; k <= maxK; k++ {
for tail := 0; tail < 64; tail++ {
length := 64*k + tail
for _, seed := range seeds {
for _, off := range offsets {
if off+length > len(pool) {
continue
}
buf := pool[off : off+length]
want := gvisorchecksum.Checksum(buf, seed)
got := Checksum(buf, seed)
if got != want {
t.Fatalf("k=%d tail=%d (len=%d) off=%d seed=%#x: got %#04x want %#04x",
k, tail, length, off, seed, got, want)
}
}
}
}
}
}
// BenchmarkChecksumTailSizes covers payload sizes that aren't clean multiples
// of the SIMD body's 32-byte (amd64) or 16-byte (arm64) chunks, so the tail
// handler is meaningfully on the hot path. Sizes are picked to either exercise
// every tail branch (tiny lengths) or sit slightly off realistic packet
// boundaries (e.g. 1499 = MTU 1).
func BenchmarkChecksumTailSizes(b *testing.B) {
sizes := []int{
1, 3, 7, 15, 31, // sub-SIMD; entire work is scalar tail
33, 35, 47, 63, // one loop32 + assorted tails
65, 95, 127, // one loop64 + assorted tails
1447, 1471, 1499, 1501, // around MTU
8191, 8193, // around USO
65531, 65533, // near the kernel max
}
for _, size := range sizes {
buf := make([]byte, size)
for i := range buf {
buf[i] = byte(i)
}
b.Run(fmt.Sprintf("size=%d/local", size), func(b *testing.B) {
b.SetBytes(int64(size))
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
_ = Checksum(buf, 0)
}
})
b.Run(fmt.Sprintf("size=%d/gvisor", size), func(b *testing.B) {
b.SetBytes(int64(size))
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
_ = gvisorchecksum.Checksum(buf, 0)
}
})
}
}
// BenchmarkChecksum compares the local Checksum to gvisor's at sizes that
// match real traffic: a TCP/IP header (60), a typical MSS (1448), a typical
// USO size (8192), and the kernel's max GSO superpacket (65535).
func BenchmarkChecksum(b *testing.B) {
for _, size := range []int{60, 1448, 8192, 65535} {
buf := make([]byte, size)
for i := range buf {
buf[i] = byte(i)
}
b.Run(fmt.Sprintf("size=%d/local", size), func(b *testing.B) {
b.SetBytes(int64(size))
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
_ = Checksum(buf, 0)
}
})
b.Run(fmt.Sprintf("size=%d/gvisor", size), func(b *testing.B) {
b.SetBytes(int64(size))
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
_ = gvisorchecksum.Checksum(buf, 0)
}
})
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ type Device interface {
Networks() []netip.Prefix
Name() string
RoutesFor(netip.Addr) routing.Gateways
SupportsMultiqueue() bool
SupportsMultiqueue() bool //todo remove?
NewMultiQueueReader() error
Readers() []tio.Queue
}
-358
View File
@@ -1,358 +0,0 @@
//go:build !e2e_testing
// +build !e2e_testing
package overlay
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"runtime"
"strings"
"syscall"
"time"
"unsafe"
"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
)
// networkCategory mirrors NLM_NETWORK_CATEGORY from netlistmgr.h.
type networkCategory int32
const (
networkCategoryPublic networkCategory = 0
networkCategoryPrivate networkCategory = 1
networkCategoryDomainAuthenticated networkCategory = 2
)
func (c networkCategory) String() string {
switch c {
case networkCategoryPublic:
return "public"
case networkCategoryPrivate:
return "private"
case networkCategoryDomainAuthenticated:
return "domain"
}
return fmt.Sprintf("unknown(%d)", c)
}
// parseNetworkCategory accepts the user-supplied tun.network_category. A
// second return of false means "leave the category alone".
func parseNetworkCategory(s string) (networkCategory, bool, error) {
switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(s)) {
case "", "unset":
return 0, false, nil
case "public":
return networkCategoryPublic, true, nil
case "private":
return networkCategoryPrivate, true, nil
case "domain", "domainauthenticated":
return networkCategoryDomainAuthenticated, true, nil
}
return 0, false, fmt.Errorf("unknown tun.network_category %q (expected public, private, domain, or unset)", s)
}
// CLSID_NetworkListManager {DCB00C01-570F-4A9B-8D69-199FDBA5723B}
var clsidNetworkListManager = windows.GUID{
Data1: 0xDCB00C01, Data2: 0x570F, Data3: 0x4A9B,
Data4: [8]byte{0x8D, 0x69, 0x19, 0x9F, 0xDB, 0xA5, 0x72, 0x3B},
}
// IID_INetworkListManager {DCB00000-570F-4A9B-8D69-199FDBA5723B}
var iidINetworkListManager = windows.GUID{
Data1: 0xDCB00000, Data2: 0x570F, Data3: 0x4A9B,
Data4: [8]byte{0x8D, 0x69, 0x19, 0x9F, 0xDB, 0xA5, 0x72, 0x3B},
}
// x/sys/windows doesn't expose CoCreateInstance, so we bind it ourselves.
var procCoCreateInstance = windows.NewLazySystemDLL("ole32.dll").NewProc("CoCreateInstance")
const clsCtxAll = windows.CLSCTX_INPROC_SERVER | windows.CLSCTX_INPROC_HANDLER |
windows.CLSCTX_LOCAL_SERVER | windows.CLSCTX_REMOTE_SERVER
const (
hrSFALSE = 0x00000001
hrRPCEChangedMode = 0x80010106
)
type hresult uint32
func (h hresult) failed() bool { return int32(h) < 0 }
func (h hresult) String() string {
return fmt.Sprintf("HRESULT 0x%08x", uint32(h))
}
var errAdapterNotFound = errors.New("adapter not present in network connections enumeration")
// Vtable layouts. Slot order must match the declaration order in netlistmgr.h.
// All NLM interfaces here derive from IDispatch, which derives from IUnknown.
type iUnknownVtbl struct {
QueryInterface uintptr
AddRef uintptr
Release uintptr
}
type iDispatchVtbl struct {
iUnknownVtbl
GetTypeInfoCount uintptr
GetTypeInfo uintptr
GetIDsOfNames uintptr
Invoke uintptr
}
type iNetworkListManagerVtbl struct {
iDispatchVtbl
GetNetworks uintptr
GetNetwork uintptr
GetNetworkConnections uintptr
GetNetworkConnection uintptr
IsConnectedToInternet uintptr
IsConnected uintptr
GetConnectivity uintptr
}
type iNetworkListManager struct{ Vtbl *iNetworkListManagerVtbl }
func (n *iNetworkListManager) Release() {
syscall.SyscallN(n.Vtbl.Release, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(n)))
}
func (n *iNetworkListManager) GetNetworkConnections() (*iEnumNetworkConnections, error) {
var enum *iEnumNetworkConnections
r1, _, _ := syscall.SyscallN(n.Vtbl.GetNetworkConnections,
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(n)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&enum)),
)
if hr := hresult(r1); hr.failed() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("INetworkListManager.GetNetworkConnections: %s", hr)
}
return enum, nil
}
type iEnumNetworkConnectionsVtbl struct {
iDispatchVtbl
NewEnum uintptr
Next uintptr
Skip uintptr
Reset uintptr
Clone uintptr
}
type iEnumNetworkConnections struct{ Vtbl *iEnumNetworkConnectionsVtbl }
func (e *iEnumNetworkConnections) Release() {
syscall.SyscallN(e.Vtbl.Release, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(e)))
}
// Next returns the next connection, or (nil, nil) at the end of the enumeration.
func (e *iEnumNetworkConnections) Next() (*iNetworkConnection, error) {
var conn *iNetworkConnection
var fetched uint32
r1, _, _ := syscall.SyscallN(e.Vtbl.Next,
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(e)), 1,
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&conn)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&fetched)),
)
if hr := hresult(r1); hr.failed() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("IEnumNetworkConnections.Next: %s", hr)
}
if fetched == 0 {
return nil, nil
}
return conn, nil
}
type iNetworkConnectionVtbl struct {
iDispatchVtbl
GetNetwork uintptr
IsConnectedToInternet uintptr
IsConnected uintptr
GetConnectivity uintptr
GetConnectionId uintptr
GetAdapterId uintptr
GetDomainType uintptr
}
type iNetworkConnection struct{ Vtbl *iNetworkConnectionVtbl }
func (c *iNetworkConnection) Release() {
syscall.SyscallN(c.Vtbl.Release, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(c)))
}
func (c *iNetworkConnection) GetAdapterId() (windows.GUID, error) {
var g windows.GUID
r1, _, _ := syscall.SyscallN(c.Vtbl.GetAdapterId,
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(c)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&g)),
)
if hr := hresult(r1); hr.failed() {
return windows.GUID{}, fmt.Errorf("INetworkConnection.GetAdapterId: %s", hr)
}
return g, nil
}
func (c *iNetworkConnection) GetNetwork() (*iNetwork, error) {
var net *iNetwork
r1, _, _ := syscall.SyscallN(c.Vtbl.GetNetwork,
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(c)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&net)),
)
if hr := hresult(r1); hr.failed() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("INetworkConnection.GetNetwork: %s", hr)
}
return net, nil
}
type iNetworkVtbl struct {
iDispatchVtbl
GetName uintptr
SetName uintptr
GetDescription uintptr
SetDescription uintptr
GetNetworkId uintptr
GetDomainType uintptr
GetNetworkConnections uintptr
GetTimeCreatedAndConnected uintptr
IsConnectedToInternet uintptr
IsConnected uintptr
GetConnectivity uintptr
GetCategory uintptr
SetCategory uintptr
}
type iNetwork struct{ Vtbl *iNetworkVtbl }
func (n *iNetwork) Release() {
syscall.SyscallN(n.Vtbl.Release, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(n)))
}
func (n *iNetwork) GetCategory() (networkCategory, error) {
var c networkCategory
r1, _, _ := syscall.SyscallN(n.Vtbl.GetCategory,
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(n)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&c)),
)
if hr := hresult(r1); hr.failed() {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("INetwork.GetCategory: %s", hr)
}
return c, nil
}
func (n *iNetwork) SetCategory(c networkCategory) error {
r1, _, _ := syscall.SyscallN(n.Vtbl.SetCategory,
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(n)), uintptr(int32(c)),
)
if hr := hresult(r1); hr.failed() {
return fmt.Errorf("INetwork.SetCategory: %s", hr)
}
return nil
}
// coInit initializes COM for the current OS thread. The returned function must
// be deferred to balance a successful init. RPC_E_CHANGED_MODE means COM is
// already initialized in a different mode on this thread, which is still fine
// for our calls but we must not Uninitialize in that case.
func coInit() (func(), error) {
err := windows.CoInitializeEx(0, windows.COINIT_MULTITHREADED)
if err == nil {
return windows.CoUninitialize, nil
}
if e, ok := err.(syscall.Errno); ok {
switch uint32(e) {
case hrSFALSE:
return windows.CoUninitialize, nil
case hrRPCEChangedMode:
return func() {}, nil
}
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("CoInitializeEx: %w", err)
}
func createNetworkListManager() (*iNetworkListManager, error) {
var nlm *iNetworkListManager
r1, _, _ := procCoCreateInstance.Call(
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&clsidNetworkListManager)),
0,
uintptr(clsCtxAll),
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&iidINetworkListManager)),
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&nlm)),
)
if hr := hresult(r1); hr.failed() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("CoCreateInstance(NetworkListManager): %s", hr)
}
return nlm, nil
}
// setNetworkCategory locates the network connection bound to adapterGUID and
// sets the category of its parent network. Returns errAdapterNotFound if the
// adapter is not yet visible in the NLM enumeration.
func setNetworkCategory(adapterGUID windows.GUID, cat networkCategory) error {
deinit, err := coInit()
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer deinit()
nlm, err := createNetworkListManager()
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer nlm.Release()
enum, err := nlm.GetNetworkConnections()
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer enum.Release()
for {
conn, err := enum.Next()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if conn == nil {
return errAdapterNotFound
}
guid, err := conn.GetAdapterId()
if err != nil || guid != adapterGUID {
conn.Release()
continue
}
net, err := conn.GetNetwork()
conn.Release()
if err != nil {
return err
}
err = net.SetCategory(cat)
net.Release()
return err
}
}
// applyNetworkCategory polls until the wintun adapter shows up in the NLM
// enumeration, then sets the category. Intended to run in its own goroutine.
func applyNetworkCategory(l *slog.Logger, adapterGUID windows.GUID, cat networkCategory) {
// COM Init/Uninit must be paired on the same OS thread.
runtime.LockOSThread()
defer runtime.UnlockOSThread()
const (
attempts = 30
interval = 500 * time.Millisecond
)
for i := 0; i < attempts; i++ {
err := setNetworkCategory(adapterGUID, cat)
if err == nil {
l.Info("Set Windows network category", "category", cat.String())
return
}
if !errors.Is(err, errAdapterNotFound) {
l.Warn("Failed to set Windows network category", "error", err, "category", cat.String())
return
}
time.Sleep(interval)
}
l.Warn("Gave up waiting for adapter to appear in NLM enumeration; network category not set",
"category", cat.String(),
"waited", time.Duration(attempts)*interval,
)
}
-109
View File
@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
//go:build !e2e_testing
// +build !e2e_testing
package overlay
import (
"testing"
)
func Test_parseNetworkCategory(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
in string
wantCat networkCategory
wantApply bool
wantErr bool
}{
{"", 0, false, false},
{"unset", 0, false, false},
{" UNSET ", 0, false, false},
{"private", networkCategoryPrivate, true, false},
{"Private", networkCategoryPrivate, true, false},
{" PRIVATE ", networkCategoryPrivate, true, false},
{"public", networkCategoryPublic, true, false},
{"PUBLIC", networkCategoryPublic, true, false},
{"domain", networkCategoryDomainAuthenticated, true, false},
{"DomainAuthenticated", networkCategoryDomainAuthenticated, true, false},
{"garbage", 0, false, true},
{"privates", 0, false, true},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
cat, apply, err := parseNetworkCategory(tc.in)
if (err != nil) != tc.wantErr {
t.Errorf("parseNetworkCategory(%q) err=%v, wantErr=%v", tc.in, err, tc.wantErr)
continue
}
if cat != tc.wantCat || apply != tc.wantApply {
t.Errorf("parseNetworkCategory(%q) = (%v, %v), want (%v, %v)", tc.in, cat, apply, tc.wantCat, tc.wantApply)
}
}
}
// Test_NLM_round_trip exercises every COM call path used by setNetworkCategory
// without mutating the host's network state. It validates the CLSID/IID
// constants and every vtable index by enumerating connections, fetching the
// adapter id and parent network, reading the current category, and writing it
// back unchanged.
//
// Requires Windows but does not require admin or the wintun driver. Skips if
// no network connections are available (unlikely outside of an isolated
// container).
func Test_NLM_round_trip(t *testing.T) {
deinit, err := coInit()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("coInit: %v", err)
}
defer deinit()
nlm, err := createNetworkListManager()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("createNetworkListManager: %v", err)
}
defer nlm.Release()
enum, err := nlm.GetNetworkConnections()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GetNetworkConnections: %v", err)
}
defer enum.Release()
saw := 0
for {
conn, err := enum.Next()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("EnumNetworkConnections.Next: %v", err)
}
if conn == nil {
break
}
saw++
if _, err := conn.GetAdapterId(); err != nil {
conn.Release()
t.Fatalf("INetworkConnection.GetAdapterId: %v", err)
}
net, err := conn.GetNetwork()
conn.Release()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("INetworkConnection.GetNetwork: %v", err)
}
cat, err := net.GetCategory()
if err != nil {
net.Release()
t.Fatalf("INetwork.GetCategory: %v", err)
}
// Set to the current value so the host's NLM state is unchanged but
// SetCategory's vtable slot is still validated end-to-end.
if err := net.SetCategory(cat); err != nil {
net.Release()
t.Fatalf("INetwork.SetCategory(%v): %v", cat, err)
}
net.Release()
}
if saw == 0 {
t.Skip("no NLM network connections available; skipping round-trip")
}
}
+2 -7
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import (
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/wire"
)
// NoopTun is an overlay.Device that silently discards every read and write.
@@ -16,10 +15,6 @@ import (
// exercise the datapath.
type NoopTun struct{}
func (NoopTun) Capabilities() tio.Capabilities {
return tio.Capabilities{}
}
func (NoopTun) RoutesFor(addr netip.Addr) routing.Gateways {
return routing.Gateways{}
}
@@ -36,8 +31,8 @@ func (NoopTun) Name() string {
return "noop"
}
func (NoopTun) Read(p []wire.TunPacket, mem []byte) (int, error) {
return 0, nil
func (NoopTun) Read() ([][]byte, error) {
return nil, nil
}
func (NoopTun) Write([]byte) (int, error) {
+70
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
package tio
import (
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"fmt"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
type offloadContainer struct {
pq []*Offload
// pqi is exactly the same as pq, but stored as the interface type
pqi []Queue
shutdownFd int
}
func NewOffloadContainer() (Container, error) {
shutdownFd, err := unix.Eventfd(0, unix.EFD_NONBLOCK|unix.EFD_CLOEXEC)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create eventfd: %w", err)
}
out := &offloadContainer{
pq: []*Offload{},
pqi: []Queue{},
shutdownFd: shutdownFd,
}
return out, nil
}
func (c *offloadContainer) Queues() []Queue {
return c.pqi
}
func (c *offloadContainer) Add(fd int) error {
x, err := newOffload(fd, c.shutdownFd)
if err != nil {
return err
}
c.pq = append(c.pq, x)
c.pqi = append(c.pqi, x)
return nil
}
func (c *offloadContainer) wakeForShutdown() error {
var buf [8]byte
binary.NativeEndian.PutUint64(buf[:], 1)
_, err := unix.Write(c.shutdownFd, buf[:])
return err
}
func (c *offloadContainer) Close() error {
errs := []error{}
// Signal all readers blocked in poll to wake up and exit
if err := c.wakeForShutdown(); err != nil {
errs = append(errs, err)
}
for _, x := range c.pq {
if err := x.Close(); err != nil {
errs = append(errs, err)
}
}
return errors.Join(errs...)
}
@@ -8,20 +8,20 @@ import (
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
type pollQueueSet struct {
type pollContainer struct {
pq []*Poll
// pqi is exactly the same as pq, but stored as the interface type
pqi []Queue
shutdownFd int
}
func NewPollQueueSet() (QueueSet, error) {
func NewPollContainer() (Container, error) {
shutdownFd, err := unix.Eventfd(0, unix.EFD_NONBLOCK|unix.EFD_CLOEXEC)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create eventfd: %w", err)
}
out := &pollQueueSet{
out := &pollContainer{
pq: []*Poll{},
pqi: []Queue{},
shutdownFd: shutdownFd,
@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ func NewPollQueueSet() (QueueSet, error) {
return out, nil
}
func (c *pollQueueSet) Queues() []Queue {
func (c *pollContainer) Queues() []Queue {
return c.pqi
}
func (c *pollQueueSet) Add(fd int) error {
func (c *pollContainer) Add(fd int) error {
x, err := newPoll(fd, c.shutdownFd)
if err != nil {
return err
@@ -45,18 +45,14 @@ func (c *pollQueueSet) Add(fd int) error {
return nil
}
func (c *pollQueueSet) wakeForShutdown() error {
func (c *pollContainer) wakeForShutdown() error {
var buf [8]byte
binary.NativeEndian.PutUint64(buf[:], 1)
_, err := unix.Write(c.shutdownFd, buf[:])
_, err := unix.Write(int(c.shutdownFd), buf[:])
return err
}
func (c *pollQueueSet) Close() error {
if c.shutdownFd < 0 {
return nil
}
func (c *pollContainer) Close() error {
errs := []error{}
if err := c.wakeForShutdown(); err != nil {
@@ -69,12 +65,5 @@ func (c *pollQueueSet) Close() error {
}
}
// All Polls reference shutdownFd in their pollfd arrays, so close it
// only after every Poll.Close has returned.
if err := unix.Close(c.shutdownFd); err != nil {
errs = append(errs, err)
}
c.shutdownFd = -1
return errors.Join(errs...)
}
-90
View File
@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
package tio
import (
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"fmt"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
type offloadQueueSet struct {
pq []*Offload
// pqi is exactly the same as pq, but stored as the interface type
pqi []Queue
shutdownFd int
// usoEnabled is true when newTun successfully negotiated TUN_F_USO4|6
// with the kernel. Queues created by Add inherit this and surface it
// via Offload.USOSupported so coalescers can gate USO emission.
usoEnabled bool
}
// NewOffloadQueueSet creates a QueueSet that uses virtio_net_hdr to do
// TSO segmentation in userspace. usoEnabled tells downstream queues whether
// the kernel agreed to deliver/accept GSO_UDP_L4 superpackets — coalescers
// should fall back to per-packet writes when this is false.
func NewOffloadQueueSet(usoEnabled bool) (QueueSet, error) {
shutdownFd, err := unix.Eventfd(0, unix.EFD_NONBLOCK|unix.EFD_CLOEXEC)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create eventfd: %w", err)
}
out := &offloadQueueSet{
pq: []*Offload{},
pqi: []Queue{},
shutdownFd: shutdownFd,
usoEnabled: usoEnabled,
}
return out, nil
}
func (c *offloadQueueSet) Queues() []Queue {
return c.pqi
}
func (c *offloadQueueSet) Add(fd int) error {
x, err := newOffload(fd, c.shutdownFd, c.usoEnabled)
if err != nil {
return err
}
c.pq = append(c.pq, x)
c.pqi = append(c.pqi, x)
return nil
}
func (c *offloadQueueSet) wakeForShutdown() error {
var buf [8]byte
binary.NativeEndian.PutUint64(buf[:], 1)
_, err := unix.Write(c.shutdownFd, buf[:])
return err
}
func (c *offloadQueueSet) Close() error {
if c.shutdownFd < 0 {
return nil
}
errs := []error{}
// Signal all readers blocked in poll to wake up and exit
if err := c.wakeForShutdown(); err != nil {
errs = append(errs, err)
}
for _, x := range c.pq {
if err := x.Close(); err != nil {
errs = append(errs, err)
}
}
// All Offloads reference shutdownFd in their pollfd arrays, so close it
// only after every Offload.Close has returned.
if err := unix.Close(c.shutdownFd); err != nil {
errs = append(errs, err)
}
c.shutdownFd = -1
return errors.Join(errs...)
}
-69
View File
@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
//go:build linux && !android && !e2e_testing
package tio
import (
"testing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/wire"
)
// fakeBatch stands in for batch.TxBatcher inside the bench — same shape
// of pointer-capturing closure that sendInsideMessage builds.
type fakeBatch struct{ buf [65536]byte }
func (b *fakeBatch) Reserve(sz int) []byte { return b.buf[:sz] }
func (b *fakeBatch) Commit([]byte) {}
type fakeHostInfo struct {
remoteIndexId uint32
counter uint64
}
type fakeIface struct {
rebindCount uint8
hi *fakeHostInfo
}
// BenchmarkSegmentSuperpacketAllocsTSO measures allocation per
// PerSegment call when a closure captures pointer-bearing receivers — the
// realistic shape of sendInsideMessage's closure.
func BenchmarkSegmentSuperpacketAllocsTSO(b *testing.B) {
const mss = 1400
const numSeg = 32
pkt := buildTSOv6(mss*numSeg, mss)
gso := wire.GSOInfo{
Size: mss,
HdrLen: 60, // 40 (IPv6) + 20 (TCP)
CsumStart: 40,
Proto: wire.GSOProtoTCP,
}
p := wire.TunPacket{Bytes: pkt, Meta: gso}
hi := &fakeHostInfo{remoteIndexId: 0xdeadbeef}
f := &fakeIface{rebindCount: 7, hi: hi}
fb := &fakeBatch{}
// PerSegment consumes pkt destructively; refresh from a master copy
// each iter (matches the production pattern where every TUN read hands
// the segmenter a fresh kernel-supplied buffer).
master := append([]byte(nil), pkt...)
work := make([]byte, len(pkt))
p.Bytes = work
b.ReportAllocs()
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
copy(work, master)
err := p.PerSegment(func(seg []byte) error {
out := fb.Reserve(16 + len(seg) + 16)
out[0] = byte(f.rebindCount)
out[1] = byte(hi.counter)
hi.counter++
fb.Commit(out)
return nil
})
if err != nil {
b.Fatalf("PerSegment: %v", err)
}
}
}
+37 -60
View File
@@ -2,89 +2,66 @@ package tio
import (
"io"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/wire"
)
// QueueSet holds one or many Queue objects and helps close them in an orderly way.
type QueueSet interface {
// defaultBatchBufSize is the per-Queue scratch size for Read on backends
// that don't do TSO segmentation. 65535 covers any single IP packet.
const defaultBatchBufSize = 65535
// Container holds one or many Queue objects and helps close them in an orderly way
type Container interface {
io.Closer
Queues() []Queue
// Add takes a tun fd, adds it to the set, and prepares it for use as a Queue.
// Add takes a tun fd, adds it to the container, and prepares it for use as a Queue
Add(fd int) error
}
// Capabilities advertises which kernel offload features a Queue successfully negotiated.
// Callers consult this to decide which coalescers to wire onto the write path.
type Capabilities struct {
// TSO means the FD was opened with IFF_VNET_HDR and the kernel agreed
// to TUN_F_TSO4|TSO6 — i.e. WriteGSO with GSOProtoTCP is safe.
TSO bool
// USO means the kernel additionally agreed to TUN_F_USO4|USO6, so
// WriteGSO with GSOProtoUDP is safe. Linux ≥ 6.2.
USO bool
io.Closer
}
// Queue is a readable/writable Poll queue. One Queue is driven by a single
// read goroutine plus a single writer (see Write below).
// read goroutine plus concurrent writers (see Write / WriteReject below).
type Queue interface {
io.Closer
// Read will read at least 1 packet from the tun (up to len(p)).
// mem will be used to provide the backing for each of p[n].Bytes.
// Callers should size mem and p to avoid exhausting mem before p.
// Returns the number of packets actually read, or error.
Read(p []wire.TunPacket, mem []byte) (int, error)
// Read returns one or more packets. The returned slices are borrowed
// from the Queue's internal buffer and are only valid until the next
// Read or Close on this Queue - callers must encrypt or copy each
// slice before the next call. Not safe for concurrent Reads.
Read() ([][]byte, error)
// Write emits a single packet on the plaintext (outside→inside)
// delivery path.
// delivery path. Not safe for concurrent Writes.
Write(p []byte) (int, error)
// Capabilities returns the Queue's negotiated offload capabilities,
// or the zero value when q does not advertise any.
Capabilities() Capabilities
}
// GSOWriter is implemented by Queues that can emit a TCP or UDP superpacket
// GSOWriter is implemented by Queues that can emit a TCP TSO superpacket
// assembled from a header prefix plus one or more borrowed payload
// fragments, in a single vectored write (writev with a leading
// virtio_net_hdr). This lets the coalescer avoid copying payload bytes
// between the caller's decrypt buffer and the TUN. Backends without GSO
// support do not implement this interface and coalescing is skipped.
// support return false from GSOSupported and coalescing is skipped.
//
// hdr contains the IPv4/IPv6 header prefix (mutable - callers will have
// filled in total length and IP csum). transportHdr is the TCP or UDP
// header (mutable - the L4 checksum field must hold the pseudo-header
// partial, single-fold not inverted, per virtio NEEDS_CSUM semantics).
// pays are non-overlapping payload fragments whose concatenation is the
// full superpacket payload; they are read-only from the writer's
// perspective and must remain valid until the call returns. Every segment
// in pays except possibly the last is exactly the same size. proto picks
// the L4 protocol so the writer knows which GSOType / CsumOffset to set.
// hdr contains the IPv4/IPv6 + TCP header prefix (mutable - callers will
// have filled in total length and pseudo-header partial). pays are
// non-overlapping payload fragments whose concatenation is the full
// superpacket payload; they are read-only from the writer's perspective
// and must remain valid until the call returns. gsoSize is the MSS:
// every segment except possibly the last is exactly that many bytes.
// csumStart is the byte offset where the TCP header begins within hdr.
//
// Callers should also consult Queue.Capabilities (via SupportsGSO) for
// the per-protocol negotiated capability; an implementation of GSOWriter
// is necessary but not sufficient since USO may not have been negotiated
// even when TSO was.
// # TODO fold into Queue
//
// hdr's TCP checksum field must already hold the pseudo-header partial
// sum (single-fold, not inverted), per virtio NEEDS_CSUM semantics.
type GSOWriter interface {
WriteGSO(hdr []byte, transportHdr []byte, pays [][]byte, proto wire.GSOProto) error
}
// SupportsGSO reports whether w implements GSOWriter and the underlying
// queue advertises the negotiated capability for `want` via Capabilities.
func SupportsGSO(w Queue, want wire.GSOProto) (GSOWriter, bool) {
gw, ok := w.(GSOWriter)
if !ok {
return nil, false
}
caps := w.Capabilities()
switch want {
case wire.GSOProtoTCP:
return gw, caps.TSO
case wire.GSOProtoUDP:
return gw, caps.USO
default:
return gw, false
}
// WriteGSO emits a TCP TSO superpacket in a single writev. hdr is the
// IPv4/IPv6 + TCP header prefix (already finalized — total length, IP csum,
// and TCP pseudo-header partial set by the caller). pays are payload
// fragments whose concatenation forms the full coalesced payload; each
// slice is read-only and must stay valid until return.
// every segment in pays except possibly the last is exactly the same size.
// csumStart is the byte offset where the TCP header begins within hdr.
WriteGSO(hdr []byte, transportHdr []byte, pays [][]byte) error
GSOSupported() bool
}
+108 -202
View File
@@ -3,45 +3,45 @@ package tio
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"os"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"syscall"
"unsafe"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/wire"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio/virtio"
)
// tunRxBufSize is the per-Read worst-case footprint for one kernel-supplied
// packet body, which is at most ~64 KiB (tunReadBufSize). Segmentation
// happens at encrypt time via wire.TunPacket.PerSegment on a per-routine
// MTU-sized scratch, so the caller-supplied read buffer only holds raw
// kernel-supplied bytes. Used by Read's drain loop to gate further reads
// on whether the remaining buffer can still hold one worst-case packet.
const tunRxBufSize = 64 * 1024
// Space for segmented output. Worst case is many small segments, each paying
// an IP+TCP header. Should be a multiple of 64KiB.
// const tunSegBufSize = 0xffff * 8 TODO larger? config?
const tunSegBufSize = 131072
// gsoMaxIovs caps the iovec budget WriteGSO assembles per call: 3 fixed
// entries (virtio_net_hdr, IP hdr, transport hdr) plus up to gsoMaxIovs-3
// payload fragments. Sized comfortably above the typical kernel GSO
// segment cap (Linux UDP_GRO is 64) so realistic coalesced bursts never
// touch the limit. iovecs are tiny (16 bytes), so the entire scratch is
// 4 KiB — fine to keep resident on every queue. WriteGSO returns an error
// rather than reallocating when a caller exceeds this budget.
const gsoMaxIovs = 256
// tunSegBufCap is the total size we allocate for the per-reader segment
// buffer. It is sized as one worst-case TSO superpacket (tunSegBufSize) plus
// the same again as drain headroom so a Read wake can accumulate
// additional packets after an initial big read without overflowing.
const tunSegBufCap = tunSegBufSize * 2
// tunDrainCap caps how many packets a single Read will accumulate via
// the post-wake drain loop. Sized to soak up a burst of small ACKs while
// bounding how much work a single caller holds before handing off.
const tunDrainCap = 64 //256
// gsoInitialPayIovs is the starting capacity (in payload fragments) of
// Offload.gsoIovs. Sized to cover the default coalesce segment cap without
// any reallocations.
const gsoInitialPayIovs = 66
// validVnetHdr is the 10-byte virtio_net_hdr we prepend to every non-GSO TUN
// write. Only flag set is VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_DATA_VALID, which marks the skb
// CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY so the receiving network stack skips L4 checksum
// verification. All packets that reach the plain Write paths already carry
// a valid L4 checksum (either supplied by a remote peer whose ciphertext we
// AEAD-authenticated, produced by virtio.SegmentTCP/SegmentUDP during
// superpacket segmentation, or built locally by CreateRejectPacket), so
// trusting them is safe.
var validVnetHdr = [virtio.Size]byte{unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_DATA_VALID}
// CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY so the receiving network stack skips L4 checks
// verification. All packets that reach the plain Write paths
// already carry a valid L4 checksum (either supplied by a remote peer whose
// ciphertext we AEAD-authenticated, or produced by finishChecksum during TSO
// segmentation, or built locally by CreateRejectPacket), so trusting them is
// safe.
var validVnetHdr = [virtioNetHdrLen]byte{unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_DATA_VALID}
// Offload wraps a TUN file descriptor with poll-based reads. The FD provided will be changed to non-blocking.
// A shared eventfd allows Close to wake all readers blocked in poll.
@@ -50,39 +50,24 @@ type Offload struct {
shutdownFd int
readPoll [2]unix.PollFd
writePoll [2]unix.PollFd
// writeLock serializes blockOnWrite's read+clear of writePoll[*].Revents.
// Any goroutine that calls Write may end up parked in poll(2); without
// the lock concurrent waiters could race the Revents reset and lose
// events.
writeLock sync.Mutex
closed atomic.Bool
// readVnetScratch holds the 10-byte virtio_net_hdr split off the front of
// every TUN read via readv(2). Decoupling the header from the packet body
// lets us read the body directly into the caller-supplied mem at the
// current rxOff with no userspace copy on the GSO_NONE fast path.
readVnetScratch [virtio.Size]byte
// readIovs is the readv(2) iovec scratch wired once at construction —
// iovec[0] points at readVnetScratch; iovec[1].Base/Len is updated per
// read to address the caller-supplied mem slot.
readIovs [2]unix.Iovec
// usoEnabled records whether the kernel agreed to TUN_F_USO* on this FD,
// so writers can decide whether emitting GSO_UDP_L4 superpackets is safe.
usoEnabled bool
writeLock sync.Mutex //there's more than one potential write source per-routine, so we need this to protect writePoll
closed atomic.Bool
readBuf []byte // scratch for a single raw read (virtio hdr + superpacket)
segBuf []byte // backing store for segmented output
segOff int // cursor into segBuf for the current Read drain
pending [][]byte // segments returned from the most recent Read
// gsoHdrBuf is a per-queue 10-byte scratch for the virtio_net_hdr emitted
// by WriteGSO. Kept separate from the read-only package-level validVnetHdr
// so non-GSO Writes can ship that constant directly while WriteGSO
// rewrites this scratch on every call.
gsoHdrBuf [virtio.Size]byte
// gsoIovs is the writev iovec scratch for WriteGSO. Pre-sized to
// gsoMaxIovs at construction; never grown. WriteGSO returns an error
// (and drops the call) if a caller hands it more fragments than fit.
// by WriteGSO. Separate from validVnetHdr so a concurrent non-GSO Write on
// another queue never observes a half-written header.
gsoHdrBuf [virtioNetHdrLen]byte
// gsoIovs is the writev iovec scratch for WriteGSO. Sized to hold the
// virtio header + IP/TCP header + up to gsoInitialPayIovs payload
// fragments; grown on demand if a coalescer pushes more.
gsoIovs []unix.Iovec
}
func newOffload(fd int, shutdownFd int, usoEnabled bool) (*Offload, error) {
func newOffload(fd int, shutdownFd int) (*Offload, error) {
if err := unix.SetNonblock(fd, true); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to set tun fd non-blocking: %w", err)
}
@@ -90,8 +75,8 @@ func newOffload(fd int, shutdownFd int, usoEnabled bool) (*Offload, error) {
out := &Offload{
fd: fd,
shutdownFd: shutdownFd,
usoEnabled: usoEnabled,
closed: atomic.Bool{},
readBuf: make([]byte, virtioNetHdrLen+tunReadBufSize),
readPoll: [2]unix.PollFd{
{Fd: int32(fd), Events: unix.POLLIN},
{Fd: int32(shutdownFd), Events: unix.POLLIN},
@@ -101,17 +86,13 @@ func newOffload(fd int, shutdownFd int, usoEnabled bool) (*Offload, error) {
{Fd: int32(shutdownFd), Events: unix.POLLIN},
},
writeLock: sync.Mutex{},
gsoIovs: make([]unix.Iovec, 2, gsoMaxIovs),
segBuf: make([]byte, tunSegBufCap),
gsoIovs: make([]unix.Iovec, 2, 2+gsoInitialPayIovs),
}
out.gsoIovs[0].Base = &out.gsoHdrBuf[0]
out.gsoIovs[0].SetLen(virtio.Size)
// readIovs[0] is wired once to the virtio_net_hdr scratch; per-read we
// only repoint readIovs[1] at the next caller-supplied mem slot
// (see readPacket).
out.readIovs[0].Base = &out.readVnetScratch[0]
out.readIovs[0].SetLen(virtio.Size)
out.gsoIovs[0].SetLen(virtioNetHdrLen)
return out, nil
}
@@ -170,84 +151,55 @@ func (r *Offload) blockOnWrite() error {
return nil
}
// readPacket issues a single readv(2) splitting the virtio_net_hdr off
// into readVnetScratch and reading the packet body directly into mem.
// Returns the body length (zero virtio header bytes, just the IP
// packet/superpacket). block controls whether EAGAIN is retried via poll:
// the initial read of a drain blocks; subsequent drain reads do not.
//
// The body iovec capacity is always tunReadBufSize; the Read drain loop
// gates entry on len(mem)-rxOff >= tunRxBufSize, sized to hold one
// worst-case kernel-supplied packet body. Without that gate the body
// iovec could be smaller than the next inbound packet and the kernel
// would truncate.
func (r *Offload) readPacket(mem []byte, block bool) (int, error) {
func (r *Offload) readRaw(buf []byte) (int, error) {
for {
r.readIovs[1].Base = &mem[0]
r.readIovs[1].SetLen(tunReadBufSize)
n, _, errno := syscall.Syscall(unix.SYS_READV, uintptr(r.fd), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&r.readIovs[0])), uintptr(len(r.readIovs)))
if errno == 0 {
if int(n) < virtio.Size {
return 0, io.ErrShortWrite
}
return int(n) - virtio.Size, nil
}
if errno == unix.EAGAIN {
if !block {
return 0, errno
}
if err := r.blockOnRead(); err != nil {
if n, err := unix.Read(r.fd, buf); err == nil {
return n, nil
} else if err == unix.EAGAIN {
if err = r.blockOnRead(); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
continue
}
if errno == unix.EINTR {
} else if err == unix.EINTR {
continue
}
if errno == unix.EBADF {
} else if err == unix.EBADF {
return 0, os.ErrClosed
} else {
return 0, err
}
return 0, errno
}
}
// Read returns one or more packets from the tun. Each wire.TunPacket
// either carries a single ready-to-use IP datagram (GSO zero) or a TSO/USO
// superpacket plus the wire.GSOInfo a caller needs to segment it (see
// wire.TunPacket.PerSegment). The first read blocks via poll; once the fd
// is known readable we drain additional packets non-blocking until the
// kernel queue is empty (EAGAIN), p is full, or mem no longer has room
// for another worst-case packet (tunRxBufSize). This amortizes the poll
// wake over bursts of small packets (e.g. TCP ACKs). The Bytes slices on
// returned packets point into the caller-supplied mem and are only valid
// until the next Read or Close on this Queue.
func (r *Offload) Read(p []wire.TunPacket, mem []byte) (int, error) {
maxP := len(p)
maxM := len(mem)
p = p[:0]
rxOff := 0
// Read reads one or more superpackets from the tun and returns the
// resulting packets. The first read blocks via poll; once the fd is known
// readable we drain additional packets non-blocking until the kernel queue
// is empty (EAGAIN), we've collected tunDrainCap packets, or we're out of
// segBuf headroom. This amortizes the poll wake over bursts of small
// packets (e.g. TCP ACKs). Slices point into the Offload's internal buffers
// and are only valid until the next Read or Close on this Queue.
func (r *Offload) Read() ([][]byte, error) {
r.pending = r.pending[:0]
r.segOff = 0
// Initial (blocking) read. Retry on decode errors so a single bad
// packet does not stall the reader.
for {
n, err := r.readPacket(mem, true)
n, err := r.readRaw(r.readBuf)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
return nil, err
}
if p, err = r.decodeRead(p, mem, n); err != nil {
if err := r.decodeRead(n); err != nil {
// Drop and read again — a bad packet should not kill the reader.
continue
}
rxOff += n
break
}
// Drain: non-blocking reads until the kernel queue is empty, p is full,
// or mem no longer has room for another worst-case kernel-supplied
// packet (tunRxBufSize).
for len(p) < maxP && maxM-rxOff >= tunRxBufSize {
n, err := r.readPacket(mem[rxOff:], false)
// Drain: non-blocking reads until the kernel queue is empty, the drain
// cap is reached, or segBuf no longer has room for another worst-case
// superpacket.
for len(r.pending) < tunDrainCap && tunSegBufCap-r.segOff >= tunSegBufSize {
n, err := unix.Read(r.fd, r.readBuf)
if err != nil {
// EAGAIN / EINTR / anything else: stop draining. We already
// have a valid batch from the first read.
@@ -256,66 +208,32 @@ func (r *Offload) Read(p []wire.TunPacket, mem []byte) (int, error) {
if n <= 0 {
break
}
if p, err = r.decodeRead(p, mem[rxOff:], n); err != nil {
if err := r.decodeRead(n); err != nil {
// Drop this packet and stop the drain; we'd rather hand off
// what we have than keep spinning here.
break
}
rxOff += n
}
return len(p), nil
return r.pending, nil
}
// decodeRead processes the packet sitting at mem[:pktLen]. The bytes stay
// in mem — for GSO_NONE we slice them as a regular IP datagram (running
// finishChecksum if NEEDS_CSUM is set); for TSO/USO superpackets we attach
// the corrected GSO metadata so the caller can segment lazily at encrypt
// time. The caller advances its own rxOff past the kernel-supplied body
// and nothing else, since segmentation no longer writes back into mem.
func (r *Offload) decodeRead(p []wire.TunPacket, mem []byte, pktLen int) ([]wire.TunPacket, error) {
if pktLen <= 0 {
return p, fmt.Errorf("short tun read: %d", pktLen)
// decodeRead decodes the virtio header plus payload in r.readBuf[:n], appends
// the segments to r.pending, and advances r.segOff by the total scratch used.
func (r *Offload) decodeRead(n int) error {
if n < virtioNetHdrLen {
return fmt.Errorf("short tun read: %d < %d", n, virtioNetHdrLen)
}
var hdr virtio.Hdr
hdr.Decode(r.readVnetScratch[:])
body := mem[:pktLen]
if hdr.GSOType == unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE {
if hdr.Flags&unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM != 0 {
if err := virtio.FinishChecksum(body, hdr); err != nil {
return p, err
}
}
p = append(p, wire.TunPacket{Bytes: body})
return p, nil
var hdr VirtioNetHdr
hdr.decode(r.readBuf[:virtioNetHdrLen])
before := len(r.pending)
if err := segmentInto(r.readBuf[virtioNetHdrLen:n], hdr, &r.pending, r.segBuf[r.segOff:]); err != nil {
return err
}
// GSO superpacket: validate, fix the kernel-supplied HdrLen on the
// FORWARD path (CorrectHdrLen), pick the L4 protocol, and attach
// the metadata. The bytes stay in mem untouched; segmentation
// happens in wire.TunPacket.PerSegment at encrypt time.
if err := virtio.CheckValid(body, hdr); err != nil {
return p, err
for k := before; k < len(r.pending); k++ {
r.segOff += len(r.pending[k])
}
if err := virtio.CorrectHdrLen(body, &hdr); err != nil {
return p, err
}
proto, err := protoFromGSOType(hdr.GSOType)
if err != nil {
return p, err
}
p = append(p, wire.TunPacket{
Bytes: body,
Meta: wire.GSOInfo{
Size: hdr.GSOSize,
HdrLen: hdr.HdrLen,
CsumStart: hdr.CsumStart,
Proto: proto,
},
})
return p, nil
return nil
}
func (r *Offload) Write(buf []byte) (int, error) {
@@ -323,7 +241,7 @@ func (r *Offload) Write(buf []byte) (int, error) {
{Base: &validVnetHdr[0]},
{Base: &buf[0]},
}
iovs[0].SetLen(virtio.Size)
iovs[0].SetLen(virtioNetHdrLen)
iovs[1].SetLen(len(buf))
return r.writeWithScratch(buf, &iovs)
}
@@ -332,6 +250,8 @@ func (r *Offload) writeWithScratch(buf []byte, iovs *[2]unix.Iovec) (int, error)
if len(buf) == 0 {
return 0, nil
}
// Point the payload iovec at the caller's buffer. iovs[0] is pre-wired
// to validVnetHdr during Offload construction so we don't rebuild it here.
iovs[1].Base = &buf[0]
iovs[1].SetLen(len(buf))
return r.rawWrite(unsafe.Slice(&iovs[0], len(iovs)))
@@ -341,10 +261,10 @@ func (r *Offload) rawWrite(iovs []unix.Iovec) (int, error) {
for {
n, _, errno := syscall.Syscall(unix.SYS_WRITEV, uintptr(r.fd), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&iovs[0])), uintptr(len(iovs)))
if errno == 0 {
if int(n) < virtio.Size {
if int(n) < virtioNetHdrLen {
return 0, io.ErrShortWrite
}
return int(n) - virtio.Size, nil
return int(n) - virtioNetHdrLen, nil
}
if errno == unix.EAGAIN {
if err := r.blockOnWrite(); err != nil {
@@ -362,44 +282,29 @@ func (r *Offload) rawWrite(iovs []unix.Iovec) (int, error) {
}
}
// Capabilities reports the offload features negotiated for this Queue. TSO
// is always true for Offload (we only construct it on IFF_VNET_HDR FDs);
// USO is true only when the kernel agreed to TUN_F_USO4|6 at open time
// (Linux ≥ 6.2).
func (r *Offload) Capabilities() Capabilities {
return Capabilities{TSO: true, USO: r.usoEnabled}
}
// GSOSupported reports whether this queue was opened with IFF_VNET_HDR and
// can accept WriteGSO. When false, callers should fall back to per-segment
// Write calls.
func (r *Offload) GSOSupported() bool { return true }
func (r *Offload) WriteGSO(hdr []byte, transportHdr []byte, pays [][]byte, proto wire.GSOProto) error {
func (r *Offload) WriteGSO(hdr []byte, transportHdr []byte, pays [][]byte) error {
if len(hdr) == 0 || len(pays) == 0 || len(transportHdr) == 0 {
return nil
}
// L4 checksum offset inside transportHdr: TCP=16 (the `check` field after
// seq/ack/dataoff/flags/window), UDP=6 (after sport/dport/length).
var csumOff uint16
switch proto {
case wire.GSOProtoUDP:
csumOff = 6
default:
csumOff = 16
}
vhdr := virtio.Hdr{
vhdr := VirtioNetHdr{
Flags: unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM,
HdrLen: uint16(len(hdr) + len(transportHdr)),
GSOSize: uint16(len(pays[0])),
CsumStart: uint16(len(hdr)),
CsumOffset: csumOff,
CsumOffset: 16, // TCP checksum field lives 16 bytes into the TCP header
}
if len(pays) > 1 {
ipVer := hdr[0] >> 4
switch {
case proto == wire.GSOProtoUDP && (ipVer == 4 || ipVer == 6):
vhdr.GSOType = unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP_L4
case ipVer == 6:
if ipVer == 6 {
vhdr.GSOType = unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6
case ipVer == 4:
} else if ipVer == 4 {
vhdr.GSOType = unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4
default:
} else {
vhdr.GSOType = unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE
vhdr.GSOSize = 0
}
@@ -407,17 +312,18 @@ func (r *Offload) WriteGSO(hdr []byte, transportHdr []byte, pays [][]byte, proto
vhdr.GSOType = unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE
vhdr.GSOSize = 0
}
vhdr.Encode(r.gsoHdrBuf[:])
vhdr.encode(r.gsoHdrBuf[:])
// Build the iovec array: [virtio_hdr, hdr, transportHdr, pays...]. r.gsoIovs[0] is
// wired to gsoHdrBuf at construction and never changes.
need := 3 + len(pays)
if need > cap(r.gsoIovs) {
slog.Default().Warn("tio: WriteGSO iovec budget exceeded; dropping superpacket",
"need", need, "cap", cap(r.gsoIovs), "segments", len(pays))
return fmt.Errorf("tio: WriteGSO needs %d iovecs but cap is %d", need, cap(r.gsoIovs))
if cap(r.gsoIovs) < need {
grown := make([]unix.Iovec, need)
grown[0] = r.gsoIovs[0]
r.gsoIovs = grown
} else {
r.gsoIovs = r.gsoIovs[:need]
}
r.gsoIovs = r.gsoIovs[:need]
r.gsoIovs[1].Base = &hdr[0]
r.gsoIovs[1].SetLen(len(hdr))
r.gsoIovs[2].Base = &transportHdr[0]
+10 -15
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import (
"os"
"sync/atomic"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/wire"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
@@ -20,6 +19,9 @@ type Poll struct {
readPoll [2]unix.PollFd
writePoll [2]unix.PollFd
closed atomic.Bool
readBuf []byte
batchRet [1][]byte
}
func newPoll(fd int, shutdownFd int) (*Poll, error) {
@@ -29,7 +31,8 @@ func newPoll(fd int, shutdownFd int) (*Poll, error) {
}
out := &Poll{
fd: fd,
fd: fd,
readBuf: make([]byte, tunReadBufSize),
readPoll: [2]unix.PollFd{
{Fd: int32(fd), Events: unix.POLLIN},
{Fd: int32(shutdownFd), Events: unix.POLLIN},
@@ -94,17 +97,13 @@ func (t *Poll) blockOnWrite() error {
return nil
}
func (t *Poll) Read(p []wire.TunPacket, mem []byte) (int, error) {
if len(p) == 0 || len(mem) == 0 {
return 0, nil //todo should this be an err?
}
p[0].Meta = wire.GSOInfo{}
n, err := t.readOne(mem)
func (t *Poll) Read() ([][]byte, error) {
n, err := t.readOne(t.readBuf)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
return nil, err
}
p[0].Bytes = mem[:n]
return 1, nil
t.batchRet[0] = t.readBuf[:n]
return t.batchRet[:], nil
}
func (t *Poll) readOne(to []byte) (int, error) {
@@ -163,7 +162,3 @@ func (t *Poll) Close() error {
return err
}
func (t *Poll) Capabilities() Capabilities {
return Capabilities{}
}
+12 -36
View File
@@ -10,13 +10,12 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/wire"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
// newReadPipe returns a read fd. The matching write fd is registered for cleanup.
// The caller takes ownership of the read fd (pass it into a QueueSet).
// The caller takes ownership of the read fd (pass it to newOffload / newFriend).
func newReadPipe(t *testing.T) int {
t.Helper()
var fds [2]int
@@ -28,13 +27,16 @@ func newReadPipe(t *testing.T) int {
}
func TestPoll_WakeForShutdown_WakesFriends(t *testing.T) {
parent, err := NewPollQueueSet()
pipe1 := newReadPipe(t)
pipe2 := newReadPipe(t)
parent, err := NewPollContainer()
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, parent.Add(newReadPipe(t)))
require.NoError(t, parent.Add(newReadPipe(t)))
// QueueSet.Close owns the read fds we Added — don't register a separate
// Cleanup to close them or we'll double-close whatever fd the kernel
// has since reused.
require.NoError(t, parent.Add(pipe1))
require.NoError(t, parent.Add(pipe2))
t.Cleanup(func() {
_ = unix.Close(pipe1)
_ = unix.Close(pipe2)
})
readers := parent.Queues()
errs := make([]error, len(readers))
@@ -43,8 +45,7 @@ func TestPoll_WakeForShutdown_WakesFriends(t *testing.T) {
wg.Add(1)
go func(i int, r Queue) {
defer wg.Done()
pkts := make([]wire.TunPacket, 1)
_, errs[i] = r.Read(pkts, make([]byte, 64))
_, errs[i] = r.Read()
}(i, r)
}
@@ -70,11 +71,7 @@ func TestPoll_WakeForShutdown_WakesFriends(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestPoll_Close_Idempotent(t *testing.T) {
shutdownFd, err := unix.Eventfd(0, unix.EFD_NONBLOCK|unix.EFD_CLOEXEC)
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = unix.Close(shutdownFd) })
tf, err := newPoll(newReadPipe(t), shutdownFd)
tf, err := newPoll(newReadPipe(t), 1)
require.NoError(t, err)
if err := tf.Close(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first Close: %v", err)
@@ -83,24 +80,3 @@ func TestPoll_Close_Idempotent(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("second Close should be a no-op, got %v", err)
}
}
func TestPollQueueSet_Close_ClosesEventfd(t *testing.T) {
qs, err := NewPollQueueSet()
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, qs.Add(newReadPipe(t)))
fd := qs.(*pollQueueSet).shutdownFd
require.NoError(t, qs.Close())
// Closing the eventfd again should fail with EBADF, proving Close
// actually released it.
if err := unix.Close(fd); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("eventfd %d still open after QueueSet.Close", fd)
}
// Second Close must be a no-op (and must not double-close the eventfd
// in case the kernel handed it out to another caller in the meantime).
if err := qs.Close(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("second Close: %v", err)
}
}
+317 -11
View File
@@ -4,22 +4,328 @@
package tio
import (
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"fmt"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/wire"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
"gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/tcpip/checksum"
)
// protoFromGSOType maps a virtio_net_hdr GSOType to the GSOProto value the
// segment-time helpers use. Returns an error for GSO_NONE or any unknown
// value — the caller should only invoke this on a confirmed superpacket.
func protoFromGSOType(t uint8) (wire.GSOProto, error) {
switch t {
case unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4, unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6:
return wire.GSOProtoTCP, nil
case unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP_L4:
return wire.GSOProtoUDP, nil
// Protocol header size bounds used to validate / cap kernel-supplied offsets.
const (
ipv4HeaderMinLen = 20 // IHL=5, no options
ipv4HeaderMaxLen = 60 // IHL=15, max options
ipv6FixedLen = 40 // IPv6 base header; extensions would extend this
tcpHeaderMinLen = 20 // data-offset=5, no options
tcpHeaderMaxLen = 60 // data-offset=15, max options
)
// Byte offsets inside an IPv4 header.
const (
ipv4TotalLenOff = 2
ipv4IDOff = 4
ipv4ChecksumOff = 10
ipv4SrcOff = 12
ipv4AddrsEnd = 20 // end of dst address (ipv4SrcOff + 2*4)
)
// Byte offsets inside an IPv6 header.
const (
ipv6PayloadLenOff = 4
ipv6SrcOff = 8
ipv6AddrsEnd = 40 // end of dst address (ipv6SrcOff + 2*16)
)
// Byte offsets inside a TCP header (relative to its start, i.e. csumStart).
const (
tcpSeqOff = 4
tcpDataOffOff = 12 // upper nibble is header len in 32-bit words
tcpFlagsOff = 13
tcpChecksumOff = 16
)
// tcpFinPshMask is cleared on every segment except the last of a TSO burst.
const tcpFinPshMask = 0x09 // FIN(0x01) | PSH(0x08)
func checkVirtioValid(pkt []byte, hdr VirtioNetHdr) error {
// When RSC_INFO is set the csum_start/csum_offset fields are repurposed to
// carry coalescing info rather than checksum offsets. A TUN writing via
// IFF_VNET_HDR should never emit this, but if it did we would silently
// miscompute the segment checksums — refuse the packet instead.
if hdr.Flags&unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_RSC_INFO != 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("virtio RSC_INFO flag not supported on TUN reads")
}
if len(pkt) < ipv4HeaderMinLen {
return fmt.Errorf("packet too short")
}
ipVersion := pkt[0] >> 4
switch hdr.GSOType {
case unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4:
if ipVersion != 4 {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid IP version %d for GSO type %d", ipVersion, hdr.GSOType)
}
case unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6:
if ipVersion != 6 {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid IP version %d for GSO type %d", ipVersion, hdr.GSOType)
}
default:
return 0, fmt.Errorf("unsupported virtio gso type: %d", t)
if !(ipVersion == 6 || ipVersion == 4) {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid IP version %d for GSO type %d", ipVersion, hdr.GSOType)
}
}
return nil
}
func handleGSONone(pkt []byte, hdr VirtioNetHdr, out *[][]byte, scratch []byte) error {
if len(pkt) > len(scratch) {
return fmt.Errorf("packet larger than segment buffer: %d > %d", len(pkt), len(scratch))
}
copy(scratch, pkt)
seg := scratch[:len(pkt)]
if hdr.Flags&unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM != 0 {
if err := finishChecksum(seg, hdr); err != nil {
return err
}
}
*out = append(*out, seg)
return nil
}
func correctHdrLen(pkt []byte, hdr *VirtioNetHdr) error {
// Thank you wireguard-go for documenting these edge-cases
// Don't trust hdr.hdrLen from the kernel as it can be equal to the length
// of the entire first packet when the kernel is handling it as part of a
// FORWARD path. Instead, parse the transport header length and add it onto
// csumStart, which is synonymous for IP header length.
const tcpDataOffset = 12
if hdr.GSOType == unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP_L4 {
hdr.HdrLen = hdr.CsumStart + 8
} else {
if len(pkt) <= int(hdr.CsumStart+tcpDataOffset) {
return errors.New("packet is too short")
}
tcpHLen := uint16(pkt[hdr.CsumStart+tcpDataOffset] >> 4 * 4)
if tcpHLen < 20 || tcpHLen > 60 {
// A TCP header must be between 20 and 60 bytes in length.
return fmt.Errorf("tcp header len is invalid: %d", tcpHLen)
}
hdr.HdrLen = hdr.CsumStart + tcpHLen
}
if len(pkt) < int(hdr.HdrLen) {
return fmt.Errorf("length of packet (%d) < virtioNetHdr.HdrLen (%d)", len(pkt), hdr.HdrLen)
}
if hdr.HdrLen < hdr.CsumStart {
return fmt.Errorf("virtioNetHdr.HdrLen (%d) < virtioNetHdr.CsumStart (%d)", hdr.HdrLen, hdr.CsumStart)
}
cSumAt := int(hdr.CsumStart + hdr.CsumStart)
if cSumAt+1 >= len(pkt) {
return fmt.Errorf("end of checksum offset (%d) exceeds packet length (%d)", cSumAt+1, len(pkt))
}
return nil
}
// segmentInto splits a TUN-side packet described by hdr into one or more
// IP packets, each appended to *out as a slice of scratch. scratch must be
// sized to hold every segment (including replicated headers).
func segmentInto(pkt []byte, hdr VirtioNetHdr, out *[][]byte, scratch []byte) error {
if err := checkVirtioValid(pkt, hdr); err != nil {
return err
}
if hdr.GSOType == unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE {
return handleGSONone(pkt, hdr, out, scratch)
}
if err := correctHdrLen(pkt, &hdr); err != nil {
return err
}
switch hdr.GSOType {
case unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4, unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6:
return segmentTCP(pkt, hdr, out, scratch)
default:
return fmt.Errorf("unsupported virtio gso type: %d", hdr.GSOType)
}
}
// finishChecksum computes the L4 checksum for a non-GSO packet that the kernel
// handed us with NEEDS_CSUM set. csum_start / csum_offset point at the 16-bit
// checksum field; we zero it, fold a full sum (the field was pre-loaded with
// the pseudo-header partial sum by the kernel), and store the result.
func finishChecksum(seg []byte, hdr VirtioNetHdr) error {
cs := int(hdr.CsumStart)
co := int(hdr.CsumOffset)
if cs+co+2 > len(seg) {
return fmt.Errorf("csum offsets out of range: start=%d offset=%d len=%d", cs, co, len(seg))
}
// The kernel stores a partial pseudo-header sum at [cs+co:]; sum over the
// L4 region starting at cs, folding the prior partial in as the seed.
partial := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(seg[cs+co : cs+co+2])
seg[cs+co] = 0
seg[cs+co+1] = 0
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[cs+co:cs+co+2], ^checksum.Checksum(seg[cs:], partial))
return nil
}
// segmentTCP software-segments a TSO superpacket into one IP packet per MSS
// chunk. The caller guarantees hdr.GSOType is TCPV4 or TCPV6.
//
// Hot-path shape: the per-segment loop only sums the payload chunk. The TCP
// header, the IPv4 header, and the pseudo-header src/dst/proto contributions
// are each summed once up front — every segment reuses those three pre-folded
// uint32 values and combines them with small per-segment deltas (seq, flags,
// tcpLen, ip_id, total_len) that are cheap to fold in.
func segmentTCP(pkt []byte, hdr VirtioNetHdr, out *[][]byte, scratch []byte) error {
if hdr.GSOSize == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("gso_size is zero")
}
if hdr.CsumStart == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("csum_start is zero")
}
isV4 := hdr.GSOType == unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4
headerLen := int(hdr.HdrLen) // already corrected by the caller
csumStart := int(hdr.CsumStart)
tcpHdrLen := int(pkt[csumStart+tcpDataOffOff]>>4) * 4
payload := pkt[headerLen:]
payLen := len(payload)
gsoSize := int(hdr.GSOSize)
numSeg := (payLen + gsoSize - 1) / gsoSize
if numSeg == 0 {
numSeg = 1
}
need := numSeg*headerLen + payLen
if need > len(scratch) {
return fmt.Errorf("scratch too small for %d segments: need %d have %d", numSeg, need, len(scratch))
}
origSeq := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(pkt[csumStart+tcpSeqOff : csumStart+tcpSeqOff+4])
origFlags := pkt[csumStart+tcpFlagsOff]
// Precompute the TCP header sum with seq/flags/csum zeroed. Copy onto
// the stack, zero the per-segment-varying fields, sum once.
var tmp [tcpHeaderMaxLen]byte
copy(tmp[:tcpHdrLen], pkt[csumStart:headerLen])
tmp[tcpSeqOff], tmp[tcpSeqOff+1], tmp[tcpSeqOff+2], tmp[tcpSeqOff+3] = 0, 0, 0, 0
tmp[tcpFlagsOff] = 0
tmp[tcpChecksumOff], tmp[tcpChecksumOff+1] = 0, 0
baseTcpHdrSum := uint32(checksum.Checksum(tmp[:tcpHdrLen], 0))
// Pseudo-header src+dst+proto contribution (tcpLen varies per segment).
var baseProtoSum uint32
if isV4 {
baseProtoSum = uint32(checksum.Checksum(pkt[ipv4SrcOff:ipv4AddrsEnd], 0))
} else {
baseProtoSum = uint32(checksum.Checksum(pkt[ipv6SrcOff:ipv6AddrsEnd], 0))
}
baseProtoSum += uint32(unix.IPPROTO_TCP)
// Precompute IPv4 header sum with total_len/id/csum zeroed.
var origIPID uint16
var ihl int
var baseIPHdrSum uint32
if isV4 {
origIPID = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[ipv4IDOff : ipv4IDOff+2])
ihl = int(pkt[0]&0x0f) * 4
if ihl < ipv4HeaderMinLen || ihl > csumStart {
return fmt.Errorf("bad IPv4 IHL: %d", ihl)
}
var ipTmp [ipv4HeaderMaxLen]byte
copy(ipTmp[:ihl], pkt[:ihl])
ipTmp[ipv4TotalLenOff], ipTmp[ipv4TotalLenOff+1] = 0, 0
ipTmp[ipv4IDOff], ipTmp[ipv4IDOff+1] = 0, 0
ipTmp[ipv4ChecksumOff], ipTmp[ipv4ChecksumOff+1] = 0, 0
baseIPHdrSum = uint32(checksum.Checksum(ipTmp[:ihl], 0))
}
off := 0
for i := 0; i < numSeg; i++ {
segStart := i * gsoSize
segEnd := segStart + gsoSize
if segEnd > payLen {
segEnd = payLen
}
segPayLen := segEnd - segStart
copy(scratch[off:], pkt[:headerLen])
copy(scratch[off+headerLen:], payload[segStart:segEnd])
seg := scratch[off : off+headerLen+segPayLen]
off += headerLen + segPayLen
segSeq := origSeq + uint32(segStart)
segFlags := origFlags
if i != numSeg-1 {
segFlags = origFlags &^ tcpFinPshMask
}
totalLen := headerLen + segPayLen
// Patch IP header and write the v4 header checksum from the precomputed base.
if isV4 {
segID := origIPID + uint16(i)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[ipv4TotalLenOff:ipv4TotalLenOff+2], uint16(totalLen))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[ipv4IDOff:ipv4IDOff+2], segID)
ipSum := baseIPHdrSum + uint32(totalLen) + uint32(segID)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[ipv4ChecksumOff:ipv4ChecksumOff+2], foldComplement(ipSum))
} else {
// IPv6 payload length excludes the fixed header but includes any
// extension headers between [ipv6FixedLen:csumStart].
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[ipv6PayloadLenOff:ipv6PayloadLenOff+2], uint16(headerLen-ipv6FixedLen+segPayLen))
}
// Patch TCP header.
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(seg[csumStart+tcpSeqOff:csumStart+tcpSeqOff+4], segSeq)
seg[csumStart+tcpFlagsOff] = segFlags
// (csum is written below; its prior contents in `seg` don't affect the
// computation since we never sum over the segment's own header.)
tcpLen := tcpHdrLen + segPayLen
paySum := uint32(checksum.Checksum(payload[segStart:segEnd], 0))
// Combine pre-folded uint32s into a wider accumulator, then fold. Using
// uint64 guards against overflow when segSeq's high bits set.
wide := uint64(baseTcpHdrSum) + uint64(paySum) + uint64(baseProtoSum)
wide += uint64(segSeq) + uint64(segFlags) + uint64(tcpLen)
wide = (wide & 0xffffffff) + (wide >> 32)
wide = (wide & 0xffffffff) + (wide >> 32)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[csumStart+tcpChecksumOff:csumStart+tcpChecksumOff+2], foldComplement(uint32(wide)))
*out = append(*out, seg)
}
return nil
}
// foldComplement folds a 32-bit one's-complement partial sum to 16 bits and
// complements it, yielding the on-wire Internet checksum value.
func foldComplement(sum uint32) uint16 {
sum = (sum & 0xffff) + (sum >> 16)
sum = (sum & 0xffff) + (sum >> 16)
return ^uint16(sum)
}
// pseudoHeaderIPv4 returns the folded pseudo-header sum used to verify a TCP
// segment's checksum in tests. src/dst are 4 bytes each.
func pseudoHeaderIPv4(src, dst []byte, proto byte, tcpLen int) uint16 {
s := uint32(checksum.Checksum(src, 0)) + uint32(checksum.Checksum(dst, 0))
s += uint32(proto) + uint32(tcpLen)
s = (s & 0xffff) + (s >> 16)
s = (s & 0xffff) + (s >> 16)
return uint16(s)
}
// pseudoHeaderIPv6 returns the folded pseudo-header sum used to verify a TCP
// segment's checksum in tests. src/dst are 16 bytes each.
func pseudoHeaderIPv6(src, dst []byte, proto byte, tcpLen int) uint16 {
s := uint32(checksum.Checksum(src, 0)) + uint32(checksum.Checksum(dst, 0))
s += uint32(tcpLen>>16) + uint32(tcpLen&0xffff) + uint32(proto)
s = (s & 0xffff) + (s >> 16)
s = (s & 0xffff) + (s >> 16)
return uint16(s)
}
+22 -476
View File
@@ -10,81 +10,17 @@ import (
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
"gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/tcpip/checksum"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio/virtio"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/wire"
)
// testSegScratchSize is a generous segmentation scratch sized to fit any
// of the synthetic TSO/USO superpackets these tests generate (one
// worst-case 64 KiB superpacket plus replicated per-segment headers).
const testSegScratchSize = 192 * 1024
// verifyChecksum confirms that the one's-complement sum across `b`, seeded
// with a folded pseudo-header sum, equals all-ones (valid).
func verifyChecksum(b []byte, pseudo uint16) bool {
return checksum.Checksum(b, pseudo) == 0xffff
}
// segmentForTest is the test-only counterpart to the production
// wire.TunPacket.PerSegment path. It handles GSO_NONE (with optional
// finishChecksum) inline and dispatches GSO superpackets through
// PerSegment, draining each yielded segment into a freshly-copied [][]byte
// slot so callers can iterate after the call returns. Tests pre-set
// hdr.HdrLen correctly, so correctHdrLen is not invoked here.
func segmentForTest(pkt []byte, hdr virtio.Hdr, out *[][]byte, scratch []byte) error {
if hdr.GSOType == unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE {
cp := append([]byte(nil), pkt...)
if hdr.Flags&unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM != 0 {
if err := virtio.FinishChecksum(cp, hdr); err != nil {
return err
}
}
*out = append(*out, cp)
return nil
}
proto, err := protoFromGSOType(hdr.GSOType)
if err != nil {
return err
}
p := wire.TunPacket{
Bytes: pkt,
Meta: wire.GSOInfo{
Size: hdr.GSOSize,
HdrLen: hdr.HdrLen,
CsumStart: hdr.CsumStart,
Proto: proto,
},
}
return p.PerSegment(func(seg []byte) error {
*out = append(*out, append([]byte(nil), seg...))
return nil
})
}
// pseudoHeaderIPv4 returns the folded pseudo-header sum used to verify a
// TCP/UDP segment's checksum in tests. src/dst are 4 bytes each.
func pseudoHeaderIPv4(src, dst []byte, proto byte, l4Len int) uint16 {
s := uint32(checksum.Checksum(src, 0)) + uint32(checksum.Checksum(dst, 0))
s += uint32(proto) + uint32(l4Len)
s = (s & 0xffff) + (s >> 16)
s = (s & 0xffff) + (s >> 16)
return uint16(s)
}
// pseudoHeaderIPv6 returns the folded pseudo-header sum used to verify a
// TCP/UDP segment's checksum in tests. src/dst are 16 bytes each.
func pseudoHeaderIPv6(src, dst []byte, proto byte, l4Len int) uint16 {
s := uint32(checksum.Checksum(src, 0)) + uint32(checksum.Checksum(dst, 0))
s += uint32(l4Len>>16) + uint32(l4Len&0xffff) + uint32(proto)
s = (s & 0xffff) + (s >> 16)
s = (s & 0xffff) + (s >> 16)
return uint16(s)
}
// buildTSOv4 builds a synthetic IPv4/TCP TSO superpacket with a payload of
// `payLen` bytes split at `mss`.
func buildTSOv4(t *testing.T, payLen, mss int) ([]byte, virtio.Hdr) {
func buildTSOv4(t *testing.T, payLen, mss int) ([]byte, VirtioNetHdr) {
t.Helper()
const ipLen = 20
const tcpLen = 20
@@ -114,7 +50,7 @@ func buildTSOv4(t *testing.T, payLen, mss int) ([]byte, virtio.Hdr) {
pkt[ipLen+tcpLen+i] = byte(i & 0xff)
}
return pkt, virtio.Hdr{
return pkt, VirtioNetHdr{
Flags: unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM,
GSOType: unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4,
HdrLen: uint16(ipLen + tcpLen),
@@ -129,10 +65,10 @@ func TestSegmentTCPv4(t *testing.T) {
const numSeg = 3
pkt, hdr := buildTSOv4(t, mss*numSeg, mss)
scratch := make([]byte, testSegScratchSize)
scratch := make([]byte, tunSegBufSize)
var out [][]byte
if err := segmentForTest(pkt, hdr, &out, scratch); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("segmentForTest: %v", err)
if err := segmentTCP(pkt, hdr, &out, scratch); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("segmentTCP: %v", err)
}
if len(out) != numSeg {
t.Fatalf("expected %d segments, got %d", numSeg, len(out))
@@ -178,10 +114,10 @@ func TestSegmentTCPv4(t *testing.T) {
func TestSegmentTCPv4OddTail(t *testing.T) {
// Payload of 250 bytes with MSS 100 → segments of 100, 100, 50.
pkt, hdr := buildTSOv4(t, 250, 100)
scratch := make([]byte, testSegScratchSize)
scratch := make([]byte, tunSegBufSize)
var out [][]byte
if err := segmentForTest(pkt, hdr, &out, scratch); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("segmentForTest: %v", err)
if err := segmentTCP(pkt, hdr, &out, scratch); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("segmentTCP: %v", err)
}
if len(out) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("want 3 segments, got %d", len(out))
@@ -235,7 +171,7 @@ func TestSegmentTCPv6(t *testing.T) {
pkt[ipLen+tcpLen+i] = byte(i)
}
hdr := virtio.Hdr{
hdr := VirtioNetHdr{
Flags: unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM,
GSOType: unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6,
HdrLen: uint16(ipLen + tcpLen),
@@ -244,10 +180,10 @@ func TestSegmentTCPv6(t *testing.T) {
CsumOffset: 16,
}
scratch := make([]byte, testSegScratchSize)
scratch := make([]byte, tunSegBufSize)
var out [][]byte
if err := segmentForTest(pkt, hdr, &out, scratch); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("segmentForTest: %v", err)
if err := segmentTCP(pkt, hdr, &out, scratch); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("segmentTCP: %v", err)
}
if len(out) != numSeg {
t.Fatalf("want %d segments, got %d", numSeg, len(out))
@@ -287,10 +223,10 @@ func TestSegmentGSONonePassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
hdr.GSOType = unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE
hdr.Flags = 0 // no NEEDS_CSUM, leave packet untouched
scratch := make([]byte, testSegScratchSize)
scratch := make([]byte, tunSegBufSize)
var out [][]byte
if err := segmentForTest(pkt, hdr, &out, scratch); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("segmentForTest: %v", err)
if err := segmentInto(pkt, hdr, &out, scratch); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("segmentInto: %v", err)
}
if len(out) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("want 1 segment, got %d", len(out))
@@ -300,254 +236,11 @@ func TestSegmentGSONonePassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestSegmentRejectsLegacyUDPGSO ensures the legacy GSO_UDP (UFO) marker is
// still rejected; only modern GSO_UDP_L4 (USO) is supported.
func TestSegmentRejectsLegacyUDPGSO(t *testing.T) {
hdr := virtio.Hdr{GSOType: unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP}
func TestSegmentRejectsUDP(t *testing.T) {
hdr := VirtioNetHdr{GSOType: unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP}
var out [][]byte
if err := segmentForTest(nil, hdr, &out, nil); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected rejection for legacy UDP GSO")
}
}
// buildUSOv4 builds a synthetic IPv4/UDP USO superpacket with payload of
// payLen bytes, segmented at gsoSize.
func buildUSOv4(t *testing.T, payLen, gsoSize int) ([]byte, virtio.Hdr) {
t.Helper()
const ipLen = 20
const udpLen = 8
pkt := make([]byte, ipLen+udpLen+payLen)
// IPv4 header
pkt[0] = 0x45 // version 4, IHL 5
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[2:4], uint16(ipLen+udpLen+payLen))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], 0x4242)
pkt[8] = 64
pkt[9] = unix.IPPROTO_UDP
copy(pkt[12:16], []byte{10, 0, 0, 1})
copy(pkt[16:20], []byte{10, 0, 0, 2})
// UDP header (length + checksum filled in per segment by segmentUDPYield)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[20:22], 12345) // sport
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[22:24], 53) // dport
for i := 0; i < payLen; i++ {
pkt[ipLen+udpLen+i] = byte(i & 0xff)
}
return pkt, virtio.Hdr{
Flags: unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM,
GSOType: unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP_L4,
HdrLen: uint16(ipLen + udpLen),
GSOSize: uint16(gsoSize),
CsumStart: uint16(ipLen),
CsumOffset: 6,
}
}
func TestSegmentUDPv4(t *testing.T) {
const gso = 100
const numSeg = 3
pkt, hdr := buildUSOv4(t, gso*numSeg, gso)
scratch := make([]byte, testSegScratchSize)
var out [][]byte
if err := segmentForTest(pkt, hdr, &out, scratch); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("segmentForTest: %v", err)
}
if len(out) != numSeg {
t.Fatalf("expected %d segments, got %d", numSeg, len(out))
}
for i, seg := range out {
if len(seg) != 28+gso {
t.Errorf("seg %d: len %d want %d", i, len(seg), 28+gso)
}
totalLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(seg[2:4])
if totalLen != uint16(28+gso) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: total_len=%d want %d", i, totalLen, 28+gso)
}
// kernel UDP-GSO does NOT bump the IPv4 ID across segments; every
// segment carries the same ID as the seed.
id := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(seg[4:6])
if id != 0x4242 {
t.Errorf("seg %d: ip id=%#x want %#x", i, id, 0x4242)
}
udpLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(seg[24:26])
if udpLen != uint16(8+gso) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: udp len=%d want %d", i, udpLen, 8+gso)
}
if !verifyChecksum(seg[:20], 0) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: bad IPv4 header checksum", i)
}
psum := pseudoHeaderIPv4(seg[12:16], seg[16:20], unix.IPPROTO_UDP, 8+gso)
if !verifyChecksum(seg[20:], psum) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: bad UDP checksum", i)
}
}
}
func TestSegmentUDPv4OddTail(t *testing.T) {
// 250 bytes payload, gsoSize=100 → segments of 100, 100, 50.
pkt, hdr := buildUSOv4(t, 250, 100)
scratch := make([]byte, testSegScratchSize)
var out [][]byte
if err := segmentForTest(pkt, hdr, &out, scratch); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("segmentForTest: %v", err)
}
if len(out) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("want 3 segments, got %d", len(out))
}
wantPay := []int{100, 100, 50}
for i, seg := range out {
if len(seg)-28 != wantPay[i] {
t.Errorf("seg %d: pay len %d want %d", i, len(seg)-28, wantPay[i])
}
udpLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(seg[24:26])
if udpLen != uint16(8+wantPay[i]) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: udp len=%d want %d", i, udpLen, 8+wantPay[i])
}
if !verifyChecksum(seg[:20], 0) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: bad IPv4 header checksum", i)
}
psum := pseudoHeaderIPv4(seg[12:16], seg[16:20], unix.IPPROTO_UDP, 8+wantPay[i])
if !verifyChecksum(seg[20:], psum) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: bad UDP checksum", i)
}
}
}
func TestSegmentUDPv6(t *testing.T) {
const ipLen = 40
const udpLen = 8
const gso = 120
const numSeg = 2
payLen := gso * numSeg
pkt := make([]byte, ipLen+udpLen+payLen)
// IPv6 header
pkt[0] = 0x60
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(udpLen+payLen))
pkt[6] = unix.IPPROTO_UDP
pkt[7] = 64
pkt[8] = 0xfe
pkt[9] = 0x80
pkt[23] = 1
pkt[24] = 0xfe
pkt[25] = 0x80
pkt[39] = 2
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[40:42], 12345)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[42:44], 53)
for i := 0; i < payLen; i++ {
pkt[ipLen+udpLen+i] = byte(i)
}
hdr := virtio.Hdr{
Flags: unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM,
GSOType: unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP_L4,
HdrLen: uint16(ipLen + udpLen),
GSOSize: uint16(gso),
CsumStart: uint16(ipLen),
CsumOffset: 6,
}
scratch := make([]byte, testSegScratchSize)
var out [][]byte
if err := segmentForTest(pkt, hdr, &out, scratch); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("segmentForTest: %v", err)
}
if len(out) != numSeg {
t.Fatalf("want %d segments, got %d", numSeg, len(out))
}
for i, seg := range out {
if len(seg) != ipLen+udpLen+gso {
t.Errorf("seg %d: len %d want %d", i, len(seg), ipLen+udpLen+gso)
}
pl := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(seg[4:6])
if pl != uint16(udpLen+gso) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: payload_length=%d want %d", i, pl, udpLen+gso)
}
ul := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(seg[ipLen+4 : ipLen+6])
if ul != uint16(udpLen+gso) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: udp len=%d want %d", i, ul, udpLen+gso)
}
psum := pseudoHeaderIPv6(seg[8:24], seg[24:40], unix.IPPROTO_UDP, udpLen+gso)
if !verifyChecksum(seg[ipLen:], psum) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: bad UDP checksum", i)
}
}
}
// TestSegmentUDPCEPropagates confirms IP-level CE marks on the seed appear on
// every segment. UDP has no transport-level CWR/ECE: the IP TOS/TC byte is
// copied verbatim into every segment by the segment-prefix copy.
func TestSegmentUDPCEPropagates(t *testing.T) {
pkt, hdr := buildUSOv4(t, 200, 100)
pkt[1] = 0x03 // CE codepoint in IP-ECN
scratch := make([]byte, testSegScratchSize)
var out [][]byte
if err := segmentForTest(pkt, hdr, &out, scratch); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("segmentForTest: %v", err)
}
if len(out) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 segments, got %d", len(out))
}
for i, seg := range out {
if seg[1]&0x03 != 0x03 {
t.Errorf("seg %d: CE missing (tos=%#x)", i, seg[1])
}
if !verifyChecksum(seg[:20], 0) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: bad IPv4 header checksum", i)
}
}
}
// TestSegmentTCPCwrFirstSegmentOnly confirms RFC 3168 §6.1.2: when a TSO
// burst's seed has CWR set, only the first emitted segment carries CWR.
// ECE is preserved on every segment (different signal, persistent state).
func TestSegmentTCPCwrFirstSegmentOnly(t *testing.T) {
const mss = 100
const numSeg = 3
pkt, hdr := buildTSOv4(t, mss*numSeg, mss)
// Seed flags: CWR | ECE | ACK | PSH.
pkt[33] = 0x80 | 0x40 | 0x10 | 0x08
scratch := make([]byte, testSegScratchSize)
var out [][]byte
if err := segmentForTest(pkt, hdr, &out, scratch); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("segmentForTest: %v", err)
}
if len(out) != numSeg {
t.Fatalf("expected %d segments, got %d", numSeg, len(out))
}
for i, seg := range out {
flags := seg[33]
hasCwr := flags&0x80 != 0
hasEce := flags&0x40 != 0
hasPsh := flags&0x08 != 0
wantCwr := i == 0
wantPsh := i == numSeg-1
if hasCwr != wantCwr {
t.Errorf("seg %d: CWR=%v want %v (flags=%#x)", i, hasCwr, wantCwr, flags)
}
if !hasEce {
t.Errorf("seg %d: ECE missing (flags=%#x)", i, flags)
}
if hasPsh != wantPsh {
t.Errorf("seg %d: PSH=%v want %v (flags=%#x)", i, hasPsh, wantPsh, flags)
}
// IP and TCP checksums must still verify after the flag rewrite.
if !verifyChecksum(seg[:20], 0) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: bad IPv4 header checksum", i)
}
psum := pseudoHeaderIPv4(seg[12:16], seg[16:20], unix.IPPROTO_TCP, 20+mss)
if !verifyChecksum(seg[20:], psum) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: bad TCP checksum", i)
}
if err := segmentInto(nil, hdr, &out, nil); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected rejection for UDP GSO")
}
}
@@ -583,7 +276,7 @@ func BenchmarkSegmentTCPv4(b *testing.B) {
for i := 0; i < sz.payLen; i++ {
pkt[ipLen+tcpLen+i] = byte(i)
}
hdr := virtio.Hdr{
hdr := VirtioNetHdr{
Flags: unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM,
GSOType: unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4,
HdrLen: uint16(ipLen + tcpLen),
@@ -592,23 +285,14 @@ func BenchmarkSegmentTCPv4(b *testing.B) {
CsumOffset: 16,
}
scratch := make([]byte, testSegScratchSize)
scratch := make([]byte, tunSegBufSize)
out := make([][]byte, 0, 64)
// PerSegment consumes its input destructively; restore pkt from
// a master copy each iteration. The restore mirrors the
// kernel→userspace copy that hands a fresh GSO blob to the
// segmenter in production, so it's representative cost rather
// than bench overhead.
master := append([]byte(nil), pkt...)
work := make([]byte, len(pkt))
b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkt)))
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
copy(work, master)
out = out[:0]
if err := segmentForTest(work, hdr, &out, scratch); err != nil {
if err := segmentTCP(pkt, hdr, &out, scratch); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
}
@@ -642,141 +326,3 @@ func TestTunFileWriteVnetHdrNoAlloc(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("Write allocated %.1f times per call, want 0", allocs)
}
}
// buildTSOv6 builds a synthetic IPv6/TCP TSO superpacket with payLen bytes
// of payload, segmented at gso. Returns the packet bytes only; the
// virtio_net_hdr is the caller's responsibility.
func buildTSOv6(payLen, gso int) []byte {
const ipLen = 40
const tcpLen = 20
pkt := make([]byte, ipLen+tcpLen+payLen)
pkt[0] = 0x60 // version 6
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(tcpLen+payLen))
pkt[6] = unix.IPPROTO_TCP
pkt[7] = 64
pkt[8] = 0xfe
pkt[9] = 0x80
pkt[23] = 1
pkt[24] = 0xfe
pkt[25] = 0x80
pkt[39] = 2
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[40:42], 12345)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[42:44], 80)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(pkt[44:48], 7)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(pkt[48:52], 99)
pkt[52] = 0x50
pkt[53] = 0x10 // ACK only
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[54:56], 65535)
for i := 0; i < payLen; i++ {
pkt[ipLen+tcpLen+i] = byte(i)
}
return pkt
}
// TestDecodeReadFitsMaxTSO proves decodeRead can absorb a worst-case
// 64KiB TSO superpacket without dropping it. With segmentation deferred to
// encrypt time, decodeRead writes nothing — it just slices the
// caller-supplied mem and attaches GSO metadata — so the size requirement
// is just "fit one worst-case input."
//
// Regression history: in a prior layout the rx buffer doubled as the
// segmentation output, a near-threshold drain read returned "scratch too
// small", the whole 45-segment TSO burst was dropped, and the remote's TCP
// fast-retransmit collapsed cwnd. Keeping this test guards against
// re-introducing per-call sizing assumptions inside decodeRead.
func TestDecodeReadFitsMaxTSO(t *testing.T) {
const ipv6HdrLen = 40
const tcpHdrLen = 20
const headerLen = ipv6HdrLen + tcpHdrLen
pktLen := tunReadBufSize
payLen := pktLen - headerLen
const targetSegs = 64
gsoSize := (payLen + targetSegs - 1) / targetSegs
pkt := buildTSOv6(payLen, gsoSize)
if len(pkt) != pktLen {
t.Fatalf("buildTSOv6 produced %d bytes, want %d", len(pkt), pktLen)
}
o := &Offload{}
// mem is sized exactly to one worst-case packet — the caller-side
// invariant the drain loop in Read enforces. decodeRead must process
// the burst within that window.
mem := make([]byte, pktLen)
copy(mem, pkt)
// Encode the matching virtio_net_hdr.
hdr := virtio.Hdr{
Flags: unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM,
GSOType: unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6,
HdrLen: uint16(headerLen),
GSOSize: uint16(gsoSize),
CsumStart: uint16(ipv6HdrLen),
CsumOffset: 16,
}
hdr.Encode(o.readVnetScratch[:])
var pkts []wire.TunPacket
pkts, err := o.decodeRead(pkts, mem, pktLen)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decodeRead returned %v — sizing regression: "+
"tunRxBufSize=%d must hold one worst-case input (%d)",
err, tunRxBufSize, pktLen)
}
if len(pkts) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("got %d packets, want 1 superpacket entry", len(pkts))
}
got := pkts[0]
if !got.Meta.IsSuperpacket() {
t.Fatalf("expected superpacket GSO metadata, got %+v", got.Meta)
}
if got.Meta.Proto != wire.GSOProtoTCP {
t.Errorf("Meta.Proto=%d want TCP", got.Meta.Proto)
}
if got.Meta.Size != uint16(gsoSize) {
t.Errorf("Meta.Size=%d want %d", got.Meta.Size, gsoSize)
}
if got.Meta.HdrLen != uint16(headerLen) {
t.Errorf("Meta.HdrLen=%d want %d", got.Meta.HdrLen, headerLen)
}
if got.Meta.CsumStart != uint16(ipv6HdrLen) {
t.Errorf("Meta.CsumStart=%d want %d", got.Meta.CsumStart, ipv6HdrLen)
}
if len(got.Bytes) != pktLen {
t.Errorf("len(Bytes)=%d want %d", len(got.Bytes), pktLen)
}
// Validate that segmenting the returned superpacket reproduces the
// expected per-segment IPv6 payload length and TCP checksum.
wantSegs := (payLen + gsoSize - 1) / gsoSize
gotSegs := 0
if err := got.PerSegment(func(seg []byte) error {
defer func() { gotSegs++ }()
if len(seg) < headerLen+1 {
t.Errorf("seg %d too short: %d", gotSegs, len(seg))
return nil
}
if seg[0]>>4 != 6 {
t.Errorf("seg %d: bad IP version %#x", gotSegs, seg[0])
}
segPay := len(seg) - headerLen
gotPL := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(seg[4:6])
if gotPL != uint16(tcpHdrLen+segPay) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: payload_len=%d want %d", gotSegs, gotPL, tcpHdrLen+segPay)
}
psum := pseudoHeaderIPv6(seg[8:24], seg[24:40], unix.IPPROTO_TCP, tcpHdrLen+segPay)
if !verifyChecksum(seg[ipv6HdrLen:], psum) {
t.Errorf("seg %d: bad TCP checksum", gotSegs)
}
return nil
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("PerSegment: %v", err)
}
if gotSegs != wantSegs {
t.Fatalf("got %d segments, want %d", gotSegs, wantSegs)
}
}
-402
View File
@@ -1,402 +0,0 @@
//go:build linux && !android
// +build linux,!android
// Package virtio implements the pure validation, header-correction, and
// per-segment slicing logic for kernel-supplied TSO/USO superpackets on
// IFF_VNET_HDR TUN devices. It is FD-free and depends only on the byte
// layout of the virtio_net_hdr and the IP/TCP/UDP headers it describes,
// so it can be unit-tested in isolation from the tio Queue runtime.
package virtio
import (
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"fmt"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/checksum"
)
// Protocol header size bounds used to validate / cap kernel-supplied offsets.
const (
ipv4HeaderMinLen = 20 // IHL=5, no options
ipv4HeaderMaxLen = 60 // IHL=15, max options
ipv6FixedLen = 40 // IPv6 base header; extensions would extend this
tcpHeaderMinLen = 20 // data-offset=5, no options
tcpHeaderMaxLen = 60 // data-offset=15, max options
)
// Byte offsets inside an IPv4 header.
const (
ipv4TotalLenOff = 2
ipv4IDOff = 4
ipv4ChecksumOff = 10
ipv4SrcOff = 12
ipv4AddrsEnd = 20 // end of dst address (ipv4SrcOff + 2*4)
)
// Byte offsets inside an IPv6 header.
const (
ipv6PayloadLenOff = 4
ipv6SrcOff = 8
ipv6AddrsEnd = 40 // end of dst address (ipv6SrcOff + 2*16)
)
// Byte offsets inside a TCP header (relative to its start, i.e. csumStart).
const (
tcpSeqOff = 4
tcpDataOffOff = 12 // upper nibble is header len in 32-bit words
tcpFlagsOff = 13
tcpChecksumOff = 16
)
// UDP header is fixed at 8 bytes: {sport, dport, length, checksum}.
const (
udpHeaderLen = 8
udpLengthOff = 4
udpChecksumOff = 6
)
// tcpFinPshMask is cleared on every segment except the last of a TSO burst.
const tcpFinPshMask = 0x09 // FIN(0x01) | PSH(0x08)
// tcpCwrFlag is cleared on every segment except the first. Per RFC 3168
// §6.1.2 the CWR bit signals a one-shot transition (the sender just halved
// its window) and must appear on the first segment of a TSO burst only.
const tcpCwrFlag = 0x80
// CheckValid rejects packets whose virtio_net_hdr/IP combination would
// cause a downstream miscompute. The TUN should never emit RSC_INFO and
// the GSO type must agree with the IP version nibble.
func CheckValid(pkt []byte, hdr Hdr) error {
// When RSC_INFO is set the csum_start/csum_offset fields are repurposed to
// carry coalescing info rather than checksum offsets. A TUN writing via
// IFF_VNET_HDR should never emit this, but if it did we would silently
// miscompute the segment checksums — refuse the packet instead.
if hdr.Flags&unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_RSC_INFO != 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("virtio RSC_INFO flag not supported on TUN reads")
}
if len(pkt) < ipv4HeaderMinLen {
return fmt.Errorf("packet too short")
}
ipVersion := pkt[0] >> 4
switch hdr.GSOType {
case unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4:
if ipVersion != 4 {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid IP version %d for GSO type %d", ipVersion, hdr.GSOType)
}
case unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6:
if ipVersion != 6 {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid IP version %d for GSO type %d", ipVersion, hdr.GSOType)
}
case unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP_L4:
// USO carries either v4 or v6; the leading nibble disambiguates.
if !(ipVersion == 4 || ipVersion == 6) {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid IP version %d for GSO type %d", ipVersion, hdr.GSOType)
}
default:
if !(ipVersion == 6 || ipVersion == 4) {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid IP version %d for GSO type %d", ipVersion, hdr.GSOType)
}
}
return nil
}
// CorrectHdrLen rewrites hdr.HdrLen based on the actual transport header
// length read out of pkt. The kernel's hdr.HdrLen on the FORWARD path can
// be the length of the entire first packet, so we don't trust it.
func CorrectHdrLen(pkt []byte, hdr *Hdr) error {
// Thank you wireguard-go for documenting these edge-cases
// Don't trust hdr.hdrLen from the kernel as it can be equal to the length
// of the entire first packet when the kernel is handling it as part of a
// FORWARD path. Instead, parse the transport header length and add it onto
// csumStart, which is synonymous for IP header length.
if hdr.GSOType == unix.VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP_L4 {
hdr.HdrLen = hdr.CsumStart + 8
} else {
if len(pkt) <= int(hdr.CsumStart+tcpDataOffOff) {
return errors.New("packet is too short")
}
tcpHLen := uint16(pkt[hdr.CsumStart+tcpDataOffOff] >> 4 * 4)
if tcpHLen < 20 || tcpHLen > 60 {
// A TCP header must be between 20 and 60 bytes in length.
return fmt.Errorf("tcp header len is invalid: %d", tcpHLen)
}
hdr.HdrLen = hdr.CsumStart + tcpHLen
}
if len(pkt) < int(hdr.HdrLen) {
return fmt.Errorf("length of packet (%d) < virtioNetHdr.HdrLen (%d)", len(pkt), hdr.HdrLen)
}
if hdr.HdrLen < hdr.CsumStart {
return fmt.Errorf("virtioNetHdr.HdrLen (%d) < virtioNetHdr.CsumStart (%d)", hdr.HdrLen, hdr.CsumStart)
}
cSumAt := int(hdr.CsumStart + hdr.CsumStart)
if cSumAt+1 >= len(pkt) {
return fmt.Errorf("end of checksum offset (%d) exceeds packet length (%d)", cSumAt+1, len(pkt))
}
return nil
}
// SegmentTCP walks a TSO superpacket pkt, yielding each segment as a
// slice into pkt itself. Per-segment plaintext is laid out by sliding a
// freshly-patched copy of the L3+L4 header into pkt at offset i*gsoSize,
// where it sits immediately before that segment's payload chunk in the
// original buffer. The slide is destructive: iter i's header write overwrites
// the last hdrLen bytes of seg_{i-1}'s payload, which is dead by the time
// the next iteration begins. pkt is consumed by this call and must not be
// inspected by the caller after the final yield.
func SegmentTCP(pkt []byte, hdrLenU, csumStartU, gsoSizeU uint16, yield func(seg []byte) error) error {
if gsoSizeU == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("gso_size is zero")
}
if csumStartU == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("csum_start is zero")
}
headerLen := int(hdrLenU)
csumStart := int(csumStartU)
isV4 := pkt[0]>>4 == 4
tcpHdrLen := int(pkt[csumStart+tcpDataOffOff]>>4) * 4
payLen := len(pkt) - headerLen
gsoSize := int(gsoSizeU)
numSeg := (payLen + gsoSize - 1) / gsoSize
if numSeg == 0 {
numSeg = 1
}
origSeq := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(pkt[csumStart+tcpSeqOff : csumStart+tcpSeqOff+4])
origFlags := pkt[csumStart+tcpFlagsOff]
var tmp [tcpHeaderMaxLen]byte
copy(tmp[:tcpHdrLen], pkt[csumStart:headerLen])
tmp[tcpSeqOff], tmp[tcpSeqOff+1], tmp[tcpSeqOff+2], tmp[tcpSeqOff+3] = 0, 0, 0, 0
tmp[tcpFlagsOff] = 0
tmp[tcpChecksumOff], tmp[tcpChecksumOff+1] = 0, 0
baseTcpHdrSum := uint32(checksum.Checksum(tmp[:tcpHdrLen], 0))
var baseProtoSum uint32
if isV4 {
baseProtoSum = uint32(checksum.Checksum(pkt[ipv4SrcOff:ipv4AddrsEnd], 0))
} else {
baseProtoSum = uint32(checksum.Checksum(pkt[ipv6SrcOff:ipv6AddrsEnd], 0))
}
baseProtoSum += uint32(unix.IPPROTO_TCP)
var origIPID uint16
var baseIPHdrSum uint32
if isV4 {
origIPID = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[ipv4IDOff : ipv4IDOff+2])
ihl := int(pkt[0]&0x0f) * 4
if ihl < ipv4HeaderMinLen || ihl > csumStart {
return fmt.Errorf("bad IPv4 IHL: %d", ihl)
}
var ipTmp [ipv4HeaderMaxLen]byte
copy(ipTmp[:ihl], pkt[:ihl])
ipTmp[ipv4TotalLenOff], ipTmp[ipv4TotalLenOff+1] = 0, 0
ipTmp[ipv4IDOff], ipTmp[ipv4IDOff+1] = 0, 0
ipTmp[ipv4ChecksumOff], ipTmp[ipv4ChecksumOff+1] = 0, 0
baseIPHdrSum = uint32(checksum.Checksum(ipTmp[:ihl], 0))
}
for i := 0; i < numSeg; i++ {
segStart := i * gsoSize
segEnd := segStart + gsoSize
if segEnd > payLen {
segEnd = payLen
}
segPayLen := segEnd - segStart
segLen := headerLen + segPayLen
headerOff := i * gsoSize
// Slide the header into place immediately before this segment's
// payload. Iter 0's header is already at pkt[:headerLen]; for
// i ≥ 1 we copy from there. The constant-byte fields of pkt[:headerLen]
// survive iter 0's in-place patches (only seq/flags/cksum/totalLen/id
// are touched), and iter 0's stale variable-field values are
// overwritten by the per-segment patches below.
if i > 0 {
copy(pkt[headerOff:headerOff+headerLen], pkt[:headerLen])
}
seg := pkt[headerOff : headerOff+segLen]
segSeq := origSeq + uint32(segStart)
segFlags := origFlags
if i != 0 {
segFlags &^= tcpCwrFlag
}
if i != numSeg-1 {
segFlags &^= tcpFinPshMask
}
totalLen := segLen
if isV4 {
segID := origIPID + uint16(i)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[ipv4TotalLenOff:ipv4TotalLenOff+2], uint16(totalLen))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[ipv4IDOff:ipv4IDOff+2], segID)
ipSum := baseIPHdrSum + uint32(totalLen) + uint32(segID)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[ipv4ChecksumOff:ipv4ChecksumOff+2], foldComplement(ipSum))
} else {
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[ipv6PayloadLenOff:ipv6PayloadLenOff+2], uint16(headerLen-ipv6FixedLen+segPayLen))
}
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(seg[csumStart+tcpSeqOff:csumStart+tcpSeqOff+4], segSeq)
seg[csumStart+tcpFlagsOff] = segFlags
tcpLen := tcpHdrLen + segPayLen
// Payload bytes still live at their original offset in pkt. The
// header slide above only writes into pkt[i*G : i*G+H], which is
// the tail of seg_{i-1}'s payload (already consumed) and never
// overlaps seg_i's own payload at pkt[H+i*G : H+(i+1)*G].
paySum := uint32(checksum.Checksum(pkt[headerLen+segStart:headerLen+segEnd], 0))
wide := uint64(baseTcpHdrSum) + uint64(paySum) + uint64(baseProtoSum)
wide += uint64(segSeq) + uint64(segFlags) + uint64(tcpLen)
wide = (wide & 0xffffffff) + (wide >> 32)
wide = (wide & 0xffffffff) + (wide >> 32)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[csumStart+tcpChecksumOff:csumStart+tcpChecksumOff+2], foldComplement(uint32(wide)))
if err := yield(seg); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// SegmentUDP walks a USO superpacket, sliding a per-segment-patched
// L3+L4 header into pkt at offset i*gsoSize and yielding pkt[i*G:i*G+segLen]
// to the caller. Per-segment patches are total_len + IPv4 csum (or IPv6
// payload_len) plus the UDP length and checksum. pkt is consumed
// destructively; see SegmentTCP for the layout reasoning.
//
// UDP-GSO leaves the IPv4 ID identical across segments (the kernel does not
// bump it), which is why the IP-level per-segment work is limited to
// total_len + IPv4 header checksum (v4) or payload_len (v6).
func SegmentUDP(pkt []byte, hdrLenU, csumStartU, gsoSizeU uint16, yield func(seg []byte) error) error {
if gsoSizeU == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("gso_size is zero")
}
if csumStartU == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("csum_start is zero")
}
isV4 := pkt[0]>>4 == 4
headerLen := int(hdrLenU)
csumStart := int(csumStartU)
if headerLen-csumStart != udpHeaderLen {
return fmt.Errorf("udp header len mismatch: %d", headerLen-csumStart)
}
payLen := len(pkt) - headerLen
gsoSize := int(gsoSizeU)
numSeg := (payLen + gsoSize - 1) / gsoSize
if numSeg == 0 {
numSeg = 1
}
var udpTmp [udpHeaderLen]byte
copy(udpTmp[:], pkt[csumStart:headerLen])
udpTmp[udpLengthOff], udpTmp[udpLengthOff+1] = 0, 0
udpTmp[udpChecksumOff], udpTmp[udpChecksumOff+1] = 0, 0
baseUDPHdrSum := uint32(checksum.Checksum(udpTmp[:], 0))
var baseProtoSum uint32
if isV4 {
baseProtoSum = uint32(checksum.Checksum(pkt[ipv4SrcOff:ipv4AddrsEnd], 0))
} else {
baseProtoSum = uint32(checksum.Checksum(pkt[ipv6SrcOff:ipv6AddrsEnd], 0))
}
baseProtoSum += uint32(unix.IPPROTO_UDP)
var baseIPHdrSum uint32
if isV4 {
ihl := int(pkt[0]&0x0f) * 4
if ihl < ipv4HeaderMinLen || ihl > csumStart {
return fmt.Errorf("bad IPv4 IHL: %d", ihl)
}
var ipTmp [ipv4HeaderMaxLen]byte
copy(ipTmp[:ihl], pkt[:ihl])
ipTmp[ipv4TotalLenOff], ipTmp[ipv4TotalLenOff+1] = 0, 0
ipTmp[ipv4ChecksumOff], ipTmp[ipv4ChecksumOff+1] = 0, 0
baseIPHdrSum = uint32(checksum.Checksum(ipTmp[:ihl], 0))
}
for i := 0; i < numSeg; i++ {
segStart := i * gsoSize
segEnd := segStart + gsoSize
if segEnd > payLen {
segEnd = payLen
}
segPayLen := segEnd - segStart
segLen := headerLen + segPayLen
headerOff := i * gsoSize
if i > 0 {
copy(pkt[headerOff:headerOff+headerLen], pkt[:headerLen])
}
seg := pkt[headerOff : headerOff+segLen]
totalLen := segLen
udpLen := udpHeaderLen + segPayLen
if isV4 {
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[ipv4TotalLenOff:ipv4TotalLenOff+2], uint16(totalLen))
ipSum := baseIPHdrSum + uint32(totalLen)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[ipv4ChecksumOff:ipv4ChecksumOff+2], foldComplement(ipSum))
} else {
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[ipv6PayloadLenOff:ipv6PayloadLenOff+2], uint16(headerLen-ipv6FixedLen+segPayLen))
}
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[csumStart+udpLengthOff:csumStart+udpLengthOff+2], uint16(udpLen))
paySum := uint32(checksum.Checksum(pkt[headerLen+segStart:headerLen+segEnd], 0))
wide := uint64(baseUDPHdrSum) + uint64(paySum) + uint64(baseProtoSum)
wide += uint64(udpLen) + uint64(udpLen)
wide = (wide & 0xffffffff) + (wide >> 32)
wide = (wide & 0xffffffff) + (wide >> 32)
csum := foldComplement(uint32(wide))
if csum == 0 {
csum = 0xffff
}
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[csumStart+udpChecksumOff:csumStart+udpChecksumOff+2], csum)
if err := yield(seg); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// FinishChecksum computes the L4 checksum for a non-GSO packet that the kernel
// handed us with NEEDS_CSUM set. csum_start / csum_offset point at the 16-bit
// checksum field; we zero it, fold a full sum (the field was pre-loaded with
// the pseudo-header partial sum by the kernel), and store the result.
func FinishChecksum(seg []byte, hdr Hdr) error {
cs := int(hdr.CsumStart)
co := int(hdr.CsumOffset)
if cs+co+2 > len(seg) {
return fmt.Errorf("csum offsets out of range: start=%d offset=%d len=%d", cs, co, len(seg))
}
// The kernel stores a partial pseudo-header sum at [cs+co:]; sum over the
// L4 region starting at cs, folding the prior partial in as the seed.
partial := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(seg[cs+co : cs+co+2])
seg[cs+co] = 0
seg[cs+co+1] = 0
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(seg[cs+co:cs+co+2], ^checksum.Checksum(seg[cs:], partial))
return nil
}
// foldComplement folds a 32-bit one's-complement partial sum to 16 bits and
// complements it, yielding the on-wire Internet checksum value.
func foldComplement(sum uint32) uint16 {
sum = (sum & 0xffff) + (sum >> 16)
sum = (sum & 0xffff) + (sum >> 16)
return ^uint16(sum)
}
@@ -1,17 +1,12 @@
//go:build linux && !android
// +build linux,!android
package virtio
package tio
import "encoding/binary"
// Size is the on-wire length of struct virtio_net_hdr the kernel
// prepends/expects on a TUN opened with IFF_VNET_HDR (TUNSETVNETHDRSZ
// not set).
const Size = 10
// Size of the legacy struct virtio_net_hdr that the kernel prepends/expects on
// a TUN opened with IFF_VNET_HDR (TUNSETVNETHDRSZ not set).
const virtioNetHdrLen = 10
// Hdr is the Go view of the legacy virtio_net_hdr.
type Hdr struct {
type VirtioNetHdr struct {
Flags uint8
GSOType uint8
HdrLen uint16
@@ -20,9 +15,9 @@ type Hdr struct {
CsumOffset uint16
}
// Decode reads a virtio_net_hdr in host byte order (TUN default; we never
// decode reads a virtio_net_hdr in host byte order (TUN default; we never
// call TUNSETVNETLE so the kernel matches our endianness).
func (h *Hdr) Decode(b []byte) {
func (h *VirtioNetHdr) decode(b []byte) {
h.Flags = b[0]
h.GSOType = b[1]
h.HdrLen = binary.NativeEndian.Uint16(b[2:4])
@@ -31,9 +26,10 @@ func (h *Hdr) Decode(b []byte) {
h.CsumOffset = binary.NativeEndian.Uint16(b[8:10])
}
// Encode is the inverse of Decode: writes the virtio_net_hdr fields into b
// (must be at least Size bytes). Used to emit a TSO superpacket on egress.
func (h *Hdr) Encode(b []byte) {
// encode is the inverse of decode: writes the virtio_net_hdr fields into b
// (must be at least virtioNetHdrLen bytes). Used to emit a TSO superpacket
// on egress.
func (h *VirtioNetHdr) encode(b []byte) {
b[0] = h.Flags
b[1] = h.GSOType
binary.NativeEndian.PutUint16(b[2:4], h.HdrLen)
+9 -14
View File
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ import (
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/wire"
)
type tun struct {
@@ -26,19 +25,18 @@ type tun struct {
Routes atomic.Pointer[[]Route]
routeTree atomic.Pointer[bart.Table[routing.Gateways]]
l *slog.Logger
readBuf []byte
batchRet [1][]byte
}
func (t *tun) Read(p []wire.TunPacket, mem []byte) (int, error) {
if len(p) == 0 || len(mem) == 0 {
return 0, nil //todo should this be an err?
}
p[0].Meta = struct{}{}
n, err := t.rwc.Read(mem)
func (t *tun) Read() ([][]byte, error) {
n, err := t.rwc.Read(t.readBuf)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
return nil, err
}
p[0].Bytes = mem[:n]
return 1, nil
t.batchRet[0] = t.readBuf[:n]
return t.batchRet[:], nil
}
func (t *tun) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
@@ -59,6 +57,7 @@ func newTunFromFd(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, deviceFd int, vpnNetworks []netip
fd: deviceFd,
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
l: l,
readBuf: make([]byte, defaultBatchBufSize),
}
err := t.reload(c, true)
@@ -129,7 +128,3 @@ func (t *tun) NewMultiQueueReader() error {
func (t *tun) Readers() []tio.Queue {
return []tio.Queue{t}
}
func (t *tun) Capabilities() tio.Capabilities {
return tio.Capabilities{}
}
-23
View File
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
//go:build (amd64 || arm64) && !e2e_testing
// +build amd64 arm64
// +build !e2e_testing
package overlay
import (
"log/slog"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/wfp"
)
// installInterfaceBypass installs a WFP PERMIT filter scoped to the wintun interface LUID so inbound traffic on the
// nebula adapter bypasses Windows Defender Firewall.
func installInterfaceBypass(l *slog.Logger, luid uint64) closer {
s, err := wfp.PermitInterface(luid)
if err != nil {
l.Warn("Failed to install WFP bypass filters on nebula interface", "error", err)
return nil
}
l.Info("Installed WFP filters bypassing Windows Defender Firewall on nebula interface")
return s
}
-11
View File
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
//go:build !e2e_testing
// +build !e2e_testing
package overlay
import "log/slog"
// installInterfaceBypass is a no-op on windows-386 because we don't currently build for it.
func installInterfaceBypass(_ *slog.Logger, _ uint64) closer {
return nil
}
+18 -14
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ import (
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/wire"
netroute "golang.org/x/net/route"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
@@ -36,6 +35,9 @@ type tun struct {
// cache out buffer since we need to prepend 4 bytes for tun metadata
out []byte
readBuf []byte
batchRet [1][]byte
}
type ifReq struct {
@@ -131,6 +133,7 @@ func newTun(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, _ bool) (*t
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
DefaultMTU: c.GetInt("tun.mtu", DefaultMTU),
l: l,
readBuf: make([]byte, defaultBatchBufSize),
}
err = t.reload(c, true)
@@ -504,17 +507,22 @@ func delRoute(prefix netip.Prefix, gateway netroute.Addr) error {
return nil
}
func (t *tun) Read(p []wire.TunPacket, mem []byte) (int, error) {
if len(p) == 0 || len(mem) <= 4 {
return 0, nil //todo should this be an err?
}
p[0].Meta = struct{}{}
n, err := t.rwc.Read(mem)
func (t *tun) readOne(to []byte) (int, error) {
buf := make([]byte, len(to)+4)
n, err := t.rwc.Read(buf)
copy(to, buf[4:])
return n - 4, err
}
func (t *tun) Read() ([][]byte, error) {
n, err := t.readOne(t.readBuf)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
return nil, err
}
p[0].Bytes = mem[4:n]
return 1, nil
t.batchRet[0] = t.readBuf[:n]
return t.batchRet[:], nil
}
// Write is only valid for single threaded use
@@ -565,7 +573,3 @@ func (t *tun) NewMultiQueueReader() error {
func (t *tun) Readers() []tio.Queue {
return []tio.Queue{t}
}
func (t *tun) Capabilities() tio.Capabilities {
return tio.Capabilities{}
}
+18 -37
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ import (
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/iputil"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/wire"
)
type disabledTun struct {
@@ -22,8 +21,25 @@ type disabledTun struct {
// Track these metrics since we don't have the tun device to do it for us
tx metrics.Counter
rx metrics.Counter
numReaders int
l *slog.Logger
numReaders int
batchRet [1][]byte
}
func (t *disabledTun) Read() ([][]byte, error) {
r, ok := <-t.read
if !ok {
return nil, io.EOF
}
t.tx.Inc(1)
if t.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
t.l.Debug("Write payload", "raw", prettyPacket(r))
}
t.batchRet[0] = r
return t.batchRet[:], nil
}
func newDisabledTun(vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, queueLen int, metricsEnabled bool, l *slog.Logger) *disabledTun {
@@ -61,37 +77,6 @@ func (*disabledTun) Name() string {
return "disabled"
}
func (t *disabledTun) readOne(b []byte) (int, error) {
r, ok := <-t.read
if !ok {
return 0, io.EOF
}
if len(r) > len(b) {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("packet larger than mtu: %d > %d bytes", len(r), len(b))
}
t.tx.Inc(1)
if t.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
t.l.Debug("Write payload", "raw", prettyPacket(r))
}
return copy(b, r), nil
}
func (t *disabledTun) Read(p []wire.TunPacket, mem []byte) (int, error) {
if len(p) == 0 || len(mem) == 0 {
return 0, nil //todo should this be an err?
}
p[0].Meta = wire.GSOInfo{}
n, err := t.readOne(mem)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
p[0].Bytes = mem[:n]
return 1, nil
}
func (t *disabledTun) handleICMPEchoRequest(b []byte) bool {
out := make([]byte, len(b))
out = iputil.CreateICMPEchoResponse(b, out)
@@ -140,10 +125,6 @@ func (t *disabledTun) Readers() []tio.Queue {
return out
}
func (t *disabledTun) Capabilities() tio.Capabilities {
return tio.Capabilities{}
}
func (t *disabledTun) Close() error {
if t.read != nil {
close(t.read)

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