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5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Nate Brown 86cef88744 Experimenting 2026-05-11 11:51:46 -05:00
Nate Brown b7e9939e92 More stable e2e test harness, better for benchmarking (#1702)
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2026-05-04 10:12:58 -05:00
Nate Brown 33c2d7277c Reduce HandshakeManager complexity a little bit (#1701)
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2026-05-01 13:21:38 -05:00
Nate Brown f141cebe8d Run e2e tests in parallel, include a goroutine leak detector test (#1700)
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2026-04-30 21:30:56 -05:00
Nate Brown 9ec8cf10f3 Handshake state machine (#1656) 2026-04-30 21:30:27 -05:00
59 changed files with 4389 additions and 2480 deletions
+52
View File
@@ -163,3 +163,55 @@ func P256Keypair() ([]byte, []byte) {
pubkey := privkey.PublicKey()
return pubkey.Bytes(), privkey.Bytes()
}
// DummyCert is a minimal cert.Certificate implementation for testing error paths.
type DummyCert struct {
Version_ cert.Version
Curve_ cert.Curve
Groups_ []string
IsCA_ bool
Issuer_ string
Name_ string
Networks_ []netip.Prefix
NotAfter_ time.Time
NotBefore_ time.Time
PublicKey_ []byte
Signature_ []byte
UnsafeNetworks_ []netip.Prefix
}
func (d *DummyCert) Version() cert.Version { return d.Version_ }
func (d *DummyCert) Curve() cert.Curve { return d.Curve_ }
func (d *DummyCert) Groups() []string { return d.Groups_ }
func (d *DummyCert) IsCA() bool { return d.IsCA_ }
func (d *DummyCert) Issuer() string { return d.Issuer_ }
func (d *DummyCert) Name() string { return d.Name_ }
func (d *DummyCert) Networks() []netip.Prefix { return d.Networks_ }
func (d *DummyCert) NotAfter() time.Time { return d.NotAfter_ }
func (d *DummyCert) NotBefore() time.Time { return d.NotBefore_ }
func (d *DummyCert) PublicKey() []byte { return d.PublicKey_ }
func (d *DummyCert) Signature() []byte { return d.Signature_ }
func (d *DummyCert) UnsafeNetworks() []netip.Prefix { return d.UnsafeNetworks_ }
func (d *DummyCert) Fingerprint() (string, error) { return "", nil }
func (d *DummyCert) CheckSignature(key []byte) bool { return false }
func (d *DummyCert) MarshalForHandshakes() ([]byte, error) { return nil, nil }
func (d *DummyCert) MarshalPEM() ([]byte, error) { return nil, nil }
func (d *DummyCert) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) { return nil, nil }
func (d *DummyCert) Marshal() ([]byte, error) { return nil, nil }
func (d *DummyCert) String() string { return "dummy" }
func (d *DummyCert) Copy() cert.Certificate { return d }
func (d *DummyCert) VerifyPrivateKey(c cert.Curve, k []byte) error { return nil }
func (d *DummyCert) Expired(time.Time) bool { return false }
func (d *DummyCert) MarshalPublicKeyPEM() []byte { return nil }
func (d *DummyCert) PublicKeyPEM() []byte { return nil }
// NewTestCAPool creates a CAPool from the given CA certificates, panicking on error.
func NewTestCAPool(cas ...cert.Certificate) *cert.CAPool {
pool := cert.NewCAPool()
for _, ca := range cas {
if err := pool.AddCA(ca); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
}
return pool
}
+8 -6
View File
@@ -153,8 +153,8 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) Start(ctx context.Context) {
defer clockSource.Stop()
p := []byte("")
nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
out := make([]byte, mtu)
// Long-lived buf for the traffic-check goroutine; never released.
buf := cm.intf.bufAlloc.Acquire()
for {
select {
@@ -169,13 +169,13 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) Start(ctx context.Context) {
break
}
cm.doTrafficCheck(localIndex, p, nb, out, now)
cm.doTrafficCheck(localIndex, p, buf, now)
}
}
}
}
func (cm *connectionManager) doTrafficCheck(localIndex uint32, p, nb, out []byte, now time.Time) {
func (cm *connectionManager) doTrafficCheck(localIndex uint32, p []byte, buf *WireBuffer, now time.Time) {
decision, hostinfo, primary := cm.makeTrafficDecision(localIndex, now)
switch decision {
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) doTrafficCheck(localIndex uint32, p, nb, out []byte
cm.tryRehandshake(hostinfo)
case sendTestPacket:
cm.intf.SendMessageToHostInfo(header.Test, header.TestRequest, hostinfo, p, nb, out)
cm.intf.SendMessageToHostInfo(header.Test, header.TestRequest, hostinfo, p, buf)
}
cm.resetRelayTrafficCheck(hostinfo)
@@ -308,7 +308,9 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) migrateRelayUsed(oldhostinfo, newhostinfo *HostInfo
if err != nil {
cm.l.Error("failed to marshal Control message to migrate relay", "error", err)
} else {
cm.intf.SendMessageToHostInfo(header.Control, 0, newhostinfo, msg, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
migBuf := cm.intf.bufAlloc.Acquire()
cm.intf.SendMessageToHostInfo(header.Control, 0, newhostinfo, msg, migBuf)
cm.intf.bufAlloc.Release(migBuf)
cm.l.Info("send CreateRelayRequest",
"relayFrom", req.RelayFromAddr,
"relayTo", req.RelayToAddr,
+16 -21
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/overlaytest"
@@ -47,7 +46,7 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest(t *testing.T) {
initiatingVersion: cert.Version1,
privateKey: []byte{},
v1Cert: &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1},
v1HandshakeBytes: []byte{},
v1Credential: nil,
}
lh := newTestLighthouse()
@@ -68,9 +67,9 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest(t *testing.T) {
punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf)
nc := newConnectionManagerFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf, hostMap, punchy)
nc.intf = ifce
p := []byte("")
nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
out := make([]byte, mtu)
buf := NewWireBuffer(mtu, 0)
// Add an ip we have established a connection w/ to hostmap
hostinfo := &HostInfo{
@@ -80,7 +79,6 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest(t *testing.T) {
}
hostinfo.ConnectionState = &ConnectionState{
myCert: &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1},
H: &noise.HandshakeState{},
}
nc.hostMap.unlockedAddHostInfo(hostinfo, ifce)
@@ -94,7 +92,7 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest(t *testing.T) {
assert.True(t, hostinfo.in.Load())
// Do a traffic check tick, should not be pending deletion but should not have any in/out packets recorded
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, nb, out, time.Now())
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, buf, time.Now())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.out.Load())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.in.Load())
@@ -102,7 +100,7 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest(t *testing.T) {
// Do another traffic check tick, this host should be pending deletion now
nc.Out(hostinfo)
assert.True(t, hostinfo.out.Load())
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, nb, out, time.Now())
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, buf, time.Now())
assert.True(t, hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.out.Load())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.in.Load())
@@ -110,7 +108,7 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest(t *testing.T) {
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Hosts, hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0])
// Do a final traffic check tick, the host should now be removed
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, nb, out, time.Now())
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, buf, time.Now())
assert.NotContains(t, nc.hostMap.Hosts, hostinfo.vpnAddrs)
assert.NotContains(t, nc.hostMap.Indexes, hostinfo.localIndexId)
}
@@ -130,7 +128,7 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest2(t *testing.T) {
initiatingVersion: cert.Version1,
privateKey: []byte{},
v1Cert: &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1},
v1HandshakeBytes: []byte{},
v1Credential: nil,
}
lh := newTestLighthouse()
@@ -151,9 +149,9 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest2(t *testing.T) {
punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf)
nc := newConnectionManagerFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf, hostMap, punchy)
nc.intf = ifce
p := []byte("")
nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
out := make([]byte, mtu)
buf := NewWireBuffer(mtu, 0)
// Add an ip we have established a connection w/ to hostmap
hostinfo := &HostInfo{
@@ -163,7 +161,6 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest2(t *testing.T) {
}
hostinfo.ConnectionState = &ConnectionState{
myCert: &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1},
H: &noise.HandshakeState{},
}
nc.hostMap.unlockedAddHostInfo(hostinfo, ifce)
@@ -177,14 +174,14 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest2(t *testing.T) {
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Indexes, hostinfo.localIndexId)
// Do a traffic check tick, should not be pending deletion but should not have any in/out packets recorded
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, nb, out, time.Now())
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, buf, time.Now())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.out.Load())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.in.Load())
// Do another traffic check tick, this host should be pending deletion now
nc.Out(hostinfo)
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, nb, out, time.Now())
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, buf, time.Now())
assert.True(t, hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.out.Load())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.in.Load())
@@ -193,7 +190,7 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest2(t *testing.T) {
// We saw traffic, should no longer be pending deletion
nc.In(hostinfo)
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, nb, out, time.Now())
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, buf, time.Now())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.out.Load())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.in.Load())
@@ -215,7 +212,7 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManager_DisconnectInactive(t *testing.T) {
initiatingVersion: cert.Version1,
privateKey: []byte{},
v1Cert: &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1},
v1HandshakeBytes: []byte{},
v1Credential: nil,
}
lh := newTestLighthouse()
@@ -249,7 +246,6 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManager_DisconnectInactive(t *testing.T) {
}
hostinfo.ConnectionState = &ConnectionState{
myCert: &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1},
H: &noise.HandshakeState{},
}
nc.hostMap.unlockedAddHostInfo(hostinfo, ifce)
@@ -340,9 +336,9 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest_DisconnectInvalid(t *testing.T) {
cachedPeerCert, err := ncp.VerifyCertificate(now.Add(time.Second), peerCert)
cs := &CertState{
privateKey: []byte{},
v1Cert: &dummyCert{},
v1HandshakeBytes: []byte{},
privateKey: []byte{},
v1Cert: &dummyCert{},
v1Credential: nil,
}
lh := newTestLighthouse()
@@ -372,7 +368,6 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest_DisconnectInvalid(t *testing.T) {
ConnectionState: &ConnectionState{
myCert: &dummyCert{},
peerCert: cachedPeerCert,
H: &noise.HandshakeState{},
},
}
nc.hostMap.unlockedAddHostInfo(hostinfo, ifce)
+16 -51
View File
@@ -1,15 +1,12 @@
package nebula
import (
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/noiseutil"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake"
)
const ReplayWindow = 1024
@@ -17,7 +14,6 @@ const ReplayWindow = 1024
type ConnectionState struct {
eKey *NebulaCipherState
dKey *NebulaCipherState
H *noise.HandshakeState
myCert cert.Certificate
peerCert *cert.CachedCertificate
initiator bool
@@ -26,55 +22,24 @@ type ConnectionState struct {
writeLock sync.Mutex
}
func NewConnectionState(cs *CertState, crt cert.Certificate, initiator bool, pattern noise.HandshakePattern) (*ConnectionState, error) {
var dhFunc noise.DHFunc
switch crt.Curve() {
case cert.Curve_CURVE25519:
dhFunc = noise.DH25519
case cert.Curve_P256:
if cs.pkcs11Backed {
dhFunc = noiseutil.DHP256PKCS11
} else {
dhFunc = noiseutil.DHP256
}
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid curve: %s", crt.Curve())
}
var ncs noise.CipherSuite
if cs.cipher == "chachapoly" {
ncs = noise.NewCipherSuite(dhFunc, noise.CipherChaChaPoly, noise.HashSHA256)
} else {
ncs = noise.NewCipherSuite(dhFunc, noiseutil.CipherAESGCM, noise.HashSHA256)
}
static := noise.DHKey{Private: cs.privateKey, Public: crt.PublicKey()}
hs, err := noise.NewHandshakeState(noise.Config{
CipherSuite: ncs,
Random: rand.Reader,
Pattern: pattern,
Initiator: initiator,
StaticKeypair: static,
//NOTE: These should come from CertState (pki.go) when we finally implement it
PresharedKey: []byte{},
PresharedKeyPlacement: 0,
})
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("NewConnectionState: %s", err)
}
// The queue and ready params prevent a counter race that would happen when
// sending stored packets and simultaneously accepting new traffic.
// newConnectionStateFromResult builds a fully-populated ConnectionState from a
// completed handshake.Result. It seeds messageCounter and the replay window so
// that the post-handshake message indices already used on the wire don't count
// as missed traffic in the data plane.
func newConnectionStateFromResult(r *handshake.Result) *ConnectionState {
ci := &ConnectionState{
H: hs,
initiator: initiator,
myCert: r.MyCert,
initiator: r.Initiator,
peerCert: r.RemoteCert,
eKey: NewNebulaCipherState(r.EKey),
dKey: NewNebulaCipherState(r.DKey),
window: NewBits(ReplayWindow),
myCert: crt,
}
// always start the counter from 2, as packet 1 and packet 2 are handshake packets.
ci.messageCounter.Add(2)
return ci, nil
ci.messageCounter.Add(r.MessageIndex)
for i := uint64(1); i <= r.MessageIndex; i++ {
ci.window.Update(nil, i)
}
return ci
}
func (cs *ConnectionState) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
+114
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
package nebula
import (
"net/netip"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
ct "github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// runTestHandshake runs a complete IX handshake between two freshly-built
// peers and returns the initiator and responder Results. Used to produce
// real cipher states for tests that need to exercise post-handshake glue.
func runTestHandshake(t *testing.T) (initR, respR *handshake.Result) {
t.Helper()
ca, _, caKey, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
caPool := ct.NewTestCAPool(ca)
makeCreds := func(name string, networks []netip.Prefix) handshake.GetCredentialFunc {
c, _, rawKey, _ := ct.NewTestCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, ca, caKey,
name, ca.NotBefore(), ca.NotAfter(), networks, nil, nil,
)
priv, _, _, err := cert.UnmarshalPrivateKeyFromPEM(rawKey)
require.NoError(t, err)
hsBytes, err := c.MarshalForHandshakes()
require.NoError(t, err)
ncs := noise.NewCipherSuite(noise.DH25519, noise.CipherChaChaPoly, noise.HashSHA256)
cred := handshake.NewCredential(c, hsBytes, priv, ncs)
return func(v cert.Version) *handshake.Credential {
if v == cert.Version2 {
return cred
}
return nil
}
}
verifier := func(c cert.Certificate) (*cert.CachedCertificate, error) {
return caPool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), c)
}
initCreds := makeCreds("initiator", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")})
respCreds := makeCreds("responder", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.2/24")})
initM, err := handshake.NewMachine(
cert.Version2, initCreds, verifier,
func() (uint32, error) { return 1000, nil },
true, header.HandshakeIXPSK0,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
respM, err := handshake.NewMachine(
cert.Version2, respCreds, verifier,
func() (uint32, error) { return 2000, nil },
false, header.HandshakeIXPSK0,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
msg1, err := initM.Initiate(nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
resp, respR, err := respM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg1)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, respR)
_, initR, err = initM.ProcessPacket(nil, resp)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, initR)
return initR, respR
}
func TestNewConnectionStateFromResult(t *testing.T) {
initR, respR := runTestHandshake(t)
t.Run("initiator", func(t *testing.T) {
ci := newConnectionStateFromResult(initR)
assert.True(t, ci.initiator)
assert.Equal(t, initR.MyCert, ci.myCert)
assert.Equal(t, initR.RemoteCert, ci.peerCert)
assert.NotNil(t, ci.eKey)
assert.NotNil(t, ci.dKey)
// IX has 2 handshake messages; the next data-plane send is counter=3.
assert.Equal(t, uint64(2), ci.messageCounter.Load(),
"messageCounter must equal Result.MessageIndex so the next send is N+1")
// Both handshake counters must be marked seen so they don't appear lost.
// Check returns false if an index has already been recorded.
assert.False(t, ci.window.Check(nil, 1), "counter 1 must already be seen")
assert.False(t, ci.window.Check(nil, 2), "counter 2 must already be seen")
// Counter 3 is the next data-plane message and must NOT be pre-marked.
assert.True(t, ci.window.Check(nil, 3), "counter 3 must not be pre-seeded")
})
t.Run("responder", func(t *testing.T) {
ci := newConnectionStateFromResult(respR)
assert.False(t, ci.initiator)
assert.Equal(t, respR.MyCert, ci.myCert)
assert.Equal(t, respR.RemoteCert, ci.peerCert)
assert.NotNil(t, ci.eKey)
assert.NotNil(t, ci.dKey)
assert.Equal(t, uint64(2), ci.messageCounter.Load())
})
}
+7 -10
View File
@@ -278,15 +278,9 @@ func (c *Control) CloseTunnel(vpnIp netip.Addr, localOnly bool) bool {
}
if !localOnly {
c.f.send(
header.CloseTunnel,
0,
hostInfo.ConnectionState,
hostInfo,
[]byte{},
make([]byte, 12, 12),
make([]byte, mtu),
)
buf := c.f.bufAlloc.Acquire()
c.f.send(header.CloseTunnel, 0, hostInfo.ConnectionState, hostInfo, []byte{}, buf)
c.f.bufAlloc.Release(buf)
}
c.f.closeTunnel(hostInfo)
@@ -296,11 +290,14 @@ func (c *Control) CloseTunnel(vpnIp netip.Addr, localOnly bool) bool {
// CloseAllTunnels is just like CloseTunnel except it goes through and shuts them all down, optionally you can avoid shutting down lighthouse tunnels
// the int returned is a count of tunnels closed
func (c *Control) CloseAllTunnels(excludeLighthouses bool) (closed int) {
// One WireBuffer for the whole shutdown loop.
buf := c.f.bufAlloc.Acquire()
defer c.f.bufAlloc.Release(buf)
shutdown := func(h *HostInfo) {
if excludeLighthouses && c.f.lightHouse.IsAnyLighthouseAddr(h.vpnAddrs) {
return
}
c.f.send(header.CloseTunnel, 0, h.ConnectionState, h, []byte{}, make([]byte, 12, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
c.f.send(header.CloseTunnel, 0, h.ConnectionState, h, []byte{}, buf)
c.f.closeTunnel(h)
c.l.Debug("Sending close tunnel message",
+12 -60
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@ package nebula
import (
"net/netip"
"github.com/google/gopacket"
"github.com/google/gopacket/layers"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
@@ -22,7 +20,9 @@ func (c *Control) WaitForType(msgType header.MessageType, subType header.Message
panic(err)
}
pipeTo.InjectUDPPacket(p)
if h.Type == msgType && h.Subtype == subType {
match := h.Type == msgType && h.Subtype == subType
p.Release()
if match {
return
}
}
@@ -38,7 +38,9 @@ func (c *Control) WaitForTypeByIndex(toIndex uint32, msgType header.MessageType,
panic(err)
}
pipeTo.InjectUDPPacket(p)
if h.RemoteIndex == toIndex && h.Type == msgType && h.Subtype == subType {
match := h.RemoteIndex == toIndex && h.Type == msgType && h.Subtype == subType
p.Release()
if match {
return
}
}
@@ -90,65 +92,15 @@ func (c *Control) GetTunTxChan() <-chan []byte {
return c.f.inside.(*overlay.TestTun).TxPackets
}
// InjectUDPPacket will inject a packet into the udp side of nebula
// InjectUDPPacket injects a packet into the udp side. We copy internally so the caller keeps ownership of p.
// The copy comes from the freelist so steady-state alloc is zero.
func (c *Control) InjectUDPPacket(p *udp.Packet) {
c.f.outside.(*udp.TesterConn).Send(p)
c.f.outside.(*udp.TesterConn).Send(p.Copy())
}
// InjectTunUDPPacket puts a udp packet on the tun interface. Using UDP here because it's a simpler protocol
func (c *Control) InjectTunUDPPacket(toAddr netip.Addr, toPort uint16, fromAddr netip.Addr, fromPort uint16, data []byte) {
serialize := make([]gopacket.SerializableLayer, 0)
var netLayer gopacket.NetworkLayer
if toAddr.Is6() {
if !fromAddr.Is6() {
panic("Cant send ipv6 to ipv4")
}
ip := &layers.IPv6{
Version: 6,
NextHeader: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
SrcIP: fromAddr.Unmap().AsSlice(),
DstIP: toAddr.Unmap().AsSlice(),
}
serialize = append(serialize, ip)
netLayer = ip
} else {
if !fromAddr.Is4() {
panic("Cant send ipv4 to ipv6")
}
ip := &layers.IPv4{
Version: 4,
TTL: 64,
Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
SrcIP: fromAddr.Unmap().AsSlice(),
DstIP: toAddr.Unmap().AsSlice(),
}
serialize = append(serialize, ip)
netLayer = ip
}
udp := layers.UDP{
SrcPort: layers.UDPPort(fromPort),
DstPort: layers.UDPPort(toPort),
}
err := udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(netLayer)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
buffer := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
opt := gopacket.SerializeOptions{
ComputeChecksums: true,
FixLengths: true,
}
serialize = append(serialize, &udp, gopacket.Payload(data))
err = gopacket.SerializeLayers(buffer, opt, serialize...)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
c.f.inside.(*overlay.TestTun).Send(buffer.Bytes())
// InjectTunPacket pushes an IP packet onto the tun interface.
func (c *Control) InjectTunPacket(packet []byte) {
c.f.inside.(*overlay.TestTun).Send(packet)
}
func (c *Control) GetVpnAddrs() []netip.Addr {
+68
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
//go:build e2e_testing
// +build e2e_testing
package e2e
import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/e2e/router"
)
// BenchmarkHandshake measures end-to-end tunnel establishment time. The two
// nodes and the router are constructed once before the loop so the timed window
// is just the handshake itself: trigger packet -> handshake1 -> handshake2 ->
// cached packet replay -> arrival on the remote TUN. Between iterations we
// tear down both sides locally (no CloseTunnel notification on the wire) and
// re-inject the lighthouse address that closeTunnel cleared, so the next
// iteration runs through a fresh handshake against the same harness.
func BenchmarkHandshake(b *testing.B) {
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
// Default try_interval is 100ms. The handshake manager schedules handshake1
// on its OutboundHandshakeTimer rather than firing immediately on trigger
// (the trigger channel only fast-paths static hosts), so a 100ms default
// drowns the actual handshake cost. Drop it to 1ms so the bench reflects
// the computation, not the wheel cadence.
bovr := m{"handshakes": m{"try_interval": "1ms"}}
myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "me", "10.128.0.1/24", bovr)
theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "them", "10.128.0.2/24", bovr)
myControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirUdpAddr)
theirControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myUdpAddr)
myControl.Start()
theirControl.Start()
defer myControl.Stop()
defer theirControl.Stop()
r := router.NewR(b, myControl, theirControl)
r.CancelFlowLogs()
r.EnableFanIn()
trigger := BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
b.ReportAllocs()
b.ResetTimer()
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
myControl.InjectTunPacket(trigger)
// RouteForAllUntilTxTun returns the moment the cached packet arrives at
// the remote TUN, which is also when both sides are fully established.
_ = r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
b.StopTimer()
// Local-only close removes hostmap state on both sides without putting a
// CloseTunnel packet on the wire that we'd then have to drain. The
// closeTunnel path also clears learned lighthouse state for the peer
// when the last hostinfo for that addr goes away, so we re-inject.
myControl.CloseTunnel(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), true)
theirControl.CloseTunnel(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), true)
myControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirUdpAddr)
theirControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myUdpAddr)
b.StartTimer()
}
}
+24 -12
View File
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ func makeHandshakePacket(from, to netip.AddrPort, subtype header.MessageSubType,
}
func TestHandshakeRetransmitDuplicate(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Verify the responder correctly handles receiving the same msg1 multiple times
// (retransmission). The duplicate goes through CheckAndComplete -> ErrAlreadySeen
// and the cached response is resent.
@@ -46,7 +47,7 @@ func TestHandshakeRetransmitDuplicate(t *testing.T) {
defer r.RenderFlow()
t.Log("Trigger handshake from me to them")
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi"))
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi")))
t.Log("Grab my msg1")
msg1 := myControl.GetFromUDP(true)
@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@ func TestHandshakeRetransmitDuplicate(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestHandshakeTruncatedPacketRecovery(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Verify that a truncated handshake packet is ignored and the real
// packet can still complete the handshake.
@@ -95,7 +97,7 @@ func TestHandshakeTruncatedPacketRecovery(t *testing.T) {
defer r.RenderFlow()
t.Log("Trigger handshake")
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi"))
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi")))
t.Log("Get msg1 and deliver to responder")
msg1 := myControl.GetFromUDP(true)
@@ -126,6 +128,7 @@ func TestHandshakeTruncatedPacketRecovery(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestHandshakeOrphanedMsg2Dropped(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// A msg2 arriving with no matching pending index should be silently dropped
// with no response sent and no state changes.
@@ -143,7 +146,7 @@ func TestHandshakeOrphanedMsg2Dropped(t *testing.T) {
defer r.RenderFlow()
t.Log("Complete a normal handshake")
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi"))
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi")))
r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
assertTunnel(t, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
@@ -168,6 +171,7 @@ func TestHandshakeOrphanedMsg2Dropped(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestHandshakeUnknownMessageCounter(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// A handshake packet with an unexpected message counter should be silently
// dropped with no side effects and no UDP response.
@@ -199,6 +203,7 @@ func TestHandshakeUnknownMessageCounter(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestHandshakeUnknownSubtype(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// A handshake packet with an unknown subtype should be silently dropped.
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
@@ -224,6 +229,7 @@ func TestHandshakeUnknownSubtype(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestHandshakeLateResponse(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// After a handshake times out, a late response should be silently ignored
// with no new tunnels created.
@@ -242,7 +248,7 @@ func TestHandshakeLateResponse(t *testing.T) {
theirControl.Start()
t.Log("Trigger handshake from me")
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi"))
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi")))
t.Log("Grab msg1 but don't deliver")
msg1 := myControl.GetFromUDP(true)
@@ -273,6 +279,7 @@ func TestHandshakeLateResponse(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestHandshakeSelfConnectionRejected(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Verify that a node rejects a handshake containing its own VPN IP in the
// peer cert. We do this by sending the initiator's own msg1 back to itself.
@@ -285,7 +292,7 @@ func TestHandshakeSelfConnectionRejected(t *testing.T) {
myControl.Start()
t.Log("Trigger handshake from me")
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(netip.MustParseAddr("10.128.0.2"), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi"))
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(netip.MustParseAddr("10.128.0.2"), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi")))
msg1 := myControl.GetFromUDP(true)
t.Log("Drain any handshake retransmits before injecting")
@@ -321,6 +328,7 @@ func TestHandshakeSelfConnectionRejected(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestHandshakeMessageCounter0Dropped(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// MessageCounter=0 is not a valid handshake message and should be dropped.
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
@@ -341,6 +349,7 @@ func TestHandshakeMessageCounter0Dropped(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestHandshakeRemoteAllowList(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Verify that a handshake from a blocked underlay IP is dropped with no
// response and no state changes. Then verify the same packet from an
// allowed IP succeeds.
@@ -366,7 +375,7 @@ func TestHandshakeRemoteAllowList(t *testing.T) {
defer r.RenderFlow()
t.Log("Trigger handshake from them")
theirControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi"))
theirControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi")))
msg1 := theirControl.GetFromUDP(true)
t.Log("Rewrite the source to a blocked IP and inject")
@@ -399,6 +408,7 @@ func TestHandshakeRemoteAllowList(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestHandshakeAlreadySeenPreferredRemote(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// When a duplicate msg1 arrives via ErrAlreadySeen, verify the tunnel
// remains functional and hostmap index count is stable.
@@ -416,7 +426,7 @@ func TestHandshakeAlreadySeenPreferredRemote(t *testing.T) {
defer r.RenderFlow()
t.Log("Complete a normal handshake via the router")
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi"))
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi")))
r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
assertTunnel(t, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
@@ -427,7 +437,7 @@ func TestHandshakeAlreadySeenPreferredRemote(t *testing.T) {
originalRemote := hi.CurrentRemote
t.Log("Re-trigger traffic to cause a new handshake attempt (ErrAlreadySeen)")
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("roam"))
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("roam")))
r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
t.Log("Verify tunnel still works")
@@ -445,6 +455,7 @@ func TestHandshakeAlreadySeenPreferredRemote(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestHandshakeWrongResponderPacketStore(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Verify that when the wrong host responds, the cached packets are
// transferred to the new handshake, the evil tunnel is closed, evil's
// address is blocked, and the correct tunnel is eventually established.
@@ -464,8 +475,8 @@ func TestHandshakeWrongResponderPacketStore(t *testing.T) {
evilControl.Start()
t.Log("Send multiple packets to them (cached during handshake)")
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("packet1"))
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("packet2"))
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("packet1")))
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("packet2")))
t.Log("Route until evil tunnel is closed")
h := &header.H{}
@@ -508,6 +519,7 @@ func TestHandshakeWrongResponderPacketStore(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestHandshakeRelayComplete(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Verify that a relay handshake completes correctly and relay state is
// properly maintained on all three nodes.
@@ -528,7 +540,7 @@ func TestHandshakeRelayComplete(t *testing.T) {
theirControl.Start()
t.Log("Trigger handshake via relay")
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi via relay"))
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi via relay")))
p := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi via relay"), p, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
@@ -556,7 +568,7 @@ func TestHandshakeRelayComplete(t *testing.T) {
}
// NOTE: Relay V1 cert + IPv6 rejection is not tested here because
// InjectTunUDPPacket from a V4 node to a V6 address panics in the test
// BuildTunUDPPacket from a V4 node to a V6 address panics in the test
// framework. The check is in handshake_manager.go handleOutbound relay
// logic (lines ~304-313): if the relay host has a V1 cert and either
// address is IPv6, the relay is skipped.
+68 -31
View File
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import (
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/e2e/router"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
@@ -39,11 +40,22 @@ func BenchmarkHotPath(b *testing.B) {
r.CancelFlowLogs()
assertTunnel(b, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
// Pre-build the IP packet bytes once so the bench measures the data plane,
// not gopacket SerializeLayers overhead.
prebuilt := BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
// EnableFanIn switches the router to a 0-alloc routing path. Required
// for hot-path benchmarks; would conflict with GetFromUDP-using tests.
r.EnableFanIn()
b.ResetTimer()
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
_ = r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
myControl.InjectTunPacket(prebuilt)
// Release the TUN-side bytes back to the harness freelist; the bench
// just confirms a packet arrived, the contents aren't inspected.
overlay.ReleaseTunBuf(r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl))
}
myControl.Stop()
@@ -71,11 +83,15 @@ func BenchmarkHotPathRelay(b *testing.B) {
theirControl.Start()
assertTunnel(b, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirControl, myControl, r)
prebuilt := BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
r.EnableFanIn()
b.ResetTimer()
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
_ = r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
myControl.InjectTunPacket(prebuilt)
overlay.ReleaseTunBuf(r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl))
}
myControl.Stop()
@@ -84,6 +100,7 @@ func BenchmarkHotPathRelay(b *testing.B) {
}
func TestGoodHandshake(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me", "10.128.0.1/24", nil)
theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "them", "10.128.0.2/24", nil)
@@ -96,7 +113,7 @@ func TestGoodHandshake(t *testing.T) {
theirControl.Start()
t.Log("Send a udp packet through to begin standing up the tunnel, this should come out the other side")
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
t.Log("Have them consume my stage 0 packet. They have a tunnel now")
theirControl.InjectUDPPacket(myControl.GetFromUDP(true))
@@ -134,6 +151,7 @@ func TestGoodHandshake(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestGoodHandshakeNoOverlap(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "me", "10.128.0.1/24", nil)
theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "them", "2001::69/24", nil) //look ma, cross-stack!
@@ -147,7 +165,7 @@ func TestGoodHandshakeNoOverlap(t *testing.T) {
empty := []byte{}
t.Log("do something to cause a handshake")
myControl.GetF().SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.Test, header.MessageNone, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), empty, empty, empty)
myControl.GetF().SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.Test, header.MessageNone, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), empty, nebula.NewWireBuffer(9001, 0))
t.Log("Have them consume my stage 0 packet. They have a tunnel now")
theirControl.InjectUDPPacket(myControl.GetFromUDP(true))
@@ -169,6 +187,7 @@ func TestGoodHandshakeNoOverlap(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestWrongResponderHandshake(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me", "10.128.0.100/24", nil)
@@ -188,7 +207,7 @@ func TestWrongResponderHandshake(t *testing.T) {
evilControl.Start()
t.Log("Start the handshake process, we will route until we see the evil tunnel closed")
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
h := &header.H{}
r.RouteForAllExitFunc(func(p *udp.Packet, c *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
@@ -245,6 +264,7 @@ func TestWrongResponderHandshake(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestWrongResponderHandshakeStaticHostMap(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "them", "10.128.0.99/24", nil)
@@ -269,7 +289,7 @@ func TestWrongResponderHandshakeStaticHostMap(t *testing.T) {
evilControl.Start()
t.Log("Start the handshake process, we will route until we see the evil tunnel closed")
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
h := &header.H{}
r.RouteForAllExitFunc(func(p *udp.Packet, c *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
@@ -327,6 +347,7 @@ func TestWrongResponderHandshakeStaticHostMap(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestStage1Race(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// This tests ensures that two hosts handshaking with each other at the same time will allow traffic to flow
// But will eventually collapse down to a single tunnel
@@ -347,8 +368,8 @@ func TestStage1Race(t *testing.T) {
theirControl.Start()
t.Log("Trigger a handshake to start on both me and them")
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
theirControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them"))
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
theirControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them")))
t.Log("Get both stage 1 handshake packets")
myHsForThem := myControl.GetFromUDP(true)
@@ -407,6 +428,7 @@ func TestStage1Race(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestUncleanShutdownRaceLoser(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me ", "10.128.0.1/24", nil)
theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "them", "10.128.0.2/24", nil)
@@ -424,7 +446,7 @@ func TestUncleanShutdownRaceLoser(t *testing.T) {
theirControl.Start()
r.Log("Trigger a handshake from me to them")
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
p := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me"), p, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
@@ -435,7 +457,7 @@ func TestUncleanShutdownRaceLoser(t *testing.T) {
myHostmap.Indexes = map[uint32]*nebula.HostInfo{}
myHostmap.RemoteIndexes = map[uint32]*nebula.HostInfo{}
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me again"))
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me again")))
p = r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me again"), p, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
@@ -456,6 +478,7 @@ func TestUncleanShutdownRaceLoser(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestUncleanShutdownRaceWinner(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me ", "10.128.0.1/24", nil)
theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "them", "10.128.0.2/24", nil)
@@ -473,7 +496,7 @@ func TestUncleanShutdownRaceWinner(t *testing.T) {
theirControl.Start()
r.Log("Trigger a handshake from me to them")
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
p := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me"), p, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
@@ -485,7 +508,7 @@ func TestUncleanShutdownRaceWinner(t *testing.T) {
theirHostmap.Indexes = map[uint32]*nebula.HostInfo{}
theirHostmap.RemoteIndexes = map[uint32]*nebula.HostInfo{}
theirControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them again"))
theirControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them again")))
p = r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(myControl)
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from them again"), p, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
r.RenderHostmaps("Derp hostmaps", myControl, theirControl)
@@ -507,6 +530,7 @@ func TestUncleanShutdownRaceWinner(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRelays(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, _, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me ", "10.128.0.1/24", m{"relay": m{"use_relays": true}})
relayControl, relayVpnIpNet, relayUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "relay ", "10.128.0.128/24", m{"relay": m{"am_relay": true}})
@@ -527,7 +551,7 @@ func TestRelays(t *testing.T) {
theirControl.Start()
t.Log("Trigger a handshake from me to them via the relay")
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
p := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
r.Log("Assert the tunnel works")
@@ -536,6 +560,7 @@ func TestRelays(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRelaysDontCareAboutIps(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, _, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "me ", "10.128.0.1/24", m{"relay": m{"use_relays": true}})
relayControl, relayVpnIpNet, relayUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "relay ", "2001::9999/24", m{"relay": m{"am_relay": true}})
@@ -556,7 +581,7 @@ func TestRelaysDontCareAboutIps(t *testing.T) {
theirControl.Start()
t.Log("Trigger a handshake from me to them via the relay")
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
p := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
r.Log("Assert the tunnel works")
@@ -565,6 +590,7 @@ func TestRelaysDontCareAboutIps(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestReestablishRelays(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, _, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me ", "10.128.0.1/24", m{"relay": m{"use_relays": true}})
relayControl, relayVpnIpNet, relayUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "relay ", "10.128.0.128/24", m{"relay": m{"am_relay": true}})
@@ -585,14 +611,14 @@ func TestReestablishRelays(t *testing.T) {
theirControl.Start()
t.Log("Trigger a handshake from me to them via the relay")
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
p := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
r.Log("Assert the tunnel works")
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me"), p, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
t.Log("Ensure packet traversal from them to me via the relay")
theirControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them"))
theirControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them")))
p = r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(myControl)
r.Log("Assert the tunnel works")
@@ -607,7 +633,7 @@ func TestReestablishRelays(t *testing.T) {
for curIndexes >= start {
curIndexes = len(myControl.GetHostmap().Indexes)
r.Logf("Wait for the dead index to go away:start=%v indexes, current=%v indexes", start, curIndexes)
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me should fail"))
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me should fail")))
r.RouteForAllExitFunc(func(p *udp.Packet, c *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
return router.RouteAndExit
@@ -624,7 +650,7 @@ func TestReestablishRelays(t *testing.T) {
myControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(relayVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), relayUdpAddr)
myControl.InjectRelays(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), []netip.Addr{relayVpnIpNet[0].Addr()})
relayControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirUdpAddr)
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
p = r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
r.Log("Assert the tunnel works")
@@ -659,7 +685,7 @@ func TestReestablishRelays(t *testing.T) {
t.Log("Assert the tunnel works the other way, too")
for {
t.Log("RouteForAllUntilTxTun")
theirControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them"))
theirControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them")))
p = r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(myControl)
r.Log("Assert the tunnel works")
@@ -696,6 +722,7 @@ func TestReestablishRelays(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestStage1RaceRelays(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
//NOTE: this is a race between me and relay resulting in a full tunnel from me to them via relay
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me ", "10.128.0.1/24", m{"relay": m{"use_relays": true}})
@@ -728,8 +755,8 @@ func TestStage1RaceRelays(t *testing.T) {
assertTunnel(t, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), relayVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirControl, relayControl, r)
r.Log("Trigger a handshake from both them and me via relay to them and me")
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
theirControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them"))
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
theirControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them")))
r.Log("Wait for a packet from them to me")
p := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(myControl)
@@ -743,6 +770,7 @@ func TestStage1RaceRelays(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestStage1RaceRelays2(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
//NOTE: this is a race between me and relay resulting in a full tunnel from me to them via relay
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me ", "10.128.0.1/24", m{"relay": m{"use_relays": true}})
@@ -775,8 +803,8 @@ func TestStage1RaceRelays2(t *testing.T) {
assertTunnel(t, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), relayVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirControl, relayControl, r)
r.Log("Trigger a handshake from both them and me via relay to them and me")
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
theirControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them"))
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
theirControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them")))
//r.RouteUntilAfterMsgType(myControl, header.Control, header.MessageNone)
//r.RouteUntilAfterMsgType(theirControl, header.Control, header.MessageNone)
@@ -819,6 +847,7 @@ func TestStage1RaceRelays2(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRehandshakingRelays(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, _, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me ", "10.128.0.1/24", m{"relay": m{"use_relays": true}})
relayControl, relayVpnIpNet, relayUdpAddr, relayConfig := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "relay ", "10.128.0.128/24", m{"relay": m{"am_relay": true}})
@@ -839,7 +868,7 @@ func TestRehandshakingRelays(t *testing.T) {
theirControl.Start()
t.Log("Trigger a handshake from me to them via the relay")
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
p := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
r.Log("Assert the tunnel works")
@@ -922,6 +951,7 @@ func TestRehandshakingRelays(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRehandshakingRelaysPrimary(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// This test is the same as TestRehandshakingRelays but one of the terminal types is a primary swap winner
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, _, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me ", "10.128.0.128/24", m{"relay": m{"use_relays": true}})
@@ -943,7 +973,7 @@ func TestRehandshakingRelaysPrimary(t *testing.T) {
theirControl.Start()
t.Log("Trigger a handshake from me to them via the relay")
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
p := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
r.Log("Assert the tunnel works")
@@ -1026,6 +1056,7 @@ func TestRehandshakingRelaysPrimary(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRehandshaking(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, myConfig := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me ", "10.128.0.2/24", nil)
theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, theirConfig := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "them", "10.128.0.1/24", nil)
@@ -1121,6 +1152,7 @@ func TestRehandshaking(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRehandshakingLoser(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// The purpose of this test is that the race loser renews their certificate and rehandshakes. The final tunnel
// Should be the one with the new certificate
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
@@ -1219,6 +1251,7 @@ func TestRehandshakingLoser(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRaceRegression(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// This test forces stage 1, stage 2, stage 1 to be received by me from them
// We had a bug where we were not finding the duplicate handshake and responding to the final stage 1 which
// caused a cross-linked hostinfo
@@ -1242,8 +1275,8 @@ func TestRaceRegression(t *testing.T) {
//them rx stage:2 initiatorIndex=120607833 responderIndex=4209862089
t.Log("Start both handshakes")
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
theirControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them"))
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
theirControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them")))
t.Log("Get both stage 1")
myStage1ForThem := myControl.GetFromUDP(true)
@@ -1279,6 +1312,7 @@ func TestRaceRegression(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestV2NonPrimaryWithLighthouse(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
lhControl, lhVpnIpNet, lhUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "lh ", "10.128.0.1/24, ff::1/64", m{"lighthouse": m{"am_lighthouse": true}})
@@ -1319,6 +1353,7 @@ func TestV2NonPrimaryWithLighthouse(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestV2NonPrimaryWithOffNetLighthouse(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
lhControl, lhVpnIpNet, lhUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "lh ", "2001::1/64", m{"lighthouse": m{"am_lighthouse": true}})
@@ -1359,6 +1394,7 @@ func TestV2NonPrimaryWithOffNetLighthouse(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestLighthouseUpdateOnReload(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
// Create the lighthouse
@@ -1434,6 +1470,7 @@ func TestLighthouseUpdateOnReload(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestGoodHandshakeUnsafeDest(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
unsafePrefix := "192.168.6.0/24"
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServerWithUdpAndUnsafeNetworks(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "spooky", "10.128.0.2/24", netip.MustParseAddrPort("10.64.0.2:4242"), unsafePrefix, nil)
@@ -1455,7 +1492,7 @@ func TestGoodHandshakeUnsafeDest(t *testing.T) {
theirControl.Start()
t.Log("Send a udp packet through to begin standing up the tunnel, this should come out the other side")
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(spookyDest, 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(spookyDest, 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
t.Log("Have them consume my stage 0 packet. They have a tunnel now")
theirControl.InjectUDPPacket(myControl.GetFromUDP(true))
@@ -1483,7 +1520,7 @@ func TestGoodHandshakeUnsafeDest(t *testing.T) {
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me"), myCachedPacket, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), spookyDest, 80, 80)
//reply
theirControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, spookyDest, 80, []byte("Hi from the spookyman"))
theirControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, spookyDest, 80, []byte("Hi from the spookyman")))
//wait for reply
theirControl.WaitForType(1, 0, myControl)
theirCachedPacket := myControl.GetFromTun(true)
+57 -2
View File
@@ -294,12 +294,12 @@ func deadline(t *testing.T, seconds time.Duration) doneCb {
func assertTunnel(t testing.TB, vpnIpA, vpnIpB netip.Addr, controlA, controlB *nebula.Control, r *router.R) {
// Send a packet from them to me
controlB.InjectTunUDPPacket(vpnIpA, 80, vpnIpB, 90, []byte("Hi from B"))
controlB.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(vpnIpA, 80, vpnIpB, 90, []byte("Hi from B")))
bPacket := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(controlA)
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from B"), bPacket, vpnIpB, vpnIpA, 90, 80)
// And once more from me to them
controlA.InjectTunUDPPacket(vpnIpB, 80, vpnIpA, 90, []byte("Hello from A"))
controlA.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(vpnIpB, 80, vpnIpA, 90, []byte("Hello from A")))
aPacket := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(controlB)
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hello from A"), aPacket, vpnIpA, vpnIpB, 90, 80)
}
@@ -408,3 +408,58 @@ func testLogLevelName() string {
}
return "info"
}
// BuildTunUDPPacket assembles an IP+UDP packet suitable for Control.InjectTunPacket.
// Using UDP here because it's a simpler protocol.
func BuildTunUDPPacket(toAddr netip.Addr, toPort uint16, fromAddr netip.Addr, fromPort uint16, data []byte) []byte {
serialize := make([]gopacket.SerializableLayer, 0)
var netLayer gopacket.NetworkLayer
if toAddr.Is6() {
if !fromAddr.Is6() {
panic("Cant send ipv6 to ipv4")
}
ip := &layers.IPv6{
Version: 6,
NextHeader: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
SrcIP: fromAddr.Unmap().AsSlice(),
DstIP: toAddr.Unmap().AsSlice(),
}
serialize = append(serialize, ip)
netLayer = ip
} else {
if !fromAddr.Is4() {
panic("Cant send ipv4 to ipv6")
}
ip := &layers.IPv4{
Version: 4,
TTL: 64,
Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
SrcIP: fromAddr.Unmap().AsSlice(),
DstIP: toAddr.Unmap().AsSlice(),
}
serialize = append(serialize, ip)
netLayer = ip
}
udp := layers.UDP{
SrcPort: layers.UDPPort(fromPort),
DstPort: layers.UDPPort(toPort),
}
if err := udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(netLayer); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
buffer := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
opt := gopacket.SerializeOptions{
ComputeChecksums: true,
FixLengths: true,
}
serialize = append(serialize, &udp, gopacket.Payload(data))
if err := gopacket.SerializeLayers(buffer, opt, serialize...); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
return buffer.Bytes()
}
+51
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
//go:build e2e_testing
// +build e2e_testing
package e2e
import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/e2e/router"
"go.uber.org/goleak"
)
// TestNoGoroutineLeaks brings up two nebula instances, completes a tunnel,
// stops both, and asserts no goroutines leak past the shutdown. goleak's
// retry mechanism gives the wg.Wait()-driven goroutines a moment to drain
// before failing the assertion.
//
// IgnoreCurrent is necessary in the parallelized suite: other tests can
// leave goroutines mid-shutdown when this one runs (Stop is async, the
// wg.Wait() drain is not blocking on test return). We're checking that
// *this* test's setup tears down cleanly, not that the whole suite is
// idle at this moment. Intentionally NOT t.Parallel()'d for the same
// reason — concurrent test goroutines would always show up.
func TestNoGoroutineLeaks(t *testing.T) {
defer goleak.VerifyNone(t, goleak.IgnoreCurrent())
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me", "10.128.0.1/24", nil)
theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "them", "10.128.0.2/24", nil)
myControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirUdpAddr)
theirControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myUdpAddr)
myControl.Start()
theirControl.Start()
r := router.NewR(t, myControl, theirControl)
assertTunnel(t, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
myControl.Stop()
theirControl.Stop()
r.RenderFlow()
// Settle period: Stop() is non-blocking; the wg-driven goroutines need
// a moment to drain. goleak retries internally too, but a short explicit
// settle reduces flakes when the suite is busy.
time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
}
+188 -54
View File
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import (
"regexp"
"sort"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -24,6 +25,19 @@ import (
"golang.org/x/exp/maps"
)
// outNatKey is the (from, to) pair used by outNat. Comparable struct, so it works as a map key without the
// allocation cost of a string-concat key.
type outNatKey struct {
from, to netip.AddrPort
}
// fannedPacket pairs a UDP TX packet with its source control so the router can route it after popping from
// the fan-in channel.
type fannedPacket struct {
from *nebula.Control
pkt *udp.Packet
}
type R struct {
// Simple map of the ip:port registered on a control to the control
// Basically a router, right?
@@ -34,12 +48,28 @@ type R struct {
// A last used map, if an inbound packet hit the inNat map then
// all return packets should use the same last used inbound address for the outbound sender
// map[from address + ":" + to address] => ip:port to rewrite in the udp packet to receiver
outNat map[string]netip.AddrPort
outNat map[outNatKey]netip.AddrPort
// A map of vpn ip to the nebula control it belongs to
vpnControls map[netip.Addr]*nebula.Control
// Cached select infrastructure for RouteForAllUntilTxTun.
// The controls map is immutable after NewR so the cases are good for the test lifetime.
// We only rebuild if a different receiver is asked.
selRecvCtl *nebula.Control
selCases []reflect.SelectCase
selCtls []*nebula.Control
// Optional fan-in mode for hot-path benchmarks: one forwarder goroutine per control drains UDP TX into udpFanIn,
// so RouteForAllUntilTxTun can do a fixed 2-way native select instead of paying reflect.Select per call.
// Off by default (would otherwise interleave with tests that use GetFromUDP directly on the same control).
// Enabled by EnableFanIn.
udpFanIn chan fannedPacket
stopFanIn chan struct{}
fanInWG sync.WaitGroup
fanInMu sync.Mutex
fanInOn atomic.Bool
ignoreFlows []ignoreFlow
flow []flowEntry
@@ -119,7 +149,7 @@ func NewR(t testing.TB, controls ...*nebula.Control) *R {
controls: make(map[netip.AddrPort]*nebula.Control),
vpnControls: make(map[netip.Addr]*nebula.Control),
inNat: make(map[netip.AddrPort]*nebula.Control),
outNat: make(map[string]netip.AddrPort),
outNat: make(map[outNatKey]netip.AddrPort),
flow: []flowEntry{},
ignoreFlows: []ignoreFlow{},
fn: filepath.Join("mermaid", fmt.Sprintf("%s.md", t.Name())),
@@ -153,8 +183,10 @@ func NewR(t testing.TB, controls ...*nebula.Control) *R {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case <-clockSource.C:
r.Lock()
r.renderHostmaps("clock tick")
r.renderFlow()
r.Unlock()
}
}
}()
@@ -180,15 +212,21 @@ func (r *R) AddRoute(ip netip.Addr, port uint16, c *nebula.Control) {
// RenderFlow renders the packet flow seen up until now and stops further automatic renders from happening.
func (r *R) RenderFlow() {
r.cancelRender()
r.Lock()
defer r.Unlock()
r.renderFlow()
}
// CancelFlowLogs stops flow logs from being tracked and destroys any logs already collected
func (r *R) CancelFlowLogs() {
r.cancelRender()
r.Lock()
r.flow = nil
r.Unlock()
}
// renderFlow writes the flow log to disk. Caller must hold r.Lock. renderFlow reads r.flow / r.additionalGraphs and
// the *packet pointers stashed inside, all of which are mutated under the same lock by routing paths.
func (r *R) renderFlow() {
if r.flow == nil {
return
@@ -434,68 +472,157 @@ func (r *R) RouteUntilTxTun(sender *nebula.Control, receiver *nebula.Control) []
panic("No control for udp tx " + a.String())
}
fp := r.unlockedInjectFlow(sender, c, p, false)
c.InjectUDPPacket(p)
c.InjectUDPPacket(p) // copies internally; original is ours to release
fp.WasReceived()
r.Unlock()
p.Release()
}
}
}
// RouteForAllUntilTxTun will route for everyone and return when a packet is seen on receivers tun
// If the router doesn't have the nebula controller for that address, we panic
// RouteForAllUntilTxTun will route for everyone and return when a packet is seen on the receiver's tun.
// If a control's UDP TX address can't be matched to a registered control, we panic.
//
// For allocation-sensitive callers (hot-path benchmarks, in particular relay
// benches with 3+ controls), call EnableFanIn() first.
func (r *R) RouteForAllUntilTxTun(receiver *nebula.Control) []byte {
if r.fanInOn.Load() {
return r.routeFanIn(receiver)
}
return r.routeReflect(receiver)
}
// routeFanIn is the alloc-free path used when EnableFanIn is in effect.
func (r *R) routeFanIn(receiver *nebula.Control) []byte {
tunTx := receiver.GetTunTxChan()
for {
select {
case p := <-tunTx:
r.Lock()
if r.flow != nil {
np := udp.Packet{Data: make([]byte, len(p))}
copy(np.Data, p)
r.unlockedInjectFlow(receiver, receiver, &np, true)
}
r.Unlock()
return p
case fp := <-r.udpFanIn:
r.routeUDP(fp.from, fp.pkt)
}
}
}
// routeReflect is the default reflect.Select-based path. Pays the boxing allocation per call but doesn't interfere
// with tests that pull packets directly from controls' UDP TX channels via GetFromUDP.
func (r *R) routeReflect(receiver *nebula.Control) []byte {
sc, cm := r.selectCasesFor(receiver)
for {
x, rx, _ := reflect.Select(sc)
if x == 0 {
p := rx.Interface().([]byte)
r.Lock()
if r.flow != nil {
np := udp.Packet{Data: make([]byte, len(p))}
copy(np.Data, p)
r.unlockedInjectFlow(cm[x], cm[x], &np, true)
}
r.Unlock()
return p
}
r.routeUDP(cm[x], rx.Interface().(*udp.Packet))
}
}
// EnableFanIn switches RouteForAllUntilTxTun to the alloc-free fan-in path.
// One forwarder goroutine per registered control drains UDP TX into a shared channel that RouteForAllUntilTxTun selects
// on alongside the receiver's TUN TX channel.
func (r *R) EnableFanIn() {
r.fanInMu.Lock()
defer r.fanInMu.Unlock()
if r.fanInOn.Load() {
return
}
r.udpFanIn = make(chan fannedPacket, 32)
r.stopFanIn = make(chan struct{})
for _, c := range r.controls {
r.startFanInWorker(c)
}
r.fanInOn.Store(true)
r.t.Cleanup(r.stopFanInWorkers)
}
// startFanInWorker spawns a goroutine that drains c's UDP TX into r.udpFanIn.
func (r *R) startFanInWorker(c *nebula.Control) {
r.fanInWG.Add(1)
udpTx := c.GetUDPTxChan()
go func() {
defer r.fanInWG.Done()
for {
select {
case <-r.stopFanIn:
return
case p := <-udpTx:
select {
case <-r.stopFanIn:
p.Release()
return
case r.udpFanIn <- fannedPacket{from: c, pkt: p}:
}
}
}
}()
}
// stopFanInWorkers signals the fan-in goroutines to exit and waits for them.
func (r *R) stopFanInWorkers() {
r.fanInMu.Lock()
wasOn := r.fanInOn.Swap(false)
r.fanInMu.Unlock()
if !wasOn {
return
}
close(r.stopFanIn)
r.fanInWG.Wait()
}
// routeUDP forwards a UDP TX packet from the named source control to the destination control derived from p.To,
// releasing the source packet after InjectUDPPacket has copied its bytes into a fresh pool slot.
func (r *R) routeUDP(from *nebula.Control, p *udp.Packet) {
r.Lock()
defer r.Unlock()
a := from.GetUDPAddr()
c := r.getControl(a, p.To, p)
if c == nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("No control for udp tx %s", p.To))
}
fp := r.unlockedInjectFlow(from, c, p, false)
c.InjectUDPPacket(p) // copies internally; original is ours to release
fp.WasReceived()
p.Release()
}
// selectCasesFor returns the SelectCase array used by routeReflect: one slot for the receiver's TUN TX channel followed
// by one per control's UDP TX channel. Cached for the test lifetime, only rebuilt if the receiver changes.
func (r *R) selectCasesFor(receiver *nebula.Control) ([]reflect.SelectCase, []*nebula.Control) {
r.Lock()
defer r.Unlock()
if r.selRecvCtl == receiver && r.selCases != nil {
return r.selCases, r.selCtls
}
sc := make([]reflect.SelectCase, len(r.controls)+1)
cm := make([]*nebula.Control, len(r.controls)+1)
i := 0
sc[i] = reflect.SelectCase{
Dir: reflect.SelectRecv,
Chan: reflect.ValueOf(receiver.GetTunTxChan()),
Send: reflect.Value{},
}
cm[i] = receiver
i++
sc[0] = reflect.SelectCase{Dir: reflect.SelectRecv, Chan: reflect.ValueOf(receiver.GetTunTxChan())}
cm[0] = receiver
i := 1
for _, c := range r.controls {
sc[i] = reflect.SelectCase{
Dir: reflect.SelectRecv,
Chan: reflect.ValueOf(c.GetUDPTxChan()),
Send: reflect.Value{},
}
sc[i] = reflect.SelectCase{Dir: reflect.SelectRecv, Chan: reflect.ValueOf(c.GetUDPTxChan())}
cm[i] = c
i++
}
for {
x, rx, _ := reflect.Select(sc)
r.Lock()
if x == 0 {
// we are the tun tx, we can exit
p := rx.Interface().([]byte)
np := udp.Packet{Data: make([]byte, len(p))}
copy(np.Data, p)
r.unlockedInjectFlow(cm[x], cm[x], &np, true)
r.Unlock()
return p
} else {
// we are a udp tx, route and continue
p := rx.Interface().(*udp.Packet)
a := cm[x].GetUDPAddr()
c := r.getControl(a, p.To, p)
if c == nil {
r.Unlock()
panic(fmt.Sprintf("No control for udp tx %s", p.To))
}
fp := r.unlockedInjectFlow(cm[x], c, p, false)
c.InjectUDPPacket(p)
fp.WasReceived()
}
r.Unlock()
}
r.selRecvCtl = receiver
r.selCases = sc
r.selCtls = cm
return sc, cm
}
// RouteExitFunc will call the whatDo func with each udp packet from sender.
@@ -522,6 +649,7 @@ func (r *R) RouteExitFunc(sender *nebula.Control, whatDo ExitFunc) {
switch e {
case ExitNow:
r.Unlock()
p.Release()
return
case RouteAndExit:
@@ -529,6 +657,7 @@ func (r *R) RouteExitFunc(sender *nebula.Control, whatDo ExitFunc) {
receiver.InjectUDPPacket(p)
fp.WasReceived()
r.Unlock()
p.Release()
return
case KeepRouting:
@@ -541,6 +670,7 @@ func (r *R) RouteExitFunc(sender *nebula.Control, whatDo ExitFunc) {
}
r.Unlock()
p.Release()
}
}
@@ -641,6 +771,7 @@ func (r *R) RouteForAllExitFunc(whatDo ExitFunc) {
switch e {
case ExitNow:
r.Unlock()
p.Release()
return
case RouteAndExit:
@@ -648,6 +779,7 @@ func (r *R) RouteForAllExitFunc(whatDo ExitFunc) {
receiver.InjectUDPPacket(p)
fp.WasReceived()
r.Unlock()
p.Release()
return
case KeepRouting:
@@ -659,6 +791,7 @@ func (r *R) RouteForAllExitFunc(whatDo ExitFunc) {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("Unknown exitFunc return: %v", e))
}
r.Unlock()
p.Release()
}
}
@@ -702,19 +835,20 @@ func (r *R) FlushAll() {
}
receiver.InjectUDPPacket(p)
r.Unlock()
p.Release()
}
}
// getControl performs or seeds NAT translation and returns the control for toAddr, p from fields may change
// This is an internal router function, the caller must hold the lock
func (r *R) getControl(fromAddr, toAddr netip.AddrPort, p *udp.Packet) *nebula.Control {
if newAddr, ok := r.outNat[fromAddr.String()+":"+toAddr.String()]; ok {
if newAddr, ok := r.outNat[outNatKey{from: fromAddr, to: toAddr}]; ok {
p.From = newAddr
}
c, ok := r.inNat[toAddr]
if ok {
r.outNat[c.GetUDPAddr().String()+":"+fromAddr.String()] = toAddr
r.outNat[outNatKey{from: c.GetUDPAddr(), to: fromAddr}] = toAddr
return c
}
+8 -2
View File
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import (
)
func TestDropInactiveTunnels(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// The goal of this test is to ensure the shortest inactivity timeout will close the tunnel on both sides
// under ideal conditions
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
@@ -63,6 +64,7 @@ func TestDropInactiveTunnels(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestCertUpgrade(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// The goal of this test is to ensure the shortest inactivity timeout will close the tunnel on both sides
// under ideal conditions
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
@@ -157,6 +159,7 @@ func TestCertUpgrade(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestCertDowngrade(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// The goal of this test is to ensure the shortest inactivity timeout will close the tunnel on both sides
// under ideal conditions
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
@@ -255,6 +258,7 @@ func TestCertDowngrade(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestCertMismatchCorrection(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// The goal of this test is to ensure the shortest inactivity timeout will close the tunnel on both sides
// under ideal conditions
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
@@ -322,6 +326,7 @@ func TestCertMismatchCorrection(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestCrossStackRelaysWork(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, _, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "me ", "10.128.0.1/24,fc00::1/64", m{"relay": m{"use_relays": true}})
relayControl, relayVpnIpNet, relayUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "relay ", "10.128.0.128/24,fc00::128/64", m{"relay": m{"am_relay": true}})
@@ -350,14 +355,14 @@ func TestCrossStackRelaysWork(t *testing.T) {
theirControl.Start()
t.Log("Trigger a handshake from me to them via the relay")
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnV6.Addr(), 80, myVpnV6.Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnV6.Addr(), 80, myVpnV6.Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
p := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
r.Log("Assert the tunnel works")
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me"), p, myVpnV6.Addr(), theirVpnV6.Addr(), 80, 80)
t.Log("reply?")
theirControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(myVpnV6.Addr(), 80, theirVpnV6.Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them"))
theirControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(myVpnV6.Addr(), 80, theirVpnV6.Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them")))
p = r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(myControl)
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from them"), p, theirVpnV6.Addr(), myVpnV6.Addr(), 80, 80)
@@ -369,6 +374,7 @@ func TestCrossStackRelaysWork(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestCloseTunnelAuthenticated(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me", "10.128.0.1/24", m{"tunnels": m{"drop_inactive": true, "inactivity_timeout": "5s"}})
theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "them", "10.128.0.2/24", m{"tunnels": m{"drop_inactive": true, "inactivity_timeout": "10m"}})
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1033,7 +1033,7 @@ func TestNewFirewallFromConfig(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
// Test a bad rule definition
c := &dummyCert{}
cs, err := newCertState(cert.Version2, nil, c, false, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, nil)
cs, err := newCertState(cert.Version2, nil, c, false, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, nil, "aes")
require.NoError(t, err)
conf := config.NewC(test.NewLogger())
+1
View File
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ require (
github.com/stefanberger/go-pkcs11uri v0.0.0-20230803200340-78284954bff6
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1
github.com/vishvananda/netlink v1.3.1
go.uber.org/goleak v1.3.0
go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.4
golang.org/x/crypto v0.50.0
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20230725093048-515e97ebf090
+57
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
package handshake
import (
"crypto/rand"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
)
// Credential holds everything needed to participate in a handshake
// at a given cert version. Version and Curve are read from Cert; the public
// half of the static keypair likewise comes from Cert.PublicKey().
type Credential struct {
Cert cert.Certificate // the certificate
Bytes []byte // pre-marshaled certificate bytes
privateKey []byte // static private key (public half lives in Cert)
cipherSuite noise.CipherSuite // pre-built cipher suite (DH + cipher + hash)
}
// NewCredential creates a Credential with all material needed for handshake
// participation. The cipherSuite should be pre-built by the caller with the
// appropriate DH function, cipher, and hash.
func NewCredential(
c cert.Certificate,
hsBytes []byte,
privateKey []byte,
cipherSuite noise.CipherSuite,
) *Credential {
return &Credential{
Cert: c,
Bytes: hsBytes,
privateKey: privateKey,
cipherSuite: cipherSuite,
}
}
// buildHandshakeState creates a noise.HandshakeState from this credential.
func (hc *Credential) buildHandshakeState(initiator bool, pattern noise.HandshakePattern) (*noise.HandshakeState, error) {
return noise.NewHandshakeState(noise.Config{
CipherSuite: hc.cipherSuite,
Random: rand.Reader,
Pattern: pattern,
Initiator: initiator,
StaticKeypair: noise.DHKey{Private: hc.privateKey, Public: hc.Cert.PublicKey()},
PresharedKey: []byte{},
PresharedKeyPlacement: 0,
})
}
// GetCredentialFunc returns the handshake credential for the given version,
// or nil if that version is not available.
//
// Implementations must return credentials drawn from a snapshot stable for
// the lifetime of any single Machine. The Machine may call this multiple
// times during a handshake (e.g. when negotiating to the peer's version)
// and assumes the underlying static keypair is consistent across calls.
type GetCredentialFunc func(v cert.Version) *Credential
+21
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
package handshake
import "errors"
var (
ErrInitiateOnResponder = errors.New("initiate called on responder")
ErrInitiateAlreadyCalled = errors.New("initiate already called")
ErrInitiateNotCalled = errors.New("initiate must be called before ProcessPacket for initiators")
ErrPacketTooShort = errors.New("packet too short")
ErrPublicKeyMismatch = errors.New("public key mismatch between certificate and handshake")
ErrIncompleteHandshake = errors.New("handshake completed without receiving required content")
ErrMachineFailed = errors.New("handshake machine has failed")
ErrUnknownSubtype = errors.New("unknown handshake subtype")
ErrMissingContent = errors.New("expected handshake content but message was empty")
ErrUnexpectedContent = errors.New("received unexpected handshake content")
ErrIndexAllocation = errors.New("failed to allocate local index")
ErrNoCredential = errors.New("no handshake credential available for cert version")
ErrAsymmetricCipherKeys = errors.New("noise produced only one cipher key")
ErrMultiMessageUnsupported = errors.New("multi-message handshake patterns are not yet supported by the manager")
ErrSubtypeMismatch = errors.New("packet subtype does not match handshake machine subtype")
)
+29
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
// This file documents the wire format the nebula handshake speaks. It is
// not run through protoc; the encoder/decoder in payload.go is hand-written
// against this shape directly to keep the parser narrow and panic-free.
//
// Any change to the wire format must be reflected here, and adding a new
// field requires updating MarshalPayload / unmarshalPayloadDetails together
// with the field-uniqueness and wire-type checks in those functions.
syntax = "proto3";
package nebula.handshake;
message NebulaHandshake {
NebulaHandshakeDetails Details = 1;
bytes Hmac = 2;
}
message NebulaHandshakeDetails {
bytes Cert = 1;
uint32 InitiatorIndex = 2;
uint32 ResponderIndex = 3;
// Cookie was reserved for an anti-DoS mechanism that was never
// implemented. No released version of nebula has ever populated it; the
// hand-written parser silently skips it on read.
uint64 Cookie = 4 [deprecated = true];
uint64 Time = 5;
uint32 CertVersion = 8;
// reserved for WIP multiport
reserved 6, 7;
}
+116
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
package handshake
import (
"net/netip"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
ct "github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// testCertState holds cert material for a test peer.
type testCertState struct {
version cert.Version
creds map[cert.Version]*Credential
}
func (s *testCertState) getCredential(v cert.Version) *Credential {
return s.creds[v]
}
func newTestCertState(
t *testing.T, ca cert.Certificate, caKey []byte, name string, networks []netip.Prefix,
) *testCertState {
return newTestCertStateWithCipher(t, ca, caKey, name, networks, noise.CipherChaChaPoly)
}
func newTestCertStateWithCipher(
t *testing.T, ca cert.Certificate, caKey []byte, name string, networks []netip.Prefix,
cipher noise.CipherFunc,
) *testCertState {
t.Helper()
c, _, rawPrivKey, _ := ct.NewTestCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, ca, caKey,
name, ca.NotBefore(), ca.NotAfter(), networks, nil, nil,
)
priv, _, _, err := cert.UnmarshalPrivateKeyFromPEM(rawPrivKey)
require.NoError(t, err)
hsBytes, err := c.MarshalForHandshakes()
require.NoError(t, err)
ncs := noise.NewCipherSuite(noise.DH25519, cipher, noise.HashSHA256)
return &testCertState{
version: cert.Version2,
creds: map[cert.Version]*Credential{
cert.Version2: NewCredential(c, hsBytes, priv, ncs),
},
}
}
func testVerifier(pool *cert.CAPool) CertVerifier {
return func(c cert.Certificate) (*cert.CachedCertificate, error) {
return pool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), c)
}
}
func newTestMachine(
t *testing.T,
cs *testCertState,
verifier CertVerifier,
initiator bool,
localIndex uint32,
) *Machine {
t.Helper()
m, err := NewMachine(
cs.version, cs.getCredential,
verifier, func() (uint32, error) { return localIndex, nil },
initiator, header.HandshakeIXPSK0,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
return m
}
func initiateHandshake(
t *testing.T,
initCS *testCertState, initVerifier CertVerifier,
respCS *testCertState, respVerifier CertVerifier,
) (initM, respM *Machine, respResult *Result, resp []byte, err error) {
t.Helper()
initM = newTestMachine(t, initCS, initVerifier, true, 100)
msg1, merr := initM.Initiate(nil)
require.NoError(t, merr)
respM = newTestMachine(t, respCS, respVerifier, false, 200)
resp, respResult, err = respM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg1)
return
}
func doFullHandshake(
t *testing.T, initCS, respCS *testCertState, caPool *cert.CAPool,
) (initResult, respResult *Result) {
t.Helper()
v := testVerifier(caPool)
initM := newTestMachine(t, initCS, v, true, 1000)
respM := newTestMachine(t, respCS, v, false, 2000)
msg1, err := initM.Initiate(nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
resp, respResult, err := respM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg1)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, respResult)
require.NotEmpty(t, resp)
_, initResult, err = initM.ProcessPacket(nil, resp)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, initResult)
return initResult, respResult
}
+444
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,444 @@
package handshake
import (
"bytes"
"fmt"
"slices"
"time"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
)
// IndexAllocator is called by the Machine to allocate a local index for the
// handshake. It is called at most once, when the first outgoing message that
// carries a payload is built.
//
// Implementations MUST NOT return 0. Zero is reserved as a sentinel meaning
// "no index assigned" on the wire and in the payload-presence checks. If an
// allocator ever returned 0, a legitimate handshake's payload could be
// indistinguishable from an empty one and would be rejected.
type IndexAllocator func() (uint32, error)
// CertVerifier is called by the Machine after reconstructing the peer's
// certificate from the handshake. The verifier performs all validation
// (CA trust, expiry, policy checks, allow lists).
type CertVerifier func(cert.Certificate) (*cert.CachedCertificate, error)
// Result contains the results of a successful handshake.
// Returned by ProcessPacket when the handshake is complete.
type Result struct {
EKey *noise.CipherState
DKey *noise.CipherState
MyCert cert.Certificate
RemoteCert *cert.CachedCertificate
RemoteIndex uint32
LocalIndex uint32
HandshakeTime uint64
MessageIndex uint64 // number of messages exchanged during the handshake
Initiator bool
}
// Machine drives a Noise handshake through N messages. It handles Noise
// protocol operations, certificate reconstruction, and payload encoding.
// Certificate validation is delegated to the caller via CertVerifier.
//
// A Machine is not safe for concurrent use. The caller must ensure that
// Initiate and ProcessPacket are not called concurrently.
//
// Error contract: when ProcessPacket or Initiate returns an error, callers
// must check Failed() to decide what to do next. If Failed() is false the
// underlying noise state was not advanced (the packet was rejected before
// ReadMessage took effect, or the rejection is non-fatal like a stale
// retransmit) and the Machine can accept another packet. If Failed() is
// true the Machine is unrecoverable and the caller must abandon it.
type Machine struct {
hs *noise.HandshakeState
getCred GetCredentialFunc
allocIndex IndexAllocator
verifier CertVerifier
result *Result
msgs []msgFlags
myVersion cert.Version
subtype header.MessageSubType
indexAllocated bool
remoteCertSet bool
payloadSet bool
failed bool
}
// NewMachine creates a handshake state machine. The subtype determines both
// the noise pattern and the per-message content layout. The credential for
// `version` is fetched via getCred and used to seed the noise.HandshakeState.
// IndexAllocator is called lazily when the first outgoing payload is built.
func NewMachine(
version cert.Version,
getCred GetCredentialFunc,
verifier CertVerifier,
allocIndex IndexAllocator,
initiator bool,
subtype header.MessageSubType,
) (*Machine, error) {
info, err := subtypeInfoFor(subtype)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
cred := getCred(version)
if cred == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrNoCredential, version)
}
hs, err := cred.buildHandshakeState(initiator, info.pattern)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("build noise state: %w", err)
}
return &Machine{
hs: hs,
subtype: subtype,
msgs: info.msgs,
getCred: getCred,
allocIndex: allocIndex,
verifier: verifier,
myVersion: version,
result: &Result{
Initiator: initiator,
},
}, nil
}
// Failed returns true if the Machine is in an unrecoverable state.
func (m *Machine) Failed() bool {
return m.failed
}
// Subtype returns the handshake subtype this Machine was built for.
func (m *Machine) Subtype() header.MessageSubType {
return m.subtype
}
// MessageIndex returns the noise handshake message index, which equals the
// wire counter of the most recently sent or received message.
func (m *Machine) MessageIndex() int {
return m.hs.MessageIndex()
}
// requireComplete checks that both a peer cert and payload have been received.
// Marks the machine as failed if not.
func (m *Machine) requireComplete() error {
if !m.payloadSet || !m.remoteCertSet {
m.failed = true
return ErrIncompleteHandshake
}
return nil
}
// myMsgFlags returns the flags for the current outgoing message.
func (m *Machine) myMsgFlags() msgFlags {
idx := m.hs.MessageIndex()
if idx < len(m.msgs) {
return m.msgs[idx]
}
return msgFlags{}
}
// peerMsgFlags returns the flags for the message we just read.
func (m *Machine) peerMsgFlags() msgFlags {
idx := m.hs.MessageIndex() - 1
if idx >= 0 && idx < len(m.msgs) {
return m.msgs[idx]
}
return msgFlags{}
}
// Initiate produces the first handshake message. Only valid for initiators,
// and must be called exactly once before ProcessPacket.
//
// out is a destination buffer the message is appended to and returned. Pass
// nil to allocate fresh, or pass a re-used buffer sliced to length 0 (e.g.
// buf[:0]) with sufficient capacity to avoid allocation.
//
// An error return may not indicate a fatal condition, check Failed() to
// determine if the Machine can still be used.
func (m *Machine) Initiate(out []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if m.failed {
return nil, ErrMachineFailed
}
if !m.result.Initiator {
m.failed = true
return nil, ErrInitiateOnResponder
}
if m.hs.MessageIndex() != 0 {
m.failed = true
return nil, ErrInitiateAlreadyCalled
}
// At MessageIndex=0 with RemoteIndex still zero, buildResponse produces
// header counter 1 and remote index 0, which is what the initial message needs.
out, _, _, err := m.buildResponse(out)
if err != nil {
m.failed = true
return nil, err
}
return out, nil
}
// ProcessPacket handles an incoming handshake message. It advances the Noise
// state, validates the peer certificate via the verifier, and optionally
// produces a response.
//
// out is a destination buffer the response is appended to and returned. Pass
// nil to allocate fresh, or pass a re-used buffer sliced to length 0 (e.g.
// buf[:0]) with sufficient capacity to avoid allocation. The returned slice
// is nil when no outgoing message is produced (handshake complete on this
// side, or final message of a multi-message pattern).
//
// Returns a non-nil Result when the handshake is complete.
// An error return may not indicate a fatal condition, check Failed() to
// determine if the Machine can still be used.
func (m *Machine) ProcessPacket(out, packet []byte) ([]byte, *Result, error) {
if m.failed {
return nil, nil, ErrMachineFailed
}
if len(packet) < header.Len {
return nil, nil, ErrPacketTooShort
}
// Reject packets whose subtype doesn't match the one this Machine was
// built for. A pending handshake that suddenly receives a different
// subtype on its index is either a stray packet that matched by chance
// or a peer protocol violation; drop it without failing the Machine so
// the legitimate retransmit can still complete.
if header.MessageSubType(packet[1]) != m.subtype {
return nil, nil, ErrSubtypeMismatch
}
if m.result.Initiator && m.hs.MessageIndex() == 0 {
m.failed = true
return nil, nil, ErrInitiateNotCalled
}
// The (eKey, dKey) ordering here is correct for IX, where the initiator
// completes the handshake by reading the responder's stage-2 message.
// noise returns (cs1, cs2) where cs1 is the initiator->responder cipher.
// For 3-message patterns where a responder finishes by reading the final
// message, this ordering would be wrong; revisit when XX/pqIX lands.
msg, eKey, dKey, err := m.hs.ReadMessage(nil, packet[header.Len:])
if err != nil {
// Noise ReadMessage failed. The noise library checkpoints and rolls back
// on failure, so the Machine is still alive. The caller can retry with
// a different packet.
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("noise ReadMessage: %w", err)
}
// From here on, noise state has advanced. Any error is fatal.
flags := m.peerMsgFlags()
if err := m.processPayload(msg, flags); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
// If ReadMessage derived keys, the handshake is complete. Noise should
// always produce both keys together; asymmetry is a protocol invariant
// violation.
if eKey != nil || dKey != nil {
if eKey == nil || dKey == nil {
m.failed = true
return nil, nil, ErrAsymmetricCipherKeys
}
if err := m.requireComplete(); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
return nil, m.completed(eKey, dKey), nil
}
// ReadMessage didn't complete, produce the next outgoing message
out, dk, ek, err := m.buildResponse(out)
if err != nil {
m.failed = true
return nil, nil, err
}
if ek != nil || dk != nil {
if ek == nil || dk == nil {
m.failed = true
return nil, nil, ErrAsymmetricCipherKeys
}
if err := m.requireComplete(); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
return out, m.completed(ek, dk), nil
}
return out, nil, nil
}
func (m *Machine) completed(eKey, dKey *noise.CipherState) *Result {
m.result.EKey = eKey
m.result.DKey = dKey
m.result.MessageIndex = uint64(m.hs.MessageIndex())
return m.result
}
func (m *Machine) processPayload(msg []byte, flags msgFlags) error {
if len(msg) == 0 {
if flags.expectsPayload || flags.expectsCert {
m.failed = true
return ErrMissingContent
}
return nil
}
payload, err := UnmarshalPayload(msg)
if err != nil {
m.failed = true
return fmt.Errorf("unmarshal handshake: %w", err)
}
// Assert the payload contains exactly what we expect
hasPayloadData := payload.InitiatorIndex != 0 || payload.ResponderIndex != 0 || payload.Time != 0
if hasPayloadData != flags.expectsPayload {
m.failed = true
return ErrUnexpectedContent
}
hasCertData := len(payload.Cert) > 0
if hasCertData != flags.expectsCert {
m.failed = true
return ErrUnexpectedContent
}
// Process payload
if flags.expectsPayload {
if m.result.Initiator {
m.result.RemoteIndex = payload.ResponderIndex
} else {
m.result.RemoteIndex = payload.InitiatorIndex
}
m.result.HandshakeTime = payload.Time
m.payloadSet = true
}
// Process certificate
if flags.expectsCert {
if err := m.validateCert(payload); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
func (m *Machine) validateCert(payload Payload) error {
cred := m.getCred(m.myVersion)
if cred == nil {
m.failed = true
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrNoCredential, m.myVersion)
}
rc, err := cert.Recombine(
cert.Version(payload.CertVersion),
payload.Cert,
m.hs.PeerStatic(),
cred.Cert.Curve(),
)
if err != nil {
m.failed = true
return fmt.Errorf("recombine cert: %w", err)
}
if !bytes.Equal(rc.PublicKey(), m.hs.PeerStatic()) {
m.failed = true
return ErrPublicKeyMismatch
}
// Version negotiation, if the peer sent a different version and we have it, switch
if rc.Version() != m.myVersion {
if m.getCred(rc.Version()) != nil {
m.myVersion = rc.Version()
}
}
verified, err := m.verifier(rc)
if err != nil {
m.failed = true
return fmt.Errorf("verify cert: %w", err)
}
m.result.RemoteCert = verified
m.remoteCertSet = true
return nil
}
func (m *Machine) marshalOutgoing(flags msgFlags) ([]byte, error) {
if !flags.expectsPayload && !flags.expectsCert {
return nil, nil
}
var p Payload
if flags.expectsPayload {
if !m.indexAllocated {
index, err := m.allocIndex()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", ErrIndexAllocation, err)
}
m.result.LocalIndex = index
m.indexAllocated = true
}
if m.result.Initiator {
p.InitiatorIndex = m.result.LocalIndex
} else {
p.ResponderIndex = m.result.LocalIndex
p.InitiatorIndex = m.result.RemoteIndex
}
p.Time = uint64(time.Now().UnixNano())
}
if flags.expectsCert {
cred := m.getCred(m.myVersion)
if cred == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrNoCredential, m.myVersion)
}
p.Cert = cred.Bytes
p.CertVersion = uint32(cred.Cert.Version())
m.result.MyCert = cred.Cert
}
return MarshalPayload(nil, p), nil
}
func (m *Machine) buildResponse(out []byte) ([]byte, *noise.CipherState, *noise.CipherState, error) {
flags := m.myMsgFlags()
hsBytes, err := m.marshalOutgoing(flags)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, nil, err
}
// Extend out by header.Len to make room for the header. slices.Grow is a
// no-op when the cap is already sufficient (the zero-copy case where the
// caller passed a pre-sized buffer). header.Encode overwrites the new
// bytes, so they don't need to be zeroed.
start := len(out)
out = slices.Grow(out, header.Len)[:start+header.Len]
header.Encode(
out[start:],
header.Version, header.Handshake, m.subtype,
m.result.RemoteIndex,
uint64(m.hs.MessageIndex()+1),
)
// noise.WriteMessage appends the encrypted handshake message to out,
// reusing capacity when present.
//
// The (dKey, eKey) ordering here is correct for IX, where the responder
// completes the handshake by writing the stage-2 message. noise returns
// (cs1, cs2) where cs1 is the initiator->responder cipher (which is the
// responder's decrypt key). For 3-message patterns where an initiator
// finishes by writing the final message, this ordering would be wrong;
// revisit when XX/pqIX lands.
out, dKey, eKey, err := m.hs.WriteMessage(out, hsBytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("noise WriteMessage: %w", err)
}
return out, dKey, eKey, nil
}
+662
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@@ -0,0 +1,662 @@
package handshake
import (
"net/netip"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
ct "github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/noiseutil"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestMachineIXHappyPath(t *testing.T) {
ca, _, caKey, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
caPool := ct.NewTestCAPool(ca)
initCS := newTestCertState(t, ca, caKey, "initiator", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")})
respCS := newTestCertState(t, ca, caKey, "responder", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.2/24")})
initR, respR := doFullHandshake(t, initCS, respCS, caPool)
assert.Equal(t, "responder", initR.RemoteCert.Certificate.Name())
assert.Equal(t, "initiator", respR.RemoteCert.Certificate.Name())
assert.Equal(t, uint32(1000), initR.LocalIndex)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(2000), initR.RemoteIndex)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(2000), respR.LocalIndex)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(1000), respR.RemoteIndex)
assert.Equal(t, uint64(2), initR.MessageIndex, "IX has 2 messages")
assert.Equal(t, uint64(2), respR.MessageIndex, "IX has 2 messages")
ct1, err := initR.EKey.Encrypt(nil, nil, []byte("hello"))
require.NoError(t, err)
pt1, err := respR.DKey.Decrypt(nil, nil, ct1)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, []byte("hello"), pt1)
ct2, err := respR.EKey.Encrypt(nil, nil, []byte("world"))
require.NoError(t, err)
pt2, err := initR.DKey.Decrypt(nil, nil, ct2)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, []byte("world"), pt2)
}
func TestMachineInitiateErrors(t *testing.T) {
ca, _, caKey, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
caPool := ct.NewTestCAPool(ca)
cs := newTestCertState(t, ca, caKey, "test", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")})
v := testVerifier(caPool)
t.Run("initiate on responder", func(t *testing.T) {
m := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, false, 100)
_, err := m.Initiate(nil)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInitiateOnResponder)
assert.True(t, m.Failed())
})
t.Run("initiate called twice", func(t *testing.T) {
m := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, true, 100)
_, err := m.Initiate(nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
_, err = m.Initiate(nil)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInitiateAlreadyCalled)
assert.True(t, m.Failed())
})
t.Run("process packet before initiate on initiator", func(t *testing.T) {
m := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, true, 100)
_, _, err := m.ProcessPacket(nil, make([]byte, 100))
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInitiateNotCalled)
assert.True(t, m.Failed())
})
t.Run("calling failed machine", func(t *testing.T) {
m := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, false, 100)
_, err := m.Initiate(nil) // fails: responder
require.Error(t, err)
_, err = m.Initiate(nil) // fails: already failed
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrMachineFailed)
})
}
func TestMachineProcessPacketErrors(t *testing.T) {
ca, _, caKey, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
caPool := ct.NewTestCAPool(ca)
cs := newTestCertState(t, ca, caKey, "test", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")})
v := testVerifier(caPool)
t.Run("packet too short", func(t *testing.T) {
m := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, false, 100)
_, _, err := m.ProcessPacket(nil, []byte{1, 2, 3})
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrPacketTooShort)
assert.False(t, m.Failed(), "short packet should not kill machine")
})
t.Run("noise decryption failure is recoverable", func(t *testing.T) {
initCS := newTestCertState(t, ca, caKey, "init", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")})
initM := newTestMachine(t, initCS, v, true, 100)
msg1, err := initM.Initiate(nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
respM := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, false, 200)
resp, _, err := respM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg1)
require.NoError(t, err)
corrupted := make([]byte, len(resp))
copy(corrupted, resp)
for i := header.Len; i < len(corrupted); i++ {
corrupted[i] ^= 0xff
}
_, _, err = initM.ProcessPacket(nil, corrupted)
require.Error(t, err)
assert.False(t, initM.Failed(), "noise failure should be recoverable")
// And the machine should still complete a real handshake afterward.
_, result, err := initM.ProcessPacket(nil, resp)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, result, "initiator should complete on the legitimate response")
})
t.Run("invalid cert is fatal", func(t *testing.T) {
otherCA, _, otherCAKey, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
otherCS := newTestCertState(t, otherCA, otherCAKey, "other", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.2/24")})
initM := newTestMachine(t, otherCS, testVerifier(ct.NewTestCAPool(otherCA)), true, 100)
msg1, err := initM.Initiate(nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
respM := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, false, 200)
_, _, err = respM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg1)
require.Error(t, err)
assert.True(t, respM.Failed(), "cert validation failure should kill machine")
})
t.Run("subtype mismatch is recoverable", func(t *testing.T) {
initCS := newTestCertState(t, ca, caKey, "init", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")})
initM := newTestMachine(t, initCS, v, true, 100)
msg1, err := initM.Initiate(nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Mutate the subtype byte (offset 1 in the header) to a value the
// responder Machine wasn't built for.
bad := make([]byte, len(msg1))
copy(bad, msg1)
bad[1] = 0xff
respM := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, false, 200)
_, _, err = respM.ProcessPacket(nil, bad)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrSubtypeMismatch)
assert.False(t, respM.Failed(), "subtype mismatch should not kill the machine")
// And the machine should still complete a real handshake afterward.
resp, result, err := respM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg1)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, result, "responder should complete on the legitimate stage-1 packet")
assert.NotEmpty(t, resp, "responder should produce a stage-2 reply")
})
}
// TestMachineProcessPayload exercises processPayload's internal validation
// directly. Most of these failure modes can't be reached black-box once the
// subtype check at the top of ProcessPacket gates external callers, so we
// drive them by hand here for coverage.
func TestMachineProcessPayload(t *testing.T) {
ca, _, caKey, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
caPool := ct.NewTestCAPool(ca)
cs := newTestCertState(t, ca, caKey, "test", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")})
v := testVerifier(caPool)
t.Run("empty message with expects fails", func(t *testing.T) {
m := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, false, 100)
err := m.processPayload(nil, msgFlags{expectsPayload: true, expectsCert: true})
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrMissingContent)
assert.True(t, m.Failed())
})
t.Run("empty message with no expects passes", func(t *testing.T) {
m := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, false, 100)
err := m.processPayload(nil, msgFlags{})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, m.Failed())
})
t.Run("malformed protobuf is fatal", func(t *testing.T) {
m := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, false, 100)
err := m.processPayload([]byte{0xff, 0xff, 0xff}, msgFlags{expectsPayload: true, expectsCert: true})
require.Error(t, err)
assert.True(t, m.Failed())
})
t.Run("unexpected payload data is fatal", func(t *testing.T) {
m := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, false, 100)
// A payload with index data when none was expected.
bytes := MarshalPayload(nil, Payload{InitiatorIndex: 42, Time: 1})
err := m.processPayload(bytes, msgFlags{expectsPayload: false, expectsCert: false})
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrUnexpectedContent)
assert.True(t, m.Failed())
})
t.Run("unexpected cert data is fatal", func(t *testing.T) {
m := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, false, 100)
// A payload with cert when none was expected.
bytes := MarshalPayload(nil, Payload{Cert: []byte{1, 2, 3}, CertVersion: 2})
err := m.processPayload(bytes, msgFlags{expectsPayload: false, expectsCert: false})
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrUnexpectedContent)
assert.True(t, m.Failed())
})
t.Run("missing payload data when expected is fatal", func(t *testing.T) {
m := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, false, 100)
// Cert present, but no index/time fields.
bytes := MarshalPayload(nil, Payload{Cert: []byte{1, 2, 3}, CertVersion: 2})
err := m.processPayload(bytes, msgFlags{expectsPayload: true, expectsCert: true})
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrUnexpectedContent)
assert.True(t, m.Failed())
})
}
// TestMachineRequireComplete checks the fail-on-incomplete-handshake path
// directly. Like processPayload above this isn't reachable from a normal IX
// flow, so we drive it by hand.
func TestMachineRequireComplete(t *testing.T) {
ca, _, caKey, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
caPool := ct.NewTestCAPool(ca)
cs := newTestCertState(t, ca, caKey, "test", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")})
v := testVerifier(caPool)
t.Run("missing both fails", func(t *testing.T) {
m := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, false, 100)
err := m.requireComplete()
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIncompleteHandshake)
assert.True(t, m.Failed())
})
t.Run("payload only fails", func(t *testing.T) {
m := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, false, 100)
m.payloadSet = true
err := m.requireComplete()
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIncompleteHandshake)
assert.True(t, m.Failed())
})
t.Run("cert only fails", func(t *testing.T) {
m := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, false, 100)
m.remoteCertSet = true
err := m.requireComplete()
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIncompleteHandshake)
assert.True(t, m.Failed())
})
t.Run("both set passes", func(t *testing.T) {
m := newTestMachine(t, cs, v, false, 100)
m.payloadSet = true
m.remoteCertSet = true
err := m.requireComplete()
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, m.Failed())
})
}
func TestMachineAESCipher(t *testing.T) {
ca, _, caKey, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
caPool := ct.NewTestCAPool(ca)
initCS := newTestCertStateWithCipher(
t, ca, caKey, "init",
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")},
noiseutil.CipherAESGCM,
)
respCS := newTestCertStateWithCipher(
t, ca, caKey, "resp",
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.2/24")},
noiseutil.CipherAESGCM,
)
initR, respR := doFullHandshake(t, initCS, respCS, caPool)
ct1, err := initR.EKey.Encrypt(nil, nil, []byte("works"))
require.NoError(t, err)
pt1, err := respR.DKey.Decrypt(nil, nil, ct1)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, []byte("works"), pt1)
ct2, err := respR.EKey.Encrypt(nil, nil, []byte("back"))
require.NoError(t, err)
pt2, err := initR.DKey.Decrypt(nil, nil, ct2)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, []byte("back"), pt2)
}
func TestResultFields(t *testing.T) {
ca, _, caKey, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
caPool := ct.NewTestCAPool(ca)
initCS := newTestCertState(t, ca, caKey, "init", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")})
respCS := newTestCertState(t, ca, caKey, "resp", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.2/24")})
initR, respR := doFullHandshake(t, initCS, respCS, caPool)
assert.True(t, initR.Initiator)
assert.False(t, respR.Initiator)
assert.NotZero(t, initR.HandshakeTime)
assert.NotZero(t, respR.HandshakeTime)
assert.NotNil(t, initR.RemoteCert)
assert.NotNil(t, respR.RemoteCert)
}
func TestMachineBufferReuse(t *testing.T) {
ca, _, caKey, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
caPool := ct.NewTestCAPool(ca)
initCS := newTestCertState(t, ca, caKey, "init", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")})
respCS := newTestCertState(t, ca, caKey, "resp", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.2/24")})
v := testVerifier(caPool)
initM := newTestMachine(t, initCS, v, true, 1000)
respM := newTestMachine(t, respCS, v, false, 2000)
msg1, err := initM.Initiate(nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Run("response writes into provided buffer", func(t *testing.T) {
buf := make([]byte, 0, 4096)
resp, result, err := respM.ProcessPacket(buf, msg1)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, result)
assert.NotEmpty(t, resp, "response should have content")
assert.Equal(t, &buf[:1][0], &resp[:1][0],
"response should reuse the provided buffer's backing array")
})
t.Run("initiate writes into provided buffer", func(t *testing.T) {
initM2 := newTestMachine(t, initCS, v, true, 3000)
buf := make([]byte, 0, 4096)
msg, err := initM2.Initiate(buf)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotEmpty(t, msg, "initiate should have content")
assert.Equal(t, &buf[:1][0], &msg[:1][0],
"initiate should reuse the provided buffer's backing array")
})
t.Run("nil out still works", func(t *testing.T) {
initM2 := newTestMachine(t, initCS, v, true, 4000)
respM2 := newTestMachine(t, respCS, v, false, 5000)
msg1, err := initM2.Initiate(nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
resp, _, err := respM2.ProcessPacket(nil, msg1)
require.NoError(t, err)
out, result, err := initM2.ProcessPacket(nil, resp)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotNil(t, result)
assert.Nil(t, out, "initiator should have no response for IX msg2")
})
}
func TestMachineMsgIndexTracking(t *testing.T) {
ca, _, caKey, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
caPool := ct.NewTestCAPool(ca)
initCS := newTestCertState(t, ca, caKey, "init", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")})
respCS := newTestCertState(t, ca, caKey, "resp", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.2/24")})
v := testVerifier(caPool)
initM := newTestMachine(t, initCS, v, true, 100)
respM := newTestMachine(t, respCS, v, false, 200)
msg1, err := initM.Initiate(nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
resp1, result1, err := respM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg1)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotNil(t, result1)
_, result2, err := initM.ProcessPacket(nil, resp1)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotNil(t, result2)
}
func TestMachineThreeMessagePattern(t *testing.T) {
registerTestXXInfo(t)
// Use HandshakeXX (3 messages) to verify the Machine handles multi-message
// patterns correctly. XX flow:
// msg1 (I->R): [E] - payload only, no cert
// msg2 (R->I): [E, ee, S, es] - payload + cert
// msg3 (I->R): [S, se] - cert only (no payload, not first two)
ca, _, caKey, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
caPool := ct.NewTestCAPool(ca)
v := testVerifier(caPool)
initCS := newTestCertState(t, ca, caKey, "init", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")})
respCS := newTestCertState(t, ca, caKey, "resp", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.2/24")})
initM, err := NewMachine(
cert.Version2,
initCS.getCredential, v,
func() (uint32, error) { return 1000, nil },
true, header.HandshakeXXPSK0,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
respM, err := NewMachine(
cert.Version2,
respCS.getCredential, v,
func() (uint32, error) { return 2000, nil },
false, header.HandshakeXXPSK0,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
// msg1: initiator -> responder (E only, no cert)
msg1, err := initM.Initiate(nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotEmpty(t, msg1)
// Responder processes msg1, should not complete yet, should produce msg2
msg2, result, err := respM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg1)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Nil(t, result, "XX should not complete on msg1")
assert.NotEmpty(t, msg2, "responder should produce msg2")
// Initiator processes msg2: gets responder's cert, produces msg3, and
// completes (WriteMessage for msg3 derives keys)
msg3, initResult, err := initM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg2)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, initResult, "XX initiator should complete after reading msg2 and writing msg3")
assert.NotEmpty(t, msg3, "initiator should produce msg3")
assert.Equal(t, "resp", initResult.RemoteCert.Certificate.Name())
// Responder processes msg3: gets initiator's cert and completes
_, respResult, err := respM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg3)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, respResult, "XX responder should complete on msg3")
assert.Equal(t, "init", respResult.RemoteCert.Certificate.Name())
assert.Equal(t, uint64(3), initResult.MessageIndex, "XX has 3 messages")
assert.Equal(t, uint64(3), respResult.MessageIndex, "XX has 3 messages")
// Verify keys work
ct1, err := initResult.EKey.Encrypt(nil, nil, []byte("three messages"))
require.NoError(t, err)
pt1, err := respResult.DKey.Decrypt(nil, nil, ct1)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, []byte("three messages"), pt1)
}
// NOTE: ErrIncompleteHandshake is tested implicitly. It can't be triggered with
// IX since the cert is always in the payload. A 3-message pattern test (HybridIX)
// should exercise the case where cert arrives in msg3 and verify that completing
// without it fails.
func TestMachineExpiredCert(t *testing.T) {
ca, _, caKey, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519,
time.Now().Add(-24*time.Hour), time.Now().Add(24*time.Hour),
nil, nil, nil,
)
caPool := ct.NewTestCAPool(ca)
expCert, _, expKeyPEM, _ := ct.NewTestCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, ca, caKey,
"expired", time.Now().Add(-2*time.Hour), time.Now().Add(-1*time.Hour),
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")}, nil, nil,
)
expKey, _, _, err := cert.UnmarshalPrivateKeyFromPEM(expKeyPEM)
require.NoError(t, err)
expHsBytes, err := expCert.MarshalForHandshakes()
require.NoError(t, err)
ncs := noise.NewCipherSuite(noise.DH25519, noise.CipherChaChaPoly, noise.HashSHA256)
expiredCS := &testCertState{
version: cert.Version2,
creds: map[cert.Version]*Credential{
cert.Version2: NewCredential(expCert, expHsBytes, expKey, ncs),
},
}
respCS := newTestCertState(
t, ca, caKey, "responder",
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.2/24")},
)
_, respM, _, _, err := initiateHandshake(
t, expiredCS, testVerifier(caPool),
respCS, testVerifier(caPool),
)
require.ErrorContains(t, err, "verify cert")
assert.True(t, respM.Failed())
}
func TestMachineNoCertNetworks(t *testing.T) {
ca, _, caKey, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
caPool := ct.NewTestCAPool(ca)
caHsBytes, err := ca.MarshalForHandshakes()
require.NoError(t, err)
ncs := noise.NewCipherSuite(noise.DH25519, noise.CipherChaChaPoly, noise.HashSHA256)
noNetCS := &testCertState{
version: cert.Version2,
creds: map[cert.Version]*Credential{
cert.Version2: NewCredential(ca, caHsBytes, caKey, ncs),
},
}
respCS := newTestCertState(
t, ca, caKey, "responder",
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.2/24")},
)
_, respM, _, _, err := initiateHandshake(
t, noNetCS, testVerifier(caPool),
respCS, testVerifier(caPool),
)
require.Error(t, err)
assert.True(t, respM.Failed())
}
func TestMachineDifferentCAs(t *testing.T) {
ca1, _, caKey1, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
ca2, _, caKey2, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
initCS := newTestCertState(
t, ca1, caKey1, "init",
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")},
)
respCS := newTestCertState(
t, ca2, caKey2, "resp",
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.2/24")},
)
_, respM, _, _, err := initiateHandshake(
t, initCS, testVerifier(ct.NewTestCAPool(ca1)),
respCS, testVerifier(ct.NewTestCAPool(ca2)),
)
require.ErrorContains(t, err, "verify cert")
assert.True(t, respM.Failed())
}
func TestMachineVersionNegotiation(t *testing.T) {
ca1, _, caKey1, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
ca2, _, caKey2, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
caPool := ct.NewTestCAPool(ca1, ca2)
makeMultiVersionResp := func(t *testing.T) *testCertState {
t.Helper()
respCertV1, _, respKeyPEM, _ := ct.NewTestCert(
cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, ca1, caKey1, "resp",
ca1.NotBefore(), ca1.NotAfter(),
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.2/24")}, nil, nil,
)
respKey, _, _, _ := cert.UnmarshalPrivateKeyFromPEM(respKeyPEM)
respCertV2, _ := ct.NewTestCertDifferentVersion(respCertV1, cert.Version2, ca2, caKey2)
respHsV1, _ := respCertV1.MarshalForHandshakes()
respHsV2, _ := respCertV2.MarshalForHandshakes()
ncs := noise.NewCipherSuite(noise.DH25519, noise.CipherChaChaPoly, noise.HashSHA256)
return &testCertState{
version: cert.Version1,
creds: map[cert.Version]*Credential{
cert.Version1: NewCredential(respCertV1, respHsV1, respKey, ncs),
cert.Version2: NewCredential(respCertV2, respHsV2, respKey, ncs),
},
}
}
t.Run("responder matches initiator version", func(t *testing.T) {
initCS := newTestCertState(
t, ca2, caKey2, "init",
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")},
)
respCS := makeMultiVersionResp(t)
v := testVerifier(caPool)
initM, _, respResult, resp, err := initiateHandshake(
t, initCS, v,
respCS, v,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, respResult)
assert.Equal(t, cert.Version2, respResult.MyCert.Version(),
"responder should negotiate to initiator's version")
_, initResult, err := initM.ProcessPacket(nil, resp)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, initResult)
assert.Equal(t, cert.Version2, initResult.RemoteCert.Certificate.Version(),
"initiator should see V2 cert from responder")
})
t.Run("responder keeps version when no match available", func(t *testing.T) {
initCS := newTestCertState(
t, ca2, caKey2, "init",
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")},
)
respCert, _, respKeyPEM, _ := ct.NewTestCert(
cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, ca1, caKey1, "resp",
ca1.NotBefore(), ca1.NotAfter(),
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.2/24")}, nil, nil,
)
respKey, _, _, _ := cert.UnmarshalPrivateKeyFromPEM(respKeyPEM)
respHs, _ := respCert.MarshalForHandshakes()
ncs := noise.NewCipherSuite(noise.DH25519, noise.CipherChaChaPoly, noise.HashSHA256)
respCS := &testCertState{
version: cert.Version1,
creds: map[cert.Version]*Credential{
cert.Version1: NewCredential(respCert, respHs, respKey, ncs),
},
}
v := testVerifier(caPool)
_, _, respResult, _, err := initiateHandshake(
t, initCS, v,
respCS, v,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, respResult)
assert.Equal(t, cert.Version1, respResult.MyCert.Version(),
"responder should keep V1 when V2 not available")
})
}
+54
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package handshake
import (
"fmt"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
)
// msgFlags tracks what application data a handshake message carries.
type msgFlags struct {
expectsPayload bool // message carries indexes and time
expectsCert bool // message carries the certificate
}
// subtypeInfo bundles the noise pattern with the per-message flags for a
// given handshake subtype.
type subtypeInfo struct {
pattern noise.HandshakePattern
msgs []msgFlags
}
// subtypeInfos defines the noise pattern and message content layout for each
// handshake subtype.
var subtypeInfos = map[header.MessageSubType]subtypeInfo{
// IX: 2 messages, both carry payload and cert
header.HandshakeIXPSK0: {
pattern: noise.HandshakeIX,
msgs: []msgFlags{
{expectsPayload: true, expectsCert: true},
{expectsPayload: true, expectsCert: true},
},
},
// XX: 3 messages
// msg1 (I->R): payload only
// msg2 (R->I): payload + cert
// msg3 (I->R): cert only
//header.HandshakeXXPSK0: {
// pattern: noise.HandshakeXX,
// msgs: []msgFlags{
// {expectsPayload: true, expectsCert: false},
// {expectsPayload: true, expectsCert: true},
// {expectsPayload: false, expectsCert: true},
// },
//},
}
func subtypeInfoFor(subtype header.MessageSubType) (subtypeInfo, error) {
if info, ok := subtypeInfos[subtype]; ok {
return info, nil
}
return subtypeInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: %d", ErrUnknownSubtype, subtype)
}
+63
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package handshake
import (
"testing"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestSubtypeInfo(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("IX", func(t *testing.T) {
info, err := subtypeInfoFor(header.HandshakeIXPSK0)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, noise.HandshakeIX.Name, info.pattern.Name)
require.Len(t, info.msgs, 2)
// msg1: payload + cert
assert.True(t, info.msgs[0].expectsPayload)
assert.True(t, info.msgs[0].expectsCert)
// msg2: payload + cert
assert.True(t, info.msgs[1].expectsPayload)
assert.True(t, info.msgs[1].expectsCert)
})
t.Run("XX", func(t *testing.T) {
registerTestXXInfo(t)
info, err := subtypeInfoFor(header.HandshakeXXPSK0)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, noise.HandshakeXX.Name, info.pattern.Name)
require.Len(t, info.msgs, 3)
// msg1: payload only
assert.True(t, info.msgs[0].expectsPayload)
assert.False(t, info.msgs[0].expectsCert)
// msg2: payload + cert
assert.True(t, info.msgs[1].expectsPayload)
assert.True(t, info.msgs[1].expectsCert)
// msg3: cert only
assert.False(t, info.msgs[2].expectsPayload)
assert.True(t, info.msgs[2].expectsCert)
})
t.Run("unknown subtype returns error", func(t *testing.T) {
_, err := subtypeInfoFor(99)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrUnknownSubtype)
})
}
// registerTestXXInfo temporarily registers XX subtype info for testing.
func registerTestXXInfo(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
subtypeInfos[header.HandshakeXXPSK0] = subtypeInfo{
pattern: noise.HandshakeXX,
msgs: []msgFlags{
{expectsPayload: true, expectsCert: false},
{expectsPayload: true, expectsCert: true},
{expectsPayload: false, expectsCert: true},
},
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
delete(subtypeInfos, header.HandshakeXXPSK0)
})
}
+173
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package handshake
import (
"errors"
"math"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/encoding/protowire"
)
var (
errInvalidHandshakeMessage = errors.New("invalid handshake message")
errInvalidHandshakeDetails = errors.New("invalid handshake details")
)
// Payload represents the decoded fields of a handshake message.
// Wire format is protobuf-compatible with NebulaHandshake{Details: NebulaHandshakeDetails{...}}.
type Payload struct {
Cert []byte
InitiatorIndex uint32
ResponderIndex uint32
Time uint64
CertVersion uint32
}
// Proto field numbers for NebulaHandshakeDetails
const (
fieldCert = 1 // bytes
fieldInitiatorIndex = 2 // uint32
fieldResponderIndex = 3 // uint32
fieldTime = 5 // uint64
fieldCertVersion = 8 // uint32
)
// MarshalPayload encodes a handshake payload in protobuf wire format compatible
// with NebulaHandshake{Details: NebulaHandshakeDetails{...}}.
// Returns out (which may be nil), with the marshalled Payload appended to it.
func MarshalPayload(out []byte, p Payload) []byte {
var details []byte
if len(p.Cert) > 0 {
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldCert, protowire.BytesType)
details = protowire.AppendBytes(details, p.Cert)
}
if p.InitiatorIndex != 0 {
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldInitiatorIndex, protowire.VarintType)
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, uint64(p.InitiatorIndex))
}
if p.ResponderIndex != 0 {
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldResponderIndex, protowire.VarintType)
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, uint64(p.ResponderIndex))
}
if p.Time != 0 {
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldTime, protowire.VarintType)
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, p.Time)
}
if p.CertVersion != 0 {
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldCertVersion, protowire.VarintType)
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, uint64(p.CertVersion))
}
out = protowire.AppendTag(out, 1, protowire.BytesType)
out = protowire.AppendBytes(out, details)
return out
}
// UnmarshalPayload decodes a protobuf-encoded NebulaHandshake message.
func UnmarshalPayload(b []byte) (Payload, error) {
var p Payload
for len(b) > 0 {
num, typ, n := protowire.ConsumeTag(b)
if n < 0 {
return p, errInvalidHandshakeMessage
}
b = b[n:]
switch {
case num == 1 && typ == protowire.BytesType:
details, n := protowire.ConsumeBytes(b)
if n < 0 {
return p, errInvalidHandshakeMessage
}
b = b[n:]
if err := unmarshalPayloadDetails(&p, details); err != nil {
return p, err
}
default:
n := protowire.ConsumeFieldValue(num, typ, b)
if n < 0 {
return p, errInvalidHandshakeMessage
}
b = b[n:]
}
}
return p, nil
}
func unmarshalPayloadDetails(p *Payload, b []byte) error {
for len(b) > 0 {
num, typ, n := protowire.ConsumeTag(b)
if n < 0 {
return errInvalidHandshakeDetails
}
b = b[n:]
// For known field numbers, reject any non-matching wire type as a
// hard error rather than silently skipping. The caller will catch
// missing-field cases downstream, but a wire-type mismatch on a tag
// we know is a peer protocol violation worth flagging here.
// Repeated occurrences of a singular field follow proto3 last-wins.
switch num {
case fieldCert:
if typ != protowire.BytesType {
return errInvalidHandshakeDetails
}
v, n := protowire.ConsumeBytes(b)
if n < 0 {
return errInvalidHandshakeDetails
}
p.Cert = append([]byte(nil), v...)
b = b[n:]
case fieldInitiatorIndex:
if typ != protowire.VarintType {
return errInvalidHandshakeDetails
}
v, n := protowire.ConsumeVarint(b)
if n < 0 || v > math.MaxUint32 {
return errInvalidHandshakeDetails
}
p.InitiatorIndex = uint32(v)
b = b[n:]
case fieldResponderIndex:
if typ != protowire.VarintType {
return errInvalidHandshakeDetails
}
v, n := protowire.ConsumeVarint(b)
if n < 0 || v > math.MaxUint32 {
return errInvalidHandshakeDetails
}
p.ResponderIndex = uint32(v)
b = b[n:]
case fieldTime:
if typ != protowire.VarintType {
return errInvalidHandshakeDetails
}
v, n := protowire.ConsumeVarint(b)
if n < 0 {
return errInvalidHandshakeDetails
}
p.Time = v
b = b[n:]
case fieldCertVersion:
if typ != protowire.VarintType {
return errInvalidHandshakeDetails
}
v, n := protowire.ConsumeVarint(b)
if n < 0 || v > math.MaxUint32 {
return errInvalidHandshakeDetails
}
p.CertVersion = uint32(v)
b = b[n:]
default:
n := protowire.ConsumeFieldValue(num, typ, b)
if n < 0 {
return errInvalidHandshakeDetails
}
b = b[n:]
}
}
return nil
}
+361
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@@ -0,0 +1,361 @@
package handshake
import (
"bytes"
"math"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/encoding/protowire"
)
func TestPayloadRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("all fields set", func(t *testing.T) {
data := MarshalPayload(nil, Payload{
Cert: []byte("test-cert-bytes"),
CertVersion: 2,
InitiatorIndex: 12345,
ResponderIndex: 67890,
Time: 1234567890,
})
got, err := UnmarshalPayload(data)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, []byte("test-cert-bytes"), got.Cert)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(12345), got.InitiatorIndex)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(67890), got.ResponderIndex)
assert.Equal(t, uint64(1234567890), got.Time)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(2), got.CertVersion)
})
t.Run("minimal fields", func(t *testing.T) {
data := MarshalPayload(nil, Payload{InitiatorIndex: 1})
got, err := UnmarshalPayload(data)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(1), got.InitiatorIndex)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(0), got.ResponderIndex)
assert.Equal(t, uint64(0), got.Time)
assert.Nil(t, got.Cert)
})
t.Run("empty payload", func(t *testing.T) {
data := MarshalPayload(nil, Payload{})
got, err := UnmarshalPayload(data)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(0), got.InitiatorIndex)
})
t.Run("large cert bytes", func(t *testing.T) {
bigCert := make([]byte, 4096)
for i := range bigCert {
bigCert[i] = byte(i % 256)
}
data := MarshalPayload(nil, Payload{
Cert: bigCert,
CertVersion: 2,
InitiatorIndex: 999,
})
got, err := UnmarshalPayload(data)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, bigCert, got.Cert)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(999), got.InitiatorIndex)
})
t.Run("append to existing buffer", func(t *testing.T) {
prefix := []byte("prefix")
data := MarshalPayload(prefix, Payload{InitiatorIndex: 42})
assert.Equal(t, []byte("prefix"), data[:6])
got, err := UnmarshalPayload(data[6:])
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(42), got.InitiatorIndex)
})
}
func TestPayloadUnknownFields(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("unknown field in outer message is skipped", func(t *testing.T) {
// Marshal a normal payload then append an unknown field (field 99, varint)
data := MarshalPayload(nil, Payload{InitiatorIndex: 42})
data = protowire.AppendTag(data, 99, protowire.VarintType)
data = protowire.AppendVarint(data, 12345)
got, err := UnmarshalPayload(data)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(42), got.InitiatorIndex)
})
t.Run("unknown field in details is skipped", func(t *testing.T) {
// Build details with a known field + unknown field
var details []byte
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldInitiatorIndex, protowire.VarintType)
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, 77)
// Unknown field 50, varint
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, 50, protowire.VarintType)
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, 9999)
// Another known field after the unknown one
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldResponderIndex, protowire.VarintType)
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, 88)
// Wrap in outer message
var data []byte
data = protowire.AppendTag(data, 1, protowire.BytesType)
data = protowire.AppendBytes(data, details)
got, err := UnmarshalPayload(data)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(77), got.InitiatorIndex)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(88), got.ResponderIndex)
})
t.Run("reserved fields 6 and 7 are skipped", func(t *testing.T) {
// Fields 6 and 7 are reserved in the proto definition
var details []byte
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldInitiatorIndex, protowire.VarintType)
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, 100)
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, 6, protowire.VarintType)
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, 1)
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, 7, protowire.VarintType)
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, 2)
var data []byte
data = protowire.AppendTag(data, 1, protowire.BytesType)
data = protowire.AppendBytes(data, details)
got, err := UnmarshalPayload(data)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(100), got.InitiatorIndex)
})
}
func TestPayloadBytesConsumed(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("all bytes consumed on valid input", func(t *testing.T) {
original := Payload{
Cert: []byte("cert"),
CertVersion: 2,
InitiatorIndex: 100,
ResponderIndex: 200,
Time: 999,
}
data := MarshalPayload(nil, original)
got, err := UnmarshalPayload(data)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Re-marshal and compare — proves we consumed and reproduced all fields
remarshaled := MarshalPayload(nil, got)
assert.Equal(t, data, remarshaled)
})
}
// wrapDetails wraps raw detail bytes in the outer NebulaHandshake envelope
// so UnmarshalPayload can reach unmarshalPayloadDetails.
func wrapDetails(details []byte) []byte {
var out []byte
out = protowire.AppendTag(out, 1, protowire.BytesType)
out = protowire.AppendBytes(out, details)
return out
}
func TestPayloadUnmarshalErrors(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("nil input", func(t *testing.T) {
got, err := UnmarshalPayload(nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(0), got.InitiatorIndex)
})
t.Run("truncated outer tag", func(t *testing.T) {
_, err := UnmarshalPayload([]byte{0x80})
assert.Error(t, err)
})
t.Run("truncated outer details field", func(t *testing.T) {
_, err := UnmarshalPayload([]byte{0x0a, 0x64, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05})
assert.Error(t, err)
})
t.Run("truncated outer unknown field", func(t *testing.T) {
// Valid tag for unknown field 99 varint, but no value follows
var data []byte
data = protowire.AppendTag(data, 99, protowire.VarintType)
_, err := UnmarshalPayload(data)
assert.Error(t, err)
})
t.Run("truncated details tag", func(t *testing.T) {
_, err := UnmarshalPayload(wrapDetails([]byte{0x80}))
assert.Error(t, err)
})
t.Run("truncated cert bytes", func(t *testing.T) {
// Field 1 (cert), bytes type, length 10 but only 2 bytes
var details []byte
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldCert, protowire.BytesType)
details = append(details, 0x0a, 0x01, 0x02) // length 10, only 2 bytes
_, err := UnmarshalPayload(wrapDetails(details))
assert.Error(t, err)
})
t.Run("truncated initiator index varint", func(t *testing.T) {
var details []byte
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldInitiatorIndex, protowire.VarintType)
details = append(details, 0x80) // incomplete varint
_, err := UnmarshalPayload(wrapDetails(details))
assert.Error(t, err)
})
t.Run("truncated responder index varint", func(t *testing.T) {
var details []byte
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldResponderIndex, protowire.VarintType)
details = append(details, 0x80)
_, err := UnmarshalPayload(wrapDetails(details))
assert.Error(t, err)
})
t.Run("truncated time varint", func(t *testing.T) {
var details []byte
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldTime, protowire.VarintType)
details = append(details, 0x80)
_, err := UnmarshalPayload(wrapDetails(details))
assert.Error(t, err)
})
t.Run("truncated cert version varint", func(t *testing.T) {
var details []byte
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldCertVersion, protowire.VarintType)
details = append(details, 0x80)
_, err := UnmarshalPayload(wrapDetails(details))
assert.Error(t, err)
})
t.Run("truncated unknown field in details", func(t *testing.T) {
var details []byte
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, 50, protowire.VarintType)
details = append(details, 0x80) // incomplete varint
_, err := UnmarshalPayload(wrapDetails(details))
assert.Error(t, err)
})
t.Run("cert with wrong wire type rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
// fieldCert as Varint instead of Bytes.
var details []byte
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldCert, protowire.VarintType)
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, 42)
_, err := UnmarshalPayload(wrapDetails(details))
assert.Error(t, err)
})
t.Run("initiator index with wrong wire type rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
// fieldInitiatorIndex as Bytes instead of Varint.
var details []byte
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldInitiatorIndex, protowire.BytesType)
details = protowire.AppendBytes(details, []byte{1, 2, 3})
_, err := UnmarshalPayload(wrapDetails(details))
assert.Error(t, err)
})
t.Run("time with wrong wire type rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
var details []byte
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldTime, protowire.BytesType)
details = protowire.AppendBytes(details, []byte{1, 2, 3})
_, err := UnmarshalPayload(wrapDetails(details))
assert.Error(t, err)
})
t.Run("cert version with wrong wire type rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
var details []byte
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldCertVersion, protowire.BytesType)
details = protowire.AppendBytes(details, []byte{1, 2, 3})
_, err := UnmarshalPayload(wrapDetails(details))
assert.Error(t, err)
})
t.Run("repeated singular field follows proto3 last-wins", func(t *testing.T) {
// Per proto3, multiple instances of a singular field are accepted and
// the last value wins. We keep this behavior so that peers using
// alternative encoders aren't rejected.
var details []byte
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldInitiatorIndex, protowire.VarintType)
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, 1)
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldInitiatorIndex, protowire.VarintType)
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, 42)
got, err := UnmarshalPayload(wrapDetails(details))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(42), got.InitiatorIndex)
})
t.Run("initiator index varint overflow rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
var details []byte
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldInitiatorIndex, protowire.VarintType)
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, math.MaxUint32+1)
_, err := UnmarshalPayload(wrapDetails(details))
assert.Error(t, err)
})
t.Run("cert version varint overflow rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
var details []byte
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldCertVersion, protowire.VarintType)
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, math.MaxUint32+1)
_, err := UnmarshalPayload(wrapDetails(details))
assert.Error(t, err)
})
}
// FuzzPayload feeds arbitrary bytes through UnmarshalPayload to confirm it
// never panics, and for any input that parses cleanly, that re-marshal +
// re-parse is a fix-point. Inputs come from an authenticated peer (post-
// noise-decrypt), so the threat model is "valid peer behaving arbitrarily,"
// not "unauthenticated injection."
func FuzzPayload(f *testing.F) {
// Seed corpus with a handful of known-good shapes.
f.Add(MarshalPayload(nil, Payload{}))
f.Add(MarshalPayload(nil, Payload{Cert: []byte{1, 2, 3}, CertVersion: 2}))
f.Add(MarshalPayload(nil, Payload{InitiatorIndex: 42, Time: 1}))
f.Add(MarshalPayload(nil, Payload{
Cert: []byte("seed-cert"),
InitiatorIndex: 1,
ResponderIndex: 2,
Time: 3,
CertVersion: 2,
}))
f.Add([]byte{})
f.Add([]byte{0xff})
f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, data []byte) {
p1, err := UnmarshalPayload(data)
if err != nil {
return
}
// For any input that parses, re-marshaling and re-parsing must
// yield an equivalent Payload. This catches dispatch bugs (e.g.
// emitting a field on marshal that we don't accept on parse) and
// any non-idempotent parsing behavior.
b2 := MarshalPayload(nil, p1)
p2, err := UnmarshalPayload(b2)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("re-parse of self-marshaled payload failed: %v\nintermediate: %x\n", err, b2)
}
if !payloadsEqual(p1, p2) {
t.Fatalf("re-marshal not idempotent\nfirst: %+v\nsecond: %+v", p1, p2)
}
})
}
func payloadsEqual(a, b Payload) bool {
return bytes.Equal(a.Cert, b.Cert) &&
a.InitiatorIndex == b.InitiatorIndex &&
a.ResponderIndex == b.ResponderIndex &&
a.Time == b.Time &&
a.CertVersion == b.CertVersion
}
-813
View File
@@ -1,813 +0,0 @@
package nebula
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"log/slog"
"net/netip"
"time"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
)
// NOISE IX Handshakes
// This function constructs a handshake packet, but does not actually send it
// Sending is done by the handshake manager
func ixHandshakeStage0(f *Interface, hh *HandshakeHostInfo) bool {
err := f.handshakeManager.allocateIndex(hh)
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to generate index",
"error", err,
"vpnAddrs", hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"handshake", m{"stage": 0, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
return false
}
cs := f.pki.getCertState()
v := cs.initiatingVersion
if hh.initiatingVersionOverride != cert.VersionPre1 {
v = hh.initiatingVersionOverride
} else if v < cert.Version2 {
// If we're connecting to a v6 address we should encourage use of a V2 cert
for _, a := range hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs {
if a.Is6() {
v = cert.Version2
break
}
}
}
crt := cs.getCertificate(v)
if crt == nil {
f.l.Error("Unable to handshake with host because no certificate is available",
"vpnAddrs", hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"handshake", m{"stage": 0, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"certVersion", v,
)
return false
}
crtHs := cs.getHandshakeBytes(v)
if crtHs == nil {
f.l.Error("Unable to handshake with host because no certificate handshake bytes is available",
"vpnAddrs", hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"handshake", m{"stage": 0, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"certVersion", v,
)
return false
}
ci, err := NewConnectionState(cs, crt, true, noise.HandshakeIX)
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to create connection state",
"error", err,
"vpnAddrs", hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"handshake", m{"stage": 0, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"certVersion", v,
)
return false
}
hh.hostinfo.ConnectionState = ci
hs := &NebulaHandshake{
Details: &NebulaHandshakeDetails{
InitiatorIndex: hh.hostinfo.localIndexId,
Time: uint64(time.Now().UnixNano()),
Cert: crtHs,
CertVersion: uint32(v),
},
}
hsBytes, err := hs.Marshal()
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to marshal handshake message",
"error", err,
"vpnAddrs", hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"certVersion", v,
"handshake", m{"stage": 0, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
return false
}
h := header.Encode(make([]byte, header.Len), header.Version, header.Handshake, header.HandshakeIXPSK0, 0, 1)
msg, _, _, err := ci.H.WriteMessage(h, hsBytes)
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to call noise.WriteMessage",
"error", err,
"vpnAddrs", hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"handshake", m{"stage": 0, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
return false
}
// We are sending handshake packet 1, so we don't expect to receive
// handshake packet 1 from the responder
ci.window.Update(f.l, 1)
hh.hostinfo.HandshakePacket[0] = msg
hh.ready = true
return true
}
func ixHandshakeStage1(f *Interface, via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H) {
cs := f.pki.getCertState()
crt := cs.GetDefaultCertificate()
if crt == nil {
f.l.Error("Unable to handshake with host because no certificate is available",
"from", via,
"handshake", m{"stage": 0, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"certVersion", cs.initiatingVersion,
)
return
}
ci, err := NewConnectionState(cs, crt, false, noise.HandshakeIX)
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to create connection state",
"error", err,
"from", via,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
return
}
// Mark packet 1 as seen so it doesn't show up as missed
ci.window.Update(f.l, 1)
msg, _, _, err := ci.H.ReadMessage(nil, packet[header.Len:])
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to call noise.ReadMessage",
"error", err,
"from", via,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
return
}
hs := &NebulaHandshake{}
err = hs.Unmarshal(msg)
if err != nil || hs.Details == nil {
f.l.Error("Failed unmarshal handshake message",
"error", err,
"from", via,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
return
}
rc, err := cert.Recombine(cert.Version(hs.Details.CertVersion), hs.Details.Cert, ci.H.PeerStatic(), ci.Curve())
if err != nil {
f.l.Info("Handshake did not contain a certificate",
"error", err,
"from", via,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
return
}
remoteCert, err := f.pki.GetCAPool().VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), rc)
if err != nil {
fp, fperr := rc.Fingerprint()
if fperr != nil {
fp = "<error generating certificate fingerprint>"
}
attrs := []slog.Attr{
slog.Any("error", err),
slog.Any("from", via),
slog.Any("handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"}),
slog.Any("certVpnNetworks", rc.Networks()),
slog.String("certFingerprint", fp),
}
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
attrs = append(attrs, slog.Any("cert", rc))
}
// LogAttrs is intentional: attrs is a pre-built []slog.Attr slice that
// callers grow conditionally, which has no pair-form equivalent.
//nolint:sloglint
f.l.LogAttrs(context.Background(), slog.LevelInfo, "Invalid certificate from host", attrs...)
return
}
if !bytes.Equal(remoteCert.Certificate.PublicKey(), ci.H.PeerStatic()) {
f.l.Info("public key mismatch between certificate and handshake",
"from", via,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"cert", remoteCert,
)
return
}
if remoteCert.Certificate.Version() != ci.myCert.Version() {
// We started off using the wrong certificate version, lets see if we can match the version that was sent to us
myCertOtherVersion := cs.getCertificate(remoteCert.Certificate.Version())
if myCertOtherVersion == nil {
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
f.l.Debug("Might be unable to handshake with host due to missing certificate version",
"error", err,
"from", via,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"cert", remoteCert,
)
}
} else {
// Record the certificate we are actually using
ci.myCert = myCertOtherVersion
}
}
if len(remoteCert.Certificate.Networks()) == 0 {
f.l.Info("No networks in certificate",
"error", err,
"from", via,
"cert", remoteCert,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
return
}
certName := remoteCert.Certificate.Name()
certVersion := remoteCert.Certificate.Version()
fingerprint := remoteCert.Fingerprint
issuer := remoteCert.Certificate.Issuer()
vpnNetworks := remoteCert.Certificate.Networks()
anyVpnAddrsInCommon := false
vpnAddrs := make([]netip.Addr, len(vpnNetworks))
for i, network := range vpnNetworks {
if f.myVpnAddrsTable.Contains(network.Addr()) {
f.l.Error("Refusing to handshake with myself",
"vpnNetworks", vpnNetworks,
"from", via,
"certName", certName,
"certVersion", certVersion,
"fingerprint", fingerprint,
"issuer", issuer,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
return
}
vpnAddrs[i] = network.Addr()
if f.myVpnNetworksTable.Contains(network.Addr()) {
anyVpnAddrsInCommon = true
}
}
if !via.IsRelayed {
// We only want to apply the remote allow list for direct tunnels here
if !f.lightHouse.GetRemoteAllowList().AllowAll(vpnAddrs, via.UdpAddr.Addr()) {
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
f.l.Debug("lighthouse.remote_allow_list denied incoming handshake",
"vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
)
}
return
}
}
myIndex, err := generateIndex(f.l)
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to generate index",
"error", err,
"vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"certName", certName,
"certVersion", certVersion,
"fingerprint", fingerprint,
"issuer", issuer,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
return
}
hostinfo := &HostInfo{
ConnectionState: ci,
localIndexId: myIndex,
remoteIndexId: hs.Details.InitiatorIndex,
vpnAddrs: vpnAddrs,
HandshakePacket: make(map[uint8][]byte, 0),
lastHandshakeTime: hs.Details.Time,
relayState: RelayState{
relays: nil,
relayForByAddr: map[netip.Addr]*Relay{},
relayForByIdx: map[uint32]*Relay{},
},
}
msgRxL := f.l.With(
"vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"certName", certName,
"certVersion", certVersion,
"fingerprint", fingerprint,
"issuer", issuer,
"initiatorIndex", hs.Details.InitiatorIndex,
"responderIndex", hs.Details.ResponderIndex,
"remoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
if anyVpnAddrsInCommon {
msgRxL.Info("Handshake message received")
} else {
//todo warn if not lighthouse or relay?
msgRxL.Info("Handshake message received, but no vpnNetworks in common.")
}
hs.Details.ResponderIndex = myIndex
hs.Details.Cert = cs.getHandshakeBytes(ci.myCert.Version())
if hs.Details.Cert == nil {
msgRxL.Error("Unable to handshake with host because no certificate handshake bytes is available",
"myCertVersion", ci.myCert.Version(),
)
return
}
hs.Details.CertVersion = uint32(ci.myCert.Version())
// Update the time in case their clock is way off from ours
hs.Details.Time = uint64(time.Now().UnixNano())
hsBytes, err := hs.Marshal()
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to marshal handshake message",
"error", err,
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"certName", certName,
"certVersion", certVersion,
"fingerprint", fingerprint,
"issuer", issuer,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
return
}
nh := header.Encode(make([]byte, header.Len), header.Version, header.Handshake, header.HandshakeIXPSK0, hs.Details.InitiatorIndex, 2)
msg, dKey, eKey, err := ci.H.WriteMessage(nh, hsBytes)
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to call noise.WriteMessage",
"error", err,
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"certName", certName,
"certVersion", certVersion,
"fingerprint", fingerprint,
"issuer", issuer,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
return
} else if dKey == nil || eKey == nil {
f.l.Error("Noise did not arrive at a key",
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"certName", certName,
"certVersion", certVersion,
"fingerprint", fingerprint,
"issuer", issuer,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
return
}
hostinfo.HandshakePacket[0] = make([]byte, len(packet[header.Len:]))
copy(hostinfo.HandshakePacket[0], packet[header.Len:])
// Regardless of whether you are the sender or receiver, you should arrive here
// and complete standing up the connection.
hostinfo.HandshakePacket[2] = make([]byte, len(msg))
copy(hostinfo.HandshakePacket[2], msg)
// We are sending handshake packet 2, so we don't expect to receive
// handshake packet 2 from the initiator.
ci.window.Update(f.l, 2)
ci.peerCert = remoteCert
ci.dKey = NewNebulaCipherState(dKey)
ci.eKey = NewNebulaCipherState(eKey)
hostinfo.remotes = f.lightHouse.QueryCache(vpnAddrs)
if !via.IsRelayed {
hostinfo.SetRemote(via.UdpAddr)
}
hostinfo.buildNetworks(f.myVpnNetworksTable, remoteCert.Certificate)
existing, err := f.handshakeManager.CheckAndComplete(hostinfo, 0, f)
if err != nil {
switch err {
case ErrAlreadySeen:
// Update remote if preferred
if existing.SetRemoteIfPreferred(f.hostMap, via) {
// Send a test packet to ensure the other side has also switched to
// the preferred remote
f.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.Test, header.TestRequest, vpnAddrs[0], []byte(""), make([]byte, 12, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
}
msg = existing.HandshakePacket[2]
f.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Handshake, header.MessageSubType(msg[1]), 1)
if !via.IsRelayed {
err := f.outside.WriteTo(msg, via.UdpAddr)
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to send handshake message",
"vpnAddrs", existing.vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"cached", true,
"error", err,
)
} else {
f.l.Info("Handshake message sent",
"vpnAddrs", existing.vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"cached", true,
)
}
return
} else {
if via.relay == nil {
f.l.Error("Handshake send failed: both addr and via.relay are nil.")
return
}
hostinfo.relayState.InsertRelayTo(via.relayHI.vpnAddrs[0])
f.SendVia(via.relayHI, via.relay, msg, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu), false)
f.l.Info("Handshake message sent",
"vpnAddrs", existing.vpnAddrs,
"relay", via.relayHI.vpnAddrs[0],
"handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"cached", true,
)
return
}
case ErrExistingHostInfo:
// This means there was an existing tunnel and this handshake was older than the one we are currently based on
f.l.Info("Handshake too old",
"vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"certName", certName,
"certVersion", certVersion,
"oldHandshakeTime", existing.lastHandshakeTime,
"newHandshakeTime", hostinfo.lastHandshakeTime,
"fingerprint", fingerprint,
"issuer", issuer,
"initiatorIndex", hs.Details.InitiatorIndex,
"responderIndex", hs.Details.ResponderIndex,
"remoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
// Send a test packet to trigger an authenticated tunnel test, this should suss out any lingering tunnel issues
f.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.Test, header.TestRequest, vpnAddrs[0], []byte(""), make([]byte, 12, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
return
case ErrLocalIndexCollision:
// This means we failed to insert because of collision on localIndexId. Just let the next handshake packet retry
f.l.Error("Failed to add HostInfo due to localIndex collision",
"vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"certName", certName,
"certVersion", certVersion,
"fingerprint", fingerprint,
"issuer", issuer,
"initiatorIndex", hs.Details.InitiatorIndex,
"responderIndex", hs.Details.ResponderIndex,
"remoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"localIndex", hostinfo.localIndexId,
"collision", existing.vpnAddrs,
)
return
default:
// Shouldn't happen, but just in case someone adds a new error type to CheckAndComplete
// And we forget to update it here
f.l.Error("Failed to add HostInfo to HostMap",
"error", err,
"vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"certName", certName,
"certVersion", certVersion,
"fingerprint", fingerprint,
"issuer", issuer,
"initiatorIndex", hs.Details.InitiatorIndex,
"responderIndex", hs.Details.ResponderIndex,
"remoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
return
}
}
// Do the send
f.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Handshake, header.MessageSubType(msg[1]), 1)
if !via.IsRelayed {
err = f.outside.WriteTo(msg, via.UdpAddr)
log := f.l.With(
"vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"certName", certName,
"certVersion", certVersion,
"fingerprint", fingerprint,
"issuer", issuer,
"initiatorIndex", hs.Details.InitiatorIndex,
"responderIndex", hs.Details.ResponderIndex,
"remoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex,
"handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
if err != nil {
log.Error("Failed to send handshake", "error", err)
} else {
log.Info("Handshake message sent")
}
} else {
if via.relay == nil {
f.l.Error("Handshake send failed: both addr and via.relay are nil.")
return
}
hostinfo.relayState.InsertRelayTo(via.relayHI.vpnAddrs[0])
// I successfully received a handshake. Just in case I marked this tunnel as 'Disestablished', ensure
// it's correctly marked as working.
via.relayHI.relayState.UpdateRelayForByIdxState(via.remoteIdx, Established)
f.SendVia(via.relayHI, via.relay, msg, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu), false)
f.l.Info("Handshake message sent",
"vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs,
"relay", via.relayHI.vpnAddrs[0],
"certName", certName,
"certVersion", certVersion,
"fingerprint", fingerprint,
"issuer", issuer,
"initiatorIndex", hs.Details.InitiatorIndex,
"responderIndex", hs.Details.ResponderIndex,
"remoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex,
"handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
}
f.connectionManager.AddTrafficWatch(hostinfo)
hostinfo.remotes.RefreshFromHandshake(vpnAddrs)
// Don't wait for UpdateWorker
if f.lightHouse.IsAnyLighthouseAddr(vpnAddrs) {
f.lightHouse.TriggerUpdate()
}
return
}
func ixHandshakeStage2(f *Interface, via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostInfo, packet []byte, h *header.H) bool {
if hh == nil {
// Nothing here to tear down, got a bogus stage 2 packet
return true
}
hh.Lock()
defer hh.Unlock()
hostinfo := hh.hostinfo
if !via.IsRelayed {
// The vpnAddr we know about is the one we tried to handshake with, use it to apply the remote allow list.
if !f.lightHouse.GetRemoteAllowList().AllowAll(hostinfo.vpnAddrs, via.UdpAddr.Addr()) {
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
f.l.Debug("lighthouse.remote_allow_list denied incoming handshake",
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
)
}
return false
}
}
ci := hostinfo.ConnectionState
msg, eKey, dKey, err := ci.H.ReadMessage(nil, packet[header.Len:])
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to call noise.ReadMessage",
"error", err,
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"header", h,
)
// We don't want to tear down the connection on a bad ReadMessage because it could be an attacker trying
// to DOS us. Every other error condition after should to allow a possible good handshake to complete in the
// near future
return false
} else if dKey == nil || eKey == nil {
f.l.Error("Noise did not arrive at a key",
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
// This should be impossible in IX but just in case, if we get here then there is no chance to recover
// the handshake state machine. Tear it down
return true
}
hs := &NebulaHandshake{}
err = hs.Unmarshal(msg)
if err != nil || hs.Details == nil {
f.l.Error("Failed unmarshal handshake message",
"error", err,
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
// The handshake state machine is complete, if things break now there is no chance to recover. Tear down and start again
return true
}
rc, err := cert.Recombine(cert.Version(hs.Details.CertVersion), hs.Details.Cert, ci.H.PeerStatic(), ci.Curve())
if err != nil {
f.l.Info("Handshake did not contain a certificate",
"error", err,
"from", via,
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
return true
}
remoteCert, err := f.pki.GetCAPool().VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), rc)
if err != nil {
fp, err := rc.Fingerprint()
if err != nil {
fp = "<error generating certificate fingerprint>"
}
attrs := []slog.Attr{
slog.Any("error", err),
slog.Any("from", via),
slog.Any("vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs),
slog.Any("handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"}),
slog.String("certFingerprint", fp),
slog.Any("certVpnNetworks", rc.Networks()),
}
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
attrs = append(attrs, slog.Any("cert", rc))
}
// LogAttrs is intentional: attrs is a pre-built []slog.Attr slice that
// callers grow conditionally, which has no pair-form equivalent.
//nolint:sloglint
f.l.LogAttrs(context.Background(), slog.LevelInfo, "Invalid certificate from host", attrs...)
return true
}
if !bytes.Equal(remoteCert.Certificate.PublicKey(), ci.H.PeerStatic()) {
f.l.Info("public key mismatch between certificate and handshake",
"from", via,
"handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"cert", remoteCert,
)
return true
}
if len(remoteCert.Certificate.Networks()) == 0 {
f.l.Info("No networks in certificate",
"error", err,
"from", via,
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"cert", remoteCert,
"handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
return true
}
vpnNetworks := remoteCert.Certificate.Networks()
certName := remoteCert.Certificate.Name()
certVersion := remoteCert.Certificate.Version()
fingerprint := remoteCert.Fingerprint
issuer := remoteCert.Certificate.Issuer()
hostinfo.remoteIndexId = hs.Details.ResponderIndex
hostinfo.lastHandshakeTime = hs.Details.Time
// Store their cert and our symmetric keys
ci.peerCert = remoteCert
ci.dKey = NewNebulaCipherState(dKey)
ci.eKey = NewNebulaCipherState(eKey)
// Make sure the current udpAddr being used is set for responding
if !via.IsRelayed {
hostinfo.SetRemote(via.UdpAddr)
} else {
hostinfo.relayState.InsertRelayTo(via.relayHI.vpnAddrs[0])
}
correctHostResponded := false
anyVpnAddrsInCommon := false
vpnAddrs := make([]netip.Addr, len(vpnNetworks))
for i, network := range vpnNetworks {
vpnAddrs[i] = network.Addr()
if f.myVpnNetworksTable.Contains(network.Addr()) {
anyVpnAddrsInCommon = true
}
if hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0] == network.Addr() {
// todo is it more correct to see if any of hostinfo.vpnAddrs are in the cert? it should have len==1, but one day it might not?
correctHostResponded = true
}
}
// Ensure the right host responded
if !correctHostResponded {
f.l.Info("Incorrect host responded to handshake",
"intendedVpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"haveVpnNetworks", vpnNetworks,
"from", via,
"certName", certName,
"certVersion", certVersion,
"handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"},
)
// Release our old handshake from pending, it should not continue
f.handshakeManager.DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo)
// Create a new hostinfo/handshake for the intended vpn ip
//TODO is hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0] always the address to use?
f.handshakeManager.StartHandshake(hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0], func(newHH *HandshakeHostInfo) {
// Block the current used address
newHH.hostinfo.remotes = hostinfo.remotes
newHH.hostinfo.remotes.BlockRemote(via)
f.l.Info("Blocked addresses for handshakes",
"blockedUdpAddrs", newHH.hostinfo.remotes.CopyBlockedRemotes(),
"vpnNetworks", vpnNetworks,
"remotes", newHH.hostinfo.remotes.CopyAddrs(f.hostMap.GetPreferredRanges()),
)
// Swap the packet store to benefit the original intended recipient
newHH.packetStore = hh.packetStore
hh.packetStore = []*cachedPacket{}
// Finally, put the correct vpn addrs in the host info, tell them to close the tunnel, and return true to tear down
hostinfo.vpnAddrs = vpnAddrs
f.sendCloseTunnel(hostinfo)
})
return true
}
// Mark packet 2 as seen so it doesn't show up as missed
ci.window.Update(f.l, 2)
duration := time.Since(hh.startTime).Nanoseconds()
msgRxL := f.l.With(
"vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"certName", certName,
"certVersion", certVersion,
"fingerprint", fingerprint,
"issuer", issuer,
"initiatorIndex", hs.Details.InitiatorIndex,
"responderIndex", hs.Details.ResponderIndex,
"remoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex,
"handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"durationNs", duration,
"sentCachedPackets", len(hh.packetStore),
)
if anyVpnAddrsInCommon {
msgRxL.Info("Handshake message received")
} else {
//todo warn if not lighthouse or relay?
msgRxL.Info("Handshake message received, but no vpnNetworks in common.")
}
// Build up the radix for the firewall if we have subnets in the cert
hostinfo.vpnAddrs = vpnAddrs
hostinfo.buildNetworks(f.myVpnNetworksTable, remoteCert.Certificate)
// Complete our handshake and update metrics, this will replace any existing tunnels for the vpnAddrs here
f.handshakeManager.Complete(hostinfo, f)
f.connectionManager.AddTrafficWatch(hostinfo)
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("Sending stored packets",
"count", len(hh.packetStore),
)
}
if len(hh.packetStore) > 0 {
nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
out := make([]byte, mtu)
for _, cp := range hh.packetStore {
cp.callback(cp.messageType, cp.messageSubType, hostinfo, cp.packet, nb, out)
}
f.cachedPacketMetrics.sent.Inc(int64(len(hh.packetStore)))
}
hostinfo.remotes.RefreshFromHandshake(vpnAddrs)
f.metricHandshakes.Update(duration)
// Don't wait for UpdateWorker
if f.lightHouse.IsAnyLighthouseAddr(vpnAddrs) {
f.lightHouse.TriggerUpdate()
}
return false
}
+610 -169
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import (
"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
)
@@ -22,7 +23,18 @@ const (
DefaultHandshakeTryInterval = time.Millisecond * 100
DefaultHandshakeRetries = 10
DefaultHandshakeTriggerBuffer = 64
DefaultUseRelays = true
// maxCachedPackets is how many unsent packets we'll buffer per pending
// handshake before dropping further ones.
maxCachedPackets = 100
// HandshakePacket map keys mirror the IX protocol stage convention:
// stage 0 = the initiator's first message (and what the responder
// receives, stripped of header)
// stage 2 = the responder's reply
// Other handshake patterns will need new keys when added.
handshakePacketStage0 uint8 = 0
handshakePacketStage2 uint8 = 2
)
var (
@@ -30,7 +42,6 @@ var (
tryInterval: DefaultHandshakeTryInterval,
retries: DefaultHandshakeRetries,
triggerBuffer: DefaultHandshakeTriggerBuffer,
useRelays: DefaultUseRelays,
}
)
@@ -38,7 +49,6 @@ type HandshakeConfig struct {
tryInterval time.Duration
retries int64
triggerBuffer int
useRelays bool
messageMetrics *MessageMetrics
}
@@ -76,10 +86,11 @@ type HandshakeHostInfo struct {
packetStore []*cachedPacket // A set of packets to be transmitted once the handshake completes
hostinfo *HostInfo
machine *handshake.Machine // The handshake state machine, set during stage 0 (initiator) or beginHandshake (responder multi-message)
}
func (hh *HandshakeHostInfo) cachePacket(l *slog.Logger, t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, packet []byte, f packetCallback, m *cachedPacketMetrics) {
if len(hh.packetStore) < 100 {
if len(hh.packetStore) < maxCachedPackets {
tempPacket := make([]byte, len(packet))
copy(tempPacket, packet)
@@ -137,6 +148,18 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) Run(ctx context.Context) {
}
func (hm *HandshakeManager) HandleIncoming(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H) {
// Gate on known handshake subtypes. Unknown subtypes (or future ones we
// don't yet support) are dropped here rather than silently routed through
// the IX path. Add a case when introducing a new pattern.
switch h.Subtype {
case header.HandshakeIXPSK0:
// supported
default:
hm.l.Debug("dropping handshake with unsupported subtype",
"from", via, "subtype", h.Subtype)
return
}
// First remote allow list check before we know the vpnIp
if !via.IsRelayed {
if !hm.lightHouse.GetRemoteAllowList().AllowUnknownVpnAddr(via.UdpAddr.Addr()) {
@@ -145,19 +168,27 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) HandleIncoming(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *head
}
}
switch h.Subtype {
case header.HandshakeIXPSK0:
switch h.MessageCounter {
case 1:
ixHandshakeStage1(hm.f, via, packet, h)
case 2:
newHostinfo := hm.queryIndex(h.RemoteIndex)
tearDown := ixHandshakeStage2(hm.f, via, newHostinfo, packet, h)
if tearDown && newHostinfo != nil {
hm.DeleteHostInfo(newHostinfo.hostinfo)
}
// First message of a new handshake. The wire format requires RemoteIndex
// to be zero here (the initiator has no responder index to fill in yet),
// and generateIndex never allocates 0, so any non-zero RemoteIndex on a
// stage-1 packet is malformed or someone probing for an index collision.
// Drop without paying the cost of running noise on a pending Machine.
if h.MessageCounter == 1 {
if h.RemoteIndex != 0 {
hm.l.Debug("dropping stage-1 handshake with non-zero RemoteIndex",
"from", via, "remoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex)
return
}
hm.beginHandshake(via, packet, h)
return
}
// Continuation message must match a pending handshake by index.
// Anything else is an orphaned packet (e.g., late retransmit after
// timeout) and is dropped.
if hh := hm.queryIndex(h.RemoteIndex); hh != nil {
hm.continueHandshake(via, hh, packet)
return
}
}
@@ -183,13 +214,22 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleOutbound(vpnIp netip.Addr, lighthouseTriggered
hostinfo := hh.hostinfo
// If we are out of time, clean up
if hh.counter >= hm.config.retries {
hh.hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Info("Handshake timed out",
fields := []any{
"udpAddrs", hh.hostinfo.remotes.CopyAddrs(hm.mainHostMap.GetPreferredRanges()),
"initiatorIndex", hh.hostinfo.localIndexId,
"remoteIndex", hh.hostinfo.remoteIndexId,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"durationNs", time.Since(hh.startTime).Nanoseconds(),
)
}
// hh.machine can be nil here if buildStage0Packet never succeeded
// (e.g., no certificate available). In that case there's no useful
// handshake metadata to log.
if hh.machine != nil {
fields = append(fields, "handshake", m{
"stage": uint64(hh.machine.MessageIndex()),
"style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, hh.machine.Subtype()),
})
}
hh.hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Info("Handshake timed out", fields...)
hm.metricTimedOut.Inc(1)
hm.DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo)
return
@@ -200,12 +240,25 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleOutbound(vpnIp netip.Addr, lighthouseTriggered
// Check if we have a handshake packet to transmit yet
if !hh.ready {
if !ixHandshakeStage0(hm.f, hh) {
if !hm.buildStage0Packet(hh) {
hm.OutboundHandshakeTimer.Add(vpnIp, hm.config.tryInterval*time.Duration(hh.counter))
return
}
}
// TODO: this hardcodes "always retransmit stage 0", which is correct for
// IX (the initiator only ever sends one packet, msg1) but wrong the
// moment a 3+ message pattern lands. The retry loop should resend the
// most recent outgoing message, not always stage 0. That implies
// HandshakeHostInfo tracking a single "currentOutbound" packet (bytes +
// header metadata) that gets replaced as the handshake progresses,
// instead of indexing into HandshakePacket.
stage0 := hostinfo.HandshakePacket[handshakePacketStage0]
hsFields := m{
"stage": uint64(hh.machine.MessageIndex()),
"style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, hh.machine.Subtype()),
}
// Get a remotes object if we don't already have one.
// This is mainly to protect us as this should never be the case
// NB ^ This comment doesn't jive. It's how the thing gets initialized.
@@ -239,13 +292,13 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleOutbound(vpnIp netip.Addr, lighthouseTriggered
// Send the handshake to all known ips, stage 2 takes care of assigning the hostinfo.remote based on the first to reply
var sentTo []netip.AddrPort
hostinfo.remotes.ForEach(hm.mainHostMap.GetPreferredRanges(), func(addr netip.AddrPort, _ bool) {
hm.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Handshake, header.MessageSubType(hostinfo.HandshakePacket[0][1]), 1)
err := hm.outside.WriteTo(hostinfo.HandshakePacket[0], addr)
hm.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Handshake, hh.machine.Subtype(), 1)
err := hm.outside.WriteTo(stage0, addr)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Error("Failed to send handshake message",
"udpAddr", addr,
"initiatorIndex", hostinfo.localIndexId,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"handshake", hsFields,
"error", err,
)
@@ -260,156 +313,17 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleOutbound(vpnIp netip.Addr, lighthouseTriggered
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Info("Handshake message sent",
"udpAddrs", sentTo,
"initiatorIndex", hostinfo.localIndexId,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"handshake", hsFields,
)
} else if hm.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Debug("Handshake message sent",
"udpAddrs", sentTo,
"initiatorIndex", hostinfo.localIndexId,
"handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"handshake", hsFields,
)
}
if hm.config.useRelays && len(hostinfo.remotes.relays) > 0 {
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Info("Attempt to relay through hosts", "relays", hostinfo.remotes.relays)
// Send a RelayRequest to all known Relay IP's
for _, relay := range hostinfo.remotes.relays {
// Don't relay through the host I'm trying to connect to
if relay == vpnIp {
continue
}
// Don't relay to myself
if hm.f.myVpnAddrsTable.Contains(relay) {
continue
}
relayHostInfo := hm.mainHostMap.QueryVpnAddr(relay)
if relayHostInfo == nil || !relayHostInfo.remote.IsValid() {
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Info("Establish tunnel to relay target", "relay", relay.String())
hm.f.Handshake(relay)
continue
}
// Check the relay HostInfo to see if we already established a relay through
existingRelay, ok := relayHostInfo.relayState.QueryRelayForByIp(vpnIp)
if !ok {
// No relays exist or requested yet.
if relayHostInfo.remote.IsValid() {
idx, err := AddRelay(hm.l, relayHostInfo, hm.mainHostMap, vpnIp, nil, TerminalType, Requested)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Info("Failed to add relay to hostmap", "relay", relay.String(), "error", err)
}
m := NebulaControl{
Type: NebulaControl_CreateRelayRequest,
InitiatorRelayIndex: idx,
}
switch relayHostInfo.GetCert().Certificate.Version() {
case cert.Version1:
if !hm.f.myVpnAddrs[0].Is4() {
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Error("can not establish v1 relay with a v6 network because the relay is not running a current nebula version")
continue
}
if !vpnIp.Is4() {
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Error("can not establish v1 relay with a v6 remote network because the relay is not running a current nebula version")
continue
}
b := hm.f.myVpnAddrs[0].As4()
m.OldRelayFromAddr = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[:])
b = vpnIp.As4()
m.OldRelayToAddr = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[:])
case cert.Version2:
m.RelayFromAddr = netAddrToProtoAddr(hm.f.myVpnAddrs[0])
m.RelayToAddr = netAddrToProtoAddr(vpnIp)
default:
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Error("Unknown certificate version found while creating relay")
continue
}
msg, err := m.Marshal()
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Error("Failed to marshal Control message to create relay", "error", err)
} else {
hm.f.SendMessageToHostInfo(header.Control, 0, relayHostInfo, msg, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
hm.l.Info("send CreateRelayRequest",
"relayFrom", hm.f.myVpnAddrs[0],
"relayTo", vpnIp,
"initiatorRelayIndex", idx,
"relay", relay,
)
}
}
continue
}
switch existingRelay.State {
case Established:
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Info("Send handshake via relay", "relay", relay.String())
hm.f.SendVia(relayHostInfo, existingRelay, hostinfo.HandshakePacket[0], make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu), false)
case Disestablished:
// Mark this relay as 'requested'
relayHostInfo.relayState.UpdateRelayForByIpState(vpnIp, Requested)
fallthrough
case Requested:
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Info("Re-send CreateRelay request", "relay", relay.String())
// Re-send the CreateRelay request, in case the previous one was lost.
m := NebulaControl{
Type: NebulaControl_CreateRelayRequest,
InitiatorRelayIndex: existingRelay.LocalIndex,
}
switch relayHostInfo.GetCert().Certificate.Version() {
case cert.Version1:
if !hm.f.myVpnAddrs[0].Is4() {
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Error("can not establish v1 relay with a v6 network because the relay is not running a current nebula version")
continue
}
if !vpnIp.Is4() {
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Error("can not establish v1 relay with a v6 remote network because the relay is not running a current nebula version")
continue
}
b := hm.f.myVpnAddrs[0].As4()
m.OldRelayFromAddr = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[:])
b = vpnIp.As4()
m.OldRelayToAddr = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[:])
case cert.Version2:
m.RelayFromAddr = netAddrToProtoAddr(hm.f.myVpnAddrs[0])
m.RelayToAddr = netAddrToProtoAddr(vpnIp)
default:
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Error("Unknown certificate version found while creating relay")
continue
}
msg, err := m.Marshal()
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Error("Failed to marshal Control message to create relay", "error", err)
} else {
// This must send over the hostinfo, not over hm.Hosts[ip]
hm.f.SendMessageToHostInfo(header.Control, 0, relayHostInfo, msg, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
hm.l.Info("send CreateRelayRequest",
"relayFrom", hm.f.myVpnAddrs[0],
"relayTo", vpnIp,
"initiatorRelayIndex", existingRelay.LocalIndex,
"relay", relay,
)
}
case PeerRequested:
// PeerRequested only occurs in Forwarding relays, not Terminal relays, and this is a Terminal relay case.
fallthrough
default:
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Error("Relay unexpected state",
"vpnIp", vpnIp,
"state", existingRelay.State,
"relay", relay,
)
}
}
}
hm.f.relayManager.StartRelays(hm.f, vpnIp, hostinfo, stage0)
// If a lighthouse triggered this attempt then we are still in the timer wheel and do not need to re-add
if !lighthouseTriggered {
@@ -587,7 +501,7 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) Complete(hostinfo *HostInfo, f *Interface) {
// allocateIndex generates a unique localIndexId for this HostInfo
// and adds it to the pendingHostMap. Will error if we are unable to generate
// a unique localIndexId
func (hm *HandshakeManager) allocateIndex(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) error {
func (hm *HandshakeManager) allocateIndex(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) (uint32, error) {
hm.mainHostMap.RLock()
defer hm.mainHostMap.RUnlock()
hm.Lock()
@@ -596,7 +510,7 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) allocateIndex(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) error {
for range 32 {
index, err := generateIndex(hm.l)
if err != nil {
return err
return 0, err
}
_, inPending := hm.indexes[index]
@@ -605,11 +519,11 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) allocateIndex(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) error {
if !inMain && !inPending {
hh.hostinfo.localIndexId = index
hm.indexes[index] = hh
return nil
return index, nil
}
}
return errors.New("failed to generate unique localIndexId")
return 0, errors.New("failed to generate unique localIndexId")
}
func (hm *HandshakeManager) DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo *HostInfo) {
@@ -728,3 +642,530 @@ func generateIndex(l *slog.Logger) (uint32, error) {
func hsTimeout(tries int64, interval time.Duration) time.Duration {
return time.Duration(tries / 2 * ((2 * int64(interval)) + (tries-1)*int64(interval)))
}
// buildStage0Packet creates the initial handshake packet for the initiator.
func (hm *HandshakeManager) buildStage0Packet(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) bool {
cs := hm.f.pki.getCertState()
v := cs.DefaultVersion()
if hh.initiatingVersionOverride != cert.VersionPre1 {
v = hh.initiatingVersionOverride
} else if v < cert.Version2 {
for _, a := range hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs {
if a.Is6() {
v = cert.Version2
break
}
}
}
cred := cs.GetCredential(v)
if cred == nil {
hm.f.l.Error("Unable to handshake with host because no certificate is available",
"vpnAddrs", hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "certVersion", v)
return false
}
machine, err := handshake.NewMachine(
v, cs.GetCredential,
hm.certVerifier(), func() (uint32, error) { return hm.allocateIndex(hh) },
true, header.HandshakeIXPSK0,
)
if err != nil {
hm.f.l.Error("Failed to create handshake machine",
"vpnAddrs", hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "error", err)
return false
}
msg, err := machine.Initiate(nil)
if err != nil {
hm.f.l.Error("Failed to initiate handshake",
"vpnAddrs", hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "error", err)
return false
}
// hostinfo.ConnectionState stays nil until the handshake completes in
// continueHandshake. Pre-completion control surfaces guard with nil
// checks; the data plane never observes a pending hostinfo.
hh.hostinfo.HandshakePacket[handshakePacketStage0] = msg
hh.machine = machine
hh.ready = true
return true
}
// beginHandshake handles an incoming handshake packet that doesn't match any
// existing pending handshake. It creates a new responder Machine and processes
// the first message.
func (hm *HandshakeManager) beginHandshake(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H) {
f := hm.f
cs := f.pki.getCertState()
v := cs.DefaultVersion()
if cs.GetCredential(v) == nil {
f.l.Error("Unable to handshake with host because no certificate is available",
"from", via, "certVersion", v)
return
}
machine, err := handshake.NewMachine(
v, cs.GetCredential,
hm.certVerifier(), func() (uint32, error) { return generateIndex(f.l) },
false, header.HandshakeIXPSK0,
)
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to create handshake machine", "from", via, "error", err)
return
}
response, result, err := machine.ProcessPacket(nil, packet)
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to process handshake packet", "from", via, "error", err)
return
}
if result == nil {
// Multi-message pattern: the responder Machine would need to be
// registered in hm.indexes so a future inbound packet finds it via
// continueHandshake. The current manager doesn't do that yet, so
// fail loudly rather than silently dropping the in-flight handshake.
// TODO: support multi-message responder flows (XX, pqIX, etc.).
// See also the IX-shaped cipher key assignment in handshake.Machine.
f.l.Error("multi-message handshake responder is not supported",
"from", via, "error", handshake.ErrMultiMessageUnsupported)
return
}
remoteCert := result.RemoteCert
if remoteCert == nil {
f.l.Error("Handshake did not produce a peer certificate", "from", via)
return
}
// Validate peer identity
vpnAddrs, anyVpnAddrsInCommon, ok := hm.validatePeerCert(via, remoteCert)
if !ok {
return
}
hostinfo := &HostInfo{
ConnectionState: newConnectionStateFromResult(result),
localIndexId: result.LocalIndex,
remoteIndexId: result.RemoteIndex,
vpnAddrs: vpnAddrs,
HandshakePacket: make(map[uint8][]byte, 0),
lastHandshakeTime: result.HandshakeTime,
relayState: RelayState{
relays: nil,
relayForByAddr: map[netip.Addr]*Relay{},
relayForByIdx: map[uint32]*Relay{},
},
}
msg := "Handshake message received"
if !anyVpnAddrsInCommon {
msg = "Handshake message received, but no vpnNetworks in common."
}
f.l.Info(msg,
"vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"certName", remoteCert.Certificate.Name(),
"certVersion", remoteCert.Certificate.Version(),
"fingerprint", remoteCert.Fingerprint,
"issuer", remoteCert.Certificate.Issuer(),
"initiatorIndex", result.RemoteIndex,
"responderIndex", result.LocalIndex,
"handshake", m{"stage": uint64(machine.MessageIndex()), "style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, machine.Subtype())},
)
// packet aliases the listener's incoming buffer, so this copy must stay.
hostinfo.HandshakePacket[handshakePacketStage0] = make([]byte, len(packet[header.Len:]))
copy(hostinfo.HandshakePacket[handshakePacketStage0], packet[header.Len:])
// response was freshly allocated by ProcessPacket; safe to retain directly.
if response != nil {
hostinfo.HandshakePacket[handshakePacketStage2] = response
}
hostinfo.remotes = f.lightHouse.QueryCache(vpnAddrs)
if !via.IsRelayed {
hostinfo.SetRemote(via.UdpAddr)
}
hostinfo.buildNetworks(f.myVpnNetworksTable, remoteCert.Certificate)
existing, err := hm.CheckAndComplete(hostinfo, handshakePacketStage0, f)
if err != nil {
hm.handleCheckAndCompleteError(err, existing, hostinfo, via)
return
}
hm.sendHandshakeResponse(via, response, hostinfo, false)
f.connectionManager.AddTrafficWatch(hostinfo)
hostinfo.remotes.RefreshFromHandshake(vpnAddrs)
// Don't wait for UpdateWorker
if f.lightHouse.IsAnyLighthouseAddr(vpnAddrs) {
f.lightHouse.TriggerUpdate()
}
}
// continueHandshake feeds an incoming packet to an existing pending handshake Machine.
func (hm *HandshakeManager) continueHandshake(via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostInfo, packet []byte) {
f := hm.f
hh.Lock()
defer hh.Unlock()
// Re-verify hh is still tracked. Between queryIndex returning and us taking
// hh.Lock, handleOutbound may have timed out and deleted it. Once we hold
// hh.Lock no other deleter can race our index: handleOutbound also takes
// hh.Lock first, and handleRecvError targets a main-hostmap entry with a
// different localIndexId.
hm.RLock()
cur, ok := hm.indexes[hh.hostinfo.localIndexId]
hm.RUnlock()
if !ok || cur != hh {
return
}
hostinfo := hh.hostinfo
if !via.IsRelayed {
if !f.lightHouse.GetRemoteAllowList().AllowAll(hostinfo.vpnAddrs, via.UdpAddr.Addr()) {
f.l.Debug("lighthouse.remote_allow_list denied incoming handshake",
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "from", via)
return
}
}
machine := hh.machine
if machine == nil {
f.l.Error("No handshake machine available for continuation",
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "from", via)
hm.DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo)
return
}
response, result, err := machine.ProcessPacket(nil, packet)
if err != nil {
// Recoverable errors are routine noise, log at Debug. Fatal errors get a Warn.
if machine.Failed() {
f.l.Warn("Failed to process handshake packet, abandoning",
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "from", via, "error", err)
hm.DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo)
} else {
f.l.Debug("Failed to process handshake packet",
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "from", via, "error", err)
}
return
}
if response != nil {
hm.sendHandshakeResponse(via, response, hostinfo, false)
}
if result == nil {
return
}
// Handshake complete; build the ConnectionState now that we have keys and a verified peer cert.
hostinfo.ConnectionState = newConnectionStateFromResult(result)
remoteCert := result.RemoteCert
if remoteCert == nil {
f.l.Error("Handshake completed without peer certificate",
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "from", via)
hm.DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo)
return
}
vpnNetworks := remoteCert.Certificate.Networks()
hostinfo.remoteIndexId = result.RemoteIndex
hostinfo.lastHandshakeTime = result.HandshakeTime
if !via.IsRelayed {
hostinfo.SetRemote(via.UdpAddr)
} else {
hostinfo.relayState.InsertRelayTo(via.relayHI.vpnAddrs[0])
}
// Verify correct host responded (initiator check)
vpnAddrs := make([]netip.Addr, len(vpnNetworks))
correctHostResponded := false
anyVpnAddrsInCommon := false
for i, network := range vpnNetworks {
// inside.go drops self-routed packets at the firewall stage, but we'd
// rather not let a self-handshake complete in the first place: it
// wastes a hostmap slot, suppresses no log, and obscures routing
// misconfig. Explicit refusal here mirrors the responder-side check
// in validatePeerCert.
if f.myVpnAddrsTable.Contains(network.Addr()) {
f.l.Error("Refusing to handshake with myself",
"vpnNetworks", vpnNetworks,
"from", via,
"certName", remoteCert.Certificate.Name(),
"certVersion", remoteCert.Certificate.Version(),
"fingerprint", remoteCert.Fingerprint,
"issuer", remoteCert.Certificate.Issuer(),
"handshake", m{"stage": uint64(machine.MessageIndex()), "style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, machine.Subtype())},
)
hm.DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo)
return
}
vpnAddrs[i] = network.Addr()
if hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0] == network.Addr() {
correctHostResponded = true
}
if f.myVpnNetworksTable.Contains(network.Addr()) {
anyVpnAddrsInCommon = true
}
}
if !correctHostResponded {
f.l.Info("Incorrect host responded to handshake",
"intendedVpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"haveVpnNetworks", vpnNetworks,
"from", via,
"certName", remoteCert.Certificate.Name(),
"certVersion", remoteCert.Certificate.Version(),
"fingerprint", remoteCert.Fingerprint,
"issuer", remoteCert.Certificate.Issuer(),
"handshake", m{"stage": uint64(machine.MessageIndex()), "style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, machine.Subtype())},
)
hm.DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo)
hm.StartHandshake(hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0], func(newHH *HandshakeHostInfo) {
newHH.hostinfo.remotes = hostinfo.remotes
newHH.hostinfo.remotes.BlockRemote(via)
newHH.packetStore = hh.packetStore
hh.packetStore = []*cachedPacket{}
hostinfo.vpnAddrs = vpnAddrs
f.sendCloseTunnel(hostinfo)
})
return
}
duration := time.Since(hh.startTime).Nanoseconds()
msg := "Handshake message received"
if !anyVpnAddrsInCommon {
msg = "Handshake message received, but no vpnNetworks in common."
}
f.l.Info(msg,
"vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"certName", remoteCert.Certificate.Name(),
"certVersion", remoteCert.Certificate.Version(),
"fingerprint", remoteCert.Fingerprint,
"issuer", remoteCert.Certificate.Issuer(),
"initiatorIndex", result.LocalIndex,
"responderIndex", result.RemoteIndex,
"handshake", m{"stage": uint64(machine.MessageIndex()), "style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, machine.Subtype())},
"durationNs", duration,
"sentCachedPackets", len(hh.packetStore),
)
hostinfo.vpnAddrs = vpnAddrs
hostinfo.buildNetworks(f.myVpnNetworksTable, remoteCert.Certificate)
hm.Complete(hostinfo, f)
f.connectionManager.AddTrafficWatch(hostinfo)
if len(hh.packetStore) > 0 {
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("Sending stored packets", "count", len(hh.packetStore))
}
buf := f.bufAlloc.Acquire()
for _, cp := range hh.packetStore {
cp.callback(cp.messageType, cp.messageSubType, hostinfo, cp.packet, buf)
}
f.bufAlloc.Release(buf)
f.cachedPacketMetrics.sent.Inc(int64(len(hh.packetStore)))
}
hostinfo.remotes.RefreshFromHandshake(vpnAddrs)
f.metricHandshakes.Update(duration)
// Don't wait for UpdateWorker
if f.lightHouse.IsAnyLighthouseAddr(vpnAddrs) {
f.lightHouse.TriggerUpdate()
}
}
// validatePeerCert checks the peer certificate for self-connection and remote allow list.
// Returns the VPN addrs, whether any of them fall within one of our own VPN
// networks, and true if valid; false if rejected.
func (hm *HandshakeManager) validatePeerCert(via ViaSender, remoteCert *cert.CachedCertificate) ([]netip.Addr, bool, bool) {
f := hm.f
vpnNetworks := remoteCert.Certificate.Networks()
// The cert package rejects host certs with no networks at parse time, so
// reaching this state would mean an invariant was bypassed elsewhere.
// Refuse explicitly so downstream code (which indexes vpnAddrs[0]) can't
// panic if that invariant ever changes.
if len(vpnNetworks) == 0 {
f.l.Info("No networks in certificate",
"from", via, "cert", remoteCert)
return nil, false, false
}
vpnAddrs := make([]netip.Addr, len(vpnNetworks))
anyVpnAddrsInCommon := false
for i, network := range vpnNetworks {
if f.myVpnAddrsTable.Contains(network.Addr()) {
f.l.Error("Refusing to handshake with myself",
"vpnNetworks", vpnNetworks,
"from", via,
"certName", remoteCert.Certificate.Name(),
"certVersion", remoteCert.Certificate.Version(),
"fingerprint", remoteCert.Fingerprint,
"issuer", remoteCert.Certificate.Issuer(),
)
return nil, false, false
}
vpnAddrs[i] = network.Addr()
if f.myVpnNetworksTable.Contains(network.Addr()) {
anyVpnAddrsInCommon = true
}
}
if !via.IsRelayed {
if !f.lightHouse.GetRemoteAllowList().AllowAll(vpnAddrs, via.UdpAddr.Addr()) {
f.l.Debug("lighthouse.remote_allow_list denied incoming handshake",
"vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs, "from", via)
return nil, false, false
}
}
return vpnAddrs, anyVpnAddrsInCommon, true
}
// sendHandshakeResponse sends a handshake response via the appropriate transport.
// cached is true when msg is a stored response being retransmitted because
// the peer's stage-1 retransmit landed (the ErrAlreadySeen path); false on a
// fresh response.
func (hm *HandshakeManager) sendHandshakeResponse(via ViaSender, msg []byte, hostinfo *HostInfo, cached bool) {
if msg == nil {
return
}
f := hm.f
f.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Handshake, header.MessageSubType(msg[1]), 1)
// Common log fields. peerCert may be nil during intermediate
// multi-message flows (handshake hasn't completed yet); skip the cert
// block if so.
logFields := []any{
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"handshake", m{"stage": uint64(2), "style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, header.HandshakeIXPSK0)},
"cached", cached,
"initiatorIndex", hostinfo.remoteIndexId,
"responderIndex", hostinfo.localIndexId,
}
if peerCert := hostinfo.ConnectionState.peerCert; peerCert != nil {
logFields = append(logFields,
"certName", peerCert.Certificate.Name(),
"certVersion", peerCert.Certificate.Version(),
"fingerprint", peerCert.Fingerprint,
"issuer", peerCert.Certificate.Issuer(),
)
}
if !via.IsRelayed {
fields := append(logFields, "from", via)
err := f.outside.WriteTo(msg, via.UdpAddr)
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to send handshake message", append(fields, "error", err)...)
} else {
f.l.Info("Handshake message sent", fields...)
}
} else {
if via.relay == nil {
f.l.Error("Handshake send failed: both addr and via.relay are nil.")
return
}
hostinfo.relayState.InsertRelayTo(via.relayHI.vpnAddrs[0])
// We received a valid handshake on this relay, so make sure the relay
// state reflects that, in case it had been marked Disestablished.
via.relayHI.relayState.UpdateRelayForByIdxState(via.remoteIdx, Established)
buf := f.bufAlloc.Acquire()
f.SendVia(via.relayHI, via.relay, msg, buf)
f.bufAlloc.Release(buf)
f.l.Info("Handshake message sent", append(logFields, "relay", via.relayHI.vpnAddrs[0])...)
}
}
// handleCheckAndCompleteError handles errors from CheckAndComplete.
// This only fires from the responder-side beginHandshake path, after the
// peer cert has been validated and ConnectionState populated, so peerCert
// is always non-nil for the cases that log it.
func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleCheckAndCompleteError(err error, existing, hostinfo *HostInfo, via ViaSender) {
f := hm.f
peerCert := hostinfo.ConnectionState.peerCert
hsFields := m{"stage": uint64(1), "style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, header.HandshakeIXPSK0)}
switch err {
case ErrAlreadySeen:
if existing.SetRemoteIfPreferred(f.hostMap, via) {
buf := f.bufAlloc.Acquire()
f.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.Test, header.TestRequest, hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0], []byte(""), buf)
f.bufAlloc.Release(buf)
}
// Resend the original response. The peer is committed to that response's
// ephemeral keys; a freshly-built one would have different keys and break
// the tunnel even though both sides "completed" the handshake.
if msg := existing.HandshakePacket[handshakePacketStage2]; msg != nil {
hm.sendHandshakeResponse(via, msg, existing, true)
}
case ErrExistingHostInfo:
f.l.Info("Handshake too old",
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"certName", peerCert.Certificate.Name(),
"certVersion", peerCert.Certificate.Version(),
"fingerprint", peerCert.Fingerprint,
"issuer", peerCert.Certificate.Issuer(),
"oldHandshakeTime", existing.lastHandshakeTime,
"newHandshakeTime", hostinfo.lastHandshakeTime,
"initiatorIndex", hostinfo.remoteIndexId,
"responderIndex", hostinfo.localIndexId,
"handshake", hsFields,
)
buf := f.bufAlloc.Acquire()
f.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.Test, header.TestRequest, hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0], []byte(""), buf)
f.bufAlloc.Release(buf)
case ErrLocalIndexCollision:
f.l.Error("Failed to add HostInfo due to localIndex collision",
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"certName", peerCert.Certificate.Name(),
"certVersion", peerCert.Certificate.Version(),
"fingerprint", peerCert.Fingerprint,
"issuer", peerCert.Certificate.Issuer(),
"localIndex", hostinfo.localIndexId,
"initiatorIndex", hostinfo.remoteIndexId,
"responderIndex", hostinfo.localIndexId,
"handshake", hsFields,
)
default:
f.l.Error("Failed to add HostInfo to HostMap",
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"from", via,
"error", err,
"certName", peerCert.Certificate.Name(),
"certVersion", peerCert.Certificate.Version(),
"fingerprint", peerCert.Fingerprint,
"issuer", peerCert.Certificate.Issuer(),
"initiatorIndex", hostinfo.remoteIndexId,
"responderIndex", hostinfo.localIndexId,
"handshake", hsFields,
)
}
}
// certVerifier returns a CertVerifier that validates certs against the current CA pool.
func (hm *HandshakeManager) certVerifier() handshake.CertVerifier {
return func(c cert.Certificate) (*cert.CachedCertificate, error) {
return hm.f.pki.GetCAPool().VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), c)
}
}
+139 -4
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
@@ -27,7 +28,7 @@ func Test_NewHandshakeManagerVpnIp(t *testing.T) {
initiatingVersion: cert.Version1,
privateKey: []byte{},
v1Cert: &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1},
v1HandshakeBytes: []byte{},
v1Credential: nil,
}
blah := NewHandshakeManager(l, mainHM, lh, &udp.NoopConn{}, defaultHandshakeConfig)
@@ -79,15 +80,15 @@ func testCountTimerWheelEntries(tw *LockingTimerWheel[netip.Addr]) (c int) {
type mockEncWriter struct {
}
func (mw *mockEncWriter) SendMessageToVpnAddr(_ header.MessageType, _ header.MessageSubType, _ netip.Addr, _, _, _ []byte) {
func (mw *mockEncWriter) SendMessageToVpnAddr(_ header.MessageType, _ header.MessageSubType, _ netip.Addr, _ []byte, _ *WireBuffer) {
return
}
func (mw *mockEncWriter) SendVia(_ *HostInfo, _ *Relay, _, _, _ []byte, _ bool) {
func (mw *mockEncWriter) SendVia(_ *HostInfo, _ *Relay, _ []byte, _ *WireBuffer) {
return
}
func (mw *mockEncWriter) SendMessageToHostInfo(_ header.MessageType, _ header.MessageSubType, _ *HostInfo, _, _, _ []byte) {
func (mw *mockEncWriter) SendMessageToHostInfo(_ header.MessageType, _ header.MessageSubType, _ *HostInfo, _ []byte, _ *WireBuffer) {
return
}
@@ -100,3 +101,137 @@ func (mw *mockEncWriter) GetHostInfo(_ netip.Addr) *HostInfo {
func (mw *mockEncWriter) GetCertState() *CertState {
return &CertState{initiatingVersion: cert.Version2}
}
func TestValidatePeerCert(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
myNetwork := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")
myAddrTable := new(bart.Lite)
myAddrTable.Insert(netip.PrefixFrom(myNetwork.Addr(), myNetwork.Addr().BitLen()))
myNetTable := new(bart.Lite)
myNetTable.Insert(myNetwork.Masked())
newHM := func() *HandshakeManager {
hm := NewHandshakeManager(l, newHostMap(l), newTestLighthouse(), &udp.NoopConn{}, defaultHandshakeConfig)
hm.f = &Interface{
handshakeManager: hm,
pki: &PKI{},
l: l,
myVpnAddrsTable: myAddrTable,
myVpnNetworksTable: myNetTable,
lightHouse: hm.lightHouse,
}
return hm
}
cached := func(networks ...netip.Prefix) *cert.CachedCertificate {
return &cert.CachedCertificate{
Certificate: &dummyCert{name: "peer", networks: networks},
}
}
via := ViaSender{
UdpAddr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("198.51.100.7:4242"),
IsRelayed: true, // skip the remote allow list (covered separately)
}
t.Run("addr inside our networks sets anyVpnAddrsInCommon", func(t *testing.T) {
hm := newHM()
// 10.0.0.2 falls inside our 10.0.0.0/24
addrs, common, ok := hm.validatePeerCert(via, cached(netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.2/24")))
assert.True(t, ok)
assert.True(t, common)
assert.Equal(t, []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.2")}, addrs)
})
t.Run("addr outside our networks leaves anyVpnAddrsInCommon false", func(t *testing.T) {
hm := newHM()
addrs, common, ok := hm.validatePeerCert(via, cached(netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.1.5/24")))
assert.True(t, ok)
assert.False(t, common)
assert.Equal(t, []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.5")}, addrs)
})
t.Run("any matching network is enough", func(t *testing.T) {
hm := newHM()
addrs, common, ok := hm.validatePeerCert(via, cached(
netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.1.5/24"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.42/24"),
))
assert.True(t, ok)
assert.True(t, common)
assert.Len(t, addrs, 2)
})
t.Run("self-handshake is rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
hm := newHM()
// 10.0.0.1 is in myVpnAddrsTable
addrs, common, ok := hm.validatePeerCert(via, cached(netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")))
assert.False(t, ok)
assert.False(t, common)
assert.Nil(t, addrs)
})
t.Run("cert with no networks is rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
hm := newHM()
addrs, common, ok := hm.validatePeerCert(via, cached())
assert.False(t, ok)
assert.False(t, common)
assert.Nil(t, addrs)
})
}
func TestHandleIncomingDispatch(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
newHM := func() *HandshakeManager {
hm := NewHandshakeManager(l, newHostMap(l), newTestLighthouse(), &udp.NoopConn{}, defaultHandshakeConfig)
hm.f = &Interface{
handshakeManager: hm,
pki: &PKI{},
l: l,
}
return hm
}
via := ViaSender{
UdpAddr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("198.51.100.7:4242"),
IsRelayed: true, // bypass remote allow list
}
// A packet body of zero length is fine for these tests: dispatch is
// gated on header fields, and we assert that we never reach noise/cert
// processing for any of the malformed shapes here.
pkt := make([]byte, header.Len)
t.Run("unsupported subtype dropped", func(t *testing.T) {
hm := newHM()
h := &header.H{Type: header.Handshake, Subtype: header.MessageSubType(99), MessageCounter: 1}
hm.HandleIncoming(via, pkt, h)
assert.Empty(t, hm.indexes, "no pending handshake should be created")
})
t.Run("stage-1 with non-zero RemoteIndex dropped", func(t *testing.T) {
hm := newHM()
h := &header.H{
Type: header.Handshake,
Subtype: header.HandshakeIXPSK0,
RemoteIndex: 0xdeadbeef,
MessageCounter: 1,
}
hm.HandleIncoming(via, pkt, h)
assert.Empty(t, hm.indexes, "spoofed stage-1 must not create a pending machine")
})
t.Run("continuation with no matching pending index dropped", func(t *testing.T) {
hm := newHM()
h := &header.H{
Type: header.Handshake,
Subtype: header.HandshakeIXPSK0,
RemoteIndex: 0xcafef00d,
MessageCounter: 2,
}
hm.HandleIncoming(via, pkt, h)
assert.Empty(t, hm.indexes, "orphan stage-2 must not create state")
})
}
+4 -2
View File
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ type cachedPacket struct {
packet []byte
}
type packetCallback func(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, h *HostInfo, p, nb, out []byte)
type packetCallback func(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, h *HostInfo, p []byte, buf *WireBuffer)
type cachedPacketMetrics struct {
sent metrics.Counter
@@ -691,6 +691,7 @@ func (i *HostInfo) TryPromoteBest(preferredRanges []netip.Prefix, ifce *Interfac
}
}
buf := ifce.bufAlloc.Acquire()
i.remotes.ForEach(preferredRanges, func(addr netip.AddrPort, preferred bool) {
if remote.IsValid() && (!addr.IsValid() || !preferred) {
return
@@ -698,8 +699,9 @@ func (i *HostInfo) TryPromoteBest(preferredRanges []netip.Prefix, ifce *Interfac
// Try to send a test packet to that host, this should
// cause it to detect a roaming event and switch remotes
ifce.sendTo(header.Test, header.TestRequest, i.ConnectionState, i, addr, []byte(""), make([]byte, 12, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
ifce.sendTo(header.Test, header.TestRequest, i.ConnectionState, i, addr, []byte(""), buf)
})
ifce.bufAlloc.Release(buf)
}
// Re query our lighthouses for new remotes occasionally
+75 -122
View File
@@ -8,12 +8,13 @@ import (
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/iputil"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/noiseutil"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
)
func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(packet []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, nb, out []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
err := newPacket(packet, false, fwPacket)
func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(buf *WireBuffer, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
packet := buf.IPPacket()
err := newPacket(packet, false, buf.FwPacket)
if err != nil {
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
f.l.Debug("Error while validating outbound packet",
@@ -26,12 +27,12 @@ func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(packet []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet
// Ignore local broadcast packets
if f.dropLocalBroadcast {
if f.myBroadcastAddrsTable.Contains(fwPacket.RemoteAddr) {
if f.myBroadcastAddrsTable.Contains(buf.FwPacket.RemoteAddr) {
return
}
}
if f.myVpnAddrsTable.Contains(fwPacket.RemoteAddr) {
if f.myVpnAddrsTable.Contains(buf.FwPacket.RemoteAddr) {
// Immediately forward packets from self to self.
// This should only happen on Darwin-based and FreeBSD hosts, which
// routes packets from the Nebula addr to the Nebula addr through the Nebula
@@ -48,20 +49,20 @@ func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(packet []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet
}
// Ignore multicast packets
if f.dropMulticast && fwPacket.RemoteAddr.IsMulticast() {
if f.dropMulticast && buf.FwPacket.RemoteAddr.IsMulticast() {
return
}
hostinfo, ready := f.getOrHandshakeConsiderRouting(fwPacket, func(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) {
hostinfo, ready := f.getOrHandshakeConsiderRouting(buf.FwPacket, func(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) {
hh.cachePacket(f.l, header.Message, 0, packet, f.sendMessageNow, f.cachedPacketMetrics)
})
if hostinfo == nil {
f.rejectInside(packet, out, q)
f.rejectInside(packet, buf.Out, q)
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
f.l.Debug("dropping outbound packet, vpnAddr not in our vpn networks or in unsafe networks",
"vpnAddr", fwPacket.RemoteAddr,
"fwPacket", fwPacket,
"vpnAddr", buf.FwPacket.RemoteAddr,
"fwPacket", buf.FwPacket,
)
}
return
@@ -71,15 +72,15 @@ func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(packet []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet
return
}
dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(*fwPacket, false, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), localCache)
dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(*buf.FwPacket, false, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), localCache)
if dropReason == nil {
f.sendNoMetrics(header.Message, 0, hostinfo.ConnectionState, hostinfo, netip.AddrPort{}, packet, nb, out, q)
f.sendNoMetrics(header.Message, 0, hostinfo.ConnectionState, hostinfo, netip.AddrPort{}, packet, buf, q)
} else {
f.rejectInside(packet, out, q)
f.rejectInside(packet, buf.Out, q)
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("dropping outbound packet",
"fwPacket", fwPacket,
"fwPacket", buf.FwPacket,
"reason", dropReason,
)
}
@@ -102,27 +103,27 @@ func (f *Interface) rejectInside(packet []byte, out []byte, q int) {
}
}
func (f *Interface) rejectOutside(packet []byte, ci *ConnectionState, hostinfo *HostInfo, nb, out []byte, q int) {
func (f *Interface) rejectOutside(packet []byte, ci *ConnectionState, hostinfo *HostInfo, scratch []byte, buf *WireBuffer, q int) {
if !f.firewall.OutSendReject {
return
}
out = iputil.CreateRejectPacket(packet, out)
if len(out) == 0 {
rejectIP := iputil.CreateRejectPacket(packet, scratch)
if len(rejectIP) == 0 {
return
}
if len(out) > iputil.MaxRejectPacketSize {
if len(rejectIP) > iputil.MaxRejectPacketSize {
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelInfo) {
f.l.Info("rejectOutside: packet too big, not sending",
"packet", packet,
"outPacket", out,
"outPacket", rejectIP,
)
}
return
}
f.sendNoMetrics(header.Message, 0, ci, hostinfo, netip.AddrPort{}, out, nb, packet, q)
f.sendNoMetrics(header.Message, 0, ci, hostinfo, netip.AddrPort{}, rejectIP, buf, q)
}
// Handshake will attempt to initiate a tunnel with the provided vpn address. This is a no-op if the tunnel is already established or being established
@@ -215,7 +216,7 @@ func (f *Interface) getOrHandshakeConsiderRouting(fwPacket *firewall.Packet, cac
}
func (f *Interface) sendMessageNow(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, hostinfo *HostInfo, p, nb, out []byte) {
func (f *Interface) sendMessageNow(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, hostinfo *HostInfo, p []byte, buf *WireBuffer) {
fp := &firewall.Packet{}
err := newPacket(p, false, fp)
if err != nil {
@@ -235,12 +236,12 @@ func (f *Interface) sendMessageNow(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubTyp
return
}
f.sendNoMetrics(header.Message, st, hostinfo.ConnectionState, hostinfo, netip.AddrPort{}, p, nb, out, 0)
f.sendNoMetrics(header.Message, st, hostinfo.ConnectionState, hostinfo, netip.AddrPort{}, p, buf, 0)
}
// SendMessageToVpnAddr handles real addr:port lookup and sends to the current best known address for vpnAddr.
// This function ignores myVpnNetworksTable, and will always attempt to treat the address as a vpnAddr
func (f *Interface) SendMessageToVpnAddr(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, vpnAddr netip.Addr, p, nb, out []byte) {
func (f *Interface) SendMessageToVpnAddr(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, vpnAddr netip.Addr, p []byte, buf *WireBuffer) {
hostInfo, ready := f.handshakeManager.GetOrHandshake(vpnAddr, func(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) {
hh.cachePacket(f.l, t, st, p, f.SendMessageToHostInfo, f.cachedPacketMetrics)
})
@@ -258,113 +259,73 @@ func (f *Interface) SendMessageToVpnAddr(t header.MessageType, st header.Message
return
}
f.SendMessageToHostInfo(t, st, hostInfo, p, nb, out)
f.SendMessageToHostInfo(t, st, hostInfo, p, buf)
}
func (f *Interface) SendMessageToHostInfo(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, hi *HostInfo, p, nb, out []byte) {
f.send(t, st, hi.ConnectionState, hi, p, nb, out)
func (f *Interface) SendMessageToHostInfo(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, hi *HostInfo, p []byte, buf *WireBuffer) {
f.send(t, st, hi.ConnectionState, hi, p, buf)
}
func (f *Interface) send(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, ci *ConnectionState, hostinfo *HostInfo, p, nb, out []byte) {
func (f *Interface) send(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, ci *ConnectionState, hostinfo *HostInfo, p []byte, buf *WireBuffer) {
f.messageMetrics.Tx(t, st, 1)
f.sendNoMetrics(t, st, ci, hostinfo, netip.AddrPort{}, p, nb, out, 0)
f.sendNoMetrics(t, st, ci, hostinfo, netip.AddrPort{}, p, buf, 0)
}
func (f *Interface) sendTo(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, ci *ConnectionState, hostinfo *HostInfo, remote netip.AddrPort, p, nb, out []byte) {
func (f *Interface) sendTo(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, ci *ConnectionState, hostinfo *HostInfo, remote netip.AddrPort, p []byte, buf *WireBuffer) {
f.messageMetrics.Tx(t, st, 1)
f.sendNoMetrics(t, st, ci, hostinfo, remote, p, nb, out, 0)
f.sendNoMetrics(t, st, ci, hostinfo, remote, p, buf, 0)
}
// SendVia sends a payload through a Relay tunnel. No authentication or encryption is done
// to the payload for the ultimate target host, making this a useful method for sending
// handshake messages to peers through relay tunnels.
// via is the HostInfo through which the message is relayed.
// ad is the plaintext data to authenticate, but not encrypt
// nb is a buffer used to store the nonce value, re-used for performance reasons.
// out is a buffer used to store the result of the Encrypt operation
// q indicates which writer to use to send the packet.
func (f *Interface) SendVia(via *HostInfo,
relay *Relay,
ad,
nb,
out []byte,
nocopy bool,
) {
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
// NOTE: for goboring AESGCMTLS we need to lock because of the nonce check
via.ConnectionState.writeLock.Lock()
}
c := via.ConnectionState.messageCounter.Add(1)
out = header.Encode(out, header.Version, header.Message, header.MessageRelay, relay.RemoteIndex, c)
f.connectionManager.Out(via)
// Authenticate the header and payload, but do not encrypt for this message type.
// The payload consists of the inner, unencrypted Nebula header, as well as the end-to-end encrypted payload.
if len(out)+len(ad)+via.ConnectionState.eKey.Overhead() > cap(out) {
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
via.ConnectionState.writeLock.Unlock()
}
//
// via is the HostInfo through which the message is relayed. ad is staged into
// the inner-payload slot of buf and then AAD-only sealed under via's key by
// SealRelayInPlace. The sendNoMetrics relay-forward path skips this entry
// point and calls sendViaInPlace directly because its inner ciphertext is
// already in place from the encrypt step.
func (f *Interface) SendVia(via *HostInfo, relay *Relay, ad []byte, buf *WireBuffer) {
if header.Len+len(ad)+via.ConnectionState.eKey.Overhead() > cap(buf.Out) {
via.logger(f.l).Error("SendVia out buffer not large enough for relay",
"outCap", cap(out),
"outCap", cap(buf.Out),
"payloadLen", len(ad),
"headerLen", len(out),
"headerLen", header.Len,
"cipherOverhead", via.ConnectionState.eKey.Overhead(),
)
return
}
buf.StageRelayInner(ad)
f.sendViaInPlace(via, relay, len(ad), buf)
}
// The header bytes are written to the 'out' slice; Grow the slice to hold the header and associated data payload.
offset := len(out)
out = out[:offset+len(ad)]
// In one call path, the associated data _is_ already stored in out. In other call paths, the associated data must
// be copied into 'out'.
if !nocopy {
copy(out[offset:], ad)
}
var err error
out, err = via.ConnectionState.eKey.EncryptDanger(out, out, nil, c, nb)
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
via.ConnectionState.writeLock.Unlock()
}
// sendViaInPlace stamps the outer relay header, AAD-seals over the [outer
// header | inner-already-staged] region, and writes the result to via.remote.
// Called from SendVia (after staging ad) and from sendNoMetrics' relay-forward
// path (where the inner ciphertext is already in place from SealForRelay).
func (f *Interface) sendViaInPlace(via *HostInfo, relay *Relay, innerLen int, buf *WireBuffer) {
f.connectionManager.Out(via)
out, err := buf.SealRelayInPlace(via.ConnectionState, relay.RemoteIndex, innerLen)
if err != nil {
via.logger(f.l).Info("Failed to EncryptDanger in sendVia", "error", err)
return
}
err = f.writers[0].WriteTo(out, via.remote)
if err != nil {
if err := f.writers[0].WriteTo(out, via.remote); err != nil {
via.logger(f.l).Info("Failed to WriteTo in sendVia", "error", err)
}
f.connectionManager.RelayUsed(relay.LocalIndex)
}
func (f *Interface) sendNoMetrics(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, ci *ConnectionState, hostinfo *HostInfo, remote netip.AddrPort, p, nb, out []byte, q int) {
// sendNoMetrics encrypts and writes one outbound nebula packet (data, control,
// lighthouse, etc) using buf as the per-call wire scratch. When the hostinfo
// has no direct remote we encrypt into the relay-reserved slot via
// SealForRelay so sendViaInPlace can wrap it without an extra copy.
func (f *Interface) sendNoMetrics(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, ci *ConnectionState, hostinfo *HostInfo, remote netip.AddrPort, p []byte, buf *WireBuffer, q int) {
if ci.eKey == nil {
return
}
useRelay := !remote.IsValid() && !hostinfo.remote.IsValid()
fullOut := out
if useRelay {
if len(out) < header.Len {
// out always has a capacity of mtu, but not always a length greater than the header.Len.
// Grow it to make sure the next operation works.
out = out[:header.Len]
}
// Save a header's worth of data at the front of the 'out' buffer.
out = out[header.Len:]
}
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
// NOTE: for goboring AESGCMTLS we need to lock because of the nonce check
ci.writeLock.Lock()
}
c := ci.messageCounter.Add(1)
//l.WithField("trace", string(debug.Stack())).Error("out Header ", &Header{Version, t, st, 0, hostinfo.remoteIndexId, c}, p)
out = header.Encode(out, header.Version, t, st, hostinfo.remoteIndexId, c)
f.connectionManager.Out(hostinfo)
// Query our LH if we haven't since the last time we've been rebound, this will cause the remote to punch against
@@ -381,50 +342,42 @@ func (f *Interface) sendNoMetrics(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType
}
}
var out []byte
var err error
out, err = ci.eKey.EncryptDanger(out, out, p, c, nb)
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
ci.writeLock.Unlock()
if useRelay {
out, err = buf.SealForRelay(ci, t, st, hostinfo.remoteIndexId, p)
} else {
out, err = buf.Seal(ci, t, st, hostinfo.remoteIndexId, p)
}
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to encrypt outgoing packet",
"error", err,
"udpAddr", remote,
"counter", c,
"attemptedCounter", c,
)
return
}
if remote.IsValid() {
err = f.writers[q].WriteTo(out, remote)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to write outgoing packet",
"error", err,
"udpAddr", remote,
)
switch {
case remote.IsValid():
if err := f.writers[q].WriteTo(out, remote); err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to write outgoing packet", "error", err, "udpAddr", remote)
}
} else if hostinfo.remote.IsValid() {
err = f.writers[q].WriteTo(out, hostinfo.remote)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to write outgoing packet",
"error", err,
"udpAddr", remote,
)
case hostinfo.remote.IsValid():
if err := f.writers[q].WriteTo(out, hostinfo.remote); err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to write outgoing packet", "error", err, "udpAddr", hostinfo.remote)
}
} else {
// Try to send via a relay
default:
// SealForRelay placed the inner ciphertext at buf.Out[header.Len:],
// so sendViaInPlace can wrap it with the outer relay header without
// an extra copy.
for _, relayIP := range hostinfo.relayState.CopyRelayIps() {
relayHostInfo, relay, err := f.hostMap.QueryVpnAddrsRelayFor(hostinfo.vpnAddrs, relayIP)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.relayState.DeleteRelay(relayIP)
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Info("sendNoMetrics failed to find HostInfo",
"relay", relayIP,
"error", err,
)
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Info("sendNoMetrics failed to find HostInfo", "relay", relayIP, "error", err)
continue
}
f.SendVia(relayHostInfo, relay, out, nb, fullOut[:header.Len+len(out)], true)
f.sendViaInPlace(relayHostInfo, relay, len(out), buf)
break
}
}
+18 -21
View File
@@ -101,19 +101,19 @@ type Interface struct {
messageMetrics *MessageMetrics
cachedPacketMetrics *cachedPacketMetrics
// bufAlloc hands out reusable WireBuffers sized for this interface's
// inside Device. All buf consumers (hot-path data-plane goroutines,
// long-lived workers, and cold callers) acquire from here so sizing
// is centralized and consistent. Long-lived owners just don't release.
bufAlloc WireBufferAllocator
l *slog.Logger
}
type EncWriter interface {
SendVia(via *HostInfo,
relay *Relay,
ad,
nb,
out []byte,
nocopy bool,
)
SendMessageToVpnAddr(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, vpnAddr netip.Addr, p, nb, out []byte)
SendMessageToHostInfo(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, hostinfo *HostInfo, p, nb, out []byte)
SendVia(via *HostInfo, relay *Relay, ad []byte, buf *WireBuffer)
SendMessageToVpnAddr(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, vpnAddr netip.Addr, p []byte, buf *WireBuffer)
SendMessageToHostInfo(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, hostinfo *HostInfo, p []byte, buf *WireBuffer)
Handshake(vpnAddr netip.Addr)
GetHostInfo(vpnAddr netip.Addr) *HostInfo
GetCertState() *CertState
@@ -204,6 +204,8 @@ func NewInterface(ctx context.Context, c *InterfaceConfig) (*Interface, error) {
dropped: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("hostinfo.cached_packets.dropped", nil),
},
bufAlloc: NewWireBufferPool(mtu, c.Inside.TunPrefixLen()),
l: c.l,
}
@@ -311,13 +313,11 @@ func (f *Interface) listenOut(i int) {
ctCache := firewall.NewConntrackCacheTicker(f.ctx, f.l, f.conntrackCacheTimeout)
lhh := f.lightHouse.NewRequestHandler()
plaintext := make([]byte, udp.MTU)
h := &header.H{}
fwPacket := &firewall.Packet{}
nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
// Long-lived per-receive-goroutine buf; never released back to the pool.
buf := f.bufAlloc.Acquire()
err := li.ListenOut(func(fromUdpAddr netip.AddrPort, payload []byte) {
f.readOutsidePackets(ViaSender{UdpAddr: fromUdpAddr}, plaintext[:0], payload, h, fwPacket, lhh, nb, i, ctCache.Get())
f.readOutsidePackets(ViaSender{UdpAddr: fromUdpAddr}, buf, payload, lhh, i, ctCache.Get())
})
if err != nil && !f.closed.Load() {
@@ -329,15 +329,12 @@ func (f *Interface) listenOut(i int) {
}
func (f *Interface) listenIn(reader io.ReadWriteCloser, i int) {
packet := make([]byte, mtu)
out := make([]byte, mtu)
fwPacket := &firewall.Packet{}
nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
// Long-lived per-tun-reader buf; never released back to the pool.
buf := f.bufAlloc.Acquire()
conntrackCache := firewall.NewConntrackCacheTicker(f.ctx, f.l, f.conntrackCacheTimeout)
for {
n, err := reader.Read(packet)
_, err := buf.ReadIPFromTUN(reader)
if err != nil {
if !f.closed.Load() {
f.l.Error("Error while reading outbound packet, closing", "error", err, "reader", i)
@@ -346,7 +343,7 @@ func (f *Interface) listenIn(reader io.ReadWriteCloser, i int) {
break
}
f.consumeInsidePacket(packet[:n], fwPacket, nb, out, i, conntrackCache.Get())
f.consumeInsidePacket(buf, i, conntrackCache.Get())
}
f.l.Debug("overlay reader is done", "reader", i)
+49 -26
View File
@@ -63,7 +63,11 @@ type LightHouse struct {
interval atomic.Int64
updateCancel context.CancelFunc
ifce EncWriter
nebulaPort uint32 // 32 bits because protobuf does not have a uint16
// bufAlloc lets the lighthouse query/update workers, request handlers
// and punchback goroutines acquire correctly sized WireBuffers from
// the same pool as the data plane. Set by main.go alongside ifce.
bufAlloc WireBufferAllocator
nebulaPort uint32 // 32 bits because protobuf does not have a uint16
advertiseAddrs atomic.Pointer[[]netip.AddrPort]
@@ -109,7 +113,11 @@ func NewLightHouseFromConfig(ctx context.Context, l *slog.Logger, c *config.C, c
punchy: p,
updateTrigger: make(chan struct{}, 1),
queryChan: make(chan netip.Addr, c.GetUint32("handshakes.query_buffer", 64)),
l: l,
// Default to a no-prefix pool so the query/update workers and
// request handlers have a working WireBufferAllocator before
// main.go wires up the real one from the Interface.
bufAlloc: NewWireBufferPool(mtu, 0),
l: l,
}
lighthouses := make([]netip.Addr, 0)
h.lighthouses.Store(&lighthouses)
@@ -758,21 +766,22 @@ func (lh *LightHouse) startQueryWorker() {
}
go func() {
nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
out := make([]byte, mtu)
// Long-lived per-worker WireBuffer; reused for every lighthouse query
// this worker issues for the life of the goroutine.
buf := lh.bufAlloc.Acquire()
for {
select {
case <-lh.ctx.Done():
return
case addr := <-lh.queryChan:
lh.innerQueryServer(addr, nb, out)
lh.innerQueryServer(addr, buf)
}
}
}()
}
func (lh *LightHouse) innerQueryServer(addr netip.Addr, nb, out []byte) {
func (lh *LightHouse) innerQueryServer(addr netip.Addr, buf *WireBuffer) {
if lh.IsLighthouseAddr(addr) {
return
}
@@ -821,7 +830,7 @@ func (lh *LightHouse) innerQueryServer(addr netip.Addr, nb, out []byte) {
}
}
lh.ifce.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.LightHouse, 0, lhVpnAddr, v1Query, nb, out)
lh.ifce.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.LightHouse, 0, lhVpnAddr, v1Query, buf)
queried++
} else if v == cert.Version2 {
@@ -840,7 +849,7 @@ func (lh *LightHouse) innerQueryServer(addr netip.Addr, nb, out []byte) {
}
}
lh.ifce.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.LightHouse, 0, lhVpnAddr, v2Query, nb, out)
lh.ifce.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.LightHouse, 0, lhVpnAddr, v2Query, buf)
queried++
} else {
@@ -869,8 +878,12 @@ func (lh *LightHouse) StartUpdateWorker() {
go func() {
defer clockSource.Stop()
// Long-lived per-worker WireBuffer; reused across every periodic
// update for the life of this goroutine.
buf := lh.bufAlloc.Acquire()
for {
lh.SendUpdate()
lh.sendUpdate(buf)
select {
case <-updateCtx.Done():
@@ -884,6 +897,15 @@ func (lh *LightHouse) StartUpdateWorker() {
}()
}
// SendUpdate is the public entry point that triggers a one-shot lighthouse
// update outside the worker loop (e.g. tests or reload paths). It allocates
// its own WireBuffer since callers don't already own one.
func (lh *LightHouse) SendUpdate() {
buf := lh.bufAlloc.Acquire()
defer lh.bufAlloc.Release(buf)
lh.sendUpdate(buf)
}
// TriggerUpdate requests an immediate lighthouse update. This is a non-blocking
// operation intended to be called after a handshake completes with a lighthouse,
// so the lighthouse has our current addresses without waiting for the next
@@ -895,7 +917,7 @@ func (lh *LightHouse) TriggerUpdate() {
}
}
func (lh *LightHouse) SendUpdate() {
func (lh *LightHouse) sendUpdate(buf *WireBuffer) {
var v4 []*V4AddrPort
var v6 []*V6AddrPort
@@ -921,9 +943,6 @@ func (lh *LightHouse) SendUpdate() {
}
}
nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
out := make([]byte, mtu)
var v1Update, v2Update []byte
var err error
updated := 0
@@ -974,7 +993,7 @@ func (lh *LightHouse) SendUpdate() {
}
}
lh.ifce.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.LightHouse, 0, lhVpnAddr, v1Update, nb, out)
lh.ifce.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.LightHouse, 0, lhVpnAddr, v1Update, buf)
updated++
} else if v == cert.Version2 {
@@ -1003,7 +1022,7 @@ func (lh *LightHouse) SendUpdate() {
}
}
lh.ifce.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.LightHouse, 0, lhVpnAddr, v2Update, nb, out)
lh.ifce.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.LightHouse, 0, lhVpnAddr, v2Update, buf)
updated++
} else {
@@ -1019,9 +1038,11 @@ func (lh *LightHouse) SendUpdate() {
}
type LightHouseHandler struct {
lh *LightHouse
nb []byte
out []byte
lh *LightHouse
// buf is the long-lived per-handler wire scratch. NewRequestHandler is
// called once per data-plane receive goroutine, so buf is owned by that
// goroutine and reused for every lighthouse send the handler issues.
buf *WireBuffer
pb []byte
meta *NebulaMeta
l *slog.Logger
@@ -1030,8 +1051,7 @@ type LightHouseHandler struct {
func (lh *LightHouse) NewRequestHandler() *LightHouseHandler {
lhh := &LightHouseHandler{
lh: lh,
nb: make([]byte, 12, 12),
out: make([]byte, mtu),
buf: lh.bufAlloc.Acquire(),
l: lh.l,
pb: make([]byte, mtu),
@@ -1168,7 +1188,7 @@ func (lhh *LightHouseHandler) handleHostQuery(n *NebulaMeta, fromVpnAddrs []neti
}
lhh.lh.metricTx(NebulaMeta_HostQueryReply, 1)
w.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.LightHouse, 0, fromVpnAddrs[0], lhh.pb[:ln], lhh.nb, lhh.out[:0])
w.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.LightHouse, 0, fromVpnAddrs[0], lhh.pb[:ln], lhh.buf)
lhh.sendHostPunchNotification(n, fromVpnAddrs, queryVpnAddr, w)
}
@@ -1228,7 +1248,7 @@ func (lhh *LightHouseHandler) sendHostPunchNotification(n *NebulaMeta, fromVpnAd
}
lhh.lh.metricTx(NebulaMeta_HostPunchNotification, 1)
w.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.LightHouse, 0, punchNotifDest, lhh.pb[:ln], lhh.nb, lhh.out[:0])
w.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.LightHouse, 0, punchNotifDest, lhh.pb[:ln], lhh.buf)
}
func (lhh *LightHouseHandler) coalesceAnswers(v cert.Version, c *cache, n *NebulaMeta) {
@@ -1385,7 +1405,7 @@ func (lhh *LightHouseHandler) handleHostUpdateNotification(n *NebulaMeta, fromVp
}
lhh.lh.metricTx(NebulaMeta_HostUpdateNotificationAck, 1)
w.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.LightHouse, 0, fromVpnAddrs[0], lhh.pb[:ln], lhh.nb, lhh.out[:0])
w.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.LightHouse, 0, fromVpnAddrs[0], lhh.pb[:ln], lhh.buf)
}
func (lhh *LightHouseHandler) handleHostPunchNotification(n *NebulaMeta, fromVpnAddrs []netip.Addr, w EncWriter) {
@@ -1452,10 +1472,13 @@ func (lhh *LightHouseHandler) handleHostPunchNotification(n *NebulaMeta, fromVpn
"vpnAddr", detailsVpnAddr,
)
}
//NOTE: we have to allocate a new output buffer here since we are spawning a new goroutine
// for each punchBack packet. We should move this into a timerwheel or a single goroutine
// We acquire and release a fresh buf within this goroutine so it
// returns to the pool once the punchback send completes. We
// should move this into a timerwheel or a single goroutine
// managed by a channel.
w.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.Test, header.TestRequest, detailsVpnAddr, []byte(""), make([]byte, 12, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
pbuf := lhh.lh.bufAlloc.Acquire()
defer lhh.lh.bufAlloc.Release(pbuf)
w.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.Test, header.TestRequest, detailsVpnAddr, []byte(""), pbuf)
}()
}
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -372,12 +372,12 @@ type testEncWriter struct {
protocolVersion cert.Version
}
func (tw *testEncWriter) SendVia(via *HostInfo, relay *Relay, ad, nb, out []byte, nocopy bool) {
func (tw *testEncWriter) SendVia(via *HostInfo, relay *Relay, ad []byte, buf *WireBuffer) {
}
func (tw *testEncWriter) Handshake(vpnIp netip.Addr) {
}
func (tw *testEncWriter) SendMessageToHostInfo(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, hostinfo *HostInfo, p, _, _ []byte) {
func (tw *testEncWriter) SendMessageToHostInfo(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, hostinfo *HostInfo, p []byte, _ *WireBuffer) {
msg := &NebulaMeta{}
err := msg.Unmarshal(p)
if tw.metaFilter == nil || msg.Type == *tw.metaFilter {
@@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ func (tw *testEncWriter) SendMessageToHostInfo(t header.MessageType, st header.M
}
}
func (tw *testEncWriter) SendMessageToVpnAddr(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, vpnIp netip.Addr, p, _, _ []byte) {
func (tw *testEncWriter) SendMessageToVpnAddr(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, vpnIp netip.Addr, p []byte, _ *WireBuffer) {
msg := &NebulaMeta{}
err := msg.Unmarshal(p)
if tw.metaFilter == nil || msg.Type == *tw.metaFilter {
+4 -7
View File
@@ -184,14 +184,10 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
messageMetrics = newMessageMetricsOnlyRecvError()
}
useRelays := c.GetBool("relay.use_relays", DefaultUseRelays) && !c.GetBool("relay.am_relay", false)
handshakeConfig := HandshakeConfig{
tryInterval: c.GetDuration("handshakes.try_interval", DefaultHandshakeTryInterval),
retries: int64(c.GetInt("handshakes.retries", DefaultHandshakeRetries)),
triggerBuffer: c.GetInt("handshakes.trigger_buffer", DefaultHandshakeTriggerBuffer),
useRelays: useRelays,
tryInterval: c.GetDuration("handshakes.try_interval", DefaultHandshakeTryInterval),
retries: int64(c.GetInt("handshakes.retries", DefaultHandshakeRetries)),
triggerBuffer: c.GetInt("handshakes.trigger_buffer", DefaultHandshakeTriggerBuffer),
messageMetrics: messageMetrics,
}
@@ -236,6 +232,7 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
ifce.writers = udpConns
lightHouse.ifce = ifce
lightHouse.bufAlloc = ifce.bufAlloc
ifce.RegisterConfigChangeCallbacks(c)
ifce.reloadDisconnectInvalid(c)
+45 -632
View File
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ func (x NebulaControl_MessageType) String() string {
}
func (NebulaControl_MessageType) EnumDescriptor() ([]byte, []int) {
return fileDescriptor_2d65afa7693df5ef, []int{8, 0}
return fileDescriptor_2d65afa7693df5ef, []int{6, 0}
}
type NebulaMeta struct {
@@ -489,142 +489,6 @@ func (m *NebulaPing) GetTime() uint64 {
return 0
}
type NebulaHandshake struct {
Details *NebulaHandshakeDetails `protobuf:"bytes,1,opt,name=Details,proto3" json:"Details,omitempty"`
Hmac []byte `protobuf:"bytes,2,opt,name=Hmac,proto3" json:"Hmac,omitempty"`
}
func (m *NebulaHandshake) Reset() { *m = NebulaHandshake{} }
func (m *NebulaHandshake) String() string { return proto.CompactTextString(m) }
func (*NebulaHandshake) ProtoMessage() {}
func (*NebulaHandshake) Descriptor() ([]byte, []int) {
return fileDescriptor_2d65afa7693df5ef, []int{6}
}
func (m *NebulaHandshake) XXX_Unmarshal(b []byte) error {
return m.Unmarshal(b)
}
func (m *NebulaHandshake) XXX_Marshal(b []byte, deterministic bool) ([]byte, error) {
if deterministic {
return xxx_messageInfo_NebulaHandshake.Marshal(b, m, deterministic)
} else {
b = b[:cap(b)]
n, err := m.MarshalToSizedBuffer(b)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return b[:n], nil
}
}
func (m *NebulaHandshake) XXX_Merge(src proto.Message) {
xxx_messageInfo_NebulaHandshake.Merge(m, src)
}
func (m *NebulaHandshake) XXX_Size() int {
return m.Size()
}
func (m *NebulaHandshake) XXX_DiscardUnknown() {
xxx_messageInfo_NebulaHandshake.DiscardUnknown(m)
}
var xxx_messageInfo_NebulaHandshake proto.InternalMessageInfo
func (m *NebulaHandshake) GetDetails() *NebulaHandshakeDetails {
if m != nil {
return m.Details
}
return nil
}
func (m *NebulaHandshake) GetHmac() []byte {
if m != nil {
return m.Hmac
}
return nil
}
type NebulaHandshakeDetails struct {
Cert []byte `protobuf:"bytes,1,opt,name=Cert,proto3" json:"Cert,omitempty"`
InitiatorIndex uint32 `protobuf:"varint,2,opt,name=InitiatorIndex,proto3" json:"InitiatorIndex,omitempty"`
ResponderIndex uint32 `protobuf:"varint,3,opt,name=ResponderIndex,proto3" json:"ResponderIndex,omitempty"`
Cookie uint64 `protobuf:"varint,4,opt,name=Cookie,proto3" json:"Cookie,omitempty"`
Time uint64 `protobuf:"varint,5,opt,name=Time,proto3" json:"Time,omitempty"`
CertVersion uint32 `protobuf:"varint,8,opt,name=CertVersion,proto3" json:"CertVersion,omitempty"`
}
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) Reset() { *m = NebulaHandshakeDetails{} }
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) String() string { return proto.CompactTextString(m) }
func (*NebulaHandshakeDetails) ProtoMessage() {}
func (*NebulaHandshakeDetails) Descriptor() ([]byte, []int) {
return fileDescriptor_2d65afa7693df5ef, []int{7}
}
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) XXX_Unmarshal(b []byte) error {
return m.Unmarshal(b)
}
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) XXX_Marshal(b []byte, deterministic bool) ([]byte, error) {
if deterministic {
return xxx_messageInfo_NebulaHandshakeDetails.Marshal(b, m, deterministic)
} else {
b = b[:cap(b)]
n, err := m.MarshalToSizedBuffer(b)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return b[:n], nil
}
}
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) XXX_Merge(src proto.Message) {
xxx_messageInfo_NebulaHandshakeDetails.Merge(m, src)
}
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) XXX_Size() int {
return m.Size()
}
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) XXX_DiscardUnknown() {
xxx_messageInfo_NebulaHandshakeDetails.DiscardUnknown(m)
}
var xxx_messageInfo_NebulaHandshakeDetails proto.InternalMessageInfo
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) GetCert() []byte {
if m != nil {
return m.Cert
}
return nil
}
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) GetInitiatorIndex() uint32 {
if m != nil {
return m.InitiatorIndex
}
return 0
}
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) GetResponderIndex() uint32 {
if m != nil {
return m.ResponderIndex
}
return 0
}
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) GetCookie() uint64 {
if m != nil {
return m.Cookie
}
return 0
}
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) GetTime() uint64 {
if m != nil {
return m.Time
}
return 0
}
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) GetCertVersion() uint32 {
if m != nil {
return m.CertVersion
}
return 0
}
type NebulaControl struct {
Type NebulaControl_MessageType `protobuf:"varint,1,opt,name=Type,proto3,enum=nebula.NebulaControl_MessageType" json:"Type,omitempty"`
InitiatorRelayIndex uint32 `protobuf:"varint,2,opt,name=InitiatorRelayIndex,proto3" json:"InitiatorRelayIndex,omitempty"`
@@ -639,7 +503,7 @@ func (m *NebulaControl) Reset() { *m = NebulaControl{} }
func (m *NebulaControl) String() string { return proto.CompactTextString(m) }
func (*NebulaControl) ProtoMessage() {}
func (*NebulaControl) Descriptor() ([]byte, []int) {
return fileDescriptor_2d65afa7693df5ef, []int{8}
return fileDescriptor_2d65afa7693df5ef, []int{6}
}
func (m *NebulaControl) XXX_Unmarshal(b []byte) error {
return m.Unmarshal(b)
@@ -729,65 +593,55 @@ func init() {
proto.RegisterType((*V4AddrPort)(nil), "nebula.V4AddrPort")
proto.RegisterType((*V6AddrPort)(nil), "nebula.V6AddrPort")
proto.RegisterType((*NebulaPing)(nil), "nebula.NebulaPing")
proto.RegisterType((*NebulaHandshake)(nil), "nebula.NebulaHandshake")
proto.RegisterType((*NebulaHandshakeDetails)(nil), "nebula.NebulaHandshakeDetails")
proto.RegisterType((*NebulaControl)(nil), "nebula.NebulaControl")
}
func init() { proto.RegisterFile("nebula.proto", fileDescriptor_2d65afa7693df5ef) }
var fileDescriptor_2d65afa7693df5ef = []byte{
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0xc3, 0xd0, 0xba, 0xa2, 0x82, 0x45, 0x24, 0x17, 0x77, 0xa0, 0xf1, 0x9a, 0x72, 0xcb, 0xf5, 0xc2,
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0x60, 0x43, 0xe4, 0xde, 0x4d, 0x1d, 0x8b, 0xd3, 0x53, 0xc6, 0xdd, 0x8f, 0xae, 0x6d, 0x71, 0x97,
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0xb8, 0x0e, 0xff, 0x65, 0x71, 0xd4, 0xb6, 0x21, 0x26, 0x1b, 0x59, 0x7c, 0x7c, 0x38, 0xa6, 0xf6,
0xb5, 0xbe, 0x22, 0x26, 0x4b, 0xc3, 0x88, 0xb2, 0x8a, 0x4f, 0xa1, 0x5b, 0x3e, 0xd9, 0xbe, 0x7d,
0xad, 0x83, 0xf9, 0x4d, 0x85, 0xff, 0x97, 0x4c, 0x41, 0x13, 0xe0, 0xcc, 0x73, 0x2e, 0xa6, 0xfe,
0xbe, 0xe3, 0x04, 0xd2, 0xfa, 0xd6, 0x81, 0xda, 0x51, 0x48, 0x2e, 0x8b, 0x9b, 0xd0, 0x48, 0x08,
0x75, 0x69, 0xf2, 0x5a, 0x62, 0xb2, 0xc8, 0x91, 0x04, 0xc4, 0x3e, 0xe8, 0x67, 0x9e, 0x43, 0xa8,
0x67, 0xcd, 0xe3, 0x54, 0xd8, 0xa9, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x71, 0xc5, 0x25, 0x0c, 0x07, 0xd0, 0x2a, 0x92,
0x1b, 0xbd, 0xea, 0x52, 0xf5, 0x22, 0x05, 0x77, 0xa1, 0x79, 0xb1, 0x2b, 0x9e, 0x23, 0x16, 0x70,
0xf1, 0xa7, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x26, 0x8a, 0x0c, 0x22, 0x79, 0x9a, 0x54, 0xed, 0x65, 0x2a, 0xed, 0x81,
0x6a, 0x2f, 0xa7, 0xca, 0x68, 0xd8, 0x81, 0x86, 0xcd, 0x66, 0x3e, 0xa7, 0x41, 0xa7, 0x2a, 0x8c,
0x21, 0x49, 0x68, 0x6e, 0x82, 0x26, 0x7f, 0x71, 0x1b, 0xd4, 0xa1, 0x2b, 0x5d, 0xd3, 0x88, 0x3a,
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0xa4, 0x8a, 0x5c, 0x26, 0x51, 0x05, 0x04, 0x4d, 0x60, 0x52, 0xd3, 0x22, 0xf2, 0x6d, 0xbe, 0x02,
0xc8, 0xc6, 0xf8, 0x57, 0x8f, 0xb4, 0x42, 0x35, 0x57, 0xe1, 0x36, 0x39, 0xac, 0x91, 0xeb, 0x5f,
0xfd, 0xfd, 0xb0, 0x04, 0xa3, 0xe4, 0xb0, 0x10, 0xb4, 0x73, 0x77, 0x42, 0xe3, 0x3e, 0xf2, 0x6d,
0x9a, 0x4b, 0x67, 0x23, 0xc4, 0x7a, 0x05, 0x57, 0xa1, 0x16, 0x2d, 0xa1, 0x62, 0x7e, 0xa9, 0x42,
0x2b, 0x2a, 0x7c, 0xc8, 0x7c, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x5f, 0x16, 0xba, 0x3f, 0x2b, 0x76, 0x8f, 0x49,
0x25, 0x03, 0xbc, 0x80, 0xf5, 0x23, 0xdf, 0xe5, 0xae, 0xc5, 0x59, 0x20, 0x57, 0xe0, 0xc8, 0x77,
0xe8, 0x6d, 0xec, 0x53, 0x19, 0x24, 0x14, 0x84, 0x86, 0x53, 0xe6, 0x3b, 0x34, 0xaf, 0x88, 0x7c,
0x29, 0x83, 0xf0, 0x39, 0xb4, 0x93, 0xa5, 0x3c, 0x67, 0xf2, 0xaf, 0xd1, 0xd2, 0x03, 0x78, 0x80,
0xe4, 0x97, 0xfb, 0x4d, 0xc0, 0x26, 0x92, 0x5d, 0x4b, 0xd9, 0x4b, 0x18, 0xf6, 0xa1, 0x99, 0x2f,
0x5c, 0x76, 0x38, 0x79, 0x42, 0x7a, 0x0c, 0x69, 0xf1, 0x46, 0x89, 0xa2, 0x48, 0x31, 0x87, 0x7f,
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0x0a, 0x3e, 0x86, 0xf5, 0x42, 0x5e, 0x58, 0x12, 0x52, 0x5d, 0x3d, 0xd8, 0xf9, 0x7a, 0x6f, 0x28,
0x77, 0xf7, 0x86, 0xf2, 0xe3, 0xde, 0x50, 0x3e, 0x2f, 0x8c, 0xca, 0xdd, 0xc2, 0xa8, 0x7c, 0x5f,
0x18, 0x95, 0x0f, 0xdd, 0x2b, 0x97, 0x8f, 0x67, 0x97, 0x7d, 0x9b, 0x4d, 0xb6, 0x43, 0xcf, 0xb2,
0xaf, 0xc7, 0x37, 0xdb, 0xd1, 0x48, 0x97, 0x75, 0xf9, 0x39, 0xdf, 0xf9, 0x1d, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff,
0xff, 0x51, 0x0a, 0xe3, 0xd7, 0xde, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00,
}
func (m *NebulaMeta) Marshal() (dAtA []byte, err error) {
@@ -1072,103 +926,6 @@ func (m *NebulaPing) MarshalToSizedBuffer(dAtA []byte) (int, error) {
return len(dAtA) - i, nil
}
func (m *NebulaHandshake) Marshal() (dAtA []byte, err error) {
size := m.Size()
dAtA = make([]byte, size)
n, err := m.MarshalToSizedBuffer(dAtA[:size])
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return dAtA[:n], nil
}
func (m *NebulaHandshake) MarshalTo(dAtA []byte) (int, error) {
size := m.Size()
return m.MarshalToSizedBuffer(dAtA[:size])
}
func (m *NebulaHandshake) MarshalToSizedBuffer(dAtA []byte) (int, error) {
i := len(dAtA)
_ = i
var l int
_ = l
if len(m.Hmac) > 0 {
i -= len(m.Hmac)
copy(dAtA[i:], m.Hmac)
i = encodeVarintNebula(dAtA, i, uint64(len(m.Hmac)))
i--
dAtA[i] = 0x12
}
if m.Details != nil {
{
size, err := m.Details.MarshalToSizedBuffer(dAtA[:i])
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
i -= size
i = encodeVarintNebula(dAtA, i, uint64(size))
}
i--
dAtA[i] = 0xa
}
return len(dAtA) - i, nil
}
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) Marshal() (dAtA []byte, err error) {
size := m.Size()
dAtA = make([]byte, size)
n, err := m.MarshalToSizedBuffer(dAtA[:size])
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return dAtA[:n], nil
}
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) MarshalTo(dAtA []byte) (int, error) {
size := m.Size()
return m.MarshalToSizedBuffer(dAtA[:size])
}
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) MarshalToSizedBuffer(dAtA []byte) (int, error) {
i := len(dAtA)
_ = i
var l int
_ = l
if m.CertVersion != 0 {
i = encodeVarintNebula(dAtA, i, uint64(m.CertVersion))
i--
dAtA[i] = 0x40
}
if m.Time != 0 {
i = encodeVarintNebula(dAtA, i, uint64(m.Time))
i--
dAtA[i] = 0x28
}
if m.Cookie != 0 {
i = encodeVarintNebula(dAtA, i, uint64(m.Cookie))
i--
dAtA[i] = 0x20
}
if m.ResponderIndex != 0 {
i = encodeVarintNebula(dAtA, i, uint64(m.ResponderIndex))
i--
dAtA[i] = 0x18
}
if m.InitiatorIndex != 0 {
i = encodeVarintNebula(dAtA, i, uint64(m.InitiatorIndex))
i--
dAtA[i] = 0x10
}
if len(m.Cert) > 0 {
i -= len(m.Cert)
copy(dAtA[i:], m.Cert)
i = encodeVarintNebula(dAtA, i, uint64(len(m.Cert)))
i--
dAtA[i] = 0xa
}
return len(dAtA) - i, nil
}
func (m *NebulaControl) Marshal() (dAtA []byte, err error) {
size := m.Size()
dAtA = make([]byte, size)
@@ -1375,51 +1132,6 @@ func (m *NebulaPing) Size() (n int) {
return n
}
func (m *NebulaHandshake) Size() (n int) {
if m == nil {
return 0
}
var l int
_ = l
if m.Details != nil {
l = m.Details.Size()
n += 1 + l + sovNebula(uint64(l))
}
l = len(m.Hmac)
if l > 0 {
n += 1 + l + sovNebula(uint64(l))
}
return n
}
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) Size() (n int) {
if m == nil {
return 0
}
var l int
_ = l
l = len(m.Cert)
if l > 0 {
n += 1 + l + sovNebula(uint64(l))
}
if m.InitiatorIndex != 0 {
n += 1 + sovNebula(uint64(m.InitiatorIndex))
}
if m.ResponderIndex != 0 {
n += 1 + sovNebula(uint64(m.ResponderIndex))
}
if m.Cookie != 0 {
n += 1 + sovNebula(uint64(m.Cookie))
}
if m.Time != 0 {
n += 1 + sovNebula(uint64(m.Time))
}
if m.CertVersion != 0 {
n += 1 + sovNebula(uint64(m.CertVersion))
}
return n
}
func (m *NebulaControl) Size() (n int) {
if m == nil {
return 0
@@ -2236,305 +1948,6 @@ func (m *NebulaPing) Unmarshal(dAtA []byte) error {
}
return nil
}
func (m *NebulaHandshake) Unmarshal(dAtA []byte) error {
l := len(dAtA)
iNdEx := 0
for iNdEx < l {
preIndex := iNdEx
var wire uint64
for shift := uint(0); ; shift += 7 {
if shift >= 64 {
return ErrIntOverflowNebula
}
if iNdEx >= l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
b := dAtA[iNdEx]
iNdEx++
wire |= uint64(b&0x7F) << shift
if b < 0x80 {
break
}
}
fieldNum := int32(wire >> 3)
wireType := int(wire & 0x7)
if wireType == 4 {
return fmt.Errorf("proto: NebulaHandshake: wiretype end group for non-group")
}
if fieldNum <= 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("proto: NebulaHandshake: illegal tag %d (wire type %d)", fieldNum, wire)
}
switch fieldNum {
case 1:
if wireType != 2 {
return fmt.Errorf("proto: wrong wireType = %d for field Details", wireType)
}
var msglen int
for shift := uint(0); ; shift += 7 {
if shift >= 64 {
return ErrIntOverflowNebula
}
if iNdEx >= l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
b := dAtA[iNdEx]
iNdEx++
msglen |= int(b&0x7F) << shift
if b < 0x80 {
break
}
}
if msglen < 0 {
return ErrInvalidLengthNebula
}
postIndex := iNdEx + msglen
if postIndex < 0 {
return ErrInvalidLengthNebula
}
if postIndex > l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
if m.Details == nil {
m.Details = &NebulaHandshakeDetails{}
}
if err := m.Details.Unmarshal(dAtA[iNdEx:postIndex]); err != nil {
return err
}
iNdEx = postIndex
case 2:
if wireType != 2 {
return fmt.Errorf("proto: wrong wireType = %d for field Hmac", wireType)
}
var byteLen int
for shift := uint(0); ; shift += 7 {
if shift >= 64 {
return ErrIntOverflowNebula
}
if iNdEx >= l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
b := dAtA[iNdEx]
iNdEx++
byteLen |= int(b&0x7F) << shift
if b < 0x80 {
break
}
}
if byteLen < 0 {
return ErrInvalidLengthNebula
}
postIndex := iNdEx + byteLen
if postIndex < 0 {
return ErrInvalidLengthNebula
}
if postIndex > l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
m.Hmac = append(m.Hmac[:0], dAtA[iNdEx:postIndex]...)
if m.Hmac == nil {
m.Hmac = []byte{}
}
iNdEx = postIndex
default:
iNdEx = preIndex
skippy, err := skipNebula(dAtA[iNdEx:])
if err != nil {
return err
}
if (skippy < 0) || (iNdEx+skippy) < 0 {
return ErrInvalidLengthNebula
}
if (iNdEx + skippy) > l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
iNdEx += skippy
}
}
if iNdEx > l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
return nil
}
func (m *NebulaHandshakeDetails) Unmarshal(dAtA []byte) error {
l := len(dAtA)
iNdEx := 0
for iNdEx < l {
preIndex := iNdEx
var wire uint64
for shift := uint(0); ; shift += 7 {
if shift >= 64 {
return ErrIntOverflowNebula
}
if iNdEx >= l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
b := dAtA[iNdEx]
iNdEx++
wire |= uint64(b&0x7F) << shift
if b < 0x80 {
break
}
}
fieldNum := int32(wire >> 3)
wireType := int(wire & 0x7)
if wireType == 4 {
return fmt.Errorf("proto: NebulaHandshakeDetails: wiretype end group for non-group")
}
if fieldNum <= 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("proto: NebulaHandshakeDetails: illegal tag %d (wire type %d)", fieldNum, wire)
}
switch fieldNum {
case 1:
if wireType != 2 {
return fmt.Errorf("proto: wrong wireType = %d for field Cert", wireType)
}
var byteLen int
for shift := uint(0); ; shift += 7 {
if shift >= 64 {
return ErrIntOverflowNebula
}
if iNdEx >= l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
b := dAtA[iNdEx]
iNdEx++
byteLen |= int(b&0x7F) << shift
if b < 0x80 {
break
}
}
if byteLen < 0 {
return ErrInvalidLengthNebula
}
postIndex := iNdEx + byteLen
if postIndex < 0 {
return ErrInvalidLengthNebula
}
if postIndex > l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
m.Cert = append(m.Cert[:0], dAtA[iNdEx:postIndex]...)
if m.Cert == nil {
m.Cert = []byte{}
}
iNdEx = postIndex
case 2:
if wireType != 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("proto: wrong wireType = %d for field InitiatorIndex", wireType)
}
m.InitiatorIndex = 0
for shift := uint(0); ; shift += 7 {
if shift >= 64 {
return ErrIntOverflowNebula
}
if iNdEx >= l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
b := dAtA[iNdEx]
iNdEx++
m.InitiatorIndex |= uint32(b&0x7F) << shift
if b < 0x80 {
break
}
}
case 3:
if wireType != 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("proto: wrong wireType = %d for field ResponderIndex", wireType)
}
m.ResponderIndex = 0
for shift := uint(0); ; shift += 7 {
if shift >= 64 {
return ErrIntOverflowNebula
}
if iNdEx >= l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
b := dAtA[iNdEx]
iNdEx++
m.ResponderIndex |= uint32(b&0x7F) << shift
if b < 0x80 {
break
}
}
case 4:
if wireType != 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("proto: wrong wireType = %d for field Cookie", wireType)
}
m.Cookie = 0
for shift := uint(0); ; shift += 7 {
if shift >= 64 {
return ErrIntOverflowNebula
}
if iNdEx >= l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
b := dAtA[iNdEx]
iNdEx++
m.Cookie |= uint64(b&0x7F) << shift
if b < 0x80 {
break
}
}
case 5:
if wireType != 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("proto: wrong wireType = %d for field Time", wireType)
}
m.Time = 0
for shift := uint(0); ; shift += 7 {
if shift >= 64 {
return ErrIntOverflowNebula
}
if iNdEx >= l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
b := dAtA[iNdEx]
iNdEx++
m.Time |= uint64(b&0x7F) << shift
if b < 0x80 {
break
}
}
case 8:
if wireType != 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("proto: wrong wireType = %d for field CertVersion", wireType)
}
m.CertVersion = 0
for shift := uint(0); ; shift += 7 {
if shift >= 64 {
return ErrIntOverflowNebula
}
if iNdEx >= l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
b := dAtA[iNdEx]
iNdEx++
m.CertVersion |= uint32(b&0x7F) << shift
if b < 0x80 {
break
}
}
default:
iNdEx = preIndex
skippy, err := skipNebula(dAtA[iNdEx:])
if err != nil {
return err
}
if (skippy < 0) || (iNdEx+skippy) < 0 {
return ErrInvalidLengthNebula
}
if (iNdEx + skippy) > l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
iNdEx += skippy
}
}
if iNdEx > l {
return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
return nil
}
func (m *NebulaControl) Unmarshal(dAtA []byte) error {
l := len(dAtA)
iNdEx := 0
+3 -15
View File
@@ -60,21 +60,9 @@ message NebulaPing {
uint64 Time = 2;
}
message NebulaHandshake {
NebulaHandshakeDetails Details = 1;
bytes Hmac = 2;
}
message NebulaHandshakeDetails {
bytes Cert = 1;
uint32 InitiatorIndex = 2;
uint32 ResponderIndex = 3;
uint64 Cookie = 4;
uint64 Time = 5;
uint32 CertVersion = 8;
// reserved for WIP multiport
reserved 6, 7;
}
// NebulaHandshake / NebulaHandshakeDetails moved to
// handshake/handshake.proto. The handshake package speaks that wire format
// directly via a hand-written encoder/decoder.
message NebulaControl {
enum MessageType {
+13
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,19 @@ type endianness interface {
var noiseEndianness endianness = binary.BigEndian
// NonceSize is the AEAD nonce length used by all ciphers nebula supports
// today (AES-GCM and ChaCha20-Poly1305 both use 96-bit nonces). Encrypt-
// and DecryptDanger lay out the nonce as 4 zero bytes followed by an 8-byte
// big-endian counter; if a future cipher with a different nonce size is
// added, this constant and those layouts must change together.
const NonceSize = 12
// AEADOverhead is the AEAD authentication tag length the ciphers nebula
// supports append to ciphertext. Both AES-GCM and ChaCha20-Poly1305 use
// 128-bit tags. NebulaCipherState.Overhead() returns this dynamically from
// the cipher; the constant is for sizing buffers at construction time.
const AEADOverhead = 16
type NebulaCipherState struct {
c cipher.AEAD
}
+35 -33
View File
@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ const (
minFwPacketLen = 4
)
func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte, h *header.H, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, lhf *LightHouseHandler, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, buf *WireBuffer, packet []byte, lhf *LightHouseHandler, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
h := buf.H
err := h.Parse(packet)
if err != nil {
// Hole punch packets are 0 or 1 byte big, so lets ignore printing those errors
@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte,
switch h.Subtype {
case header.MessageNone:
if !f.decryptToTun(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out, packet, fwPacket, nb, q, localCache) {
if !f.decryptToTun(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, buf, packet, q, localCache) {
return
}
case header.MessageRelay:
@@ -76,8 +77,9 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte,
// which will gracefully fail in the DecryptDanger call.
signedPayload := packet[:len(packet)-hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead()]
signatureValue := packet[len(packet)-hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead():]
out, err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.DecryptDanger(out, signedPayload, signatureValue, h.MessageCounter, nb)
if err != nil {
// AAD-only validation: passing dst=nil since there's no plaintext
// to recover (ciphertext is just the trailing AEAD tag).
if _, err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.DecryptDanger(nil, signedPayload, signatureValue, h.MessageCounter, buf.NB); err != nil {
return
}
// Successfully validated the thing. Get rid of the Relay header.
@@ -110,7 +112,8 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte,
relay: relay,
IsRelayed: true,
}
f.readOutsidePackets(via, out[:0], signedPayload, h, fwPacket, lhf, nb, q, localCache)
buf.Reset()
f.readOutsidePackets(via, buf, signedPayload, lhf, q, localCache)
return
case ForwardingType:
// Find the target HostInfo relay object
@@ -130,7 +133,7 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte,
case ForwardingType:
// Forward this packet through the relay tunnel
// Find the target HostInfo
f.SendVia(targetHI, targetRelay, signedPayload, nb, out, false)
f.SendVia(targetHI, targetRelay, signedPayload, buf)
return
case TerminalType:
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Unexpected Relay Type of Terminal")
@@ -152,7 +155,7 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte,
return
}
d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out, packet, h, nb)
d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, buf, packet, h)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to decrypt lighthouse packet",
"error", err,
@@ -173,7 +176,7 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte,
return
}
d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out, packet, h, nb)
d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, buf, packet, h)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to decrypt test packet",
"error", err,
@@ -185,9 +188,9 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte,
if h.Subtype == header.TestRequest {
// This testRequest might be from TryPromoteBest, so we should roam
// to the new IP address before responding
// to the new IP address before responding.
f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, via)
f.send(header.Test, header.TestReply, ci, hostinfo, d, nb, out)
f.send(header.Test, header.TestReply, ci, hostinfo, d, buf)
}
// Fallthrough to the bottom to record incoming traffic
@@ -210,7 +213,7 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte,
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, via, h) {
return
}
_, err = f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out, packet, h, nb)
_, err = f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, buf, packet, h)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to decrypt CloseTunnel packet",
"error", err,
@@ -230,7 +233,7 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte,
return
}
d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out, packet, h, nb)
d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, buf, packet, h)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to decrypt Control packet",
"error", err,
@@ -266,7 +269,9 @@ func (f *Interface) closeTunnel(hostInfo *HostInfo) {
// sendCloseTunnel is a helper function to send a proper close tunnel packet to a remote
func (f *Interface) sendCloseTunnel(h *HostInfo) {
f.send(header.CloseTunnel, 0, h.ConnectionState, h, []byte{}, make([]byte, 12, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
buf := f.bufAlloc.Acquire()
defer f.bufAlloc.Release(buf)
f.send(header.CloseTunnel, 0, h.ConnectionState, h, []byte{}, buf)
}
func (f *Interface) handleHostRoaming(hostinfo *HostInfo, via ViaSender) {
@@ -515,9 +520,8 @@ func parseV4(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.Packet) error {
return nil
}
func (f *Interface) decrypt(hostinfo *HostInfo, mc uint64, out []byte, packet []byte, h *header.H, nb []byte) ([]byte, error) {
var err error
out, err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.DecryptDanger(out, packet[:header.Len], packet[header.Len:], mc, nb)
func (f *Interface) decrypt(hostinfo *HostInfo, mc uint64, buf *WireBuffer, packet []byte, h *header.H) ([]byte, error) {
plaintext, err := buf.DecryptForHandler(hostinfo.ConnectionState, packet, mc)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -529,42 +533,41 @@ func (f *Interface) decrypt(hostinfo *HostInfo, mc uint64, out []byte, packet []
return nil, errors.New("out of window packet")
}
return out, nil
return plaintext, nil
}
func (f *Interface) decryptToTun(hostinfo *HostInfo, messageCounter uint64, out []byte, packet []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) bool {
var err error
out, err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.DecryptDanger(out, packet[:header.Len], packet[header.Len:], messageCounter, nb)
if err != nil {
func (f *Interface) decryptToTun(hostinfo *HostInfo, messageCounter uint64, buf *WireBuffer, packet []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) bool {
if err := buf.DecryptDatagram(hostinfo.ConnectionState, packet, messageCounter); err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to decrypt packet", "error", err)
return false
}
err = newPacket(out, true, fwPacket)
if err != nil {
ipPacket := buf.IPPacket()
if err := newPacket(ipPacket, true, buf.FwPacket); err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Warn("Error while validating inbound packet",
"error", err,
"packet", out,
"packet", ipPacket,
)
return false
}
if !hostinfo.ConnectionState.window.Update(f.l, messageCounter) {
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("dropping out of window packet", "fwPacket", fwPacket)
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("dropping out of window packet", "fwPacket", buf.FwPacket)
}
return false
}
dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(*fwPacket, true, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), localCache)
dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(*buf.FwPacket, true, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), localCache)
if dropReason != nil {
// NOTE: We give `packet` as the `out` here since we already decrypted from it and we don't need it anymore
// This gives us a buffer to build the reject packet in
f.rejectOutside(out, hostinfo.ConnectionState, hostinfo, nb, packet, q)
// NOTE: We hand `packet` (the original UDP ciphertext we already
// decrypted from) as the reject-IP scratch since we no longer
// need its ciphertext, and it's disjoint from buf.Out where
// sendNoMetrics will encrypt the wire packet.
f.rejectOutside(ipPacket, hostinfo.ConnectionState, hostinfo, packet, buf, q)
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("dropping inbound packet",
"fwPacket", fwPacket,
"fwPacket", buf.FwPacket,
"reason", dropReason,
)
}
@@ -572,8 +575,7 @@ func (f *Interface) decryptToTun(hostinfo *HostInfo, messageCounter uint64, out
}
f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo)
_, err = f.readers[q].Write(out)
if err != nil {
if _, err := buf.WriteIPToTUN(f.readers[q]); err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to write to tun", "error", err)
}
return true
+3
View File
@@ -15,4 +15,7 @@ type Device interface {
RoutesFor(netip.Addr) routing.Gateways
SupportsMultiqueue() bool
NewMultiQueueReader() (io.ReadWriteCloser, error)
// TunPrefixLen reports the number of bytes the device prepends to every IP packet on the wire.
// Currently only non zero for the BSD tun devices.
TunPrefixLen() int
}
+2
View File
@@ -50,3 +50,5 @@ func (NoopTun) NewMultiQueueReader() (io.ReadWriteCloser, error) {
func (NoopTun) Close() error {
return nil
}
func (NoopTun) TunPrefixLen() int { return 0 }
+2
View File
@@ -102,3 +102,5 @@ func (t *tun) SupportsMultiqueue() bool {
func (t *tun) NewMultiQueueReader() (io.ReadWriteCloser, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("TODO: multiqueue not implemented for android")
}
func (t *tun) TunPrefixLen() int { return 0 }
+29
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
//go:build (darwin || ios || freebsd || openbsd || netbsd) && !e2e_testing
package overlay
import (
"fmt"
"syscall"
)
// StampTunPrefix writes the 4-byte AF_INET / AF_INET6 protocol-family marker into buf[0:4] in place,
// picking the family from the first byte of the IP packet at buf[4].
func StampTunPrefix(buf []byte) error {
if len(buf) < 5 {
return fmt.Errorf("tun write buffer too small for prefix")
}
ipVer := buf[4] >> 4
buf[0] = 0
buf[1] = 0
buf[2] = 0
switch ipVer {
case 4:
buf[3] = syscall.AF_INET
case 6:
buf[3] = syscall.AF_INET6
default:
return fmt.Errorf("unable to determine IP version from packet")
}
return nil
}
+4 -42
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import (
"net/netip"
"os"
"sync/atomic"
"syscall"
"unsafe"
"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
@@ -31,9 +30,6 @@ type tun struct {
routeTree atomic.Pointer[bart.Table[routing.Gateways]]
linkAddr *netroute.LinkAddr
l *slog.Logger
// cache out buffer since we need to prepend 4 bytes for tun metadata
out []byte
}
type ifReq struct {
@@ -502,44 +498,6 @@ func delRoute(prefix netip.Prefix, gateway netroute.Addr) error {
return nil
}
func (t *tun) Read(to []byte) (int, error) {
buf := make([]byte, len(to)+4)
n, err := t.ReadWriteCloser.Read(buf)
copy(to, buf[4:])
return n - 4, err
}
// Write is only valid for single threaded use
func (t *tun) Write(from []byte) (int, error) {
buf := t.out
if cap(buf) < len(from)+4 {
buf = make([]byte, len(from)+4)
t.out = buf
}
buf = buf[:len(from)+4]
if len(from) == 0 {
return 0, syscall.EIO
}
// Determine the IP Family for the NULL L2 Header
ipVer := from[0] >> 4
if ipVer == 4 {
buf[3] = syscall.AF_INET
} else if ipVer == 6 {
buf[3] = syscall.AF_INET6
} else {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("unable to determine IP version from packet")
}
copy(buf[4:], from)
n, err := t.ReadWriteCloser.Write(buf)
return n - 4, err
}
func (t *tun) Networks() []netip.Prefix {
return t.vpnNetworks
}
@@ -555,3 +513,7 @@ func (t *tun) SupportsMultiqueue() bool {
func (t *tun) NewMultiQueueReader() (io.ReadWriteCloser, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("TODO: multiqueue not implemented for darwin")
}
// TunPrefixLen reports the 4-byte BSD AF_INET / AF_INET6 protocol-family
// marker the kernel prepends on read and expects on write.
func (t *tun) TunPrefixLen() int { return 4 }
+2
View File
@@ -136,3 +136,5 @@ func (p prettyPacket) String() string {
return s.String()
}
func (t *disabledTun) TunPrefixLen() int { return 0 }
+18 -45
View File
@@ -158,74 +158,43 @@ func (t *tun) blockOnWrite() error {
}
func (t *tun) Read(to []byte) (int, error) {
// first 4 bytes is protocol family, in network byte order
var head [4]byte
iovecs := [2]syscall.Iovec{
{&head[0], 4},
{&to[0], uint64(len(to))},
}
for {
n, _, errno := syscall.Syscall(syscall.SYS_READV, uintptr(t.fd), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&iovecs[0])), 2)
if errno == 0 {
bytesRead := int(n)
if bytesRead < 4 {
return 0, nil
}
return bytesRead - 4, nil
n, err := unix.Read(t.fd, to)
if err == nil {
return n, nil
}
switch errno {
switch err {
case unix.EAGAIN:
if err := t.blockOnRead(); err != nil {
return 0, err
if berr := t.blockOnRead(); berr != nil {
return 0, berr
}
case unix.EINTR:
// retry
case unix.EBADF:
return 0, os.ErrClosed
default:
return 0, errno
return 0, err
}
}
}
// Write is only valid for single threaded use
func (t *tun) Write(from []byte) (int, error) {
if len(from) <= 1 {
return 0, syscall.EIO
}
ipVer := from[0] >> 4
var head [4]byte
// first 4 bytes is protocol family, in network byte order
switch ipVer {
case 4:
head[3] = syscall.AF_INET
case 6:
head[3] = syscall.AF_INET6
default:
return 0, fmt.Errorf("unable to determine IP version from packet")
}
iovecs := [2]syscall.Iovec{
{&head[0], 4},
{&from[0], uint64(len(from))},
}
for {
n, _, errno := syscall.Syscall(syscall.SYS_WRITEV, uintptr(t.fd), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&iovecs[0])), 2)
if errno == 0 {
return int(n) - 4, nil
n, err := unix.Write(t.fd, from)
if err == nil {
return n, nil
}
switch errno {
switch err {
case unix.EAGAIN:
if err := t.blockOnWrite(); err != nil {
return 0, err
if berr := t.blockOnWrite(); berr != nil {
return 0, berr
}
case unix.EINTR:
// retry
case unix.EBADF:
return 0, os.ErrClosed
default:
return 0, errno
return 0, err
}
}
}
@@ -732,3 +701,7 @@ func getLinkAddr(name string) (*netroute.LinkAddr, error) {
return nil, nil
}
// TunPrefixLen reports the 4-byte BSD AF_INET / AF_INET6 protocol-family
// marker the kernel prepends on read and expects on write.
func (t *tun) TunPrefixLen() int { return 4 }
+5 -62
View File
@@ -4,15 +4,12 @@
package overlay
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/netip"
"os"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"syscall"
"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
@@ -36,7 +33,7 @@ func newTunFromFd(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, deviceFd int, vpnNetworks []netip
file := os.NewFile(uintptr(deviceFd), "/dev/tun")
t := &tun{
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
ReadWriteCloser: &tunReadCloser{f: file},
ReadWriteCloser: file,
l: l,
}
@@ -85,64 +82,6 @@ func (t *tun) RoutesFor(ip netip.Addr) routing.Gateways {
return r
}
// The following is hoisted up from water, we do this so we can inject our own fd on iOS
type tunReadCloser struct {
f io.ReadWriteCloser
rMu sync.Mutex
rBuf []byte
wMu sync.Mutex
wBuf []byte
}
func (tr *tunReadCloser) Read(to []byte) (int, error) {
tr.rMu.Lock()
defer tr.rMu.Unlock()
if cap(tr.rBuf) < len(to)+4 {
tr.rBuf = make([]byte, len(to)+4)
}
tr.rBuf = tr.rBuf[:len(to)+4]
n, err := tr.f.Read(tr.rBuf)
copy(to, tr.rBuf[4:])
return n - 4, err
}
func (tr *tunReadCloser) Write(from []byte) (int, error) {
if len(from) == 0 {
return 0, syscall.EIO
}
tr.wMu.Lock()
defer tr.wMu.Unlock()
if cap(tr.wBuf) < len(from)+4 {
tr.wBuf = make([]byte, len(from)+4)
}
tr.wBuf = tr.wBuf[:len(from)+4]
// Determine the IP Family for the NULL L2 Header
ipVer := from[0] >> 4
if ipVer == 4 {
tr.wBuf[3] = syscall.AF_INET
} else if ipVer == 6 {
tr.wBuf[3] = syscall.AF_INET6
} else {
return 0, errors.New("unable to determine IP version from packet")
}
copy(tr.wBuf[4:], from)
n, err := tr.f.Write(tr.wBuf)
return n - 4, err
}
func (tr *tunReadCloser) Close() error {
return tr.f.Close()
}
func (t *tun) Networks() []netip.Prefix {
return t.vpnNetworks
}
@@ -158,3 +97,7 @@ func (t *tun) SupportsMultiqueue() bool {
func (t *tun) NewMultiQueueReader() (io.ReadWriteCloser, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("TODO: multiqueue not implemented for ios")
}
// TunPrefixLen reports the 4-byte BSD AF_INET / AF_INET6 protocol-family
// marker the kernel prepends on read and expects on write.
func (t *tun) TunPrefixLen() int { return 4 }
+2
View File
@@ -907,3 +907,5 @@ func (t *tun) Close() error {
}
return err
}
func (t *tun) TunPrefixLen() int { return 0 }
+14 -103
View File
@@ -58,13 +58,13 @@ type addrLifetime struct {
}
type tun struct {
io.ReadWriteCloser
Device string
vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix
MTU int
Routes atomic.Pointer[[]Route]
routeTree atomic.Pointer[bart.Table[routing.Gateways]]
l *slog.Logger
f *os.File
fd int
}
@@ -96,12 +96,12 @@ func newTun(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, _ bool) (*t
}
t := &tun{
f: os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), ""),
fd: fd,
Device: deviceName,
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
MTU: c.GetInt("tun.mtu", DefaultMTU),
l: l,
ReadWriteCloser: os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), ""),
fd: fd,
Device: deviceName,
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
MTU: c.GetInt("tun.mtu", DefaultMTU),
l: l,
}
err = t.reload(c, true)
@@ -120,12 +120,12 @@ func newTun(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, _ bool) (*t
}
func (t *tun) Close() error {
if t.f != nil {
if err := t.f.Close(); err != nil {
if t.ReadWriteCloser != nil {
if err := t.ReadWriteCloser.Close(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error closing tun file: %w", err)
}
// t.f.Close should have handled it for us but let's be extra sure
// Close on the os.File should have handled the fd for us but let's be extra sure
_ = unix.Close(t.fd)
s, err := syscall.Socket(syscall.AF_INET, syscall.SOCK_DGRAM, syscall.IPPROTO_IP)
@@ -141,99 +141,6 @@ func (t *tun) Close() error {
return nil
}
func (t *tun) Read(to []byte) (int, error) {
rc, err := t.f.SyscallConn()
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to get syscall conn for tun: %w", err)
}
var errno syscall.Errno
var n uintptr
err = rc.Read(func(fd uintptr) bool {
// first 4 bytes is protocol family, in network byte order
head := [4]byte{}
iovecs := []syscall.Iovec{
{&head[0], 4},
{&to[0], uint64(len(to))},
}
n, _, errno = syscall.Syscall(syscall.SYS_READV, fd, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&iovecs[0])), uintptr(2))
if errno.Temporary() {
// We got an EAGAIN, EINTR, or EWOULDBLOCK, go again
return false
}
return true
})
if err != nil {
if err == syscall.EBADF || err.Error() == "use of closed file" {
// Go doesn't export poll.ErrFileClosing but happily reports it to us so here we are
// https://github.com/golang/go/blob/master/src/internal/poll/fd_poll_runtime.go#L121
return 0, os.ErrClosed
}
return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to make read call for tun: %w", err)
}
if errno != 0 {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to make inner read call for tun: %w", errno)
}
// fix bytes read number to exclude header
bytesRead := int(n)
if bytesRead < 0 {
return bytesRead, nil
} else if bytesRead < 4 {
return 0, nil
} else {
return bytesRead - 4, nil
}
}
// Write is only valid for single threaded use
func (t *tun) Write(from []byte) (int, error) {
if len(from) <= 1 {
return 0, syscall.EIO
}
ipVer := from[0] >> 4
var head [4]byte
// first 4 bytes is protocol family, in network byte order
if ipVer == 4 {
head[3] = syscall.AF_INET
} else if ipVer == 6 {
head[3] = syscall.AF_INET6
} else {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("unable to determine IP version from packet")
}
rc, err := t.f.SyscallConn()
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
var errno syscall.Errno
var n uintptr
err = rc.Write(func(fd uintptr) bool {
iovecs := []syscall.Iovec{
{&head[0], 4},
{&from[0], uint64(len(from))},
}
n, _, errno = syscall.Syscall(syscall.SYS_WRITEV, fd, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&iovecs[0])), uintptr(2))
// According to NetBSD documentation for TUN, writes will only return errors in which
// this packet will never be delivered so just go on living life.
return true
})
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
if errno != 0 {
return 0, errno
}
return int(n) - 4, err
}
func (t *tun) addIp(cidr netip.Prefix) error {
if cidr.Addr().Is4() {
var req ifreqAlias4
@@ -551,3 +458,7 @@ func delRoute(prefix netip.Prefix, gateways []netip.Prefix) error {
return nil
}
// TunPrefixLen reports the 4-byte BSD AF_INET / AF_INET6 protocol-family
// marker the kernel prepends on read and expects on write.
func (t *tun) TunPrefixLen() int { return 4 }
+10
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
//go:build (!darwin && !ios && !freebsd && !openbsd && !netbsd) || e2e_testing
package overlay
// StampTunPrefix is a no-op on platforms whose tun devices have no
// protocol-family marker. WireBuffer only invokes it when its prefixLen
// is non-zero, so this should never be reached on these platforms.
func StampTunPrefix(buf []byte) error {
return nil
}
+14 -50
View File
@@ -49,16 +49,14 @@ type ifreq struct {
}
type tun struct {
io.ReadWriteCloser
Device string
vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix
MTU int
Routes atomic.Pointer[[]Route]
routeTree atomic.Pointer[bart.Table[routing.Gateways]]
l *slog.Logger
f *os.File
fd int
// cache out buffer since we need to prepend 4 bytes for tun metadata
out []byte
}
var deviceNameRE = regexp.MustCompile(`^tun[0-9]+$`)
@@ -89,12 +87,12 @@ func newTun(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, _ bool) (*t
}
t := &tun{
f: os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), ""),
fd: fd,
Device: deviceName,
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
MTU: c.GetInt("tun.mtu", DefaultMTU),
l: l,
ReadWriteCloser: os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), ""),
fd: fd,
Device: deviceName,
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
MTU: c.GetInt("tun.mtu", DefaultMTU),
l: l,
}
err = t.reload(c, true)
@@ -113,55 +111,17 @@ func newTun(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, _ bool) (*t
}
func (t *tun) Close() error {
if t.f != nil {
if err := t.f.Close(); err != nil {
if t.ReadWriteCloser != nil {
if err := t.ReadWriteCloser.Close(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error closing tun file: %w", err)
}
// t.f.Close should have handled it for us but let's be extra sure
// Close on the os.File should have handled the fd for us but let's be extra sure
_ = unix.Close(t.fd)
}
return nil
}
func (t *tun) Read(to []byte) (int, error) {
buf := make([]byte, len(to)+4)
n, err := t.f.Read(buf)
copy(to, buf[4:])
return n - 4, err
}
// Write is only valid for single threaded use
func (t *tun) Write(from []byte) (int, error) {
buf := t.out
if cap(buf) < len(from)+4 {
buf = make([]byte, len(from)+4)
t.out = buf
}
buf = buf[:len(from)+4]
if len(from) == 0 {
return 0, syscall.EIO
}
// Determine the IP Family for the NULL L2 Header
ipVer := from[0] >> 4
if ipVer == 4 {
buf[3] = syscall.AF_INET
} else if ipVer == 6 {
buf[3] = syscall.AF_INET6
} else {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("unable to determine IP version from packet")
}
copy(buf[4:], from)
n, err := t.f.Write(buf)
return n - 4, err
}
func (t *tun) addIp(cidr netip.Prefix) error {
if cidr.Addr().Is4() {
var req ifreqAlias4
@@ -471,3 +431,7 @@ func delRoute(prefix netip.Prefix, gateways []netip.Prefix) error {
return nil
}
// TunPrefixLen reports the 4-byte BSD AF_INET / AF_INET6 protocol-family
// marker the kernel prepends on read and expects on write.
func (t *tun) TunPrefixLen() int { return 4 }
+51 -5
View File
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import (
"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
)
type TestTun struct {
@@ -54,9 +55,12 @@ func newTunFromFd(_ *config.C, _ *slog.Logger, _ int, _ []netip.Prefix) (*TestTu
return nil, fmt.Errorf("newTunFromFd not supported")
}
// Send will place a byte array onto the receive queue for nebula to consume
// Send will place a byte array onto the receive queue for nebula to consume.
// These are unencrypted ip layer frames destined for another nebula node.
// packets should exit the udp side, capture them with udpConn.Get
// packets should exit the udp side, capture them with udpConn.Get.
//
// Send copies the input via the freelist, so the caller is free to mutate
// or reuse it after the call returns.
func (t *TestTun) Send(packet []byte) {
if t.closed.Load() {
return
@@ -65,7 +69,9 @@ func (t *TestTun) Send(packet []byte) {
if t.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
t.l.Debug("Tun receiving injected packet", "dataLen", len(packet))
}
t.rxPackets <- packet
buf := acquireTunBuf(len(packet))
copy(buf, packet)
t.rxPackets <- buf
}
// Get will pull an unencrypted ip layer frame from the transmit queue
@@ -110,12 +116,44 @@ func (t *TestTun) Write(b []byte) (n int, err error) {
return 0, io.ErrClosedPipe
}
packet := make([]byte, len(b), len(b))
packet := acquireTunBuf(len(b))
copy(packet, b)
t.TxPackets <- packet
return len(b), nil
}
// ReleaseTunBuf returns a slice from TxPackets to the harness freelist, don't use the bytes after the call.
// Channel-backed instead of sync.Pool because putting a []byte in a sync.Pool escapes the slice header to heap.
func ReleaseTunBuf(b []byte) {
if b == nil {
return
}
select {
case tunBufFreelist <- b:
default:
// Freelist full; drop the buffer for the GC.
}
}
// tunBufFreelist retains the backing arrays for TestTun.Write so steady-state allocation drops to zero once the
// freelist has saturated for the current MTU.
var tunBufFreelist = make(chan []byte, 64)
func acquireTunBuf(n int) []byte {
var b []byte
select {
case b = <-tunBufFreelist:
default:
b = make([]byte, 0, udp.MTU)
}
if cap(b) < n {
b = make([]byte, n)
} else {
b = b[:n]
}
return b
}
func (t *TestTun) Close() error {
if t.closed.CompareAndSwap(false, true) {
close(t.rxPackets)
@@ -129,8 +167,14 @@ func (t *TestTun) Read(b []byte) (int, error) {
if !ok {
return 0, os.ErrClosed
}
n := len(p)
copy(b, p)
return len(p), nil
// Send always pushes a freelist-acquired slice, return it once we've copied the bytes into the caller's buffer.
select {
case tunBufFreelist <- p:
default:
}
return n, nil
}
func (t *TestTun) SupportsMultiqueue() bool {
@@ -140,3 +184,5 @@ func (t *TestTun) SupportsMultiqueue() bool {
func (t *TestTun) NewMultiQueueReader() (io.ReadWriteCloser, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("TODO: multiqueue not implemented")
}
func (t *TestTun) TunPrefixLen() int { return 0 }
+2
View File
@@ -296,3 +296,5 @@ func checkWinTunExists() error {
_, err = syscall.LoadDLL(filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(myPath), "dist", "windows", "wintun", "bin", arch, "wintun.dll"))
return err
}
func (t *winTun) TunPrefixLen() int { return 0 }
+2
View File
@@ -69,3 +69,5 @@ func (d *UserDevice) Close() error {
d.outboundWriter.Close()
return nil
}
func (d *UserDevice) TunPrefixLen() int { return 0 }
+79 -42
View File
@@ -15,9 +15,12 @@ import (
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/noiseutil"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
)
@@ -28,11 +31,11 @@ type PKI struct {
}
type CertState struct {
v1Cert cert.Certificate
v1HandshakeBytes []byte
v1Cert cert.Certificate
v1Credential *handshake.Credential
v2Cert cert.Certificate
v2HandshakeBytes []byte
v2Cert cert.Certificate
v2Credential *handshake.Credential
initiatingVersion cert.Version
privateKey []byte
@@ -92,13 +95,35 @@ func (p *PKI) reload(c *config.C, initial bool) error {
}
func (p *PKI) reloadCerts(c *config.C, initial bool) *util.ContextualError {
newState, err := newCertStateFromConfig(c)
var cipher string
var currentState *CertState
if initial {
cipher = c.GetString("cipher", "aes")
//TODO: this sucks and we should make it not a global
switch cipher {
case "aes":
noiseEndianness = binary.BigEndian
case "chachapoly":
noiseEndianness = binary.LittleEndian
default:
return util.NewContextualError(
"unknown cipher",
m{"cipher": cipher},
nil,
)
}
} else {
// Cipher cant be hot swapped so just leave it at what it was before
currentState = p.cs.Load()
cipher = currentState.cipher
}
newState, err := newCertStateFromConfig(c, cipher)
if err != nil {
return util.NewContextualError("Could not load client cert", nil, err)
}
if !initial {
currentState := p.cs.Load()
if currentState != nil {
if newState.v1Cert != nil {
if currentState.v1Cert == nil {
//adding certs is fine, actually. Networks-in-common confirmed in newCertState().
@@ -158,25 +183,6 @@ func (p *PKI) reloadCerts(c *config.C, initial bool) *util.ContextualError {
)
}
}
// Cipher cant be hot swapped so just leave it at what it was before
newState.cipher = currentState.cipher
} else {
newState.cipher = c.GetString("cipher", "aes")
//TODO: this sucks and we should make it not a global
switch newState.cipher {
case "aes":
noiseEndianness = binary.BigEndian
case "chachapoly":
noiseEndianness = binary.LittleEndian
default:
return util.NewContextualError(
"unknown cipher",
m{"cipher": newState.cipher},
nil,
)
}
}
p.cs.Store(newState)
@@ -208,6 +214,20 @@ func (cs *CertState) GetDefaultCertificate() cert.Certificate {
return c
}
// DefaultVersion returns the preferred cert version for initiating handshakes.
func (cs *CertState) DefaultVersion() cert.Version { return cs.initiatingVersion }
// GetCredential returns the pre-computed handshake credential for the given version, or nil.
func (cs *CertState) GetCredential(v cert.Version) *handshake.Credential {
switch v {
case cert.Version1:
return cs.v1Credential
case cert.Version2:
return cs.v2Credential
}
return nil
}
func (cs *CertState) getCertificate(v cert.Version) cert.Certificate {
switch v {
case cert.Version1:
@@ -219,17 +239,25 @@ func (cs *CertState) getCertificate(v cert.Version) cert.Certificate {
return nil
}
// getHandshakeBytes returns the cached bytes to be used in a handshake message for the requested version.
// Callers must check if the return []byte is nil.
func (cs *CertState) getHandshakeBytes(v cert.Version) []byte {
switch v {
case cert.Version1:
return cs.v1HandshakeBytes
case cert.Version2:
return cs.v2HandshakeBytes
func newCipherSuite(curve cert.Curve, pkcs11backed bool, cipher string) (noise.CipherSuite, error) {
var dhFunc noise.DHFunc
switch curve {
case cert.Curve_CURVE25519:
dhFunc = noise.DH25519
case cert.Curve_P256:
if pkcs11backed {
dhFunc = noiseutil.DHP256PKCS11
} else {
dhFunc = noiseutil.DHP256
}
default:
return nil
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported curve: %s", curve)
}
if cipher == "chachapoly" {
return noise.NewCipherSuite(dhFunc, noise.CipherChaChaPoly, noise.HashSHA256), nil
}
return noise.NewCipherSuite(dhFunc, noiseutil.CipherAESGCM, noise.HashSHA256), nil
}
func (cs *CertState) String() string {
@@ -261,7 +289,7 @@ func (cs *CertState) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
return json.Marshal(msg)
}
func newCertStateFromConfig(c *config.C) (*CertState, error) {
func newCertStateFromConfig(c *config.C, cipher string) (*CertState, error) {
var err error
privPathOrPEM := c.GetString("pki.key", "")
@@ -345,13 +373,14 @@ func newCertStateFromConfig(c *config.C) (*CertState, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unknown pki.initiating_version: %v", rawInitiatingVersion)
}
return newCertState(initiatingVersion, v1, v2, isPkcs11, curve, rawKey)
return newCertState(initiatingVersion, v1, v2, isPkcs11, curve, rawKey, cipher)
}
func newCertState(dv cert.Version, v1, v2 cert.Certificate, pkcs11backed bool, privateKeyCurve cert.Curve, privateKey []byte) (*CertState, error) {
func newCertState(dv cert.Version, v1, v2 cert.Certificate, pkcs11backed bool, privateKeyCurve cert.Curve, privateKey []byte, cipher string) (*CertState, error) {
cs := CertState{
privateKey: privateKey,
pkcs11Backed: pkcs11backed,
cipher: cipher,
myVpnNetworksTable: new(bart.Lite),
myVpnAddrsTable: new(bart.Lite),
myVpnBroadcastAddrsTable: new(bart.Lite),
@@ -384,10 +413,14 @@ func newCertState(dv cert.Version, v1, v2 cert.Certificate, pkcs11backed bool, p
v1hs, err := v1.MarshalForHandshakes()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error marshalling certificate for handshake: %w", err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error marshalling v1 certificate for handshake: %w", err)
}
ncs, err := newCipherSuite(v1.Curve(), pkcs11backed, cipher)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
cs.v1Cert = v1
cs.v1HandshakeBytes = v1hs
cs.v1Credential = handshake.NewCredential(v1, v1hs, privateKey, ncs)
if cs.initiatingVersion == 0 {
cs.initiatingVersion = cert.Version1
@@ -405,10 +438,14 @@ func newCertState(dv cert.Version, v1, v2 cert.Certificate, pkcs11backed bool, p
v2hs, err := v2.MarshalForHandshakes()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error marshalling certificate for handshake: %w", err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error marshalling v2 certificate for handshake: %w", err)
}
ncs, err := newCipherSuite(v2.Curve(), pkcs11backed, cipher)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
cs.v2Cert = v2
cs.v2HandshakeBytes = v2hs
cs.v2Credential = handshake.NewCredential(v2, v2hs, privateKey, ncs)
if cs.initiatingVersion == 0 {
cs.initiatingVersion = cert.Version2
+171 -10
View File
@@ -15,9 +15,10 @@ import (
)
type relayManager struct {
l *slog.Logger
hostmap *HostMap
amRelay atomic.Bool
l *slog.Logger
hostmap *HostMap
amRelay atomic.Bool
useRelays atomic.Bool
}
func NewRelayManager(ctx context.Context, l *slog.Logger, hostmap *HostMap, c *config.C) *relayManager {
@@ -36,8 +37,10 @@ func NewRelayManager(ctx context.Context, l *slog.Logger, hostmap *HostMap, c *c
}
func (rm *relayManager) reload(c *config.C, initial bool) error {
if initial || c.HasChanged("relay.am_relay") {
rm.setAmRelay(c.GetBool("relay.am_relay", false))
if initial || c.HasChanged("relay.am_relay") || c.HasChanged("relay.use_relays") {
amRelay := c.GetBool("relay.am_relay", false)
rm.amRelay.Store(amRelay)
rm.useRelays.Store(c.GetBool("relay.use_relays", true) && !amRelay)
}
return nil
}
@@ -46,8 +49,160 @@ func (rm *relayManager) GetAmRelay() bool {
return rm.amRelay.Load()
}
func (rm *relayManager) setAmRelay(v bool) {
rm.amRelay.Store(v)
func (rm *relayManager) GetUseRelays() bool {
return rm.useRelays.Load()
}
// StartRelays drives the relay-establishment side of an outbound handshake attempt.
// For each candidate relay it either kicks off a handshake to the relay, sends a CreateRelayRequest, retransmits
// one that may have been lost, or, once the relay is Established, forwards the in-progress
// stage 0 handshake packet for vpnIp through it.
func (rm *relayManager) StartRelays(f *Interface, vpnIp netip.Addr, hostinfo *HostInfo, stage0 []byte) {
if !rm.GetUseRelays() || len(hostinfo.remotes.relays) == 0 {
return
}
hostinfo.logger(rm.l).Info("Attempt to relay through hosts", "relays", hostinfo.remotes.relays)
// One WireBuffer for the whole relay-fanout loop.
buf := f.bufAlloc.Acquire()
defer f.bufAlloc.Release(buf)
// Send a RelayRequest to all known Relay IP's
for _, relay := range hostinfo.remotes.relays {
// Don't relay through the host I'm trying to connect to
if relay == vpnIp {
continue
}
// Don't relay to myself
if f.myVpnAddrsTable.Contains(relay) {
continue
}
relayHostInfo := rm.hostmap.QueryVpnAddr(relay)
if relayHostInfo == nil || !relayHostInfo.remote.IsValid() {
hostinfo.logger(rm.l).Info("Establish tunnel to relay target", "relay", relay.String())
f.Handshake(relay)
continue
}
// Check the relay HostInfo to see if we already established a relay through
existingRelay, ok := relayHostInfo.relayState.QueryRelayForByIp(vpnIp)
if !ok {
// No relays exist or requested yet.
if relayHostInfo.remote.IsValid() {
idx, err := AddRelay(rm.l, relayHostInfo, rm.hostmap, vpnIp, nil, TerminalType, Requested)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(rm.l).Info("Failed to add relay to hostmap", "relay", relay.String(), "error", err)
}
m := NebulaControl{
Type: NebulaControl_CreateRelayRequest,
InitiatorRelayIndex: idx,
}
switch relayHostInfo.GetCert().Certificate.Version() {
case cert.Version1:
if !f.myVpnAddrs[0].Is4() {
hostinfo.logger(rm.l).Error("can not establish v1 relay with a v6 network because the relay is not running a current nebula version")
continue
}
if !vpnIp.Is4() {
hostinfo.logger(rm.l).Error("can not establish v1 relay with a v6 remote network because the relay is not running a current nebula version")
continue
}
b := f.myVpnAddrs[0].As4()
m.OldRelayFromAddr = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[:])
b = vpnIp.As4()
m.OldRelayToAddr = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[:])
case cert.Version2:
m.RelayFromAddr = netAddrToProtoAddr(f.myVpnAddrs[0])
m.RelayToAddr = netAddrToProtoAddr(vpnIp)
default:
hostinfo.logger(rm.l).Error("Unknown certificate version found while creating relay")
continue
}
msg, err := m.Marshal()
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(rm.l).Error("Failed to marshal Control message to create relay", "error", err)
} else {
f.SendMessageToHostInfo(header.Control, 0, relayHostInfo, msg, buf)
rm.l.Info("send CreateRelayRequest",
"relayFrom", f.myVpnAddrs[0],
"relayTo", vpnIp,
"initiatorRelayIndex", idx,
"relay", relay,
)
}
}
continue
}
switch existingRelay.State {
case Established:
hostinfo.logger(rm.l).Info("Send handshake via relay", "relay", relay.String())
f.SendVia(relayHostInfo, existingRelay, stage0, buf)
case Disestablished:
// Mark this relay as 'requested'
relayHostInfo.relayState.UpdateRelayForByIpState(vpnIp, Requested)
fallthrough
case Requested:
hostinfo.logger(rm.l).Info("Re-send CreateRelay request", "relay", relay.String())
// Re-send the CreateRelay request, in case the previous one was lost.
m := NebulaControl{
Type: NebulaControl_CreateRelayRequest,
InitiatorRelayIndex: existingRelay.LocalIndex,
}
switch relayHostInfo.GetCert().Certificate.Version() {
case cert.Version1:
if !f.myVpnAddrs[0].Is4() {
hostinfo.logger(rm.l).Error("can not establish v1 relay with a v6 network because the relay is not running a current nebula version")
continue
}
if !vpnIp.Is4() {
hostinfo.logger(rm.l).Error("can not establish v1 relay with a v6 remote network because the relay is not running a current nebula version")
continue
}
b := f.myVpnAddrs[0].As4()
m.OldRelayFromAddr = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[:])
b = vpnIp.As4()
m.OldRelayToAddr = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[:])
case cert.Version2:
m.RelayFromAddr = netAddrToProtoAddr(f.myVpnAddrs[0])
m.RelayToAddr = netAddrToProtoAddr(vpnIp)
default:
hostinfo.logger(rm.l).Error("Unknown certificate version found while creating relay")
continue
}
msg, err := m.Marshal()
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(rm.l).Error("Failed to marshal Control message to create relay", "error", err)
} else {
// This must send over the hostinfo, not over hm.Hosts[ip]
f.SendMessageToHostInfo(header.Control, 0, relayHostInfo, msg, buf)
rm.l.Info("send CreateRelayRequest",
"relayFrom", f.myVpnAddrs[0],
"relayTo", vpnIp,
"initiatorRelayIndex", existingRelay.LocalIndex,
"relay", relay,
)
}
case PeerRequested:
// PeerRequested only occurs in Forwarding relays, not Terminal relays, and this is a Terminal relay case.
fallthrough
default:
hostinfo.logger(rm.l).Error("Relay unexpected state",
"vpnIp", vpnIp,
"state", existingRelay.State,
"relay", relay,
)
}
}
}
// AddRelay finds an available relay index on the hostmap, and associates the relay info with it.
@@ -216,7 +371,9 @@ func (rm *relayManager) handleCreateRelayResponse(v cert.Version, h *HostInfo, f
if err != nil {
rm.l.Error("relayManager Failed to marshal Control CreateRelayResponse message to create relay", "error", err)
} else {
f.SendMessageToHostInfo(header.Control, 0, peerHostInfo, msg, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
buf := f.bufAlloc.Acquire()
f.SendMessageToHostInfo(header.Control, 0, peerHostInfo, msg, buf)
f.bufAlloc.Release(buf)
rm.l.Info("send CreateRelayResponse",
"relayFrom", resp.RelayFromAddr,
"relayTo", resp.RelayToAddr,
@@ -316,7 +473,9 @@ func (rm *relayManager) handleCreateRelayRequest(v cert.Version, h *HostInfo, f
if err != nil {
logMsg.Error("relayManager Failed to marshal Control CreateRelayResponse message to create relay", "error", err)
} else {
f.SendMessageToHostInfo(header.Control, 0, h, msg, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
buf := f.bufAlloc.Acquire()
f.SendMessageToHostInfo(header.Control, 0, h, msg, buf)
f.bufAlloc.Release(buf)
rm.l.Info("send CreateRelayResponse",
"relayFrom", from,
"relayTo", target,
@@ -386,7 +545,9 @@ func (rm *relayManager) handleCreateRelayRequest(v cert.Version, h *HostInfo, f
if err != nil {
logMsg.Error("relayManager Failed to marshal Control message to create relay", "error", err)
} else {
f.SendMessageToHostInfo(header.Control, 0, peer, msg, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
buf := f.bufAlloc.Acquire()
f.SendMessageToHostInfo(header.Control, 0, peer, msg, buf)
f.bufAlloc.Release(buf)
rm.l.Info("send CreateRelayRequest",
"relayFrom", h.vpnAddrs[0],
"relayTo", target,
+3 -9
View File
@@ -632,15 +632,9 @@ func sshCloseTunnel(ifce *Interface, fs any, a []string, w sshd.StringWriter) er
}
if !flags.LocalOnly {
ifce.send(
header.CloseTunnel,
0,
hostInfo.ConnectionState,
hostInfo,
[]byte{},
make([]byte, 12, 12),
make([]byte, mtu),
)
buf := ifce.bufAlloc.Acquire()
ifce.send(header.CloseTunnel, 0, hostInfo.ConnectionState, hostInfo, []byte{}, buf)
ifce.bufAlloc.Release(buf)
}
ifce.closeTunnel(hostInfo)
+52 -15
View File
@@ -21,17 +21,48 @@ type Packet struct {
Data []byte
}
// Copy returns a fresh *Packet (from the freelist) with a duplicate Data buffer.
func (u *Packet) Copy() *Packet {
n := &Packet{
To: u.To,
From: u.From,
Data: make([]byte, len(u.Data)),
n := acquirePacket()
n.To = u.To
n.From = u.From
if cap(n.Data) < len(u.Data) {
n.Data = make([]byte, len(u.Data))
} else {
n.Data = n.Data[:len(u.Data)]
}
copy(n.Data, u.Data)
return n
}
// Release returns p to the harness packet freelist.
// Callers that pull a *Packet from Get / TxPackets must Release when done.
// Channel-backed instead of sync.Pool because sync.Pool's per-P caches drain badly under cross-goroutine Get/Put,
// and putting a []byte in a Pool escapes the slice header to heap.
func (p *Packet) Release() {
if p == nil {
return
}
p.Data = p.Data[:0]
select {
case packetFreelist <- p:
default:
// Freelist full; drop the *Packet for the GC.
}
}
// packetFreelist retains *Packet structs (and their backing Data arrays) so steady-state allocation drops to zero.
var packetFreelist = make(chan *Packet, 64)
func acquirePacket() *Packet {
select {
case p := <-packetFreelist:
return p
default:
return &Packet{}
}
}
type TesterConn struct {
Addr netip.AddrPort
@@ -64,13 +95,15 @@ func NewListener(l *slog.Logger, ip netip.Addr, port int, _ bool, _ int) (Conn,
// this is an encrypted packet or a handshake message in most cases
// packets were transmitted from another nebula node, you can send them with Tun.Send
func (u *TesterConn) Send(packet *Packet) {
h := &header.H{}
if err := h.Parse(packet.Data); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
if u.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
// Parse the header only under debug logging, otherwise the
// allocation would show up in every Send call.
var h header.H
if err := h.Parse(packet.Data); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
u.l.Debug("UDP receiving injected packet",
"header", h,
"header", &h,
"udpAddr", packet.From,
"dataLen", len(packet.Data),
)
@@ -107,15 +140,18 @@ func (u *TesterConn) Get(block bool) *Packet {
//********************************************************************************************************************//
func (u *TesterConn) WriteTo(b []byte, addr netip.AddrPort) error {
p := &Packet{
Data: make([]byte, len(b), len(b)),
From: u.Addr,
To: addr,
p := acquirePacket()
if cap(p.Data) < len(b) {
p.Data = make([]byte, len(b))
} else {
p.Data = p.Data[:len(b)]
}
copy(p.Data, b)
p.From = u.Addr
p.To = addr
select {
case <-u.done:
p.Release()
return io.ErrClosedPipe
case u.TxPackets <- p:
return nil
@@ -129,6 +165,7 @@ func (u *TesterConn) ListenOut(r EncReader) error {
return os.ErrClosed
case p := <-u.RxPackets:
r(p.From, p.Data)
p.Release()
}
}
}
+255
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
package nebula
import (
"io"
"sync"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/noiseutil"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay"
)
// WireBuffer is the per-goroutine working set for processing one IP packet
// through the data plane. It owns:
//
// - The IP-payload byte buffer used to hold the current inbound or
// outbound packet, with prefixLen bytes of slack at the front for
// the BSD AF_INET protocol-family marker.
// - The fwPacket scratch parsed by newPacket().
// - The 12-byte AEAD nonce scratch.
// - The header.H parse target used by the receive path.
// - An mtu-sized wire-output scratch for sendNoMetrics and for building
// reject packets.
//
// One WireBuffer is allocated per data-plane goroutine (listenIn for the
// TUN-side, listenOut for the UDP-side) and reused for every packet. No
// per-packet allocation. Future GRO/GSO/TSO and reliable-transport work
// will likely extend this to carry batch state and fragment metadata.
//
// The TUN protocol-family prefix is handled here, not in the overlay
// package. On BSDs the kernel writes the 4-byte marker into the slack on
// read, and we stamp it into the slack before write. On linux/windows
// /userspace devices prefixLen is 0 and the slack is empty.
type WireBuffer struct {
// FwPacket is the parsed IP packet metadata (5-tuple, fragment flags,
// etc.) populated by newPacket().
FwPacket *firewall.Packet
// NB is a 12-byte scratch the AEAD uses for the nonce; reused so we
// don't allocate one per encrypt/decrypt.
NB []byte
// H is the parse target for inbound nebula headers. Receive path only.
H *header.H
// Out is an mtu-sized wire-output scratch passed to sendNoMetrics and
// rejectInside / rejectOutside. Sized to fit any single wire packet.
Out []byte
// ip is the IP-payload region: a slice of len 0, cap linkMTU sliced
// from raw at offset prefixLen. The current packet (if any) is
// ip[:bodyN]. The TUN prefix slack lives at raw[0:prefixLen] just
// before ip.
ip []byte
// raw is the backing slab. Layout:
// [prefixLen bytes prefix slack | linkMTU bytes IP region | outSize bytes Out scratch]
// Holding it lets ReadIPFromTUN / WriteIPToTUN address the slack
// region directly.
raw []byte
prefixLen int
bodyN int
}
// NewWireBuffer returns a buffer sized to hold any single IP packet up to
// linkMTU, plus a disjoint wire-output scratch sliced from the same backing
// slab (the AEAD's Seal contract requires plaintext and dst not to partially
// overlap, and keeping them in one slab gives a single allocation per
// goroutine). Out is sized for the relay worst case
// (linkMTU + 2*header.Len + 2*AEADOverhead).
//
// prefixLen is the number of bytes the destination tun device prepends/
// expects on each IP packet (overlay.Device.TunPrefixLen). On BSDs this
// is 4 (AF_INET marker); on linux/windows/userspace devices it is 0.
func NewWireBuffer(linkMTU, prefixLen int) *WireBuffer {
outSize := linkMTU + 2*header.Len + 2*AEADOverhead
raw := make([]byte, prefixLen+linkMTU+outSize)
outStart := prefixLen + linkMTU
return &WireBuffer{
FwPacket: &firewall.Packet{},
NB: make([]byte, NonceSize),
H: &header.H{},
Out: raw[outStart : outStart : outStart+outSize],
ip: raw[prefixLen:prefixLen:outStart],
raw: raw,
prefixLen: prefixLen,
}
}
// Reset clears the body-length record so the buffer is ready for another
// recv (e.g. relay-receive recursion before a nested decrypt).
func (b *WireBuffer) Reset() { b.bodyN = 0 }
// IPPacket returns the IP packet currently held in the payload region (after
// a successful ReadIPFromTUN or DecryptDatagram). The slice aliases the
// buffer; do not retain past the next operation.
func (b *WireBuffer) IPPacket() []byte {
return b.ip[:b.bodyN]
}
// Seal stamps a nebula header at the front of buf.Out and AEAD-seals p as the
// payload, treating the header as additional authenticated data. The lock
// scope around counter increment + encrypt matches what goboring AESGCMTLS
// requires; non-boring builds skip the lock.
//
// Returns the wire bytes (header || ciphertext || tag), aliased to buf.Out.
// The slice is invalidated by the next Seal* call on this buffer.
func (b *WireBuffer) Seal(ci *ConnectionState, t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, remoteIndex uint32, p []byte) ([]byte, error) {
return b.sealInto(b.Out[:cap(b.Out)], ci, t, st, remoteIndex, p)
}
// SealForRelay is like Seal but reserves header.Len bytes of slack at the front
// of buf.Out for an outer relay header. The inner header + ciphertext lands at
// offset header.Len so a follow-up SealRelayInPlace can stamp the outer header
// without copying. Use this when the caller may need to wrap the result in a
// relay envelope after the fact.
func (b *WireBuffer) SealForRelay(ci *ConnectionState, t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, remoteIndex uint32, p []byte) ([]byte, error) {
return b.sealInto(b.Out[header.Len:cap(b.Out)], ci, t, st, remoteIndex, p)
}
func (b *WireBuffer) sealInto(out []byte, ci *ConnectionState, t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, remoteIndex uint32, p []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
ci.writeLock.Lock()
}
c := ci.messageCounter.Add(1)
out = header.Encode(out, header.Version, t, st, remoteIndex, c)
out, err := ci.eKey.EncryptDanger(out, out, p, c, b.NB)
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
ci.writeLock.Unlock()
}
return out, err
}
// SealRelayInPlace wraps an inner message that is already staged at
// buf.Out[header.Len:header.Len+innerLen] (either from a SealForRelay encrypt
// or from a copy via the SendVia entry point). It stamps the outer relay
// header into buf.Out[:header.Len] and AAD-only seals over the entire region,
// producing the wire bytes for the relay tunnel.
//
// Returns the wire bytes aliased to buf.Out; invalidated by the next Seal*
// call on this buffer.
func (b *WireBuffer) SealRelayInPlace(ci *ConnectionState, remoteIndex uint32, innerLen int) ([]byte, error) {
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
ci.writeLock.Lock()
}
c := ci.messageCounter.Add(1)
out := b.Out[:cap(b.Out)]
out = header.Encode(out, header.Version, header.Message, header.MessageRelay, remoteIndex, c)
out = out[:header.Len+innerLen]
out, err := ci.eKey.EncryptDanger(out, out, nil, c, b.NB)
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
ci.writeLock.Unlock()
}
return out, err
}
// StageRelayInner copies ad into the inner-payload slot at buf.Out[header.Len:]
// so SealRelayInPlace can wrap it on the next call. Used by SendVia when ad
// did not come from a prior SealForRelay (e.g. a handshake message being
// forwarded through a relay tunnel without our own encryption).
func (b *WireBuffer) StageRelayInner(ad []byte) int {
return copy(b.Out[header.Len:cap(b.Out)], ad)
}
// ReadIPFromTUN reads one IP packet from r into the payload region and
// updates bodyN. On BSDs the kernel writes its 4-byte protocol-family
// marker into the slack at raw[0:prefixLen] and the IP packet at
// raw[prefixLen:prefixLen+n]; we hand it the slack-prefixed slice so
// the kernel can do this in one syscall with no copy. On linux/windows/
// userspace devices prefixLen is 0 and the slack is empty.
func (b *WireBuffer) ReadIPFromTUN(r io.Reader) (int, error) {
n, err := r.Read(b.raw[:b.prefixLen+cap(b.ip)])
if err != nil {
b.bodyN = 0
return 0, err
}
if n < b.prefixLen {
b.bodyN = 0
return 0, nil
}
b.bodyN = n - b.prefixLen
return b.bodyN, nil
}
// WriteIPToTUN writes the IP packet currently in the payload region to w.
// On BSDs we stamp the protocol-family marker into the slack at
// raw[0:prefixLen] in place and write the entire slack+IP region in a
// single syscall, so the kernel sees [marker][ip] back to back without a
// userspace copy. On linux/windows/userspace devices the slack is empty
// and we just write the IP region.
func (b *WireBuffer) WriteIPToTUN(w io.Writer) (int, error) {
out := b.raw[:b.prefixLen+b.bodyN]
if b.prefixLen > 0 {
if err := overlay.StampTunPrefix(out); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
}
return w.Write(out)
}
// DecryptDatagram decrypts an inbound UDP packet into the payload region.
func (b *WireBuffer) DecryptDatagram(ci *ConnectionState, packet []byte, mc uint64) error {
dst, err := ci.dKey.DecryptDanger(b.ip[:0], packet[:header.Len], packet[header.Len:], mc, b.NB)
if err != nil {
b.bodyN = 0
return err
}
b.bodyN = len(dst)
return nil
}
// DecryptForHandler decrypts an inbound UDP packet (lighthouse, test,
// control, close-tunnel) into the payload region and returns the plaintext
// slice for the in-process handler. Returned slice aliases the buffer.
func (b *WireBuffer) DecryptForHandler(ci *ConnectionState, packet []byte, mc uint64) ([]byte, error) {
dst, err := ci.dKey.DecryptDanger(b.ip[:0], packet[:header.Len], packet[header.Len:], mc, b.NB)
if err != nil {
b.bodyN = 0
return nil, err
}
b.bodyN = len(dst)
return dst, nil
}
// WireBufferAllocator hands out reusable WireBuffers for cold callers that
// don't own a long-lived per-goroutine buffer (control plane, relay manager,
// connection manager teardown, etc.). Hot-path goroutines hold their own
// buffer for the life of the goroutine and don't need to acquire one.
type WireBufferAllocator interface {
Acquire() *WireBuffer
Release(*WireBuffer)
}
// wireBufferPool is a sync.Pool-backed WireBufferAllocator. The pool is
// keyed off a single linkMTU and prefixLen; cold callers send across the
// data-plane mtu and target the same Device, so we size the pool's
// buffers the same way.
type wireBufferPool struct {
pool sync.Pool
}
func NewWireBufferPool(linkMTU, prefixLen int) *wireBufferPool {
return &wireBufferPool{
pool: sync.Pool{
New: func() any {
return NewWireBuffer(linkMTU, prefixLen)
},
},
}
}
func (p *wireBufferPool) Acquire() *WireBuffer {
return p.pool.Get().(*WireBuffer)
}
func (p *wireBufferPool) Release(b *WireBuffer) {
b.Reset()
p.pool.Put(b)
}