mirror of
https://github.com/slackhq/nebula.git
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No files matched your search
@@ -25,9 +25,9 @@ inputs:
|
||||
required: false
|
||||
default: "code-signer"
|
||||
key-prefix:
|
||||
description: "S3 key prefix the caller is authorized to write under"
|
||||
description: "S3 key prefix to write under; defaults to code-signing/<owner>/<repo> of the calling repo"
|
||||
required: false
|
||||
default: "code-signing/slackhq/nebula"
|
||||
default: ""
|
||||
|
||||
runs:
|
||||
using: composite
|
||||
@@ -43,8 +43,15 @@ runs:
|
||||
with:
|
||||
role-to-assume: ${{ inputs.role }}
|
||||
aws-region: ${{ inputs.region }}
|
||||
# Default is 12 retries to ride out IAM trust-policy propagation; once
|
||||
# the role is stable we want a real misconfiguration to fail fast.
|
||||
# An STS secret key with special characters does not survive the
|
||||
# pwsh -> make -> MSYS sh -> aws.exe chain, and SigV4 then signs with a
|
||||
# key that no longer matches, so the first S3 upload fails with
|
||||
# SignatureDoesNotMatch. Retries the assume until it comes back clean.
|
||||
# Same fix as DefinedNet/dnclient#867.
|
||||
special-characters-workaround: true
|
||||
# Overridden by the workaround above and kept for whenever that goes:
|
||||
# the default 12 rides out IAM trust-policy propagation, and once the
|
||||
# role is stable a real misconfiguration should fail fast.
|
||||
retry-max-attempts: 5
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Sign .exe files
|
||||
@@ -57,6 +64,9 @@ runs:
|
||||
KEY_PREFIX: ${{ inputs.key-prefix }}
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
set -eu
|
||||
# Default the prefix to this repo so the S3 key attributes the sign correctly.
|
||||
# nebula-nightly runs this same action but writes under its own repo's prefix.
|
||||
KEY_PREFIX="${KEY_PREFIX:-code-signing/$GITHUB_REPOSITORY}"
|
||||
RUN="${GITHUB_RUN_ID}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT}"
|
||||
|
||||
find "$SIGN_PATH" -name '*.exe' -print | while read -r path
|
||||
|
||||
Executable
+142
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Backport a merged PR to a release branch.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Cherry-picks the merge commit of a merged PR onto release-1.11 and opens a
|
||||
# backport PR, mirroring the shape of #1842.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Usage: ./backport.sh <pr-number> [target-version] [--continue]
|
||||
# pr-number The merged PR to backport
|
||||
# target-version Release version to target (default: 1.11)
|
||||
# --continue Resume after resolving cherry-pick conflicts: assumes the
|
||||
# fixes are staged, runs `git cherry-pick --continue`, and
|
||||
# proceeds to push and open the backport PR.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Requires: gh (authenticated), git, jq.
|
||||
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
|
||||
PR_NUMBER=${1:?usage: backport.sh <pr-number> [target-version] [--continue]}
|
||||
shift
|
||||
CONTINUE=0
|
||||
TARGET_VERSION=""
|
||||
for arg in "$@"; do
|
||||
case "$arg" in
|
||||
--continue) CONTINUE=1 ;;
|
||||
*) TARGET_VERSION=$arg ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
for cmd in gh git jq; do
|
||||
command -v "$cmd" >/dev/null || { echo "error: $cmd is required" >&2; exit 1; }
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
# Pull the source PR's metadata. Refuse to backport a PR that never merged.
|
||||
pr_json=$(gh pr view "$PR_NUMBER" --json title,body,mergedAt,mergeCommit,milestone)
|
||||
PR_TITLE=$(jq -r '.title' <<<"$pr_json")
|
||||
PR_BODY=$(jq -r '.body' <<<"$pr_json")
|
||||
MERGE_SHA=$(jq -r '.mergeCommit.oid // empty' <<<"$pr_json")
|
||||
PR_MILESTONE=$(jq -r '.milestone.title // empty' <<<"$pr_json")
|
||||
|
||||
if [ "$(jq -r '.mergedAt // empty' <<<"$pr_json")" = "" ] || [ -z "$MERGE_SHA" ]; then
|
||||
echo "error: PR #${PR_NUMBER} is not merged (no merge commit to cherry-pick)" >&2
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Default the target to one minor below the PR's milestone: a PR landing in
|
||||
# v1.12.0 backports to release-1.11. An explicit target-version arg overrides.
|
||||
if [ -z "$TARGET_VERSION" ]; then
|
||||
if [[ $PR_MILESTONE =~ ^v?([0-9]+)\.([0-9]+) ]]; then
|
||||
TARGET_VERSION="${BASH_REMATCH[1]}.$(( BASH_REMATCH[2] - 1 ))"
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "error: PR #${PR_NUMBER} has no v<major>.<minor>.* milestone to infer the target from." >&2
|
||||
echo "Pass the target version explicitly, e.g. $0 ${PR_NUMBER} 1.11" >&2
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
TARGET_BRANCH="release-${TARGET_VERSION}"
|
||||
|
||||
# Slug from the PR title: lower-case, non-alphanumerics to dashes, trimmed.
|
||||
slug=$(printf '%s' "$PR_TITLE" \
|
||||
| tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]' \
|
||||
| sed -E 's/[^a-z0-9]+/-/g; s/^-+//; s/-+$//' \
|
||||
| cut -c1-50 \
|
||||
| sed -E 's/-+$//')
|
||||
BRANCH="backport-${TARGET_VERSION//./-}-${slug}"
|
||||
|
||||
if [ "$CONTINUE" -eq 1 ]; then
|
||||
# Resuming: the branch already exists and a cherry-pick is mid-conflict.
|
||||
current=$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)
|
||||
if [ "$current" != "$BRANCH" ]; then
|
||||
echo "error: --continue expects to be on ${BRANCH}, but HEAD is ${current}" >&2
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
echo "Resuming backport of #${PR_NUMBER} on ${BRANCH}"
|
||||
# Conflicts assumed resolved and staged; core.editor=true keeps the commit message.
|
||||
git -c core.editor=true cherry-pick --continue
|
||||
else
|
||||
# A fresh run switches branches and cherry-picks, so tracked changes must be
|
||||
# clean. Untracked files are fine, and --continue is exempt (its resolved
|
||||
# conflicts are meant to be staged).
|
||||
if [ -n "$(git status --porcelain --untracked-files=no)" ]; then
|
||||
echo "error: working tree has uncommitted changes to tracked files; commit or stash them first." >&2
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
echo "Backporting #${PR_NUMBER} (${MERGE_SHA}) onto ${TARGET_BRANCH} as ${BRANCH}"
|
||||
|
||||
git fetch origin
|
||||
git checkout -b "$BRANCH" "origin/${TARGET_BRANCH}"
|
||||
|
||||
# -m 1 handles a real merge commit; plain cherry-pick handles a squash merge.
|
||||
if ! { git cherry-pick -x -m 1 "$MERGE_SHA" 2>/dev/null || git cherry-pick -x "$MERGE_SHA"; }; then
|
||||
echo "error: ${MERGE_SHA} did not cherry-pick cleanly onto ${TARGET_BRANCH}." >&2
|
||||
echo "Resolve the conflicts, 'git add' them, then re-run:" >&2
|
||||
echo " $0 ${PR_NUMBER} ${TARGET_VERSION} --continue" >&2
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
title="backport v${TARGET_VERSION}: ${PR_TITLE}"
|
||||
body=$(printf 'Backport from #%s to release v%s\n\n---\n\n%s' \
|
||||
"$PR_NUMBER" "$TARGET_VERSION" "$PR_BODY")
|
||||
|
||||
# Highest open milestone matching v<version>.* (e.g. v1.11.1), if any.
|
||||
MILESTONE=$(gh api "repos/{owner}/{repo}/milestones?state=open" \
|
||||
--jq ".[].title | select(startswith(\"v${TARGET_VERSION}.\"))" \
|
||||
| sort -V | tail -n1)
|
||||
milestone_args=()
|
||||
if [ -n "$MILESTONE" ]; then
|
||||
milestone_args=(--milestone "$MILESTONE")
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "warning: no open milestone matching v${TARGET_VERSION}.* found; PR will have no milestone" >&2
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
echo
|
||||
echo "About to run:"
|
||||
printf ' git push -u --force-with-lease origin %q\n' "$BRANCH"
|
||||
printf ' gh pr create --base %q --head %q --title %q --body %q' \
|
||||
"$TARGET_BRANCH" "$BRANCH" "$title" "$body"
|
||||
[ -n "$MILESTONE" ] && printf ' --milestone %q' "$MILESTONE"
|
||||
printf '\n'
|
||||
echo
|
||||
read -r -p "Open this pull request? [y/N] " reply
|
||||
case "$reply" in
|
||||
[yY] | [yY][eE][sS]) ;;
|
||||
*) echo "Aborted. The cherry-pick is on local branch ${BRANCH}; push it manually if desired."; exit 0 ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
|
||||
git push -u --force-with-lease origin "$BRANCH"
|
||||
|
||||
gh pr create \
|
||||
--base "$TARGET_BRANCH" \
|
||||
--head "$BRANCH" \
|
||||
--title "$title" \
|
||||
--body "$body" \
|
||||
${milestone_args[@]+"${milestone_args[@]}"}
|
||||
|
||||
# The backport now exists, so drop the label that flagged this PR for one.
|
||||
gh pr edit "$PR_NUMBER" --remove-label needs-backport
|
||||
|
||||
# Switch back to the original branch we were on before doing the backport
|
||||
git checkout -
|
||||
@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ jobs:
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
|
||||
- uses: actions/setup-go@v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
go-version: '1.25'
|
||||
go-version: '1.26'
|
||||
check-latest: true
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Build
|
||||
@@ -38,9 +38,9 @@ jobs:
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
|
||||
- uses: actions/setup-go@v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
go-version: '1.25'
|
||||
go-version: '1.26'
|
||||
check-latest: true
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Build
|
||||
@@ -73,27 +73,81 @@ jobs:
|
||||
build-darwin:
|
||||
name: Build Universal Darwin
|
||||
env:
|
||||
HAS_SIGNING_CREDS: ${{ secrets.AC_USERNAME != '' }}
|
||||
HAS_SIGNING_CREDS: ${{ secrets.APPLE_SIGNING_ROLE_ARN != '' }}
|
||||
runs-on: macos-latest
|
||||
permissions:
|
||||
id-token: write
|
||||
contents: read
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
|
||||
- uses: actions/setup-go@v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
go-version: '1.25'
|
||||
go-version: '1.26'
|
||||
check-latest: true
|
||||
|
||||
# GitHub holds ARNs, not credentials, and ARNs outlive a rotation
|
||||
- name: Configure AWS credentials
|
||||
if: env.HAS_SIGNING_CREDS == 'true'
|
||||
uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v6
|
||||
with:
|
||||
role-to-assume: ${{ secrets.APPLE_SIGNING_ROLE_ARN }}
|
||||
aws-region: us-east-2
|
||||
|
||||
# parse-json-secrets unpacks into SIGNING_* and ASC_*, masked on the way in
|
||||
- name: Fetch signing credentials
|
||||
if: env.HAS_SIGNING_CREDS == 'true'
|
||||
uses: aws-actions/aws-secretsmanager-get-secrets@v3
|
||||
with:
|
||||
parse-json-secrets: true
|
||||
secret-ids: |
|
||||
SIGNING,${{ secrets.APPLE_SIGNING_DEVELOPER_ID_ARN }}
|
||||
ASC,${{ secrets.APPLE_NOTARY_KEY_ARN }}
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Import certificates
|
||||
if: env.HAS_SIGNING_CREDS == 'true'
|
||||
uses: Apple-Actions/import-codesign-certs@v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
p12-file-base64: ${{ secrets.APPLE_DEVELOPER_CERTIFICATE_P12_BASE64 }}
|
||||
p12-password: ${{ secrets.APPLE_DEVELOPER_CERTIFICATE_PASSWORD }}
|
||||
p12-file-base64: ${{ env.SIGNING_P12_BASE64 }}
|
||||
p12-password: ${{ env.SIGNING_PASSWORD }}
|
||||
|
||||
# The action imports but does not check the chain validates, which is how a p12
|
||||
# missing its intermediate reaches a failing codesign
|
||||
- name: Check the identity is usable
|
||||
if: env.HAS_SIGNING_CREDS == 'true'
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
: "${SIGNING_IDENTITY_SHA1:?empty, so the secret has no identity_sha1}"
|
||||
identities=$(security find-identity -v -p codesigning signing_temp.keychain)
|
||||
case "$identities" in
|
||||
*"$SIGNING_IDENTITY_SHA1"*) ;;
|
||||
*) printf '%s\n' "$identities" >&2; exit 1 ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
|
||||
# notarytool wants the key as a file
|
||||
- name: Write the App Store Connect key
|
||||
if: env.HAS_SIGNING_CREDS == 'true'
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
mkdir -p ~/private_keys
|
||||
chmod 700 ~/private_keys
|
||||
key_path="$HOME/private_keys/AuthKey_${ASC_KEY_ID}.p8"
|
||||
(umask 077; printf '%s\n' "$ASC_PRIVATE_KEY" > "$key_path")
|
||||
echo "ASC_P8=$key_path" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Drop the credentials from the environment
|
||||
if: env.HAS_SIGNING_CREDS == 'true'
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
# The action's own inventory, so a new field in a secret is covered
|
||||
python3 -c '
|
||||
import json, os
|
||||
raw = os.environ.get("SECRETS_LIST_CLEAN_UP")
|
||||
if raw is None and os.environ.get("SIGNING_P12_BASE64"):
|
||||
raise SystemExit("SECRETS_LIST_CLEAN_UP is gone, fetched secrets are not being scrubbed")
|
||||
keep = {"SIGNING_IDENTITY_SHA1", "ASC_KEY_ID", "ASC_ISSUER_ID"}
|
||||
names = [n for n in json.loads(raw or "[]") if n not in keep]
|
||||
print("\n".join(f"{n}=" for n in dict.fromkeys(names)))
|
||||
' >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Build, sign, and notarize
|
||||
env:
|
||||
AC_USERNAME: ${{ secrets.AC_USERNAME }}
|
||||
AC_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.AC_PASSWORD }}
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
rm -rf release
|
||||
mkdir release
|
||||
@@ -102,17 +156,34 @@ jobs:
|
||||
lipo -create -output ./release/nebula ./build/darwin-amd64/nebula ./build/darwin-arm64/nebula
|
||||
lipo -create -output ./release/nebula-cert ./build/darwin-amd64/nebula-cert ./build/darwin-arm64/nebula-cert
|
||||
|
||||
if [ -n "$AC_USERNAME" ]; then
|
||||
codesign -s "10BC1FDDEB6CE753550156C0669109FAC49E4D1E" -f -v --timestamp --options=runtime -i "net.defined.nebula" ./release/nebula
|
||||
codesign -s "10BC1FDDEB6CE753550156C0669109FAC49E4D1E" -f -v --timestamp --options=runtime -i "net.defined.nebula-cert" ./release/nebula-cert
|
||||
# Unset in a fork, which has no credentials to sign with
|
||||
if [ -n "$SIGNING_IDENTITY_SHA1" ]; then
|
||||
codesign -s "$SIGNING_IDENTITY_SHA1" -f -v --timestamp --options=runtime -i "net.defined.nebula" ./release/nebula
|
||||
codesign -s "$SIGNING_IDENTITY_SHA1" -f -v --timestamp --options=runtime -i "net.defined.nebula-cert" ./release/nebula-cert
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
zip -j release/nebula-darwin.zip release/nebula-cert release/nebula
|
||||
|
||||
if [ -n "$AC_USERNAME" ]; then
|
||||
xcrun notarytool submit ./release/nebula-darwin.zip --team-id "576H3XS7FP" --apple-id "$AC_USERNAME" --password "$AC_PASSWORD" --wait
|
||||
if [ -n "$ASC_P8" ]; then
|
||||
xcrun notarytool submit ./release/nebula-darwin.zip --key "$ASC_P8" --key-id "$ASC_KEY_ID" --issuer "$ASC_ISSUER_ID" --wait
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Drop the signing key
|
||||
if: always() && env.HAS_SIGNING_CREDS == 'true'
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
# Locked, not deleted: import-codesign-certs deletes it in its own post
|
||||
# step and fails the job if it is already gone. Locked is unusable.
|
||||
security lock-keychain signing_temp.keychain || true
|
||||
rm -f "$ASC_P8"
|
||||
# Nothing later in this job needs AWS
|
||||
python3 -c '
|
||||
import json, os
|
||||
names = json.loads(os.environ.get("SECRETS_LIST_CLEAN_UP") or "[]")
|
||||
names += ["ASC_P8", "SIGNING_IDENTITY_SHA1", "ASC_KEY_ID", "ASC_ISSUER_ID",
|
||||
"AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID", "AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY", "AWS_SESSION_TOKEN"]
|
||||
print("\n".join(f"{n}=" for n in dict.fromkeys(names)))
|
||||
' >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Upload artifacts
|
||||
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -32,9 +32,9 @@ jobs:
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
|
||||
- uses: actions/setup-go@v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
go-version: '1.25'
|
||||
go-version: '1.26'
|
||||
check-latest: true
|
||||
|
||||
- name: add hashicorp source
|
||||
@@ -64,9 +64,9 @@ jobs:
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
|
||||
- uses: actions/setup-go@v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
go-version: '1.25'
|
||||
go-version: '1.26'
|
||||
check-latest: true
|
||||
|
||||
- name: add hashicorp source
|
||||
@@ -90,15 +90,15 @@ jobs:
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
|
||||
- uses: actions/setup-go@v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
go-version: '1.25'
|
||||
go-version: '1.26'
|
||||
check-latest: true
|
||||
|
||||
# WSL2 + Ubuntu so the smoke can run a real linux peer with its own
|
||||
# netns. iputils-ping is needed for the in-WSL ping check. WSL1 has no
|
||||
# real kernel and would lack /dev/net/tun, so we have to force WSL2.
|
||||
- uses: Vampire/setup-wsl@v3
|
||||
- uses: Vampire/setup-wsl@v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
distribution: Ubuntu-24.04
|
||||
additional-packages: iputils-ping iproute2
|
||||
|
||||
+34
-33
@@ -20,44 +20,45 @@ jobs:
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
|
||||
- uses: actions/setup-go@v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
go-version: '1.25'
|
||||
go-version: '1.26'
|
||||
check-latest: true
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Smoke Docker
|
||||
run: make smoke-docker
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Smoke Docker IPv6 overlay
|
||||
run: make smoke-docker-ipv6
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Smoke Relay Docker
|
||||
run: make smoke-relay-docker
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Smoke Docker boringcrypto
|
||||
run: make boringcrypto smoke-docker
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Smoke Docker fips140
|
||||
run: make fips140-all GOALS=smoke-docker
|
||||
|
||||
timeout-minutes: 10
|
||||
|
||||
smoke-self:
|
||||
name: Run self traffic smoke test on macOS
|
||||
runs-on: macos-latest
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: actions/setup-go@v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
go-version: '1.26'
|
||||
check-latest: true
|
||||
|
||||
- name: build
|
||||
run: make bin-docker CGO_ENABLED=1 BUILD_ARGS=-race
|
||||
run: make bin
|
||||
|
||||
- name: setup docker image
|
||||
- name: run smoke-self
|
||||
working-directory: ./.github/workflows/smoke
|
||||
run: ./build.sh
|
||||
|
||||
- name: run smoke
|
||||
working-directory: ./.github/workflows/smoke
|
||||
run: ./smoke.sh
|
||||
|
||||
- name: setup docker image ipv6
|
||||
working-directory: ./.github/workflows/smoke
|
||||
run: SMOKE_OVERLAY_IPV6=1 ./build.sh
|
||||
|
||||
- name: run smoke ipv6
|
||||
working-directory: ./.github/workflows/smoke
|
||||
run: SMOKE_OVERLAY_IPV6=1 ./smoke.sh
|
||||
|
||||
- name: setup relay docker image
|
||||
working-directory: ./.github/workflows/smoke
|
||||
run: ./build-relay.sh
|
||||
|
||||
- name: run smoke relay
|
||||
working-directory: ./.github/workflows/smoke
|
||||
run: ./smoke-relay.sh
|
||||
|
||||
- name: setup docker image for P256
|
||||
working-directory: ./.github/workflows/smoke
|
||||
run: NAME="smoke-p256" CURVE=P256 ./build.sh
|
||||
|
||||
- name: run smoke-p256
|
||||
working-directory: ./.github/workflows/smoke
|
||||
run: NAME="smoke-p256" ./smoke.sh
|
||||
run: ./smoke-self.sh
|
||||
|
||||
timeout-minutes: 10
|
||||
Executable
+130
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
|
||||
#!/bin/bash
|
||||
|
||||
# A host must be able to reach its own overlay address. Where the kernel sends
|
||||
# that traffic through the tun rather than over loopback, nebula sees it and
|
||||
# hands it straight back (immediatelyForwardToSelf), and whether the kernel
|
||||
# accepts what comes back is only answerable against a real kernel. Runs one
|
||||
# nebula on this machine as root and aims every probe at its own address.
|
||||
|
||||
set -e -x
|
||||
|
||||
set -o pipefail
|
||||
|
||||
V4=192.0.2.1
|
||||
V6=2001:db8::1
|
||||
|
||||
case "$(uname -s)" in
|
||||
Darwin) TUN_DEV=utun ;;
|
||||
*) TUN_DEV=tun0 ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
|
||||
ROOT="$(cd ../../.. && pwd)"
|
||||
|
||||
rm -rf build/self
|
||||
mkdir -p build/self
|
||||
cd build/self
|
||||
|
||||
cleanup() {
|
||||
echo
|
||||
echo " *** cleanup"
|
||||
echo
|
||||
|
||||
set +e
|
||||
if [ -n "$NEBULA_PID" ]
|
||||
then
|
||||
sudo kill "$NEBULA_PID"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
{ kill $(jobs -p); wait; } 2>/dev/null
|
||||
sed 's/^/ [self] /' nebula.log
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
trap cleanup EXIT
|
||||
|
||||
# perl is on every platform this runs on; timeout(1) is not.
|
||||
alarm() {
|
||||
perl -e 'alarm shift; exec @ARGV' "$@"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
RESULTS=""
|
||||
FAILED=""
|
||||
probe() {
|
||||
local name="$1"
|
||||
shift
|
||||
if "$@"
|
||||
then
|
||||
RESULTS="$RESULTS $name=ok"
|
||||
else
|
||||
RESULTS="$RESULTS $name=FAIL"
|
||||
FAILED="$FAILED $name"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Send one datagram, then wait for the listener to have written it out.
|
||||
udp_probe() {
|
||||
echo self | alarm 5 nc -u -w1 "$1" 3000 || true
|
||||
set +x
|
||||
for _ in $(seq 1 20)
|
||||
do
|
||||
if grep -q self "$2"
|
||||
then
|
||||
set -x
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
sleep 0.25
|
||||
done
|
||||
set -x
|
||||
return 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
"$ROOT/nebula-cert" ca -name "Smoke Test"
|
||||
"$ROOT/nebula-cert" sign -name self -networks "$V4/24,$V6/64"
|
||||
|
||||
HOST=self AM_LIGHTHOUSE=true TUN_DEV="$TUN_DEV" ../../genconfig.sh >self.yml
|
||||
|
||||
"$ROOT/nebula" -config self.yml -test
|
||||
|
||||
sudo -v
|
||||
sudo "$ROOT/nebula" -config self.yml >nebula.log 2>&1 &
|
||||
NEBULA_PID=$!
|
||||
|
||||
for _ in $(seq 1 40)
|
||||
do
|
||||
ifconfig | grep "inet6 $V6 " >/dev/null && break
|
||||
sleep 0.25
|
||||
done
|
||||
ifconfig | grep "inet $V4 "
|
||||
ifconfig | grep "inet6 $V6 "
|
||||
|
||||
nc -l "$V4" 2000 >/dev/null &
|
||||
nc -l "$V6" 2000 >/dev/null &
|
||||
nc -u -l "$V4" 3000 >udp4.txt &
|
||||
nc -u -l "$V6" 3000 >udp6.txt &
|
||||
sleep 1
|
||||
|
||||
set +x
|
||||
echo
|
||||
echo " *** Testing self traffic from $V4"
|
||||
echo
|
||||
set -x
|
||||
probe icmp4 alarm 5 ping -c1 "$V4"
|
||||
probe tcp4 alarm 5 nc -z "$V4" 2000
|
||||
probe udp4 udp_probe "$V4" udp4.txt
|
||||
|
||||
set +x
|
||||
echo
|
||||
echo " *** Testing self traffic from $V6"
|
||||
echo
|
||||
set -x
|
||||
probe icmp6 alarm 5 ping6 -c1 "$V6"
|
||||
probe tcp6 alarm 5 nc -z "$V6" 2000
|
||||
probe udp6 udp_probe "$V6" udp6.txt
|
||||
|
||||
set +x
|
||||
echo
|
||||
echo " *** self traffic:$RESULTS"
|
||||
echo
|
||||
if [ -n "$FAILED" ]
|
||||
then
|
||||
echo "self traffic failed:$FAILED" >&2
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
@@ -51,15 +51,19 @@ wsl -d $Distro -- bash -c "rm -rf $WslDir && mkdir -p $WslDir" | Out-Null
|
||||
$DevName = 'nebula-smoke'
|
||||
$Ip1 = '192.168.241.1'
|
||||
$Ip2 = '192.168.241.2'
|
||||
# Dual stack on purpose: a v4-only overlay never exercises the v6 side of tun.mtu.
|
||||
$Ip6_1 = 'fd42:4242:241::1'
|
||||
$Ip6_2 = 'fd42:4242:241::2'
|
||||
$Mtu = 1300
|
||||
$Port = 4242
|
||||
|
||||
& $NebulaCert ca -name 'smoke-ca' -out-crt "$WorkDir\ca.crt" -out-key "$WorkDir\ca.key"
|
||||
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "nebula-cert ca failed (exit $LASTEXITCODE)" }
|
||||
|
||||
& $NebulaCert sign -name 'lighthouse' -networks "$Ip1/24" -ca-crt "$WorkDir\ca.crt" -ca-key "$WorkDir\ca.key" -out-crt "$WorkDir\lighthouse.crt" -out-key "$WorkDir\lighthouse.key"
|
||||
& $NebulaCert sign -name 'lighthouse' -networks "$Ip1/24,$Ip6_1/64" -ca-crt "$WorkDir\ca.crt" -ca-key "$WorkDir\ca.key" -out-crt "$WorkDir\lighthouse.crt" -out-key "$WorkDir\lighthouse.key"
|
||||
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "nebula-cert sign lighthouse failed (exit $LASTEXITCODE)" }
|
||||
|
||||
& $NebulaCert sign -name 'peer' -networks "$Ip2/24" -ca-crt "$WorkDir\ca.crt" -ca-key "$WorkDir\ca.key" -out-crt "$WorkDir\peer.crt" -out-key "$WorkDir\peer.key"
|
||||
& $NebulaCert sign -name 'peer' -networks "$Ip2/24,$Ip6_2/64" -ca-crt "$WorkDir\ca.crt" -ca-key "$WorkDir\ca.key" -out-crt "$WorkDir\peer.crt" -out-key "$WorkDir\peer.key"
|
||||
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "nebula-cert sign peer failed (exit $LASTEXITCODE)" }
|
||||
|
||||
# Windows lighthouse config.
|
||||
@@ -82,7 +86,7 @@ tun:
|
||||
drop_local_broadcast: false
|
||||
drop_multicast: false
|
||||
tx_queue: 500
|
||||
mtu: 1300
|
||||
mtu: $Mtu
|
||||
network_category: private
|
||||
logging:
|
||||
level: info
|
||||
@@ -126,7 +130,7 @@ tun:
|
||||
drop_local_broadcast: false
|
||||
drop_multicast: false
|
||||
tx_queue: 500
|
||||
mtu: 1300
|
||||
mtu: $Mtu
|
||||
logging:
|
||||
level: info
|
||||
format: text
|
||||
@@ -169,7 +173,7 @@ Write-Host '=== WSL diagnostic ==='
|
||||
wsl --version 2>&1 | Out-Host
|
||||
wsl --list --verbose 2>&1 | Out-Host
|
||||
wsl -d $Distro -u root -- uname -a | Out-Host
|
||||
wsl -d $Distro -u root -- bash -c "modprobe tun 2>&1 || true; mkdir -p /dev/net; [ -c /dev/net/tun ] || mknod /dev/net/tun c 10 200; chmod 600 /dev/net/tun; ls -l /dev/net/tun"
|
||||
wsl -d $Distro -u root -- bash -c "modprobe tun 2>&1 || true; mkdir -p /dev/net; [ -c /dev/net/tun ] || mknod /dev/net/tun c 10 200; chmod 600 /dev/net/tun; { echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/disable_ipv6; echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/default/disable_ipv6; } 2>/dev/null || true; ls -l /dev/net/tun"
|
||||
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "failed to prepare /dev/net/tun in WSL (TUN support missing?)" }
|
||||
|
||||
# Deliberately no New-NetFirewallRule calls here -- nebula's windows_bypass_wdf
|
||||
@@ -214,6 +218,16 @@ try {
|
||||
}
|
||||
Write-Host "OK: $DevName NetworkCategory=Private"
|
||||
|
||||
# v6 silently kept the adapter default of 65535 while v4 was correct.
|
||||
foreach ($family in @('IPv4', 'IPv6')) {
|
||||
Wait-Until -TimeoutSec 30 -What "$DevName $family NlMtu=$Mtu" -Predicate {
|
||||
if ($lhProc.HasExited) { throw "lighthouse exited (code $($lhProc.ExitCode)) before $family mtu was set" }
|
||||
$rows = @(Get-NetIPInterface -InterfaceAlias $DevName -AddressFamily $family -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
|
||||
$rows.Count -gt 0 -and -not ($rows | Where-Object { $_.NlMtu -ne $Mtu })
|
||||
}
|
||||
Write-Host "OK: $DevName $family NlMtu=$Mtu"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Wait-Until -TimeoutSec 30 -What "WSL nebula1 with $Ip2" -Predicate {
|
||||
if ($peerProc.HasExited) { throw "peer exited (code $($peerProc.ExitCode)) before tun was ready" }
|
||||
$r = wsl -d $Distro -u root -- bash -c "ip -o addr show nebula1 2>/dev/null | grep -q 'inet $Ip2' && echo yes"
|
||||
@@ -221,6 +235,13 @@ try {
|
||||
}
|
||||
Write-Host "OK: WSL nebula1 has $Ip2"
|
||||
|
||||
Wait-Until -TimeoutSec 30 -What "WSL nebula1 with $Ip6_2" -Predicate {
|
||||
if ($peerProc.HasExited) { throw "peer exited (code $($peerProc.ExitCode)) before the v6 address was up" }
|
||||
$r = wsl -d $Distro -u root -- bash -c "ip -o addr show nebula1 2>/dev/null | grep -q 'inet6 $Ip6_2' && echo yes"
|
||||
("$r").Trim() -eq 'yes'
|
||||
}
|
||||
Write-Host "OK: WSL nebula1 has $Ip6_2"
|
||||
|
||||
Wait-Until -TimeoutSec 30 -What "ping from WSL peer to windows lighthouse ($Ip1)" -Predicate {
|
||||
if ($peerProc.HasExited) { throw "peer exited (code $($peerProc.ExitCode)) before ping succeeded" }
|
||||
$r = wsl -d $Distro -u root -- bash -c "ping -c1 -W1 $Ip1 >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo OK"
|
||||
@@ -234,6 +255,28 @@ try {
|
||||
}
|
||||
Write-Host "OK: windows lighthouse -> WSL peer"
|
||||
|
||||
# Otherwise the v6 networks only prove the interface exists, not that it forwards.
|
||||
Wait-Until -TimeoutSec 30 -What "v6 ping from WSL peer to windows lighthouse ($Ip6_1)" -Predicate {
|
||||
if ($peerProc.HasExited) { throw "peer exited (code $($peerProc.ExitCode)) before the v6 ping succeeded" }
|
||||
$r = wsl -d $Distro -u root -- bash -c "ping -6 -c1 -W1 $Ip6_1 >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo OK"
|
||||
("$r").Trim() -eq 'OK'
|
||||
}
|
||||
Write-Host "OK: WSL peer -> windows lighthouse over v6"
|
||||
|
||||
# The NlMtu check above proves the value was written, not that windows honors it. A payload this size only
|
||||
# crosses the tunnel as fragments cut at NlMtu on the way out of the adapter. Left at the adapter default it
|
||||
# reaches nebula whole, overflows the udp.MTU (9001) write buffer and is dropped, so the ping never answers.
|
||||
# Anything smaller would ride out as one oversized datagram and survive on IP fragmentation of the underlay.
|
||||
$BigPayload = 9000
|
||||
foreach ($target in @(@{ Family = 'v4'; Ip = $Ip2 }, @{ Family = 'v6'; Ip = $Ip6_2 })) {
|
||||
Wait-Until -TimeoutSec 30 -What "$($target.Family) ping with a $BigPayload byte payload from windows lighthouse to WSL peer ($($target.Ip))" -Predicate {
|
||||
if ($peerProc.HasExited) { throw "peer exited (code $($peerProc.ExitCode)) before the large $($target.Family) ping succeeded" }
|
||||
$null = & ping.exe -n 1 -w 1000 -l $BigPayload $target.Ip
|
||||
$LASTEXITCODE -eq 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
Write-Host "OK: windows lighthouse -> WSL peer, $BigPayload byte $($target.Family) payload"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Write-Host ''
|
||||
Write-Host 'All smoke checks passed.'
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+15
-10
@@ -20,9 +20,9 @@ jobs:
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
|
||||
- uses: actions/setup-go@v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
go-version: '1.25'
|
||||
go-version: '1.26'
|
||||
check-latest: true
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Install goimports
|
||||
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ jobs:
|
||||
- name: golangci-lint
|
||||
uses: golangci/golangci-lint-action@v9
|
||||
with:
|
||||
version: v2.5
|
||||
version: v2.12
|
||||
|
||||
test:
|
||||
name: Test ${{ matrix.name }}
|
||||
@@ -58,9 +58,14 @@ jobs:
|
||||
e2e-cmd: make e2evv
|
||||
- name: linux-boringcrypto
|
||||
os: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
build-cmd: make bin-boringcrypto
|
||||
test-cmd: make test-boringcrypto
|
||||
e2e-cmd: make e2e GOEXPERIMENT=boringcrypto CGO_ENABLED=1 TEST_ENV="TEST_LOGS=1" TEST_FLAGS="-v -ldflags -checklinkname=0"
|
||||
build-cmd: make boringcrypto
|
||||
test-cmd: make boringcrypto test
|
||||
e2e-cmd: make boringcrypto e2evv
|
||||
- name: linux-fips140
|
||||
os: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
build-cmd: make fips140-all
|
||||
test-cmd: make fips140-all GOALS=test
|
||||
e2e-cmd: make fips140-all GOALS=e2evv
|
||||
- name: linux-pkcs11
|
||||
os: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
build-cmd: make bin-pkcs11
|
||||
@@ -80,9 +85,9 @@ jobs:
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
|
||||
- uses: actions/setup-go@v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
go-version: '1.25'
|
||||
go-version: '1.26'
|
||||
check-latest: true
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Build
|
||||
@@ -125,9 +130,9 @@ jobs:
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
|
||||
- uses: actions/setup-go@v7
|
||||
with:
|
||||
go-version: '1.25'
|
||||
go-version: '1.26'
|
||||
check-latest: true
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Build ${{ matrix.name }}
|
||||
|
||||
+117
-1
@@ -7,6 +7,120 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
|
||||
|
||||
## [Unreleased]
|
||||
|
||||
### Fixed
|
||||
|
||||
- `create-tunnel -address <ip:port>` panicked on a nil RemoteList and, over the ssh debug server, took nebula
|
||||
down with it. A hostinfo returned by StartHandshake had no RemoteList until the handshake loop's first
|
||||
pass attached one, and `create-tunnel -address` set the remote before that. The list is now attached when
|
||||
the handshake starts, so a pending hostinfo never exists without one.
|
||||
|
||||
## [1.11.1] - 2026-08-21
|
||||
|
||||
See the [v1.11.1](https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/milestone/30?closed=1) milestone for a complete list of changes.
|
||||
|
||||
### Changed
|
||||
|
||||
- IPv6 packets whose next header is a protocol Nebula does not parse (SCTP, GRE, IP-in-IP, etc.) are now
|
||||
classified as that protocol with no ports, closing a firewall bypass where a crafted payload could steer
|
||||
the classifier into reading one as TCP/UDP and matching a TCP/UDP rule. These packets are now matched as
|
||||
their true protocol, so only a `proto: any` rule allows them. If you carry one of these protocols over the
|
||||
overlay, confirm a `proto: any` rule covers it before upgrading, it may have been passing only through this
|
||||
bypass. (#1840)
|
||||
- Drop the dependency on `github.com/cyberdelia/go-metrics-graphite`, which has been unmaintained for over ten
|
||||
years, by inlining the small amount of code Nebula used. (#1832)
|
||||
|
||||
### Fixed
|
||||
|
||||
- The ICMPv6 type was read from the wrong byte when classifying IPv6 packets, so the echo identifier used
|
||||
for conntrack was never picked up. (#1840)
|
||||
- Enforce outbound message counter limits so a tunnel is rehandshaked before the counter can wrap, preventing
|
||||
nonce reuse. This is unreachable in practice, but is enforced as a defense-in-depth measure. (#1841)
|
||||
- Prevent `nebula-cert ca` from running out of memory on 32bit systems when generating encrypted private keys. (#1834)
|
||||
- Tolerate `ErrDumpInterrupted` when listing tun addresses on Linux, so a transient interrupted netlink dump
|
||||
no longer aborts startup. (#1835)
|
||||
|
||||
## [1.11.0] - 2026-07-23
|
||||
|
||||
See the [v1.11.0](https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/milestone/25?closed=1) milestone for a complete list of changes.
|
||||
|
||||
### Breaking
|
||||
|
||||
- Logging has switched from logrus to Go's structured `slog`. Log output changes: levels are upper case
|
||||
(`level=INFO`), trace prints as `level=DEBUG-4`, timestamps are always RFC3339Nano and `logging.timestamp_format`
|
||||
is ignored, and some messages were reworded. Review any log parsing before upgrading. This is also an API break
|
||||
for embedders, as constructors now take a `*slog.Logger`. (#1672, #1734, #1621)
|
||||
- `firewall.inbound_action` and `firewall.outbound_action` (used to set reject vs. drop policy) were each being
|
||||
applied to the opposite direction, that is now corrected. This only affects how blocked packets are answered, not
|
||||
which packets the firewall allows or denies. If you set either of these you are getting the behavior of the other
|
||||
one today and likely want to swap them before upgrading. (#1798)
|
||||
- On Windows, Nebula now installs WFP PERMIT filters for the nebula adapter and the listener port by default. WFP
|
||||
sits below Windows Defender Firewall, so any WDF inbound rules you rely on for either will no longer apply. Set
|
||||
`tun.windows_bypass_wdf` and `listen.windows_bypass_wdf` to false to leave WDF in charge. (#1710)
|
||||
- On Windows, the nebula device is now set to the `private` network category instead of whatever Windows decided,
|
||||
which is usually `Public`. This makes the host firewall less restrictive on the overlay. Set
|
||||
`tun.network_category` to `unset` to keep the old behavior. (#1710)
|
||||
- Reject packets for non-TCP now use ICMP code 13, communication administratively prohibited, instead of code 3,
|
||||
port unreachable. Anything keying off the old code needs updating. (#1766, #1768)
|
||||
- The SSH debug server's profiling commands are now confined to `sshd.sandbox_dir`, which defaults to
|
||||
`$TMP/nebula-debug`. Relative paths resolve inside it and absolute paths outside it are rejected, so anything
|
||||
scripting `start-cpu-profile`, `save-heap-profile`, or `save-mutex-profile` with a path elsewhere needs the
|
||||
directory set. The directory is not created for you. (#1622)
|
||||
|
||||
### Added
|
||||
|
||||
- Sign the Windows release binaries. (#1718)
|
||||
- Generate IPv6 reject packets, matching the existing IPv4 behavior. (#1766, #1767, #1768)
|
||||
- Accept `-` in `nebula-cert` to read from stdin or write to stdout. (#1714)
|
||||
- Search for both `config.yml` and `config.yaml` in service and command line modes. (#1717)
|
||||
- Add version labels to the Docker/OCI images. (#1772)
|
||||
- Rebind the listener and re-query lighthouses on macOS when the underlay network changes, so devices moving
|
||||
between wifi and wired or between networks recover without waiting for dead tunnel detection. Controlled by
|
||||
`listen.rebind_on_network_change` (default `true`, not reloadable). (#1816)
|
||||
|
||||
### Changed
|
||||
|
||||
- Reload the firewall when the unsafe networks in the certificate change. (#1719)
|
||||
- Reconfigure, start, and stop the stats listener on a config reload instead of requiring a restart. (#1670)
|
||||
- Update a static host's addresses when they change on reload. (#1713)
|
||||
- Don't require a port on ICMP firewall rules. (#1609)
|
||||
- Connection track ICMP traffic. (#1602)
|
||||
- Return `NODATA` instead of `NXDOMAIN` from the DNS server for a name that exists but has no record of the
|
||||
requested type, so clients that query `AAAA` first (busybox/Alpine) fall through to `A`. (#1668)
|
||||
- Record the local host's details in the DNS server. (#1716)
|
||||
- Install Windows unsafe routes as link routes. (#1709)
|
||||
- Reduce relay handshake log spam, and only log a handshake send error at error level when the remote list
|
||||
changes. (#1733, #1765, #1810)
|
||||
- Start, stop, and reload subsystems (DNS, stats, conntrack, ssh, punchy) cleanly without leaking goroutines. (#1640, #1654, #1661, #1667, #1669, #1708, #1806, #1815)
|
||||
- `Control` is now safe to stop and wait on from any lifecycle state, and a new `Control.Wait` blocks until nebula
|
||||
has fully stopped and returns the first fatal reader error. Failed starts release the udp sockets and tun fd
|
||||
instead of leaking them. (#1794)
|
||||
- Trigger an immediate lighthouse update when reconnecting to or adding a lighthouse instead of waiting for the next update tick. (#1645)
|
||||
- Bring the Darwin and OpenBSD tun implementations in line with the other BSDs. (#1703)
|
||||
- Update to build against go v1.26. (#1818)
|
||||
- Various dependency updates. (#1586, #1587, #1604, #1617, #1618, #1627, #1628, #1629, #1652, #1664, #1665, #1697, #1721, #1732, #1742, #1743, #1750, #1763, #1771, #1782, #1800, #1807)
|
||||
|
||||
### Fixed
|
||||
|
||||
- Fix a data race on a host's remote address that could send packets to the wrong address during a roam. (#1773)
|
||||
- Fix tunnels that could permanently escape connection manager monitoring. (#1752)
|
||||
- Fix a crash when reloading the SSH server's trusted keys. (#1787)
|
||||
- Fix hostmap corruption when a host has multiple overlay addresses. Each address now gets its own list instead of
|
||||
a single shared chain, which also fixes two latent bugs on the add and makePrimary paths. (#1788, #1790)
|
||||
- Apply `remote_allow_list` IPv4 rules to 4-in-6 mapped addresses. (#1786)
|
||||
- Don't panic in the DNS server on a short or empty query name. (#1635)
|
||||
- Advance the replay window on relayed packets so a relay drops replayed frames instead of re-forwarding them. (#1751)
|
||||
- Fix a race in relay state handling. (#1753)
|
||||
- Lock replay window updates so concurrent readers can't corrupt it. (#1802)
|
||||
- Reject malformed handshakes more reliably, including invalid ed25519 key lengths. (#1601, #1756)
|
||||
- Properly handle `closetunnel` packets. (#1638)
|
||||
- Fix an IPv6 extension-header length overflow that could make the firewall parse the wrong protocol and ports. (#1789)
|
||||
- Fix relay re-establishment when a handshake arrives over a relay entry that a one-sided teardown left
|
||||
`Disestablished`, which silently dropped every send until dead tunnel detection forced a re-handshake. (#1805)
|
||||
- Don't build new relay state on a tunnel that was just discarded. (#1796)
|
||||
- Don't delete the wrong pending hostinfo in the handshake manager. (#1811)
|
||||
- Don't call the packet reader after a UDP error on Darwin. (#1755)
|
||||
- Open the FreeBSD tun device non blocking. (#1666)
|
||||
|
||||
## [1.10.3] - 2026-02-06
|
||||
|
||||
### Security
|
||||
@@ -788,7 +902,9 @@ created.)
|
||||
|
||||
- Initial public release.
|
||||
|
||||
[Unreleased]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/compare/v1.10.3...HEAD
|
||||
[Unreleased]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/compare/v1.11.1...HEAD
|
||||
[1.11.1]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.11.1
|
||||
[1.11.0]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.11.0
|
||||
[1.10.3]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.10.3
|
||||
[1.10.2]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.10.2
|
||||
[1.10.1]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.10.1
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -72,6 +72,17 @@ ALL_CROSS_LINUX_ARM = linux-arm-5 linux-arm-6 linux-arm-7 linux-arm64
|
||||
ALL_CROSS_LINUX_MIPS = linux-mips linux-mipsle linux-mips64 linux-mips64le linux-mips-softfloat
|
||||
ALL_CROSS_LINUX_OTHER = linux-386 linux-ppc64le linux-riscv64 linux-loong64
|
||||
|
||||
# Based on section 2.2 of the Go Cryptographic Module CVMP Security Policy #5247
|
||||
ALL_FIPS140 = linux-amd64-fips140 \
|
||||
linux-arm64-fips140 \
|
||||
windows-amd64-fips140 \
|
||||
windows-arm64-fips140 \
|
||||
darwin-arm64-fips140 \
|
||||
freebsd-amd64-fips140 \
|
||||
linux-arm-7-fips140 \
|
||||
linux-mips64-fips140 \
|
||||
linux-ppc64le-fips140
|
||||
|
||||
e2e:
|
||||
$(TEST_ENV) go test -tags=e2e_testing -count=1 $(TEST_FLAGS) ./e2e
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -137,6 +148,8 @@ release-netbsd: $(ALL_NETBSD:%=build/nebula-%.tar.gz)
|
||||
|
||||
release-boringcrypto: build/nebula-linux-$(shell go env GOARCH)-boringcrypto.tar.gz
|
||||
|
||||
release-fips140: $(ALL_FIPS140:%=build/nebula-%.tar.gz)
|
||||
|
||||
BUILD_ARGS += -trimpath
|
||||
|
||||
bin-windows: build/windows-amd64/nebula.exe build/windows-amd64/nebula-cert.exe
|
||||
@@ -157,17 +170,24 @@ bin-freebsd-arm64: build/freebsd-arm64/nebula build/freebsd-arm64/nebula-cert
|
||||
bin-boringcrypto: build/linux-$(shell go env GOARCH)-boringcrypto/nebula build/linux-$(shell go env GOARCH)-boringcrypto/nebula-cert
|
||||
mv $? .
|
||||
|
||||
bin-fips140: build/linux-$(shell go env GOARCH)-fips140/nebula build/linux-$(shell go env GOARCH)-fips140/nebula-cert
|
||||
mv $? .
|
||||
|
||||
bin-pkcs11: BUILD_ARGS += -tags pkcs11
|
||||
bin-pkcs11: CGO_ENABLED = 1
|
||||
bin-pkcs11: bin
|
||||
|
||||
# Build with the pprof debug server (serves on :6060). See startPprofServer.
|
||||
debug: BUILD_ARGS += -tags debug
|
||||
debug: bin
|
||||
|
||||
bin:
|
||||
go build $(BUILD_ARGS) -ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" -o ./nebula${NEBULA_CMD_SUFFIX} ${NEBULA_CMD_PATH}
|
||||
go build $(BUILD_ARGS) -ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" -o ./nebula-cert${NEBULA_CMD_SUFFIX} ./cmd/nebula-cert
|
||||
$(GOENV) go build $(BUILD_ARGS) -ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" -o ./nebula${NEBULA_CMD_SUFFIX} ${NEBULA_CMD_PATH}
|
||||
$(GOENV) go build $(BUILD_ARGS) -ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" -o ./nebula-cert${NEBULA_CMD_SUFFIX} ./cmd/nebula-cert
|
||||
|
||||
install:
|
||||
go install $(BUILD_ARGS) -ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" ${NEBULA_CMD_PATH}
|
||||
go install $(BUILD_ARGS) -ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" ./cmd/nebula-cert
|
||||
$(GOENV) go install $(BUILD_ARGS) -ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" ${NEBULA_CMD_PATH}
|
||||
$(GOENV) go install $(BUILD_ARGS) -ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" ./cmd/nebula-cert
|
||||
|
||||
build/linux-arm-%: GOENV += GOARM=$(word 3, $(subst -, ,$*))
|
||||
build/linux-mips-%: GOENV += GOMIPS=$(word 3, $(subst -, ,$*))
|
||||
@@ -178,8 +198,11 @@ build/linux-mips-softfloat/%: LDFLAGS += -s -w
|
||||
# boringcrypto
|
||||
build/linux-amd64-boringcrypto/%: GOENV += GOEXPERIMENT=boringcrypto CGO_ENABLED=1
|
||||
build/linux-arm64-boringcrypto/%: GOENV += GOEXPERIMENT=boringcrypto CGO_ENABLED=1
|
||||
build/linux-amd64-boringcrypto/%: LDFLAGS += -checklinkname=0
|
||||
build/linux-arm64-boringcrypto/%: LDFLAGS += -checklinkname=0
|
||||
|
||||
# fips140
|
||||
FIPSVERSION = v1.0.0
|
||||
$(foreach _rule, $(ALL_FIPS140), build/$(_rule)/%): GOENV += GOFIPS140=$(FIPSVERSION)
|
||||
$(foreach _rule, $(ALL_FIPS140), build/$(_rule)/%): BUILD_ARGS += -tags fips140enforce
|
||||
|
||||
build/%/nebula: .FORCE
|
||||
GOOS=$(firstword $(subst -, , $*)) \
|
||||
@@ -210,10 +233,7 @@ vet:
|
||||
go vet $(VET_FLAGS) -v ./...
|
||||
|
||||
test:
|
||||
go test -v ./...
|
||||
|
||||
test-boringcrypto:
|
||||
GOEXPERIMENT=boringcrypto CGO_ENABLED=1 go test -ldflags "-checklinkname=0" -v ./...
|
||||
$(TEST_ENV) go test $(TEST_FLAGS) -v ./...
|
||||
|
||||
test-pkcs11:
|
||||
CGO_ENABLED=1 go test -v -tags pkcs11 ./...
|
||||
@@ -222,11 +242,14 @@ test-cov-html:
|
||||
go test -coverprofile=coverage.out
|
||||
go tool cover -html=coverage.out
|
||||
|
||||
# The package builds only compile. The final line links an android binary so a linker-only failure
|
||||
# cannot pass CI.
|
||||
build-test-mobile:
|
||||
GOARCH=amd64 GOOS=ios go build $(shell go list ./... | grep -v '/cmd/\|/examples/')
|
||||
GOARCH=arm64 GOOS=ios go build $(shell go list ./... | grep -v '/cmd/\|/examples/')
|
||||
GOARCH=amd64 GOOS=android go build $(shell go list ./... | grep -v '/cmd/\|/examples/')
|
||||
GOARCH=arm64 GOOS=android go build $(shell go list ./... | grep -v '/cmd/\|/examples/')
|
||||
GOARCH=arm64 GOOS=android go build -o /dev/null ${NEBULA_CMD_PATH}
|
||||
|
||||
bench:
|
||||
go test -bench=.
|
||||
@@ -256,29 +279,75 @@ ifeq ($(words $(MAKECMDGOALS)),1)
|
||||
@$(MAKE) service ${.DEFAULT_GOAL} --no-print-directory
|
||||
endif
|
||||
|
||||
# Useful to chain together, like:
|
||||
# - make fips140 e2evv
|
||||
# - make fips140 smoke-docker
|
||||
# Use `release-fips140` to build release binaries
|
||||
fips140:
|
||||
@echo > $(NULL_FILE)
|
||||
ifeq ($(strip $(GOFIPS140)),)
|
||||
$(eval GOFIPS140 = $(FIPSVERSION))
|
||||
endif
|
||||
$(eval GOENV += GOFIPS140=$(GOFIPS140))
|
||||
$(eval BUILD_ARGS += -tags fips140enforce)
|
||||
$(eval TEST_ENV += $(GOENV))
|
||||
$(eval CURVE = P256)
|
||||
ifeq ($(words $(MAKECMDGOALS)),1)
|
||||
@$(MAKE) fips140 GOFIPS140=$(GOFIPS140) ${.DEFAULT_GOAL} --no-print-directory
|
||||
endif
|
||||
|
||||
# To test the future pending module, use like `make fips140-latest test`
|
||||
ALL_GOFIPS140 = v1.0.0 v1.26.0 latest
|
||||
define FIPS140_rule
|
||||
fips140-$(1): GOFIPS140 = $(1)
|
||||
fips140-$(1): fips140
|
||||
endef
|
||||
$(foreach _rule, $(ALL_GOFIPS140), $(eval $(call FIPS140_rule,$(_rule))))
|
||||
|
||||
# Iterate and run the goals for all fips versions, like `make fips140-all GOALS=test`
|
||||
fips140-all:
|
||||
@$(foreach _v,$(ALL_GOFIPS140),$(MAKE) fips140-$(_v) $(GOALS) &&) true
|
||||
|
||||
# Useful to chain together, like:
|
||||
# - make boringcrypto e2evv
|
||||
# - make boringcrypto smoke-docker
|
||||
# Use `release-boringcrypto` or `bin-boringcrypto` to build release binaries
|
||||
boringcrypto:
|
||||
@echo > $(NULL_FILE)
|
||||
$(eval GOENV += GOEXPERIMENT=boringcrypto CGO_ENABLED=1)
|
||||
$(eval TEST_ENV += $(GOENV))
|
||||
$(eval CURVE = P256)
|
||||
ifeq ($(words $(MAKECMDGOALS)),1)
|
||||
@$(MAKE) boringcrypto ${.DEFAULT_GOAL} --no-print-directory
|
||||
endif
|
||||
|
||||
bin-docker: bin build/linux-amd64/nebula build/linux-amd64/nebula-cert
|
||||
|
||||
smoke-docker: BUILD_ARGS += -race
|
||||
smoke-docker: GOENV += CGO_ENABLED=1
|
||||
smoke-docker: bin-docker
|
||||
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && ./build.sh
|
||||
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && ./smoke.sh
|
||||
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && NAME="smoke-p256" CURVE="P256" ./build.sh
|
||||
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && NAME="smoke-p256" ./smoke.sh
|
||||
# This is so we can limit `fips140` smoke test to just P256 curve.
|
||||
if [ "$(CURVE)" != "P256" ]; then cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && $(GOENV) ./build.sh; fi
|
||||
if [ "$(CURVE)" != "P256" ]; then cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && $(GOENV) ./smoke.sh; fi
|
||||
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && $(GOENV) NAME="smoke-p256" CURVE="P256" ./build.sh
|
||||
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && $(GOENV) NAME="smoke-p256" ./smoke.sh
|
||||
|
||||
smoke-relay-docker: BUILD_ARGS += -race
|
||||
smoke-relay-docker: GOENV += CGO_ENABLED=1
|
||||
smoke-relay-docker: bin-docker
|
||||
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && ./build-relay.sh
|
||||
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && ./smoke-relay.sh
|
||||
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && $(GOENV) ./build-relay.sh
|
||||
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && $(GOENV) ./smoke-relay.sh
|
||||
|
||||
smoke-docker-ipv6: export SMOKE_OVERLAY_IPV6 = 1
|
||||
smoke-docker-ipv6: smoke-docker
|
||||
|
||||
smoke-docker-race: BUILD_ARGS = -race
|
||||
smoke-docker-race: CGO_ENABLED = 1
|
||||
smoke-docker-race: smoke-docker
|
||||
smoke-self: bin
|
||||
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && ./smoke-self.sh
|
||||
|
||||
smoke-vagrant/%: bin-docker build/%/nebula
|
||||
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && ./build.sh $*
|
||||
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && ./smoke-vagrant.sh $*
|
||||
|
||||
.FORCE:
|
||||
.PHONY: all all-linux all-freebsd all-openbsd all-netbsd all-darwin all-windows all-cross-linux all-cross-linux-arm all-cross-linux-mips all-cross-linux-other all-cross-darwin all-cross-windows bench bench-cpu bench-cpu-long bin build-test-mobile e2e e2ev e2evv e2evvv e2evvvv proto release service smoke-docker smoke-docker-race test test-cov-html smoke-vagrant/%
|
||||
.PHONY: all all-linux all-freebsd all-openbsd all-netbsd all-darwin all-windows all-cross-linux all-cross-linux-arm all-cross-linux-mips all-cross-linux-other all-cross-darwin all-cross-windows bench bench-cpu bench-cpu-long bin bin-windows bin-windows-arm64 bin-darwin bin-freebsd bin-freebsd-arm64 bin-boringcrypto bin-fips140 bin-pkcs11 bin-docker boringcrypto build-test-mobile debug docker e2e e2ev e2evv e2evvv e2evvvv e2e-bench fips140 fips140-all $(ALL_GOFIPS140:%=fips140-%) install proto release release-linux release-freebsd release-openbsd release-netbsd release-boringcrypto release-fips140 service smoke-docker smoke-relay-docker smoke-docker-ipv6 smoke-self test test-pkcs11 test-cov-html vet smoke-vagrant/%
|
||||
.DEFAULT_GOAL := bin
|
||||
@@ -145,17 +145,27 @@ To build nebula for a specific platform (ex, Windows):
|
||||
|
||||
See the [Makefile](Makefile) for more details on build targets
|
||||
|
||||
## Curve P256 and BoringCrypto
|
||||
## Curve P256 and FIPS 140-3 mode
|
||||
|
||||
The default curve used for cryptographic handshakes and signatures is Curve25519. This is the recommended setting for most users. If your deployment has certain compliance requirements, you have the option of creating your CA using `nebula-cert ca -curve P256` to use NIST Curve P256. The CA will then sign certificates using ECDSA P256, and any hosts using these certificates will use P256 for ECDH handshakes.
|
||||
|
||||
In addition, Nebula can be built using the [BoringCrypto GOEXPERIMENT](https://github.com/golang/go/blob/go1.20/src/crypto/internal/boring/README.md) by running either of the following make targets:
|
||||
Nebula can be built to support the [FIPS 140-3](https://go.dev/doc/security/fips140) mode of Go by running either of the following make targets. (This sets GOFIPS140=v1.0.0, which must be done at compile time so that the correct AES-GCM can be used for FIPS 140-3 enforcement mode).
|
||||
|
||||
```sh
|
||||
make fips140
|
||||
make fips140 test
|
||||
make release-fips140
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Nebula can also be built using the [BoringCrypto GOEXPERIMENT](https://github.com/golang/go/blob/go1.20/src/crypto/internal/boring/README.md) by running either of the following make targets.
|
||||
|
||||
```sh
|
||||
make bin-boringcrypto
|
||||
make release-boringcrypto
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
NOTE: boringcrypto support is deprecated and will be removed in the next release. Users should migrate to the native FIPS 140-3 mode described above.
|
||||
|
||||
This is not the recommended default deployment, but may be useful based on your compliance requirements.
|
||||
|
||||
## Credits
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -79,13 +79,7 @@ func (b *Bits) clearRange(startPos, count uint64) uint64 {
|
||||
// handle the potential partial word before pos becomes u64 aligned
|
||||
word := pos >> 6
|
||||
bit := pos & 63
|
||||
take := uint64(64) - bit
|
||||
if take > remaining {
|
||||
take = remaining
|
||||
}
|
||||
if take > b.length-pos {
|
||||
take = b.length - pos
|
||||
}
|
||||
take := min(min(uint64(64)-bit, remaining), b.length-pos)
|
||||
var mask uint64
|
||||
if take == 64 {
|
||||
mask = math.MaxUint64
|
||||
@@ -189,10 +183,7 @@ func (b *Bits) Update(l *slog.Logger, i uint64) bool {
|
||||
func (b *Bits) updateSlow(l *slog.Logger, i uint64) bool {
|
||||
// If i is a jump, adjust the window, record lost, update current, and return true
|
||||
if i > b.current {
|
||||
end := i
|
||||
if end > b.current+b.length {
|
||||
end = b.current + b.length
|
||||
}
|
||||
end := min(i, b.current+b.length)
|
||||
count := end - b.current
|
||||
startPos := (b.current + 1) & b.lengthMask
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+32
-2
@@ -148,6 +148,9 @@ func MarshalSigningPublicKeyToPEM(curve Curve, b []byte) []byte {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM will try to unmarshal the first pem block in a byte array, returning any non
|
||||
// consumed data or an error on failure. Only key-agreement (ECDH) public key banners are accepted.
|
||||
// Use UnmarshalSigningPublicKeyFromPEM for Ed25519/ECDSA banners.
|
||||
func UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(b []byte) ([]byte, []byte, Curve, error) {
|
||||
k, r := pem.Decode(b)
|
||||
if k == nil {
|
||||
@@ -156,10 +159,10 @@ func UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(b []byte) ([]byte, []byte, Curve, error) {
|
||||
var expectedLen int
|
||||
var curve Curve
|
||||
switch k.Type {
|
||||
case X25519PublicKeyBanner, Ed25519PublicKeyBanner:
|
||||
case X25519PublicKeyBanner:
|
||||
expectedLen = 32
|
||||
curve = Curve_CURVE25519
|
||||
case P256PublicKeyBanner, ECDSAP256PublicKeyBanner:
|
||||
case P256PublicKeyBanner:
|
||||
// Uncompressed
|
||||
expectedLen = 65
|
||||
curve = Curve_P256
|
||||
@@ -172,6 +175,33 @@ func UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(b []byte) ([]byte, []byte, Curve, error) {
|
||||
return k.Bytes, r, curve, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// UnmarshalSigningPublicKeyFromPEM will try to unmarshal the first pem block in a byte array, returning any non
|
||||
// consumed data or an error on failure. Only Ed25519/ECDSA public key banners are accepted.
|
||||
// Use UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM for X25519/P256 (ECDH) banners.
|
||||
func UnmarshalSigningPublicKeyFromPEM(b []byte) ([]byte, []byte, Curve, error) {
|
||||
k, r := pem.Decode(b)
|
||||
if k == nil {
|
||||
return nil, r, 0, fmt.Errorf("input did not contain a valid PEM encoded block")
|
||||
}
|
||||
var expectedLen int
|
||||
var curve Curve
|
||||
switch k.Type {
|
||||
case Ed25519PublicKeyBanner:
|
||||
expectedLen = 32
|
||||
curve = Curve_CURVE25519
|
||||
case ECDSAP256PublicKeyBanner:
|
||||
// Uncompressed
|
||||
expectedLen = 65
|
||||
curve = Curve_P256
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return nil, r, 0, fmt.Errorf("bytes did not contain a proper Ed25519/ECDSA public key banner")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(k.Bytes) != expectedLen {
|
||||
return nil, r, 0, fmt.Errorf("key was not %d bytes, is invalid %s public key", expectedLen, curve)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return k.Bytes, r, curve, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func MarshalPrivateKeyToPEM(curve Curve, b []byte) []byte {
|
||||
switch curve {
|
||||
case Curve_CURVE25519:
|
||||
|
||||
+88
-68
@@ -255,60 +255,6 @@ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
|
||||
func TestUnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
pubKey := []byte(`# A good key
|
||||
-----BEGIN NEBULA ED25519 PUBLIC KEY-----
|
||||
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
|
||||
-----END NEBULA ED25519 PUBLIC KEY-----
|
||||
`)
|
||||
shortKey := []byte(`# A short key
|
||||
-----BEGIN NEBULA ED25519 PUBLIC KEY-----
|
||||
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==
|
||||
-----END NEBULA ED25519 PUBLIC KEY-----
|
||||
`)
|
||||
invalidBanner := []byte(`# Invalid banner
|
||||
-----BEGIN NOT A NEBULA PUBLIC KEY-----
|
||||
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
|
||||
-----END NOT A NEBULA PUBLIC KEY-----
|
||||
`)
|
||||
invalidPem := []byte(`# Not a valid PEM format
|
||||
-BEGIN NEBULA ED25519 PUBLIC KEY-----
|
||||
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
|
||||
-END NEBULA ED25519 PUBLIC KEY-----`)
|
||||
|
||||
keyBundle := appendByteSlices(pubKey, shortKey, invalidBanner, invalidPem)
|
||||
|
||||
// Success test case
|
||||
k, rest, curve, err := UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(keyBundle)
|
||||
assert.Len(t, k, 32)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, Curve_CURVE25519, curve)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, rest, appendByteSlices(shortKey, invalidBanner, invalidPem))
|
||||
|
||||
// Fail due to short key
|
||||
k, rest, curve, err = UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(rest)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, k)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, Curve_CURVE25519, curve)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, rest, appendByteSlices(invalidBanner, invalidPem))
|
||||
require.EqualError(t, err, "key was not 32 bytes, is invalid CURVE25519 public key")
|
||||
|
||||
// Fail due to invalid banner
|
||||
k, rest, curve, err = UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(rest)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, k)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, Curve_CURVE25519, curve)
|
||||
require.EqualError(t, err, "bytes did not contain a proper public key banner")
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, rest, invalidPem)
|
||||
|
||||
// Fail due to invalid PEM format, because
|
||||
// it's missing the requisite pre-encapsulation boundary.
|
||||
k, rest, curve, err = UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(rest)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, k)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, Curve_CURVE25519, curve)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, rest, invalidPem)
|
||||
require.EqualError(t, err, "input did not contain a valid PEM encoded block")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestUnmarshalX25519PublicKey(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
pubKey := []byte(`# A good key
|
||||
-----BEGIN NEBULA X25519 PUBLIC KEY-----
|
||||
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
|
||||
-----END NEBULA X25519 PUBLIC KEY-----
|
||||
@@ -319,7 +265,7 @@ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
|
||||
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
|
||||
-----END NEBULA P256 PUBLIC KEY-----
|
||||
`)
|
||||
oldPubP256Key := []byte(`# A good key
|
||||
signingKey := []byte(`# A signing key has the wrong scope for this function
|
||||
-----BEGIN NEBULA ECDSA P256 PUBLIC KEY-----
|
||||
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
|
||||
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
|
||||
@@ -340,44 +286,118 @@ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
|
||||
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
|
||||
-END NEBULA X25519 PUBLIC KEY-----`)
|
||||
|
||||
keyBundle := appendByteSlices(pubKey, pubP256Key, oldPubP256Key, shortKey, invalidBanner, invalidPem)
|
||||
keyBundle := appendByteSlices(pubKey, pubP256Key, signingKey, shortKey, invalidBanner, invalidPem)
|
||||
|
||||
// Success test case
|
||||
// X25519 key
|
||||
k, rest, curve, err := UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(keyBundle)
|
||||
assert.Len(t, k, 32)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, rest, appendByteSlices(pubP256Key, oldPubP256Key, shortKey, invalidBanner, invalidPem))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, rest, appendByteSlices(pubP256Key, signingKey, shortKey, invalidBanner, invalidPem))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, Curve_CURVE25519, curve)
|
||||
|
||||
// Success test case
|
||||
// P256 key
|
||||
k, rest, curve, err = UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(rest)
|
||||
assert.Len(t, k, 65)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, rest, appendByteSlices(oldPubP256Key, shortKey, invalidBanner, invalidPem))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, rest, appendByteSlices(signingKey, shortKey, invalidBanner, invalidPem))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, Curve_P256, curve)
|
||||
|
||||
// Success test case
|
||||
k, rest, curve, err = UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(rest)
|
||||
assert.Len(t, k, 65)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
// Reject a signing public key (Ed25519/ECDSA banner)
|
||||
k, rest, _, err = UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(rest)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, k)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, rest, appendByteSlices(shortKey, invalidBanner, invalidPem))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, Curve_P256, curve)
|
||||
require.EqualError(t, err, "bytes did not contain a proper public key banner")
|
||||
|
||||
// Fail due to short key
|
||||
k, rest, curve, err = UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(rest)
|
||||
k, rest, _, err = UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(rest)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, k)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, rest, appendByteSlices(invalidBanner, invalidPem))
|
||||
require.EqualError(t, err, "key was not 32 bytes, is invalid CURVE25519 public key")
|
||||
|
||||
// Fail due to invalid banner
|
||||
k, rest, curve, err = UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(rest)
|
||||
k, rest, _, err = UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(rest)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, k)
|
||||
require.EqualError(t, err, "bytes did not contain a proper public key banner")
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, rest, invalidPem)
|
||||
|
||||
// Fail due to invalid PEM format, because
|
||||
// it's missing the requisite pre-encapsulation boundary.
|
||||
k, rest, curve, err = UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(rest)
|
||||
k, rest, _, err = UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(rest)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, k)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, rest, invalidPem)
|
||||
require.EqualError(t, err, "input did not contain a valid PEM encoded block")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestUnmarshalSigningPublicKeyFromPEM(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
pubKey := []byte(`# A good key
|
||||
-----BEGIN NEBULA ED25519 PUBLIC KEY-----
|
||||
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
|
||||
-----END NEBULA ED25519 PUBLIC KEY-----
|
||||
`)
|
||||
pubP256Key := []byte(`# A good key
|
||||
-----BEGIN NEBULA ECDSA P256 PUBLIC KEY-----
|
||||
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
|
||||
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
|
||||
-----END NEBULA ECDSA P256 PUBLIC KEY-----
|
||||
`)
|
||||
ecdhKey := []byte(`# A key-agreement key has the wrong scope for this function
|
||||
-----BEGIN NEBULA X25519 PUBLIC KEY-----
|
||||
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
|
||||
-----END NEBULA X25519 PUBLIC KEY-----
|
||||
`)
|
||||
shortKey := []byte(`# A short key
|
||||
-----BEGIN NEBULA ED25519 PUBLIC KEY-----
|
||||
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==
|
||||
-----END NEBULA ED25519 PUBLIC KEY-----
|
||||
`)
|
||||
invalidBanner := []byte(`# Invalid banner
|
||||
-----BEGIN NOT A NEBULA PUBLIC KEY-----
|
||||
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
|
||||
-----END NOT A NEBULA PUBLIC KEY-----
|
||||
`)
|
||||
invalidPem := []byte(`# Not a valid PEM format
|
||||
-BEGIN NEBULA ED25519 PUBLIC KEY-----
|
||||
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
|
||||
-END NEBULA ED25519 PUBLIC KEY-----`)
|
||||
|
||||
keyBundle := appendByteSlices(pubKey, pubP256Key, ecdhKey, shortKey, invalidBanner, invalidPem)
|
||||
|
||||
// Ed25519 key
|
||||
k, rest, curve, err := UnmarshalSigningPublicKeyFromPEM(keyBundle)
|
||||
assert.Len(t, k, 32)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, rest, appendByteSlices(pubP256Key, ecdhKey, shortKey, invalidBanner, invalidPem))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, Curve_CURVE25519, curve)
|
||||
|
||||
// ECDSA P256 key
|
||||
k, rest, curve, err = UnmarshalSigningPublicKeyFromPEM(rest)
|
||||
assert.Len(t, k, 65)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, rest, appendByteSlices(ecdhKey, shortKey, invalidBanner, invalidPem))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, Curve_P256, curve)
|
||||
|
||||
// Reject a key-agreement public key (X25519/P256 banner)
|
||||
k, rest, _, err = UnmarshalSigningPublicKeyFromPEM(rest)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, k)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, rest, appendByteSlices(shortKey, invalidBanner, invalidPem))
|
||||
require.EqualError(t, err, "bytes did not contain a proper Ed25519/ECDSA public key banner")
|
||||
|
||||
// Fail due to short key
|
||||
k, rest, _, err = UnmarshalSigningPublicKeyFromPEM(rest)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, k)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, rest, appendByteSlices(invalidBanner, invalidPem))
|
||||
require.EqualError(t, err, "key was not 32 bytes, is invalid CURVE25519 public key")
|
||||
|
||||
// Fail due to invalid banner
|
||||
k, rest, _, err = UnmarshalSigningPublicKeyFromPEM(rest)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, k)
|
||||
require.EqualError(t, err, "bytes did not contain a proper Ed25519/ECDSA public key banner")
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, rest, invalidPem)
|
||||
|
||||
// Fail due to invalid PEM format, because
|
||||
// it's missing the requisite pre-encapsulation boundary.
|
||||
k, rest, _, err = UnmarshalSigningPublicKeyFromPEM(rest)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, k)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, rest, invalidPem)
|
||||
require.EqualError(t, err, "input did not contain a valid PEM encoded block")
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ func TestCertificate_SignP256_AlwaysNormalized(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
pub := elliptic.Marshal(elliptic.P256(), priv.PublicKey.X, priv.PublicKey.Y)
|
||||
rawPriv := priv.D.FillBytes(make([]byte, 32))
|
||||
|
||||
for i := 0; i < 1000; i++ {
|
||||
for i := range 1000 {
|
||||
if i&1 == 1 {
|
||||
tbs.Version = Version1
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
|
||||
+34
-7
@@ -3,11 +3,14 @@ package main
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"crypto/ecdsa"
|
||||
"crypto/elliptic"
|
||||
"crypto/fips140"
|
||||
"crypto/rand"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"flag"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
"math"
|
||||
"math/bits"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
@@ -43,7 +46,28 @@ type caFlags struct {
|
||||
subnets *string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func defaultCurve() string {
|
||||
if fips140.Enforced() {
|
||||
return "P256"
|
||||
}
|
||||
return "25519"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func newCaFlags() *caFlags {
|
||||
// prevent running out of memory on 32-bit systems by defaulting to
|
||||
// RFC9106's recommendation for memory-constrained environments
|
||||
var (
|
||||
defaultArgonMemory uint
|
||||
defaultArgonIterations uint
|
||||
)
|
||||
if bits.UintSize == 32 {
|
||||
defaultArgonMemory = 64 * 1024
|
||||
defaultArgonIterations = 3
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
defaultArgonMemory = 2 * 1024 * 1024
|
||||
defaultArgonIterations = 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cf := caFlags{set: flag.NewFlagSet("ca", flag.ContinueOnError)}
|
||||
cf.set.Usage = func() {}
|
||||
cf.name = cf.set.String("name", "", "Required: name of the certificate authority")
|
||||
@@ -55,11 +79,11 @@ func newCaFlags() *caFlags {
|
||||
cf.groups = cf.set.String("groups", "", "Optional: comma separated list of groups. This will limit which groups subordinate certs can use")
|
||||
cf.networks = cf.set.String("networks", "", "Optional: comma separated list of ip address and network in CIDR notation. This will limit which ip addresses and networks subordinate certs can use in networks")
|
||||
cf.unsafeNetworks = cf.set.String("unsafe-networks", "", "Optional: comma separated list of ip address and network in CIDR notation. This will limit which ip addresses and networks subordinate certs can use in unsafe networks")
|
||||
cf.argonMemory = cf.set.Uint("argon-memory", 2*1024*1024, "Optional: Argon2 memory parameter (in KiB) used for encrypted private key passphrase")
|
||||
cf.argonMemory = cf.set.Uint("argon-memory", defaultArgonMemory, "Optional: Argon2 memory parameter (in KiB) used for encrypted private key passphrase")
|
||||
cf.argonParallelism = cf.set.Uint("argon-parallelism", 4, "Optional: Argon2 parallelism parameter used for encrypted private key passphrase")
|
||||
cf.argonIterations = cf.set.Uint("argon-iterations", 1, "Optional: Argon2 iterations parameter used for encrypted private key passphrase")
|
||||
cf.argonIterations = cf.set.Uint("argon-iterations", defaultArgonIterations, "Optional: Argon2 iterations parameter used for encrypted private key passphrase")
|
||||
cf.encryption = cf.set.Bool("encrypt", false, "Optional: prompt for passphrase and write out-key in an encrypted format")
|
||||
cf.curve = cf.set.String("curve", "25519", "EdDSA/ECDSA Curve (25519, P256)")
|
||||
cf.curve = cf.set.String("curve", defaultCurve(), "EdDSA/ECDSA Curve (25519, P256)")
|
||||
cf.p11url = p11Flag(cf.set)
|
||||
|
||||
cf.ips = cf.set.String("ips", "", "Deprecated, see -networks")
|
||||
@@ -127,7 +151,7 @@ func ca(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader) error
|
||||
|
||||
var groups []string
|
||||
if *cf.groups != "" {
|
||||
for _, rg := range strings.Split(*cf.groups, ",") {
|
||||
for rg := range strings.SplitSeq(*cf.groups, ",") {
|
||||
g := strings.TrimSpace(rg)
|
||||
if g != "" {
|
||||
groups = append(groups, g)
|
||||
@@ -147,7 +171,7 @@ func ca(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader) error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if *cf.networks != "" {
|
||||
for _, rs := range strings.Split(*cf.networks, ",") {
|
||||
for rs := range strings.SplitSeq(*cf.networks, ",") {
|
||||
rs := strings.Trim(rs, " ")
|
||||
if rs != "" {
|
||||
n, err := netip.ParsePrefix(rs)
|
||||
@@ -169,7 +193,7 @@ func ca(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader) error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if *cf.unsafeNetworks != "" {
|
||||
for _, rs := range strings.Split(*cf.unsafeNetworks, ",") {
|
||||
for rs := range strings.SplitSeq(*cf.unsafeNetworks, ",") {
|
||||
rs := strings.Trim(rs, " ")
|
||||
if rs != "" {
|
||||
n, err := netip.ParsePrefix(rs)
|
||||
@@ -197,7 +221,7 @@ func ca(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader) error
|
||||
if !isP11 && *cf.encryption {
|
||||
passphrase = []byte(os.Getenv("NEBULA_CA_PASSPHRASE"))
|
||||
if len(passphrase) == 0 {
|
||||
for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
|
||||
for range 5 {
|
||||
errOut.Write([]byte("Enter passphrase: "))
|
||||
passphrase, err = pr.ReadPassword()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -244,6 +268,9 @@ func ca(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader) error
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
switch *cf.curve {
|
||||
case "25519", "X25519", "Curve25519", "CURVE25519":
|
||||
if fips140.Enforced() {
|
||||
return errors.New("use of Curve25519 is not allowed in FIPS 140-only mode")
|
||||
}
|
||||
curve = cert.Curve_CURVE25519
|
||||
pub, rawPriv, err = ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
|
||||
//go:build !windows
|
||||
// +build !windows
|
||||
|
||||
package main
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -7,7 +6,9 @@ import (
|
||||
"bytes"
|
||||
"encoding/pem"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"math/bits"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"strconv"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
@@ -22,6 +23,18 @@ func Test_caSummary(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func Test_caHelp(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
var (
|
||||
defaultArgonMemory string
|
||||
defaultArgonIterations string
|
||||
)
|
||||
if bits.UintSize == 32 {
|
||||
defaultArgonMemory = strconv.Itoa(64 * 1024)
|
||||
defaultArgonIterations = strconv.Itoa(3)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
defaultArgonMemory = strconv.Itoa(2 * 1024 * 1024)
|
||||
defaultArgonIterations = strconv.Itoa(1)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ob := &bytes.Buffer{}
|
||||
caHelp(ob)
|
||||
assert.Equal(
|
||||
@@ -29,9 +42,9 @@ func Test_caHelp(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
"Usage of "+os.Args[0]+" ca <flags>: create a self signed certificate authority\n"+
|
||||
" Pass \"-\" to any path flag to read from stdin or write to stdout.\n"+
|
||||
" -argon-iterations uint\n"+
|
||||
" \tOptional: Argon2 iterations parameter used for encrypted private key passphrase (default 1)\n"+
|
||||
" \tOptional: Argon2 iterations parameter used for encrypted private key passphrase (default "+defaultArgonIterations+")\n"+
|
||||
" -argon-memory uint\n"+
|
||||
" \tOptional: Argon2 memory parameter (in KiB) used for encrypted private key passphrase (default 2097152)\n"+
|
||||
" \tOptional: Argon2 memory parameter (in KiB) used for encrypted private key passphrase (default "+defaultArgonMemory+")\n"+
|
||||
" -argon-parallelism uint\n"+
|
||||
" \tOptional: Argon2 parallelism parameter used for encrypted private key passphrase (default 4)\n"+
|
||||
" -curve string\n"+
|
||||
@@ -188,10 +201,16 @@ func Test_ca(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
k, _ := pem.Decode(rb)
|
||||
ned, err := cert.UnmarshalNebulaEncryptedData(k.Bytes)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
// we won't know salt in advance, so just check start of string
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, uint32(2*1024*1024), ned.EncryptionMetadata.Argon2Parameters.Memory)
|
||||
|
||||
if bits.UintSize == 32 {
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, uint32(64*1024), ned.EncryptionMetadata.Argon2Parameters.Memory)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, uint32(3), ned.EncryptionMetadata.Argon2Parameters.Iterations)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, uint32(2*1024*1024), ned.EncryptionMetadata.Argon2Parameters.Memory)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, uint32(1), ned.EncryptionMetadata.Argon2Parameters.Iterations)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, uint8(4), ned.EncryptionMetadata.Argon2Parameters.Parallelism)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, uint32(1), ned.EncryptionMetadata.Argon2Parameters.Iterations)
|
||||
|
||||
// verify the key is valid and decrypt-able
|
||||
var curve cert.Curve
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
||||
//go:build fips140enforce
|
||||
|
||||
//go:debug fips140=only
|
||||
|
||||
package main
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
|
||||
package main
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"crypto/fips140"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"flag"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
@@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ func newKeygenFlags() *keygenFlags {
|
||||
cf.set.Usage = func() {}
|
||||
cf.outPubPath = cf.set.String("out-pub", "", "Required: path to write the public key to")
|
||||
cf.outKeyPath = cf.set.String("out-key", "", "Required: path to write the private key to")
|
||||
cf.curve = cf.set.String("curve", "25519", "ECDH Curve (25519, P256)")
|
||||
cf.curve = cf.set.String("curve", defaultCurve(), "ECDH Curve (25519, P256)")
|
||||
cf.p11url = p11Flag(cf.set)
|
||||
return &cf
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -61,6 +63,9 @@ func keygen(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer) error {
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
switch *cf.curve {
|
||||
case "25519", "X25519", "Curve25519", "CURVE25519":
|
||||
if fips140.Enforced() {
|
||||
return errors.New("use of Curve25519 is not allowed in FIPS 140-only mode")
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub, rawPriv = x25519Keypair()
|
||||
curve = cert.Curve_CURVE25519
|
||||
case "P256":
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package main
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"crypto/ecdh"
|
||||
"crypto/fips140"
|
||||
"crypto/rand"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"flag"
|
||||
@@ -145,7 +146,7 @@ func signCert(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader)
|
||||
passphrase = []byte(os.Getenv("NEBULA_CA_PASSPHRASE"))
|
||||
if len(passphrase) == 0 {
|
||||
// ask for a passphrase until we get one
|
||||
for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
|
||||
for range 5 {
|
||||
errOut.Write([]byte("Enter passphrase: "))
|
||||
passphrase, err = pr.ReadPassword()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -202,7 +203,7 @@ func signCert(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if *sf.networks != "" {
|
||||
for _, rs := range strings.Split(*sf.networks, ",") {
|
||||
for rs := range strings.SplitSeq(*sf.networks, ",") {
|
||||
rs := strings.Trim(rs, " ")
|
||||
if rs != "" {
|
||||
n, err := netip.ParsePrefix(rs)
|
||||
@@ -227,7 +228,7 @@ func signCert(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if *sf.unsafeNetworks != "" {
|
||||
for _, rs := range strings.Split(*sf.unsafeNetworks, ",") {
|
||||
for rs := range strings.SplitSeq(*sf.unsafeNetworks, ",") {
|
||||
rs := strings.Trim(rs, " ")
|
||||
if rs != "" {
|
||||
n, err := netip.ParsePrefix(rs)
|
||||
@@ -246,7 +247,7 @@ func signCert(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader)
|
||||
|
||||
var groups []string
|
||||
if *sf.groups != "" {
|
||||
for _, rg := range strings.Split(*sf.groups, ",") {
|
||||
for rg := range strings.SplitSeq(*sf.groups, ",") {
|
||||
g := strings.TrimSpace(rg)
|
||||
if g != "" {
|
||||
groups = append(groups, g)
|
||||
@@ -268,6 +269,10 @@ func signCert(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader)
|
||||
}(p11Client)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if fips140.Enforced() && curve == cert.Curve_CURVE25519 {
|
||||
return errors.New("use of Curve25519 is not allowed in FIPS 140-only mode")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if *sf.inPubPath != "" {
|
||||
var pubCurve cert.Curve
|
||||
rawPub, err := readInput("in-pub", *sf.inPubPath, &claims)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
|
||||
//go:build !windows
|
||||
// +build !windows
|
||||
|
||||
package main
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
||||
//go:build fips140enforce
|
||||
|
||||
//go:debug fips140=only
|
||||
|
||||
package main
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
|
||||
//go:build !windows
|
||||
// +build !windows
|
||||
|
||||
package main
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -53,7 +53,12 @@ func main() {
|
||||
l := logging.NewLogger(os.Stdout)
|
||||
|
||||
if *serviceFlag != "" {
|
||||
if err := doService(configPath, configTest, Build, serviceFlag); err != nil {
|
||||
if *configTest {
|
||||
fmt.Println("-test is not supported with -service, run the config test without -service")
|
||||
os.Exit(1)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if err := doService(configPath, Build, serviceFlag); err != nil {
|
||||
l.Error("Service command failed", "error", err)
|
||||
os.Exit(1)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -93,15 +98,14 @@ func main() {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if !*configTest {
|
||||
wait, err := ctrl.Start()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
if err := ctrl.Start(); err != nil {
|
||||
util.LogWithContextIfNeeded("Error while running", err, l)
|
||||
os.Exit(1)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
go ctrl.ShutdownBlock()
|
||||
|
||||
if err := wait(); err != nil {
|
||||
if err := ctrl.Wait(); err != nil {
|
||||
l.Error("Nebula stopped due to fatal error", "error", err)
|
||||
os.Exit(2)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package main
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"log"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/kardianos/service"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula"
|
||||
@@ -14,7 +15,6 @@ var logger service.Logger
|
||||
|
||||
type program struct {
|
||||
configPath *string
|
||||
configTest *bool
|
||||
build string
|
||||
control *nebula.Control
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -40,22 +40,41 @@ func (p *program) Start(s service.Service) error {
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
p.control, err = nebula.Main(c, *p.configTest, Build, l, nil)
|
||||
p.control, err = nebula.Main(c, false, Build, l, nil)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
p.control.Start()
|
||||
if err := p.control.Start(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Nebula can stop itself on a fatal packet reader error, make sure to log it if it happens.
|
||||
go func() {
|
||||
if err := p.control.Wait(); err != nil {
|
||||
logger.Error(fmt.Sprintf("Nebula stopped due to fatal error: %v", err))
|
||||
os.Exit(2)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}()
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (p *program) Stop(s service.Service) error {
|
||||
logger.Info("Nebula service stopping.")
|
||||
if p.control == nil {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
p.control.Stop()
|
||||
|
||||
// block until nebula has fully drained before reporting stopped.
|
||||
// error logging is handled by Start.
|
||||
_ = p.control.Wait()
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func doService(configPath *string, configTest *bool, build string, serviceFlag *string) error {
|
||||
func doService(configPath *string, build string, serviceFlag *string) error {
|
||||
if *configPath == "" {
|
||||
p, err := config.DefaultPath()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
@@ -73,7 +92,6 @@ func doService(configPath *string, configTest *bool, build string, serviceFlag *
|
||||
|
||||
prg := &program{
|
||||
configPath: configPath,
|
||||
configTest: configTest,
|
||||
build: build,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -105,8 +123,9 @@ func doService(configPath *string, configTest *bool, build string, serviceFlag *
|
||||
switch *serviceFlag {
|
||||
case "run":
|
||||
if err := s.Run(); err != nil {
|
||||
// Route any errors to the system logger
|
||||
// Route any errors to the system logger and report the failure
|
||||
logger.Error(err)
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
default:
|
||||
if err := service.Control(s, *serviceFlag); err != nil {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
|
||||
//go:build linux && !android && !e2e_testing
|
||||
|
||||
package main
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"path/filepath"
|
||||
"runtime"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
|
||||
cert_test "github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// TestControlStopClosesOnTimer reproduces the dnclient lifecycle: nebula runs as
|
||||
// a library, and on a config update dnclient calls Stop() in-process to tear the
|
||||
// old instance down before starting a new one. This boots a real nebula (real
|
||||
// blocking UDP sockets, tun disabled), lets it run, then Stop()s it on a timer
|
||||
// and asserts it actually closes. If the reader goroutines parked in recvmmsg
|
||||
// don't wake on Close(), Wait() blocks forever and this fails with a goroutine
|
||||
// dump instead of relying on a process signal to unstick them.
|
||||
func TestControlStopClosesOnTimer(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
l := test.NewLogger()
|
||||
dir := t.TempDir()
|
||||
|
||||
before := time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)
|
||||
after := time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
|
||||
ca, _, caKey, caPEM := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, before, after, nil, nil, nil)
|
||||
networks := []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")}
|
||||
_, _, keyPEM, certPEM := cert_test.NewTestCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, ca, caKey, "close-on-timer", before, after, networks, nil, nil)
|
||||
|
||||
caPath := filepath.Join(dir, "ca.pem")
|
||||
certPath := filepath.Join(dir, "cert.pem")
|
||||
keyPath := filepath.Join(dir, "key.pem")
|
||||
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(caPath, caPEM, 0o600))
|
||||
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(certPath, certPEM, 0o600))
|
||||
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(keyPath, keyPEM, 0o600))
|
||||
|
||||
// tun disabled so no device/root is needed; routines: 2 so we exercise the
|
||||
// multi-socket (SO_REUSEPORT) teardown, which is where dnclient runs.
|
||||
configBody := fmt.Sprintf(`
|
||||
pki:
|
||||
ca: %s
|
||||
cert: %s
|
||||
key: %s
|
||||
listen:
|
||||
host: 127.0.0.1
|
||||
port: 0
|
||||
tun:
|
||||
disabled: true
|
||||
firewall:
|
||||
outbound:
|
||||
- port: any
|
||||
proto: any
|
||||
host: any
|
||||
inbound:
|
||||
- port: any
|
||||
proto: any
|
||||
host: any
|
||||
routines: 2
|
||||
`, caPath, certPath, keyPath)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "config.yml"), []byte(configBody), 0o600))
|
||||
|
||||
c := config.NewC(l)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, c.Load(dir))
|
||||
|
||||
ctrl, err := nebula.Main(c, false, "close-on-timer", l, nil)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, ctrl.Start())
|
||||
|
||||
// Run like a live nebula, then close on a timer, exactly as dnclient does.
|
||||
<-time.NewTimer(5 * time.Second).C
|
||||
|
||||
stopped := make(chan struct{})
|
||||
go func() {
|
||||
ctrl.Stop() // closes the udp sockets (shutdown(2)) and the tun
|
||||
ctrl.Wait() // blocks until every reader goroutine has returned
|
||||
close(stopped)
|
||||
}()
|
||||
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case <-stopped:
|
||||
t.Log("nebula closed cleanly on timer")
|
||||
case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
|
||||
buf := make([]byte, 1<<20)
|
||||
n := runtime.Stack(buf, true)
|
||||
t.Fatalf("nebula did NOT close within 10s of Stop(): a blocking reader never woke\n%s", buf[:n])
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
||||
//go:build fips140enforce
|
||||
|
||||
//go:debug fips140=only
|
||||
|
||||
package main
|
||||
+2
-3
@@ -84,8 +84,7 @@ func main() {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if !*configTest {
|
||||
wait, err := ctrl.Start()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
if err := ctrl.Start(); err != nil {
|
||||
util.LogWithContextIfNeeded("Error while running", err, l)
|
||||
os.Exit(1)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -93,7 +92,7 @@ func main() {
|
||||
go ctrl.ShutdownBlock()
|
||||
notifyReady(l)
|
||||
|
||||
if err := wait(); err != nil {
|
||||
if err := ctrl.Wait(); err != nil {
|
||||
l.Error("Nebula stopped due to fatal error", "error", err)
|
||||
os.Exit(2)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
|
||||
//go:build !linux
|
||||
// +build !linux
|
||||
|
||||
package main
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+6
-9
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"maps"
|
||||
"math"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"os/signal"
|
||||
@@ -154,9 +155,7 @@ func (c *C) ReloadConfig() {
|
||||
defer c.reloadLock.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
c.oldSettings = make(map[string]any)
|
||||
for k, v := range c.Settings {
|
||||
c.oldSettings[k] = v
|
||||
}
|
||||
maps.Copy(c.oldSettings, c.Settings)
|
||||
|
||||
err := c.Load(c.path)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
@@ -177,9 +176,7 @@ func (c *C) ReloadConfigString(raw string) error {
|
||||
defer c.reloadLock.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
c.oldSettings = make(map[string]any)
|
||||
for k, v := range c.Settings {
|
||||
c.oldSettings[k] = v
|
||||
}
|
||||
maps.Copy(c.oldSettings, c.Settings)
|
||||
|
||||
err := c.LoadString(raw)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
@@ -216,7 +213,7 @@ func (c *C) GetStringSlice(k string, d []string) []string {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
v := make([]string, len(rv))
|
||||
for i := 0; i < len(v); i++ {
|
||||
for i := range v {
|
||||
v[i] = fmt.Sprintf("%v", rv[i])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -310,8 +307,8 @@ func (c *C) IsSet(k string) bool {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *C) get(k string, v any) any {
|
||||
parts := strings.Split(k, ".")
|
||||
for _, p := range parts {
|
||||
parts := strings.SplitSeq(k, ".")
|
||||
for p := range parts {
|
||||
m, ok := v.(map[string]any)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
|
||||
+36
-12
@@ -105,11 +105,18 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) getInactivityTimeout() time.Duration {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (cm *connectionManager) In(h *HostInfo) {
|
||||
h.in.Store(true)
|
||||
h.markIn()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (cm *connectionManager) Out(h *HostInfo) {
|
||||
h.out.Store(true)
|
||||
// OutNoRebind records outbound traffic without consuming the rebind epoch, for relayed sends: the direct path
|
||||
// to the relay consumes the edge, the via send must not.
|
||||
func (cm *connectionManager) OutNoRebind(h *HostInfo) {
|
||||
h.markOutOnly()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Out records outbound traffic and reports whether we rebound since this tunnel last sent
|
||||
func (cm *connectionManager) Out(h *HostInfo) bool {
|
||||
return h.markOut(cm.intf.rebindEpoch.Load())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (cm *connectionManager) RelayUsed(localIndex uint32) {
|
||||
@@ -128,8 +135,7 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) RelayUsed(localIndex uint32) {
|
||||
// getAndResetTrafficCheck returns if there was any inbound or outbound traffic within the last tick and
|
||||
// resets the state for this local index
|
||||
func (cm *connectionManager) getAndResetTrafficCheck(h *HostInfo, now time.Time) (bool, bool) {
|
||||
in := h.in.Swap(false)
|
||||
out := h.out.Swap(false)
|
||||
in, out := h.takeTraffic()
|
||||
if in || out {
|
||||
h.lastUsed = now
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -168,10 +174,8 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) doTrafficCheck(localIndex uint32, p, nb, out []byte
|
||||
|
||||
switch decision {
|
||||
case deleteTunnel:
|
||||
if cm.hostMap.DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo) {
|
||||
// Only clearing the lighthouse cache if this is the last hostinfo for this vpn ip in the hostmap
|
||||
cm.intf.lightHouse.DeleteVpnAddrs(hostinfo.vpnAddrs)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Local delete only, clearing the lighthouse cache if this was the last hostinfo for the vpn addr
|
||||
cm.intf.closeTunnel(hostinfo)
|
||||
|
||||
case closeTunnel:
|
||||
cm.intf.sendCloseTunnel(hostinfo)
|
||||
@@ -323,6 +327,12 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) makeTrafficDecision(localIndex uint32, now time.Tim
|
||||
return closeTunnel, hostinfo, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if hostinfo.ConnectionState != nil && hostinfo.ConnectionState.messageCounter.Load() >= RejectAfterMessages {
|
||||
// Send path can't encrypt a CloseTunnel notify, so just delete locally; the peer recovers via recv_error.
|
||||
hostinfo.logger(cm.l).Error("Dropping tunnel, message counter is exhausted")
|
||||
return deleteTunnel, hostinfo, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
primary := cm.hostMap.Hosts[hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0]]
|
||||
mainHostInfo := true
|
||||
if primary != nil && primary != hostinfo {
|
||||
@@ -340,7 +350,7 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) makeTrafficDecision(localIndex uint32, now time.Tim
|
||||
"tunnelCheck", m{"state": "alive", "method": "passive"},
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Store(false)
|
||||
hostinfo.setPendingDeletion(false)
|
||||
|
||||
if mainHostInfo {
|
||||
decision = tryRehandshake
|
||||
@@ -363,7 +373,7 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) makeTrafficDecision(localIndex uint32, now time.Tim
|
||||
return decision, hostinfo, primary
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load() {
|
||||
if hostinfo.isPendingDeletion() {
|
||||
// We have already sent a test packet and nothing was returned, this hostinfo is dead
|
||||
hostinfo.logger(cm.l).Info("Tunnel status",
|
||||
"tunnelCheck", m{"state": "dead", "method": "active"},
|
||||
@@ -414,7 +424,7 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) makeTrafficDecision(localIndex uint32, now time.Tim
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Store(true)
|
||||
hostinfo.setPendingDeletion(true)
|
||||
cm.trafficTimer.Add(hostinfo.localIndexId, cm.pendingDeletionInterval)
|
||||
return decision, hostinfo, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -448,6 +458,11 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) shouldSwapPrimary(current *HostInfo) bool {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if current.ConnectionState.messageCounter.Load() >= RehandshakeAfterMessages {
|
||||
// This tunnel is being rolled for counter exhaustion, never swap back onto its spent key.
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
crt := cm.intf.pki.getCertState().getCertificate(current.ConnectionState.myCert.Version())
|
||||
if crt == nil {
|
||||
//my cert was reloaded away. We should definitely swap from this tunnel
|
||||
@@ -544,6 +559,15 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) tryRehandshake(hostinfo *HostInfo) {
|
||||
"reason", "current cert version < pki.initiatingVersion",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
cm.intf.handshakeManager.StartHandshake(hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0], nil)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if hostinfo.ConnectionState.messageCounter.Load() >= RehandshakeAfterMessages {
|
||||
cm.l.Info("Re-handshaking with remote",
|
||||
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
|
||||
"reason", "message counter rehandshake threshold reached",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
cm.intf.handshakeManager.StartHandshake(hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0], nil)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+113
-36
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/overlaytest"
|
||||
@@ -21,10 +22,13 @@ func newTestLighthouse() *LightHouse {
|
||||
l: test.NewLogger(),
|
||||
addrMap: map[netip.Addr]*RemoteList{},
|
||||
queryChan: make(chan netip.Addr, 10),
|
||||
// Nothing drains queryChan here, so an 11th query is dropped.
|
||||
queryDropped: metrics.NilCounter{},
|
||||
}
|
||||
lighthouses := []netip.Addr{}
|
||||
staticList := map[netip.Addr]struct{}{}
|
||||
|
||||
lh.localAddrsFn = func(*LocalAllowList) []netip.Addr { return nil }
|
||||
lh.lighthouses.Store(&lighthouses)
|
||||
lh.staticList.Store(&staticList)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -85,25 +89,25 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// We saw traffic out to vpnIp
|
||||
nc.Out(hostinfo)
|
||||
nc.In(hostinfo)
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.isPendingDeletion())
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Hosts, hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0])
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Indexes, hostinfo.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.True(t, hostinfo.out.Load())
|
||||
assert.True(t, hostinfo.in.Load())
|
||||
assert.True(t, hostinfo.sentSinceCheck())
|
||||
assert.True(t, (hostinfo.state.Load()&stateIn != 0))
|
||||
|
||||
// Do a traffic check tick, should not be pending deletion but should not have any in/out packets recorded
|
||||
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, nb, out, time.Now())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.out.Load())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.in.Load())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.isPendingDeletion())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.sentSinceCheck())
|
||||
assert.False(t, (hostinfo.state.Load()&stateIn != 0))
|
||||
|
||||
// Do another traffic check tick, this host should be pending deletion now
|
||||
nc.Out(hostinfo)
|
||||
assert.True(t, hostinfo.out.Load())
|
||||
assert.True(t, hostinfo.sentSinceCheck())
|
||||
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, nb, out, time.Now())
|
||||
assert.True(t, hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.out.Load())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.in.Load())
|
||||
assert.True(t, hostinfo.isPendingDeletion())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.sentSinceCheck())
|
||||
assert.False(t, (hostinfo.state.Load()&stateIn != 0))
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Indexes, hostinfo.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Hosts, hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0])
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -167,37 +171,110 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest2(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// We saw traffic out to vpnIp
|
||||
nc.Out(hostinfo)
|
||||
nc.In(hostinfo)
|
||||
assert.True(t, hostinfo.in.Load())
|
||||
assert.True(t, hostinfo.out.Load())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load())
|
||||
assert.True(t, (hostinfo.state.Load()&stateIn != 0))
|
||||
assert.True(t, hostinfo.sentSinceCheck())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.isPendingDeletion())
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Hosts, hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0])
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Indexes, hostinfo.localIndexId)
|
||||
|
||||
// Do a traffic check tick, should not be pending deletion but should not have any in/out packets recorded
|
||||
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, nb, out, time.Now())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.out.Load())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.in.Load())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.isPendingDeletion())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.sentSinceCheck())
|
||||
assert.False(t, (hostinfo.state.Load()&stateIn != 0))
|
||||
|
||||
// Do another traffic check tick, this host should be pending deletion now
|
||||
nc.Out(hostinfo)
|
||||
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, nb, out, time.Now())
|
||||
assert.True(t, hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.out.Load())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.in.Load())
|
||||
assert.True(t, hostinfo.isPendingDeletion())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.sentSinceCheck())
|
||||
assert.False(t, (hostinfo.state.Load()&stateIn != 0))
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Indexes, hostinfo.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Hosts, hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0])
|
||||
|
||||
// We saw traffic, should no longer be pending deletion
|
||||
nc.In(hostinfo)
|
||||
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, nb, out, time.Now())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.out.Load())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.in.Load())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.isPendingDeletion())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.sentSinceCheck())
|
||||
assert.False(t, (hostinfo.state.Load()&stateIn != 0))
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Indexes, hostinfo.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Hosts, hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func Test_NewConnectionManager_CounterLimits(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
l := test.NewLogger()
|
||||
localrange := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.1.1.1/24")
|
||||
vpnIp := netip.MustParseAddr("172.1.1.2")
|
||||
preferredRanges := []netip.Prefix{localrange}
|
||||
|
||||
// Very incomplete mock objects
|
||||
hostMap := newHostMap(l)
|
||||
hostMap.preferredRanges.Store(&preferredRanges)
|
||||
|
||||
cs := &CertState{
|
||||
initiatingVersion: cert.Version1,
|
||||
privateKey: []byte{},
|
||||
v1Cert: &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1},
|
||||
v1Credential: nil,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
lh := newTestLighthouse()
|
||||
ifce := &Interface{
|
||||
hostMap: hostMap,
|
||||
inside: &overlaytest.NoopTun{},
|
||||
outside: &udp.NoopConn{},
|
||||
firewall: &Firewall{},
|
||||
lightHouse: lh,
|
||||
pki: &PKI{},
|
||||
myVpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("172.1.1.1")}, // sorts below vpnIp so shouldSwapPrimary can proceed
|
||||
handshakeManager: NewHandshakeManager(l, hostMap, lh, &udp.NoopConn{}, defaultHandshakeConfig),
|
||||
l: l,
|
||||
}
|
||||
ifce.pki.cs.Store(cs)
|
||||
|
||||
conf := config.NewC(test.NewLogger())
|
||||
punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf, nil)
|
||||
nc := newConnectionManagerFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf, hostMap, punchy)
|
||||
nc.intf = ifce
|
||||
|
||||
hostinfo := &HostInfo{
|
||||
vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{vpnIp},
|
||||
localIndexId: 1099,
|
||||
remoteIndexId: 9901,
|
||||
}
|
||||
hostinfo.ConnectionState = &ConnectionState{
|
||||
myCert: &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1},
|
||||
}
|
||||
nc.hostMap.unlockedAddHostInfo(hostinfo, ifce)
|
||||
|
||||
// Below the rehandshake threshold, no handshake is started
|
||||
hostinfo.ConnectionState.messageCounter.Store(RehandshakeAfterMessages - 1)
|
||||
nc.tryRehandshake(hostinfo)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, ifce.handshakeManager.QueryVpnAddr(vpnIp))
|
||||
|
||||
// A tunnel on its current cert would normally swap to primary
|
||||
assert.True(t, nc.shouldSwapPrimary(hostinfo))
|
||||
|
||||
// At the rehandshake threshold, a new handshake is started
|
||||
hostinfo.ConnectionState.messageCounter.Store(RehandshakeAfterMessages)
|
||||
nc.tryRehandshake(hostinfo)
|
||||
assert.NotNil(t, ifce.handshakeManager.QueryVpnAddr(vpnIp))
|
||||
|
||||
// An exhausted tunnel being rolled must never swap back to primary onto its spent key
|
||||
assert.False(t, nc.shouldSwapPrimary(hostinfo))
|
||||
|
||||
// Still below the reject limit, the tunnel stays up
|
||||
nc.In(hostinfo)
|
||||
decision, _, _ := nc.makeTrafficDecision(hostinfo.localIndexId, time.Now())
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, tryRehandshake, decision)
|
||||
|
||||
// At the reject limit, the tunnel is deleted locally without a doomed CloseTunnel notify
|
||||
hostinfo.ConnectionState.messageCounter.Store(RejectAfterMessages)
|
||||
decision, _, _ = nc.makeTrafficDecision(hostinfo.localIndexId, time.Now())
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, deleteTunnel, decision)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func Test_NewConnectionManager_DisconnectInactive(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
l := test.NewLogger()
|
||||
localrange := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.1.1.1/24")
|
||||
@@ -252,31 +329,31 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManager_DisconnectInactive(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// Do a traffic check tick, in and out should be cleared but should not be pending deletion
|
||||
nc.Out(hostinfo)
|
||||
nc.In(hostinfo)
|
||||
assert.True(t, hostinfo.out.Load())
|
||||
assert.True(t, hostinfo.in.Load())
|
||||
assert.True(t, hostinfo.sentSinceCheck())
|
||||
assert.True(t, (hostinfo.state.Load()&stateIn != 0))
|
||||
|
||||
now := time.Now()
|
||||
decision, _, _ := nc.makeTrafficDecision(hostinfo.localIndexId, now)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, tryRehandshake, decision)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, now, hostinfo.lastUsed)
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.out.Load())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.in.Load())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.isPendingDeletion())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.sentSinceCheck())
|
||||
assert.False(t, (hostinfo.state.Load()&stateIn != 0))
|
||||
|
||||
decision, _, _ = nc.makeTrafficDecision(hostinfo.localIndexId, now.Add(time.Second*5))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, doNothing, decision)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, now, hostinfo.lastUsed)
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.out.Load())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.in.Load())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.isPendingDeletion())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.sentSinceCheck())
|
||||
assert.False(t, (hostinfo.state.Load()&stateIn != 0))
|
||||
|
||||
// Do another traffic check tick, should still not be pending deletion
|
||||
decision, _, _ = nc.makeTrafficDecision(hostinfo.localIndexId, now.Add(time.Second*10))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, doNothing, decision)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, now, hostinfo.lastUsed)
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.out.Load())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.in.Load())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.isPendingDeletion())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.sentSinceCheck())
|
||||
assert.False(t, (hostinfo.state.Load()&stateIn != 0))
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Indexes, hostinfo.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Hosts, hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0])
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -284,9 +361,9 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManager_DisconnectInactive(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
decision, _, _ = nc.makeTrafficDecision(hostinfo.localIndexId, now.Add(time.Minute*10))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, closeTunnel, decision)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, now, hostinfo.lastUsed)
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.out.Load())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.in.Load())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.isPendingDeletion())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.sentSinceCheck())
|
||||
assert.False(t, (hostinfo.state.Load()&stateIn != 0))
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Indexes, hostinfo.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Hosts, hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+95
-3
@@ -2,15 +2,37 @@ package nebula
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"sync/atomic"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/noiseutil"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
const ReplayWindow = 1024
|
||||
const (
|
||||
ReplayWindow = 8192
|
||||
|
||||
// RehandshakeAfterMessages rolls keys inside the AES-GCM data-volume margin (~2^-36 advantage at 64KB frames).
|
||||
RehandshakeAfterMessages = uint64(1) << 34
|
||||
|
||||
// RejectAfterMessages is the nonce ceiling enforced by noiseutil; a tunnel here is deleted locally, not notified.
|
||||
RejectAfterMessages = noiseutil.RejectAfterMessages
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// RehandshakeAfterMessages must stay below RejectAfterMessages so tunnels roll before the hard send stop.
|
||||
const _ = RejectAfterMessages - RehandshakeAfterMessages
|
||||
|
||||
// sessionEpoch hands out a receiver-local ordinal to every ConnectionState at creation. The RX
|
||||
// staging sort (overlay/batch) orders packets by (epoch, message counter). A re-handshake never
|
||||
// rekeys an existing tunnel; it brings up a new hostinfo and ConnectionState with a counter space
|
||||
// starting near zero, while the old tunnel keeps decrypting until torn down. During that cutover
|
||||
// one flush batch can hold packets from both tunnels, and the epoch keeps the old tunnel's
|
||||
// packets sorted first.
|
||||
var sessionEpoch atomic.Uint64
|
||||
|
||||
type ConnectionState struct {
|
||||
eKey noiseutil.CipherState
|
||||
@@ -20,14 +42,22 @@ type ConnectionState struct {
|
||||
initiator bool
|
||||
messageCounter atomic.Uint64
|
||||
window *Bits
|
||||
decryptLock sync.Mutex
|
||||
writeLock sync.Mutex
|
||||
// epoch is this session's sessionEpoch ordinal. Immutable after creation.
|
||||
epoch uint64
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newConnectionStateFromResult builds a fully-populated ConnectionState from a
|
||||
// completed handshake.Result. It seeds messageCounter and the replay window so
|
||||
// that the post-handshake message indices already used on the wire don't count
|
||||
// as missed traffic in the data plane.
|
||||
func newConnectionStateFromResult(r *handshake.Result) *ConnectionState {
|
||||
func newConnectionStateFromResult(r *handshake.Result) (*ConnectionState, error) {
|
||||
// Refuse a MessageIndex too big for the replay window: it can only be a bug, and would spin the seed loop below.
|
||||
if r.MessageIndex >= ReplayWindow {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("handshake message index %d exceeds replay window", r.MessageIndex)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ci := &ConnectionState{
|
||||
myCert: r.MyCert,
|
||||
initiator: r.Initiator,
|
||||
@@ -35,12 +65,13 @@ func newConnectionStateFromResult(r *handshake.Result) *ConnectionState {
|
||||
eKey: noiseutil.NewCipherState(r.EKey, r.Cipher),
|
||||
dKey: noiseutil.NewCipherState(r.DKey, r.Cipher),
|
||||
window: NewBits(ReplayWindow),
|
||||
epoch: sessionEpoch.Add(1),
|
||||
}
|
||||
ci.messageCounter.Add(r.MessageIndex)
|
||||
for i := uint64(1); i <= r.MessageIndex; i++ {
|
||||
ci.window.Update(nil, i)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return ci
|
||||
return ci, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (cs *ConnectionState) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
@@ -51,6 +82,67 @@ func (cs *ConnectionState) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NextMessageCounter reserves the next 1-based counter; RejectAfterMessages is the first we refuse, pinned to not wrap.
|
||||
func (cs *ConnectionState) NextMessageCounter() (uint64, bool) {
|
||||
c := cs.messageCounter.Add(1)
|
||||
if c >= RejectAfterMessages {
|
||||
cs.messageCounter.Store(RejectAfterMessages)
|
||||
return c, false
|
||||
}
|
||||
return c, true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (cs *ConnectionState) Curve() cert.Curve {
|
||||
return cs.myCert.Curve()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (cs *ConnectionState) Decrypt(l *slog.Logger, messageCounter uint64, packet []byte, nb []byte) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
cs.decryptLock.Lock()
|
||||
result := cs.window.Check(l, messageCounter)
|
||||
cs.decryptLock.Unlock()
|
||||
if !result {
|
||||
return nil, ErrAlreadySeen
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
out, err := cs.dKey.DecryptDanger(packet[header.Len:header.Len], packet[:header.Len], packet[header.Len:], messageCounter, nb)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cs.decryptLock.Lock()
|
||||
result = cs.window.Update(l, messageCounter)
|
||||
cs.decryptLock.Unlock()
|
||||
if !result {
|
||||
return nil, ErrAlreadySeen
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (cs *ConnectionState) VerifyRelay(l *slog.Logger, messageCounter uint64, packet []byte, nb []byte) error {
|
||||
cs.decryptLock.Lock()
|
||||
result := cs.window.Check(l, messageCounter)
|
||||
cs.decryptLock.Unlock()
|
||||
if !result {
|
||||
return ErrAlreadySeen
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The entire body is sent as AD, not encrypted.
|
||||
// The packet consists of a 16-byte parsed Nebula header, Associated Data-protected payload, and a trailing 16-byte AEAD signature value.
|
||||
// The packet is guaranteed to be at least 16 bytes at this point, b/c it got past the h.Parse() call above. If it's
|
||||
// otherwise malformed (meaning, there is no trailing 16 byte AEAD value), then this will result in at worst a 0-length slice
|
||||
// which will gracefully fail in the DecryptDanger call.
|
||||
signedPayload := packet[:len(packet)-cs.dKey.Overhead()]
|
||||
signatureValue := packet[len(packet)-cs.dKey.Overhead():]
|
||||
_, err := cs.dKey.DecryptDanger(nil, signedPayload, signatureValue, messageCounter, nb)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cs.decryptLock.Lock()
|
||||
result = cs.window.Update(l, messageCounter)
|
||||
cs.decryptLock.Unlock()
|
||||
if !result {
|
||||
return ErrAlreadySeen
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
+199
-2
@@ -2,14 +2,20 @@ package nebula
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"strconv"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/flynn/noise"
|
||||
"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
|
||||
ct "github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -79,11 +85,193 @@ func runTestHandshake(t *testing.T) (initR, respR *handshake.Result) {
|
||||
return initR, respR
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestConnectionState_NextMessageCounter(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cs := &ConnectionState{}
|
||||
cs.messageCounter.Store(RejectAfterMessages - 2)
|
||||
|
||||
c, ok := cs.NextMessageCounter()
|
||||
assert.True(t, ok)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, RejectAfterMessages-1, c)
|
||||
|
||||
// Hitting the limit refuses and pins the counter there
|
||||
c, ok = cs.NextMessageCounter()
|
||||
assert.False(t, ok)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, RejectAfterMessages, c)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, RejectAfterMessages, cs.messageCounter.Load())
|
||||
|
||||
// Continued send attempts stay refused and the counter never wraps
|
||||
for range 10 {
|
||||
_, ok = cs.NextMessageCounter()
|
||||
assert.False(t, ok)
|
||||
}
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, RejectAfterMessages, cs.messageCounter.Load())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestSendNoMetricsDropsExhausted drives the send path to the exhausted drop; metric and out flag prove it.
|
||||
func TestSendNoMetricsDropsExhausted(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
initR, _ := runTestHandshake(t)
|
||||
ci, err := newConnectionStateFromResult(initR)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
ci.messageCounter.Store(RejectAfterMessages - 1)
|
||||
|
||||
f := &Interface{l: test.NewLogger(), messageMetrics: &MessageMetrics{txExhausted: metrics.NewCounter()}}
|
||||
hostinfo := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.1")}, ConnectionState: ci}
|
||||
|
||||
f.sendNoMetrics(header.Message, 0, ci, hostinfo, netip.AddrPort{}, []byte{}, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu), 0)
|
||||
|
||||
// The crossing send is refused: it records an exhaustion drop and never reaches connectionManager.Out.
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), f.messageMetrics.txExhausted.Count())
|
||||
assert.False(t, hostinfo.sentSinceCheck())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestSendNoMetricsCloseTunnelKeepsRebindEpoch pins that a closing tunnel does not consume a rebind, a later
|
||||
// packet on a re-established tunnel still needs that edge to trigger the far-side punch.
|
||||
func TestSendNoMetricsCloseTunnelKeepsRebindEpoch(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
initR, _ := runTestHandshake(t)
|
||||
ci, err := newConnectionStateFromResult(initR)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
|
||||
f := &Interface{
|
||||
l: test.NewLogger(),
|
||||
messageMetrics: &MessageMetrics{txExhausted: metrics.NewCounter()},
|
||||
writers: []udp.Conn{udp.NoopConn{}},
|
||||
connectionManager: &connectionManager{},
|
||||
}
|
||||
hostinfo := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.1")}, ConnectionState: ci}
|
||||
|
||||
// Tunnel is on epoch 0, then we rebind.
|
||||
hostinfo.markOut(0)
|
||||
f.rebindEpoch.Add(1)
|
||||
|
||||
remote := netip.MustParseAddrPort("10.0.0.2:4242")
|
||||
f.sendNoMetrics(header.CloseTunnel, 0, ci, hostinfo, remote, []byte{}, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu), 0)
|
||||
|
||||
// markOut at the new epoch still reports the move, so the edge was preserved.
|
||||
assert.True(t, hostinfo.markOut(1), "a CloseTunnel send must not consume the rebind epoch")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// capturingConn is a udp.Conn that records every WriteTo.
|
||||
type capturingConn struct {
|
||||
udp.NoopConn
|
||||
writes [][]byte
|
||||
addrs []netip.AddrPort
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *capturingConn) WriteTo(b []byte, addr netip.AddrPort) error {
|
||||
c.writes = append(c.writes, append([]byte(nil), b...))
|
||||
c.addrs = append(c.addrs, addr)
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestSendNoMetricsViaRelay sends through a relay from the mtu sized buffer the cached packet flush uses. Payloads up
|
||||
// to overlay.MaxMTU go out intact, anything bigger is dropped rather than outgrowing the buffer, which once panicked.
|
||||
func TestSendNoMetricsViaRelay(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
tests := []struct {
|
||||
n int
|
||||
sent bool
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{0, true},
|
||||
{1300, true},
|
||||
{overlay.MaxMTU, true},
|
||||
{overlay.MaxMTU + 1, false}, // too big for the relay's tag
|
||||
{mtu - 47, false}, // too big for the inner tag, this panicked
|
||||
{9000, false}, // a full packet at tun.mtu 9000
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, tt := range tests {
|
||||
t.Run(strconv.Itoa(tt.n), func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// One tunnel to the target, carried end to end, and one to the relay that wraps it
|
||||
targetInit, targetResp := runTestHandshake(t)
|
||||
relayInit, relayResp := runTestHandshake(t)
|
||||
ci, err := newConnectionStateFromResult(targetInit)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
relayCI, err := newConnectionStateFromResult(relayInit)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
|
||||
targetAddr := netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.2")
|
||||
relayAddr := netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.3")
|
||||
relayRemote := netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.1:4242")
|
||||
|
||||
relay := &Relay{Type: TerminalType, State: Established, LocalIndex: 5, RemoteIndex: 6, PeerAddr: targetAddr}
|
||||
relayHI := &HostInfo{
|
||||
vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{relayAddr},
|
||||
ConnectionState: relayCI,
|
||||
relayState: RelayState{
|
||||
relayForByAddr: map[netip.Addr]*Relay{targetAddr: relay},
|
||||
relayForByIdx: map[uint32]*Relay{relay.LocalIndex: relay},
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
relayHI.remote.Store(&relayRemote)
|
||||
|
||||
// No remote of its own, so the send has to go via the relay
|
||||
hostinfo := &HostInfo{
|
||||
vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{targetAddr},
|
||||
ConnectionState: ci,
|
||||
remoteIndexId: 7,
|
||||
relayState: RelayState{
|
||||
relays: []netip.Addr{relayAddr},
|
||||
relayForByAddr: map[netip.Addr]*Relay{},
|
||||
relayForByIdx: map[uint32]*Relay{},
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
l := test.NewLogger()
|
||||
hm := newHostMap(l)
|
||||
hm.Hosts[relayAddr] = relayHI
|
||||
conn := &capturingConn{}
|
||||
f := &Interface{
|
||||
l: l,
|
||||
hostMap: hm,
|
||||
messageMetrics: &MessageMetrics{txExhausted: metrics.NewCounter()},
|
||||
writers: []udp.Conn{conn},
|
||||
}
|
||||
f.connectionManager = &connectionManager{intf: f, relayUsed: map[uint32]struct{}{}, relayUsedLock: &sync.RWMutex{}}
|
||||
|
||||
payload := make([]byte, tt.n)
|
||||
for i := range payload {
|
||||
payload[i] = byte(i)
|
||||
}
|
||||
counter := ci.messageCounter.Load()
|
||||
f.sendNoMetrics(header.Message, 0, ci, hostinfo, netip.AddrPort{}, payload, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu), 0)
|
||||
|
||||
if !tt.sent {
|
||||
assert.Empty(t, conn.writes)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, counter, ci.messageCounter.Load(), "a dropped packet must not spend a counter")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
require.Len(t, conn.writes, 1)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, relayRemote, conn.addrs[0])
|
||||
pkt := conn.writes[0]
|
||||
|
||||
// The relay authenticates the whole packet under its own header
|
||||
outer := &header.H{}
|
||||
require.NoError(t, outer.Parse(pkt))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, header.MessageRelay, outer.Subtype)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, relay.RemoteIndex, outer.RemoteIndex)
|
||||
relayPeer, err := newConnectionStateFromResult(relayResp)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, relayPeer.VerifyRelay(l, outer.MessageCounter, pkt, make([]byte, 12)))
|
||||
|
||||
// Inside it, the target decrypts the end to end packet back to the payload
|
||||
inner := pkt[header.Len : len(pkt)-relayPeer.dKey.Overhead()]
|
||||
h := &header.H{}
|
||||
require.NoError(t, h.Parse(inner))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, header.Message, h.Type)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, hostinfo.remoteIndexId, h.RemoteIndex)
|
||||
targetPeer, err := newConnectionStateFromResult(targetResp)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
got, err := targetPeer.Decrypt(l, h.MessageCounter, inner, make([]byte, 12))
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, payload, got)
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestNewConnectionStateFromResult(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
initR, respR := runTestHandshake(t)
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("initiator", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
ci := newConnectionStateFromResult(initR)
|
||||
ci, err := newConnectionStateFromResult(initR)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.True(t, ci.initiator)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, initR.MyCert, ci.myCert)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, initR.RemoteCert, ci.peerCert)
|
||||
@@ -102,8 +290,17 @@ func TestNewConnectionStateFromResult(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
assert.True(t, ci.window.Check(nil, 3), "counter 3 must not be pre-seeded")
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("message index too large is refused", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
bad := *initR
|
||||
bad.MessageIndex = ReplayWindow
|
||||
ci, err := newConnectionStateFromResult(&bad)
|
||||
require.Error(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, ci)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("responder", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
ci := newConnectionStateFromResult(respR)
|
||||
ci, err := newConnectionStateFromResult(respR)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.False(t, ci.initiator)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, respR.MyCert, ci.myCert)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, respR.RemoteCert, ci.peerCert)
|
||||
|
||||
+62
-28
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ type Control struct {
|
||||
statsStart func()
|
||||
dnsStart func()
|
||||
lighthouseStart func()
|
||||
networkChangeStart func(rebind func())
|
||||
connectionManagerStart func(context.Context)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -69,29 +70,29 @@ type ControlHostInfo struct {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Start actually runs nebula, this is a nonblocking call.
|
||||
// The returned function blocks until nebula has fully stopped and returns the
|
||||
// first fatal reader error (if any). A nil error means nebula shut down
|
||||
// gracefully; a non-nil error means a reader hit an unexpected failure that
|
||||
// triggered the shutdown.
|
||||
func (c *Control) Start() (func() error, error) {
|
||||
// Use Wait to block until nebula has fully stopped and to learn whether a fatal reader error caused the shutdown.
|
||||
func (c *Control) Start() error {
|
||||
c.stateLock.Lock()
|
||||
defer c.stateLock.Unlock()
|
||||
switch c.state {
|
||||
case StateReady:
|
||||
//yay!
|
||||
case StateStopped, StateStopping:
|
||||
return nil, ErrAlreadyStopped
|
||||
return ErrAlreadyStopped
|
||||
case StateStarted:
|
||||
return nil, ErrAlreadyStarted
|
||||
return ErrAlreadyStarted
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return nil, ErrUnknownState
|
||||
return ErrUnknownState
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Activate the interface
|
||||
err := c.f.activate()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
// Cancel before Close so a caller returning from Wait always observes a dead Context
|
||||
c.cancel()
|
||||
_ = c.f.Close()
|
||||
c.state = StateStopped
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Call all the delayed funcs that waited patiently for the interface to be created.
|
||||
@@ -104,6 +105,9 @@ func (c *Control) Start() (func() error, error) {
|
||||
if c.dnsStart != nil {
|
||||
go c.dnsStart()
|
||||
}
|
||||
if c.networkChangeStart != nil {
|
||||
go c.networkChangeStart(c.RebindUDPServer)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if c.connectionManagerStart != nil {
|
||||
go c.connectionManagerStart(c.ctx)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -111,16 +115,12 @@ func (c *Control) Start() (func() error, error) {
|
||||
c.lighthouseStart()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
c.f.triggerShutdown = c.Stop
|
||||
c.f.triggerShutdown = func() { go c.Stop() }
|
||||
|
||||
// Start reading packets.
|
||||
out, err := c.f.run()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
c.state = StateStopped
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.f.run()
|
||||
c.state = StateStarted
|
||||
return out, nil
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *Control) State() RunState {
|
||||
@@ -133,10 +133,26 @@ func (c *Control) Context() context.Context {
|
||||
return c.ctx
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Stop is a non-blocking call that signals nebula to close all tunnels and shut down
|
||||
// Stop tears nebula down, closing all tunnels and releasing everything it holds.
|
||||
// Use Wait to block until the shutdown has completed.
|
||||
// A Control that has been stopped cannot be started again, Start will return ErrAlreadyStopped.
|
||||
func (c *Control) Stop() {
|
||||
c.stateLock.Lock()
|
||||
if c.state != StateStarted {
|
||||
switch c.state {
|
||||
case StateStarted:
|
||||
// Fall through to the full teardown below
|
||||
|
||||
case StateReady:
|
||||
// Never started
|
||||
c.cancel()
|
||||
c.state = StateStopped
|
||||
if err := c.f.Close(); err != nil {
|
||||
c.l.Error("Close interface failed", "error", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.stateLock.Unlock()
|
||||
return
|
||||
|
||||
default:
|
||||
c.stateLock.Unlock()
|
||||
// We are stopping or stopped already
|
||||
return
|
||||
@@ -145,19 +161,26 @@ func (c *Control) Stop() {
|
||||
c.state = StateStopping
|
||||
c.stateLock.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
// Stop the handshakeManager (and other services), to prevent new tunnels from
|
||||
// being created while we're shutting them all down.
|
||||
// Closing tunnels can be slow with a large hostmap, don't hold the lock for it
|
||||
c.cancel()
|
||||
|
||||
c.CloseAllTunnels(false)
|
||||
|
||||
c.stateLock.Lock()
|
||||
c.state = StateStopped
|
||||
if err := c.f.Close(); err != nil {
|
||||
c.l.Error("Close interface failed", "error", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.stateLock.Lock()
|
||||
c.state = StateStopped
|
||||
c.stateLock.Unlock()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Wait blocks until nebula has fully stopped, either via Stop or an internal fatal error,
|
||||
// and returns the first fatal packet reader error if there was one.
|
||||
// It is safe to call from multiple goroutines and at any point in the lifecycle,
|
||||
// but a Wait on a Control that is never started and never stopped will block forever.
|
||||
func (c *Control) Wait() error {
|
||||
return c.f.wait()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ShutdownBlock will listen for and block on term and interrupt signals, calling Control.Stop() once signalled
|
||||
func (c *Control) ShutdownBlock() {
|
||||
sigChan := make(chan os.Signal, 1)
|
||||
@@ -170,15 +193,26 @@ func (c *Control) ShutdownBlock() {
|
||||
c.Stop()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RebindUDPServer asks the UDP listener to rebind it's listener. Mainly used on mobile clients when interfaces change
|
||||
// RebindUDPServer asks the UDP listener to rebind it's listener. Mainly used on mobile clients when interfaces change.
|
||||
func (c *Control) RebindUDPServer() {
|
||||
_ = c.f.outside.Rebind()
|
||||
c.stateLock.Lock()
|
||||
defer c.stateLock.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
if c.state != StateStarted {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A failure here means we are likely still pinned to the interface we came up on, so the rest of this is
|
||||
// unlikely to help. Say so instead of silently carrying on as if we rebound.
|
||||
if err := c.f.outside.Rebind(); err != nil {
|
||||
c.l.Error("Failed to rebind udp socket", "error", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Trigger a lighthouse update, useful for mobile clients that should have an update interval of 0
|
||||
c.f.lightHouse.SendUpdate()
|
||||
|
||||
// Let the main interface know that we rebound so that underlying tunnels know to trigger punches from their remotes
|
||||
c.f.rebindCount++
|
||||
c.f.rebindEpoch.Add(1)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ListHostmapHosts returns details about the actual or pending (handshaking) hostmap by vpn ip
|
||||
@@ -305,7 +339,7 @@ func (c *Control) CloseAllTunnels(excludeLighthouses bool) (closed int) {
|
||||
|
||||
c.l.Debug("Sending close tunnel message",
|
||||
"vpnAddrs", h.vpnAddrs,
|
||||
"udpAddr", h.remote,
|
||||
"udpAddr", h.GetRemote(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
closed++
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -350,7 +384,7 @@ func copyHostInfo(h *HostInfo, preferredRanges []netip.Prefix) ControlHostInfo {
|
||||
RemoteAddrs: h.remotes.CopyAddrs(preferredRanges),
|
||||
CurrentRelaysToMe: h.relayState.CopyRelayIps(),
|
||||
CurrentRelaysThroughMe: h.relayState.CopyRelayForIps(),
|
||||
CurrentRemote: h.remote,
|
||||
CurrentRemote: h.GetRemote(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for i, a := range h.vpnAddrs {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,309 @@
|
||||
package nebula
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/batch"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
type fakeDevice struct {
|
||||
closeOnce sync.Once
|
||||
closedCh chan struct{}
|
||||
closed bool
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func newFakeDevice() *fakeDevice {
|
||||
return &fakeDevice{closedCh: make(chan struct{})}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Read blocks until Close like a real tun with no traffic, then reports EOF
|
||||
// the same way a closed device does
|
||||
func (d *fakeDevice) Read() ([]tio.Packet, error) {
|
||||
<-d.closedCh
|
||||
return nil, io.EOF
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (d *fakeDevice) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return len(p), nil }
|
||||
|
||||
func (d *fakeDevice) Close() error {
|
||||
d.closeOnce.Do(func() {
|
||||
d.closed = true
|
||||
close(d.closedCh)
|
||||
})
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (d *fakeDevice) Activate() error { return nil }
|
||||
func (d *fakeDevice) Networks() []netip.Prefix { return nil }
|
||||
func (d *fakeDevice) Name() string { return "fake" }
|
||||
func (d *fakeDevice) RoutesFor(netip.Addr) routing.Gateways { return nil }
|
||||
|
||||
func (d *fakeDevice) Queues(int) ([]tio.Queue, error) { return []tio.Queue{d}, nil }
|
||||
|
||||
// newReadyControl hand-builds the minimum Control that Main would have
|
||||
// produced right before Start, including the construction token NewInterface
|
||||
// takes so waiters block until Close releases the resources
|
||||
func newReadyControl(t *testing.T) (*Control, *fakeDevice, *fakeConn) {
|
||||
l := test.NewLogger()
|
||||
dev := newFakeDevice()
|
||||
conn := &fakeConn{}
|
||||
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
|
||||
|
||||
myVpnNet := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.128.0.1/16")
|
||||
nt := new(bart.Lite)
|
||||
nt.Insert(myVpnNet)
|
||||
cs := &CertState{
|
||||
myVpnNetworks: []netip.Prefix{myVpnNet},
|
||||
myVpnNetworksTable: nt,
|
||||
}
|
||||
lh, err := NewLightHouseFromConfig(ctx, l, config.NewC(l), cs, nil, nil)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
|
||||
f := &Interface{
|
||||
ctx: ctx,
|
||||
inside: dev,
|
||||
outside: conn,
|
||||
writers: []udp.Conn{conn},
|
||||
batchers: make([]*batch.MultiCoalescer, 1),
|
||||
routines: 1,
|
||||
hostMap: newHostMap(l),
|
||||
lightHouse: lh,
|
||||
l: l,
|
||||
}
|
||||
f.wg.Add(1)
|
||||
|
||||
return &Control{
|
||||
state: StateReady,
|
||||
f: f,
|
||||
l: l,
|
||||
ctx: ctx,
|
||||
cancel: cancel,
|
||||
}, dev, conn
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestControl_StopBeforeStart(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
c, dev, conn := newReadyControl(t)
|
||||
|
||||
// A Stop on a never started control must release everything Main acquired
|
||||
c.Stop()
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, StateStopped, c.State())
|
||||
assert.True(t, dev.closed, "the tun device should have been closed")
|
||||
assert.True(t, conn.closed, "the udp socket should have been closed")
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, c.ctx.Err(), context.Canceled, "the service context should have been cancelled")
|
||||
|
||||
// Wait must return promptly now that the resources are released
|
||||
require.NoError(t, c.Wait())
|
||||
|
||||
// A stopped control can never be started
|
||||
err := c.Start()
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAlreadyStopped)
|
||||
|
||||
// A second Stop is a harmless no-op
|
||||
c.Stop()
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, StateStopped, c.State())
|
||||
require.NoError(t, c.Wait())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestControl_WaitBlocksUntilStop(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
c, _, _ := newReadyControl(t)
|
||||
|
||||
done := make(chan error, 1)
|
||||
go func() { done <- c.Wait() }()
|
||||
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case <-done:
|
||||
t.Fatal("Wait returned before Stop")
|
||||
case <-time.After(50 * time.Millisecond):
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
c.Stop()
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case err := <-done:
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
case <-time.After(time.Second):
|
||||
t.Fatal("Wait did not return after Stop")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type fakeConn struct {
|
||||
closed bool
|
||||
rebinds int
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *fakeConn) Rebind() error { c.rebinds++; return nil }
|
||||
func (c *fakeConn) LocalAddr() (netip.AddrPort, error) { return netip.AddrPort{}, nil }
|
||||
func (c *fakeConn) ListenOut(_ udp.EncReader, _ func()) error { return nil }
|
||||
func (c *fakeConn) WriteTo(_ []byte, _ netip.AddrPort) error { return nil }
|
||||
func (c *fakeConn) WriteBatch(bufs [][]byte, _ []netip.AddrPort) (int, error) {
|
||||
return len(bufs), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
func (c *fakeConn) ReloadConfig(_ *config.C) {}
|
||||
func (c *fakeConn) SupportsMultipleReaders() bool { return true }
|
||||
func (c *fakeConn) Close() error { c.closed = true; return nil }
|
||||
|
||||
type multiqueueDevice struct {
|
||||
*fakeDevice
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Queues claims multiqueue support but fails to open the second queue,
|
||||
// exercising the activation error path.
|
||||
func (d *multiqueueDevice) Queues(n int) ([]tio.Queue, error) {
|
||||
if n > 1 {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("second queue failed to open")
|
||||
}
|
||||
return d.fakeDevice.Queues(n)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestControl_StartMultiqueueFailureReleases(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
dev := &multiqueueDevice{fakeDevice: newFakeDevice()}
|
||||
conn := &fakeConn{}
|
||||
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
|
||||
f := &Interface{
|
||||
ctx: ctx,
|
||||
inside: dev,
|
||||
outside: conn,
|
||||
writers: []udp.Conn{conn},
|
||||
batchers: make([]*batch.MultiCoalescer, 2),
|
||||
routines: 2,
|
||||
l: test.NewLogger(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
f.wg.Add(1)
|
||||
|
||||
c := &Control{
|
||||
state: StateReady,
|
||||
f: f,
|
||||
l: test.NewLogger(),
|
||||
ctx: ctx,
|
||||
cancel: cancel,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The second reader fails to open, everything must be released
|
||||
err := c.Start()
|
||||
require.Error(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, StateStopped, c.State())
|
||||
assert.True(t, dev.closed, "the tun device should have been closed")
|
||||
assert.True(t, conn.closed, "the udp socket should have been closed")
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, c.ctx.Err(), context.Canceled)
|
||||
|
||||
// And Wait must not hang on the construction token
|
||||
require.NoError(t, c.Wait())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestInterface_CloseIsIdempotent(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
dev := newFakeDevice()
|
||||
f := &Interface{
|
||||
inside: dev,
|
||||
l: test.NewLogger(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
f.wg.Add(1)
|
||||
|
||||
require.NoError(t, f.Close())
|
||||
assert.True(t, dev.closed)
|
||||
|
||||
// A second Close must not double release the wg token or the device
|
||||
require.NoError(t, f.Close())
|
||||
require.NoError(t, f.wait())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestControl_FatalErrorReportsThroughWait(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
c, dev, conn := newReadyControl(t)
|
||||
|
||||
// Mirror what Start wires up, without needing real packet readers
|
||||
c.f.triggerShutdown = c.Stop
|
||||
c.state = StateStarted
|
||||
|
||||
boom := errors.New("boom")
|
||||
c.f.onFatal(boom)
|
||||
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, c.Wait(), boom)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, StateStopped, c.State())
|
||||
assert.True(t, dev.closed)
|
||||
assert.True(t, conn.closed)
|
||||
|
||||
// A second fatal error must not fire the shutdown again or replace the first
|
||||
c.f.onFatal(errors.New("later"))
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, c.Wait(), boom)
|
||||
|
||||
// Wait stays factual, a Stop after the death does not mask the error
|
||||
c.Stop()
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, c.Wait(), boom)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestControl_ConcurrentStopAndStart(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
c, _, _ := newReadyControl(t)
|
||||
|
||||
var wg sync.WaitGroup
|
||||
for range 2 {
|
||||
wg.Go(func() { c.Stop() })
|
||||
}
|
||||
wg.Go(func() { _ = c.Start() })
|
||||
wg.Go(func() {
|
||||
_ = c.Wait()
|
||||
// A returned Wait must always observe the final state, no matter how
|
||||
// the race resolved
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, StateStopped, c.State())
|
||||
})
|
||||
wg.Wait()
|
||||
|
||||
// However the race resolves, the control must end fully stopped with no
|
||||
// panic and Wait must observe the final state
|
||||
require.NoError(t, c.Wait())
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, StateStopped, c.State())
|
||||
err := c.Start()
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAlreadyStopped)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestControl_StartStopLifecycle(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
c, dev, conn := newReadyControl(t)
|
||||
|
||||
err := c.Start()
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, StateStarted, c.State())
|
||||
err = c.Start()
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAlreadyStarted)
|
||||
|
||||
// Stop must unpark the reader blocked in the device and release everything
|
||||
c.Stop()
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, StateStopped, c.State())
|
||||
assert.True(t, dev.closed, "the tun device should have been closed")
|
||||
assert.True(t, conn.closed, "the udp socket should have been closed")
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, c.ctx.Err(), context.Canceled)
|
||||
|
||||
// The reader drained off a closed device, that is not a fatal error
|
||||
require.NoError(t, c.Wait())
|
||||
err = c.Start()
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAlreadyStopped)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestControl_RebindIsGatedByState(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
c, _, conn := newReadyControl(t)
|
||||
|
||||
// A rebind before Start reaches nothing, the interface is not up
|
||||
c.RebindUDPServer()
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, 0, conn.rebinds, "rebind before start must be a no-op")
|
||||
|
||||
err := c.Start()
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
c.RebindUDPServer()
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, 1, conn.rebinds, "rebind while started must reach the conn")
|
||||
|
||||
// A rebind racing a completed stop must not touch the closed conn
|
||||
c.Stop()
|
||||
require.NoError(t, c.Wait())
|
||||
c.RebindUDPServer()
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, 1, conn.rebinds, "rebind after stop must be a no-op")
|
||||
}
|
||||
+161
-6
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
|
||||
package nebula
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"bytes"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"net"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"reflect"
|
||||
@@ -9,6 +11,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func TestControl_GetHostInfoByVpnIp(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
@@ -42,8 +45,7 @@ func TestControl_GetHostInfoByVpnIp(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
assert.True(t, ok)
|
||||
|
||||
crt := &dummyCert{}
|
||||
hm.unlockedAddHostInfo(&HostInfo{
|
||||
remote: remote1,
|
||||
hi := &HostInfo{
|
||||
remotes: remotes,
|
||||
ConnectionState: &ConnectionState{
|
||||
peerCert: &cert.CachedCertificate{Certificate: crt},
|
||||
@@ -56,13 +58,14 @@ func TestControl_GetHostInfoByVpnIp(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
relayForByAddr: map[netip.Addr]*Relay{},
|
||||
relayForByIdx: map[uint32]*Relay{},
|
||||
},
|
||||
}, &Interface{})
|
||||
}
|
||||
hi.remote.Store(&remote1)
|
||||
hm.unlockedAddHostInfo(hi, &Interface{})
|
||||
|
||||
vpnIp2, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(ipNet2.IP)
|
||||
assert.True(t, ok)
|
||||
|
||||
hm.unlockedAddHostInfo(&HostInfo{
|
||||
remote: remote1,
|
||||
hi2 := &HostInfo{
|
||||
remotes: remotes,
|
||||
ConnectionState: &ConnectionState{
|
||||
peerCert: nil,
|
||||
@@ -75,7 +78,9 @@ func TestControl_GetHostInfoByVpnIp(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
relayForByAddr: map[netip.Addr]*Relay{},
|
||||
relayForByIdx: map[uint32]*Relay{},
|
||||
},
|
||||
}, &Interface{})
|
||||
}
|
||||
hi2.remote.Store(&remote1)
|
||||
hm.unlockedAddHostInfo(hi2, &Interface{})
|
||||
|
||||
c := Control{
|
||||
state: StateReady,
|
||||
@@ -119,3 +124,153 @@ func assertFields(t *testing.T, expected []string, actualStruct any) {
|
||||
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, expected, fields)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// alwaysAllowV4/V6 are check funcs that accept every entry (including nil pointers),
|
||||
// letting us inject a nil *V4AddrPort/*V6AddrPort into a RemoteList's reported cache
|
||||
// the same way a malformed proto message off the wire could.
|
||||
func alwaysAllowV4(netip.Addr, *V4AddrPort) bool { return true }
|
||||
func alwaysAllowV6(netip.Addr, *V6AddrPort) bool { return true }
|
||||
|
||||
// TestGetRelays_SkipsNilRelayAddrs proves GetRelays tolerates nil entries in the
|
||||
// RelayVpnAddrs proto slice (which protoAddrToNetAddr would nil-deref on) and still
|
||||
// returns the valid relays, including the legacy OldRelayVpnAddrs.
|
||||
func TestGetRelays_SkipsNilRelayAddrs(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
good := netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.9")
|
||||
|
||||
d := &NebulaMetaDetails{
|
||||
OldRelayVpnAddrs: []uint32{0x0a000001}, // 10.0.0.1
|
||||
RelayVpnAddrs: []*Addr{
|
||||
nil,
|
||||
netAddrToProtoAddr(good),
|
||||
nil,
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var relays []netip.Addr
|
||||
require.NotPanics(t, func() { relays = d.GetRelays() })
|
||||
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []netip.Addr{
|
||||
netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.1"),
|
||||
good,
|
||||
}, relays)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestGetRelays_AllNil ensures an all-nil RelayVpnAddrs slice yields no relays and no panic.
|
||||
func TestGetRelays_AllNil(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
d := &NebulaMetaDetails{RelayVpnAddrs: []*Addr{nil, nil}}
|
||||
var relays []netip.Addr
|
||||
require.NotPanics(t, func() { relays = d.GetRelays() })
|
||||
assert.Empty(t, relays)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestRemoteList_CopyCache_SkipsNilReported proves CopyCache skips nil reported
|
||||
// pointers (v4 and v6) instead of nil-dereferencing them in protoV*AddrPortToNetAddrPort.
|
||||
func TestRemoteList_CopyCache_SkipsNilReported(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
owner := netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.1")
|
||||
rl := NewRemoteList([]netip.Addr{owner}, nil)
|
||||
|
||||
rl.unlockedSetV4(owner, owner, []*V4AddrPort{
|
||||
nil,
|
||||
newIp4AndPortFromString("1.2.3.4:5"),
|
||||
nil,
|
||||
}, alwaysAllowV4)
|
||||
|
||||
rl.unlockedSetV6(owner, owner, []*V6AddrPort{
|
||||
nil,
|
||||
newIp6AndPortFromString("[1::1]:6"),
|
||||
nil,
|
||||
}, alwaysAllowV6)
|
||||
|
||||
var cm *CacheMap
|
||||
require.NotPanics(t, func() { cm = rl.CopyCache() })
|
||||
|
||||
c := (*cm)[owner.String()]
|
||||
require.NotNil(t, c)
|
||||
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []netip.AddrPort{
|
||||
netip.MustParseAddrPort("1.2.3.4:5"),
|
||||
netip.MustParseAddrPort("[1::1]:6"),
|
||||
}, c.Reported)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestRemoteList_Rebuild_SkipsNilReported drives unlockedCollect (via Rebuild) with
|
||||
// nil reported entries and confirms only the valid addresses survive, with no panic.
|
||||
func TestRemoteList_Rebuild_SkipsNilReported(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
owner := netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.1")
|
||||
rl := NewRemoteList([]netip.Addr{owner}, nil)
|
||||
|
||||
rl.unlockedSetV4(owner, owner, []*V4AddrPort{
|
||||
nil,
|
||||
newIp4AndPortFromString("1.2.3.4:5"),
|
||||
}, alwaysAllowV4)
|
||||
rl.unlockedSetV6(owner, owner, []*V6AddrPort{
|
||||
newIp6AndPortFromString("[1::1]:6"),
|
||||
nil,
|
||||
}, alwaysAllowV6)
|
||||
|
||||
require.NotPanics(t, func() { rl.Rebuild([]netip.Prefix{}) })
|
||||
|
||||
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []netip.AddrPort{
|
||||
netip.MustParseAddrPort("1.2.3.4:5"),
|
||||
netip.MustParseAddrPort("[1::1]:6"),
|
||||
}, rl.addrs)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newRelayControl marshals a NebulaControl the way it arrives on the wire so we can feed
|
||||
// it through HandleControlMsg's unmarshal + validate path.
|
||||
func newRelayControl(t *testing.T, typ NebulaControl_MessageType, from, to *Addr) []byte {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
msg := &NebulaControl{
|
||||
Type: typ,
|
||||
RelayFromAddr: from,
|
||||
RelayToAddr: to,
|
||||
}
|
||||
b, err := msg.Marshal()
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
return b
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestRelayManager_HandleControlMsg_NilRelayAddrs verifies the validation block added to
|
||||
// HandleControlMsg: CreateRelay{Request,Response} carrying a nil RelayFromAddr or
|
||||
// RelayToAddr are dropped with a debug log rather than nil-dereferencing downstream.
|
||||
func TestRelayManager_HandleControlMsg_NilRelayAddrs(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
good := netAddrToProtoAddr(netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.9"))
|
||||
|
||||
cases := []struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
typ NebulaControl_MessageType
|
||||
from *Addr
|
||||
to *Addr
|
||||
wantLog string // debug substring expected, "" == expect no drop log
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{"request nil from", NebulaControl_CreateRelayRequest, nil, good, "nil RelayFromAddr"},
|
||||
{"request nil to", NebulaControl_CreateRelayRequest, good, nil, "nil RelayToAddr"},
|
||||
{"request both nil", NebulaControl_CreateRelayRequest, nil, nil, "nil RelayFromAddr"},
|
||||
{"response nil from", NebulaControl_CreateRelayResponse, nil, good, "nil RelayFromAddr"},
|
||||
{"response nil to", NebulaControl_CreateRelayResponse, good, nil, "nil RelayToAddr"},
|
||||
// A non-relay control type is not subject to the relay-addr validation and must
|
||||
// pass through it untouched (the final switch simply no-ops on it).
|
||||
{"unrelated type nil addrs", NebulaControl_None, nil, nil, ""},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tc := range cases {
|
||||
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
var buf bytes.Buffer
|
||||
l := test.NewLoggerWithOutputAndLevel(&buf, slog.LevelDebug)
|
||||
rm := &relayManager{l: l, hostmap: newHostMap(l)}
|
||||
rm.useRelays.Store(true)
|
||||
|
||||
f := &Interface{l: l}
|
||||
h := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.2")}, localIndexId: 1}
|
||||
|
||||
d := newRelayControl(t, tc.typ, tc.from, tc.to)
|
||||
|
||||
require.NotPanics(t, func() { rm.HandleControlMsg(h, d, f) })
|
||||
|
||||
if tc.wantLog == "" {
|
||||
assert.NotContains(t, buf.String(), "nil Relay")
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, buf.String(), tc.wantLog)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+31
-1
@@ -108,7 +108,29 @@ func (c *Control) GetVpnAddrs() []netip.Addr {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *Control) GetUDPAddr() netip.AddrPort {
|
||||
return c.f.outside.(*udp.TesterConn).Addr
|
||||
return c.f.outside.(*udp.TesterConn).GetAddr()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// SetUDPAddr moves this node to a new underlay address, standing in for a laptop waking up on a different
|
||||
// network. Register the new address with the router as well or nothing will route back.
|
||||
func (c *Control) SetUDPAddr(addr netip.AddrPort) {
|
||||
c.f.outside.(*udp.TesterConn).SetAddr(addr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// SetLocalAddrsFn replaces underlay address discovery so a test can advertise its simulated address instead of
|
||||
// whatever this machine's NICs happen to be. Call it before Start, SendUpdate reads it from the update worker.
|
||||
func (c *Control) SetLocalAddrsFn(fn func(*LocalAllowList) []netip.Addr) {
|
||||
c.f.lightHouse.localAddrsFn = fn
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// GetRebindEpochFor returns the rebind epoch a tunnel last sent under, so a test can tell whether a send
|
||||
// consumed the epoch edge without having to infer it from lighthouse traffic.
|
||||
func (c *Control) GetRebindEpochFor(vpnAddr netip.Addr) (uint32, bool) {
|
||||
h := c.f.hostMap.QueryVpnAddr(vpnAddr)
|
||||
if h == nil {
|
||||
return 0, false
|
||||
}
|
||||
return h.state.Load() >> stateEpochShift, true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *Control) KillPendingTunnel(vpnIp netip.Addr) bool {
|
||||
@@ -125,6 +147,14 @@ func (c *Control) GetHostmap() *HostMap {
|
||||
return c.f.hostMap
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// GetHostmapIndexCount returns the number of entries in the main hostmap Indexes table, holding
|
||||
// the hostmap read lock so tests can poll it while connection manager churns tunnels.
|
||||
func (c *Control) GetHostmapIndexCount() int {
|
||||
c.f.hostMap.RLock()
|
||||
defer c.f.hostMap.RUnlock()
|
||||
return len(c.f.hostMap.Indexes)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *Control) GetF() *Interface {
|
||||
return c.f
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
|
||||
// Package cpupick chooses which CPUs the tun reader threads pin to when the
|
||||
// operator has not chosen for us (tun.cpu_affinity). The stock spread —
|
||||
// allowed[i] for routine i — has two failure modes this package exists to fix:
|
||||
//
|
||||
// - every co-located nebula starts its spread at allowed[0], so N instances
|
||||
// on one box stack their readers onto the same cores, and allowed[0] is
|
||||
// usually CPU 0, the core housekeeping and default IRQ affinity already
|
||||
// favor;
|
||||
// - on heterogeneous CPUs (ARM big.LITTLE, Intel P/E hybrids, AMD compact
|
||||
// cores) low IDs are not necessarily fast cores, and pinning an encrypt
|
||||
// thread to an efficiency core caps that queue's throughput.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Default instead returns a preference-ordered pin list: the allowed set
|
||||
// filtered to performance cores (when the platform distinguishes them and
|
||||
// enough remain for every routine), confined to a single NUMA node and spread
|
||||
// across distinct physical cores when the topology permits, CPU 0's physical
|
||||
// core demoted to last resort, and the order rotated by a stable per-instance
|
||||
// key so co-located instances spread instead of stacking.
|
||||
package cpupick
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// topology is the slice of machine layout arrange consults: the NUMA node
|
||||
// and the physical core behind each candidate CPU, plus which core CPU 0
|
||||
// lives on (zeroCore, -1 when unknown — tracked separately because CPU 0's
|
||||
// SMT sibling deserves demotion even when CPU 0 itself isn't a candidate).
|
||||
// Probed from sysfs on Linux; flatTopology stands in when the platform can't
|
||||
// say, which turns every topology rule into a no-op rather than a wrong
|
||||
// answer.
|
||||
type topology struct {
|
||||
nodeOf map[int]int
|
||||
coreOf map[int]int
|
||||
zeroCore int
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// flatTopology places every CPU on node 0 and on a physical core of its own.
|
||||
func flatTopology(cpus []int) topology {
|
||||
t := topology{
|
||||
nodeOf: make(map[int]int, len(cpus)),
|
||||
coreOf: make(map[int]int, len(cpus)),
|
||||
zeroCore: -1,
|
||||
}
|
||||
for i, c := range cpus {
|
||||
t.nodeOf[c] = 0
|
||||
t.coreOf[c] = i
|
||||
if c == 0 {
|
||||
t.zeroCore = i
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return t
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Default computes the pin order for `routines` tun readers. key is any
|
||||
// stable per-instance value; the bound UDP port is ideal — distinct across
|
||||
// co-located instances, stable across restarts so benchmark runs stay
|
||||
// comparable. Returns nil when there is nothing useful to say (no affinity
|
||||
// support on this platform, lookup failure); callers keep their existing
|
||||
// fallback spread.
|
||||
func Default(routines int, key uint64, l *slog.Logger) []int {
|
||||
allowed, err := util.AllowedCPUs()
|
||||
if err != nil || len(allowed) == 0 {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
perf, signal := perfCPUs(allowed)
|
||||
cands := pickCandidates(allowed, perf, routines)
|
||||
if len(cands) == 0 {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(perf) < routines {
|
||||
signal = ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
cpus := arrange(cands, readTopology(cands), routines, splitmix64(key))
|
||||
if l != nil {
|
||||
l.Info("chose default pin CPUs for tun readers",
|
||||
"cpus", cpus[:min(routines, len(cpus))],
|
||||
"perfSignal", signal)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return cpus
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// pickCandidates applies the enough-for-everyone guard: a perf filter that
|
||||
// leaves fewer candidates than routines is discarded — giving every reader
|
||||
// its own (possibly slow) core beats stacking two readers on a fast one.
|
||||
func pickCandidates(allowed, perf []int, routines int) []int {
|
||||
if len(perf) < routines {
|
||||
return allowed
|
||||
}
|
||||
return perf
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// arrange turns the candidate set into the final pin order:
|
||||
//
|
||||
// 1. NUMA: when at least one node holds enough candidates for every
|
||||
// routine, confine to one such node, chosen by the instance hash. The
|
||||
// readers share hostmap and cipher state, so splitting one instance
|
||||
// across nodes taxes every packet — and co-located instances that hash
|
||||
// to different nodes stop competing entirely. When no node is big
|
||||
// enough, span nodes rather than stack readers.
|
||||
// 2. Rotate the preferred candidates by the hash so instances spread.
|
||||
// 3. SMT: emit one thread per physical core before any of their siblings —
|
||||
// two encrypt threads on one core split its execution units. Siblings
|
||||
// still follow for the routines > cores case.
|
||||
// 4. CPU 0's whole physical core goes last: housekeeping and default IRQ
|
||||
// noise on CPU 0 bleeds into its SMT sibling too. Within that tail the
|
||||
// sibling precedes CPU 0 itself, which only catches the bleed-through.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The rotation happens before the SMT pass so each instance's one-per-core
|
||||
// walk also starts at a different core, and CPU 0's core is excluded from
|
||||
// the rotation so no hash value can put it back at the front.
|
||||
func arrange(cands []int, topo topology, routines int, h uint64) []int {
|
||||
byNode := map[int][]int{}
|
||||
var nodes []int
|
||||
for _, c := range cands {
|
||||
n := topo.nodeOf[c]
|
||||
if _, ok := byNode[n]; !ok {
|
||||
nodes = append(nodes, n)
|
||||
}
|
||||
byNode[n] = append(byNode[n], c)
|
||||
}
|
||||
var eligible []int
|
||||
for _, n := range nodes {
|
||||
if len(byNode[n]) >= routines {
|
||||
eligible = append(eligible, n)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(eligible) > 0 {
|
||||
cands = byNode[eligible[int(h%uint64(len(eligible)))]]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Split off CPU 0's core: its siblings tail the list, CPU 0 tails them.
|
||||
preferred := make([]int, 0, len(cands))
|
||||
var zeroTail []int
|
||||
hasZero := false
|
||||
for _, c := range cands {
|
||||
switch {
|
||||
case c == 0:
|
||||
hasZero = true
|
||||
case topo.zeroCore >= 0 && topo.coreOf[c] == topo.zeroCore:
|
||||
zeroTail = append(zeroTail, c)
|
||||
default:
|
||||
preferred = append(preferred, c)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if hasZero {
|
||||
zeroTail = append(zeroTail, 0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(preferred) == 0 {
|
||||
return zeroTail // CPU 0's core is all we have
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The node pick consumed the low hash bits; rotate by the high ones so
|
||||
// the two choices stay independent.
|
||||
off := int((h >> 32) % uint64(len(preferred)))
|
||||
rot := make([]int, 0, len(preferred))
|
||||
rot = append(rot, preferred[off:]...)
|
||||
rot = append(rot, preferred[:off]...)
|
||||
|
||||
seenCore := make(map[int]bool, len(rot))
|
||||
out := make([]int, 0, len(cands))
|
||||
var siblings []int
|
||||
for _, c := range rot {
|
||||
g := topo.coreOf[c]
|
||||
if seenCore[g] {
|
||||
siblings = append(siblings, c)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
seenCore[g] = true
|
||||
out = append(out, c)
|
||||
}
|
||||
out = append(out, siblings...)
|
||||
out = append(out, zeroTail...)
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// splitmix64 decorrelates instance keys before the selection modulos: ports
|
||||
// on one box often share spacing (4242/4243, or round steps like +1000) that
|
||||
// raw key%len arithmetic would fold onto the same offset.
|
||||
func splitmix64(x uint64) uint64 {
|
||||
x += 0x9e3779b97f4a7c15
|
||||
x = (x ^ (x >> 30)) * 0xbf58476d1ce4e5b9
|
||||
x = (x ^ (x >> 27)) * 0x94d049bb133111eb
|
||||
return x ^ (x >> 31)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
|
||||
package cpupick
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"slices"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// pairTopo builds a topology where consecutive candidate pairs are SMT
|
||||
// siblings: (cpus[0],cpus[1]) share a core, (cpus[2],cpus[3]) the next, ...
|
||||
// All CPUs land on node 0.
|
||||
func pairTopo(cpus []int) topology {
|
||||
t := topology{
|
||||
nodeOf: make(map[int]int, len(cpus)),
|
||||
coreOf: make(map[int]int, len(cpus)),
|
||||
zeroCore: -1,
|
||||
}
|
||||
for i, c := range cpus {
|
||||
t.nodeOf[c] = 0
|
||||
t.coreOf[c] = i / 2
|
||||
if c == 0 {
|
||||
t.zeroCore = i / 2
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return t
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestArrangeDemotesZeroForEveryKey(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
candidates := []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}
|
||||
for key := range uint64(64) {
|
||||
got := arrange(candidates, flatTopology(candidates), 4, splitmix64(key))
|
||||
if len(got) != len(candidates) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("key %d: len=%d want %d", key, len(got), len(candidates))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got[0] == 0 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("key %d: CPU 0 at the front: %v", key, got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got[len(got)-1] != 0 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("key %d: CPU 0 not demoted to last: %v", key, got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
sorted := slices.Clone(got)
|
||||
slices.Sort(sorted)
|
||||
if !slices.Equal(sorted, candidates) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("key %d: not a permutation: %v", key, got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestArrangeDemotesZeroSiblings(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// Pairs (0,1),(2,3),(4,5),(6,7): CPU 0's core — 0 and its sibling 1 —
|
||||
// must tail the list, sibling ahead of 0 itself.
|
||||
candidates := []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}
|
||||
for key := range uint64(64) {
|
||||
got := arrange(candidates, pairTopo(candidates), 2, splitmix64(key))
|
||||
n := len(got)
|
||||
if got[n-1] != 0 || got[n-2] != 1 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("key %d: tail = %v, want [... 1 0]", key, got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestArrangeZeroSiblingWithoutZero(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// CPU 0 excluded (cpuset) but its sibling 1 remains: the sibling still
|
||||
// tails the list when the topology knows which core CPU 0 lives on.
|
||||
candidates := []int{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
|
||||
topo := pairTopo([]int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5})
|
||||
got := arrange(candidates, topo, 2, splitmix64(7))
|
||||
if got[len(got)-1] != 1 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("CPU 0's sibling not demoted: %v", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestArrangeRotatesByKey(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
candidates := []int{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}
|
||||
seen := map[int]bool{}
|
||||
for key := range uint64(64) {
|
||||
seen[arrange(candidates, flatTopology(candidates), 4, splitmix64(key))[0]] = true
|
||||
}
|
||||
// 64 hashed keys over 8 slots must hit more than one starting CPU, or
|
||||
// co-located instances would all stack again.
|
||||
if len(seen) < 2 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("rotation never varied across keys: %v", seen)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestArrangeStableForSameKey(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
candidates := []int{0, 2, 4, 6}
|
||||
topo := flatTopology(candidates)
|
||||
a := arrange(candidates, topo, 2, splitmix64(4242))
|
||||
b := arrange(candidates, topo, 2, splitmix64(4242))
|
||||
if !slices.Equal(a, b) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("same key ordered differently: %v vs %v", a, b)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestArrangeZeroOnly(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
if got := arrange([]int{0}, flatTopology([]int{0}), 1, splitmix64(7)); !slices.Equal(got, []int{0}) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("sole CPU 0 must survive: %v", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestArrangeSMTSiblingsLast(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// Pairs (1,2),(3,4),(5,6),(7,8): the first four picks must cover four
|
||||
// distinct physical cores before any sibling repeats.
|
||||
candidates := []int{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}
|
||||
topo := pairTopo(candidates)
|
||||
for key := range uint64(16) {
|
||||
got := arrange(candidates, topo, 4, splitmix64(key))
|
||||
seen := map[int]bool{}
|
||||
for _, c := range got[:4] {
|
||||
g := topo.coreOf[c]
|
||||
if seen[g] {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("key %d: sibling before all cores covered: %v", key, got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
seen[g] = true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestArrangeNUMAConfinesToOneNode(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// Two nodes of four; both fit routines=3, so the result must sit
|
||||
// entirely inside one of them, and the hash must pick both across keys.
|
||||
candidates := []int{1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 13}
|
||||
topo := flatTopology(candidates)
|
||||
for _, c := range []int{10, 11, 12, 13} {
|
||||
topo.nodeOf[c] = 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
nodesSeen := map[int]bool{}
|
||||
for key := range uint64(32) {
|
||||
got := arrange(candidates, topo, 3, splitmix64(key))
|
||||
if len(got) != 4 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("key %d: not confined to one node: %v", key, got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
n := topo.nodeOf[got[0]]
|
||||
for _, c := range got {
|
||||
if topo.nodeOf[c] != n {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("key %d: spans nodes: %v", key, got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
nodesSeen[n] = true
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(nodesSeen) != 2 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("hash never spread instances across nodes: %v", nodesSeen)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestArrangeNUMASpansWhenNoNodeFits(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
candidates := []int{1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 13}
|
||||
topo := flatTopology(candidates)
|
||||
for _, c := range []int{10, 11, 12, 13} {
|
||||
topo.nodeOf[c] = 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
got := arrange(candidates, topo, 6, splitmix64(1))
|
||||
if len(got) != len(candidates) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("undersized nodes must span, got %v", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestPickCandidates(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
allowed := []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}
|
||||
perf := []int{4, 5}
|
||||
|
||||
// Enough perf cores for every routine: only they are used.
|
||||
if got := pickCandidates(allowed, perf, 2); !slices.Equal(got, perf) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("perf filter not applied: %v", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Perf filter too small for the routine count: discarded, everyone
|
||||
// gets their own core from the full allowed set.
|
||||
if got := pickCandidates(allowed, perf, 4); !slices.Equal(got, allowed) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("undersized perf filter not discarded: %v", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
|
||||
//go:build linux
|
||||
|
||||
package cpupick
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"path/filepath"
|
||||
"strconv"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// capacityKeepPct is the cpu_capacity admission threshold, relative to the
|
||||
// fastest allowed core. LITTLE cores are normalized to ~250-400 of the big
|
||||
// core's 1024 while mid cores sit at ~75%+, so half of max separates little
|
||||
// from the rest without splitting prime from mid on three-tier parts.
|
||||
const capacityKeepPct = 50
|
||||
|
||||
// freqKeepPct is the cpuinfo_max_freq admission threshold. Favored-core
|
||||
// turbo skew is 2-4% and ARM mid-vs-prime ~12%, while E-cores, LITTLE
|
||||
// cores, and AMD compact cores all sit >= 20% below their siblings' max.
|
||||
const freqKeepPct = 85
|
||||
|
||||
// perfCPUs partitions allowed into the subset that are "performance" cores,
|
||||
// consulting (in order of authority):
|
||||
//
|
||||
// 1. cpu_capacity — arch_topology's normalized per-CPU capacity, exposed on
|
||||
// arm/arm64/riscv; the scheduler's own view of big vs LITTLE.
|
||||
// 2. /sys/devices/cpu_core/cpus — the Intel hybrid P-core PMU mask, present
|
||||
// only on P/E parts (x86 has no cpu_capacity) and naming P cores outright.
|
||||
// 3. cpuinfo_max_freq — the cross-vendor fallback; catches AMD compact
|
||||
// cores, which neither of the above covers.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Returns allowed unchanged (signal "") when nothing distinguishes the
|
||||
// cores: homogeneous parts, VMs without cpufreq, sysfs unavailable.
|
||||
func perfCPUs(allowed []int) ([]int, string) {
|
||||
return perfCPUsFrom("/sys/devices/system/cpu", "/sys/devices/cpu_core/cpus", allowed)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func perfCPUsFrom(cpuDir, intelCoreMask string, allowed []int) ([]int, string) {
|
||||
if cpus, ok := byPerCPUValue(cpuDir, "cpu_capacity", allowed, capacityKeepPct); ok {
|
||||
return cpus, "cpu_capacity"
|
||||
}
|
||||
if cpus, ok := byIntelCoreMask(intelCoreMask, allowed); ok {
|
||||
return cpus, "intel_core_pmu"
|
||||
}
|
||||
if cpus, ok := byPerCPUValue(cpuDir, "cpufreq/cpuinfo_max_freq", allowed, freqKeepPct); ok {
|
||||
return cpus, "max_freq"
|
||||
}
|
||||
return allowed, ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// byPerCPUValue keeps the allowed CPUs whose per-CPU sysfs value is at least
|
||||
// keepPct percent of the maximum across allowed. Inconclusive (ok=false)
|
||||
// when any CPU is missing the file or when every value is equal.
|
||||
func byPerCPUValue(cpuDir, file string, allowed []int, keepPct int) ([]int, bool) {
|
||||
vals := make([]int, len(allowed))
|
||||
minV, maxV := 0, 0
|
||||
for i, cpu := range allowed {
|
||||
v, err := readIntFile(filepath.Join(cpuDir, fmt.Sprintf("cpu%d", cpu), file))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, false
|
||||
}
|
||||
vals[i] = v
|
||||
if i == 0 || v < minV {
|
||||
minV = v
|
||||
}
|
||||
if v > maxV {
|
||||
maxV = v
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if minV == maxV {
|
||||
return nil, false // homogeneous by this signal; try the next one
|
||||
}
|
||||
keep := make([]int, 0, len(allowed))
|
||||
for i, cpu := range allowed {
|
||||
if vals[i]*100 >= maxV*keepPct {
|
||||
keep = append(keep, cpu)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return keep, true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// byIntelCoreMask keeps the allowed CPUs named by the hybrid P-core PMU
|
||||
// mask. Inconclusive when the file is absent (non-hybrid x86, other arches)
|
||||
// or no allowed CPU is in the mask (the process was deliberately confined
|
||||
// to E-cores; nothing useful to prefer within that).
|
||||
func byIntelCoreMask(maskPath string, allowed []int) ([]int, bool) {
|
||||
b, err := os.ReadFile(maskPath)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, false
|
||||
}
|
||||
set, err := parseCPUList(strings.TrimSpace(string(b)))
|
||||
if err != nil || len(set) == 0 {
|
||||
return nil, false
|
||||
}
|
||||
pcore := make(map[int]bool, len(set))
|
||||
for _, c := range set {
|
||||
pcore[c] = true
|
||||
}
|
||||
keep := make([]int, 0, len(allowed))
|
||||
for _, cpu := range allowed {
|
||||
if pcore[cpu] {
|
||||
keep = append(keep, cpu)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(keep) == 0 {
|
||||
return nil, false
|
||||
}
|
||||
return keep, true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// parseCPUList decodes the kernel's cpulist format ("0-7,16-23", "3") into
|
||||
// individual CPU IDs. Empty input yields an empty list.
|
||||
func parseCPUList(s string) ([]int, error) {
|
||||
if s == "" {
|
||||
return nil, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
var out []int
|
||||
for part := range strings.SplitSeq(s, ",") {
|
||||
part = strings.TrimSpace(part)
|
||||
if part == "" {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
lo, hi, isRange := strings.Cut(part, "-")
|
||||
a, err := strconv.Atoi(lo)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("bad cpulist entry %q: %w", part, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !isRange {
|
||||
out = append(out, a)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
b, err := strconv.Atoi(hi)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("bad cpulist entry %q: %w", part, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if b < a || b-a > 8192 {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("bad cpulist range %q", part)
|
||||
}
|
||||
for v := a; v <= b; v++ {
|
||||
out = append(out, v)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func readIntFile(path string) (int, error) {
|
||||
b, err := os.ReadFile(path)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return 0, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(string(b)))
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
|
||||
//go:build linux
|
||||
|
||||
package cpupick
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"path/filepath"
|
||||
"slices"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// fakeSysfs builds a cpuDir tree with the given per-CPU file values.
|
||||
// A nil map for a file means "file absent on every CPU".
|
||||
func fakeSysfs(t *testing.T, capacity, maxFreq map[int]int) string {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
dir := t.TempDir()
|
||||
write := func(cpu int, rel string, v int) {
|
||||
p := filepath.Join(dir, fmt.Sprintf("cpu%d", cpu), rel)
|
||||
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(p), 0o755); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := os.WriteFile(p, fmt.Appendf(nil, "%d\n", v), 0o644); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
for cpu, v := range capacity {
|
||||
write(cpu, "cpu_capacity", v)
|
||||
}
|
||||
for cpu, v := range maxFreq {
|
||||
write(cpu, "cpufreq/cpuinfo_max_freq", v)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return dir
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func writeCoreMask(t *testing.T, mask string) string {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
p := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "cpus")
|
||||
if err := os.WriteFile(p, []byte(mask+"\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return p
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestPerfCPUsBigLittleCapacity(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// 4 big (1024) + 4 LITTLE (~290): capacity is authoritative on ARM.
|
||||
dir := fakeSysfs(t, map[int]int{
|
||||
0: 1024, 1: 1024, 2: 1024, 3: 1024,
|
||||
4: 290, 5: 290, 6: 290, 7: 290,
|
||||
}, nil)
|
||||
got, signal := perfCPUsFrom(dir, filepath.Join(dir, "nope"), []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7})
|
||||
if signal != "cpu_capacity" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("signal = %q", signal)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !slices.Equal(got, []int{0, 1, 2, 3}) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("got %v", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestPerfCPUsThreeTierKeepsMid(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// prime (1024) + mid (~780) + little (~280): 50% keeps prime+mid.
|
||||
dir := fakeSysfs(t, map[int]int{
|
||||
0: 280, 1: 280, 2: 280, 3: 280,
|
||||
4: 780, 5: 780, 6: 780,
|
||||
7: 1024,
|
||||
}, nil)
|
||||
got, _ := perfCPUsFrom(dir, filepath.Join(dir, "nope"), []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7})
|
||||
if !slices.Equal(got, []int{4, 5, 6, 7}) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("got %v", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestPerfCPUsIntelHybridMask(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// No cpu_capacity on x86; the P-core PMU mask decides.
|
||||
dir := fakeSysfs(t, nil, nil)
|
||||
mask := writeCoreMask(t, "0-7")
|
||||
got, signal := perfCPUsFrom(dir, mask, []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11})
|
||||
if signal != "intel_core_pmu" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("signal = %q", signal)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !slices.Equal(got, []int{0, 1, 2, 3}) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("got %v", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestPerfCPUsIntelMaskDisjointFallsThrough(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// Confined to E-cores only: the mask can't help, and equal freqs below
|
||||
// mean nothing else distinguishes them either -> allowed unchanged.
|
||||
dir := fakeSysfs(t, nil, map[int]int{8: 4300000, 9: 4300000})
|
||||
mask := writeCoreMask(t, "0-7")
|
||||
got, signal := perfCPUsFrom(dir, mask, []int{8, 9})
|
||||
if signal != "" || !slices.Equal(got, []int{8, 9}) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("got %v signal %q", got, signal)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestPerfCPUsMaxFreqCompactCores(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// AMD-style compact cores: no capacity, no Intel mask; 3.3 vs 5.7 GHz.
|
||||
dir := fakeSysfs(t, nil, map[int]int{
|
||||
0: 5700000, 1: 5700000, 2: 3300000, 3: 3300000,
|
||||
})
|
||||
got, signal := perfCPUsFrom(dir, filepath.Join(dir, "nope"), []int{0, 1, 2, 3})
|
||||
if signal != "max_freq" {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("signal = %q", signal)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !slices.Equal(got, []int{0, 1}) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("got %v", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestPerfCPUsFavoredCoreSkewKept(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// Turbo Boost Max favored cores run a few percent hot; they must not
|
||||
// shrink the candidate set to one or two cores.
|
||||
dir := fakeSysfs(t, nil, map[int]int{
|
||||
0: 5800000, 1: 5700000, 2: 5700000, 3: 5600000,
|
||||
})
|
||||
got, _ := perfCPUsFrom(dir, filepath.Join(dir, "nope"), []int{0, 1, 2, 3})
|
||||
if !slices.Equal(got, []int{0, 1, 2, 3}) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("favored-core skew filtered CPUs: %v", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestPerfCPUsHomogeneousInconclusive(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
dir := fakeSysfs(t, nil, map[int]int{0: 3000000, 1: 3000000})
|
||||
got, signal := perfCPUsFrom(dir, filepath.Join(dir, "nope"), []int{0, 1})
|
||||
if signal != "" || !slices.Equal(got, []int{0, 1}) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("got %v signal %q", got, signal)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestPerfCPUsNoSysfs(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
dir := t.TempDir()
|
||||
got, signal := perfCPUsFrom(dir, filepath.Join(dir, "nope"), []int{0, 1, 2})
|
||||
if signal != "" || !slices.Equal(got, []int{0, 1, 2}) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("got %v signal %q", got, signal)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestParseCPUList(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cases := []struct {
|
||||
in string
|
||||
want []int
|
||||
wantErr bool
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{"0-3", []int{0, 1, 2, 3}, false},
|
||||
{"0-1,16-17", []int{0, 1, 16, 17}, false},
|
||||
{"5", []int{5}, false},
|
||||
{"", nil, false},
|
||||
{"3-1", nil, true},
|
||||
{"a-b", nil, true},
|
||||
{"1,x", nil, true},
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, c := range cases {
|
||||
got, err := parseCPUList(c.in)
|
||||
if (err != nil) != c.wantErr {
|
||||
t.Errorf("%q: err=%v wantErr=%v", c.in, err, c.wantErr)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !c.wantErr && !slices.Equal(got, c.want) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("%q: got %v want %v", c.in, got, c.want)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
|
||||
//go:build !linux
|
||||
|
||||
package cpupick
|
||||
|
||||
// perfCPUs is Linux-only sysfs walking; elsewhere report "no distinction".
|
||||
// Default already returns nil off-Linux (util.AllowedCPUs has no answer
|
||||
// there), so this exists to keep the package compiling everywhere.
|
||||
func perfCPUs(allowed []int) ([]int, string) {
|
||||
return allowed, ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
|
||||
//go:build linux
|
||||
|
||||
package cpupick
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"path/filepath"
|
||||
"strconv"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// readTopology probes the NUMA node and physical-core layout of cpus from
|
||||
// sysfs. Anything sysfs won't say degrades toward flatTopology: an unknown
|
||||
// node becomes node 0, an unknown core becomes a core of its own — either
|
||||
// way the corresponding arrange rule becomes a no-op instead of a wrong
|
||||
// answer.
|
||||
func readTopology(cpus []int) topology {
|
||||
return readTopologyFrom("/sys/devices/system/node", "/sys/devices/system/cpu", cpus)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func readTopologyFrom(nodeDir, cpuDir string, cpus []int) topology {
|
||||
coreOf, zeroCore := coreGroups(cpuDir, cpus)
|
||||
return topology{
|
||||
nodeOf: numaNodes(nodeDir, cpus),
|
||||
coreOf: coreOf,
|
||||
zeroCore: zeroCore,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// numaNodes maps each cpu to its NUMA node via
|
||||
// /sys/devices/system/node/nodeN/cpulist. CPUs no node claims (or no node
|
||||
// dirs at all: VMs, non-NUMA kernels) land on node 0.
|
||||
func numaNodes(nodeDir string, cpus []int) map[int]int {
|
||||
out := make(map[int]int, len(cpus))
|
||||
for _, c := range cpus {
|
||||
out[c] = 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
entries, err := os.ReadDir(nodeDir)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
want := make(map[int]bool, len(cpus))
|
||||
for _, c := range cpus {
|
||||
want[c] = true
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, e := range entries {
|
||||
id, ok := strings.CutPrefix(e.Name(), "node")
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
n, err := strconv.Atoi(id)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
continue // has_cpu, possible, ... share the prefix
|
||||
}
|
||||
b, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(nodeDir, e.Name(), "cpulist"))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
list, err := parseCPUList(strings.TrimSpace(string(b)))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, c := range list {
|
||||
if want[c] {
|
||||
out[c] = n
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// coreGroups maps each cpu to a dense physical-core id derived from its
|
||||
// (physical_package_id, core_id) pair — core_id alone repeats across
|
||||
// sockets. CPUs whose topology files are unreadable get a core of their own.
|
||||
// The second return is the group id of the core CPU 0 lives on, or -1 when
|
||||
// that can't be determined; CPU 0's own files are consulted even when 0 is
|
||||
// not a candidate, so its SMT siblings are recognized under cpusets that
|
||||
// exclude CPU 0 itself.
|
||||
func coreGroups(cpuDir string, cpus []int) (map[int]int, int) {
|
||||
type pkgCore struct{ pkg, core int }
|
||||
pairOf := func(cpu int) (pkgCore, bool) {
|
||||
topoDir := filepath.Join(cpuDir, fmt.Sprintf("cpu%d", cpu), "topology")
|
||||
pkg, err1 := readIntFile(filepath.Join(topoDir, "physical_package_id"))
|
||||
core, err2 := readIntFile(filepath.Join(topoDir, "core_id"))
|
||||
if err1 != nil || err2 != nil {
|
||||
return pkgCore{}, false
|
||||
}
|
||||
return pkgCore{pkg, core}, true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ids := map[pkgCore]int{}
|
||||
out := make(map[int]int, len(cpus))
|
||||
next := 0
|
||||
for _, cpu := range cpus {
|
||||
k, ok := pairOf(cpu)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
out[cpu] = next
|
||||
next++
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
id, ok := ids[k]
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
id = next
|
||||
next++
|
||||
ids[k] = id
|
||||
}
|
||||
out[cpu] = id
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
zeroCore := -1
|
||||
if k, ok := pairOf(0); ok {
|
||||
if id, ok := ids[k]; ok {
|
||||
zeroCore = id
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out, zeroCore
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
|
||||
//go:build linux
|
||||
|
||||
package cpupick
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"path/filepath"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// fakeTopoSysfs builds nodeDir/cpuDir trees. nodes maps node id -> cpulist
|
||||
// string; cores maps cpu -> (package, core) pair.
|
||||
func fakeTopoSysfs(t *testing.T, nodes map[int]string, cores map[int][2]int) (string, string) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
base := t.TempDir()
|
||||
nodeDir := filepath.Join(base, "node")
|
||||
cpuDir := filepath.Join(base, "cpu")
|
||||
for n, list := range nodes {
|
||||
d := filepath.Join(nodeDir, fmt.Sprintf("node%d", n))
|
||||
if err := os.MkdirAll(d, 0o755); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(d, "cpulist"), []byte(list+"\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
for cpu, pc := range cores {
|
||||
d := filepath.Join(cpuDir, fmt.Sprintf("cpu%d", cpu), "topology")
|
||||
if err := os.MkdirAll(d, 0o755); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(d, "physical_package_id"), fmt.Appendf(nil, "%d\n", pc[0]), 0o644); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(d, "core_id"), fmt.Appendf(nil, "%d\n", pc[1]), 0o644); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nodeDir, cpuDir
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestReadTopology(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// Two nodes; SMT pairs (0,4),(1,5) on node 0 and (2,6),(3,7) on node 1.
|
||||
// core_id repeats across packages on purpose: the pair must disambiguate.
|
||||
nodeDir, cpuDir := fakeTopoSysfs(t,
|
||||
map[int]string{0: "0-1,4-5", 1: "2-3,6-7"},
|
||||
map[int][2]int{
|
||||
0: {0, 0}, 4: {0, 0}, 1: {0, 1}, 5: {0, 1},
|
||||
2: {1, 0}, 6: {1, 0}, 3: {1, 1}, 7: {1, 1},
|
||||
})
|
||||
cpus := []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}
|
||||
topo := readTopologyFrom(nodeDir, cpuDir, cpus)
|
||||
|
||||
for _, c := range []int{0, 1, 4, 5} {
|
||||
if topo.nodeOf[c] != 0 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("cpu %d on node %d, want 0", c, topo.nodeOf[c])
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, c := range []int{2, 3, 6, 7} {
|
||||
if topo.nodeOf[c] != 1 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("cpu %d on node %d, want 1", c, topo.nodeOf[c])
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
pairs := [][2]int{{0, 4}, {1, 5}, {2, 6}, {3, 7}}
|
||||
for _, p := range pairs {
|
||||
if topo.coreOf[p[0]] != topo.coreOf[p[1]] {
|
||||
t.Errorf("siblings %v not grouped: %d vs %d", p, topo.coreOf[p[0]], topo.coreOf[p[1]])
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if topo.coreOf[0] == topo.coreOf[2] {
|
||||
t.Error("cross-package cores with equal core_id must not merge")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if topo.zeroCore != topo.coreOf[0] {
|
||||
t.Errorf("zeroCore = %d, want %d", topo.zeroCore, topo.coreOf[0])
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestReadTopologyZeroCoreWithoutZeroCandidate(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// CPU 0 is not a candidate (cpuset excludes it) but its sibling 4 is:
|
||||
// zeroCore must still identify their shared core.
|
||||
nodeDir, cpuDir := fakeTopoSysfs(t,
|
||||
map[int]string{0: "0-7"},
|
||||
map[int][2]int{0: {0, 0}, 4: {0, 0}, 1: {0, 1}, 5: {0, 1}})
|
||||
topo := readTopologyFrom(nodeDir, cpuDir, []int{1, 4, 5})
|
||||
if topo.zeroCore < 0 || topo.coreOf[4] != topo.zeroCore {
|
||||
t.Errorf("zeroCore = %d, coreOf[4] = %d; sibling of CPU 0 not identified", topo.zeroCore, topo.coreOf[4])
|
||||
}
|
||||
if topo.coreOf[1] == topo.zeroCore {
|
||||
t.Error("cpu 1 wrongly grouped with CPU 0's core")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestReadTopologyMissingSysfs(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
base := t.TempDir()
|
||||
cpus := []int{0, 1, 2}
|
||||
topo := readTopologyFrom(filepath.Join(base, "nope"), filepath.Join(base, "also-nope"), cpus)
|
||||
seen := map[int]bool{}
|
||||
for _, c := range cpus {
|
||||
if topo.nodeOf[c] != 0 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("cpu %d node = %d, want 0", c, topo.nodeOf[c])
|
||||
}
|
||||
if seen[topo.coreOf[c]] {
|
||||
t.Errorf("cpu %d shares a fallback core group", c)
|
||||
}
|
||||
seen[topo.coreOf[c]] = true
|
||||
}
|
||||
if topo.zeroCore != -1 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("zeroCore = %d, want -1 when unknown", topo.zeroCore)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
|
||||
//go:build !linux
|
||||
|
||||
package cpupick
|
||||
|
||||
// readTopology has no sysfs to consult off Linux; the flat stand-in makes
|
||||
// arrange's NUMA and SMT rules no-ops. Default is already nil off Linux
|
||||
// (util.AllowedCPUs has no answer there) — this keeps the package compiling.
|
||||
func readTopology(cpus []int) topology {
|
||||
return flatTopology(cpus)
|
||||
}
|
||||
+16
-7
@@ -97,8 +97,7 @@ func (d *dnsServer) reload(c *config.C, initial bool) error {
|
||||
newAddr := getDnsServerAddr(c)
|
||||
|
||||
d.serverMu.Lock()
|
||||
running := d.server
|
||||
runningStarted := d.started
|
||||
running := d.server != nil
|
||||
sameAddr := d.addr == newAddr
|
||||
d.addr = newAddr
|
||||
d.enabled.Store(enabled)
|
||||
@@ -112,7 +111,7 @@ func (d *dnsServer) reload(c *config.C, initial bool) error {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if !enabled {
|
||||
if running != nil {
|
||||
if running {
|
||||
d.Stop()
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Drop any records that accumulated while enabled; a later re-enable
|
||||
@@ -121,12 +120,12 @@ func (d *dnsServer) reload(c *config.C, initial bool) error {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if running == nil {
|
||||
if !running {
|
||||
// Was disabled (or never started); bring it up now.
|
||||
go d.Start()
|
||||
} else if !sameAddr {
|
||||
d.shutdownServer(running, runningStarted, "reload")
|
||||
// Old Start goroutine has now exited; bring up a fresh listener on the new address.
|
||||
// Stop clears the slot before shutting down, otherwise the Start below can find the dying server and refuse
|
||||
d.Stop()
|
||||
go d.Start()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -162,7 +161,9 @@ func (d *dnsServer) Start() {
|
||||
|
||||
started := make(chan struct{})
|
||||
d.serverMu.Lock()
|
||||
if d.ctx.Err() != nil {
|
||||
// Re-check enabled under the lock, a disable that raced our check above snapshots the slot under it too.
|
||||
// Two reloads in quick succession can both spawn a Start, the loser would orphan the live listener past Stop
|
||||
if d.ctx.Err() != nil || d.server != nil || !d.enabled.Load() {
|
||||
d.serverMu.Unlock()
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -200,6 +201,14 @@ func (d *dnsServer) Start() {
|
||||
close(started)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Release our slot, unless a reload already replaced us, so a dead listener can't block a future Start
|
||||
d.serverMu.Lock()
|
||||
if d.server == server {
|
||||
d.server = nil
|
||||
d.started = nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
d.serverMu.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
d.l.Warn("Failed to run the DNS responder", "error", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+206
-4
@@ -194,14 +194,51 @@ func TestDnsServer_reload_initial_serveDnsWithoutLighthouse(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestDnsServer_reload_sameAddr_noOp(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
port := freeUDPPort(t)
|
||||
ds, c := newTestDnsServer(t)
|
||||
setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", "0", true, true)
|
||||
|
||||
setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", port, true, true)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, true))
|
||||
// No server running yet, no addr change. Reload should not spawn anything.
|
||||
|
||||
go ds.Start()
|
||||
waitForBind(t, ds)
|
||||
|
||||
ds.serverMu.Lock()
|
||||
before := ds.server
|
||||
ds.serverMu.Unlock()
|
||||
require.NotNil(t, before)
|
||||
|
||||
// Same address, so the running listener must be left alone rather than rebuilt under live queries
|
||||
require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, false))
|
||||
assert.True(t, ds.enabled.Load())
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, ds.server)
|
||||
|
||||
ds.serverMu.Lock()
|
||||
after := ds.server
|
||||
ds.serverMu.Unlock()
|
||||
assert.Same(t, before, after, "a same-address reload must not restart the listener")
|
||||
|
||||
ds.Stop()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The branch the old sameAddr test was accidentally hitting: enabled with nothing running means reload starts it.
|
||||
func TestDnsServer_reload_whenNotRunning_starts(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
port := freeUDPPort(t)
|
||||
ds, c := newTestDnsServer(t)
|
||||
setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", port, true, true)
|
||||
|
||||
// initial only records config, it never starts anything
|
||||
require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, true))
|
||||
ds.serverMu.Lock()
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, ds.server, "the initial reload must not start a listener")
|
||||
ds.serverMu.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, false))
|
||||
waitForBind(t, ds)
|
||||
|
||||
ds.serverMu.Lock()
|
||||
assert.NotNil(t, ds.server, "a reload with nothing running should bring DNS up")
|
||||
ds.serverMu.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
ds.Stop()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestDnsServer_StartStop_lifecycle(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
@@ -427,3 +464,168 @@ func waitFor(t *testing.T, cond func() bool) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
t.Fatal("timed out waiting for condition")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Two reloads in quick succession, or a HUP before Control.Start, can race two Starts at the same listener.
|
||||
func TestDnsServer_Start_isIdempotent(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
port := freeUDPPort(t)
|
||||
ds, c := newTestDnsServer(t)
|
||||
setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", port, true, true)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, true))
|
||||
|
||||
go ds.Start()
|
||||
waitForBind(t, ds)
|
||||
|
||||
ds.serverMu.Lock()
|
||||
first := ds.server
|
||||
ds.serverMu.Unlock()
|
||||
require.NotNil(t, first)
|
||||
|
||||
// If the second Start replaces the tracked server, Stop kills the wrong one and the port leaks
|
||||
done := make(chan struct{})
|
||||
go func() {
|
||||
ds.Start()
|
||||
close(done)
|
||||
}()
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case <-done:
|
||||
case <-time.After(time.Second * 5):
|
||||
t.Fatal("second Start never returned")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ds.serverMu.Lock()
|
||||
second := ds.server
|
||||
ds.serverMu.Unlock()
|
||||
assert.Same(t, first, second, "a second Start must not replace the running server")
|
||||
|
||||
// The real proof, after Stop the port must actually be free
|
||||
ds.Stop()
|
||||
waitFor(t, func() bool {
|
||||
pc, err := net.ListenPacket("udp", "127.0.0.1:"+port)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ = pc.Close()
|
||||
return true
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// An address change must actually end up listening on the new port. Start's guard refuses when a server is already
|
||||
// installed, so reload has to clear the slot before shutting the old one down.
|
||||
func TestDnsServer_reload_addrChange_restarts(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
first := freeUDPPort(t)
|
||||
second := freeUDPPort(t)
|
||||
|
||||
ds, c := newTestDnsServer(t)
|
||||
setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", first, true, true)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, true))
|
||||
|
||||
go ds.Start()
|
||||
waitForBind(t, ds)
|
||||
|
||||
// Cycle a few times, the failure this guards against depends on which goroutine wins serverMu
|
||||
for i := range 8 {
|
||||
want := second
|
||||
if i%2 == 1 {
|
||||
want = first
|
||||
}
|
||||
setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", want, true, true)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, false))
|
||||
waitForBind(t, ds)
|
||||
|
||||
ds.serverMu.Lock()
|
||||
srv := ds.server
|
||||
ds.serverMu.Unlock()
|
||||
require.NotNil(t, srv, "reload left DNS down instead of restarting it")
|
||||
require.Equal(t, "127.0.0.1:"+want, srv.Addr, "reload should be serving the new address")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Land back on second so the port assertions below are meaningful
|
||||
setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", second, true, true)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, false))
|
||||
waitForBind(t, ds)
|
||||
|
||||
// The old port must be released and the new one actually held
|
||||
waitFor(t, func() bool {
|
||||
pc, err := net.ListenPacket("udp", "127.0.0.1:"+first)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ = pc.Close()
|
||||
return true
|
||||
})
|
||||
_, err := net.ListenPacket("udp", "127.0.0.1:"+second)
|
||||
require.Error(t, err, "the new address should be bound by the DNS responder")
|
||||
|
||||
ds.Stop()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A listener that dies on its own must release the slot, or a later same-addr reload sees it as running and no-ops.
|
||||
func TestDnsServer_Start_bindFailure_releasesSlot(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
port := freeUDPPort(t)
|
||||
blocker, err := net.ListenPacket("udp", "127.0.0.1:"+port)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
|
||||
ds, c := newTestDnsServer(t)
|
||||
setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", port, true, true)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, true))
|
||||
|
||||
ds.Start() // returns once the bind fails
|
||||
|
||||
ds.serverMu.Lock()
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, ds.server, "a listener that failed to bind must not stay parked in the slot")
|
||||
ds.serverMu.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
// With the slot released, a reload can retry once the port frees up
|
||||
require.NoError(t, blocker.Close())
|
||||
require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, false))
|
||||
waitForBind(t, ds)
|
||||
|
||||
ds.serverMu.Lock()
|
||||
assert.NotNil(t, ds.server, "a same-addr reload should retry after a failed bind")
|
||||
ds.serverMu.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
ds.Stop()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A disable that lands while Start is between its unlocked check and the guard must not leave a listener behind.
|
||||
func TestDnsServer_Start_refusesWhenDisabledUnderLock(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
port := freeUDPPort(t)
|
||||
ds, c := newTestDnsServer(t)
|
||||
setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", port, true, true)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, true))
|
||||
require.True(t, ds.enabled.Load())
|
||||
|
||||
// Holding serverMu parks Start on the lock, the only way to land the disable in that window on purpose
|
||||
ds.serverMu.Lock()
|
||||
|
||||
done := make(chan struct{})
|
||||
go func() {
|
||||
ds.Start()
|
||||
close(done)
|
||||
}()
|
||||
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case <-done:
|
||||
ds.serverMu.Unlock()
|
||||
t.Fatal("Start returned early, the test never exercised the window")
|
||||
case <-time.After(time.Millisecond * 100):
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The disable reload's critical section. It sees nothing running, so it never calls Stop.
|
||||
ds.enabled.Store(false)
|
||||
ds.serverMu.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case <-done:
|
||||
case <-time.After(time.Second * 5):
|
||||
t.Fatal("Start never returned")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ds.serverMu.Lock()
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, ds.server, "Start must not install a listener a disable already cancelled")
|
||||
ds.serverMu.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
pc, err := net.ListenPacket("udp", "127.0.0.1:"+port)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err, "an orphaned listener is still holding the port")
|
||||
_ = pc.Close()
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
|
||||
# Post-quantum handshake transport compared with QUIC
|
||||
|
||||
Status: analysis, 2026-10-14. Compares the fragment transport in
|
||||
[pq-handshake.md](pq-handshake.md) with how QUIC makes its handshake reliable. TLS is out of
|
||||
scope; only the transport mechanics are compared.
|
||||
|
||||
## Summary
|
||||
|
||||
QUIC's handshake reliability is closed-loop: the receiver acknowledges, and the sender
|
||||
repairs exactly what is missing. Ours is open-loop: repair symbols are sent up front, and a
|
||||
timer sends fresh symbols. At handshake sizes (K <= 15) a QUIC-style acknowledgement
|
||||
shrinks to a 16-bit bitmap, and with an MDS code to a single count. So the real comparison
|
||||
is forward error correction versus acknowledgements, not QUIC versus us.
|
||||
|
||||
FEC is the right core. One piece of feedback is worth adding, initiator to responder and for
|
||||
msg2 only (see [Worth taking from QUIC](#worth-taking-from-quic)).
|
||||
|
||||
## What QUIC does
|
||||
|
||||
- **Messages as a stream.** Handshake bytes travel as `CRYPTO` frames (offset and length)
|
||||
and are reassembled in order. Initial and Handshake packets each have their own packet
|
||||
number space.
|
||||
- **Immediate acknowledgements.** Receivers must acknowledge Initial and Handshake packets
|
||||
without delay. ACK frames list ranges of received packet numbers.
|
||||
- **Loss detection** (RFC 9002). A packet is lost once 3 later packets are acknowledged, or
|
||||
after 9/8 of the round-trip time. Lost bytes are resent in new packets.
|
||||
- **Probe timeout (PTO).** If a whole flight vanishes, a probe timer fires. Before any RTT
|
||||
sample it starts at about 1 s (333 ms initial RTT plus 4x its variance) and doubles each
|
||||
time. Both endpoints run it.
|
||||
- **Amplification limit and anti-deadlock.** The server may send at most 3x what it
|
||||
received until the client's address is validated. The client must keep probing so a
|
||||
server stuck at that limit cannot deadlock.
|
||||
- **Retry.** A stateless round trip to validate the address. `NEW_TOKEN` lets later
|
||||
connections skip it.
|
||||
- **Congestion control from the first packet.** The initial window is 10 packets of 1200
|
||||
bytes.
|
||||
|
||||
## Side by side
|
||||
|
||||
| | QUIC | pq-handshake |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Receiver feedback | ACK ranges, sent immediately | None; the next handshake message is the only acknowledgement |
|
||||
| Partial loss | +1 to 2 RTT (ACK, detect, resend) | 0 RTT while at most m symbols are lost |
|
||||
| Total loss | PTO: about 1 s, then doubling | Next PQ tick: 300 ms, then 1 s (alternating), or 100/300/600 ms (sticky) |
|
||||
| Spurious retransmit | Wasted bytes | Still useful: fresh repair indexes add to what the receiver holds |
|
||||
| Reassembly | Every byte offset, in order | Any K of up to 256 symbols |
|
||||
| Who retransmits | Both sides on their own timers | Initiator on a timer; the responder resends msg2 only when a repeat msg1 arrives (rate limited) |
|
||||
| State from the first packet | Server buffers and acknowledges partial flights | Capped pre-authentication table that never acknowledges |
|
||||
| Address validation | Retry, 1 RTT | Cookie under load, 1 RTT |
|
||||
|
||||
From the [simulation results](pq-handshake.md#simulation-results): phase 2 at 5% random
|
||||
loss with no FEC completes on the first attempt 39.8% of the time. Under
|
||||
acknowledgement-based recovery roughly 60% of handshakes would pay at least one extra round
|
||||
trip. With FEC, 0.4% wait for a retry. Spending bandwidth to save round trips is the stated
|
||||
design preference, and open-loop recovery delivers it.
|
||||
|
||||
## Where the designs already agree
|
||||
|
||||
- **1200-byte floor and the 3x amplification budget**, both taken directly from QUIC.
|
||||
- **Cookie and Retry.** Both cost one round trip and both can be forged by an on-path
|
||||
attacker. QUIC's Retry integrity tag uses a fixed, published key.
|
||||
- **On-path injection.** QUIC's Initial keys are derived from the client's connection ID,
|
||||
which an observer can read, so QUIC accepts the same handshake-blocking injection
|
||||
weakness documented for our symbols in
|
||||
[Injected symbols](pq-handshake.md#injected-symbols).
|
||||
- **Phase 2 msg3 confirmation.** Resending msg3 until any authenticated packet arrives,
|
||||
with a `Test` from the responder on completion, is QUIC's handshake confirmation and
|
||||
`HANDSHAKE_DONE`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Worth taking from QUIC
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. A msg2 progress probe from the initiator
|
||||
|
||||
This is the main gap. Today, recovering a partially lost msg2 means the initiator resends a
|
||||
full msg1 attempt; the responder decodes it, matches it in the answered-msg1 cache, and
|
||||
resends msg2. In phase 2 that is about 12 fragments (~13 KB) uploaded just to act as an
|
||||
acknowledgement, and recovery waits for the 300 ms or 1 s tick.
|
||||
|
||||
- The initiator already knows the responder's index: msg2 fragments carry it as `FragID`
|
||||
(`sendFragmentedResponse` passes `hostinfo.localIndexId`).
|
||||
- A one-packet probe, "msg2: have n of K", sent to that index would recover in about one
|
||||
round trip. The responder finds it the way phase 2 plans to find msg3.
|
||||
- Timing comes for free: msg1 send to first msg2 fragment is an RTT sample. Probe at
|
||||
roughly RTT/8 plus the repair delay after the first msg2 fragment if decoding has not
|
||||
completed.
|
||||
- Forging a probe needs the 32-bit responder index, so only an on-path attacker can, and
|
||||
the existing 3x budget bounds the reply.
|
||||
- If no msg2 fragment arrived at all, the initiator keeps today's msg1 resend. That is the
|
||||
same tail-loss case QUIC's PTO covers.
|
||||
|
||||
The reverse direction, the responder reporting progress on msg1, should not be added. It
|
||||
needs per-entry timers on the pre-authentication path, which is exactly the state QUIC
|
||||
servers carry and the reason QUIC needs Retry.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Buffer early data in phase 2
|
||||
|
||||
QUIC stacks hold a few packets they cannot decrypt yet. The phase 2 plan drops data that
|
||||
reaches the responder before msg3 decodes. Because repair fragments trail by
|
||||
`handshakes.pq.repair_delay` (10 ms), losing one msg3 data fragment drops about 10 ms of
|
||||
the initiator's first data while the repair is in flight. A small queue on the pending
|
||||
responder entry, replayed once msg3 verifies, avoids this.
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Burst size across remotes
|
||||
|
||||
QUIC handshakes on a single path. `handleOutbound` sends the same `now` and `later` sets to
|
||||
every known remote and to relays (`StartRelays`).
|
||||
|
||||
- Phase 1 is fine.
|
||||
- In phase 2, four remotes means about 48 packets (~54 KB) leaving one uplink at once,
|
||||
every PQ tick, about 4x QUIC's initial window.
|
||||
- The Gilbert-Elliott simulation treats each path independently, so it does not capture
|
||||
this self-inflicted burst on a constrained uplink such as cellular.
|
||||
- Options: send the full FEC set only to the most likely remote and a reduced set to the
|
||||
others, or interleave packets across remotes.
|
||||
|
||||
## Not worth taking
|
||||
|
||||
- **Packet numbers, ACK ranges, an RTT estimator, loss thresholds, congestion control.**
|
||||
QUIC pays for this machinery because it also serves a data transport. Nebula carries
|
||||
packets and leaves reliability to the overlay's own transports. Building it only for
|
||||
handshakes of at most 15 fragments buys nothing a symbol count cannot.
|
||||
- **Offset-based reassembly.** It gives up the any-K-of-256 property and makes spurious
|
||||
retransmits wasteful again.
|
||||
- **An RTT-adaptive retry timer.** Low value. The fixed 100 ms linear schedule already fires
|
||||
sooner than QUIC's 1 s first PTO, and a spurious resend costs bandwidth, not correctness.
|
||||
|
||||
## Conclusion
|
||||
|
||||
Keep FEC as the core and add the msg2 progress probe. That gets QUIC's roughly one round
|
||||
trip tail recovery without pre-authentication state, and cuts phase 2's retry cost on the
|
||||
uplink by about 10x. Items 2 and 3 are phase 2 concerns; item 1 also helps phase 1.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,348 @@
|
||||
# Post-quantum handshakes
|
||||
|
||||
Status: draft. Decisions below were made on 2026-10-13; open items are listed at the end.
|
||||
Phase 1 is implemented (see [Implementation](#implementation-phase-1)).
|
||||
|
||||
## Goals
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Confidentiality against harvest-now-decrypt-later.** Traffic recorded today must stay
|
||||
secret after a cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists. This needs a
|
||||
post-quantum key exchange now.
|
||||
2. **Post-quantum authentication, later.** Needs certificates whose CA signature and host
|
||||
keys are post-quantum. This requires reissuing certificates, so it ships second.
|
||||
3. **Never rely on IP fragmentation.** ML-KEM and ML-DSA do not fit in one packet, so the
|
||||
handshake must carry messages larger than the path MTU itself.
|
||||
|
||||
Non-goals: identity hiding beyond what IX offers today, and signatures at handshake time.
|
||||
The only signature in the system stays the CA signature inside the certificate.
|
||||
|
||||
## Primitives and sizes
|
||||
|
||||
| Primitive | Size |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| ML-KEM-1024 encapsulation key | 1568 B |
|
||||
| ML-KEM-1024 ciphertext | 1568 B |
|
||||
| ML-DSA-87 public key / signature | 2592 B / 4627 B |
|
||||
| Today's IX msg1 / msg2 (v2 cert, 151 B) | 252 B / 287 B |
|
||||
|
||||
`crypto/mlkem` is available in Go 1.26 (the current `go.mod`); `crypto/mldsa` arrives in
|
||||
Go 1.27 and is only needed for phase 2.
|
||||
|
||||
## Phase 1: ephemeral ML-KEM on today's certificates
|
||||
|
||||
A new handshake subtype, `ix_psk2_mlkem1024` (2), IX-shaped (2 messages; the responder
|
||||
completes on msg1 as today), using the flynn/noise `psk2` modifier. The Noise protocol name
|
||||
becomes `Noise_IXpsk2_...`, which separates it from the classical subtype.
|
||||
|
||||
- **msg1**: the initiator generates a fresh ML-KEM-1024 key pair and places the
|
||||
encapsulation key in `NebulaHandshakeDetails.KEMKey` (field 9). msg1's payload is mixed
|
||||
into the Noise transcript, so it cannot be stripped or replaced without msg2 failing.
|
||||
With the psk modifier Noise also mixes `e` into the cipher key, so msg1's static key and
|
||||
payload are encrypted, though only under a key derived from the public ephemeral.
|
||||
- **Responder**: after `ReadMessage(msg1)` it encapsulates to that key, obtaining
|
||||
`(ct, ss)`, and calls `HandshakeState.SetPresharedKey(psk)` before writing msg2, with
|
||||
`psk = HKDF-Extract(SHA-256, salt = "nebula ix_psk2_mlkem1024 v1", ikm = ss || ct)`.
|
||||
The ciphertext is bound in because, unlike the encapsulation key, it is not part of the
|
||||
Noise transcript.
|
||||
- **msg2** on the wire is `ct || noise_msg2`. The ciphertext travels outside the Noise
|
||||
message because the initiator needs `ss` before processing msg2's `psk` token. Any change
|
||||
to `ct` yields a different `ss` (ML-KEM implicit rejection) and the handshake fails.
|
||||
|
||||
Transport keys depend on both the X25519 DH outputs and the ML-KEM shared secret.
|
||||
Authentication is unchanged and classical. With a minimal v2 certificate msg1 and msg2 are
|
||||
about 1.84 KB each, so each travels as 2 data and 2 repair fragments of about 936 bytes.
|
||||
A KEM key on the classical subtype, or a missing or malformed one on this subtype, is a fatal
|
||||
protocol error; a forged ciphertext only fails that packet.
|
||||
|
||||
## Phase 2: pqIX hybrid with certificate v3
|
||||
|
||||
Certificate v3 is hybrid: the classical static key and CA signature plus a static
|
||||
ML-KEM-1024 key and an ML-DSA-87 CA signature. Host authentication is by KEM rather than by
|
||||
signature, following PQNoise's pqIX, while keeping the classical DH tokens:
|
||||
|
||||
- **msg1** (I to R): `e, s`, ephemeral ML-KEM key, initiator cert.
|
||||
- **msg2** (R to I): `e, s`, ciphertext to I's ephemeral KEM key, ciphertext to I's static
|
||||
KEM key, responder cert.
|
||||
- **msg3** (I to R): ciphertext to R's static KEM key, plus first data. R authenticates I
|
||||
when msg3 decrypts; I authenticates R implicitly when R's first reply decrypts.
|
||||
|
||||
msg3 is about 1.6 KB, 2 data and 2 repair fragments, and adds no new message types:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Responder.** After sending msg2 the responder keeps a pending Machine, found by its
|
||||
local index like the initiator's today; this is the multi-message responder support the
|
||||
manager lacks now. A repeat msg1 maps to it through the answered-msg1 cache and gets msg2
|
||||
resent with fresh symbols, exactly as in phase 1. Until msg3 verifies, data for that
|
||||
index is dropped silently: it must not draw a RecvError, which would tear down the
|
||||
initiator's new tunnel. On completing it sends an empty `Test`/`TestReply` under the
|
||||
new keys, so the initiator hears back even when there is no traffic.
|
||||
- **Initiator.** Writing msg3 yields the transport keys, so the hostinfo moves to the main
|
||||
hostmap and data flows at once, readable only by the real responder. The handshake entry
|
||||
stays behind in a confirming state: each retry tick resends msg3 with fresh symbols until
|
||||
any packet from the responder decrypts on the new tunnel, and if that never happens
|
||||
within the handshake timeout the tunnel is torn down. Losing msg3 costs the data sent
|
||||
behind it, which the overlay's own transport retransmits.
|
||||
- msg3's fragments use the responder's index as RemoteIndex and land on the responder's
|
||||
pending entry, so they never enter the pre-authentication table.
|
||||
|
||||
The initiator never caches the responder's certificate, so every handshake has three
|
||||
messages and carries both full certificates. With ML-DSA-87:
|
||||
|
||||
| Message | Size | Data fragments (k) |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| msg1 | ~8.2 KB | 8 |
|
||||
| msg2 | ~9.8 KB | 9 |
|
||||
| msg3 | ~1.6 KB | 2 |
|
||||
|
||||
flynn/noise cannot mix multiple KEM secrets into the chaining key, so phase 2 needs a
|
||||
KEM-aware Noise symmetric state written in this repository. Both subtypes coexist.
|
||||
|
||||
Cryptographic review of the hybrid composition will be done by in-house cryptographers.
|
||||
|
||||
## Fragment transport
|
||||
|
||||
### Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
- No IP fragmentation: every datagram's UDP payload is at most 1232 bytes **after** relay
|
||||
wrapping (16 B header + 16 B tag), the IPv6 minimum MTU budget also used by DNS Flag Day
|
||||
2020 and Solana's Turbine.
|
||||
- Every fragment of a handshake uses the same 5-tuple.
|
||||
- Bounded pre-authentication state, bounded amplification, selective loss recovery,
|
||||
tolerance of reordering and duplication, and a strictly validated, fuzzable parser.
|
||||
|
||||
### Wire format
|
||||
|
||||
Every packet of a fragmented handshake subtype is:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Nebula header (16) Version | Type=Handshake | Subtype | Reserved=0 | RemoteIndex | Counter
|
||||
Fragment header (8) FragID u32 | MsgLen u16 | Index u8 | Flags u8
|
||||
Cookie (16) only when Flags has 0x01
|
||||
Symbol SymbolSize bytes
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- `Counter` is the Noise message number (1, 2, 3). `RemoteIndex` is 0 for msg1, as today.
|
||||
- `FragID` is the sender's local index (random, non-zero).
|
||||
- `MsgLen` is the length of the whole message. Both ends derive the layout from it:
|
||||
`K = ceil(MsgLen / 1160)`, `SymbolSize = ceil(MsgLen / K)`. Every symbol has the same
|
||||
size. Room for a cookie is always reserved, so a packet is at most
|
||||
16 + 8 + 16 + 1160 = 1200 bytes with or without one.
|
||||
- `Index < K` is a data symbol (a slice of the message, the last one zero padded);
|
||||
`Index >= K` is a repair symbol.
|
||||
- `Flags` bit 0x01 means a cookie follows the fragment header. Other bits must be zero.
|
||||
|
||||
A cookie reply, sent by a responder under load, is a bare 32 byte packet:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Nebula header (16) Version | Type=Handshake | Subtype | Reserved=0 | RemoteIndex=FragID | Counter=0
|
||||
Cookie (16)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
It names the initiator's FragID, so the initiator finds its attempt the same way it finds
|
||||
msg2.
|
||||
|
||||
### Forward error correction
|
||||
|
||||
Messages are protected with a systematic Reed-Solomon code over GF(2^8), implemented in
|
||||
`handshake/fec`:
|
||||
|
||||
- The repair rows form a Cauchy matrix, `coefficient(row, col) = 1 / (row XOR col)` with
|
||||
`row >= K > col`, so every square submatrix is invertible and **any K distinct symbols
|
||||
reconstruct the message**. Naive identity-over-Vandermonde constructions are not MDS
|
||||
(the PAR1 flaw and the 1997 Plank tutorial erratum).
|
||||
- A repair row depends only on its index, so repair symbols are generated on demand and
|
||||
their indexes never need to be agreed in advance. Up to 256 symbols exist per message.
|
||||
- Known-answer vectors in `fec_test.go` pin the encoding and were cross-checked against an
|
||||
independent implementation; changing them is a wire format change.
|
||||
- Cost for a 9.8 KB message (k=9): about 13 µs for three repair symbols, about 19 µs to
|
||||
decode with three data symbols missing.
|
||||
|
||||
**The sender chooses m**, the number of repair symbols per attempt. The receiver only needs
|
||||
any K symbols, so this is policy and can change without a protocol change. The starting
|
||||
rule is `m = max(2, ceil(K/3))`.
|
||||
|
||||
**Retries send fresh symbols.** Attempt 0 sends indexes `0 .. K+m-1`; each retry sends
|
||||
the next `K+m` unused indexes. The receiver merges all distinct symbols across attempts,
|
||||
so no received fragment is wasted. Indexes are a deterministic function of the message,
|
||||
so retransmits stay idempotent: the responder caches msg2 itself and regenerates any
|
||||
symbol.
|
||||
|
||||
**Repair symbols trail the data.** Data symbols go out back to back; repair symbols follow
|
||||
after a short delay, so a queue tail-drop at the end of the data run does not also take the
|
||||
repair. In simulation this lifts small messages substantially (k=2 at 10% loss, burst 8:
|
||||
91.4% to 98.2% first-attempt success). Pacing every fragment was also evaluated; it gains
|
||||
about 5 more points for k=7..9 on bursty paths, which is not worth the extra machinery,
|
||||
and the retry with fresh symbols covers the remainder.
|
||||
|
||||
### Receiver rules
|
||||
|
||||
Implemented in `handshake/fragment` (`Sender`, `Assembly`, and the capped `Table`).
|
||||
|
||||
- Fragments are stored individually as they arrive and charged against a memory cap.
|
||||
Nothing is allocated from a claimed size alone (FragmentSmack, game-engine "fragment
|
||||
bombs").
|
||||
- `MsgLen` must be identical for every fragment of a `FragID`; a mismatch drops the whole
|
||||
entry. msg1 is capped at `MsgLen <= 16384` (K <= 15).
|
||||
- The decoder keeps at most K distinct symbols, so an entry never exceeds about MsgLen bytes
|
||||
however many repair symbols arrive.
|
||||
- When K symbols are present the message is decoded and handed to the handshake `Machine`
|
||||
as a synthetic `[header | message]`. The Machine never sees fragments.
|
||||
- A completed entry is forgotten immediately. A late duplicate fragment starts a new entry
|
||||
and, once enough arrive, reconstructs the same message again; the handshake layer's
|
||||
duplicate detection recognises it.
|
||||
- If Noise rejects a decoded message, the entry is discarded and the next attempt
|
||||
supplies fresh symbols. (Possible refinement: keep a few spare symbols so an injected
|
||||
bad symbol can be identified by re-encoding instead of waiting for a retry.)
|
||||
- Pre-authentication msg1 entries live in a table keyed by (source address or relay index,
|
||||
FragID) with a total memory cap, per-source quotas (/32 for IPv4, /64 for IPv6), a
|
||||
sliding TTL of about 2 s refreshed by progress, and random eviction under pressure.
|
||||
msg2 and msg3 reassembly attaches to the existing pending handshake found by RemoteIndex.
|
||||
|
||||
### Retransmission and amplification
|
||||
|
||||
- Only timers cause transmission. Reactive resends (the responder resending its cached
|
||||
msg2 when a duplicate msg1 completes) are rate limited to one per handshake per retry
|
||||
interval, to avoid TFTP's Sorcerer's Apprentice amplification.
|
||||
- Duplicate msg1 detection compares the decoded message to the cached one **before**
|
||||
running Noise or certificate verification.
|
||||
- Before an address is validated, a responder sends at most 3x the bytes it received from
|
||||
it (QUIC's rule). Normal handshakes sit near 1.1-1.2x.
|
||||
- In phase 2 the initiator retransmits msg3 until any authenticated packet arrives from
|
||||
the responder; the responder sends a small confirmation on completion and holds tunnel
|
||||
traffic until msg3 verifies.
|
||||
|
||||
### Denial of service
|
||||
|
||||
The responder can no longer complete statelessly on msg1, since msg1 arrives in pieces.
|
||||
Defenses are the capped table above plus a **cookie under load**, in the style of
|
||||
WireGuard's mac2, QUIC Retry and the SCTP state cookie:
|
||||
|
||||
- Once the msg1 table is at least half full (by bytes or by entries), every msg1 fragment
|
||||
must carry a valid cookie. One without is answered with a cookie reply and leaves no
|
||||
state. Fragments that already belong to an entry need one too, so an attacker cannot
|
||||
hold old entries open.
|
||||
- A cookie is `HMAC-SHA256(secret, source address and port, relay channel, FragID)`
|
||||
truncated to 16 bytes. The secret rotates every 2 minutes and the previous one is still
|
||||
accepted, so a cookie is good for 2 to 4 minutes.
|
||||
- Replies are never larger than the packet that prompted them (no amplification) and are
|
||||
rate limited as a whole (a burst of 256, then 1000 per second), so spoofed floods cannot
|
||||
turn the responder into a reflector.
|
||||
- The initiator attaches the cookie to its PQ attempt, so every later packet carries it,
|
||||
and immediately resends fresh symbols to the address the reply came from, at most once
|
||||
per retry interval. Under load a PQ handshake costs one extra round trip, which in
|
||||
practice still beats the classical attempt on the next retry tick.
|
||||
- An attacker on the path can forge a cookie reply; the bogus cookie is simply rejected
|
||||
and answered with a real one.
|
||||
|
||||
A CA-keyed pre-filter MAC was considered and rejected: networks commonly trust many CAs.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Injected symbols
|
||||
|
||||
The decoder keeps the first K distinct symbols it sees, so one forged symbol in those K
|
||||
spoils that attempt's decode; Noise rejects the result and the next attempt brings fresh
|
||||
symbols. Forging one needs the attempt's FragID or index, which are random 32 bit values,
|
||||
and for msg1 the initiator's exact address and port too, so in practice only an attacker
|
||||
who sees the traffic can do it. An attacker who can also drop packets gains nothing new.
|
||||
One who can only inject, and races a forged symbol into every attempt, can stop a PQ
|
||||
handshake where it could not stop a classical one, since classical msg2s are tried one
|
||||
packet at a time. Keeping spare symbols to find a consistent subset only raises the number
|
||||
of forgeries needed per attempt, and authenticating symbols is impossible for msg1, which
|
||||
travels before any key exists. So the decoder deliberately does neither. A non-sticky
|
||||
initiator still gets a classical tunnel from its next attempt; a sticky one, by design,
|
||||
does not downgrade.
|
||||
|
||||
## Rollout
|
||||
|
||||
- Separate settings for initiating and accepting PQ handshakes, both off by default:
|
||||
`handshakes.pq.initiate`, `handshakes.pq.accept`. `handshakes.pq.repair_delay` (default
|
||||
10ms) sets how long repair fragments trail the data fragments.
|
||||
- `handshakes.pq.require` makes every handshake PQ: it implies `initiate` and `accept`,
|
||||
never offers a classical attempt, and drops classical msg1s.
|
||||
- Old nodes silently drop unknown subtypes, so discovery is speculative: an initiator with
|
||||
`initiate` enabled alternates PQ and classical attempts on successive timer retries,
|
||||
keeping both pending, and the first to complete wins. A path nothing has been sent over
|
||||
yet gets the PQ attempt first: an early resend triggered by a lighthouse reply is PQ, and
|
||||
a relay that comes up pushes the PQ attempt through at once, counting as the PQ turn.
|
||||
Without that, relays set up during the first attempt handed every relayed handshake to
|
||||
the classical retry (seen on real hosts: 11 of 11). Once a msg2 fragment or cookie reply
|
||||
arrives for the PQ attempt the peer evidently speaks PQ, and classical stops getting
|
||||
turns.
|
||||
- All `handshakes.pq` settings reload without a restart. Handshakes in flight carry on;
|
||||
the new settings apply to the next attempt and the next packet.
|
||||
- `handshakes.pq.sticky` (default off): once a peer has completed a PQ handshake, never fall
|
||||
back to classical for it again during this process lifetime. This resists active
|
||||
downgrade after first contact.
|
||||
- No lighthouse capability advertisement.
|
||||
|
||||
## Simulation results
|
||||
|
||||
Gilbert-Elliott channel (bad state drops everything), losses expressed as average rate and
|
||||
mean burst length in packets. First-attempt success for the whole handshake with
|
||||
`m = max(2, ceil(K/3))` and repair delayed 16 packet slots, compared with no FEC:
|
||||
|
||||
| Handshake | Loss | Burst 1 | Burst 2 | Burst 4 | Burst 8 |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| phase 1 (2, 2) no FEC | 5% | 81.4% | 85.6% | 87.9% | 89.0% |
|
||||
| phase 1 (2, 2) FEC | 5% | 99.9% | 99.4% | 99.3% | 98.6% |
|
||||
| phase 1 (2, 2) FEC | 10% | 99.3% | 97.5% | 97.4% | 96.3% |
|
||||
| phase 2 (8, 9, 2) no FEC | 5% | 37.8% | 56.0% | 69.3% | 77.1% |
|
||||
| phase 2 (8, 9, 2) FEC | 5% | 99.6% | 93.7% | 89.9% | 88.4% |
|
||||
| phase 2 (8, 9, 2) FEC | 10% | 95.3% | 83.5% | 77.9% | 76.7% |
|
||||
|
||||
With fresh repair symbols, phase 2 completes within two attempts at least 99.1% of the time
|
||||
in every scenario above, and within three at least 99.98%.
|
||||
|
||||
The simulators and their outputs are in [pq-handshake-sim](pq-handshake-sim/README.md),
|
||||
including a comparison with classical handshakes and a model of time to a working tunnel
|
||||
under Nebula's retry schedule.
|
||||
|
||||
## Prior art
|
||||
|
||||
- **WireGuard / Rosenpass**: fit every message in one packet; cookies and biscuits for
|
||||
statelessness. Not possible at our sizes.
|
||||
- **IKEv2**: RFC 7383 fragments only after keys exist, with each fragment authenticated;
|
||||
RFC 9242/9370 move PQ key exchange into intermediate exchanges for that reason.
|
||||
- **QUIC / DTLS 1.3**: offset-based reassembly with ACKs; QUIC's 3x amplification limit and
|
||||
1200-byte floor.
|
||||
- **Solana Turbine**: Reed-Solomon over 1232-byte UDP packets through untrusted relays;
|
||||
moved to Merkle-authenticated shreds after unauthenticated repair symbols enabled
|
||||
poisoning.
|
||||
- **kcp-go, UDPspeeder, CM256**: RS FEC over UDP; parity must scale up for small groups.
|
||||
- **gQUIC FEC (removed)**: FEC does not pay for bulk transfer under bursty loss; it does
|
||||
for short, latency-critical transfers such as handshakes.
|
||||
- **TFTP, NFS duplicate request cache, memcached UDP, IP reassembly bugs**: retransmit
|
||||
storms, ID-wrap misassembly, reflection amplification, and allocation from claimed sizes.
|
||||
|
||||
## Implementation (phase 1)
|
||||
|
||||
- `handshake`: the `ix_psk2_mlkem1024` subtype (`patterns.go`, `kem.go`), the `KEMKey`
|
||||
payload field, and the psk2 plumbing in `Machine`.
|
||||
- `handshake/fec`, `handshake/fragment`: the code and the fragment transport.
|
||||
- `handshake_manager_pq.go` and the manager:
|
||||
- **Initiator.** Attempts alternate PQ and classical, starting with PQ (sticky peers get
|
||||
only PQ). The PQ attempt has its own local index registered alongside the classical
|
||||
one; whichever response completes first wins, and the other index is released
|
||||
(`settleIndex`). A timed out or deleted pending handshake releases both.
|
||||
- **Responder.** msg1 fragments go into the capped pre-authentication table. A decoded
|
||||
msg1 is looked up by hash among recently answered ones before any Noise, KEM or
|
||||
certificate work: the trailing repair fragments of an attempt rebuild a msg1 its data
|
||||
fragments already completed, and a retrying initiator offers fresh symbols for the
|
||||
same msg1. A repeat goes straight to the cached-response resend, which offers fresh
|
||||
msg2 symbols, is rate limited to one per retry interval and is held to the 3x
|
||||
amplification budget.
|
||||
- **Relays** carry fragments unchanged; repair fragments trail via a timer.
|
||||
- The pre-authentication table is capped at 4 MiB, 1024 entries, 4 per source (IPv4 /32,
|
||||
IPv6 /64, or relay channel), 16 KiB messages and a 3 s idle timeout. Cookies are
|
||||
demanded from half full.
|
||||
- Tests: Noise-level KEM tests, codec and fragment tests and fuzzers, manager unit tests
|
||||
for the response budget and rate limit, and e2e tests for a clean handshake, loss of
|
||||
data fragments in both directions, fallback to a peer that does not accept PQ, a lost
|
||||
msg2 recovered by fresh symbols, sticky mode under an attacker dropping PQ packets,
|
||||
relays, index cleanup on completion, fallback and timeout, and a responder flooded from
|
||||
spoofed sources demanding and accepting a cookie. Unit tests cover cookie binding and
|
||||
rotation, the never-amplify rule, the initiator's rate limited resend, and reload. ML-KEM and HKDF also
|
||||
pass under `GOEXPERIMENT=boringcrypto` and `GODEBUG=fips140=on`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Open items
|
||||
|
||||
None for phase 1. Phase 2 needs certificate v3, the KEM-aware Noise symmetric state, and
|
||||
the msg3 design above.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
|
||||
//go:build e2e_testing
|
||||
|
||||
package e2e
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/e2e/router"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func assertTestRequestEchoed(t *testing.T, cipher string) {
|
||||
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
|
||||
over := m{"cipher": cipher}
|
||||
a, aNet, aUdp, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "a", "10.128.0.1/24", over)
|
||||
b, bNet, bUdp, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "b", "10.128.0.2/24", over)
|
||||
|
||||
a.InjectLightHouseAddr(bNet[0].Addr(), bUdp)
|
||||
b.InjectLightHouseAddr(aNet[0].Addr(), aUdp)
|
||||
a.Start()
|
||||
b.Start()
|
||||
t.Cleanup(func() { a.Stop(); b.Stop() })
|
||||
r := router.NewR(t, a, b)
|
||||
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
||||
|
||||
assertTunnel(t, aNet[0].Addr(), bNet[0].Addr(), a, b, r)
|
||||
drainUDPTx(a)
|
||||
drainUDPTx(b)
|
||||
|
||||
payload := []byte("a test payload well over sixteen bytes long, wow it's so very long long long!")
|
||||
require.Greater(t, len(payload), header.Len)
|
||||
a.GetF().SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.Test, header.TestRequest, bNet[0].Addr(), payload, make([]byte, 12, 12), make([]byte, udp.MTU))
|
||||
|
||||
// Deliver A's request to B; B must echo a reply back
|
||||
b.InjectUDPPacket(a.GetFromUDP(true))
|
||||
reply := nextUDPTxOfType(t, b, header.Test, header.TestReply, 2*time.Second)
|
||||
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, aUdp, reply.To, "the reply must go back to the requester")
|
||||
// header + echoed payload + 16-byte AEAD tag: proves the whole payload
|
||||
// round-tripped rather than being dropped or truncated.
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, header.Len+len(payload)+16, len(reply.Data), "the full payload must be echoed back")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestTestRequestEchoesLongPayloadAES(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
assertTestRequestEchoed(t, "aes")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestTestRequestEchoesLongPayloadChaChaPoly(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
assertTestRequestEchoed(t, "chachapoly")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// drainUDPTx empties a control's UDP tx queue without blocking.
|
||||
func drainUDPTx(c *nebula.Control) {
|
||||
for c.GetFromUDP(false) != nil {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// nextUDPTxOfType returns the next packet a control transmits whose nebula
|
||||
// header matches (wantType, wantSub), skipping unrelated packets.
|
||||
// It fails the test if none arrives within the timeout.
|
||||
func nextUDPTxOfType(t *testing.T, c *nebula.Control, wantType header.MessageType, wantSub header.MessageSubType, within time.Duration) *udp.Packet {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
ch := c.GetUDPTxChan()
|
||||
timeout := time.After(within)
|
||||
for {
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case p := <-ch:
|
||||
var h header.H
|
||||
if err := h.Parse(p.Data); err == nil && h.Type == wantType && h.Subtype == wantSub {
|
||||
return p
|
||||
}
|
||||
case <-timeout:
|
||||
t.Fatalf("timed out waiting for a %v/%v packet on the udp tx queue", wantType, wantSub)
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
|
||||
//go:build e2e_testing
|
||||
// +build e2e_testing
|
||||
|
||||
package e2e
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+173
-31
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
|
||||
//go:build e2e_testing
|
||||
// +build e2e_testing
|
||||
|
||||
package e2e
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -405,7 +404,7 @@ func TestStage1Race(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
|
||||
r.Log("Spin until connection manager tears down a tunnel")
|
||||
|
||||
for len(myControl.GetHostmap().Indexes)+len(theirControl.GetHostmap().Indexes) > 2 {
|
||||
for myControl.GetHostmapIndexCount()+theirControl.GetHostmapIndexCount() > 2 {
|
||||
assertTunnel(t, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
|
||||
t.Log("Connection manager hasn't ticked yet")
|
||||
time.Sleep(time.Second)
|
||||
@@ -453,9 +452,11 @@ func TestUncleanShutdownRaceLoser(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
|
||||
r.Log("Nuke my hostmap")
|
||||
myHostmap := myControl.GetHostmap()
|
||||
myHostmap.Lock()
|
||||
myHostmap.Hosts = map[netip.Addr]*nebula.HostInfo{}
|
||||
myHostmap.Indexes = map[uint32]*nebula.HostInfo{}
|
||||
myHostmap.RemoteIndexes = map[uint32]*nebula.HostInfo{}
|
||||
myHostmap.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me again")))
|
||||
p = r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
|
||||
@@ -465,10 +466,10 @@ func TestUncleanShutdownRaceLoser(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
assertTunnel(t, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
|
||||
|
||||
r.Log("Wait for the dead index to go away")
|
||||
start := len(theirControl.GetHostmap().Indexes)
|
||||
start := theirControl.GetHostmapIndexCount()
|
||||
for {
|
||||
assertTunnel(t, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
|
||||
if len(theirControl.GetHostmap().Indexes) < start {
|
||||
if theirControl.GetHostmapIndexCount() < start {
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
time.Sleep(time.Second)
|
||||
@@ -504,9 +505,11 @@ func TestUncleanShutdownRaceWinner(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
|
||||
r.Log("Nuke my hostmap")
|
||||
theirHostmap := theirControl.GetHostmap()
|
||||
theirHostmap.Lock()
|
||||
theirHostmap.Hosts = map[netip.Addr]*nebula.HostInfo{}
|
||||
theirHostmap.Indexes = map[uint32]*nebula.HostInfo{}
|
||||
theirHostmap.RemoteIndexes = map[uint32]*nebula.HostInfo{}
|
||||
theirHostmap.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
theirControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them again")))
|
||||
p = r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(myControl)
|
||||
@@ -517,10 +520,10 @@ func TestUncleanShutdownRaceWinner(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
assertTunnel(t, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
|
||||
|
||||
r.Log("Wait for the dead index to go away")
|
||||
start := len(myControl.GetHostmap().Indexes)
|
||||
start := myControl.GetHostmapIndexCount()
|
||||
for {
|
||||
assertTunnel(t, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
|
||||
if len(myControl.GetHostmap().Indexes) < start {
|
||||
if myControl.GetHostmapIndexCount() < start {
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
time.Sleep(time.Second)
|
||||
@@ -628,10 +631,10 @@ func TestReestablishRelays(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
r.Log("Close the tunnel")
|
||||
relayControl.CloseTunnel(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), true)
|
||||
|
||||
start := len(myControl.GetHostmap().Indexes)
|
||||
curIndexes := len(myControl.GetHostmap().Indexes)
|
||||
start := myControl.GetHostmapIndexCount()
|
||||
curIndexes := myControl.GetHostmapIndexCount()
|
||||
for curIndexes >= start {
|
||||
curIndexes = len(myControl.GetHostmap().Indexes)
|
||||
curIndexes = myControl.GetHostmapIndexCount()
|
||||
r.Logf("Wait for the dead index to go away:start=%v indexes, current=%v indexes", start, curIndexes)
|
||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me should fail")))
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -721,6 +724,70 @@ func TestReestablishRelays(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRelayHandshakeOverDisestablishedEntry(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
// If them tears down the tunnel while me keeps Established relay state, me's next
|
||||
// handshake flows through the relay with no fresh CreateRelayRequest and lands on
|
||||
// them's Disestablished terminal relay entry. them must re-establish that entry, or
|
||||
// its first transmit deletes its only relay and the tunnel is born transmit-dead:
|
||||
// them can receive but every send is silently dropped.
|
||||
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
|
||||
myControl, myVpnIpNet, _, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me ", "10.128.0.1/24", m{"relay": m{"use_relays": true}})
|
||||
relayControl, relayVpnIpNet, relayUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "relay ", "10.128.0.128/24", m{"relay": m{"am_relay": true}})
|
||||
theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "them ", "10.128.0.2/24", m{"relay": m{"use_relays": true}})
|
||||
|
||||
// Teach my how to get to the relay and that their can be reached via the relay
|
||||
myControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(relayVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), relayUdpAddr)
|
||||
myControl.InjectRelays(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), []netip.Addr{relayVpnIpNet[0].Addr()})
|
||||
relayControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirUdpAddr)
|
||||
|
||||
// Build a router so we don't have to reason who gets which packet
|
||||
r := router.NewR(t, myControl, relayControl, theirControl)
|
||||
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
||||
|
||||
// Start the servers
|
||||
myControl.Start()
|
||||
relayControl.Start()
|
||||
theirControl.Start()
|
||||
|
||||
t.Log("Trigger a handshake from me to them via the relay")
|
||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
|
||||
|
||||
p := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
|
||||
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me"), p, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
|
||||
oldIdx := myControl.GetHostInfoByVpnAddr(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), false).LocalIndex
|
||||
|
||||
t.Log("Close the tunnel on them only, marking their relay entry Disestablished")
|
||||
theirControl.CloseTunnel(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), true)
|
||||
|
||||
t.Log("Re-handshake from me, riding the still-Established relay state")
|
||||
myControl.ReHandshake(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr())
|
||||
for {
|
||||
h := myControl.GetHostInfoByVpnAddr(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), false)
|
||||
if h != nil && h.LocalIndex != oldIdx && h.RemoteIndex != 0 {
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
r.RouteForAllExitFunc(func(*udp.Packet, *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
||||
return router.RouteAndExit
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hAtThem := theirControl.GetHostInfoByVpnAddr(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), false)
|
||||
require.NotNil(t, hAtThem, "them should have completed the relayed handshake")
|
||||
require.Equal(t, []netip.Addr{relayVpnIpNet[0].Addr()}, hAtThem.CurrentRelaysToMe, "them should know a relay for the new tunnel")
|
||||
|
||||
t.Log("Send from them to me; their only relay entry must survive the transmit")
|
||||
theirControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from them")))
|
||||
require.Never(t, func() bool {
|
||||
h := theirControl.GetHostInfoByVpnAddr(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), false)
|
||||
return h == nil || len(h.CurrentRelaysToMe) == 0
|
||||
}, time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond, "them deleted its only relay entry; the tunnel is permanently transmit-dead")
|
||||
|
||||
p = r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(myControl)
|
||||
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from them"), p, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
|
||||
r.RenderHostmaps("Final hostmaps", myControl, relayControl, theirControl)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestStage1RaceRelays(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
//NOTE: this is a race between me and relay resulting in a full tunnel from me to them via relay
|
||||
@@ -819,18 +886,18 @@ func TestStage1RaceRelays2(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
|
||||
t.Log("Wait until we remove extra tunnels")
|
||||
t.Logf("Waiting for hostinfos to be removed... myControl=%d theirControl=%d relayControl=%d",
|
||||
len(myControl.GetHostmap().Indexes),
|
||||
len(theirControl.GetHostmap().Indexes),
|
||||
len(relayControl.GetHostmap().Indexes),
|
||||
myControl.GetHostmapIndexCount(),
|
||||
theirControl.GetHostmapIndexCount(),
|
||||
relayControl.GetHostmapIndexCount(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
hostInfos := len(myControl.GetHostmap().Indexes) + len(theirControl.GetHostmap().Indexes) + len(relayControl.GetHostmap().Indexes)
|
||||
hostInfos := myControl.GetHostmapIndexCount() + theirControl.GetHostmapIndexCount() + relayControl.GetHostmapIndexCount()
|
||||
retries := 60
|
||||
for hostInfos > 6 && retries > 0 {
|
||||
hostInfos = len(myControl.GetHostmap().Indexes) + len(theirControl.GetHostmap().Indexes) + len(relayControl.GetHostmap().Indexes)
|
||||
hostInfos = myControl.GetHostmapIndexCount() + theirControl.GetHostmapIndexCount() + relayControl.GetHostmapIndexCount()
|
||||
t.Logf("Waiting for hostinfos to be removed... myControl=%d theirControl=%d relayControl=%d",
|
||||
len(myControl.GetHostmap().Indexes),
|
||||
len(theirControl.GetHostmap().Indexes),
|
||||
len(relayControl.GetHostmap().Indexes),
|
||||
myControl.GetHostmapIndexCount(),
|
||||
theirControl.GetHostmapIndexCount(),
|
||||
relayControl.GetHostmapIndexCount(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
assertTunnel(t, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
|
||||
t.Log("Connection manager hasn't ticked yet")
|
||||
@@ -924,24 +991,24 @@ func TestRehandshakingRelays(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
assertTunnel(t, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirControl, myControl, r)
|
||||
r.RenderHostmaps("working hostmaps", myControl, relayControl, theirControl)
|
||||
// We should have two hostinfos on all sides
|
||||
for len(myControl.GetHostmap().Indexes) != 2 {
|
||||
t.Logf("Waiting for myControl hostinfos (%v != 2) to get cleaned up from lack of use...", len(myControl.GetHostmap().Indexes))
|
||||
for myControl.GetHostmapIndexCount() != 2 {
|
||||
t.Logf("Waiting for myControl hostinfos (%v != 2) to get cleaned up from lack of use...", myControl.GetHostmapIndexCount())
|
||||
r.Log("Assert the relay tunnel still works")
|
||||
assertTunnel(t, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirControl, myControl, r)
|
||||
r.Log("yupitdoes")
|
||||
time.Sleep(time.Second)
|
||||
}
|
||||
t.Logf("myControl hostinfos got cleaned up!")
|
||||
for len(theirControl.GetHostmap().Indexes) != 2 {
|
||||
t.Logf("Waiting for theirControl hostinfos (%v != 2) to get cleaned up from lack of use...", len(theirControl.GetHostmap().Indexes))
|
||||
for theirControl.GetHostmapIndexCount() != 2 {
|
||||
t.Logf("Waiting for theirControl hostinfos (%v != 2) to get cleaned up from lack of use...", theirControl.GetHostmapIndexCount())
|
||||
r.Log("Assert the relay tunnel still works")
|
||||
assertTunnel(t, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirControl, myControl, r)
|
||||
r.Log("yupitdoes")
|
||||
time.Sleep(time.Second)
|
||||
}
|
||||
t.Logf("theirControl hostinfos got cleaned up!")
|
||||
for len(relayControl.GetHostmap().Indexes) != 2 {
|
||||
t.Logf("Waiting for relayControl hostinfos (%v != 2) to get cleaned up from lack of use...", len(relayControl.GetHostmap().Indexes))
|
||||
for relayControl.GetHostmapIndexCount() != 2 {
|
||||
t.Logf("Waiting for relayControl hostinfos (%v != 2) to get cleaned up from lack of use...", relayControl.GetHostmapIndexCount())
|
||||
r.Log("Assert the relay tunnel still works")
|
||||
assertTunnel(t, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirControl, myControl, r)
|
||||
r.Log("yupitdoes")
|
||||
@@ -1029,24 +1096,24 @@ func TestRehandshakingRelaysPrimary(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
assertTunnel(t, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirControl, myControl, r)
|
||||
r.RenderHostmaps("working hostmaps", myControl, relayControl, theirControl)
|
||||
// We should have two hostinfos on all sides
|
||||
for len(myControl.GetHostmap().Indexes) != 2 {
|
||||
t.Logf("Waiting for myControl hostinfos (%v != 2) to get cleaned up from lack of use...", len(myControl.GetHostmap().Indexes))
|
||||
for myControl.GetHostmapIndexCount() != 2 {
|
||||
t.Logf("Waiting for myControl hostinfos (%v != 2) to get cleaned up from lack of use...", myControl.GetHostmapIndexCount())
|
||||
r.Log("Assert the relay tunnel still works")
|
||||
assertTunnel(t, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirControl, myControl, r)
|
||||
r.Log("yupitdoes")
|
||||
time.Sleep(time.Second)
|
||||
}
|
||||
t.Logf("myControl hostinfos got cleaned up!")
|
||||
for len(theirControl.GetHostmap().Indexes) != 2 {
|
||||
t.Logf("Waiting for theirControl hostinfos (%v != 2) to get cleaned up from lack of use...", len(theirControl.GetHostmap().Indexes))
|
||||
for theirControl.GetHostmapIndexCount() != 2 {
|
||||
t.Logf("Waiting for theirControl hostinfos (%v != 2) to get cleaned up from lack of use...", theirControl.GetHostmapIndexCount())
|
||||
r.Log("Assert the relay tunnel still works")
|
||||
assertTunnel(t, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirControl, myControl, r)
|
||||
r.Log("yupitdoes")
|
||||
time.Sleep(time.Second)
|
||||
}
|
||||
t.Logf("theirControl hostinfos got cleaned up!")
|
||||
for len(relayControl.GetHostmap().Indexes) != 2 {
|
||||
t.Logf("Waiting for relayControl hostinfos (%v != 2) to get cleaned up from lack of use...", len(relayControl.GetHostmap().Indexes))
|
||||
for relayControl.GetHostmapIndexCount() != 2 {
|
||||
t.Logf("Waiting for relayControl hostinfos (%v != 2) to get cleaned up from lack of use...", relayControl.GetHostmapIndexCount())
|
||||
r.Log("Assert the relay tunnel still works")
|
||||
assertTunnel(t, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirControl, myControl, r)
|
||||
r.Log("yupitdoes")
|
||||
@@ -1123,7 +1190,7 @@ func TestRehandshaking(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
theirConfig.ReloadConfigString(string(rc))
|
||||
|
||||
r.Log("Spin until there is only 1 tunnel")
|
||||
for len(myControl.GetHostmap().Indexes)+len(theirControl.GetHostmap().Indexes) > 2 {
|
||||
for myControl.GetHostmapIndexCount()+theirControl.GetHostmapIndexCount() > 2 {
|
||||
assertTunnel(t, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
|
||||
t.Log("Connection manager hasn't ticked yet")
|
||||
time.Sleep(time.Second)
|
||||
@@ -1223,7 +1290,7 @@ func TestRehandshakingLoser(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
myConfig.ReloadConfigString(string(rc))
|
||||
|
||||
r.Log("Spin until there is only 1 tunnel")
|
||||
for len(myControl.GetHostmap().Indexes)+len(theirControl.GetHostmap().Indexes) > 2 {
|
||||
for myControl.GetHostmapIndexCount()+theirControl.GetHostmapIndexCount() > 2 {
|
||||
assertTunnel(t, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
|
||||
t.Log("Connection manager hasn't ticked yet")
|
||||
time.Sleep(time.Second)
|
||||
@@ -1535,3 +1602,78 @@ func TestGoodHandshakeUnsafeDest(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
myControl.Stop()
|
||||
theirControl.Stop()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestMultiVpnAddrDeletePrimaryKeepsSecondAddr(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
// Regression for the hostmap multi-vpnAddr delete bug. A dual-stack (v4+v6) V2-cert peer that
|
||||
// handshakes twice at once ends up with two hostinfos linked in the shared next/prev chain, with the
|
||||
// primary owning both addresses. Deleting that primary (e.g. connection manager dropping it, a
|
||||
// CloseTunnel, a collision) must promote the surviving sibling for EVERY address. The pre-fix code
|
||||
// unlinked the chain once per address, so it promoted the sibling for the first address and orphaned
|
||||
// the second: the peer stayed reachable at its v4 addr but not its v6 addr despite a live tunnel.
|
||||
|
||||
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
|
||||
myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "me ", "10.128.0.1/24,fd00::1/64", nil)
|
||||
theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "them", "10.128.0.2/24,fd00::2/64", nil)
|
||||
|
||||
// This bug only exists for peers carrying more than one vpn address
|
||||
require.Len(t, theirVpnIpNet, 2)
|
||||
theirV4 := theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr()
|
||||
theirV6 := theirVpnIpNet[1].Addr()
|
||||
|
||||
// Put their info in our lighthouse and vice versa
|
||||
myControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(theirV4, theirUdpAddr)
|
||||
theirControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myUdpAddr)
|
||||
|
||||
// Build a router so we don't have to reason who gets which packet
|
||||
r := router.NewR(t, myControl, theirControl)
|
||||
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
||||
|
||||
myControl.Start()
|
||||
theirControl.Start()
|
||||
|
||||
// Race a handshake so both of us build a hostinfo for the other, leaving my hostmap with a single
|
||||
// host (them) backed by two linked hostinfos, just like TestStage1Race.
|
||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirV4, 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
|
||||
theirControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, theirV4, 80, []byte("Hi from them")))
|
||||
|
||||
myHsForThem := myControl.GetFromUDP(true)
|
||||
theirHsForMe := theirControl.GetFromUDP(true)
|
||||
|
||||
r.InjectUDPPacket(theirControl, myControl, theirHsForMe)
|
||||
r.InjectUDPPacket(myControl, theirControl, myHsForThem)
|
||||
|
||||
r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
|
||||
r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(myControl)
|
||||
|
||||
r.RenderHostmaps("Racing hostmaps", myControl, theirControl)
|
||||
|
||||
// Two hostinfos for them means the shared next/prev chain has a sibling to promote. The Hosts map has
|
||||
// one entry per vpn address (two, for dual stack), so the index count is what tells us there are two
|
||||
// hostinfos.
|
||||
require.Len(t, myControl.ListHostmapIndexes(false), 2)
|
||||
|
||||
// The primary owns both of their addresses
|
||||
primaryV4 := myControl.GetHostInfoByVpnAddr(theirV4, false)
|
||||
primaryV6 := myControl.GetHostInfoByVpnAddr(theirV6, false)
|
||||
require.NotNil(t, primaryV4)
|
||||
require.NotNil(t, primaryV6)
|
||||
require.Equal(t, primaryV4.LocalIndex, primaryV6.LocalIndex, "both addrs should point at the same primary")
|
||||
|
||||
// Delete the primary tunnel. localOnly so we don't perturb their side, we only care about my hostmap.
|
||||
require.True(t, myControl.CloseTunnel(theirV4, true))
|
||||
|
||||
// The surviving sibling must still serve BOTH addresses.
|
||||
survivorV4 := myControl.GetHostInfoByVpnAddr(theirV4, false)
|
||||
survivorV6 := myControl.GetHostInfoByVpnAddr(theirV6, false)
|
||||
require.NotNil(t, survivorV4, "v4 addr should still resolve to the surviving tunnel")
|
||||
// Pre-fix this is nil: the second address was orphaned when the primary was deleted.
|
||||
require.NotNil(t, survivorV6, "v6 addr was orphaned after deleting the primary (multi-vpnAddr delete bug)")
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, survivorV4.LocalIndex, survivorV6.LocalIndex, "both addrs should promote to the same survivor")
|
||||
assert.NotEqual(t, primaryV4.LocalIndex, survivorV4.LocalIndex, "a different hostinfo should now be primary")
|
||||
|
||||
r.RenderHostmaps("Final hostmaps", myControl, theirControl)
|
||||
|
||||
myControl.Stop()
|
||||
theirControl.Stop()
|
||||
}
|
||||
+2
-5
@@ -1,18 +1,15 @@
|
||||
//go:build e2e_testing
|
||||
// +build e2e_testing
|
||||
|
||||
package e2e
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
|
||||
"dario.cat/mergo"
|
||||
"github.com/google/gopacket"
|
||||
"github.com/google/gopacket/layers"
|
||||
@@ -382,7 +379,7 @@ func getAddrs(ns []netip.Prefix) []netip.Addr {
|
||||
func NewTestLogger() *slog.Logger {
|
||||
v := os.Getenv("TEST_LOGS")
|
||||
if v == "" {
|
||||
return slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil))
|
||||
return slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
level := slog.LevelInfo
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
|
||||
//go:build e2e_testing
|
||||
// +build e2e_testing
|
||||
|
||||
package e2e
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,476 @@
|
||||
//go:build e2e_testing
|
||||
|
||||
package e2e
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/e2e/router"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake/fragment"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func pqRequire() m {
|
||||
return m{"handshakes": m{"pq": m{"require": true, "repair_delay": "0s"}}}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func pqConfig(initiate, accept, sticky bool) m {
|
||||
return m{"handshakes": m{"pq": m{
|
||||
"initiate": initiate,
|
||||
"accept": accept,
|
||||
"sticky": sticky,
|
||||
"repair_delay": "0s",
|
||||
}}}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// handshakeOf returns the handshake header p carries, looking inside relay
|
||||
// wrapping, plus the fragment header when the handshake is fragmented.
|
||||
func handshakeOf(p *udp.Packet) (*header.H, *fragment.Header) {
|
||||
b := p.Data
|
||||
h := &header.H{}
|
||||
if h.Parse(b) != nil {
|
||||
return nil, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
if h.Type == header.Message && h.Subtype == header.MessageRelay {
|
||||
// Relays authenticate but do not encrypt the inner packet.
|
||||
b = b[header.Len:]
|
||||
if h.Parse(b) != nil {
|
||||
return nil, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if h.Type != header.Handshake {
|
||||
return nil, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !header.IsFragmented(h.Subtype) {
|
||||
return h, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
// A relayed packet still has the relay's AEAD tag on the end.
|
||||
for _, tag := range []int{0, 16} {
|
||||
if len(b) < header.Len+tag {
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
if fh, _, err := fragment.Parse(b[header.Len : len(b)-tag]); err == nil {
|
||||
return h, &fh
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return h, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// handshakeTally counts handshake packets by style as the router moves them.
|
||||
type handshakeTally struct {
|
||||
sync.Mutex
|
||||
pq, classical int
|
||||
maxPQLen int
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (ht *handshakeTally) observe(p *udp.Packet) {
|
||||
h, _ := handshakeOf(p)
|
||||
if h == nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
ht.Lock()
|
||||
defer ht.Unlock()
|
||||
if h.Subtype == header.HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024 {
|
||||
ht.pq++
|
||||
ht.maxPQLen = max(ht.maxPQLen, len(p.Data))
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
ht.classical++
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// isTunnelData reports whether p is ordinary tunnel traffic headed for to,
|
||||
// directly or as the last hop of a relay.
|
||||
func isTunnelData(p *udp.Packet, receiver, to *nebula.Control) bool {
|
||||
h := &header.H{}
|
||||
if receiver != to || h.Parse(p.Data) != nil || h.Type != header.Message {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
if h.Subtype == header.MessageRelay {
|
||||
if h.Parse(p.Data[header.Len:]) != nil {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return h.Type == header.Message && h.Subtype == header.MessageNone
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func newPQPair(t *testing.T, mine, theirs m) (myControl, theirControl *nebula.Control, myVpn, theirVpn []netip.Prefix, myUdp, theirUdp netip.AddrPort, r *router.R) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
|
||||
myControl, myVpn, myUdp, _ = newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "me", "10.128.0.1/24", mine)
|
||||
theirControl, theirVpn, theirUdp, _ = newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "them", "10.128.0.2/24", theirs)
|
||||
myControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(theirVpn[0].Addr(), theirUdp)
|
||||
r = router.NewR(t, myControl, theirControl)
|
||||
myControl.Start()
|
||||
theirControl.Start()
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestPQHandshake(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
// They only accept, which is all a PQ initiator needs.
|
||||
myControl, theirControl, myVpn, theirVpn, myUdp, theirUdp, r := newPQPair(t, pqConfig(true, true, false), pqConfig(false, true, false))
|
||||
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
||||
|
||||
var tally handshakeTally
|
||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, myVpn[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
|
||||
require.True(t, r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(5*time.Second, func(p *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
||||
tally.observe(p)
|
||||
if isTunnelData(p, receiver, theirControl) {
|
||||
return router.RouteAndExit
|
||||
}
|
||||
return router.KeepRouting
|
||||
}), "tunnel never came up")
|
||||
|
||||
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me"), theirControl.GetFromTun(true), myVpn[0].Addr(), theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
|
||||
assert.Zero(t, tally.classical, "no classical handshake should be needed")
|
||||
assert.GreaterOrEqual(t, tally.pq, 4, "both messages travel as several fragments")
|
||||
assert.LessOrEqual(t, tally.maxPQLen, fragment.MaxPacketLen)
|
||||
|
||||
assertHostInfoPair(t, myUdp, theirUdp, myVpn, theirVpn, myControl, theirControl)
|
||||
assertTunnel(t, myVpn[0].Addr(), theirVpn[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
|
||||
assert.Empty(t, myControl.ListHostmapIndexes(true), "no pending index may outlive the handshake")
|
||||
assert.Empty(t, theirControl.ListHostmapIndexes(true))
|
||||
|
||||
myControl.Stop()
|
||||
theirControl.Stop()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestPQHandshakeLoss drops data fragments of both messages; the repair
|
||||
// fragments must carry the handshake without a retry.
|
||||
func TestPQHandshakeLoss(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
myControl, theirControl, myVpn, theirVpn, _, _, r := newPQPair(t, pqConfig(true, true, false), pqConfig(false, true, false))
|
||||
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
||||
|
||||
var tally handshakeTally
|
||||
dropped := 0
|
||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, myVpn[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
|
||||
require.True(t, r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(5*time.Second, func(p *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
||||
if h, fh := handshakeOf(p); fh != nil {
|
||||
// Every data fragment of msg1, and the first of msg2.
|
||||
if (h.MessageCounter == 1 && int(fh.Index) < 2) || (h.MessageCounter == 2 && fh.Index == 0) {
|
||||
dropped++
|
||||
return router.Drop
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
tally.observe(p)
|
||||
if isTunnelData(p, receiver, theirControl) {
|
||||
return router.RouteAndExit
|
||||
}
|
||||
return router.KeepRouting
|
||||
}), "tunnel never came up")
|
||||
|
||||
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me"), theirControl.GetFromTun(true), myVpn[0].Addr(), theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, 3, dropped)
|
||||
assert.Zero(t, tally.classical, "the first attempt should succeed from repair fragments")
|
||||
assertTunnel(t, myVpn[0].Addr(), theirVpn[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
|
||||
|
||||
myControl.Stop()
|
||||
theirControl.Stop()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestPQFallback has a peer that does not accept PQ handshakes. The initiator's
|
||||
// next attempt is classical and the tunnel comes up anyway.
|
||||
func TestPQFallback(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
myControl, theirControl, myVpn, theirVpn, myUdp, theirUdp, r := newPQPair(t, pqConfig(true, true, false), nil)
|
||||
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
||||
|
||||
var tally handshakeTally
|
||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, myVpn[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
|
||||
require.True(t, r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(5*time.Second, func(p *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
||||
tally.observe(p)
|
||||
if isTunnelData(p, receiver, theirControl) {
|
||||
return router.RouteAndExit
|
||||
}
|
||||
return router.KeepRouting
|
||||
}), "tunnel never came up")
|
||||
|
||||
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me"), theirControl.GetFromTun(true), myVpn[0].Addr(), theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
|
||||
assert.Positive(t, tally.pq, "a PQ attempt comes first")
|
||||
assert.Positive(t, tally.classical, "then a classical one")
|
||||
|
||||
assertHostInfoPair(t, myUdp, theirUdp, myVpn, theirVpn, myControl, theirControl)
|
||||
assertTunnel(t, myVpn[0].Addr(), theirVpn[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
|
||||
assert.Empty(t, myControl.ListHostmapIndexes(true), "the losing PQ attempt's index must be released")
|
||||
|
||||
myControl.Stop()
|
||||
theirControl.Stop()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestPQResendFreshSymbols loses the responder's whole first msg2. The
|
||||
// initiator's next PQ attempt offers fresh msg1 symbols, the responder
|
||||
// recognises the repeat and resends msg2 with symbols it has not sent before.
|
||||
func TestPQResendFreshSymbols(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
myControl, theirControl, myVpn, theirVpn, _, _, r := newPQPair(t, pqConfig(true, true, false), pqConfig(false, true, false))
|
||||
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
||||
|
||||
var firstMsg2, freshMsg2, freshMsg1 int
|
||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, myVpn[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
|
||||
require.True(t, r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(10*time.Second, func(p *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
||||
h, fh := handshakeOf(p)
|
||||
switch {
|
||||
case h != nil && fh == nil:
|
||||
// Keep the classical fallback out of the way.
|
||||
return router.Drop
|
||||
case fh != nil && h.MessageCounter == 2 && fh.Index < 4:
|
||||
firstMsg2++
|
||||
return router.Drop
|
||||
case fh != nil && h.MessageCounter == 2:
|
||||
freshMsg2++
|
||||
case fh != nil && h.MessageCounter == 1 && fh.Index >= 4:
|
||||
freshMsg1++
|
||||
}
|
||||
if isTunnelData(p, receiver, theirControl) {
|
||||
return router.RouteAndExit
|
||||
}
|
||||
return router.KeepRouting
|
||||
}), "tunnel never came up")
|
||||
|
||||
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me"), theirControl.GetFromTun(true), myVpn[0].Addr(), theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, 4, firstMsg2, "the first msg2 is 2 data and 2 repair fragments")
|
||||
assert.Positive(t, freshMsg1, "the retry offers fresh msg1 symbols")
|
||||
assert.Positive(t, freshMsg2, "the resend offers fresh msg2 symbols")
|
||||
assertTunnel(t, myVpn[0].Addr(), theirVpn[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
|
||||
|
||||
myControl.Stop()
|
||||
theirControl.Stop()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestPQSticky checks a sticky initiator never offers a classical handshake to a
|
||||
// peer it has already completed a PQ handshake with.
|
||||
func TestPQSticky(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
myControl, theirControl, myVpn, theirVpn, _, _, r := newPQPair(t, pqConfig(true, true, true), pqConfig(false, true, false))
|
||||
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
||||
|
||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, myVpn[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
|
||||
require.True(t, r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(5*time.Second, func(p *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
||||
if isTunnelData(p, receiver, theirControl) {
|
||||
return router.RouteAndExit
|
||||
}
|
||||
return router.KeepRouting
|
||||
}), "tunnel never came up")
|
||||
theirControl.GetFromTun(true)
|
||||
|
||||
t.Log("Rehandshake while an attacker drops every PQ packet")
|
||||
var tally handshakeTally
|
||||
myControl.ReHandshake(theirVpn[0].Addr())
|
||||
r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(time.Second, func(p *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
||||
tally.observe(p)
|
||||
if h, _ := handshakeOf(p); h != nil && h.Subtype == header.HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024 {
|
||||
return router.Drop
|
||||
}
|
||||
return router.KeepRouting
|
||||
})
|
||||
assert.Positive(t, tally.pq, "PQ attempts keep being made")
|
||||
assert.Zero(t, tally.classical, "sticky must never fall back")
|
||||
|
||||
myControl.Stop()
|
||||
theirControl.Stop()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestPQRelays(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
|
||||
useRelays := pqConfig(true, true, false)
|
||||
useRelays["relay"] = m{"use_relays": true}
|
||||
amRelay := pqConfig(true, true, false)
|
||||
amRelay["relay"] = m{"am_relay": true}
|
||||
myControl, myVpnIpNet, _, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me ", "10.128.0.1/24", useRelays)
|
||||
relayControl, relayVpnIpNet, relayUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "relay ", "10.128.0.128/24", amRelay)
|
||||
theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "them ", "10.128.0.2/24", useRelays)
|
||||
|
||||
myControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(relayVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), relayUdpAddr)
|
||||
myControl.InjectRelays(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), []netip.Addr{relayVpnIpNet[0].Addr()})
|
||||
relayControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirUdpAddr)
|
||||
|
||||
r := router.NewR(t, myControl, relayControl, theirControl)
|
||||
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
||||
|
||||
myControl.Start()
|
||||
relayControl.Start()
|
||||
theirControl.Start()
|
||||
|
||||
var tally handshakeTally
|
||||
var relayedPQ, relayedClassical int
|
||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
|
||||
require.True(t, r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(10*time.Second, func(p *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
||||
tally.observe(p)
|
||||
outer := &header.H{}
|
||||
if outer.Parse(p.Data) == nil && outer.Type == header.Message && outer.Subtype == header.MessageRelay {
|
||||
if h, fh := handshakeOf(p); h != nil && fh != nil {
|
||||
relayedPQ++
|
||||
assert.LessOrEqual(t, len(p.Data), fragment.MaxPacketLen+32, "a relayed fragment fits the IPv6 minimum MTU")
|
||||
} else if h != nil {
|
||||
relayedClassical++
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if isTunnelData(p, receiver, theirControl) {
|
||||
return router.RouteAndExit
|
||||
}
|
||||
return router.KeepRouting
|
||||
}), "tunnel never came up")
|
||||
|
||||
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me"), theirControl.GetFromTun(true), myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
|
||||
assert.Positive(t, relayedPQ, "the end to end handshake is PQ through the relay")
|
||||
assert.Zero(t, relayedClassical, "the relay coming up carries the PQ attempt, not the classical retry")
|
||||
r.RenderHostmaps("Final hostmaps", myControl, relayControl, theirControl)
|
||||
|
||||
myControl.Stop()
|
||||
relayControl.Stop()
|
||||
theirControl.Stop()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestPQTimeoutReleasesIndexes lets a handshake with both a PQ and a classical
|
||||
// attempt pending time out, and checks neither index is left behind.
|
||||
func TestPQTimeoutReleasesIndexes(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
mine := pqConfig(true, true, false)
|
||||
mine["handshakes"].(m)["retries"] = 2
|
||||
myControl, theirControl, myVpn, theirVpn, _, _, r := newPQPair(t, mine, pqConfig(false, true, false))
|
||||
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
||||
|
||||
var tally handshakeTally
|
||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, myVpn[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
|
||||
r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(1500*time.Millisecond, func(p *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
||||
tally.observe(p)
|
||||
return router.Drop
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
assert.Positive(t, tally.pq)
|
||||
assert.Positive(t, tally.classical)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, myControl.GetHostInfoByVpnAddr(theirVpn[0].Addr(), true), "the handshake should have timed out")
|
||||
assert.Empty(t, myControl.ListHostmapIndexes(true))
|
||||
|
||||
myControl.Stop()
|
||||
theirControl.Stop()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestPQCookieUnderLoad floods the responder with msg1 fragments from spoofed
|
||||
// sources until it demands cookies, then checks a real initiator picks up the
|
||||
// cookie and still completes a PQ handshake.
|
||||
func TestPQCookieUnderLoad(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
myControl, theirControl, myVpn, theirVpn, _, theirUdp, r := newPQPair(t, pqConfig(true, true, false), pqConfig(false, true, false))
|
||||
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
||||
|
||||
// Half of the 1024 entry table is the cookie threshold. Stopping exactly there
|
||||
// keeps them from answering the spoofed sources, which the router cannot reach.
|
||||
t.Log("Flood them with the first fragment of msg1s nobody will finish")
|
||||
for i := range 512 {
|
||||
from := netip.AddrPortFrom(netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{198, 18, byte(i >> 8), byte(i)}), 4242)
|
||||
s, err := fragment.NewSender(make([]byte, 2000), header.HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024, 0, 1, uint32(i+1))
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
pkts, _, err := s.Attempt(0)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
theirControl.InjectUDPPacket(&udp.Packet{From: from, To: theirUdp, Data: pkts[0]})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var tally handshakeTally
|
||||
var cookieReplies, msg2, withCookie int
|
||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, myVpn[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
|
||||
require.True(t, r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(5*time.Second, func(p *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
||||
tally.observe(p)
|
||||
if h, fh := handshakeOf(p); h != nil && h.Subtype == header.HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024 {
|
||||
switch {
|
||||
case h.MessageCounter == 0:
|
||||
cookieReplies++
|
||||
case h.MessageCounter == 2:
|
||||
msg2++
|
||||
case fh != nil && fh.HasCookie():
|
||||
withCookie++
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if isTunnelData(p, receiver, theirControl) {
|
||||
return router.RouteAndExit
|
||||
}
|
||||
return router.KeepRouting
|
||||
}), "tunnel never came up")
|
||||
|
||||
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me"), theirControl.GetFromTun(true), myVpn[0].Addr(), theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
|
||||
assert.Positive(t, cookieReplies, "a loaded responder asks for a cookie")
|
||||
assert.Positive(t, withCookie, "the initiator resends with it")
|
||||
assert.Positive(t, msg2, "and the handshake completes post-quantum")
|
||||
assert.Zero(t, tally.classical, "the cookie round trip beats the classical fallback")
|
||||
assertTunnel(t, myVpn[0].Addr(), theirVpn[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
|
||||
|
||||
myControl.Stop()
|
||||
theirControl.Stop()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestPQRequire checks require mode never handshakes classically, in either
|
||||
// direction.
|
||||
func TestPQRequire(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("initiator", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// They neither speak PQ nor require it; we never fall back.
|
||||
myControl, theirControl, myVpn, theirVpn, _, _, r := newPQPair(t, pqRequire(), nil)
|
||||
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
||||
|
||||
var tally handshakeTally
|
||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, myVpn[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
|
||||
r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(time.Second, func(p *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
||||
tally.observe(p)
|
||||
return router.KeepRouting
|
||||
})
|
||||
assert.Positive(t, tally.pq)
|
||||
assert.Zero(t, tally.classical)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, theirControl.GetHostInfoByVpnAddr(myVpn[0].Addr(), false), "no tunnel without PQ")
|
||||
|
||||
myControl.Stop()
|
||||
theirControl.Stop()
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("responder", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// We only speak classical; they refuse it.
|
||||
myControl, theirControl, myVpn, theirVpn, _, _, r := newPQPair(t, nil, pqRequire())
|
||||
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
||||
|
||||
var answers int
|
||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, myVpn[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
|
||||
r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(time.Second, func(p *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
||||
if h, _ := handshakeOf(p); h != nil && h.MessageCounter == 2 {
|
||||
answers++
|
||||
}
|
||||
return router.KeepRouting
|
||||
})
|
||||
assert.Zero(t, answers, "a classical msg1 gets no answer")
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, theirControl.GetHostInfoByVpnAddr(myVpn[0].Addr(), false))
|
||||
|
||||
myControl.Stop()
|
||||
theirControl.Stop()
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("both", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
myControl, theirControl, myVpn, theirVpn, _, _, r := newPQPair(t, pqRequire(), pqRequire())
|
||||
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
||||
|
||||
var tally handshakeTally
|
||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, myVpn[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me")))
|
||||
require.True(t, r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(5*time.Second, func(p *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
||||
tally.observe(p)
|
||||
if isTunnelData(p, receiver, theirControl) {
|
||||
return router.RouteAndExit
|
||||
}
|
||||
return router.KeepRouting
|
||||
}), "tunnel never came up")
|
||||
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hi from me"), theirControl.GetFromTun(true), myVpn[0].Addr(), theirVpn[0].Addr(), 80, 80)
|
||||
assert.Zero(t, tally.classical)
|
||||
assertTunnel(t, myVpn[0].Addr(), theirVpn[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
|
||||
|
||||
myControl.Stop()
|
||||
theirControl.Stop()
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
|
||||
//go:build e2e_testing
|
||||
|
||||
package e2e
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/e2e/router"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// reportedAddrs is what the lighthouse would hand a peer asking where vpnAddr is.
|
||||
func reportedAddrs(t *testing.T, lh *nebula.Control, vpnAddr netip.Addr) []netip.AddrPort {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
cm := lh.QueryLighthouse(vpnAddr)
|
||||
if cm == nil {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
var out []netip.AddrPort
|
||||
for _, c := range *cm {
|
||||
out = append(out, c.Reported...)
|
||||
out = append(out, c.Learned...)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// waitForLighthouseMsg routes until a lighthouse message lands on lh, or gives up. Reports whether one arrived.
|
||||
func waitForLighthouseMsg(t *testing.T, r *router.R, lh *nebula.Control, wait time.Duration) bool {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
h := &header.H{}
|
||||
return r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(wait, func(p *udp.Packet, c *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
||||
if c != lh {
|
||||
return router.KeepRouting
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Punches are a single byte and never parse, they are just not what we are after
|
||||
if err := h.Parse(p.Data); err != nil {
|
||||
return router.KeepRouting
|
||||
}
|
||||
if h.Type == header.LightHouse {
|
||||
return router.RouteAndExit
|
||||
}
|
||||
return router.KeepRouting
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A laptop that changes networks has to tell the lighthouse promptly, otherwise the lighthouse keeps handing peers
|
||||
// the old address and their punches land nowhere. On a long lighthouse interval the only thing that closes that
|
||||
// window is the rebind, which on darwin the network change monitor drives. The e2e build compiles the monitor out,
|
||||
// so we call RebindUDPServer directly, which is the same thing the monitor does.
|
||||
func TestRebindSendsLighthouseUpdate(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
|
||||
|
||||
lhControl, lhVpnIpNet, lhUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "lh", "10.128.0.1/24", m{
|
||||
"lighthouse": m{"am_lighthouse": true},
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
// 600s interval, so nothing scheduled can send an update during this test. A rebind is the only thing that can.
|
||||
myControl, _, _, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "me", "10.128.0.2/24", m{
|
||||
"lighthouse": m{
|
||||
"hosts": []any{lhVpnIpNet[0].Addr().String()},
|
||||
"interval": 600,
|
||||
},
|
||||
"static_host_map": m{
|
||||
lhVpnIpNet[0].Addr().String(): []any{lhUdpAddr.String()},
|
||||
},
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
r := router.NewR(t, lhControl, myControl)
|
||||
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
||||
|
||||
lhControl.Start()
|
||||
myControl.Start()
|
||||
|
||||
// Let the startup registration finish, then clear everything it left behind
|
||||
require.True(t, waitForLighthouseMsg(t, r, lhControl, time.Second*5), "expected an initial registration")
|
||||
r.RouteFor(time.Millisecond * 400)
|
||||
|
||||
// Nothing should be talking to the lighthouse on its own now
|
||||
require.False(t, waitForLighthouseMsg(t, r, lhControl, time.Millisecond*200),
|
||||
"nothing should reach the lighthouse before the rebind")
|
||||
|
||||
myControl.RebindUDPServer()
|
||||
|
||||
assert.True(t, waitForLighthouseMsg(t, r, lhControl, time.Second*5),
|
||||
"a rebind should push an update to the lighthouse rather than waiting out the interval")
|
||||
|
||||
lhControl.Stop()
|
||||
myControl.Stop()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The other half of a rebind: every live tunnel requeries the lighthouse on its next send. That query is what makes
|
||||
// the lighthouse tell the peer to punch toward our new address, which is the part that actually revives a tunnel
|
||||
// whose remote NAT state died while we were on a different network.
|
||||
func TestRebindRequeriesPeersOnNextSend(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
|
||||
|
||||
lhControl, lhVpnIpNet, lhUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "lh", "10.128.0.1/24", m{
|
||||
"lighthouse": m{"am_lighthouse": true},
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
lhCfg := m{
|
||||
"lighthouse": m{
|
||||
"hosts": []any{lhVpnIpNet[0].Addr().String()},
|
||||
"interval": 600,
|
||||
// Without this the peers advertise this machine's real addresses and then try to punch at them,
|
||||
// which the router has no route for.
|
||||
"local_allow_list": m{
|
||||
"10.0.0.0/24": true,
|
||||
"::/0": false,
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
"static_host_map": m{
|
||||
lhVpnIpNet[0].Addr().String(): []any{lhUdpAddr.String()},
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "me", "10.128.0.2/24", lhCfg)
|
||||
theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "them", "10.128.0.3/24", lhCfg)
|
||||
|
||||
r := router.NewR(t, lhControl, myControl, theirControl)
|
||||
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
||||
|
||||
lhControl.Start()
|
||||
myControl.Start()
|
||||
theirControl.Start()
|
||||
r.RouteFor(time.Millisecond * 500)
|
||||
|
||||
// Point the peers at each other directly, this test is about the rebind and not about lighthouse discovery
|
||||
myControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirUdpAddr)
|
||||
theirControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myUdpAddr)
|
||||
|
||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("initial")))
|
||||
r.RouteFor(time.Second)
|
||||
require.NotNil(t, myControl.GetHostInfoByVpnAddr(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), false), "expected a tunnel to them")
|
||||
r.RouteFor(time.Millisecond * 300)
|
||||
|
||||
// Assert on what the peer sees rather than on lighthouse traffic. A query for them makes the lighthouse send
|
||||
// them a punch notification, which is the whole point. Our own update to the lighthouse sends them nothing,
|
||||
// so this cannot be satisfied by the update the rebind itself pushes.
|
||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("quiet")))
|
||||
require.False(t, waitForLighthouseMsg(t, r, theirControl, time.Millisecond*300),
|
||||
"an ordinary send should not requery the lighthouse")
|
||||
|
||||
myControl.RebindUDPServer()
|
||||
r.RouteFor(time.Millisecond * 300) // let the update the rebind itself sends pass by
|
||||
|
||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("after rebind")))
|
||||
assert.True(t, waitForLighthouseMsg(t, r, theirControl, time.Second*5),
|
||||
"the first send after a rebind should requery the lighthouse, which then tells the peer to punch at us")
|
||||
|
||||
lhControl.Stop()
|
||||
myControl.Stop()
|
||||
theirControl.Stop()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The scenario this whole thing exists for: a laptop sleeps at the office and wakes up at home on a new address.
|
||||
// Until it tells the lighthouse, the lighthouse keeps handing peers the office address, so their punches land
|
||||
// nowhere and the tunnel stays dead. On a long interval the rebind is the only thing that closes that window.
|
||||
func TestRebindAdvertisesNewAddressAfterMove(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
|
||||
|
||||
lhControl, lhVpnIpNet, lhUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "lh", "10.128.0.1/24", m{
|
||||
"lighthouse": m{"am_lighthouse": true},
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "me", "10.128.0.2/24", m{
|
||||
"lighthouse": m{
|
||||
"hosts": []any{lhVpnIpNet[0].Addr().String()},
|
||||
"interval": 600,
|
||||
},
|
||||
"static_host_map": m{
|
||||
lhVpnIpNet[0].Addr().String(): []any{lhUdpAddr.String()},
|
||||
},
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
// Advertise wherever we currently are rather than this machine's real NICs, read fresh each time so a move
|
||||
// is picked up.
|
||||
myControl.SetLocalAddrsFn(func(*nebula.LocalAllowList) []netip.Addr {
|
||||
return []netip.Addr{myControl.GetUDPAddr().Addr()}
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
r := router.NewR(t, lhControl, myControl)
|
||||
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
||||
|
||||
lhControl.Start()
|
||||
myControl.Start()
|
||||
|
||||
require.True(t, waitForLighthouseMsg(t, r, lhControl, time.Second*5), "expected an initial registration")
|
||||
r.RouteFor(time.Millisecond * 400)
|
||||
|
||||
require.Contains(t, reportedAddrs(t, lhControl, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr()), myUdpAddr,
|
||||
"the lighthouse should know the address we started on")
|
||||
|
||||
// Wake up somewhere else
|
||||
newAddr := netip.MustParseAddrPort("10.0.0.99:4242")
|
||||
myControl.SetUDPAddr(newAddr)
|
||||
r.AddRoute(newAddr.Addr(), newAddr.Port(), myControl)
|
||||
|
||||
// Nothing has told the lighthouse, and with interval 600 nothing scheduled will
|
||||
r.RouteFor(time.Millisecond * 400)
|
||||
require.NotContains(t, reportedAddrs(t, lhControl, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr()), newAddr,
|
||||
"the lighthouse should still be handing out the old address before the rebind")
|
||||
|
||||
myControl.RebindUDPServer()
|
||||
require.True(t, waitForLighthouseMsg(t, r, lhControl, time.Second*5), "expected an update after the rebind")
|
||||
r.RouteFor(time.Millisecond * 400)
|
||||
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, reportedAddrs(t, lhControl, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr()), newAddr,
|
||||
"after the rebind the lighthouse should hand peers our new address")
|
||||
|
||||
lhControl.Stop()
|
||||
myControl.Stop()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A relayed send records traffic but must not consume the rebind epoch. If it does, the next direct send to the
|
||||
// relay host sees the epoch already current and never requeries, so the far side is never told to punch at our
|
||||
// new address. This pins the SendVia call site, which the unit tests cannot reach.
|
||||
func TestRebindRequeriesAfterRelayedSend(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
|
||||
|
||||
// No lighthouse on purpose: it would hand out a direct address for them and nothing would relay.
|
||||
// Long connection manager timers so it never fires a direct test packet at the relay tunnel and bumps its
|
||||
// epoch mid-test, which is the only other thing that touches that tunnel and would flake the assertion below.
|
||||
myControl, myVpnIpNet, _, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "me", "10.128.0.1/24",
|
||||
m{"relay": m{"use_relays": true}, "timers": m{"connection_alive_interval": 3600, "pending_deletion_interval": 3600}})
|
||||
relayControl, relayVpnIpNet, relayUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "relay", "10.128.0.128/24", m{"relay": m{"am_relay": true}})
|
||||
theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "them", "10.128.0.2/24", m{"relay": m{"use_relays": true}})
|
||||
|
||||
myControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(relayVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), relayUdpAddr)
|
||||
myControl.InjectRelays(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), []netip.Addr{relayVpnIpNet[0].Addr()})
|
||||
relayControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirUdpAddr)
|
||||
|
||||
r := router.NewR(t, myControl, relayControl, theirControl)
|
||||
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
||||
|
||||
myControl.Start()
|
||||
relayControl.Start()
|
||||
theirControl.Start()
|
||||
|
||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("establish")))
|
||||
r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
|
||||
r.RouteFor(time.Millisecond * 500)
|
||||
|
||||
hi := myControl.GetHostInfoByVpnAddr(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), false)
|
||||
require.NotNil(t, hi, "expected a tunnel to them")
|
||||
require.NotEmpty(t, hi.CurrentRelaysToMe, "them must be reachable only via the relay for this test to mean anything")
|
||||
// sendNoMetrics only reaches SendVia when there is no direct remote, so pin that too. Without this the test
|
||||
// keeps passing while quietly sending direct and never exercising the relay path.
|
||||
require.False(t, hi.CurrentRemote.IsValid(), "them must have no direct remote, otherwise SendVia is never called")
|
||||
|
||||
before, ok := myControl.GetRebindEpochFor(relayVpnIpNet[0].Addr())
|
||||
require.True(t, ok, "expected a tunnel to the relay")
|
||||
|
||||
myControl.RebindUDPServer()
|
||||
|
||||
// Traffic to them goes through SendVia on the relay tunnel. That must record traffic without consuming the
|
||||
// relay tunnel's own epoch edge, which belongs to the direct path.
|
||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("relayed")))
|
||||
r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
|
||||
|
||||
after, ok := myControl.GetRebindEpochFor(relayVpnIpNet[0].Addr())
|
||||
require.True(t, ok)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, before, after,
|
||||
"a relayed send consumed the relay tunnel's rebind epoch, so the next direct send will not requery")
|
||||
|
||||
myControl.Stop()
|
||||
relayControl.Stop()
|
||||
theirControl.Stop()
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
|
||||
//go:build e2e_testing
|
||||
|
||||
package e2e
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/e2e/router"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// TestRecoveryTiming measures how long a tunnel takes to come back after the peer stops accepting our traffic,
|
||||
// which is what a laptop waking on a new network looks like from the peer's side: its NAT has no state for where
|
||||
// we are now, so everything we send disappears.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// It is a measurement, not a pass/fail assertion. Recovery is timed to the moment the peer punches back at us,
|
||||
// since that is when its NAT opens and the tunnel is usable again.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// go test -tags e2e_testing -v -run TestRecoveryTiming ./e2e/
|
||||
func TestRecoveryTiming(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
for _, tc := range []struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
rebind bool
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{"no trigger", false},
|
||||
{"rebind counter", true},
|
||||
} {
|
||||
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
d, lost := measureRecovery(t, tc.rebind)
|
||||
t.Logf("RESULT %-16s recovered in %-9v (%d packets lost)", tc.name, d.Round(time.Millisecond), lost)
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// measureRecovery returns how long until the peer punched back, and how many of our packets died meanwhile. When
|
||||
// rebind is true we call RebindUDPServer once the tunnel goes dark, which is what the darwin network change
|
||||
// monitor does and what iOS has always done. When false, nothing tells nebula anything is wrong.
|
||||
func measureRecovery(t *testing.T, rebind bool) (time.Duration, int) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
|
||||
|
||||
lhControl, lhVpnIpNet, lhUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "lh", "10.128.0.1/24", m{
|
||||
"lighthouse": m{"am_lighthouse": true},
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
peerCfg := m{
|
||||
"lighthouse": m{
|
||||
"hosts": []any{lhVpnIpNet[0].Addr().String()},
|
||||
"interval": 600,
|
||||
"local_allow_list": m{
|
||||
"10.0.0.0/24": true,
|
||||
"::/0": false,
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
"static_host_map": m{
|
||||
lhVpnIpNet[0].Addr().String(): []any{lhUdpAddr.String()},
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "me", "10.128.0.2/24", peerCfg)
|
||||
theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "them", "10.128.0.3/24", peerCfg)
|
||||
|
||||
r := router.NewR(t, lhControl, myControl, theirControl)
|
||||
defer r.RenderFlow()
|
||||
defer func() {
|
||||
lhControl.Stop()
|
||||
myControl.Stop()
|
||||
theirControl.Stop()
|
||||
}()
|
||||
|
||||
lhControl.Start()
|
||||
myControl.Start()
|
||||
theirControl.Start()
|
||||
r.RouteFor(time.Millisecond * 500)
|
||||
|
||||
myControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirUdpAddr)
|
||||
theirControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myUdpAddr)
|
||||
|
||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("establish")))
|
||||
r.RouteFor(time.Second)
|
||||
if myControl.GetHostInfoByVpnAddr(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), false) == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("failed to establish the tunnel we are measuring")
|
||||
}
|
||||
r.RouteFor(time.Millisecond * 500)
|
||||
|
||||
// From here the peer's NAT has no state for us, everything we send it disappears
|
||||
start := time.Now()
|
||||
blackholed := 0
|
||||
var recovered time.Duration
|
||||
|
||||
if rebind {
|
||||
myControl.RebindUDPServer()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Keep the tun busy the way someone retrying a stalled connection would
|
||||
stop := make(chan struct{})
|
||||
defer close(stop)
|
||||
go func() {
|
||||
tick := time.NewTicker(time.Millisecond * 200)
|
||||
defer tick.Stop()
|
||||
for {
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case <-stop:
|
||||
return
|
||||
case <-tick.C:
|
||||
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(
|
||||
theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("retry")))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}()
|
||||
|
||||
r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(time.Second*30, func(p *udp.Packet, c *nebula.Control) router.ExitType {
|
||||
if c == theirControl && p.From == myControl.GetUDPAddr() {
|
||||
blackholed++
|
||||
return router.Drop
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The peer reaching us directly is the moment its NAT opened, whether that is a punch or a handshake
|
||||
if c == myControl && p.From == theirUdpAddr {
|
||||
recovered = time.Since(start)
|
||||
return router.RouteAndExit
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return router.KeepRouting
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
if recovered == 0 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("no recovery within 30s (%d packets blackholed)", blackholed)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return recovered, blackholed
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
|
||||
//go:build e2e_testing
|
||||
// +build e2e_testing
|
||||
|
||||
package router
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+151
-32
@@ -1,16 +1,17 @@
|
||||
//go:build e2e_testing
|
||||
// +build e2e_testing
|
||||
|
||||
package router
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"maps"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"path/filepath"
|
||||
"reflect"
|
||||
"regexp"
|
||||
"slices"
|
||||
"sort"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"sync/atomic"
|
||||
@@ -22,7 +23,6 @@ import (
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
|
||||
"golang.org/x/exp/maps"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// outNatKey is the (from, to) pair used by outNat. Comparable struct, so it works as a map key without the
|
||||
@@ -114,6 +114,28 @@ type packet struct {
|
||||
packet *udp.Packet
|
||||
tun bool // a packet pulled off a tun device
|
||||
rx bool // the packet was received by a udp device
|
||||
|
||||
// h is the nebula header, parsed once when the packet is recorded. parseErr says why there isn't one, which
|
||||
// the flow log reports rather than hiding. Punchy sends a single byte, so an unparseable packet is normal.
|
||||
h header.H
|
||||
parseErr error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// fromAddr and toAddr are the addresses this packet actually travelled between. Reading them off the control
|
||||
// instead would misreport the whole history once a test moves a node. Tun packets are synthesized without
|
||||
// addresses, so they fall back to the control.
|
||||
func (p *packet) fromAddr() netip.AddrPort {
|
||||
if p.tun || !p.packet.From.IsValid() {
|
||||
return p.from.GetUDPAddr()
|
||||
}
|
||||
return p.packet.From
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (p *packet) toAddr() netip.AddrPort {
|
||||
if p.tun || !p.packet.To.IsValid() {
|
||||
return p.to.GetUDPAddr()
|
||||
}
|
||||
return p.packet.To
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (p *packet) WasReceived() {
|
||||
@@ -131,6 +153,9 @@ const (
|
||||
ExitNow ExitType = 1
|
||||
// RouteAndExit routes this packet and exits immediately afterwards
|
||||
RouteAndExit ExitType = 2
|
||||
// Drop discards this packet without delivering it and keeps routing. Use it to simulate a blackhole, such as
|
||||
// a restrictive NAT refusing traffic from an address it has not seen.
|
||||
Drop ExitType = 3
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
type ExitFunc func(packet *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) ExitType
|
||||
@@ -141,7 +166,9 @@ type ExitFunc func(packet *udp.Packet, receiver *nebula.Control) ExitType
|
||||
func NewR(t testing.TB, controls ...*nebula.Control) *R {
|
||||
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
|
||||
|
||||
if err := os.MkdirAll("mermaid", 0755); err != nil {
|
||||
// t.Name() contains a slash for subtests, so the flow log can land in a nested directory
|
||||
fn := filepath.Join("mermaid", fmt.Sprintf("%s.md", t.Name()))
|
||||
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(fn), 0755); err != nil {
|
||||
panic(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -152,7 +179,7 @@ func NewR(t testing.TB, controls ...*nebula.Control) *R {
|
||||
outNat: make(map[outNatKey]netip.AddrPort),
|
||||
flow: []flowEntry{},
|
||||
ignoreFlows: []ignoreFlow{},
|
||||
fn: filepath.Join("mermaid", fmt.Sprintf("%s.md", t.Name())),
|
||||
fn: fn,
|
||||
t: t,
|
||||
cancelRender: cancel,
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -249,7 +276,7 @@ func (r *R) renderFlow() {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
addr := e.packet.from.GetUDPAddr()
|
||||
addr := e.packet.fromAddr()
|
||||
if _, ok := participants[addr]; ok {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -268,7 +295,6 @@ func (r *R) renderFlow() {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Print packets
|
||||
h := &header.H{}
|
||||
for _, e := range r.flow {
|
||||
if e.packet == nil {
|
||||
//fmt.Fprintf(f, " note over %s: %s\n", strings.Join(participantsVals, ", "), e.note)
|
||||
@@ -280,21 +306,22 @@ func (r *R) renderFlow() {
|
||||
fmt.Fprintln(f, r.formatUdpPacket(p))
|
||||
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if err := h.Parse(p.packet.Data); err != nil {
|
||||
panic(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
line := "--x"
|
||||
if p.rx {
|
||||
line = "->>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(f,
|
||||
" %s%s%s: %s(%s), index %v, counter: %v\n",
|
||||
normalizeName(p.from.GetUDPAddr().String()),
|
||||
detail := fmt.Sprintf("%s(%s), index %v, counter: %v",
|
||||
p.h.TypeName(), p.h.SubTypeName(), p.h.RemoteIndex, p.h.MessageCounter)
|
||||
if p.parseErr != nil {
|
||||
detail = fmt.Sprintf("unparsed, %v (%d bytes)", p.parseErr, len(p.packet.Data))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(f, " %s%s%s: %s\n",
|
||||
normalizeName(p.fromAddr().String()),
|
||||
line,
|
||||
normalizeName(p.to.GetUDPAddr().String()),
|
||||
h.TypeName(), h.SubTypeName(), h.RemoteIndex, h.MessageCounter,
|
||||
normalizeName(p.toAddr().String()),
|
||||
detail,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -347,7 +374,7 @@ func (r *R) RenderHostmaps(title string, controls ...*nebula.Control) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *R) renderHostmaps(title string) {
|
||||
c := maps.Values(r.controls)
|
||||
c := slices.AppendSeq(make([]*nebula.Control, 0, len(r.controls)), maps.Values(r.controls))
|
||||
sort.SliceStable(c, func(i, j int) bool {
|
||||
return c[i].GetVpnAddrs()[0].Compare(c[j].GetVpnAddrs()[0]) > 0
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -408,29 +435,34 @@ func (r *R) unlockedInjectFlow(from, to *nebula.Control, p *udp.Packet, tun bool
|
||||
|
||||
r.renderHostmaps(fmt.Sprintf("Packet %v", len(r.flow)))
|
||||
|
||||
if len(r.ignoreFlows) > 0 {
|
||||
var h header.H
|
||||
err := h.Parse(p.Data)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
panic(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
var h header.H
|
||||
var parseErr error
|
||||
if !tun {
|
||||
parseErr = h.Parse(p.Data)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, i := range r.ignoreFlows {
|
||||
if !tun {
|
||||
if i.messageType == h.Type && i.subType == h.Subtype {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else if i.tun.HasValue && i.tun.IsTrue {
|
||||
// Decide before copying, the copy comes from a freelist and an ignored packet would never be released
|
||||
for _, i := range r.ignoreFlows {
|
||||
if tun {
|
||||
if i.tun.HasValue && i.tun.IsTrue {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A packet we could not parse has no type to match against, so no rule can ignore it
|
||||
if parseErr == nil && i.messageType == h.Type && i.subType == h.Subtype {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fp := &packet{
|
||||
from: from,
|
||||
to: to,
|
||||
packet: p.Copy(),
|
||||
tun: tun,
|
||||
from: from,
|
||||
to: to,
|
||||
packet: p.Copy(),
|
||||
tun: tun,
|
||||
h: h,
|
||||
parseErr: parseErr,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
r.flow = append(r.flow, flowEntry{packet: fp})
|
||||
@@ -660,6 +692,10 @@ func (r *R) RouteExitFunc(sender *nebula.Control, whatDo ExitFunc) {
|
||||
p.Release()
|
||||
return
|
||||
|
||||
case Drop:
|
||||
// Record it so the flow log shows the attempt, but never hand it to the receiver
|
||||
r.unlockedInjectFlow(sender, receiver, p, false)
|
||||
|
||||
case KeepRouting:
|
||||
fp := r.unlockedInjectFlow(sender, receiver, p, false)
|
||||
receiver.InjectUDPPacket(p)
|
||||
@@ -690,6 +726,85 @@ func (r *R) RouteUntilAfterMsgType(sender *nebula.Control, msgType header.Messag
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RouteFor routes everything that shows up for the given duration and then returns. Use it to let a test settle
|
||||
// deterministically rather than sleeping and hoping: a single FlushAll races a completing handshake, which queues
|
||||
// more packets right behind it.
|
||||
func (r *R) RouteFor(d time.Duration) {
|
||||
r.RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(d, func(*udp.Packet, *nebula.Control) ExitType {
|
||||
return KeepRouting
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout is RouteForAllExitFunc with a deadline, reporting whether whatDo asked to exit
|
||||
// before time ran out. The unbounded version blocks forever on a quiet network, so this is what a test needs to
|
||||
// assert that something does NOT happen, or to route for a fixed settling period.
|
||||
func (r *R) RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout(timeout time.Duration, whatDo ExitFunc) bool {
|
||||
sc := make([]reflect.SelectCase, 0, len(r.controls)+1)
|
||||
cm := make([]*nebula.Control, 0, len(r.controls))
|
||||
|
||||
for _, c := range r.controls {
|
||||
sc = append(sc, reflect.SelectCase{
|
||||
Dir: reflect.SelectRecv,
|
||||
Chan: reflect.ValueOf(c.GetUDPTxChan()),
|
||||
Send: reflect.Value{},
|
||||
})
|
||||
cm = append(cm, c)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
timer := time.NewTimer(timeout)
|
||||
defer timer.Stop()
|
||||
sc = append(sc, reflect.SelectCase{
|
||||
Dir: reflect.SelectRecv,
|
||||
Chan: reflect.ValueOf(timer.C),
|
||||
Send: reflect.Value{},
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
for {
|
||||
x, rx, _ := reflect.Select(sc)
|
||||
if x == len(cm) {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
r.Lock()
|
||||
p := rx.Interface().(*udp.Packet)
|
||||
receiver := r.getControl(cm[x].GetUDPAddr(), p.To, p)
|
||||
if receiver == nil {
|
||||
r.Unlock()
|
||||
panic("Can't RouteForAllExitFuncOrTimeout for host: " + p.To.String())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
e := whatDo(p, receiver)
|
||||
switch e {
|
||||
case ExitNow:
|
||||
r.Unlock()
|
||||
p.Release()
|
||||
return true
|
||||
|
||||
case RouteAndExit:
|
||||
fp := r.unlockedInjectFlow(cm[x], receiver, p, false)
|
||||
receiver.InjectUDPPacket(p)
|
||||
fp.WasReceived()
|
||||
r.Unlock()
|
||||
p.Release()
|
||||
return true
|
||||
|
||||
case Drop:
|
||||
// Record it so the flow log shows the attempt, but never hand it to the receiver
|
||||
r.unlockedInjectFlow(cm[x], receiver, p, false)
|
||||
|
||||
case KeepRouting:
|
||||
fp := r.unlockedInjectFlow(cm[x], receiver, p, false)
|
||||
receiver.InjectUDPPacket(p)
|
||||
fp.WasReceived()
|
||||
|
||||
default:
|
||||
panic(fmt.Sprintf("Unknown exitFunc return: %v", e))
|
||||
}
|
||||
r.Unlock()
|
||||
p.Release()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (r *R) RouteForAllUntilAfterMsgTypeTo(receiver *nebula.Control, msgType header.MessageType, subType header.MessageSubType) {
|
||||
h := &header.H{}
|
||||
r.RouteForAllExitFunc(func(p *udp.Packet, r *nebula.Control) ExitType {
|
||||
@@ -782,6 +897,10 @@ func (r *R) RouteForAllExitFunc(whatDo ExitFunc) {
|
||||
p.Release()
|
||||
return
|
||||
|
||||
case Drop:
|
||||
// Record it so the flow log shows the attempt, but never hand it to the receiver
|
||||
r.unlockedInjectFlow(cm[x], receiver, p, false)
|
||||
|
||||
case KeepRouting:
|
||||
fp := r.unlockedInjectFlow(cm[x], receiver, p, false)
|
||||
receiver.InjectUDPPacket(p)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
|
||||
//go:build e2e_testing
|
||||
// +build e2e_testing
|
||||
|
||||
package e2e
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+6
-7
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
|
||||
//go:build e2e_testing
|
||||
// +build e2e_testing
|
||||
|
||||
package e2e
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -43,8 +42,8 @@ func TestDropInactiveTunnels(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
r.Log("Go inactive and wait for the tunnels to get dropped")
|
||||
waitStart := time.Now()
|
||||
for {
|
||||
myIndexes := len(myControl.GetHostmap().Indexes)
|
||||
theirIndexes := len(theirControl.GetHostmap().Indexes)
|
||||
myIndexes := myControl.GetHostmapIndexCount()
|
||||
theirIndexes := theirControl.GetHostmapIndexCount()
|
||||
if myIndexes == 0 && theirIndexes == 0 {
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -493,8 +492,8 @@ func TestCloseTunnelAuthenticated(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
|
||||
waitStart := time.Now()
|
||||
for {
|
||||
myIndexes := len(myControl.GetHostmap().Indexes)
|
||||
theirIndexes := len(theirControl.GetHostmap().Indexes)
|
||||
myIndexes := myControl.GetHostmapIndexCount()
|
||||
theirIndexes := theirControl.GetHostmapIndexCount()
|
||||
if myIndexes == 0 && theirIndexes == 0 {
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -548,8 +547,8 @@ func TestCloseTunnelAuthenticated(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
r.Log("Injected bogus close tunnel. Let's see!")
|
||||
waitStart = time.Now()
|
||||
for {
|
||||
myIndexes := len(myControl.GetHostmap().Indexes)
|
||||
theirIndexes := len(theirControl.GetHostmap().Indexes)
|
||||
myIndexes := myControl.GetHostmapIndexCount()
|
||||
theirIndexes := theirControl.GetHostmapIndexCount()
|
||||
if myIndexes == 0 {
|
||||
t.Fatal("myIndexes should not be 0")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+66
-7
@@ -131,13 +131,16 @@ listen:
|
||||
port: 4242
|
||||
# Sets the max number of packets to pull from the kernel for each syscall (under systems that support recvmmsg)
|
||||
# default is 64, does not support reload
|
||||
# Note: on Linux with UDP GRO (kernel 5.10+), each receive slot is sized for a full 64KiB coalesced
|
||||
# superpacket, so the receive scratch is batch * 64KiB per listening socket (~4MiB per routine at the
|
||||
# default of 64). Lower this to trade peak per-syscall throughput for memory on constrained hosts.
|
||||
#batch: 64
|
||||
# Configure socket buffers for the udp side (outside), leave unset to use the system defaults. Values will be doubled by the kernel
|
||||
# Linux only. Configure socket buffers for the udp side (outside), leave unset to use the system defaults. Values will be doubled by the kernel
|
||||
# Default is net.core.rmem_default and net.core.wmem_default (/proc/sys/net/core/rmem_default and /proc/sys/net/core/rmem_default)
|
||||
# Maximum is limited by memory in the system, SO_RCVBUFFORCE and SO_SNDBUFFORCE is used to avoid having to raise the system wide
|
||||
# max, net.core.rmem_max and net.core.wmem_max
|
||||
#read_buffer: 10485760
|
||||
#write_buffer: 10485760
|
||||
read_buffer: 3412512
|
||||
write_buffer: 3412512
|
||||
|
||||
# On Windows only
|
||||
# When true, Nebula installs a WFP (Windows Filtering Platform) PERMIT filter scoped to UDP at the listener port.
|
||||
@@ -146,6 +149,14 @@ listen:
|
||||
# Default true; set to false to leave WDF in charge of inbound decisions on the listener port. Not reloadable.
|
||||
#windows_bypass_wdf: true
|
||||
|
||||
# On macOS only
|
||||
# macOS scopes the udp socket to the interface it was created on, so moving between networks (wifi to wired,
|
||||
# office to home) leaves Nebula sending out an interface that no longer has a route. When true, Nebula watches
|
||||
# the routing socket and rebinds the listener once the change settles.
|
||||
# iOS does not use this, the host app drives the same rebind itself.
|
||||
# Default true. Not reloadable.
|
||||
#rebind_on_network_change: true
|
||||
|
||||
# By default, Nebula replies to packets it has no tunnel for with a "recv_error" packet. This packet helps speed up reconnection
|
||||
# in the case that Nebula on either side did not shut down cleanly. This response can be abused as a way to discover if Nebula is running
|
||||
# on a host though. This option lets you configure if you want to send "recv_error" packets always, never, or only to private network remotes.
|
||||
@@ -161,6 +172,8 @@ listen:
|
||||
# allowing for more precise routing decisions based on the packet tags. Default is 0 meaning no mark is set.
|
||||
# This setting is reloadable.
|
||||
#so_mark: 0
|
||||
# the udp_offloads setting controls if Nebula will attempt to enable GSO and GRO for its UDP socket(s). Linux only, not reloadable.
|
||||
# udp_offloads: false
|
||||
|
||||
# Routines is the number of thread pairs to run that consume from the tun and UDP queues.
|
||||
# Currently, this defaults to 1 which means we have 1 tun queue reader and 1
|
||||
@@ -249,11 +262,39 @@ tun:
|
||||
drop_local_broadcast: false
|
||||
# Toggles forwarding of multicast packets
|
||||
drop_multicast: false
|
||||
# Sets the transmit queue length, if you notice lots of transmit drops on the tun it may help to raise this number. Default is 500
|
||||
tx_queue: 500
|
||||
# Sets the transmit queue length, if you notice lots of transmit drops on the tun it may help to raise this number. Default is 5000
|
||||
tx_queue: 5000
|
||||
# Default MTU for every packet, safe setting is (and the default) 1300 for internet based traffic
|
||||
# Anything above 8937, here or on a route below, is capped to 8937 with a warning
|
||||
mtu: 1300
|
||||
|
||||
# the use_offloads setting controls if Nebula will attempt to enable GSO and GRO for the tun device. Linux only, not reloadable.
|
||||
#use_offloads: false
|
||||
|
||||
# Linux only. pin_threads pins each tun reader/encrypt OS thread to a single CPU. This keeps every goroutine's
|
||||
# batched sends flowing through one XPS-selected NIC TX ring, so packets within a flow stay ordered on the wire
|
||||
# instead of being sprayed across multiple TX rings and reordered. Not reloadable. Coerced to false if routines <= 1.
|
||||
#pin_threads: true
|
||||
|
||||
# pin_threads_key helps the CPU-auto-selector shuffle which CPUs are chosen for pinning.
|
||||
# Valid options are "pid" or "port". Use "port" if you want Nebula to choose the same cores every time, which is nice for benchmarking.
|
||||
# Linux only, not reloadable.
|
||||
#pin_threads_key: "pid"
|
||||
|
||||
# Linux only. cpu_affinity overrides which CPUs the tun reader threads pin to: a list of CPU IDs, one per routine
|
||||
# (see the top-level `routines` setting). Lists shorter than `routines` are modulo-cycled across the queues; extra
|
||||
# entries are ignored. IDs must be within the process's allowed CPU set, so this respects taskset / cgroup cpusets;
|
||||
# a non-integer or not-allowed entry disables the override, leaving the default pin selection described below.
|
||||
# Only meaningful while pin_threads is true. Not reloadable.
|
||||
# When unset (or rejected), the default spread prefers performance cores on heterogeneous CPUs (ARM big.LITTLE,
|
||||
# Intel P/E hybrids, AMD compact cores), keeps all readers on one NUMA node and on distinct physical cores when the
|
||||
# topology allows (SMT siblings last), leaves CPU 0's physical core as a last resort, and rotates its starting
|
||||
# point per instance (keyed by the bound UDP port) so co-located nebulas don't stack their readers onto the
|
||||
# same cores.
|
||||
#cpu_affinity:
|
||||
# - 2
|
||||
# - 4
|
||||
|
||||
# Route based MTU overrides, you have known vpn ip paths that can support larger MTUs you can increase/decrease them here
|
||||
routes:
|
||||
#- mtu: 8800
|
||||
@@ -370,13 +411,31 @@ logging:
|
||||
#try_interval: 100ms
|
||||
#retries: 20
|
||||
|
||||
# query_buffer is the size of the buffer channel for querying lighthouses
|
||||
#query_buffer: 64
|
||||
# query_buffer is the size of the buffer channel for querying lighthouses, drops are recorded in the lighthouse.query.dropped metric.
|
||||
#query_buffer: 1024
|
||||
|
||||
# trigger_buffer is the size of the buffer channel for quickly sending handshakes
|
||||
# after receiving the response for lighthouse queries
|
||||
#trigger_buffer: 64
|
||||
|
||||
# pq enables handshakes that mix an ephemeral ML-KEM-1024 key exchange into the session keys, protecting
|
||||
# recorded traffic against a future quantum computer. Authentication is unchanged. These handshakes are too
|
||||
# large for one packet and travel as fragments with forward error correction.
|
||||
#pq:
|
||||
# initiate starts post-quantum handshakes. Attempts alternate between post-quantum and classical until one is
|
||||
# answered, so peers that do not support them still connect.
|
||||
#initiate: false
|
||||
# accept answers post-quantum handshakes from peers.
|
||||
#accept: false
|
||||
# require makes every handshake post-quantum: it implies initiate and accept, never offers a classical handshake
|
||||
# and refuses classical handshakes from peers. Only enable it once every host can speak post-quantum handshakes.
|
||||
#require: false
|
||||
# sticky never falls back to a classical handshake with a peer that has completed a post-quantum one since
|
||||
# nebula started, which defeats an attacker who drops post-quantum handshakes to force a downgrade.
|
||||
#sticky: false
|
||||
# repair_delay is how long the forward error correction fragments trail the rest of a handshake message.
|
||||
#repair_delay: 10ms
|
||||
|
||||
# Tunnel manager settings
|
||||
#tunnels:
|
||||
# drop_inactive controls whether inactive tunnels are maintained or dropped after the inactive_timeout period has
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -8,6 +8,15 @@ Before=sshd.service
|
||||
Type=notify
|
||||
NotifyAccess=main
|
||||
SyslogIdentifier=nebula
|
||||
|
||||
# Uncomment to run as an unprivileged user with only CAP_NET_ADMIN. Requires a
|
||||
# nebula user that owns the config directory. Add CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE to both
|
||||
# lines if any listener (lighthouse DNS, listen.port, stats, sshd) binds <1024.
|
||||
#User=nebula
|
||||
#Group=nebula
|
||||
#CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_NET_ADMIN
|
||||
#AmbientCapabilities=CAP_NET_ADMIN
|
||||
|
||||
ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
|
||||
ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/nebula -config /etc/nebula/config.yml
|
||||
Restart=always
|
||||
|
||||
+28
-27
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/iputil"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
type FirewallInterface interface {
|
||||
@@ -44,8 +45,8 @@ type Firewall struct {
|
||||
InRules *FirewallTable
|
||||
OutRules *FirewallTable
|
||||
|
||||
InSendReject bool
|
||||
OutSendReject bool
|
||||
InboundSendReject bool
|
||||
OutboundSendReject bool
|
||||
|
||||
//TODO: we should have many more options for TCP, an option for ICMP, and mimic the kernel a bit better
|
||||
// https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/networking/nf_conntrack-sysctl.txt
|
||||
@@ -216,23 +217,23 @@ func NewFirewallFromConfig(l *slog.Logger, cs *CertState, c *config.C) (*Firewal
|
||||
inboundAction := c.GetString("firewall.inbound_action", "drop")
|
||||
switch inboundAction {
|
||||
case "reject":
|
||||
fw.InSendReject = true
|
||||
fw.InboundSendReject = true
|
||||
case "drop":
|
||||
fw.InSendReject = false
|
||||
fw.InboundSendReject = false
|
||||
default:
|
||||
l.Warn("invalid firewall.inbound_action, defaulting to `drop`", "action", inboundAction)
|
||||
fw.InSendReject = false
|
||||
fw.InboundSendReject = false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
outboundAction := c.GetString("firewall.outbound_action", "drop")
|
||||
switch outboundAction {
|
||||
case "reject":
|
||||
fw.OutSendReject = true
|
||||
fw.OutboundSendReject = true
|
||||
case "drop":
|
||||
fw.OutSendReject = false
|
||||
fw.OutboundSendReject = false
|
||||
default:
|
||||
l.Warn("invalid firewall.outbound_action, defaulting to `drop`", "action", outboundAction)
|
||||
fw.OutSendReject = false
|
||||
fw.OutboundSendReject = false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
err := AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, c, fw)
|
||||
@@ -262,11 +263,11 @@ func (f *Firewall) AddRule(incoming bool, proto uint8, startPort int32, endPort
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
switch proto {
|
||||
case firewall.ProtoTCP:
|
||||
case iputil.IPProtocolTCP:
|
||||
fp = ft.TCP
|
||||
case firewall.ProtoUDP:
|
||||
case iputil.IPProtocolUDP:
|
||||
fp = ft.UDP
|
||||
case firewall.ProtoICMP, firewall.ProtoICMPv6:
|
||||
case iputil.IPProtocolICMP, iputil.IPProtocolICMPv6:
|
||||
//ICMP traffic doesn't have ports, so we always coerce to "any", even if a value is provided
|
||||
if startPort != firewall.PortAny {
|
||||
f.l.Warn("ignoring port specification for ICMP firewall rule", "startPort", startPort)
|
||||
@@ -364,13 +365,13 @@ func AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l *slog.Logger, inbound bool, c *config.C, fw Fi
|
||||
proto = firewall.ProtoAny
|
||||
startPort, endPort, err = parsePort(sPort)
|
||||
case "tcp":
|
||||
proto = firewall.ProtoTCP
|
||||
proto = iputil.IPProtocolTCP
|
||||
startPort, endPort, err = parsePort(sPort)
|
||||
case "udp":
|
||||
proto = firewall.ProtoUDP
|
||||
proto = iputil.IPProtocolUDP
|
||||
startPort, endPort, err = parsePort(sPort)
|
||||
case "icmp":
|
||||
proto = firewall.ProtoICMP
|
||||
proto = iputil.IPProtocolICMP
|
||||
startPort = firewall.PortAny
|
||||
endPort = firewall.PortAny
|
||||
if sPort != "" {
|
||||
@@ -423,11 +424,6 @@ var ErrNoMatchingRule = errors.New("no matching rule in firewall table")
|
||||
// Drop returns an error if the packet should be dropped, explaining why. It
|
||||
// returns nil if the packet should not be dropped.
|
||||
func (f *Firewall) Drop(fp firewall.Packet, incoming bool, h *HostInfo, caPool *cert.CAPool, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) error {
|
||||
// Check if we spoke to this tuple, if we did then allow this packet
|
||||
if f.inConns(fp, h, caPool, localCache) {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Make sure remote address matches nebula certificate, and determine how to treat it
|
||||
if h.networks == nil {
|
||||
// Simple case: Certificate has one address and no unsafe networks
|
||||
@@ -461,6 +457,11 @@ func (f *Firewall) Drop(fp firewall.Packet, incoming bool, h *HostInfo, caPool *
|
||||
return ErrInvalidLocalIP
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Check if we spoke to this tuple, if we did then allow this packet
|
||||
if f.inConns(fp, h, caPool, localCache) {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
table := f.OutRules
|
||||
if incoming {
|
||||
table = f.InRules
|
||||
@@ -560,9 +561,9 @@ func (f *Firewall) inConns(fp firewall.Packet, h *HostInfo, caPool *cert.CAPool,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
switch fp.Protocol {
|
||||
case firewall.ProtoTCP:
|
||||
case iputil.IPProtocolTCP:
|
||||
c.Expires = time.Now().Add(f.TCPTimeout)
|
||||
case firewall.ProtoUDP:
|
||||
case iputil.IPProtocolUDP:
|
||||
c.Expires = time.Now().Add(f.UDPTimeout)
|
||||
default:
|
||||
c.Expires = time.Now().Add(f.DefaultTimeout)
|
||||
@@ -582,9 +583,9 @@ func (f *Firewall) addConn(fp firewall.Packet, incoming bool) {
|
||||
c := &conn{}
|
||||
|
||||
switch fp.Protocol {
|
||||
case firewall.ProtoTCP:
|
||||
case iputil.IPProtocolTCP:
|
||||
timeout = f.TCPTimeout
|
||||
case firewall.ProtoUDP:
|
||||
case iputil.IPProtocolUDP:
|
||||
timeout = f.UDPTimeout
|
||||
default:
|
||||
timeout = f.DefaultTimeout
|
||||
@@ -635,15 +636,15 @@ func (ft *FirewallTable) match(p firewall.Packet, incoming bool, c *cert.CachedC
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
switch p.Protocol {
|
||||
case firewall.ProtoTCP:
|
||||
case iputil.IPProtocolTCP:
|
||||
if ft.TCP.match(p, incoming, c, caPool) {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
case firewall.ProtoUDP:
|
||||
case iputil.IPProtocolUDP:
|
||||
if ft.UDP.match(p, incoming, c, caPool) {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
case firewall.ProtoICMP, firewall.ProtoICMPv6:
|
||||
case iputil.IPProtocolICMP, iputil.IPProtocolICMPv6:
|
||||
if ft.ICMP.match(p, incoming, c, caPool) {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -680,7 +681,7 @@ func (fp firewallPort) match(p firewall.Packet, incoming bool, c *cert.CachedCer
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// this branch is here to catch traffic from FirewallTable.Any.match and FirewallTable.ICMP.match
|
||||
if p.Protocol == firewall.ProtoICMP || p.Protocol == firewall.ProtoICMPv6 {
|
||||
if p.Protocol == iputil.IPProtocolICMP || p.Protocol == iputil.IPProtocolICMPv6 {
|
||||
// port numbers are re-used for connection tracking of ICMP,
|
||||
// but we don't want to actually filter on them.
|
||||
return fp[firewall.PortAny].match(p, c, caPool)
|
||||
|
||||
+4
-2
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ import (
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"sync/atomic"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/logging"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// ConntrackCache is used as a local routine cache to know if a given flow
|
||||
@@ -56,8 +58,8 @@ func (c *ConntrackCacheTicker) Get() ConntrackCache {
|
||||
if tick := c.cacheTick.Load(); tick != c.cacheV {
|
||||
c.cacheV = tick
|
||||
if ll := len(c.cache); ll > 0 {
|
||||
if c.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
|
||||
c.l.Debug("resetting conntrack cache", "len", ll)
|
||||
if c.l.Enabled(context.Background(), logging.LevelTrace) {
|
||||
c.l.Log(context.Background(), logging.LevelTrace, "resetting conntrack cache", "len", ll)
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.cache = make(ConntrackCache, ll)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/logging"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -21,7 +22,7 @@ func newFixedTicker(t *testing.T, l *slog.Logger, cacheLen int) *ConntrackCacheT
|
||||
l: l,
|
||||
cache: make(ConntrackCache, cacheLen),
|
||||
}
|
||||
for i := 0; i < cacheLen; i++ {
|
||||
for i := range cacheLen {
|
||||
c.cache[Packet{LocalPort: uint16(i) + 1}] = struct{}{}
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.cacheTick.Store(1) // cacheV starts at 0, so Get() takes the reset path
|
||||
@@ -30,27 +31,27 @@ func newFixedTicker(t *testing.T, l *slog.Logger, cacheLen int) *ConntrackCacheT
|
||||
|
||||
func TestConntrackCacheTicker_Get_TextFormat(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
|
||||
l := test.NewLoggerWithOutputAndLevel(buf, slog.LevelDebug)
|
||||
l := test.NewLoggerWithOutputAndLevel(buf, logging.LevelTrace)
|
||||
|
||||
c := newFixedTicker(t, l, 3)
|
||||
c.Get()
|
||||
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, "level=DEBUG msg=\"resetting conntrack cache\" len=3\n", buf.String())
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, "level=DEBUG-4 msg=\"resetting conntrack cache\" len=3\n", buf.String())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestConntrackCacheTicker_Get_JSONFormat(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
|
||||
l := test.NewJSONLoggerWithOutput(buf, slog.LevelDebug)
|
||||
l := test.NewJSONLoggerWithOutput(buf, logging.LevelTrace)
|
||||
|
||||
c := newFixedTicker(t, l, 2)
|
||||
c.Get()
|
||||
|
||||
assert.JSONEq(t, `{"level":"DEBUG","msg":"resetting conntrack cache","len":2}`, strings.TrimSpace(buf.String()))
|
||||
assert.JSONEq(t, `{"level":"DEBUG-4","msg":"resetting conntrack cache","len":2}`, strings.TrimSpace(buf.String()))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestConntrackCacheTicker_Get_QuietBelowDebug(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
func TestConntrackCacheTicker_Get_QuietBelowTrace(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
|
||||
l := test.NewLoggerWithOutputAndLevel(buf, slog.LevelInfo)
|
||||
l := test.NewLoggerWithOutputAndLevel(buf, slog.LevelDebug)
|
||||
|
||||
c := newFixedTicker(t, l, 5)
|
||||
c.Get()
|
||||
@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ func TestConntrackCacheTicker_Get_QuietBelowDebug(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
|
||||
func TestConntrackCacheTicker_Get_QuietWhenCacheEmpty(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
|
||||
l := test.NewLoggerWithOutputAndLevel(buf, slog.LevelDebug)
|
||||
l := test.NewLoggerWithOutputAndLevel(buf, logging.LevelTrace)
|
||||
|
||||
c := newFixedTicker(t, l, 0)
|
||||
c.Get()
|
||||
|
||||
+16
-10
@@ -4,17 +4,14 @@ import (
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/iputil"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
type m = map[string]any
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
ProtoAny = 0 // When we want to handle HOPOPT (0) we can change this, if ever
|
||||
ProtoTCP = 6
|
||||
ProtoUDP = 17
|
||||
ProtoICMP = 1
|
||||
ProtoICMPv6 = 58
|
||||
|
||||
ProtoAny = 0 // When we want to handle HOPOPT (0) we can change this, if ever
|
||||
PortAny = 0 // Special value for matching `port: any`
|
||||
PortFragment = -1 // Special value for matching `port: fragment`
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -45,13 +42,13 @@ func (fp *Packet) Copy() *Packet {
|
||||
func (fp Packet) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
var proto string
|
||||
switch fp.Protocol {
|
||||
case ProtoTCP:
|
||||
case iputil.IPProtocolTCP:
|
||||
proto = "tcp"
|
||||
case ProtoICMP:
|
||||
case iputil.IPProtocolICMP:
|
||||
proto = "icmp"
|
||||
case ProtoICMPv6:
|
||||
case iputil.IPProtocolICMPv6:
|
||||
proto = "icmpv6"
|
||||
case ProtoUDP:
|
||||
case iputil.IPProtocolUDP:
|
||||
proto = "udp"
|
||||
default:
|
||||
proto = fmt.Sprintf("unknown %v", fp.Protocol)
|
||||
@@ -65,3 +62,12 @@ func (fp Packet) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
"Fragment": fp.Fragment,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ParsedPacket is a Packet plus the parse byproducts the RX path reuses
|
||||
type ParsedPacket struct {
|
||||
Packet
|
||||
IPHdrLen int
|
||||
// FragAny reports any fragmentation at all: MF flag or nonzero offset for IPv4, a fragment extension header for IPv6.
|
||||
// Distinct from Packet.Fragment, which is true only for NON-FIRST fragments
|
||||
FragAny bool
|
||||
}
|
||||
+185
-31
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/iputil"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
|
||||
@@ -72,20 +73,20 @@ func TestFirewall_AddRule(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
ti6, err := netip.ParsePrefix("fd12::34/128")
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
|
||||
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoTCP, 1, 1, []string{}, "", "", "", "", ""))
|
||||
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, iputil.IPProtocolTCP, 1, 1, []string{}, "", "", "", "", ""))
|
||||
// An empty rule is any
|
||||
assert.True(t, fw.InRules.TCP[1].Any.Any.Any)
|
||||
assert.Empty(t, fw.InRules.TCP[1].Any.Groups)
|
||||
assert.Empty(t, fw.InRules.TCP[1].Any.Hosts)
|
||||
|
||||
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoUDP, 1, 1, []string{"g1"}, "", "", "", "", ""))
|
||||
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, iputil.IPProtocolUDP, 1, 1, []string{"g1"}, "", "", "", "", ""))
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, fw.InRules.UDP[1].Any.Any)
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, fw.InRules.UDP[1].Any.Groups[0].Groups, "g1")
|
||||
assert.Empty(t, fw.InRules.UDP[1].Any.Hosts)
|
||||
|
||||
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoICMP, 1, 1, []string{}, "h1", "", "", "", ""))
|
||||
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, iputil.IPProtocolICMP, 1, 1, []string{}, "h1", "", "", "", ""))
|
||||
//no matter what port is given for icmp, it should end up as "any"
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, fw.InRules.ICMP[firewall.PortAny].Any.Any)
|
||||
assert.Empty(t, fw.InRules.ICMP[firewall.PortAny].Any.Groups)
|
||||
@@ -116,11 +117,11 @@ func TestFirewall_AddRule(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
assert.True(t, ok)
|
||||
|
||||
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoUDP, 1, 1, []string{"g1"}, "", "", "", "ca-name", ""))
|
||||
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, iputil.IPProtocolUDP, 1, 1, []string{"g1"}, "", "", "", "ca-name", ""))
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, fw.InRules.UDP[1].CANames, "ca-name")
|
||||
|
||||
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoUDP, 1, 1, []string{"g1"}, "", "", "", "", "ca-sha"))
|
||||
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, iputil.IPProtocolUDP, 1, 1, []string{"g1"}, "", "", "", "", "ca-sha"))
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, fw.InRules.UDP[1].CAShas, "ca-sha")
|
||||
|
||||
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c)
|
||||
@@ -185,7 +186,7 @@ func TestFirewall_Drop(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
RemoteAddr: netip.MustParseAddr("1.2.3.4"),
|
||||
LocalPort: 10,
|
||||
RemotePort: 90,
|
||||
Protocol: firewall.ProtoUDP,
|
||||
Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolUDP,
|
||||
Fragment: false,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -263,7 +264,7 @@ func TestFirewall_DropV6(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
RemoteAddr: netip.MustParseAddr("fd12::34"),
|
||||
LocalPort: 10,
|
||||
RemotePort: 90,
|
||||
Protocol: firewall.ProtoUDP,
|
||||
Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolUDP,
|
||||
Fragment: false,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -350,7 +351,7 @@ func BenchmarkFirewallTable_match(b *testing.B) {
|
||||
Certificate: &dummyCert{},
|
||||
}
|
||||
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
|
||||
assert.False(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: firewall.ProtoUDP}, true, c, cp))
|
||||
assert.False(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolUDP}, true, c, cp))
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -360,7 +361,7 @@ func BenchmarkFirewallTable_match(b *testing.B) {
|
||||
Certificate: &dummyCert{},
|
||||
}
|
||||
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
|
||||
assert.False(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: firewall.ProtoTCP, LocalPort: 1}, true, c, cp))
|
||||
assert.False(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolTCP, LocalPort: 1}, true, c, cp))
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -370,7 +371,7 @@ func BenchmarkFirewallTable_match(b *testing.B) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
ip := netip.MustParsePrefix("9.254.254.254/32")
|
||||
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
|
||||
assert.False(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: firewall.ProtoTCP, LocalPort: 100, LocalAddr: ip.Addr()}, true, c, cp))
|
||||
assert.False(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolTCP, LocalPort: 100, LocalAddr: ip.Addr()}, true, c, cp))
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
b.Run("pass proto, port, fail on local CIDRv6", func(b *testing.B) {
|
||||
@@ -379,7 +380,7 @@ func BenchmarkFirewallTable_match(b *testing.B) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
ip := netip.MustParsePrefix("fd99::99/128")
|
||||
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
|
||||
assert.False(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: firewall.ProtoTCP, LocalPort: 100, LocalAddr: ip.Addr()}, true, c, cp))
|
||||
assert.False(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolTCP, LocalPort: 100, LocalAddr: ip.Addr()}, true, c, cp))
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -392,7 +393,7 @@ func BenchmarkFirewallTable_match(b *testing.B) {
|
||||
InvertedGroups: map[string]struct{}{"nope": {}},
|
||||
}
|
||||
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
|
||||
assert.False(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: firewall.ProtoTCP, LocalPort: 10}, true, c, cp))
|
||||
assert.False(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolTCP, LocalPort: 10}, true, c, cp))
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
b.Run("pass proto, port, any local CIDRv6, fail all group, name, and cidr", func(b *testing.B) {
|
||||
@@ -404,7 +405,7 @@ func BenchmarkFirewallTable_match(b *testing.B) {
|
||||
InvertedGroups: map[string]struct{}{"nope": {}},
|
||||
}
|
||||
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
|
||||
assert.False(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: firewall.ProtoTCP, LocalPort: 10}, true, c, cp))
|
||||
assert.False(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolTCP, LocalPort: 10}, true, c, cp))
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -417,7 +418,7 @@ func BenchmarkFirewallTable_match(b *testing.B) {
|
||||
InvertedGroups: map[string]struct{}{"nope": {}},
|
||||
}
|
||||
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
|
||||
assert.False(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: firewall.ProtoTCP, LocalPort: 100, LocalAddr: pfix.Addr()}, true, c, cp))
|
||||
assert.False(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolTCP, LocalPort: 100, LocalAddr: pfix.Addr()}, true, c, cp))
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
b.Run("pass proto, port, specific local CIDRv6, fail all group, name, and cidr", func(b *testing.B) {
|
||||
@@ -429,7 +430,7 @@ func BenchmarkFirewallTable_match(b *testing.B) {
|
||||
InvertedGroups: map[string]struct{}{"nope": {}},
|
||||
}
|
||||
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
|
||||
assert.False(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: firewall.ProtoTCP, LocalPort: 100, LocalAddr: pfix6.Addr()}, true, c, cp))
|
||||
assert.False(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolTCP, LocalPort: 100, LocalAddr: pfix6.Addr()}, true, c, cp))
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -441,7 +442,7 @@ func BenchmarkFirewallTable_match(b *testing.B) {
|
||||
InvertedGroups: map[string]struct{}{"good-group": {}},
|
||||
}
|
||||
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
|
||||
assert.True(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: firewall.ProtoTCP, LocalPort: 10}, true, c, cp))
|
||||
assert.True(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolTCP, LocalPort: 10}, true, c, cp))
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -453,7 +454,7 @@ func BenchmarkFirewallTable_match(b *testing.B) {
|
||||
InvertedGroups: map[string]struct{}{"good-group": {}},
|
||||
}
|
||||
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
|
||||
assert.True(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: firewall.ProtoTCP, LocalPort: 100, LocalAddr: pfix.Addr()}, true, c, cp))
|
||||
assert.True(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolTCP, LocalPort: 100, LocalAddr: pfix.Addr()}, true, c, cp))
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
b.Run("pass on group on specific local cidr6", func(b *testing.B) {
|
||||
@@ -464,7 +465,7 @@ func BenchmarkFirewallTable_match(b *testing.B) {
|
||||
InvertedGroups: map[string]struct{}{"good-group": {}},
|
||||
}
|
||||
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
|
||||
assert.True(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: firewall.ProtoTCP, LocalPort: 100, LocalAddr: pfix6.Addr()}, true, c, cp))
|
||||
assert.True(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolTCP, LocalPort: 100, LocalAddr: pfix6.Addr()}, true, c, cp))
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -476,7 +477,7 @@ func BenchmarkFirewallTable_match(b *testing.B) {
|
||||
InvertedGroups: map[string]struct{}{"nope": {}},
|
||||
}
|
||||
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
|
||||
ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: firewall.ProtoTCP, LocalPort: 10}, true, c, cp)
|
||||
ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolTCP, LocalPort: 10}, true, c, cp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -492,7 +493,7 @@ func TestFirewall_Drop2(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
RemoteAddr: netip.MustParseAddr("1.2.3.4"),
|
||||
LocalPort: 10,
|
||||
RemotePort: 90,
|
||||
Protocol: firewall.ProtoUDP,
|
||||
Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolUDP,
|
||||
Fragment: false,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -550,7 +551,7 @@ func TestFirewall_Drop3(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
RemoteAddr: netip.MustParseAddr("1.2.3.4"),
|
||||
LocalPort: 1,
|
||||
RemotePort: 1,
|
||||
Protocol: firewall.ProtoUDP,
|
||||
Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolUDP,
|
||||
Fragment: false,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -638,7 +639,7 @@ func TestFirewall_Drop3V6(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
RemoteAddr: netip.MustParseAddr("fd12::34"),
|
||||
LocalPort: 1,
|
||||
RemotePort: 1,
|
||||
Protocol: firewall.ProtoUDP,
|
||||
Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolUDP,
|
||||
Fragment: false,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -675,7 +676,7 @@ func TestFirewall_DropConntrackReload(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
RemoteAddr: netip.MustParseAddr("1.2.3.4"),
|
||||
LocalPort: 10,
|
||||
RemotePort: 90,
|
||||
Protocol: firewall.ProtoUDP,
|
||||
Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolUDP,
|
||||
Fragment: false,
|
||||
}
|
||||
network := netip.MustParsePrefix("1.2.3.4/24")
|
||||
@@ -758,13 +759,13 @@ func TestFirewall_ICMPPortBehavior(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
templ := firewall.Packet{
|
||||
LocalAddr: netip.MustParseAddr("1.2.3.4"),
|
||||
RemoteAddr: netip.MustParseAddr("1.2.3.4"),
|
||||
Protocol: firewall.ProtoICMP,
|
||||
Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolICMP,
|
||||
Fragment: false,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("ICMP allowed", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
fw := NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c.Certificate)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoICMP, 0, 0, []string{"any"}, "", "", "", "", ""))
|
||||
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, iputil.IPProtocolICMP, 0, 0, []string{"any"}, "", "", "", "", ""))
|
||||
t.Run("zero ports", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
p := templ.Copy()
|
||||
p.LocalPort = 0
|
||||
@@ -910,12 +911,165 @@ func TestFirewall_DropIPSpoofing(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
RemoteAddr: netip.MustParseAddr("192.0.2.3"),
|
||||
LocalPort: 1,
|
||||
RemotePort: 1,
|
||||
Protocol: firewall.ProtoUDP,
|
||||
Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolUDP,
|
||||
Fragment: false,
|
||||
}
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h1, cp, nil), ErrInvalidRemoteIP)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestFirewall_ConntrackSourceSpoofingAcrossPeers(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
l := test.NewLoggerWithOutput(&bytes.Buffer{})
|
||||
|
||||
myVpnNetworksTable := new(bart.Lite)
|
||||
myVpnNetworksTable.Insert(netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.1/24"))
|
||||
|
||||
owner := &dummyCert{
|
||||
name: "owner",
|
||||
networks: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.1/24")},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
victim := &cert.CachedCertificate{
|
||||
Certificate: &dummyCert{
|
||||
name: "victim",
|
||||
networks: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.2/24")},
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
victimHI := HostInfo{
|
||||
ConnectionState: &ConnectionState{peerCert: victim},
|
||||
vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("192.0.2.2")},
|
||||
}
|
||||
victimHI.buildNetworks(myVpnNetworksTable, victim.Certificate)
|
||||
|
||||
attacker := &cert.CachedCertificate{
|
||||
Certificate: &dummyCert{
|
||||
name: "attacker",
|
||||
networks: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.3/24")},
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
attackerHI := HostInfo{
|
||||
ConnectionState: &ConnectionState{peerCert: attacker},
|
||||
vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("192.0.2.3")},
|
||||
}
|
||||
attackerHI.buildNetworks(myVpnNetworksTable, attacker.Certificate)
|
||||
|
||||
fw := NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, owner)
|
||||
// Allow any inbound traffic that passes the cert / source-IP checks.
|
||||
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"any"}, "", "", "", "", ""))
|
||||
cp := cert.NewCAPool()
|
||||
|
||||
flow := firewall.Packet{
|
||||
LocalAddr: netip.MustParseAddr("192.0.2.1"),
|
||||
RemoteAddr: netip.MustParseAddr("192.0.2.2"),
|
||||
LocalPort: 443,
|
||||
RemotePort: 55000,
|
||||
Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolUDP,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(flow, true, &victimHI, cp, nil),
|
||||
"victim's own traffic from its own overlay IP must be allowed")
|
||||
|
||||
unseen := flow
|
||||
unseen.RemotePort = 55001
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, ErrInvalidRemoteIP, fw.Drop(unseen, true, &attackerHI, cp, nil),
|
||||
"sanity: attacker forging victim's source IP must be rejected when no conntrack entry exists")
|
||||
|
||||
got := fw.Drop(flow, true, &attackerHI, cp, nil)
|
||||
t.Logf("attacker replaying victim's 4-tuple: Drop returned %v (nil == packet ALLOWED == spoof succeeded)", got)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, ErrInvalidRemoteIP, got,
|
||||
"SECURITY: attacker spoofed victim's overlay source IP (192.0.2.2) by reusing an existing conntrack 4-tuple; Drop returned %v instead of rejecting", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// BenchmarkFirewallDropConntrackHit measures Drop on an already-established flow
|
||||
// (a conntrack hit). This is the fast path that the source-IP<->cert binding
|
||||
// reordering adds work to, so it quantifies the cost of moving the address checks
|
||||
// ahead of the conntrack lookup. Cases:
|
||||
// - simple: peer cert has one address, no unsafe networks (h.networks == nil),
|
||||
// so the remote-address check is a single netip.Addr compare.
|
||||
// - complex: peer cert has unsafe networks (h.networks populated), so the
|
||||
// remote-address check is a BART lookup.
|
||||
// - noCache/localCache: whether a per-batch ConntrackCache is supplied, which in
|
||||
// the original code let the fast path skip straight past the address checks.
|
||||
func BenchmarkFirewallDropConntrackHit(b *testing.B) {
|
||||
l := test.NewLoggerWithOutput(&bytes.Buffer{})
|
||||
|
||||
myVpnNetworksTable := new(bart.Lite)
|
||||
myVpnNetworksTable.Insert(netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.1/24"))
|
||||
|
||||
owner := &dummyCert{
|
||||
name: "owner",
|
||||
networks: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.1/24")},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
simpleCert := &cert.CachedCertificate{
|
||||
Certificate: &dummyCert{
|
||||
name: "simple",
|
||||
networks: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.2/24")},
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
simpleHost := &HostInfo{
|
||||
ConnectionState: &ConnectionState{peerCert: simpleCert},
|
||||
vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("192.0.2.2")},
|
||||
}
|
||||
simpleHost.buildNetworks(myVpnNetworksTable, simpleCert.Certificate)
|
||||
|
||||
complexCert := &cert.CachedCertificate{
|
||||
Certificate: &dummyCert{
|
||||
name: "complex",
|
||||
networks: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.2/24")},
|
||||
unsafeNetworks: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("198.51.100.0/24")},
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
complexHost := &HostInfo{
|
||||
ConnectionState: &ConnectionState{peerCert: complexCert},
|
||||
vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("192.0.2.2")},
|
||||
}
|
||||
complexHost.buildNetworks(myVpnNetworksTable, complexCert.Certificate)
|
||||
|
||||
cp := cert.NewCAPool()
|
||||
|
||||
flow := firewall.Packet{
|
||||
LocalAddr: netip.MustParseAddr("192.0.2.1"),
|
||||
RemoteAddr: netip.MustParseAddr("192.0.2.2"),
|
||||
LocalPort: 443,
|
||||
RemotePort: 55000,
|
||||
Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolUDP,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cases := []struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
host *HostInfo
|
||||
useCache bool
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{"simple/noCache", simpleHost, false},
|
||||
{"simple/localCache", simpleHost, true},
|
||||
{"complex/noCache", complexHost, false},
|
||||
{"complex/localCache", complexHost, true},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tc := range cases {
|
||||
b.Run(tc.name, func(b *testing.B) {
|
||||
fw := NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, owner)
|
||||
require.NoError(b, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"any"}, "", "", "", "", ""))
|
||||
|
||||
// Establish the conntrack entry so every benchmarked Drop is a hit.
|
||||
require.NoError(b, fw.Drop(flow, true, tc.host, cp, nil))
|
||||
|
||||
var cache firewall.ConntrackCache
|
||||
if tc.useCache {
|
||||
cache = firewall.ConntrackCache{}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
b.ReportAllocs()
|
||||
b.ResetTimer()
|
||||
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
|
||||
if err := fw.Drop(flow, true, tc.host, cp, cache); err != nil {
|
||||
b.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func BenchmarkLookup(b *testing.B) {
|
||||
ml := func(m map[string]struct{}, a [][]string) {
|
||||
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
|
||||
@@ -1164,28 +1318,28 @@ func TestAddFirewallRulesFromConfig(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
mf := &mockFirewall{}
|
||||
conf.Settings["firewall"] = map[string]any{"outbound": []any{map[string]any{"port": "1", "proto": "tcp", "host": "a"}}}
|
||||
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, conf, mf))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: false, proto: firewall.ProtoTCP, startPort: 1, endPort: 1, groups: nil, host: "a", ip: "", localIp: ""}, mf.lastCall)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: false, proto: iputil.IPProtocolTCP, startPort: 1, endPort: 1, groups: nil, host: "a", ip: "", localIp: ""}, mf.lastCall)
|
||||
|
||||
// Test adding udp rule
|
||||
conf = config.NewC(test.NewLogger())
|
||||
mf = &mockFirewall{}
|
||||
conf.Settings["firewall"] = map[string]any{"outbound": []any{map[string]any{"port": "1", "proto": "udp", "host": "a"}}}
|
||||
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, conf, mf))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: false, proto: firewall.ProtoUDP, startPort: 1, endPort: 1, groups: nil, host: "a", ip: "", localIp: ""}, mf.lastCall)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: false, proto: iputil.IPProtocolUDP, startPort: 1, endPort: 1, groups: nil, host: "a", ip: "", localIp: ""}, mf.lastCall)
|
||||
|
||||
// Test adding icmp rule
|
||||
conf = config.NewC(test.NewLogger())
|
||||
mf = &mockFirewall{}
|
||||
conf.Settings["firewall"] = map[string]any{"outbound": []any{map[string]any{"port": "1", "proto": "icmp", "host": "a"}}}
|
||||
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, conf, mf))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: false, proto: firewall.ProtoICMP, startPort: firewall.PortAny, endPort: firewall.PortAny, groups: nil, host: "a", ip: "", localIp: ""}, mf.lastCall)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: false, proto: iputil.IPProtocolICMP, startPort: firewall.PortAny, endPort: firewall.PortAny, groups: nil, host: "a", ip: "", localIp: ""}, mf.lastCall)
|
||||
|
||||
// Test adding icmp rule no port
|
||||
conf = config.NewC(test.NewLogger())
|
||||
mf = &mockFirewall{}
|
||||
conf.Settings["firewall"] = map[string]any{"outbound": []any{map[string]any{"proto": "icmp", "host": "a"}}}
|
||||
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, conf, mf))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: false, proto: firewall.ProtoICMP, startPort: firewall.PortAny, endPort: firewall.PortAny, groups: nil, host: "a", ip: "", localIp: ""}, mf.lastCall)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: false, proto: iputil.IPProtocolICMP, startPort: firewall.PortAny, endPort: firewall.PortAny, groups: nil, host: "a", ip: "", localIp: ""}, mf.lastCall)
|
||||
|
||||
// Test adding any rule
|
||||
conf = config.NewC(test.NewLogger())
|
||||
@@ -1429,7 +1583,7 @@ func buildTestCase(setup testsetup, err error, theirPrefixes ...netip.Prefix) te
|
||||
RemoteAddr: theirPrefixes[0].Addr(),
|
||||
LocalPort: 10,
|
||||
RemotePort: 90,
|
||||
Protocol: firewall.ProtoUDP,
|
||||
Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolUDP,
|
||||
Fragment: false,
|
||||
}
|
||||
return testcase{
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,39 +1,37 @@
|
||||
module github.com/slackhq/nebula
|
||||
|
||||
go 1.25.0
|
||||
go 1.26.0
|
||||
|
||||
require (
|
||||
dario.cat/mergo v1.0.2
|
||||
filippo.io/bigmod v0.1.0
|
||||
github.com/DefinedNet/netlink v1.3.2-dn.1
|
||||
github.com/anmitsu/go-shlex v0.0.0-20200514113438-38f4b401e2be
|
||||
github.com/armon/go-radix v1.0.0
|
||||
github.com/cyberdelia/go-metrics-graphite v0.0.0-20161219230853-39f87cc3b432
|
||||
github.com/flynn/noise v1.1.0
|
||||
github.com/gaissmai/bart v0.28.0
|
||||
github.com/gaissmai/bart v0.29.0
|
||||
github.com/gogo/protobuf v1.3.2
|
||||
github.com/google/gopacket v1.1.19
|
||||
github.com/kardianos/service v1.2.4
|
||||
github.com/miekg/dns v1.1.72
|
||||
github.com/kardianos/service v1.3.0
|
||||
github.com/miekg/dns v1.1.73
|
||||
github.com/miekg/pkcs11 v1.1.2
|
||||
github.com/nbrownus/go-metrics-prometheus v0.0.0-20210712211119-974a6260965f
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.23.2
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.24.1
|
||||
github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics v0.0.0-20201227073835-cf1acfcdf475
|
||||
github.com/skip2/go-qrcode v0.0.0-20200617195104-da1b6568686e
|
||||
github.com/stefanberger/go-pkcs11uri v0.0.0-20230803200340-78284954bff6
|
||||
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1
|
||||
github.com/vishvananda/netlink v1.3.1
|
||||
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.12.1
|
||||
go.uber.org/goleak v1.3.0
|
||||
go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.4
|
||||
golang.org/x/crypto v0.53.0
|
||||
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20230725093048-515e97ebf090
|
||||
golang.org/x/net v0.56.0
|
||||
golang.org/x/sync v0.21.0
|
||||
golang.org/x/sys v0.46.0
|
||||
golang.org/x/term v0.44.0
|
||||
go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.5
|
||||
golang.org/x/crypto v0.57.0
|
||||
golang.org/x/net v0.59.0
|
||||
golang.org/x/sync v0.23.0
|
||||
golang.org/x/sys v0.48.0
|
||||
golang.org/x/term v0.46.0
|
||||
golang.zx2c4.com/wintun v0.0.0-20230126152724-0fa3db229ce2
|
||||
golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard v0.0.0-20230325221338-052af4a8072b
|
||||
golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/windows v0.6.1
|
||||
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.11
|
||||
golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/windows v1.0.1
|
||||
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.12
|
||||
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1
|
||||
gvisor.dev/gvisor v0.0.0-20240423190808-9d7a357edefe
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -41,16 +39,11 @@ require (
|
||||
require (
|
||||
github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1 // indirect
|
||||
github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.3.0 // indirect
|
||||
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1 // indirect
|
||||
github.com/google/btree v1.1.2 // indirect
|
||||
github.com/munnerz/goautoneg v0.0.0-20191010083416-a7dc8b61c822 // indirect
|
||||
github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0 // indirect
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.6.2 // indirect
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/common v0.66.1 // indirect
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.16.1 // indirect
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/common v0.70.1 // indirect
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.21.1 // indirect
|
||||
github.com/vishvananda/netns v0.0.5 // indirect
|
||||
go.yaml.in/yaml/v2 v2.4.2 // indirect
|
||||
golang.org/x/mod v0.34.0 // indirect
|
||||
golang.org/x/time v0.5.0 // indirect
|
||||
golang.org/x/tools v0.43.0 // indirect
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ dario.cat/mergo v1.0.2 h1:85+piFYR1tMbRrLcDwR18y4UKJ3aH1Tbzi24VRW1TK8=
|
||||
dario.cat/mergo v1.0.2/go.mod h1:E/hbnu0NxMFBjpMIE34DRGLWqDy0g5FuKDhCb31ngxA=
|
||||
filippo.io/bigmod v0.1.0 h1:UNzDk7y9ADKST+axd9skUpBQeW7fG2KrTZyOE4uGQy8=
|
||||
filippo.io/bigmod v0.1.0/go.mod h1:OjOXDNlClLblvXdwgFFOQFJEocLhhtai8vGLy0JCZlI=
|
||||
github.com/DefinedNet/netlink v1.3.2-dn.1 h1:Md2PsUE1Xuy1Zxs/Bm6356n1kt5bq2HspXlPJ6pEspg=
|
||||
github.com/DefinedNet/netlink v1.3.2-dn.1/go.mod h1:o4YSn8Jw7zoDcYXDmV77TRd4eS5sSLuE+vu2zAN67C8=
|
||||
github.com/alecthomas/template v0.0.0-20160405071501-a0175ee3bccc/go.mod h1:LOuyumcjzFXgccqObfd/Ljyb9UuFJ6TxHnclSeseNhc=
|
||||
github.com/alecthomas/template v0.0.0-20190718012654-fb15b899a751/go.mod h1:LOuyumcjzFXgccqObfd/Ljyb9UuFJ6TxHnclSeseNhc=
|
||||
github.com/alecthomas/units v0.0.0-20151022065526-2efee857e7cf/go.mod h1:ybxpYRFXyAe+OPACYpWeL0wqObRcbAqCMya13uyzqw0=
|
||||
@@ -19,15 +21,12 @@ github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1/go.mod h1:G2ZrVWU2WbWT9wwq4/hrbKbnv/1ERSJQ0ibhJ6r
|
||||
github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.1.1/go.mod h1:VGX0DQ3Q6kWi7AoAeZDth3/j3BFtOZR5XLFGgcrjCOs=
|
||||
github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.3.0 h1:UL815xU9SqsFlibzuggzjXhog7bL6oX9BbNZnL2UFvs=
|
||||
github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.3.0/go.mod h1:VGX0DQ3Q6kWi7AoAeZDth3/j3BFtOZR5XLFGgcrjCOs=
|
||||
github.com/cyberdelia/go-metrics-graphite v0.0.0-20161219230853-39f87cc3b432 h1:M5QgkYacWj0Xs8MhpIK/5uwU02icXpEoSo9sM2aRCps=
|
||||
github.com/cyberdelia/go-metrics-graphite v0.0.0-20161219230853-39f87cc3b432/go.mod h1:xwIwAxMvYnVrGJPe2FKx5prTrnAjGOD8zvDOnxnrrkM=
|
||||
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.0/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38=
|
||||
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1 h1:vj9j/u1bqnvCEfJOwUhtlOARqs3+rkHYY13jYWTU97c=
|
||||
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38=
|
||||
github.com/flynn/noise v1.1.0 h1:KjPQoQCEFdZDiP03phOvGi11+SVVhBG2wOWAorLsstg=
|
||||
github.com/flynn/noise v1.1.0/go.mod h1:xbMo+0i6+IGbYdJhF31t2eR1BIU0CYc12+BNAKwUTag=
|
||||
github.com/gaissmai/bart v0.28.0 h1:89yZLo8NmyqD0RYgJ3QO9HhqqGGw+oWhf90cZm69Lko=
|
||||
github.com/gaissmai/bart v0.28.0/go.mod h1:GREWQfTLRWz/c5FTOsIw+KkscuFkIV5t8Rp7Nd1Td5c=
|
||||
github.com/gaissmai/bart v0.29.0 h1:wO6HGE8g9YE0Wm0bCpYxwRzfQ4+fbJKOhL64e5ACGCI=
|
||||
github.com/gaissmai/bart v0.29.0/go.mod h1:GREWQfTLRWz/c5FTOsIw+KkscuFkIV5t8Rp7Nd1Td5c=
|
||||
github.com/go-kit/kit v0.8.0/go.mod h1:xBxKIO96dXMWWy0MnWVtmwkA9/13aqxPnvrjFYMA2as=
|
||||
github.com/go-kit/kit v0.9.0/go.mod h1:xBxKIO96dXMWWy0MnWVtmwkA9/13aqxPnvrjFYMA2as=
|
||||
github.com/go-kit/log v0.1.0/go.mod h1:zbhenjAZHb184qTLMA9ZjW7ThYL0H2mk7Q6pNt4vbaY=
|
||||
@@ -66,27 +65,26 @@ github.com/json-iterator/go v1.1.10/go.mod h1:KdQUCv79m/52Kvf8AW2vK1V8akMuk1QjK/
|
||||
github.com/json-iterator/go v1.1.11/go.mod h1:KdQUCv79m/52Kvf8AW2vK1V8akMuk1QjK/uOdHXbAo4=
|
||||
github.com/julienschmidt/httprouter v1.2.0/go.mod h1:SYymIcj16QtmaHHD7aYtjjsJG7VTCxuUUipMqKk8s4w=
|
||||
github.com/julienschmidt/httprouter v1.3.0/go.mod h1:JR6WtHb+2LUe8TCKY3cZOxFyyO8IZAc4RVcycCCAKdM=
|
||||
github.com/kardianos/service v1.2.4 h1:XNlGtZOYNx2u91urOdg/Kfmc+gfmuIo1Dd3rEi2OgBk=
|
||||
github.com/kardianos/service v1.2.4/go.mod h1:E4V9ufUuY82F7Ztlu1eN9VXWIQxg8NoLQlmFe0MtrXc=
|
||||
github.com/kardianos/service v1.3.0 h1:/LGy+xPP2TM+GLTiCZ2di7cy0Jd/qrawlTUfqKYFdTI=
|
||||
github.com/kardianos/service v1.3.0/go.mod h1:E4V9ufUuY82F7Ztlu1eN9VXWIQxg8NoLQlmFe0MtrXc=
|
||||
github.com/kisielk/errcheck v1.5.0/go.mod h1:pFxgyoBC7bSaBwPgfKdkLd5X25qrDl4LWUI2bnpBCr8=
|
||||
github.com/kisielk/gotool v1.0.0/go.mod h1:XhKaO+MFFWcvkIS/tQcRk01m1F5IRFswLeQ+oQHNcck=
|
||||
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.18.0 h1:c/Cqfb0r+Yi+JtIEq73FWXVkRonBlf0CRNYc8Zttxdo=
|
||||
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.18.0/go.mod h1:2Pp+KzxcywXVXMr50+X0Q/Lsb43OQHYWRCY2AiWywWQ=
|
||||
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.19.1 h1:VsB4HPswih7mmZ8WleSFQ75c/Ui1M4trX5oAsJnhSlk=
|
||||
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.19.1/go.mod h1:cwPg85FWrGar70rWktvGQj8/hthj3wpl0PGDogxkrSQ=
|
||||
github.com/konsorten/go-windows-terminal-sequences v1.0.1/go.mod h1:T0+1ngSBFLxvqU3pZ+m/2kptfBszLMUkC4ZK/EgS/cQ=
|
||||
github.com/konsorten/go-windows-terminal-sequences v1.0.3/go.mod h1:T0+1ngSBFLxvqU3pZ+m/2kptfBszLMUkC4ZK/EgS/cQ=
|
||||
github.com/kr/logfmt v0.0.0-20140226030751-b84e30acd515/go.mod h1:+0opPa2QZZtGFBFZlji/RkVcI2GknAs/DXo4wKdlNEc=
|
||||
github.com/kr/pretty v0.1.0/go.mod h1:dAy3ld7l9f0ibDNOQOHHMYYIIbhfbHSm3C4ZsoJORNo=
|
||||
github.com/kr/pretty v0.2.1 h1:Fmg33tUaq4/8ym9TJN1x7sLJnHVwhP33CNkpYV/7rwI=
|
||||
github.com/kr/pretty v0.2.1/go.mod h1:ipq/a2n7PKx3OHsz4KJII5eveXtPO4qwEXGdVfWzfnI=
|
||||
github.com/kr/pretty v0.3.1 h1:flRD4NNwYAUpkphVc1HcthR4KEIFJ65n8Mw5qdRn3LE=
|
||||
github.com/kr/pretty v0.3.1/go.mod h1:hoEshYVHaxMs3cyo3Yncou5ZscifuDolrwPKZanG3xk=
|
||||
github.com/kr/pty v1.1.1/go.mod h1:pFQYn66WHrOpPYNljwOMqo10TkYh1fy3cYio2l3bCsQ=
|
||||
github.com/kr/text v0.1.0 h1:45sCR5RtlFHMR4UwH9sdQ5TC8v0qDQCHnXt+kaKSTVE=
|
||||
github.com/kr/text v0.1.0/go.mod h1:4Jbv+DJW3UT/LiOwJeYQe1efqtUx/iVham/4vfdArNI=
|
||||
github.com/kylelemons/godebug v1.1.0 h1:RPNrshWIDI6G2gRW9EHilWtl7Z6Sb1BR0xunSBf0SNc=
|
||||
github.com/kylelemons/godebug v1.1.0/go.mod h1:9/0rRGxNHcop5bhtWyNeEfOS8JIWk580+fNqagV/RAw=
|
||||
github.com/matttproud/golang_protobuf_extensions v1.0.1/go.mod h1:D8He9yQNgCq6Z5Ld7szi9bcBfOoFv/3dc6xSMkL2PC0=
|
||||
github.com/miekg/dns v1.1.72 h1:vhmr+TF2A3tuoGNkLDFK9zi36F2LS+hKTRW0Uf8kbzI=
|
||||
github.com/miekg/dns v1.1.72/go.mod h1:+EuEPhdHOsfk6Wk5TT2CzssZdqkmFhf8r+aVyDEToIs=
|
||||
github.com/miekg/dns v1.1.73 h1:uhT8nJxmTrPJYClxVxTCX+CVn6qnzSiybRk72Z6DgrE=
|
||||
github.com/miekg/dns v1.1.73/go.mod h1:RW2Obtfd5NZHvOFe3zYG0W8koWOQtAzyHaLo8vASBuQ=
|
||||
github.com/miekg/pkcs11 v1.1.2 h1:/VxmeAX5qU6Q3EwafypogwWbYryHFmF2RpkJmw3m4MQ=
|
||||
github.com/miekg/pkcs11 v1.1.2/go.mod h1:XsNlhZGX73bx86s2hdc/FuaLm2CPZJemRLMA+WTFxgs=
|
||||
github.com/modern-go/concurrent v0.0.0-20180228061459-e0a39a4cb421/go.mod h1:6dJC0mAP4ikYIbvyc7fijjWJddQyLn8Ig3JB5CqoB9Q=
|
||||
@@ -102,14 +100,13 @@ github.com/nbrownus/go-metrics-prometheus v0.0.0-20210712211119-974a6260965f/go.
|
||||
github.com/pkg/errors v0.8.0/go.mod h1:bwawxfHBFNV+L2hUp1rHADufV3IMtnDRdf1r5NINEl0=
|
||||
github.com/pkg/errors v0.8.1/go.mod h1:bwawxfHBFNV+L2hUp1rHADufV3IMtnDRdf1r5NINEl0=
|
||||
github.com/pkg/errors v0.9.1/go.mod h1:bwawxfHBFNV+L2hUp1rHADufV3IMtnDRdf1r5NINEl0=
|
||||
github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0 h1:4DBwDE0NGyQoBHbLQYPwSUPoCMWR5BEzIk/f1lZbAQM=
|
||||
github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0/go.mod h1:iKH77koFhYxTK1pcRnkKkqfTogsbg7gZNVY4sRDYZ/4=
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v0.9.1/go.mod h1:7SWBe2y4D6OKWSNQJUaRYU/AaXPKyh/dDVn+NZz0KFw=
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.0.0/go.mod h1:db9x61etRT2tGnBNRi70OPL5FsnadC4Ky3P0J6CfImo=
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.7.1/go.mod h1:PY5Wy2awLA44sXw4AOSfFBetzPP4j5+D6mVACh+pe2M=
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.11.0/go.mod h1:Z6t4BnS23TR94PD6BsDNk8yVqroYurpAkEiz0P2BEV0=
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.23.2 h1:Je96obch5RDVy3FDMndoUsjAhG5Edi49h0RJWRi/o0o=
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.23.2/go.mod h1:Tb1a6LWHB3/SPIzCoaDXI4I8UHKeFTEQ1YCr+0Gyqmg=
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.24.1 h1:JnJkREXzWxUdCuPFpIWZiPispT9xVV59uiuyR2bPlnU=
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.24.1/go.mod h1:F+oSRECHg4sse5ucfYpYDeIv/hu68Zo0uoHKetWnzcE=
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.0.0-20180712105110-5c3871d89910/go.mod h1:MbSGuTsp3dbXC40dX6PRTWyKYBIrTGTE9sqQNg2J8bo=
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.0.0-20190129233127-fd36f4220a90/go.mod h1:xMI15A0UPsDsEKsMN9yxemIoYk6Tm2C1GtYGdfGttqA=
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.2.0/go.mod h1:xMI15A0UPsDsEKsMN9yxemIoYk6Tm2C1GtYGdfGttqA=
|
||||
@@ -118,18 +115,16 @@ github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.6.2/go.mod h1:y3m2F6Gdpfy6Ut/GBsUqTWZqCUvM
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/common v0.4.1/go.mod h1:TNfzLD0ON7rHzMJeJkieUDPYmFC7Snx/y86RQel1bk4=
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/common v0.10.0/go.mod h1:Tlit/dnDKsSWFlCLTWaA1cyBgKHSMdTB80sz/V91rCo=
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/common v0.26.0/go.mod h1:M7rCNAaPfAosfx8veZJCuw84e35h3Cfd9VFqTh1DIvc=
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/common v0.66.1 h1:h5E0h5/Y8niHc5DlaLlWLArTQI7tMrsfQjHV+d9ZoGs=
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/common v0.66.1/go.mod h1:gcaUsgf3KfRSwHY4dIMXLPV0K/Wg1oZ8+SbZk/HH/dA=
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/common v0.70.1 h1:1HvjP4D5oL3t8RsPlwxA9onvvStjtIHYE5XuuwOi/PY=
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/common v0.70.1/go.mod h1:VdFUQDMZK3VLkurFUVhia6uys/0suUp86TJz5qbJRhc=
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.0.0-20181005140218-185b4288413d/go.mod h1:c3At6R/oaqEKCNdg8wHV1ftS6bRYblBhIjjI8uT2IGk=
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.0.2/go.mod h1:TjEm7ze935MbeOT/UhFTIMYKhuLP4wbCsTZCD3I8kEA=
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.1.3/go.mod h1:lV6e/gmhEcM9IjHGsFOCxxuZ+z1YqCvr4OA4YeYWdaU=
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.6.0/go.mod h1:cz+aTbrPOrUb4q7XlbU9ygM+/jj0fzG6c1xBZuNvfVA=
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.16.1 h1:hZ15bTNuirocR6u0JZ6BAHHmwS1p8B4P6MRqxtzMyRg=
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.16.1/go.mod h1:teAbpZRB1iIAJYREa1LsoWUXykVXA1KlTmWl8x/U+Is=
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.21.1 h1:GljZCt+zSTS+NZq88cyQ1LjZ+RCHp3uVuabBWA5+OJI=
|
||||
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.21.1/go.mod h1:aB55Cww9pdSJVHk0hUf0inxWyyjPogFIjmHKYgMKmtY=
|
||||
github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics v0.0.0-20201227073835-cf1acfcdf475 h1:N/ElC8H3+5XpJzTSTfLsJV/mx9Q9g7kxmchpfZyxgzM=
|
||||
github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics v0.0.0-20201227073835-cf1acfcdf475/go.mod h1:bCqnVzQkZxMG4s8nGwiZ5l3QUCyqpo9Y+/ZMZ9VjZe4=
|
||||
github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.10.0 h1:TMyTOH3F/DB16zRVcYyreMH6GnZZrwQVAoYjRBZyWFQ=
|
||||
github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.10.0/go.mod h1:UQnix2H7Ngw/k4C5ijL5+65zddjncjaFoBhdsK/akog=
|
||||
github.com/sirupsen/logrus v1.2.0/go.mod h1:LxeOpSwHxABJmUn/MG1IvRgCAasNZTLOkJPxbbu5VWo=
|
||||
github.com/sirupsen/logrus v1.4.2/go.mod h1:tLMulIdttU9McNUspp0xgXVQah82FyeX6MwdIuYE2rE=
|
||||
github.com/sirupsen/logrus v1.6.0/go.mod h1:7uNnSEd1DgxDLC74fIahvMZmmYsHGZGEOFrfsX/uA88=
|
||||
@@ -143,35 +138,29 @@ github.com/stretchr/testify v1.2.2/go.mod h1:a8OnRcib4nhh0OaRAV+Yts87kKdq0PP7pXf
|
||||
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.3.0/go.mod h1:M5WIy9Dh21IEIfnGCwXGc5bZfKNJtfHm1UVUgZn+9EI=
|
||||
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.4.0/go.mod h1:j7eGeouHqKxXV5pUuKE4zz7dFj8WfuZ+81PSLYec5m4=
|
||||
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.7.0/go.mod h1:6Fq8oRcR53rry900zMqJjRRixrwX3KX962/h/Wwjteg=
|
||||
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1 h1:7s2iGBzp5EwR7/aIZr8ao5+dra3wiQyKjjFuvgVKu7U=
|
||||
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1/go.mod h1:wZwfW3scLgRK+23gO65QZefKpKQRnfz6sD981Nm4B6U=
|
||||
github.com/vishvananda/netlink v1.3.1 h1:3AEMt62VKqz90r0tmNhog0r/PpWKmrEShJU0wJW6bV0=
|
||||
github.com/vishvananda/netlink v1.3.1/go.mod h1:ARtKouGSTGchR8aMwmkzC0qiNPrrWO5JS/XMVl45+b4=
|
||||
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.12.1 h1:EuwCh5fleGS7H32xRwO3wRGT7DxrDhLAT6FF8MpWDWE=
|
||||
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.12.1/go.mod h1:MDEgiDPPsNp5cuIrHPPCyornHKgEVbtFUmoNlxoYthg=
|
||||
github.com/vishvananda/netns v0.0.5 h1:DfiHV+j8bA32MFM7bfEunvT8IAqQ/NzSJHtcmW5zdEY=
|
||||
github.com/vishvananda/netns v0.0.5/go.mod h1:SpkAiCQRtJ6TvvxPnOSyH3BMl6unz3xZlaprSwhNNJM=
|
||||
github.com/yuin/goldmark v1.1.27/go.mod h1:3hX8gzYuyVAZsxl0MRgGTJEmQBFcNTphYh9decYSb74=
|
||||
github.com/yuin/goldmark v1.2.1/go.mod h1:3hX8gzYuyVAZsxl0MRgGTJEmQBFcNTphYh9decYSb74=
|
||||
go.uber.org/goleak v1.3.0 h1:2K3zAYmnTNqV73imy9J1T3WC+gmCePx2hEGkimedGto=
|
||||
go.uber.org/goleak v1.3.0/go.mod h1:CoHD4mav9JJNrW/WLlf7HGZPjdw8EucARQHekz1X6bE=
|
||||
go.yaml.in/yaml/v2 v2.4.2 h1:DzmwEr2rDGHl7lsFgAHxmNz/1NlQ7xLIrlN2h5d1eGI=
|
||||
go.yaml.in/yaml/v2 v2.4.2/go.mod h1:081UH+NErpNdqlCXm3TtEran0rJZGxAYx9hb/ELlsPU=
|
||||
go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.4 h1:tfq32ie2Jv2UxXFdLJdh3jXuOzWiL1fo0bu/FbuKpbc=
|
||||
go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.4/go.mod h1:DhzuOOF2ATzADvBadXxruRBLzYTpT36CKvDb3+aBEFg=
|
||||
go.yaml.in/yaml/v2 v2.4.4 h1:tuyd0P+2Ont/d6e2rl3be67goVK4R6deVxCUX5vyPaQ=
|
||||
go.yaml.in/yaml/v2 v2.4.4/go.mod h1:gMZqIpDtDqOfM0uNfy0SkpRhvUryYH0Z6wdMYcacYXQ=
|
||||
go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.5 h1:N6y/pJk8buWs9NY5ERU2HSMfm+IuD/OtfdAnq6kESPw=
|
||||
go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.5/go.mod h1:HVTZu1O7/Vkt2N+BFy8Zza+lnLsABggaTM2ZpNIGuKg=
|
||||
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20180904163835-0709b304e793/go.mod h1:6SG95UA2DQfeDnfUPMdvaQW0Q7yPrPDi9nlGo2tz2b4=
|
||||
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190308221718-c2843e01d9a2/go.mod h1:djNgcEr1/C05ACkg1iLfiJU5Ep61QUkGW8qpdssI0+w=
|
||||
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20191011191535-87dc89f01550/go.mod h1:yigFU9vqHzYiE8UmvKecakEJjdnWj3jj499lnFckfCI=
|
||||
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20200622213623-75b288015ac9/go.mod h1:LzIPMQfyMNhhGPhUkYOs5KpL4U8rLKemX1yGLhDgUto=
|
||||
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20210322153248-0c34fe9e7dc2/go.mod h1:T9bdIzuCu7OtxOm1hfPfRQxPLYneinmdGuTeoZ9dtd4=
|
||||
golang.org/x/crypto v0.53.0 h1:QZ4Muo8THX6CizN2vPPd5fBGHyogrdK9fG4wLPFUsto=
|
||||
golang.org/x/crypto v0.53.0/go.mod h1:DNLU434OwVakk9PzuwV8w62mAJpRJL3vsgcfp4Qnsio=
|
||||
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20230725093048-515e97ebf090 h1:Di6/M8l0O2lCLc6VVRWhgCiApHV8MnQurBnFSHsQtNY=
|
||||
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20230725093048-515e97ebf090/go.mod h1:FXUEEKJgO7OQYeo8N01OfiKP8RXMtf6e8aTskBGqWdc=
|
||||
golang.org/x/crypto v0.57.0 h1:3ZVCjf8Ggz7zneR/EHRVx68Ctf+2pmIMP2UFhh9cC6M=
|
||||
golang.org/x/crypto v0.57.0/go.mod h1:Fdz0i5U6CoizGwLda9DttjSk6qlZo25zYNtR+ycvuZA=
|
||||
golang.org/x/lint v0.0.0-20200302205851-738671d3881b/go.mod h1:3xt1FjdF8hUf6vQPIChWIBhFzV8gjjsPE/fR3IyQdNY=
|
||||
golang.org/x/mod v0.1.1-0.20191105210325-c90efee705ee/go.mod h1:QqPTAvyqsEbceGzBzNggFXnrqF1CaUcvgkdR5Ot7KZg=
|
||||
golang.org/x/mod v0.2.0/go.mod h1:s0Qsj1ACt9ePp/hMypM3fl4fZqREWJwdYDEqhRiZZUA=
|
||||
golang.org/x/mod v0.3.0/go.mod h1:s0Qsj1ACt9ePp/hMypM3fl4fZqREWJwdYDEqhRiZZUA=
|
||||
golang.org/x/mod v0.34.0 h1:xIHgNUUnW6sYkcM5Jleh05DvLOtwc6RitGHbDk4akRI=
|
||||
golang.org/x/mod v0.34.0/go.mod h1:ykgH52iCZe79kzLLMhyCUzhMci+nQj+0XkbXpNYtVjY=
|
||||
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20180724234803-3673e40ba225/go.mod h1:mL1N/T3taQHkDXs73rZJwtUhF3w3ftmwwsq0BUmARs4=
|
||||
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20181114220301-adae6a3d119a/go.mod h1:mL1N/T3taQHkDXs73rZJwtUhF3w3ftmwwsq0BUmARs4=
|
||||
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20190108225652-1e06a53dbb7e/go.mod h1:mL1N/T3taQHkDXs73rZJwtUhF3w3ftmwwsq0BUmARs4=
|
||||
@@ -182,8 +171,8 @@ golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20200226121028-0de0cce0169b/go.mod h1:z5CRVTTTmAJ677TzLL
|
||||
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20200625001655-4c5254603344/go.mod h1:/O7V0waA8r7cgGh81Ro3o1hOxt32SMVPicZroKQ2sZA=
|
||||
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20201021035429-f5854403a974/go.mod h1:sp8m0HH+o8qH0wwXwYZr8TS3Oi6o0r6Gce1SSxlDquU=
|
||||
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20210226172049-e18ecbb05110/go.mod h1:m0MpNAwzfU5UDzcl9v0D8zg8gWTRqZa9RBIspLL5mdg=
|
||||
golang.org/x/net v0.56.0 h1:Rw8j/hFzGvJUZwNBXnAtf5sVDVt+65SK2C7IxCxZt5o=
|
||||
golang.org/x/net v0.56.0/go.mod h1:D3Ku6r+V6JROoZK144D2XfMHFcMq/0zSfLelVTCFKec=
|
||||
golang.org/x/net v0.59.0 h1:5zfYln+w5XCxwrnMMJPufRgNoXEaGxl0wo5GqPXyues=
|
||||
golang.org/x/net v0.59.0/go.mod h1:2DA/G1UfVbCpQPeWTmMPGY7Cs2PkBkwu743bVX5PIVg=
|
||||
golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.0.0-20190226205417-e64efc72b421/go.mod h1:gOpvHmFTYa4IltrdGE7lF6nIHvwfUNPOp7c8zoXwtLw=
|
||||
golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20181108010431-42b317875d0f/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
|
||||
golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20181221193216-37e7f081c4d4/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
|
||||
@@ -191,8 +180,8 @@ golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20190423024810-112230192c58/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJ
|
||||
golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20190911185100-cd5d95a43a6e/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
|
||||
golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20201020160332-67f06af15bc9/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
|
||||
golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20201207232520-09787c993a3a/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
|
||||
golang.org/x/sync v0.21.0 h1:HLII4xRRTtCRkxYp4HNFF0Js/Og6q2i++KXbg0gHCwM=
|
||||
golang.org/x/sync v0.21.0/go.mod h1:9xrNwdLfx4jkKbNva9FpL6vEN7evnE43NNNJQ2LF3+0=
|
||||
golang.org/x/sync v0.23.0 h1:KameEIfc1IkluZyXWLn39Wd4tURc6GbCiISGiZm2bQk=
|
||||
golang.org/x/sync v0.23.0/go.mod h1:sUUOizhqBxiL6pEWpqNLUiaJn1ShEbZ6BBqskPbjZm0=
|
||||
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20180905080454-ebe1bf3edb33/go.mod h1:STP8DvDyc/dI5b8T5hshtkjS+E42TnysNCUPdjciGhY=
|
||||
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20181116152217-5ac8a444bdc5/go.mod h1:STP8DvDyc/dI5b8T5hshtkjS+E42TnysNCUPdjciGhY=
|
||||
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20190215142949-d0b11bdaac8a/go.mod h1:STP8DvDyc/dI5b8T5hshtkjS+E42TnysNCUPdjciGhY=
|
||||
@@ -206,13 +195,11 @@ golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20200930185726-fdedc70b468f/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7w
|
||||
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20201119102817-f84b799fce68/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7wpKNCjG9DtNlClVuFLEZdDNbEs=
|
||||
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20210124154548-22da62e12c0c/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7wpKNCjG9DtNlClVuFLEZdDNbEs=
|
||||
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20210603081109-ebe580a85c40/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
|
||||
golang.org/x/sys v0.2.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
|
||||
golang.org/x/sys v0.10.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
|
||||
golang.org/x/sys v0.46.0 h1:noSf2Fq6F8DBgS+LysIkx7rIExoNHJsxOAtPp4rthXw=
|
||||
golang.org/x/sys v0.46.0/go.mod h1:4GL1E5IUh+htKOUEOaiffhrAeqysfVGipDYzABqnCmw=
|
||||
golang.org/x/sys v0.48.0 h1:bbX/i/6MgT9BVLM9RT1thmxL04yeTAhbEz4SyadbXoo=
|
||||
golang.org/x/sys v0.48.0/go.mod h1:hNLxWAXmnKAxqDtdwIYC4bM9oQPEecfsnNMuSxOs3og=
|
||||
golang.org/x/term v0.0.0-20201126162022-7de9c90e9dd1/go.mod h1:bj7SfCRtBDWHUb9snDiAeCFNEtKQo2Wmx5Cou7ajbmo=
|
||||
golang.org/x/term v0.44.0 h1:0rLvDRCtNj0gZkyIXhCyOb2OAzEhLVqc4B+hrsBhrmc=
|
||||
golang.org/x/term v0.44.0/go.mod h1:7ze4MdzUzLXpSAoFP1H0bOI9aXDqveSvatT5vKcFh2Y=
|
||||
golang.org/x/term v0.46.0 h1:3+OXuTbaKDgwk8jTi3aSLHRlmWqHEUDUtxnbFigO4YE=
|
||||
golang.org/x/term v0.46.0/go.mod h1:+K02xbkittuwc0Am4abfA3Fc+XRGXkvBXNO88NCXPoc=
|
||||
golang.org/x/text v0.3.0/go.mod h1:NqM8EUOU14njkJ3fqMW+pc6Ldnwhi/IjpwHt7yyuwOQ=
|
||||
golang.org/x/text v0.3.2/go.mod h1:bEr9sfX3Q8Zfm5fL9x+3itogRgK3+ptLWKqgva+5dAk=
|
||||
golang.org/x/text v0.3.3/go.mod h1:5Zoc/QRtKVWzQhOtBMvqHzDpF6irO9z98xDceosuGiQ=
|
||||
@@ -223,8 +210,6 @@ golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20191119224855-298f0cb1881e/go.mod h1:b+2E5dAYhXwXZwtn
|
||||
golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20200130002326-2f3ba24bd6e7/go.mod h1:TB2adYChydJhpapKDTa4BR/hXlZSLoq2Wpct/0txZ28=
|
||||
golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20200619180055-7c47624df98f/go.mod h1:EkVYQZoAsY45+roYkvgYkIh4xh/qjgUK9TdY2XT94GE=
|
||||
golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20210106214847-113979e3529a/go.mod h1:emZCQorbCU4vsT4fOWvOPXz4eW1wZW4PmDk9uLelYpA=
|
||||
golang.org/x/tools v0.43.0 h1:12BdW9CeB3Z+J/I/wj34VMl8X+fEXBxVR90JeMX5E7s=
|
||||
golang.org/x/tools v0.43.0/go.mod h1:uHkMso649BX2cZK6+RpuIPXS3ho2hZo4FVwfoy1vIk0=
|
||||
golang.org/x/xerrors v0.0.0-20190717185122-a985d3407aa7/go.mod h1:I/5z698sn9Ka8TeJc9MKroUUfqBBauWjQqLJ2OPfmY0=
|
||||
golang.org/x/xerrors v0.0.0-20191011141410-1b5146add898/go.mod h1:I/5z698sn9Ka8TeJc9MKroUUfqBBauWjQqLJ2OPfmY0=
|
||||
golang.org/x/xerrors v0.0.0-20191204190536-9bdfabe68543/go.mod h1:I/5z698sn9Ka8TeJc9MKroUUfqBBauWjQqLJ2OPfmY0=
|
||||
@@ -233,8 +218,8 @@ golang.zx2c4.com/wintun v0.0.0-20230126152724-0fa3db229ce2 h1:B82qJJgjvYKsXS9jeu
|
||||
golang.zx2c4.com/wintun v0.0.0-20230126152724-0fa3db229ce2/go.mod h1:deeaetjYA+DHMHg+sMSMI58GrEteJUUzzw7en6TJQcI=
|
||||
golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard v0.0.0-20230325221338-052af4a8072b h1:J1CaxgLerRR5lgx3wnr6L04cJFbWoceSK9JWBdglINo=
|
||||
golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard v0.0.0-20230325221338-052af4a8072b/go.mod h1:tqur9LnfstdR9ep2LaJT4lFUl0EjlHtge+gAjmsHUG4=
|
||||
golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/windows v0.6.1 h1:XMaKojH1Hs/raMrmnir4n35nTvzvWj7NmSYzHn2F4qU=
|
||||
golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/windows v0.6.1/go.mod h1:04aqInu5GYuTFvMuDw/rKBAF7mHrltW/3rekpfbbZDM=
|
||||
golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/windows v1.0.1 h1:eOxiDVbywPC+ZQqvdCK7x+ZwWXKbYv50TtH8ysFIbw8=
|
||||
golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/windows v1.0.1/go.mod h1:+fbT3FFdX4zzYDLwJh5+HPEcNN/3HyNdzhNSVsQM+zs=
|
||||
google.golang.org/appengine v1.4.0/go.mod h1:xpcJRLb0r/rnEns0DIKYYv+WjYCduHsrkT7/EB5XEv4=
|
||||
google.golang.org/protobuf v0.0.0-20200109180630-ec00e32a8dfd/go.mod h1:DFci5gLYBciE7Vtevhsrf46CRTquxDuWsQurQQe4oz8=
|
||||
google.golang.org/protobuf v0.0.0-20200221191635-4d8936d0db64/go.mod h1:kwYJMbMJ01Woi6D6+Kah6886xMZcty6N08ah7+eCXa0=
|
||||
@@ -243,8 +228,8 @@ google.golang.org/protobuf v1.20.1-0.20200309200217-e05f789c0967/go.mod h1:A+miE
|
||||
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.21.0/go.mod h1:47Nbq4nVaFHyn7ilMalzfO3qCViNmqZ2kzikPIcrTAo=
|
||||
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.23.0/go.mod h1:EGpADcykh3NcUnDUJcl1+ZksZNG86OlYog2l/sGQquU=
|
||||
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.26.0-rc.1/go.mod h1:jlhhOSvTdKEhbULTjvd4ARK9grFBp09yW+WbY/TyQbw=
|
||||
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.11 h1:fV6ZwhNocDyBLK0dj+fg8ektcVegBBuEolpbTQyBNVE=
|
||||
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.11/go.mod h1:HTf+CrKn2C3g5S8VImy6tdcUvCska2kB7j23XfzDpco=
|
||||
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.12 h1:pJOKDDOyeXErUroCihFAd5LQuwXBSpVnKGrj5o/fwxc=
|
||||
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.12/go.mod h1:HTf+CrKn2C3g5S8VImy6tdcUvCska2kB7j23XfzDpco=
|
||||
gopkg.in/alecthomas/kingpin.v2 v2.2.6/go.mod h1:FMv+mEhP44yOT+4EoQTLFTRgOQ1FBLkstjWtayDeSgw=
|
||||
gopkg.in/check.v1 v0.0.0-20161208181325-20d25e280405/go.mod h1:Co6ibVJAznAaIkqp8huTwlJQCZ016jof/cbN4VW5Yz0=
|
||||
gopkg.in/check.v1 v1.0.0-20190902080502-41f04d3bba15/go.mod h1:Co6ibVJAznAaIkqp8huTwlJQCZ016jof/cbN4VW5Yz0=
|
||||
|
||||
+130
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
|
||||
package nebula
|
||||
|
||||
// This file is a trimmed, inlined copy of the graphite exporter from
|
||||
// github.com/cyberdelia/go-metrics-graphite, retaining only the Config type and
|
||||
// the Once entrypoint that Nebula uses. The upstream package has been
|
||||
// unmaintained for 10+ years, so it was vendored here to drop the dependency.
|
||||
// See https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/issues/1831.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Copyright 2015 Timothée Peignier. All rights reserved.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
||||
// modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
|
||||
//
|
||||
// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
|
||||
// this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
|
||||
// this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
|
||||
// and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
|
||||
// AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
||||
// IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
|
||||
// DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
|
||||
// FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
|
||||
// DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
|
||||
// SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
|
||||
// CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY,
|
||||
// OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
|
||||
// OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"bufio"
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"net"
|
||||
"strconv"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// graphiteConfigExport provides a container with configuration parameters for
|
||||
// the Graphite exporter.
|
||||
type graphiteConfigExport struct {
|
||||
Addr *net.TCPAddr // Network address to connect to
|
||||
Registry metrics.Registry // Registry to be exported
|
||||
FlushInterval time.Duration // Flush interval
|
||||
DurationUnit time.Duration // Time conversion unit for durations
|
||||
Prefix string // Prefix to be prepended to metric names
|
||||
Percentiles []float64 // Percentiles to export from timers and histograms
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// graphiteTimeout bounds one submission, the connect and the write together. An export is a few KB, a host that can't
|
||||
// take that in this long isn't going to.
|
||||
const graphiteTimeout = 30 * time.Second
|
||||
|
||||
// graphiteOnce performs a single submission to Graphite, returning a non-nil
|
||||
// error if it could not connect or write all of it within timeout. It gives up
|
||||
// as soon as ctx is done.
|
||||
func graphiteOnce(ctx context.Context, c graphiteConfigExport, timeout time.Duration) error {
|
||||
now := time.Now().Unix()
|
||||
du := float64(c.DurationUnit)
|
||||
flushSeconds := float64(c.FlushInterval) / float64(time.Second)
|
||||
deadline := time.Now().Add(timeout)
|
||||
d := net.Dialer{Deadline: deadline}
|
||||
conn, err := d.DialContext(ctx, "tcp", c.Addr.String())
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer conn.Close()
|
||||
if err := conn.SetDeadline(deadline); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
stop := context.AfterFunc(ctx, func() { _ = conn.Close() })
|
||||
defer stop()
|
||||
w := bufio.NewWriter(conn)
|
||||
c.Registry.Each(func(name string, i any) {
|
||||
switch metric := i.(type) {
|
||||
case metrics.Counter:
|
||||
count := metric.Count()
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.count %d %d\n", c.Prefix, name, count, now)
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.count_ps %.2f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, float64(count)/flushSeconds, now)
|
||||
case metrics.Gauge:
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.value %d %d\n", c.Prefix, name, metric.Value(), now)
|
||||
case metrics.GaugeFloat64:
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.value %f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, metric.Value(), now)
|
||||
case metrics.Histogram:
|
||||
h := metric.Snapshot()
|
||||
ps := h.Percentiles(c.Percentiles)
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.count %d %d\n", c.Prefix, name, h.Count(), now)
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.min %d %d\n", c.Prefix, name, h.Min(), now)
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.max %d %d\n", c.Prefix, name, h.Max(), now)
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.mean %.2f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, h.Mean(), now)
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.std-dev %.2f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, h.StdDev(), now)
|
||||
for psIdx, psKey := range c.Percentiles {
|
||||
key := strings.Replace(strconv.FormatFloat(psKey*100.0, 'f', -1, 64), ".", "", 1)
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.%s-percentile %.2f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, key, ps[psIdx], now)
|
||||
}
|
||||
case metrics.Meter:
|
||||
m := metric.Snapshot()
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.count %d %d\n", c.Prefix, name, m.Count(), now)
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.one-minute %.2f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, m.Rate1(), now)
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.five-minute %.2f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, m.Rate5(), now)
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.fifteen-minute %.2f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, m.Rate15(), now)
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.mean %.2f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, m.RateMean(), now)
|
||||
case metrics.Timer:
|
||||
t := metric.Snapshot()
|
||||
ps := t.Percentiles(c.Percentiles)
|
||||
count := t.Count()
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.count %d %d\n", c.Prefix, name, count, now)
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.count_ps %.2f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, float64(count)/flushSeconds, now)
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.min %d %d\n", c.Prefix, name, t.Min()/int64(du), now)
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.max %d %d\n", c.Prefix, name, t.Max()/int64(du), now)
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.mean %.2f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, t.Mean()/du, now)
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.std-dev %.2f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, t.StdDev()/du, now)
|
||||
for psIdx, psKey := range c.Percentiles {
|
||||
key := strings.Replace(strconv.FormatFloat(psKey*100.0, 'f', -1, 64), ".", "", 1)
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.%s-percentile %.2f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, key, ps[psIdx]/du, now)
|
||||
}
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.one-minute %.2f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, t.Rate1(), now)
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.five-minute %.2f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, t.Rate5(), now)
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.fifteen-minute %.2f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, t.Rate15(), now)
|
||||
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.mean-rate %.2f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, t.RateMean(), now)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
// A failed write sticks, so this reports the first one
|
||||
return w.Flush()
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,315 @@
|
||||
package nebula
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"bytes"
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
"net"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// graphiteHost accepts connections and hands each one to the test
|
||||
type graphiteHost struct {
|
||||
ln net.Listener
|
||||
conns chan net.Conn
|
||||
|
||||
mu sync.Mutex
|
||||
closed bool
|
||||
open []net.Conn
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newGraphiteHost accepts connections for the test. A non-zero window shrinks each connection's receive buffer, so a
|
||||
// sender that is not read from blocks after a little whatever the host's TCP tuning. Only for tests that need a stall,
|
||||
// a small window makes reading very slow on Linux.
|
||||
func newGraphiteHost(t *testing.T, window int) *graphiteHost {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
h := &graphiteHost{ln: ln, conns: make(chan net.Conn, 8)}
|
||||
done := make(chan struct{})
|
||||
t.Cleanup(func() {
|
||||
_ = ln.Close()
|
||||
h.mu.Lock()
|
||||
h.closed = true
|
||||
for _, c := range h.open {
|
||||
_ = c.Close()
|
||||
}
|
||||
h.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
close(done)
|
||||
})
|
||||
go func() {
|
||||
for {
|
||||
c, err := ln.Accept()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
h.mu.Lock()
|
||||
if h.closed {
|
||||
h.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
_ = c.Close()
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
h.open = append(h.open, c)
|
||||
h.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
if tc, ok := c.(*net.TCPConn); ok && window > 0 {
|
||||
_ = tc.SetReadBuffer(window)
|
||||
}
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case h.conns <- c:
|
||||
case <-done:
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}()
|
||||
return h
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (h *graphiteHost) addr(t *testing.T) *net.TCPAddr {
|
||||
a, err := net.ResolveTCPAddr("tcp", h.ln.Addr().String())
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
return a
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// readExport reads what one send wrote, bounded so a send that never finishes fails the test rather than hanging it
|
||||
func readExport(t *testing.T, c net.Conn) []byte {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
require.NoError(t, c.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(10*time.Second)))
|
||||
b, err := io.ReadAll(c)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
return b
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (h *graphiteHost) next(t *testing.T, wait time.Duration) net.Conn {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case c := <-h.conns:
|
||||
return c
|
||||
case <-time.After(wait):
|
||||
t.Fatal("no connection")
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// lockedBuffer is a log destination a test can read while the code under test writes to it from another goroutine
|
||||
type lockedBuffer struct {
|
||||
mu sync.Mutex
|
||||
buf bytes.Buffer
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (b *lockedBuffer) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
|
||||
b.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer b.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
return b.buf.Write(p)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (b *lockedBuffer) String() string {
|
||||
b.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer b.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
return b.buf.String()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func testGraphiteConfig(addr *net.TCPAddr, r metrics.Registry) graphiteConfigExport {
|
||||
return graphiteConfigExport{Addr: addr, Registry: r, FlushInterval: time.Second, DurationUnit: time.Nanosecond, Prefix: "nebula"}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Enough metrics that one export overflows the socket buffers on any platform, so a send to a host that stops
|
||||
// reading blocks
|
||||
func bigGraphiteRegistry(r metrics.Registry, t *testing.T) {
|
||||
for i := range 200000 {
|
||||
name := fmt.Sprintf("big.gauge.%d", i)
|
||||
metrics.GetOrRegisterGauge(name, r).Update(int64(i))
|
||||
t.Cleanup(func() { r.Unregister(name) })
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestGraphiteOnce_sends(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
r := metrics.NewRegistry()
|
||||
metrics.GetOrRegisterGauge("g", r).Update(7)
|
||||
metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("c", r).Inc(3)
|
||||
h := newGraphiteHost(t, 0)
|
||||
|
||||
require.NoError(t, graphiteOnce(t.Context(), testGraphiteConfig(h.addr(t), r), time.Minute))
|
||||
b := readExport(t, h.next(t, 5*time.Second))
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, string(b), "nebula.g.value 7 ")
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, string(b), "nebula.c.count 3 ")
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, string(b), "nebula.c.count_ps 3.00 ")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A host that accepts and never reads is given up on, and the failed write is reported
|
||||
func TestGraphiteOnce_stalledHostTimesOut(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
r := metrics.NewRegistry()
|
||||
bigGraphiteRegistry(r, t)
|
||||
h := newGraphiteHost(t, 4096)
|
||||
done := make(chan error, 1)
|
||||
cfg := testGraphiteConfig(h.addr(t), r)
|
||||
go func() { done <- graphiteOnce(t.Context(), cfg, 300*time.Millisecond) }()
|
||||
h.next(t, 5*time.Second) // accepted, never read
|
||||
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case err := <-done:
|
||||
require.Error(t, err)
|
||||
case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
|
||||
t.Fatal("the send did not give up on a host that stopped reading")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The timeout covers the whole send, a host that keeps reading but too slowly is still given up on
|
||||
func TestGraphiteOnce_timeoutCoversTheWholeSend(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
r := metrics.NewRegistry()
|
||||
bigGraphiteRegistry(r, t)
|
||||
h := newGraphiteHost(t, 0)
|
||||
done := make(chan error, 1)
|
||||
start := time.Now()
|
||||
cfg := testGraphiteConfig(h.addr(t), r)
|
||||
go func() { done <- graphiteOnce(t.Context(), cfg, 500*time.Millisecond) }()
|
||||
c := h.next(t, 5*time.Second)
|
||||
stopReading := make(chan struct{})
|
||||
defer close(stopReading)
|
||||
// 32KB every 10ms keeps every write well inside the timeout, the whole export takes seconds
|
||||
go func() {
|
||||
buf := make([]byte, 32<<10)
|
||||
for {
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case <-stopReading:
|
||||
return
|
||||
case <-time.After(10 * time.Millisecond):
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := c.Read(buf); err != nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}()
|
||||
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case err := <-done:
|
||||
require.Error(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Less(t, time.Since(start), 5*time.Second)
|
||||
case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
|
||||
t.Fatal("a host that kept reading slowly held the send past its timeout")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestGraphiteOnce_cancelledCtxDoesNotConnect(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h := newGraphiteHost(t, 0)
|
||||
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
|
||||
cancel()
|
||||
require.Error(t, graphiteOnce(ctx, testGraphiteConfig(h.addr(t), metrics.NewRegistry()), time.Minute))
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case <-h.conns:
|
||||
t.Fatal("connected on a cancelled ctx")
|
||||
case <-time.After(200 * time.Millisecond):
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A stop or reload abandons a stuck send rather than waiting out its timeout
|
||||
func TestGraphiteOnce_cancelAbandonsSend(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
r := metrics.NewRegistry()
|
||||
bigGraphiteRegistry(r, t)
|
||||
h := newGraphiteHost(t, 4096)
|
||||
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
|
||||
done := make(chan error, 1)
|
||||
cfg := testGraphiteConfig(h.addr(t), r)
|
||||
go func() { done <- graphiteOnce(ctx, cfg, time.Minute) }()
|
||||
h.next(t, 5*time.Second)
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case err := <-done:
|
||||
t.Fatalf("the send should be stuck on a host that is not reading, it ended with %v", err)
|
||||
case <-time.After(200 * time.Millisecond):
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cancel()
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case err := <-done:
|
||||
require.Error(t, err)
|
||||
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
|
||||
t.Fatal("the send is still stuck after its ctx was cancelled")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// buildRuntime hands graphite the configured prefix and interval
|
||||
func TestStatsServer_graphiteExportUsesConfig(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
const name = "graphite.wiring.test"
|
||||
metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter(name, nil).Inc(8)
|
||||
t.Cleanup(func() { metrics.DefaultRegistry.Unregister(name) })
|
||||
h := newGraphiteHost(t, 0)
|
||||
s, c := newTestStatsServer(t)
|
||||
setStatsConfig(c, map[string]any{"type": "graphite", "interval": "4s", "prefix": "pfx", "host": h.ln.Addr().String()})
|
||||
cfg, err := loadStatsConfig(c)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
|
||||
s.runMu.Lock()
|
||||
fns, _ := s.buildRuntime(t.Context(), cfg)
|
||||
s.runMu.Unlock()
|
||||
for _, fn := range fns {
|
||||
fn()
|
||||
}
|
||||
b := readExport(t, h.next(t, 5*time.Second))
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, string(b), "pfx."+name+".count 8 ")
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, string(b), "pfx."+name+".count_ps 2.00 ")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestStatsServer_graphiteFailureIsLogged(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
logs := &lockedBuffer{}
|
||||
s, c := newTestStatsServer(t)
|
||||
s.l = test.NewLoggerWithOutput(logs)
|
||||
setStatsConfig(c, map[string]any{"type": "graphite", "interval": "1h", "host": "127.0.0.1:" + freeTCPPort(t)})
|
||||
cfg, err := loadStatsConfig(c)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
|
||||
s.runMu.Lock()
|
||||
fns, _ := s.buildRuntime(t.Context(), cfg)
|
||||
s.runMu.Unlock()
|
||||
for _, fn := range fns {
|
||||
fn()
|
||||
}
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, logs.String(), "Graphite export failed")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Stop abandons the running export, so it goes through Start rather than handing buildRuntime a ctx, and a stop is
|
||||
// not logged as a failure
|
||||
func TestStatsServer_stopAbandonsGraphiteSend(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
bigGraphiteRegistry(metrics.DefaultRegistry, t)
|
||||
h := newGraphiteHost(t, 4096)
|
||||
logs := &lockedBuffer{}
|
||||
s, c := newTestStatsServer(t)
|
||||
s.l = test.NewLoggerWithOutput(logs)
|
||||
setStatsConfig(c, map[string]any{"type": "graphite", "interval": "50ms", "host": h.ln.Addr().String()})
|
||||
require.NoError(t, s.reload(c, true))
|
||||
|
||||
started := make(chan struct{})
|
||||
go func() {
|
||||
s.Start()
|
||||
close(started)
|
||||
}()
|
||||
stuck := h.next(t, 30*time.Second)
|
||||
s.Stop()
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case <-started:
|
||||
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
|
||||
t.Fatal("Start did not return after Stop")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A closed sender resets the connection once it sees this, one still sending just buffers it. Either way the
|
||||
// read below doesn't have to drain the export through the small window to find out
|
||||
_, err := stuck.Write([]byte("x"))
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, stuck.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(10*time.Second)))
|
||||
n, err := io.Copy(io.Discard, stuck)
|
||||
var ne net.Error
|
||||
if errors.As(err, &ne) && ne.Timeout() {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("the send kept the connection after Stop, read %d bytes", n)
|
||||
}
|
||||
assert.Less(t, n, int64(1<<20), "the send kept going after Stop")
|
||||
// The capture loop logs on its own goroutine after Start has returned, give it the chance
|
||||
assert.Never(t, func() bool { return strings.Contains(logs.String(), "Graphite export failed") }, 500*time.Millisecond, 10*time.Millisecond, "a stop is not a failure")
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -35,7 +35,9 @@ func NewCredential(
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// buildHandshakeState creates a noise.HandshakeState from this credential.
|
||||
func (hc *Credential) buildHandshakeState(initiator bool, pattern noise.HandshakePattern) (*noise.HandshakeState, error) {
|
||||
// pskPlacement selects the noise psk modifier; 0 means none. A psk for
|
||||
// placements 2 and up is supplied later with SetPresharedKey.
|
||||
func (hc *Credential) buildHandshakeState(initiator bool, pattern noise.HandshakePattern, pskPlacement int) (*noise.HandshakeState, error) {
|
||||
return noise.NewHandshakeState(noise.Config{
|
||||
CipherSuite: hc.cipherSuite,
|
||||
Random: rand.Reader,
|
||||
@@ -43,7 +45,7 @@ func (hc *Credential) buildHandshakeState(initiator bool, pattern noise.Handshak
|
||||
Initiator: initiator,
|
||||
StaticKeypair: noise.DHKey{Private: hc.privateKey, Public: hc.Cert.PublicKey()},
|
||||
PresharedKey: []byte{},
|
||||
PresharedKeyPlacement: 0,
|
||||
PresharedKeyPlacement: pskPlacement,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
|
||||
// Package fec implements the systematic Reed-Solomon erasure code used to carry
|
||||
// handshake messages that do not fit in a single UDP packet.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// A message is split into K equally sized data symbols (the last one zero
|
||||
// padded). Symbol indexes 0..K-1 are the data symbols themselves; indexes
|
||||
// K..MaxSymbols-1 are repair symbols. Any K distinct symbols reconstruct the
|
||||
// message. Repair symbols are generated on demand, so a sender can emit fresh
|
||||
// ones on every retransmit and a receiver can merge everything it has seen.
|
||||
package fec
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// MaxSymbols is the number of distinct symbols, data and repair together, one
|
||||
// message can be encoded into. It is bounded by the size of GF(2^8).
|
||||
const MaxSymbols = 256
|
||||
|
||||
var (
|
||||
ErrInvalidLayout = errors.New("invalid fec layout")
|
||||
ErrIndexRange = errors.New("symbol index out of range")
|
||||
ErrSymbolSize = errors.New("symbol has the wrong size")
|
||||
ErrNotEnough = errors.New("not enough symbols to decode")
|
||||
ErrCorrupt = errors.New("decoded message has non-zero padding")
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Layout describes how a message is split into symbols. Both ends derive it
|
||||
// from the message length alone, so it never has to be sent.
|
||||
type Layout struct {
|
||||
MsgLen int // length of the message in bytes
|
||||
K int // number of data symbols
|
||||
SymbolSize int // size of every symbol, data and repair
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NewLayout returns the layout for a message of msgLen bytes carried in symbols
|
||||
// of at most maxSymbolSize bytes. Symbols are balanced, so padding is always
|
||||
// less than K bytes.
|
||||
func NewLayout(msgLen, maxSymbolSize int) (Layout, error) {
|
||||
if msgLen <= 0 || maxSymbolSize <= 0 {
|
||||
return Layout{}, ErrInvalidLayout
|
||||
}
|
||||
k := (msgLen + maxSymbolSize - 1) / maxSymbolSize
|
||||
if k >= MaxSymbols {
|
||||
return Layout{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: %d data symbols", ErrInvalidLayout, k)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return Layout{
|
||||
MsgLen: msgLen,
|
||||
K: k,
|
||||
SymbolSize: (msgLen + k - 1) / k,
|
||||
}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Encoder produces symbols for one message.
|
||||
type Encoder struct {
|
||||
layout Layout
|
||||
data [][]byte
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NewEncoder copies msg into padded data symbols.
|
||||
func NewEncoder(msg []byte, maxSymbolSize int) (*Encoder, error) {
|
||||
l, err := NewLayout(len(msg), maxSymbolSize)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
buf := make([]byte, l.K*l.SymbolSize)
|
||||
copy(buf, msg)
|
||||
data := make([][]byte, l.K)
|
||||
for i := range data {
|
||||
data[i] = buf[i*l.SymbolSize : (i+1)*l.SymbolSize]
|
||||
}
|
||||
return &Encoder{layout: l, data: data}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (e *Encoder) Layout() Layout {
|
||||
return e.layout
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Symbol appends the symbol with the given index to dst and returns the result.
|
||||
func (e *Encoder) Symbol(dst []byte, index int) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
if index < 0 || index >= MaxSymbols {
|
||||
return nil, ErrIndexRange
|
||||
}
|
||||
if index < e.layout.K {
|
||||
return append(dst, e.data[index]...), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
start := len(dst)
|
||||
dst = append(dst, make([]byte, e.layout.SymbolSize)...)
|
||||
out := dst[start:]
|
||||
for col, d := range e.data {
|
||||
mulAdd(out, d, coefficient(index, col))
|
||||
}
|
||||
return dst, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Decoder collects symbols for one message until it can reconstruct it.
|
||||
// It stores at most K symbols, so its memory is bounded by the layout no matter
|
||||
// how many symbols arrive.
|
||||
type Decoder struct {
|
||||
layout Layout
|
||||
have [MaxSymbols]bool
|
||||
syms map[int][]byte
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NewDecoder returns a decoder for a message of msgLen bytes that was encoded
|
||||
// with the same maxSymbolSize.
|
||||
func NewDecoder(msgLen, maxSymbolSize int) (*Decoder, error) {
|
||||
l, err := NewLayout(msgLen, maxSymbolSize)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return &Decoder{layout: l, syms: make(map[int][]byte, l.K)}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (d *Decoder) Layout() Layout {
|
||||
return d.layout
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Stored returns the number of symbols held.
|
||||
func (d *Decoder) Stored() int {
|
||||
return len(d.syms)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Has reports whether the symbol with the given index is held.
|
||||
func (d *Decoder) Has(index int) bool {
|
||||
return index >= 0 && index < MaxSymbols && d.have[index]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Ready reports whether enough symbols have arrived to decode.
|
||||
func (d *Decoder) Ready() bool {
|
||||
return len(d.syms) >= d.layout.K
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Add stores a copy of the symbol. Duplicates, and anything beyond the first K
|
||||
// distinct symbols, are ignored. It returns whether the decoder is ready.
|
||||
func (d *Decoder) Add(index int, sym []byte) (bool, error) {
|
||||
if index < 0 || index >= MaxSymbols {
|
||||
return d.Ready(), ErrIndexRange
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(sym) != d.layout.SymbolSize {
|
||||
return d.Ready(), ErrSymbolSize
|
||||
}
|
||||
if d.have[index] || d.Ready() {
|
||||
return d.Ready(), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
d.have[index] = true
|
||||
d.syms[index] = append([]byte(nil), sym...)
|
||||
return d.Ready(), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Decode reconstructs the message from the stored symbols.
|
||||
func (d *Decoder) Decode() ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
if !d.Ready() {
|
||||
return nil, ErrNotEnough
|
||||
}
|
||||
l := d.layout
|
||||
|
||||
out := make([]byte, l.K*l.SymbolSize)
|
||||
var missing, repair []int
|
||||
for i := range l.K {
|
||||
if s, ok := d.syms[i]; ok {
|
||||
copy(out[i*l.SymbolSize:], s)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
missing = append(missing, i)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if len(missing) > 0 {
|
||||
for i := l.K; i < MaxSymbols && len(repair) < len(missing); i++ {
|
||||
if d.have[i] {
|
||||
repair = append(repair, i)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(repair) < len(missing) {
|
||||
return nil, ErrNotEnough
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Each repair symbol r satisfies r = sum_col coefficient(r, col) * data[col].
|
||||
// Move the known data columns to the left hand side, leaving a square
|
||||
// Cauchy system in the missing columns.
|
||||
rhs := make([][]byte, len(repair))
|
||||
m := make([][]byte, len(repair))
|
||||
for ri, row := range repair {
|
||||
rhs[ri] = append([]byte(nil), d.syms[row]...)
|
||||
m[ri] = make([]byte, len(missing))
|
||||
mi := 0
|
||||
for col := range l.K {
|
||||
if mi < len(missing) && missing[mi] == col {
|
||||
m[ri][mi] = coefficient(row, col)
|
||||
mi++
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
mulAdd(rhs[ri], out[col*l.SymbolSize:(col+1)*l.SymbolSize], coefficient(row, col))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !invert(m) {
|
||||
// Unreachable for a Cauchy matrix; kept so a broken invariant fails loudly.
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("fec: singular decode matrix")
|
||||
}
|
||||
for mi, col := range missing {
|
||||
dst := out[col*l.SymbolSize : (col+1)*l.SymbolSize]
|
||||
for ri := range repair {
|
||||
mulAdd(dst, rhs[ri], m[mi][ri])
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, b := range out[l.MsgLen:] {
|
||||
if b != 0 {
|
||||
return nil, ErrCorrupt
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out[:l.MsgLen], nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,318 @@
|
||||
package fec
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"crypto/sha256"
|
||||
"encoding/hex"
|
||||
"math/rand/v2"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// slowMul is carry-less multiplication reduced by gfPoly, used to check the tables.
|
||||
func slowMul(a, b byte) byte {
|
||||
var p int
|
||||
x, y := int(a), int(b)
|
||||
for y > 0 {
|
||||
if y&1 != 0 {
|
||||
p ^= x
|
||||
}
|
||||
x <<= 1
|
||||
if x&0x100 != 0 {
|
||||
x ^= gfPoly
|
||||
}
|
||||
y >>= 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
return byte(p)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestGF(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
for a := range 256 {
|
||||
for b := range 256 {
|
||||
require.Equal(t, slowMul(byte(a), byte(b)), gfMul(byte(a), byte(b)), "%d*%d", a, b)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if a != 0 {
|
||||
require.Equal(t, byte(1), gfMul(byte(a), gfInv(byte(a))), "inv(%d)", a)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
src := make([]byte, 256)
|
||||
for i := range src {
|
||||
src[i] = byte(i)
|
||||
}
|
||||
for c := range 256 {
|
||||
dst := make([]byte, 256)
|
||||
mulAdd(dst, src, byte(c))
|
||||
for i := range src {
|
||||
require.Equal(t, gfMul(byte(c), src[i]), dst[i])
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestLayout(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
for msgLen := 1; msgLen <= 20000; msgLen++ {
|
||||
l, err := NewLayout(msgLen, 1176)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
require.Equal(t, (msgLen+1175)/1176, l.K)
|
||||
require.LessOrEqual(t, l.SymbolSize, 1176)
|
||||
require.GreaterOrEqual(t, l.K*l.SymbolSize, msgLen)
|
||||
require.Less(t, l.K*l.SymbolSize-msgLen, l.K, "padding must be less than one byte per symbol")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
l, err := NewLayout(65535, 1176)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, 56, l.K)
|
||||
|
||||
_, err = NewLayout(0, 1176)
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInvalidLayout)
|
||||
_, err = NewLayout(100, 0)
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInvalidLayout)
|
||||
_, err = NewLayout(256, 1)
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInvalidLayout)
|
||||
_, err = NewLayout(255, 1)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func randMsg(r *rand.Rand, n int) []byte {
|
||||
b := make([]byte, n)
|
||||
for i := range b {
|
||||
b[i] = byte(r.Uint32())
|
||||
}
|
||||
return b
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func decodeWith(t *testing.T, enc *Encoder, msgLen, maxSym int, indexes []int) []byte {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
dec, err := NewDecoder(msgLen, maxSym)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
for _, idx := range indexes {
|
||||
sym, err := enc.Symbol(nil, idx)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
_, err = dec.Add(idx, sym)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
require.True(t, dec.Ready())
|
||||
out, err := dec.Decode()
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestExhaustiveSubsets decodes every k-subset of the first k+m symbols for
|
||||
// small codes, which checks the MDS property directly.
|
||||
func TestExhaustiveSubsets(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
r := rand.New(rand.NewPCG(1, 2))
|
||||
const maxSym = 16
|
||||
for k := 1; k <= 10; k++ {
|
||||
for m := 1; m <= 5; m++ {
|
||||
msgLen := (k-1)*maxSym + 1 + r.IntN(maxSym)
|
||||
msg := randMsg(r, msgLen)
|
||||
enc, err := NewEncoder(msg, maxSym)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
require.Equal(t, k, enc.Layout().K)
|
||||
|
||||
n := k + m
|
||||
for mask := 0; mask < 1<<n; mask++ {
|
||||
var idx []int
|
||||
for i := range n {
|
||||
if mask&(1<<i) != 0 {
|
||||
idx = append(idx, i)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(idx) != k {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
require.Equal(t, msg, decodeWith(t, enc, msgLen, maxSym, idx), "k=%d m=%d idx=%v", k, m, idx)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestRandomHighIndexes draws symbols from the whole index space, the shape
|
||||
// retransmits produce once fresh repair symbols are in play.
|
||||
func TestRandomHighIndexes(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
r := rand.New(rand.NewPCG(3, 4))
|
||||
for range 2000 {
|
||||
msgLen := 1 + r.IntN(65535)
|
||||
msg := randMsg(r, msgLen)
|
||||
enc, err := NewEncoder(msg, 1176)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
k := enc.Layout().K
|
||||
|
||||
idx := r.Perm(MaxSymbols)[:k]
|
||||
require.Equal(t, msg, decodeWith(t, enc, msgLen, 1176, idx), "k=%d idx=%v", k, idx)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestDecoderBounds(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
r := rand.New(rand.NewPCG(5, 6))
|
||||
msg := randMsg(r, 3000)
|
||||
enc, err := NewEncoder(msg, 1176)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
l := enc.Layout()
|
||||
require.Equal(t, 3, l.K)
|
||||
require.Equal(t, 1000, l.SymbolSize)
|
||||
|
||||
dec, err := NewDecoder(3000, 1176)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
|
||||
_, err = dec.Decode()
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNotEnough)
|
||||
|
||||
_, err = dec.Add(-1, make([]byte, 1000))
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIndexRange)
|
||||
_, err = dec.Add(MaxSymbols, make([]byte, 1000))
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIndexRange)
|
||||
_, err = dec.Add(0, make([]byte, 999))
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrSymbolSize)
|
||||
|
||||
s5, _ := enc.Symbol(nil, 5)
|
||||
ready, err := dec.Add(5, s5)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
require.False(t, ready)
|
||||
|
||||
// A duplicate index is ignored, even with different contents.
|
||||
ready, err = dec.Add(5, make([]byte, 1000))
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
require.False(t, ready)
|
||||
|
||||
s0, _ := enc.Symbol(nil, 0)
|
||||
s9, _ := enc.Symbol(nil, 9)
|
||||
_, err = dec.Add(0, s0)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
ready, err = dec.Add(9, s9)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
require.True(t, ready)
|
||||
|
||||
// Symbols beyond K are not stored.
|
||||
ready, err = dec.Add(1, make([]byte, 1000))
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
require.True(t, ready)
|
||||
require.Len(t, dec.syms, 3)
|
||||
|
||||
out, err := dec.Decode()
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
require.Equal(t, msg, out)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestCorruptPadding(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// 3001 bytes in 3 symbols of 1001 leaves 2 bytes of padding in the last one.
|
||||
dec, err := NewDecoder(3001, 1176)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
require.Equal(t, 1001, dec.Layout().SymbolSize)
|
||||
|
||||
last := make([]byte, 1001)
|
||||
last[1000] = 1
|
||||
for i, s := range [][]byte{make([]byte, 1001), make([]byte, 1001), last} {
|
||||
_, err = dec.Add(i, s)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
_, err = dec.Decode()
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrCorrupt)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestKnownAnswer pins the encoding. Both ends of a handshake must produce
|
||||
// identical repair symbols, so any change here is a wire format change.
|
||||
func TestKnownAnswer(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
msg := make([]byte, 3000)
|
||||
for i := range msg {
|
||||
msg[i] = byte(i*7 + 3)
|
||||
}
|
||||
enc, err := NewEncoder(msg, 1176)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
|
||||
// Cross-checked against an independent bit-serial GF(2^8) implementation.
|
||||
want := map[int]string{
|
||||
3: "52124f58276ec6338d3b3f4eed273bc7cabfe4f0f467928962b046ad1b348f50",
|
||||
4: "a50928b04738981985a7d4a17ffaf8d7e30014ca64fc53c99800ffb61aec4aa7",
|
||||
5: "ada4c95a7facbc542aaef584e6f0d081b7b0d0eed69ded03b57d0753a119cfc9",
|
||||
255: "839066cdf94f963b223fb1c1c1360f698c14f6349b25653ff5b521791a4021b1",
|
||||
}
|
||||
for idx, h := range want {
|
||||
sym, err := enc.Symbol(nil, idx)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
sum := sha256.Sum256(sym)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h, hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]), "symbol %d", idx)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func FuzzRoundTrip(f *testing.F) {
|
||||
f.Add([]byte("hello"), uint16(2), uint64(0))
|
||||
f.Add(make([]byte, 9000), uint16(1176), uint64(7))
|
||||
f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, msg []byte, maxSym uint16, seed uint64) {
|
||||
if len(msg) == 0 || maxSym == 0 {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
enc, err := NewEncoder(msg, int(maxSym))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
r := rand.New(rand.NewPCG(seed, seed))
|
||||
idx := r.Perm(MaxSymbols)[:enc.Layout().K]
|
||||
require.Equal(t, msg, decodeWith(t, enc, len(msg), int(maxSym), idx))
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// FuzzDecoder feeds arbitrary symbols to a decoder; it must never panic and
|
||||
// must either fail or return a message of the declared length.
|
||||
func FuzzDecoder(f *testing.F) {
|
||||
f.Add(uint16(3000), []byte{0, 5, 9, 200}, []byte("some symbol bytes"))
|
||||
f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, msgLen uint16, indexes []byte, fill []byte) {
|
||||
dec, err := NewDecoder(int(msgLen), 1176)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
size := dec.Layout().SymbolSize
|
||||
for i, idx := range indexes {
|
||||
sym := make([]byte, size)
|
||||
for j := range sym {
|
||||
if len(fill) > 0 {
|
||||
sym[j] = fill[(i+j)%len(fill)]
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := dec.Add(int(idx), sym); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
out, err := dec.Decode()
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
require.Len(t, out, int(msgLen))
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// BenchmarkRepair and BenchmarkDecode use a v3-sized msg2 (~9.8KB, k=9) with
|
||||
// three repair symbols, decoding with three data symbols missing.
|
||||
func BenchmarkRepair(b *testing.B) {
|
||||
msg := randMsg(rand.New(rand.NewPCG(7, 8)), 9800)
|
||||
enc, err := NewEncoder(msg, 1176)
|
||||
require.NoError(b, err)
|
||||
buf := make([]byte, 0, 1176)
|
||||
b.SetBytes(int64(len(msg)))
|
||||
for b.Loop() {
|
||||
for idx := 9; idx < 12; idx++ {
|
||||
buf, _ = enc.Symbol(buf[:0], idx)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func BenchmarkDecode(b *testing.B) {
|
||||
msg := randMsg(rand.New(rand.NewPCG(7, 8)), 9800)
|
||||
enc, err := NewEncoder(msg, 1176)
|
||||
require.NoError(b, err)
|
||||
idx := []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11}
|
||||
syms := make([][]byte, len(idx))
|
||||
for i, x := range idx {
|
||||
syms[i], _ = enc.Symbol(nil, x)
|
||||
}
|
||||
b.SetBytes(int64(len(msg)))
|
||||
for b.Loop() {
|
||||
dec, _ := NewDecoder(len(msg), 1176)
|
||||
for i, x := range idx {
|
||||
_, _ = dec.Add(x, syms[i])
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, err := dec.Decode(); err != nil {
|
||||
b.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
|
||||
package fec
|
||||
|
||||
// Arithmetic over GF(2^8) with the reducing polynomial x^8+x^4+x^3+x^2+1 (0x11d).
|
||||
// Addition is XOR. Multiplication uses log/exp tables; the exp table is doubled so
|
||||
// the sum of two logs never needs reducing mod 255.
|
||||
|
||||
const gfPoly = 0x11d
|
||||
|
||||
var (
|
||||
gfExp [510]byte
|
||||
gfLog [256]byte
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func init() {
|
||||
x := 1
|
||||
for i := range 255 {
|
||||
gfExp[i] = byte(x)
|
||||
gfExp[i+255] = byte(x)
|
||||
gfLog[x] = byte(i)
|
||||
x <<= 1
|
||||
if x&0x100 != 0 {
|
||||
x ^= gfPoly
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func gfMul(a, b byte) byte {
|
||||
if a == 0 || b == 0 {
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
return gfExp[int(gfLog[a])+int(gfLog[b])]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// gfInv returns the multiplicative inverse of a. a must be non-zero.
|
||||
func gfInv(a byte) byte {
|
||||
return gfExp[255-int(gfLog[a])]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// mulAdd computes dst ^= c*src element-wise. dst must be at least as long as src.
|
||||
func mulAdd(dst, src []byte, c byte) {
|
||||
switch c {
|
||||
case 0:
|
||||
return
|
||||
case 1:
|
||||
for i, s := range src {
|
||||
dst[i] ^= s
|
||||
}
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var t [256]byte
|
||||
lc := int(gfLog[c])
|
||||
for s := 1; s < 256; s++ {
|
||||
t[s] = gfExp[int(gfLog[s])+lc]
|
||||
}
|
||||
for i, s := range src {
|
||||
dst[i] ^= t[s]
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// coefficient returns the generator matrix entry for repair symbol index row and
|
||||
// data symbol index col. Repair rows are a Cauchy matrix 1/(x_row + y_col) with
|
||||
// x_row = row and y_col = col: rows are always >= k and columns < k so the two
|
||||
// sets are disjoint, which makes every square submatrix invertible and the
|
||||
// systematic code [I; C] MDS. A row depends only on its index, never on how many
|
||||
// repair symbols exist, so new repair symbols can be generated at any time.
|
||||
func coefficient(row, col int) byte {
|
||||
return gfInv(byte(row) ^ byte(col))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// invert inverts the n x n matrix m in place with Gauss-Jordan elimination.
|
||||
// It returns false if m is singular.
|
||||
func invert(m [][]byte) bool {
|
||||
n := len(m)
|
||||
inv := make([][]byte, n)
|
||||
for i := range inv {
|
||||
inv[i] = make([]byte, n)
|
||||
inv[i][i] = 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for col := range n {
|
||||
pivot := -1
|
||||
for r := col; r < n; r++ {
|
||||
if m[r][col] != 0 {
|
||||
pivot = r
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if pivot < 0 {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
m[col], m[pivot] = m[pivot], m[col]
|
||||
inv[col], inv[pivot] = inv[pivot], inv[col]
|
||||
|
||||
scale := gfInv(m[col][col])
|
||||
for c := range n {
|
||||
m[col][c] = gfMul(m[col][c], scale)
|
||||
inv[col][c] = gfMul(inv[col][c], scale)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for r := 0; r < n; r++ {
|
||||
if r == col || m[r][col] == 0 {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
f := m[r][col]
|
||||
for c := range n {
|
||||
m[r][c] ^= gfMul(f, m[col][c])
|
||||
inv[r][c] ^= gfMul(f, inv[col][c])
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
copy(m, inv)
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
|
||||
package fragment
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake/fec"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// ErrMismatch is returned when a fragment disagrees with the message it claims to
|
||||
// belong to. The caller should discard the whole assembly.
|
||||
var ErrMismatch = errors.New("fragment does not match its message")
|
||||
|
||||
// Assembly collects the fragments of one incoming message. Its memory is bounded
|
||||
// by the message length: at most K symbols are kept however many arrive.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// An Assembly is not safe for concurrent use.
|
||||
type Assembly struct {
|
||||
fragID uint32
|
||||
msgLen uint16
|
||||
dec *fec.Decoder
|
||||
received int
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NewAssembly starts an assembly for the message described by h. The fragment
|
||||
// itself still has to be passed to Add.
|
||||
func NewAssembly(h Header) (*Assembly, error) {
|
||||
dec, err := fec.NewDecoder(int(h.MsgLen), MaxSymbolSize)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return &Assembly{fragID: h.FragID, msgLen: h.MsgLen, dec: dec}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Add records a fragment parsed by Parse. It returns true once enough symbols
|
||||
// are held to call Decode.
|
||||
func (a *Assembly) Add(h Header, sym []byte) (bool, error) {
|
||||
if h.FragID != a.fragID || h.MsgLen != a.msgLen {
|
||||
return a.dec.Ready(), ErrMismatch
|
||||
}
|
||||
a.received += header.Len + HeaderLen + len(sym)
|
||||
return a.dec.Add(int(h.Index), sym)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// wouldStore returns how many bytes Add would retain for this fragment.
|
||||
func (a *Assembly) wouldStore(h Header, sym []byte) int {
|
||||
if h.FragID != a.fragID || h.MsgLen != a.msgLen || a.dec.Ready() || a.dec.Has(int(h.Index)) {
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
return len(sym)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Decode reconstructs the message. It requires Add to have reported ready.
|
||||
func (a *Assembly) Decode() ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
return a.dec.Decode()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Stored returns the number of symbol bytes held.
|
||||
func (a *Assembly) Stored() int {
|
||||
return a.dec.Stored() * a.dec.Layout().SymbolSize
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Received returns the number of packet bytes received for this message,
|
||||
// duplicates included. It is the basis for the amplification budget.
|
||||
func (a *Assembly) Received() int {
|
||||
return a.received
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,515 @@
|
||||
package fragment
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"bytes"
|
||||
"math/rand/v2"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
const testSubtype = header.MessageSubType(9)
|
||||
|
||||
type testKey struct {
|
||||
src string
|
||||
fragID uint32
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func randMsg(r *rand.Rand, n int) []byte {
|
||||
b := make([]byte, n)
|
||||
for i := range b {
|
||||
b[i] = byte(r.Uint32())
|
||||
}
|
||||
return b
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func testConfig() TableConfig {
|
||||
return TableConfig{
|
||||
MaxBytes: 1 << 20,
|
||||
MaxEntries: 64,
|
||||
MaxPerSource: 4,
|
||||
MaxMsgLen: 16384,
|
||||
TTL: 2 * time.Second,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// checkInvariants verifies the table's bookkeeping against its contents.
|
||||
func checkInvariants[K, S comparable](t *testing.T, tb *Table[K, S]) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
tb.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer tb.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
require.Len(t, tb.order, len(tb.entries))
|
||||
require.LessOrEqual(t, len(tb.entries), tb.cfg.MaxEntries)
|
||||
bytes := 0
|
||||
perSource := map[S]int{}
|
||||
for i, key := range tb.order {
|
||||
e, ok := tb.entries[key]
|
||||
require.True(t, ok)
|
||||
require.Equal(t, i, e.pos)
|
||||
bytes += e.a.Stored()
|
||||
perSource[e.source]++
|
||||
}
|
||||
require.Equal(t, bytes, tb.bytes)
|
||||
require.LessOrEqual(t, tb.bytes, tb.cfg.MaxBytes)
|
||||
require.Equal(t, perSource, tb.perSource)
|
||||
for _, n := range perSource {
|
||||
require.LessOrEqual(t, n, tb.cfg.MaxPerSource)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func parse(t *testing.T, p []byte) (header.H, Header, []byte) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
var nh header.H
|
||||
require.NoError(t, nh.Parse(p))
|
||||
h, sym, err := Parse(p[header.Len:])
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
return nh, h, sym
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestParse(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h := Header{FragID: 0xdeadbeef, MsgLen: 3000, Index: 7}
|
||||
b := h.Encode(nil)
|
||||
require.Len(t, b, HeaderLen)
|
||||
b = append(b, make([]byte, 1000)...)
|
||||
|
||||
got, sym, err := Parse(b)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h, got)
|
||||
assert.Len(t, sym, 1000)
|
||||
|
||||
_, _, err = Parse(b[:HeaderLen-1])
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrShortFragment)
|
||||
_, _, err = Parse(b[:len(b)-1])
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrSymbolSize)
|
||||
_, _, err = Parse(append(b, 0))
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrSymbolSize)
|
||||
|
||||
bad := Header{FragID: 0, MsgLen: 3000}.Encode(nil)
|
||||
_, _, err = Parse(append(bad, make([]byte, 1000)...))
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrFragID)
|
||||
|
||||
bad = Header{FragID: 1, MsgLen: 0}.Encode(nil)
|
||||
_, _, err = Parse(bad)
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrMsgLen)
|
||||
|
||||
bad = Header{FragID: 1, MsgLen: 3000, Flags: 0x02}.Encode(nil)
|
||||
_, _, err = Parse(append(bad, make([]byte, 1000)...))
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrFlags)
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("cookie", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h := Header{FragID: 7, MsgLen: 3000, Index: 4, Flags: FlagCookie}
|
||||
for i := range h.Cookie {
|
||||
h.Cookie[i] = byte(i + 1)
|
||||
}
|
||||
b := h.Encode(nil)
|
||||
require.Len(t, b, HeaderLen+CookieLen)
|
||||
b = append(b, make([]byte, 1000)...)
|
||||
|
||||
got, sym, err := Parse(b)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h, got)
|
||||
assert.True(t, got.HasCookie())
|
||||
assert.Len(t, sym, 1000)
|
||||
|
||||
_, _, err = Parse(b[:HeaderLen+CookieLen-1])
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNoCookie)
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestDefaultRepair(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
for k, want := range map[int]int{1: 2, 2: 2, 6: 2, 7: 3, 9: 3, 10: 4, 14: 5} {
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, want, DefaultRepair(k), "k=%d", k)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestSender(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
_, err := NewSender(nil, testSubtype, 0, 1, 1)
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrMsgLen)
|
||||
_, err = NewSender(make([]byte, 65536), testSubtype, 0, 1, 1)
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrMsgLen)
|
||||
_, err = NewSender(make([]byte, 10), testSubtype, 0, 1, 0)
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrFragID)
|
||||
|
||||
msg := randMsg(rand.New(rand.NewPCG(1, 1)), 9800)
|
||||
s, err := NewSender(msg, testSubtype, 77, 2, 1234)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
require.Equal(t, 9, s.Layout().K)
|
||||
|
||||
indexes := func(ps [][]byte) []int {
|
||||
var out []int
|
||||
for _, p := range ps {
|
||||
require.LessOrEqual(t, len(p), MaxPacketLen)
|
||||
nh, h, _ := parse(t, p)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, header.Handshake, nh.Type)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, testSubtype, nh.Subtype)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, uint32(77), nh.RemoteIndex)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, uint64(2), nh.MessageCounter)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, uint32(1234), h.FragID)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, uint16(9800), h.MsgLen)
|
||||
out = append(out, int(h.Index))
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
now, later, err := s.Attempt(3)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}, indexes(now))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []int{9, 10, 11}, indexes(later))
|
||||
|
||||
// A retry offers only indexes the receiver has not seen.
|
||||
now, later, err = s.Attempt(3)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []int{12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20}, indexes(now))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []int{21, 22, 23}, indexes(later))
|
||||
|
||||
// A sender rebuilt from the same message resumes where it was told to.
|
||||
s2, err := NewSender(msg, testSubtype, 77, 2, 1234)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
s2.SetNext(s.Next())
|
||||
now2, _, err := s2.Attempt(0)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []int{24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32}, indexes(now2))
|
||||
s2.SetNext(-1)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, 255, s2.Next())
|
||||
|
||||
// A cookie rides on every later packet, which still fits MaxPacketLen even
|
||||
// with a full size symbol.
|
||||
full, err := NewSender(make([]byte, 2*MaxSymbolSize), testSubtype, 0, 1, 9)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
full.SetCookie(Cookie{1, 2, 3})
|
||||
pkts, _, err := full.Attempt(1)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
for _, p := range pkts {
|
||||
assert.Len(t, p, MaxPacketLen)
|
||||
_, h, _ := parse(t, p)
|
||||
assert.True(t, h.HasCookie())
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, Cookie{1, 2, 3}, h.Cookie)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Indexes wrap once the space is used up.
|
||||
for range 19 {
|
||||
_, _, err = s.Attempt(3)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
now, _, err = s.Attempt(3)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []int{252, 253, 254, 255, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, indexes(now))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestLossy runs whole messages through heavy loss, reordering and duplication,
|
||||
// merging across attempts, and checks the table ends empty.
|
||||
func TestLossy(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
r := rand.New(rand.NewPCG(2, 2))
|
||||
tb := NewTable[testKey, string](testConfig())
|
||||
now := time.Unix(1000, 0)
|
||||
|
||||
for i := range 300 {
|
||||
msg := randMsg(r, 1+r.IntN(16384))
|
||||
fragID := uint32(i + 1)
|
||||
s, err := NewSender(msg, testSubtype, 0, 1, fragID)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
|
||||
var got *Result
|
||||
for attempt := 0; got == nil; attempt++ {
|
||||
require.Less(t, attempt, 20, "message never completed")
|
||||
a, b, err := s.Attempt(DefaultRepair(s.Layout().K))
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
var pkts [][]byte
|
||||
for _, p := range append(a, b...) {
|
||||
if r.Float64() < 0.3 {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
pkts = append(pkts, p)
|
||||
if r.Float64() < 0.2 {
|
||||
pkts = append(pkts, p)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
r.Shuffle(len(pkts), func(i, j int) { pkts[i], pkts[j] = pkts[j], pkts[i] })
|
||||
|
||||
for _, p := range pkts {
|
||||
_, h, sym := parse(t, p)
|
||||
res, err := tb.Add(testKey{"a", h.FragID}, "a", now, h, sym)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
if res != nil {
|
||||
// The table keeps no memory of completed messages, so a late
|
||||
// duplicate can complete one again; the handshake layer
|
||||
// recognises the repeat.
|
||||
require.True(t, bytes.Equal(msg, res.Msg))
|
||||
got = res
|
||||
}
|
||||
checkInvariants(t, tb)
|
||||
}
|
||||
now = now.Add(100 * time.Millisecond)
|
||||
}
|
||||
require.Positive(t, got.Received)
|
||||
// Late fragments of a completed message start a fresh entry; drop it.
|
||||
tb.Expire(now.Add(time.Hour))
|
||||
}
|
||||
assert.Zero(t, tb.Len())
|
||||
assert.Zero(t, tb.Bytes())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestConcurrent spreads each message's fragments across goroutines, as
|
||||
// multiple UDP reader routines would.
|
||||
func TestConcurrent(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
tb := NewTable[testKey, string](testConfig())
|
||||
now := time.Unix(1000, 0)
|
||||
r := rand.New(rand.NewPCG(3, 3))
|
||||
|
||||
const msgs = 50
|
||||
want := make(map[uint32][]byte, msgs)
|
||||
var pkts [][]byte
|
||||
for id := uint32(1); id <= msgs; id++ {
|
||||
msg := randMsg(r, 1+r.IntN(16384))
|
||||
want[id] = msg
|
||||
s, err := NewSender(msg, testSubtype, 0, 1, id)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
a, b, err := s.Attempt(DefaultRepair(s.Layout().K))
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
pkts = append(pkts, a...)
|
||||
pkts = append(pkts, b...)
|
||||
}
|
||||
r.Shuffle(len(pkts), func(i, j int) { pkts[i], pkts[j] = pkts[j], pkts[i] })
|
||||
|
||||
var mu sync.Mutex
|
||||
done := map[uint32]bool{}
|
||||
var wg sync.WaitGroup
|
||||
for w := range 8 {
|
||||
wg.Go(func() {
|
||||
for i := w; i < len(pkts); i += 8 {
|
||||
h, sym, err := Parse(pkts[i][16:])
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Error(err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
src := string(rune('a' + h.FragID))
|
||||
res, err := tb.Add(testKey{src, h.FragID}, src, now, h, sym)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Error(err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if res != nil {
|
||||
if !bytes.Equal(want[h.FragID], res.Msg) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("message %d decoded wrong", h.FragID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
mu.Lock()
|
||||
done[h.FragID] = true
|
||||
mu.Unlock()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
wg.Wait()
|
||||
assert.Len(t, done, msgs)
|
||||
checkInvariants(t, tb)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func firstFragment(t *testing.T, msgLen int, fragID uint32) (Header, []byte) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
s, err := NewSender(make([]byte, msgLen), testSubtype, 0, 1, fragID)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
now, _, err := s.Attempt(0)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
_, h, sym := parse(t, now[0])
|
||||
return h, sym
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestTableLimits(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
now := time.Unix(1000, 0)
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("max message length", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
tb := NewTable[testKey, string](testConfig())
|
||||
h, sym := firstFragment(t, 16385, 1)
|
||||
_, err := tb.Add(testKey{"a", 1}, "a", now, h, sym)
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrTooLarge)
|
||||
assert.Zero(t, tb.Len())
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("per source quota", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := testConfig()
|
||||
cfg.MaxPerSource = 2
|
||||
tb := NewTable[testKey, string](cfg)
|
||||
for id := uint32(1); id <= 3; id++ {
|
||||
h, sym := firstFragment(t, 5000, id)
|
||||
_, err := tb.Add(testKey{"a", id}, "a", now, h, sym)
|
||||
if id <= 2 {
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrSourceQuota)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
h, sym := firstFragment(t, 5000, 4)
|
||||
_, err := tb.Add(testKey{"b", 4}, "b", now, h, sym)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, 3, tb.Len())
|
||||
checkInvariants(t, tb)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("max entries evicts", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := testConfig()
|
||||
cfg.MaxEntries = 4
|
||||
tb := NewTable[testKey, string](cfg)
|
||||
for id := uint32(1); id <= 10; id++ {
|
||||
h, sym := firstFragment(t, 5000, id)
|
||||
src := string(rune('a' + id))
|
||||
_, err := tb.Add(testKey{src, id}, src, now, h, sym)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
checkInvariants(t, tb)
|
||||
}
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, 4, tb.Len())
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("max bytes evicts others", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := testConfig()
|
||||
cfg.MaxBytes = 3 * 1000
|
||||
tb := NewTable[testKey, string](cfg)
|
||||
for id := uint32(1); id <= 10; id++ {
|
||||
h, sym := firstFragment(t, 5000, id) // 5 symbols of 1000
|
||||
src := string(rune('a' + id))
|
||||
_, err := tb.Add(testKey{src, id}, src, now, h, sym)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
checkInvariants(t, tb)
|
||||
}
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, 3000, tb.Bytes())
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("no room removes new entry", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := testConfig()
|
||||
cfg.MaxBytes = 500
|
||||
tb := NewTable[testKey, string](cfg)
|
||||
h, sym := firstFragment(t, 5000, 1)
|
||||
_, err := tb.Add(testKey{"a", 1}, "a", now, h, sym)
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNoRoom)
|
||||
assert.Zero(t, tb.Len())
|
||||
checkInvariants(t, tb)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("duplicates are not charged", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
tb := NewTable[testKey, string](testConfig())
|
||||
h, sym := firstFragment(t, 5000, 1)
|
||||
for range 5 {
|
||||
_, err := tb.Add(testKey{"a", 1}, "a", now, h, sym)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, 1000, tb.Bytes())
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("mismatch drops the entry", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
tb := NewTable[testKey, string](testConfig())
|
||||
h, sym := firstFragment(t, 5000, 1)
|
||||
_, err := tb.Add(testKey{"a", 1}, "a", now, h, sym)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
|
||||
h2, sym2 := firstFragment(t, 6000, 1)
|
||||
_, err = tb.Add(testKey{"a", 1}, "a", now, h2, sym2)
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrMismatch)
|
||||
assert.Zero(t, tb.Len())
|
||||
assert.Zero(t, tb.Bytes())
|
||||
checkInvariants(t, tb)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("load", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := testConfig()
|
||||
cfg.MaxEntries = 4
|
||||
cfg.MaxBytes = 10000
|
||||
tb := NewTable[testKey, string](cfg)
|
||||
assert.Zero(t, tb.Load())
|
||||
h, sym := firstFragment(t, 5000, 1)
|
||||
_, err := tb.Add(testKey{"a", 1}, "a", now, h, sym)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.InDelta(t, 0.25, tb.Load(), 0.001, "one of four entries")
|
||||
h, sym = firstFragment(t, 5000, 2)
|
||||
_, err = tb.Add(testKey{"b", 2}, "b", now, h, sym)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.InDelta(t, 0.5, tb.Load(), 0.001)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("ttl", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
tb := NewTable[testKey, string](testConfig())
|
||||
s, err := NewSender(make([]byte, 5000), testSubtype, 0, 1, 1)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
pkts, _, err := s.Attempt(0)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
|
||||
_, h, sym := parse(t, pkts[0])
|
||||
_, err = tb.Add(testKey{"a", 1}, "a", now, h, sym)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
|
||||
// Activity within the TTL keeps the entry and slides its deadline.
|
||||
_, h, sym = parse(t, pkts[1])
|
||||
_, err = tb.Add(testKey{"a", 1}, "a", now.Add(1500*time.Millisecond), h, sym)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, 2000, tb.Bytes())
|
||||
|
||||
tb.Expire(now.Add(3 * time.Second))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, 1, tb.Len())
|
||||
|
||||
// A stale entry is restarted rather than merged.
|
||||
_, h, sym = parse(t, pkts[2])
|
||||
_, err = tb.Add(testKey{"a", 1}, "a", now.Add(10*time.Second), h, sym)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, 1000, tb.Bytes())
|
||||
|
||||
tb.Expire(now.Add(time.Minute))
|
||||
assert.Zero(t, tb.Len())
|
||||
checkInvariants(t, tb)
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func FuzzParse(f *testing.F) {
|
||||
f.Add(append(Header{FragID: 1, MsgLen: 3000}.Encode(nil), make([]byte, 1000)...))
|
||||
f.Add([]byte{0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 7})
|
||||
f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, b []byte) {
|
||||
h, sym, err := Parse(b)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
require.Equal(t, b, append(h.Encode(nil), sym...))
|
||||
l, err := h.Layout()
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
require.LessOrEqual(t, l.SymbolSize, MaxSymbolSize)
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// FuzzTable drives a small table with arbitrary fragments and checks its
|
||||
// bookkeeping after every step.
|
||||
func FuzzTable(f *testing.F) {
|
||||
f.Add([]byte{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12})
|
||||
f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, ops []byte) {
|
||||
tb := NewTable[testKey, string](TableConfig{
|
||||
MaxBytes: 4000,
|
||||
MaxEntries: 3,
|
||||
MaxPerSource: 2,
|
||||
MaxMsgLen: 6000,
|
||||
TTL: time.Second,
|
||||
})
|
||||
now := time.Unix(0, 0)
|
||||
for len(ops) >= 4 {
|
||||
src := string(rune('a' + ops[0]%4))
|
||||
fragID := uint32(ops[1]%5) + 1
|
||||
msgLen := uint16(ops[2])*32 + 1
|
||||
index := ops[3]
|
||||
ops = ops[4:]
|
||||
|
||||
h := Header{FragID: fragID, MsgLen: msgLen, Index: index}
|
||||
l, err := h.Layout()
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
sym := make([]byte, l.SymbolSize)
|
||||
if index%7 == 0 {
|
||||
now = now.Add(600 * time.Millisecond)
|
||||
tb.Expire(now)
|
||||
}
|
||||
res, err := tb.Add(testKey{src, fragID}, src, now, h, sym)
|
||||
if res != nil {
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
require.Len(t, res.Msg, int(msgLen))
|
||||
}
|
||||
checkInvariants(t, tb)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
|
||||
package fragment
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"math"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake/fec"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// DefaultRepair is the starting number of repair symbols per attempt for a
|
||||
// message of k data symbols. Small messages get proportionally more repair.
|
||||
func DefaultRepair(k int) int {
|
||||
return max(2, (k+2)/3)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Sender produces the fragment packets of one outgoing handshake message.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The first attempt sends the K data symbols followed by repair symbols. Every
|
||||
// later attempt sends symbols with indexes the receiver has not been offered yet,
|
||||
// so whatever it already holds still counts toward K. Symbols are a deterministic
|
||||
// function of the message, which keeps retransmits idempotent. Once all
|
||||
// fec.MaxSymbols indexes are used the sequence wraps and repeats.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// A Sender is not safe for concurrent use.
|
||||
type Sender struct {
|
||||
enc *fec.Encoder
|
||||
subtype header.MessageSubType
|
||||
remoteIndex uint32
|
||||
counter uint64
|
||||
fragID uint32
|
||||
next int
|
||||
cookie *Cookie
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NewSender prepares msg for sending. subtype, remoteIndex and counter fill the
|
||||
// Nebula header of every fragment; fragID is the sender's local index.
|
||||
func NewSender(msg []byte, subtype header.MessageSubType, remoteIndex uint32, counter uint64, fragID uint32) (*Sender, error) {
|
||||
if len(msg) == 0 || len(msg) > math.MaxUint16 {
|
||||
return nil, ErrMsgLen
|
||||
}
|
||||
if fragID == 0 {
|
||||
return nil, ErrFragID
|
||||
}
|
||||
enc, err := fec.NewEncoder(msg, MaxSymbolSize)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return &Sender{
|
||||
enc: enc,
|
||||
subtype: subtype,
|
||||
remoteIndex: remoteIndex,
|
||||
counter: counter,
|
||||
fragID: fragID,
|
||||
}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Sender) Layout() fec.Layout {
|
||||
return s.enc.Layout()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// SetNext sets the index the next attempt starts from, so a sender rebuilt from
|
||||
// a cached message can carry on offering fresh symbols.
|
||||
func (s *Sender) SetNext(index int) {
|
||||
s.next = ((index % fec.MaxSymbols) + fec.MaxSymbols) % fec.MaxSymbols
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// SetCookie attaches a cookie from a responder under load to every later packet.
|
||||
func (s *Sender) SetCookie(c Cookie) {
|
||||
s.cookie = &c
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Next returns the index the next attempt starts from.
|
||||
func (s *Sender) Next() int {
|
||||
return s.next
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Attempt returns the packets for one transmission attempt carrying K+repair
|
||||
// symbols. now should be sent immediately and later after the repair delay, so
|
||||
// a tail drop at the end of the first burst does not also take the repair.
|
||||
func (s *Sender) Attempt(repair int) (now, later [][]byte, err error) {
|
||||
if repair < 0 {
|
||||
return nil, nil, errors.New("negative repair count")
|
||||
}
|
||||
k := s.enc.Layout().K
|
||||
now = make([][]byte, 0, k)
|
||||
later = make([][]byte, 0, repair)
|
||||
for i := range k + repair {
|
||||
p, err := s.packet(s.next)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.next = (s.next + 1) % fec.MaxSymbols
|
||||
if i < k {
|
||||
now = append(now, p)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
later = append(later, p)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return now, later, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (s *Sender) packet(index int) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
l := s.enc.Layout()
|
||||
p := make([]byte, header.Len, header.Len+HeaderLen+CookieLen+l.SymbolSize)
|
||||
header.Encode(p, header.Version, header.Handshake, s.subtype, s.remoteIndex, s.counter)
|
||||
h := Header{
|
||||
FragID: s.fragID,
|
||||
MsgLen: uint16(l.MsgLen),
|
||||
Index: uint8(index),
|
||||
}
|
||||
if s.cookie != nil {
|
||||
h.Flags |= FlagCookie
|
||||
h.Cookie = *s.cookie
|
||||
}
|
||||
p = h.Encode(p)
|
||||
return s.enc.Symbol(p, index)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
|
||||
package fragment
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"math/rand/v2"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
var (
|
||||
ErrTooLarge = errors.New("fragmented message exceeds the size limit")
|
||||
ErrSourceQuota = errors.New("source has too many messages in progress")
|
||||
ErrNoRoom = errors.New("no room for fragment")
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// TableConfig bounds a Table.
|
||||
type TableConfig struct {
|
||||
MaxBytes int // symbol bytes held across all entries
|
||||
MaxEntries int // messages in progress across all sources
|
||||
MaxPerSource int // messages in progress per source
|
||||
MaxMsgLen int // largest message accepted
|
||||
TTL time.Duration // an entry idle this long is dropped
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Table reassembles messages from senders that have not authenticated yet, the
|
||||
// responder's view of msg1. Every resource is capped. When a cap is hit a
|
||||
// random entry is evicted; random eviction is harder to aim than LRU, which a
|
||||
// flood can use to flush specific entries.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// K identifies one message, typically the source plus FragID. S identifies the
|
||||
// source for quotas, typically the address masked to /32 or /64.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// A Table is safe for concurrent use.
|
||||
type Table[K, S comparable] struct {
|
||||
mu sync.Mutex
|
||||
cfg TableConfig
|
||||
entries map[K]*tableEntry[K, S]
|
||||
order []K
|
||||
perSource map[S]int
|
||||
bytes int
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type tableEntry[K, S comparable] struct {
|
||||
a *Assembly
|
||||
source S
|
||||
lastSeen time.Time
|
||||
pos int
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func NewTable[K, S comparable](cfg TableConfig) *Table[K, S] {
|
||||
return &Table[K, S]{
|
||||
cfg: cfg,
|
||||
entries: make(map[K]*tableEntry[K, S]),
|
||||
perSource: make(map[S]int),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Result describes a completed message.
|
||||
type Result struct {
|
||||
Msg []byte // the decoded message
|
||||
Received int // packet bytes received for it, for the amplification budget
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Add records a fragment parsed by Parse. When the message is complete its entry
|
||||
// is removed and the result returned; otherwise the result is nil. A decode
|
||||
// error means the message is lost and must be retransmitted.
|
||||
func (t *Table[K, S]) Add(key K, source S, now time.Time, h Header, sym []byte) (*Result, error) {
|
||||
if int(h.MsgLen) > t.cfg.MaxMsgLen {
|
||||
return nil, ErrTooLarge
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
t.mu.Lock()
|
||||
e, ok := t.entries[key]
|
||||
if ok && now.Sub(e.lastSeen) > t.cfg.TTL {
|
||||
t.remove(key, e)
|
||||
ok = false
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
var err error
|
||||
e, err = t.insert(key, source, h)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
e.lastSeen = now
|
||||
|
||||
if !t.makeRoom(key, e.a.wouldStore(h, sym)) {
|
||||
if e.a.Stored() == 0 {
|
||||
t.remove(key, e)
|
||||
}
|
||||
t.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
return nil, ErrNoRoom
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
before := e.a.Stored()
|
||||
ready, err := e.a.Add(h, sym)
|
||||
t.bytes += e.a.Stored() - before
|
||||
if err != nil || !ready {
|
||||
if errors.Is(err, ErrMismatch) || (err != nil && e.a.Stored() == 0) {
|
||||
t.remove(key, e)
|
||||
}
|
||||
t.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
t.remove(key, e)
|
||||
t.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
msg, err := e.a.Decode()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return &Result{Msg: msg, Received: e.a.Received()}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Expire drops every entry idle for longer than the TTL.
|
||||
func (t *Table[K, S]) Expire(now time.Time) {
|
||||
t.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer t.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
for i := 0; i < len(t.order); {
|
||||
key := t.order[i]
|
||||
e := t.entries[key]
|
||||
if now.Sub(e.lastSeen) > t.cfg.TTL {
|
||||
// remove swaps the last entry into position i, so look at i again.
|
||||
t.remove(key, e)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
i++
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Len returns the number of messages in progress.
|
||||
func (t *Table[K, S]) Len() int {
|
||||
t.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer t.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
return len(t.entries)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Load returns how full the table is, from 0 to 1, by whichever of its byte and
|
||||
// entry limits is closer.
|
||||
func (t *Table[K, S]) Load() float64 {
|
||||
t.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer t.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
return max(float64(t.bytes)/float64(t.cfg.MaxBytes), float64(len(t.entries))/float64(t.cfg.MaxEntries))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Bytes returns the number of symbol bytes held.
|
||||
func (t *Table[K, S]) Bytes() int {
|
||||
t.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer t.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
return t.bytes
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (t *Table[K, S]) insert(key K, source S, h Header) (*tableEntry[K, S], error) {
|
||||
if t.perSource[source] >= t.cfg.MaxPerSource {
|
||||
return nil, ErrSourceQuota
|
||||
}
|
||||
a, err := NewAssembly(h)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
for len(t.entries) >= t.cfg.MaxEntries {
|
||||
if !t.evictRandom(nil) {
|
||||
return nil, ErrNoRoom
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
e := &tableEntry[K, S]{a: a, source: source, pos: len(t.order)}
|
||||
t.entries[key] = e
|
||||
t.order = append(t.order, key)
|
||||
t.perSource[source]++
|
||||
return e, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// makeRoom evicts random entries other than keep until n more bytes fit.
|
||||
func (t *Table[K, S]) makeRoom(keep K, n int) bool {
|
||||
for t.bytes+n > t.cfg.MaxBytes {
|
||||
if !t.evictRandom(&keep) {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (t *Table[K, S]) evictRandom(keep *K) bool {
|
||||
candidates := len(t.order)
|
||||
if keep != nil {
|
||||
if _, ok := t.entries[*keep]; ok {
|
||||
candidates--
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if candidates <= 0 {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
for {
|
||||
key := t.order[rand.IntN(len(t.order))]
|
||||
if keep != nil && key == *keep {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
t.remove(key, t.entries[key])
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (t *Table[K, S]) remove(key K, e *tableEntry[K, S]) {
|
||||
last := len(t.order) - 1
|
||||
moved := t.order[last]
|
||||
t.order[e.pos] = moved
|
||||
t.entries[moved].pos = e.pos
|
||||
t.order = t.order[:last]
|
||||
delete(t.entries, key)
|
||||
|
||||
t.bytes -= e.a.Stored()
|
||||
if t.perSource[e.source] <= 1 {
|
||||
delete(t.perSource, e.source)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
t.perSource[e.source]--
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
|
||||
// Package fragment carries handshake messages that do not fit in one UDP
|
||||
// packet. A message is Reed-Solomon coded into equally sized symbols (see
|
||||
// handshake/fec) and each symbol travels in its own packet:
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Nebula header (16) | Fragment header (8) | [cookie (16)] | symbol
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The fragment header is FragID u32 | MsgLen u16 | Index u8 | Flags u8, all big
|
||||
// endian. Both ends derive the symbol layout from MsgLen, so any MsgLen-derived
|
||||
// value never has to be sent. FlagCookie marks a cookie a responder under load
|
||||
// asked for; room for it is always reserved, so a fragment never outgrows
|
||||
// MaxPacketLen.
|
||||
package fragment
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"encoding/binary"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake/fec"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
// HeaderLen is the size of the fragment header that follows the Nebula header.
|
||||
HeaderLen = 8
|
||||
|
||||
// CookieLen is the size of the cookie a fragment carries when FlagCookie is set.
|
||||
CookieLen = 16
|
||||
|
||||
// FlagCookie marks a fragment that carries a cookie after its header.
|
||||
FlagCookie uint8 = 0x01
|
||||
|
||||
// MaxPacketLen bounds every fragment packet, Nebula header included. A relayed
|
||||
// fragment gains a 16 byte header and a 16 byte tag, which lands exactly on
|
||||
// the 1232 byte UDP payload available on an IPv6 minimum MTU path.
|
||||
MaxPacketLen = 1200
|
||||
|
||||
// MaxSymbolSize is the largest symbol that fits in MaxPacketLen alongside a cookie.
|
||||
MaxSymbolSize = MaxPacketLen - header.Len - HeaderLen - CookieLen
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
var (
|
||||
ErrShortFragment = errors.New("fragment is too short")
|
||||
ErrFragID = errors.New("fragment has a zero FragID")
|
||||
ErrMsgLen = errors.New("fragment has a zero MsgLen")
|
||||
ErrFlags = errors.New("fragment has reserved flags set")
|
||||
ErrNoCookie = errors.New("fragment is too short for its cookie")
|
||||
ErrSymbolSize = errors.New("fragment symbol size does not match its MsgLen")
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Cookie proves a sender received a responder's reply at its address.
|
||||
type Cookie [CookieLen]byte
|
||||
|
||||
// Header is the fragment header.
|
||||
type Header struct {
|
||||
FragID uint32 // the sender's local index for this handshake, never zero
|
||||
MsgLen uint16 // length of the whole message
|
||||
Index uint8 // symbol index, data below K and repair from K
|
||||
Flags uint8 // FlagCookie, other bits reserved and zero
|
||||
Cookie Cookie // valid when Flags has FlagCookie
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (h Header) HasCookie() bool {
|
||||
return h.Flags&FlagCookie != 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Encode appends the header, and its cookie if it has one, to b.
|
||||
func (h Header) Encode(b []byte) []byte {
|
||||
b = binary.BigEndian.AppendUint32(b, h.FragID)
|
||||
b = binary.BigEndian.AppendUint16(b, h.MsgLen)
|
||||
b = append(b, h.Index, h.Flags)
|
||||
if h.HasCookie() {
|
||||
b = append(b, h.Cookie[:]...)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return b
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Layout returns the symbol layout the header's MsgLen implies.
|
||||
func (h Header) Layout() (fec.Layout, error) {
|
||||
return fec.NewLayout(int(h.MsgLen), MaxSymbolSize)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Parse validates the bytes following the Nebula header and splits them into
|
||||
// the fragment header and the symbol. The symbol aliases b.
|
||||
func Parse(b []byte) (Header, []byte, error) {
|
||||
if len(b) < HeaderLen {
|
||||
return Header{}, nil, ErrShortFragment
|
||||
}
|
||||
h := Header{
|
||||
FragID: binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[0:4]),
|
||||
MsgLen: binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[4:6]),
|
||||
Index: b[6],
|
||||
Flags: b[7],
|
||||
}
|
||||
if h.FragID == 0 {
|
||||
return Header{}, nil, ErrFragID
|
||||
}
|
||||
if h.MsgLen == 0 {
|
||||
return Header{}, nil, ErrMsgLen
|
||||
}
|
||||
if h.Flags&^FlagCookie != 0 {
|
||||
return Header{}, nil, ErrFlags
|
||||
}
|
||||
b = b[HeaderLen:]
|
||||
if h.HasCookie() {
|
||||
if len(b) < CookieLen {
|
||||
return Header{}, nil, ErrNoCookie
|
||||
}
|
||||
copy(h.Cookie[:], b)
|
||||
b = b[CookieLen:]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
l, err := h.Layout()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return Header{}, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
sym := b
|
||||
if len(sym) != l.SymbolSize {
|
||||
return Header{}, nil, ErrSymbolSize
|
||||
}
|
||||
return h, sym, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ message NebulaHandshakeDetails {
|
||||
uint64 Cookie = 4 [deprecated = true];
|
||||
uint64 Time = 5;
|
||||
uint32 CertVersion = 8;
|
||||
// KEMKey is the initiator's ephemeral ML-KEM-1024 encapsulation key. It is
|
||||
// only present in msg1 of the ix_psk2_mlkem1024 subtype.
|
||||
bytes KEMKey = 9;
|
||||
// reserved for WIP multiport
|
||||
reserved 6, 7;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
|
||||
package handshake
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"crypto/hkdf"
|
||||
"crypto/mlkem"
|
||||
"crypto/sha256"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// kemPSKSalt separates the psk derivation from any other use of the secret.
|
||||
const kemPSKSalt = "nebula ix_psk2_mlkem1024 v1"
|
||||
|
||||
var ErrInvalidKEMKey = errors.New("peer sent an invalid ML-KEM encapsulation key")
|
||||
|
||||
// kemPSK derives the noise psk from an ML-KEM shared secret. The ciphertext is
|
||||
// bound in because, unlike the encapsulation key, it travels outside the noise
|
||||
// transcript.
|
||||
func kemPSK(sharedKey, ciphertext []byte) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
secret := make([]byte, 0, len(sharedKey)+len(ciphertext))
|
||||
secret = append(secret, sharedKey...)
|
||||
secret = append(secret, ciphertext...)
|
||||
return hkdf.Extract(sha256.New, secret, []byte(kemPSKSalt))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// kemEncapsulate is the responder half: encapsulate to the initiator's key,
|
||||
// install the psk, and remember the ciphertext to prefix the response with.
|
||||
func (m *Machine) kemEncapsulate(encapsulationKey []byte) error {
|
||||
ek, err := mlkem.NewEncapsulationKey1024(encapsulationKey)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", ErrInvalidKEMKey, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
sharedKey, ct := ek.Encapsulate()
|
||||
psk, err := kemPSK(sharedKey, ct)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := m.hs.SetPresharedKey(psk); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
m.kemCiphertext = ct
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// kemDecapsulate is the initiator half: recover the shared secret from the
|
||||
// ciphertext prefixing the response and install the psk. It returns the rest of
|
||||
// the message, which is the noise message.
|
||||
func (m *Machine) kemDecapsulate(msg []byte) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
if len(msg) < mlkem.CiphertextSize1024 {
|
||||
return nil, ErrPacketTooShort
|
||||
}
|
||||
if m.kemKey == nil {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("no ML-KEM decapsulation key for this handshake")
|
||||
}
|
||||
ct := msg[:mlkem.CiphertextSize1024]
|
||||
sharedKey, err := m.kemKey.Decapsulate(ct)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
psk, err := kemPSK(sharedKey, ct)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := m.hs.SetPresharedKey(psk); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return msg[mlkem.CiphertextSize1024:], nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
|
||||
package handshake
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"bytes"
|
||||
"crypto/mlkem"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/flynn/noise"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
|
||||
ct "github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func newKEMMachine(t *testing.T, cs *testCertState, v CertVerifier, initiator bool, index uint32) *Machine {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
m, err := NewMachine(
|
||||
cs.version, cs.getCredential, v,
|
||||
func() (uint32, error) { return index, nil },
|
||||
initiator, header.HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024,
|
||||
)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
return m
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type kemFixture struct {
|
||||
initCS, respCS *testCertState
|
||||
v CertVerifier
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func newKEMFixture(t *testing.T, cipher noise.CipherFunc) kemFixture {
|
||||
ca, _, caKey, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
|
||||
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
|
||||
)
|
||||
return kemFixture{
|
||||
initCS: newTestCertStateWithCipher(t, ca, caKey, "initiator", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")}, cipher),
|
||||
respCS: newTestCertStateWithCipher(t, ca, caKey, "responder", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.2/24")}, cipher),
|
||||
v: testVerifier(ct.NewTestCAPool(ca)),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func requireKeysMatch(t *testing.T, a, b *Result) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
c, err := a.EKey.Encrypt(nil, nil, []byte("hello"))
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
p, err := b.DKey.Decrypt(nil, nil, c)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []byte("hello"), p)
|
||||
|
||||
c, err = b.EKey.Encrypt(nil, nil, []byte("world"))
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
p, err = a.DKey.Decrypt(nil, nil, c)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []byte("world"), p)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestKEMHandshake(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
for _, cipher := range []noise.CipherFunc{noise.CipherChaChaPoly, noise.CipherAESGCM} {
|
||||
t.Run(cipher.CipherName(), func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
f := newKEMFixture(t, cipher)
|
||||
initM := newKEMMachine(t, f.initCS, f.v, true, 1000)
|
||||
respM := newKEMMachine(t, f.respCS, f.v, false, 2000)
|
||||
|
||||
msg1, err := initM.Initiate(nil)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, header.HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024, header.MessageSubType(msg1[1]))
|
||||
assert.Greater(t, len(msg1), header.Len+mlkem.EncapsulationKeySize1024)
|
||||
|
||||
msg2, respR, err := respM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg1)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
require.NotNil(t, respR)
|
||||
assert.Greater(t, len(msg2), header.Len+mlkem.CiphertextSize1024)
|
||||
|
||||
_, initR, err := initM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg2)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
require.NotNil(t, initR)
|
||||
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, "responder", initR.RemoteCert.Certificate.Name())
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, "initiator", respR.RemoteCert.Certificate.Name())
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, uint32(2000), initR.RemoteIndex)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, uint32(1000), respR.RemoteIndex)
|
||||
requireKeysMatch(t, initR, respR)
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestKEMSecretMatters checks the ML-KEM secret really reaches the transport
|
||||
// keys: an initiator holding a different decapsulation key cannot complete even
|
||||
// though every DH input is genuine.
|
||||
func TestKEMSecretMatters(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
f := newKEMFixture(t, noise.CipherChaChaPoly)
|
||||
initM := newKEMMachine(t, f.initCS, f.v, true, 1000)
|
||||
respM := newKEMMachine(t, f.respCS, f.v, false, 2000)
|
||||
|
||||
msg1, err := initM.Initiate(nil)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
msg2, _, err := respM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg1)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
|
||||
other, err := mlkem.GenerateKey1024()
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
initM.kemKey = other
|
||||
|
||||
_, res, err := initM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg2)
|
||||
require.Error(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, res)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestKEMTamperedCiphertext(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
f := newKEMFixture(t, noise.CipherChaChaPoly)
|
||||
initM := newKEMMachine(t, f.initCS, f.v, true, 1000)
|
||||
respM := newKEMMachine(t, f.respCS, f.v, false, 2000)
|
||||
|
||||
msg1, err := initM.Initiate(nil)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
msg2, respR, err := respM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg1)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("truncated", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
_, res, err := initM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg2[:header.Len+mlkem.CiphertextSize1024-1])
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrPacketTooShort)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, res)
|
||||
assert.False(t, initM.Failed())
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("flipped ciphertext bit", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
bad := bytes.Clone(msg2)
|
||||
bad[header.Len+10] ^= 1
|
||||
_, res, err := initM.ProcessPacket(nil, bad)
|
||||
require.Error(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, res)
|
||||
assert.False(t, initM.Failed(), "a forged ciphertext must not kill the handshake")
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("genuine response still completes", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
_, initR, err := initM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg2)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
require.NotNil(t, initR)
|
||||
requireKeysMatch(t, initR, respR)
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestKEMBadMsg1 drives processPayload by hand. With the psk modifier msg1's
|
||||
// payload is encrypted under a key derived from the public ephemeral, so a
|
||||
// forged payload would need re-encrypting; the parsing rules are what matter.
|
||||
func TestKEMBadMsg1(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
f := newKEMFixture(t, noise.CipherChaChaPoly)
|
||||
msg1Flags := subtypeInfos[header.HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024].msgs[0]
|
||||
cert := f.initCS.creds[cert.Version2]
|
||||
payload := func(kemKey []byte) []byte {
|
||||
return MarshalPayload(nil, Payload{
|
||||
Cert: cert.Bytes,
|
||||
CertVersion: uint32(cert.Cert.Version()),
|
||||
InitiatorIndex: 1000,
|
||||
Time: 1,
|
||||
KEMKey: kemKey,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
dk, err := mlkem.GenerateKey1024()
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("missing KEM key", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
m := newKEMMachine(t, f.respCS, f.v, false, 2000)
|
||||
err := m.processPayload(payload(nil), msg1Flags)
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrUnexpectedContent)
|
||||
assert.True(t, m.Failed())
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("invalid KEM key", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
m := newKEMMachine(t, f.respCS, f.v, false, 2000)
|
||||
// Coefficients of 0xfff exceed the modulus, which ML-KEM must reject.
|
||||
bad := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xff}, mlkem.EncapsulationKeySize1024)
|
||||
err := m.kemEncapsulate(bad)
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInvalidKEMKey)
|
||||
err = m.kemEncapsulate(bad[:100])
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInvalidKEMKey)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("valid KEM key", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
m := newKEMMachine(t, f.respCS, f.v, false, 2000)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, m.kemEncapsulate(dk.EncapsulationKey().Bytes()))
|
||||
assert.Len(t, m.kemCiphertext, mlkem.CiphertextSize1024)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("KEM key on the classical subtype", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
m := newTestMachine(t, f.respCS, f.v, false, 2000)
|
||||
classical := subtypeInfos[header.HandshakeIXPSK0].msgs[0]
|
||||
err := m.processPayload(payload(dk.EncapsulationKey().Bytes()), classical)
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrUnexpectedContent)
|
||||
assert.True(t, m.Failed())
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestKEMDistinctFromClassical makes sure the two subtypes cannot be mixed: a
|
||||
// classical responder cannot answer a KEM initiator.
|
||||
func TestKEMDistinctFromClassical(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
f := newKEMFixture(t, noise.CipherChaChaPoly)
|
||||
initM := newKEMMachine(t, f.initCS, f.v, true, 1000)
|
||||
respM := newTestMachine(t, f.respCS, f.v, false, 2000)
|
||||
|
||||
msg1, err := initM.Initiate(nil)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
_, _, err = respM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg1)
|
||||
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrSubtypeMismatch)
|
||||
}
|
||||
+54
-5
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ package handshake
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"bytes"
|
||||
"crypto/mlkem"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"slices"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
@@ -67,6 +69,9 @@ type Machine struct {
|
||||
remoteCertSet bool
|
||||
payloadSet bool
|
||||
failed bool
|
||||
|
||||
kemKey *mlkem.DecapsulationKey1024 // initiator's ephemeral ML-KEM key, until completion
|
||||
kemCiphertext []byte // responder's ciphertext to prefix its response with
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NewMachine creates a handshake state machine. The subtype determines both
|
||||
@@ -91,7 +96,7 @@ func NewMachine(
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrNoCredential, version)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hs, err := cred.buildHandshakeState(initiator, info.pattern)
|
||||
hs, err := cred.buildHandshakeState(initiator, info.pattern, info.pskPlacement)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("build noise state: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -137,7 +142,8 @@ func (m *Machine) requireComplete() error {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// myMsgFlags returns the flags for the current outgoing message.
|
||||
// myMsgFlags returns the flags for the current outgoing message, which are
|
||||
// also the flags of the next incoming message before it is read.
|
||||
func (m *Machine) myMsgFlags() msgFlags {
|
||||
idx := m.hs.MessageIndex()
|
||||
if idx < len(m.msgs) {
|
||||
@@ -225,7 +231,18 @@ func (m *Machine) ProcessPacket(out, packet []byte) ([]byte, *Result, error) {
|
||||
// noise returns (cs1, cs2) where cs1 is the initiator->responder cipher.
|
||||
// For 3-message patterns where a responder finishes by reading the final
|
||||
// message, this ordering would be wrong; revisit when XX/pqIX lands.
|
||||
msg, eKey, dKey, err := m.hs.ReadMessage(nil, packet[header.Len:])
|
||||
noiseMsg := packet[header.Len:]
|
||||
if m.myMsgFlags().kemCiphertext {
|
||||
var err error
|
||||
// Installing a psk derived from a forged ciphertext is harmless: ReadMessage
|
||||
// then fails without advancing, and the next packet installs its own.
|
||||
noiseMsg, err = m.kemDecapsulate(noiseMsg)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
msg, eKey, dKey, err := m.hs.ReadMessage(nil, noiseMsg)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
// Noise ReadMessage failed. The noise library checkpoints and rolls back
|
||||
// on failure, so the Machine is still alive. The caller can retry with
|
||||
@@ -276,6 +293,8 @@ func (m *Machine) ProcessPacket(out, packet []byte) ([]byte, *Result, error) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (m *Machine) completed(eKey, dKey *noise.CipherState) *Result {
|
||||
m.kemKey = nil
|
||||
m.kemCiphertext = nil
|
||||
m.result.EKey = eKey
|
||||
m.result.DKey = dKey
|
||||
m.result.MessageIndex = uint64(m.hs.MessageIndex())
|
||||
@@ -284,7 +303,7 @@ func (m *Machine) completed(eKey, dKey *noise.CipherState) *Result {
|
||||
|
||||
func (m *Machine) processPayload(msg []byte, flags msgFlags) error {
|
||||
if len(msg) == 0 {
|
||||
if flags.expectsPayload || flags.expectsCert {
|
||||
if flags.expectsPayload || flags.expectsCert || flags.kemKey {
|
||||
m.failed = true
|
||||
return ErrMissingContent
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -310,6 +329,12 @@ func (m *Machine) processPayload(msg []byte, flags msgFlags) error {
|
||||
return ErrUnexpectedContent
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hasKEMKey := len(payload.KEMKey) > 0
|
||||
if hasKEMKey != flags.kemKey {
|
||||
m.failed = true
|
||||
return ErrUnexpectedContent
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Process payload
|
||||
if flags.expectsPayload {
|
||||
var remoteIndex uint32
|
||||
@@ -336,6 +361,13 @@ func (m *Machine) processPayload(msg []byte, flags msgFlags) error {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if flags.kemKey {
|
||||
if err := m.kemEncapsulate(payload.KEMKey); err != nil {
|
||||
m.failed = true
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -380,11 +412,21 @@ func (m *Machine) validateCert(payload Payload) error {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (m *Machine) marshalOutgoing(flags msgFlags) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
if !flags.expectsPayload && !flags.expectsCert {
|
||||
if !flags.expectsPayload && !flags.expectsCert && !flags.kemKey {
|
||||
return nil, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var p Payload
|
||||
if flags.kemKey {
|
||||
if m.kemKey == nil {
|
||||
dk, err := mlkem.GenerateKey1024()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("generate ML-KEM key: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
m.kemKey = dk
|
||||
}
|
||||
p.KEMKey = m.kemKey.EncapsulationKey().Bytes()
|
||||
}
|
||||
if flags.expectsPayload {
|
||||
if !m.indexAllocated {
|
||||
index, err := m.allocIndex()
|
||||
@@ -436,6 +478,13 @@ func (m *Machine) buildResponse(out []byte) ([]byte, *noise.CipherState, *noise.
|
||||
uint64(m.hs.MessageIndex()+1),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if flags.kemCiphertext {
|
||||
if m.kemCiphertext == nil {
|
||||
return nil, nil, nil, errors.New("no ML-KEM ciphertext to send")
|
||||
}
|
||||
out = append(out, m.kemCiphertext...)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// noise.WriteMessage appends the encrypted handshake message to out,
|
||||
// reusing capacity when present.
|
||||
//
|
||||
|
||||
+21
-2
@@ -11,13 +11,16 @@ import (
|
||||
type msgFlags struct {
|
||||
expectsPayload bool // message carries indexes and time
|
||||
expectsCert bool // message carries the certificate
|
||||
kemKey bool // payload carries an ML-KEM encapsulation key
|
||||
kemCiphertext bool // message is prefixed with the ML-KEM ciphertext for the peer's key
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// subtypeInfo bundles the noise pattern with the per-message flags for a
|
||||
// given handshake subtype.
|
||||
type subtypeInfo struct {
|
||||
pattern noise.HandshakePattern
|
||||
msgs []msgFlags
|
||||
pattern noise.HandshakePattern
|
||||
pskPlacement int // noise psk modifier position, 0 means no psk token
|
||||
msgs []msgFlags
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// subtypeInfos defines the noise pattern and message content layout for each
|
||||
@@ -32,6 +35,22 @@ var subtypeInfos = map[header.MessageSubType]subtypeInfo{
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
// IX with an ephemeral ML-KEM-1024 exchange:
|
||||
// msg1 (I->R): payload + cert + encapsulation key
|
||||
// msg2 (R->I): ciphertext || noise(payload + cert)
|
||||
// The responder encapsulates after reading msg1 and mixes the shared secret in
|
||||
// through the psk2 token at the end of msg2. The ciphertext travels outside the
|
||||
// noise message because the initiator needs the secret before it can process
|
||||
// that token.
|
||||
header.HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024: {
|
||||
pattern: noise.HandshakeIX,
|
||||
pskPlacement: 2,
|
||||
msgs: []msgFlags{
|
||||
{expectsPayload: true, expectsCert: true, kemKey: true},
|
||||
{expectsPayload: true, expectsCert: true, kemCiphertext: true},
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
// XX: 3 messages
|
||||
// msg1 (I->R): payload only
|
||||
// msg2 (R->I): payload + cert
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ type Payload struct {
|
||||
ResponderIndex uint32
|
||||
Time uint64
|
||||
CertVersion uint32
|
||||
KEMKey []byte // ML-KEM encapsulation key, only in subtypes that carry one
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Proto field numbers for NebulaHandshakeDetails
|
||||
@@ -29,6 +30,7 @@ const (
|
||||
fieldResponderIndex = 3 // uint32
|
||||
fieldTime = 5 // uint64
|
||||
fieldCertVersion = 8 // uint32
|
||||
fieldKEMKey = 9 // bytes
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// MarshalPayload encodes a handshake payload in protobuf wire format compatible
|
||||
@@ -57,6 +59,10 @@ func MarshalPayload(out []byte, p Payload) []byte {
|
||||
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldCertVersion, protowire.VarintType)
|
||||
details = protowire.AppendVarint(details, uint64(p.CertVersion))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(p.KEMKey) > 0 {
|
||||
details = protowire.AppendTag(details, fieldKEMKey, protowire.BytesType)
|
||||
details = protowire.AppendBytes(details, p.KEMKey)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
out = protowire.AppendTag(out, 1, protowire.BytesType)
|
||||
out = protowire.AppendBytes(out, details)
|
||||
@@ -161,6 +167,16 @@ func unmarshalPayloadDetails(p *Payload, b []byte) error {
|
||||
}
|
||||
p.CertVersion = uint32(v)
|
||||
b = b[n:]
|
||||
case fieldKEMKey:
|
||||
if typ != protowire.BytesType {
|
||||
return errInvalidHandshakeDetails
|
||||
}
|
||||
v, n := protowire.ConsumeBytes(b)
|
||||
if n < 0 {
|
||||
return errInvalidHandshakeDetails
|
||||
}
|
||||
p.KEMKey = append([]byte(nil), v...)
|
||||
b = b[n:]
|
||||
default:
|
||||
n := protowire.ConsumeFieldValue(num, typ, b)
|
||||
if n < 0 {
|
||||
|
||||
+191
-69
@@ -10,12 +10,15 @@ import (
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"slices"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"sync/atomic"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake/fragment"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/ratelimit"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -49,12 +52,14 @@ type HandshakeConfig struct {
|
||||
tryInterval time.Duration
|
||||
retries int64
|
||||
triggerBuffer int
|
||||
pq pqHandshakeConfig
|
||||
|
||||
messageMetrics *MessageMetrics
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type HandshakeManager struct {
|
||||
// Mutex for interacting with the vpnIps and indexes maps
|
||||
// Mutex for interacting with the vpnIps and indexes maps.
|
||||
// Lock order is hostmap, then this lock, then the lighthouse, then a RemoteList.
|
||||
sync.RWMutex
|
||||
|
||||
vpnIps map[netip.Addr]*HandshakeHostInfo
|
||||
@@ -73,6 +78,18 @@ type HandshakeManager struct {
|
||||
|
||||
// can be used to trigger outbound handshake for the given vpnIp
|
||||
trigger chan netip.Addr
|
||||
|
||||
// pq holds the post-quantum settings, which change on reload.
|
||||
pq atomic.Pointer[pqHandshakeConfig]
|
||||
// pqTable reassembles post-quantum msg1s from senders that have not authenticated yet.
|
||||
pqTable *fragment.Table[pqFragKey, pqFragSource]
|
||||
// pqPeers holds vpn addresses that completed a post-quantum handshake, for sticky mode.
|
||||
pqPeers sync.Map
|
||||
// pqAnswered recognises repeats of post-quantum msg1s already answered.
|
||||
pqAnswered *pqAnswered
|
||||
// pqCookies and pqCookieLimiter serve cookies while pqTable is under load.
|
||||
pqCookies *pqCookies
|
||||
pqCookieLimiter *ratelimit.Limiter
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type HandshakeHostInfo struct {
|
||||
@@ -88,6 +105,8 @@ type HandshakeHostInfo struct {
|
||||
|
||||
hostinfo *HostInfo
|
||||
machine *handshake.Machine // The handshake state machine, set during stage 0 (initiator) or beginHandshake (responder multi-message)
|
||||
pq *pqAttempt // The initiator's post-quantum attempt, pending alongside the classical one
|
||||
lastPQ bool // Whether the latest attempt was post-quantum
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hh *HandshakeHostInfo) cachePacket(l *slog.Logger, t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, packet []byte, f packetCallback, m *cachedPacketMetrics) {
|
||||
@@ -116,7 +135,7 @@ func (hh *HandshakeHostInfo) cachePacket(l *slog.Logger, t header.MessageType, s
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func NewHandshakeManager(l *slog.Logger, mainHostMap *HostMap, lightHouse *LightHouse, outside udp.Conn, config HandshakeConfig) *HandshakeManager {
|
||||
return &HandshakeManager{
|
||||
hm := &HandshakeManager{
|
||||
vpnIps: map[netip.Addr]*HandshakeHostInfo{},
|
||||
indexes: map[uint32]*HandshakeHostInfo{},
|
||||
mainHostMap: mainHostMap,
|
||||
@@ -129,7 +148,16 @@ func NewHandshakeManager(l *slog.Logger, mainHostMap *HostMap, lightHouse *Light
|
||||
metricInitiated: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("handshake_manager.initiated", nil),
|
||||
metricTimedOut: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("handshake_manager.timed_out", nil),
|
||||
l: l,
|
||||
pqTable: fragment.NewTable[pqFragKey, pqFragSource](pqTableConfig),
|
||||
pqAnswered: newPQAnswered(hsTimeout(config.retries, config.tryInterval)),
|
||||
}
|
||||
pq := config.pq
|
||||
hm.pq.Store(&pq)
|
||||
hm.pqCookies = newPQCookies(time.Now())
|
||||
// Cookie replies are tiny, but a flood of spoofed fragments must not turn
|
||||
// into a flood of replies.
|
||||
hm.pqCookieLimiter, _ = ratelimit.New(256, time.Millisecond)
|
||||
return hm
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) Run(ctx context.Context) {
|
||||
@@ -144,6 +172,8 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) Run(ctx context.Context) {
|
||||
hm.handleOutbound(vpnIP, true)
|
||||
case now := <-clockSource.C:
|
||||
hm.NextOutboundHandshakeTimerTick(now)
|
||||
hm.pqTable.Expire(now)
|
||||
hm.pqAnswered.expire(now)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -153,7 +183,7 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) HandleIncoming(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *head
|
||||
// don't yet support) are dropped here rather than silently routed through
|
||||
// the IX path. Add a case when introducing a new pattern.
|
||||
switch h.Subtype {
|
||||
case header.HandshakeIXPSK0:
|
||||
case header.HandshakeIXPSK0, pqSubtype:
|
||||
// supported
|
||||
default:
|
||||
hm.l.Debug("dropping handshake with unsupported subtype",
|
||||
@@ -169,6 +199,11 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) HandleIncoming(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *head
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if header.IsFragmented(h.Subtype) {
|
||||
hm.handleFragment(via, packet, h)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// First message of a new handshake. The wire format requires RemoteIndex
|
||||
// to be zero here (the initiator has no responder index to fill in yet),
|
||||
// and generateIndex never allocates 0, so any non-zero RemoteIndex on a
|
||||
@@ -180,7 +215,11 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) HandleIncoming(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *head
|
||||
"from", via, "remoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
hm.beginHandshake(via, packet, h)
|
||||
if hm.pqConfig().require {
|
||||
hm.l.Debug("dropping classical handshake, post-quantum handshakes are required", "from", via)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
hm.beginHandshake(via, packet, h, 0)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -229,6 +268,9 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleOutbound(vpnIp netip.Addr, lighthouseTriggered
|
||||
"style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, hh.machine.Subtype()),
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
if hh.pq != nil {
|
||||
fields = append(fields, "pqInitiatorIndex", hh.pq.index)
|
||||
}
|
||||
hh.hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Info("Handshake timed out", fields...)
|
||||
hm.metricTimedOut.Inc(1)
|
||||
hm.DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo)
|
||||
@@ -238,33 +280,45 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleOutbound(vpnIp netip.Addr, lighthouseTriggered
|
||||
// Increment the counter to increase our delay, linear backoff
|
||||
hh.counter++
|
||||
|
||||
// Check if we have a handshake packet to transmit yet
|
||||
if !hh.ready {
|
||||
if !hm.buildStage0Packet(hh) {
|
||||
// Pick this attempt's style and make sure its first message exists. A PQ
|
||||
// attempt sends msg1 as fragments: now goes out immediately, later after the
|
||||
// repair delay, and every attempt offers fresh repair symbols.
|
||||
var now, later [][]byte
|
||||
var machine *handshake.Machine
|
||||
hh.lastPQ = hm.usePQ(hh, vpnIp, lighthouseTriggered)
|
||||
if hh.lastPQ {
|
||||
if hh.pq == nil && !hm.buildPQAttempt(hh) {
|
||||
hm.OutboundHandshakeTimer.Add(vpnIp, hm.config.tryInterval*time.Duration(hh.counter))
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
var err error
|
||||
now, later, err = hh.pq.sender.Attempt(fragment.DefaultRepair(hh.pq.sender.Layout().K))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Error("Failed to fragment handshake", "error", err)
|
||||
hm.OutboundHandshakeTimer.Add(vpnIp, hm.config.tryInterval*time.Duration(hh.counter))
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
machine = hh.pq.machine
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if !hh.ready {
|
||||
if !hm.buildStage0Packet(hh) {
|
||||
hm.OutboundHandshakeTimer.Add(vpnIp, hm.config.tryInterval*time.Duration(hh.counter))
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
// TODO: this hardcodes "always retransmit stage 0", which is correct for
|
||||
// IX (the initiator only ever sends one packet, msg1) but wrong the
|
||||
// moment a 3+ message pattern lands. The retry loop should resend the
|
||||
// most recent outgoing message, not always stage 0. That implies
|
||||
// HandshakeHostInfo tracking a single "currentOutbound" packet (bytes +
|
||||
// header metadata) that gets replaced as the handshake progresses,
|
||||
// instead of indexing into HandshakePacket.
|
||||
now = [][]byte{hostinfo.HandshakePacket[handshakePacketStage0]}
|
||||
machine = hh.machine
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TODO: this hardcodes "always retransmit stage 0", which is correct for
|
||||
// IX (the initiator only ever sends one packet, msg1) but wrong the
|
||||
// moment a 3+ message pattern lands. The retry loop should resend the
|
||||
// most recent outgoing message, not always stage 0. That implies
|
||||
// HandshakeHostInfo tracking a single "currentOutbound" packet (bytes +
|
||||
// header metadata) that gets replaced as the handshake progresses,
|
||||
// instead of indexing into HandshakePacket.
|
||||
stage0 := hostinfo.HandshakePacket[handshakePacketStage0]
|
||||
hsFields := m{
|
||||
"stage": uint64(hh.machine.MessageIndex()),
|
||||
"style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, hh.machine.Subtype()),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Get a remotes object if we don't already have one.
|
||||
// This is mainly to protect us as this should never be the case
|
||||
// NB ^ This comment doesn't jive. It's how the thing gets initialized.
|
||||
// It's the common path. Should it update every time, in case a future LH query/queries give us more info?
|
||||
if hostinfo.remotes == nil {
|
||||
hostinfo.remotes = hm.lightHouse.QueryCache([]netip.Addr{vpnIp})
|
||||
"stage": uint64(machine.MessageIndex()),
|
||||
"style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, machine.Subtype()),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
remotes := hostinfo.remotes.CopyAddrs(hm.mainHostMap.GetPreferredRanges())
|
||||
@@ -292,10 +346,18 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleOutbound(vpnIp netip.Addr, lighthouseTriggered
|
||||
// Send the handshake to all known ips, stage 2 takes care of assigning the hostinfo.remote based on the first to reply
|
||||
var sentTo []netip.AddrPort
|
||||
hostinfo.remotes.ForEach(hm.mainHostMap.GetPreferredRanges(), func(addr netip.AddrPort, _ bool) {
|
||||
hm.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Handshake, hh.machine.Subtype(), 1)
|
||||
err := hm.outside.WriteTo(stage0, addr)
|
||||
hm.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Handshake, machine.Subtype(), int64(len(now)+len(later)))
|
||||
err := hm.sendFragmented(now, later, func(p []byte) error {
|
||||
return hm.outside.WriteTo(p, addr)
|
||||
})
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Error("Failed to send handshake message",
|
||||
// These repeat every attempt, so match the success log below and only shout when the remotes changed
|
||||
level := slog.LevelDebug
|
||||
if remotesHaveChanged {
|
||||
level = slog.LevelError
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Log(context.Background(), level, "Failed to send handshake message",
|
||||
"udpAddr", addr,
|
||||
"initiatorIndex", hostinfo.localIndexId,
|
||||
"handshake", hsFields,
|
||||
@@ -323,7 +385,7 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleOutbound(vpnIp netip.Addr, lighthouseTriggered
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hm.f.relayManager.StartRelays(hm.f, vpnIp, hh, stage0)
|
||||
hm.f.relayManager.StartRelays(hm.f, vpnIp, hh, now, later)
|
||||
|
||||
// If a lighthouse triggered this attempt then we are still in the timer wheel and do not need to re-add
|
||||
if !lighthouseTriggered {
|
||||
@@ -365,6 +427,9 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) StartHandshake(vpnAddr netip.Addr, cacheCb func(*Han
|
||||
hostinfo := &HostInfo{
|
||||
vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{vpnAddr},
|
||||
HandshakePacket: make(map[uint8][]byte, 0),
|
||||
// Attached here so a pending hostinfo never exists without one: SetRemote dereferences
|
||||
// it, and create-tunnel -address can reach SetRemote before the handshake loop runs.
|
||||
remotes: hm.lightHouse.QueryCache([]netip.Addr{vpnAddr}),
|
||||
relayState: RelayState{
|
||||
relays: nil,
|
||||
relayForByAddr: map[netip.Addr]*Relay{},
|
||||
@@ -430,14 +495,11 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) CheckAndComplete(hostinfo *HostInfo, handshakePacket
|
||||
// Check if we already have a tunnel with this vpn ip
|
||||
existingHostInfo, found := hm.mainHostMap.Hosts[hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0]]
|
||||
if found && existingHostInfo != nil {
|
||||
testHostInfo := existingHostInfo
|
||||
for testHostInfo != nil {
|
||||
// Is it just a delayed handshake packet?
|
||||
// Is it just a delayed handshake packet? Check every hostinfo we hold for this address.
|
||||
for _, testHostInfo := range hm.mainHostMap.unlockedGetHostList(hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0]) {
|
||||
if bytes.Equal(hostinfo.HandshakePacket[handshakePacket], testHostInfo.HandshakePacket[handshakePacket]) {
|
||||
return testHostInfo, ErrAlreadySeen
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
testHostInfo = testHostInfo.next
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Is this a newer handshake?
|
||||
@@ -532,7 +594,13 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo *HostInfo) {
|
||||
|
||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) unlockedDeleteHostInfo(hostinfo *HostInfo) {
|
||||
for _, addr := range hostinfo.vpnAddrs {
|
||||
delete(hm.vpnIps, addr)
|
||||
if cur, ok := hm.vpnIps[addr]; ok && cur.hostinfo == hostinfo {
|
||||
// A PQ attempt holds its own index alongside the hostinfo's.
|
||||
if idx := cur.pqIndex(); idx != 0 && hm.indexes[idx] == cur {
|
||||
delete(hm.indexes, idx)
|
||||
}
|
||||
delete(hm.vpnIps, addr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if len(hm.vpnIps) == 0 {
|
||||
@@ -641,9 +709,8 @@ func hsTimeout(tries int64, interval time.Duration) time.Duration {
|
||||
return time.Duration(tries / 2 * ((2 * int64(interval)) + (tries-1)*int64(interval)))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// buildStage0Packet creates the initial handshake packet for the initiator.
|
||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) buildStage0Packet(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) bool {
|
||||
cs := hm.f.pki.getCertState()
|
||||
// initiatingVersion picks the certificate version to initiate a handshake with.
|
||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) initiatingVersion(hh *HandshakeHostInfo, cs *CertState) cert.Version {
|
||||
v := cs.DefaultVersion()
|
||||
if hh.initiatingVersionOverride != cert.VersionPre1 {
|
||||
v = hh.initiatingVersionOverride
|
||||
@@ -655,6 +722,13 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) buildStage0Packet(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) bool {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return v
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// buildStage0Packet creates the initial handshake packet for the initiator.
|
||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) buildStage0Packet(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) bool {
|
||||
cs := hm.f.pki.getCertState()
|
||||
v := hm.initiatingVersion(hh, cs)
|
||||
|
||||
cred := cs.GetCredential(v)
|
||||
if cred == nil {
|
||||
@@ -693,7 +767,10 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) buildStage0Packet(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) bool {
|
||||
// beginHandshake handles an incoming handshake packet that doesn't match any
|
||||
// existing pending handshake. It creates a new responder Machine and processes
|
||||
// the first message.
|
||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) beginHandshake(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H) {
|
||||
//
|
||||
// received is the number of bytes a fragmented msg1 arrived in, which bounds the
|
||||
// response sent back before the address is validated; 0 for unfragmented ones.
|
||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) beginHandshake(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H, received int) {
|
||||
f := hm.f
|
||||
cs := f.pki.getCertState()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -707,7 +784,7 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) beginHandshake(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *head
|
||||
machine, err := handshake.NewMachine(
|
||||
v, cs.GetCredential,
|
||||
hm.certVerifier(), func() (uint32, error) { return generateIndex(f.l) },
|
||||
false, header.HandshakeIXPSK0,
|
||||
false, h.Subtype,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
f.l.Error("Failed to create handshake machine", "from", via, "error", err)
|
||||
@@ -744,8 +821,14 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) beginHandshake(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *head
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
connState, err := newConnectionStateFromResult(result)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
f.l.Error("Discarding handshake with an invalid message index", "error", err, "vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hostinfo := &HostInfo{
|
||||
ConnectionState: newConnectionStateFromResult(result),
|
||||
ConnectionState: connState,
|
||||
localIndexId: result.LocalIndex,
|
||||
remoteIndexId: result.RemoteIndex,
|
||||
vpnAddrs: vpnAddrs,
|
||||
@@ -791,11 +874,15 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) beginHandshake(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *head
|
||||
|
||||
existing, err := hm.CheckAndComplete(hostinfo, handshakePacketStage0, f)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
hm.handleCheckAndCompleteError(err, existing, hostinfo, via)
|
||||
hm.handleCheckAndCompleteError(err, existing, hostinfo, via, machine.Subtype(), received)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hm.sendHandshakeResponse(via, response, hostinfo, false)
|
||||
hm.sendHandshakeResponse(via, response, hostinfo, false, received)
|
||||
if header.IsFragmented(machine.Subtype()) {
|
||||
hm.pqAnswered.add(packet[header.Len:], hostinfo, time.Now())
|
||||
}
|
||||
hm.notePQPeer(machine.Subtype(), vpnAddrs)
|
||||
hostinfo.remotes.RefreshFromHandshake(vpnAddrs)
|
||||
|
||||
// Don't wait for UpdateWorker
|
||||
@@ -806,23 +893,32 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) beginHandshake(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *head
|
||||
|
||||
// continueHandshake feeds an incoming packet to an existing pending handshake Machine.
|
||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) continueHandshake(via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostInfo, packet []byte) {
|
||||
f := hm.f
|
||||
|
||||
hh.Lock()
|
||||
defer hh.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
// Re-verify hh is still tracked. Between queryIndex returning and us taking
|
||||
// hh.Lock, handleOutbound may have timed out and deleted it. Once we hold
|
||||
// hh.Lock no other deleter can race our index: handleOutbound also takes
|
||||
// hh.Lock first, and handleRecvError targets a main-hostmap entry with a
|
||||
// different localIndexId.
|
||||
hm.RLock()
|
||||
cur, ok := hm.indexes[hh.hostinfo.localIndexId]
|
||||
hm.RUnlock()
|
||||
if !ok || cur != hh {
|
||||
if !hm.stillPending(hh, hh.hostinfo.localIndexId) {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
hm.processResponse(via, hh, hh.machine, packet)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// stillPending re-verifies hh is still tracked under index. Between queryIndex
|
||||
// returning and the caller taking hh.Lock, handleOutbound may have timed out and
|
||||
// deleted it. Once hh.Lock is held no other deleter can race the index:
|
||||
// handleOutbound also takes hh.Lock first, and handleRecvError targets a
|
||||
// main-hostmap entry with a different localIndexId. The caller must hold hh.Lock.
|
||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) stillPending(hh *HandshakeHostInfo, index uint32) bool {
|
||||
hm.RLock()
|
||||
defer hm.RUnlock()
|
||||
cur, ok := hm.indexes[index]
|
||||
return ok && cur == hh
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// processResponse runs a responder's message through one of the initiator's
|
||||
// pending attempts and completes the tunnel when the handshake finishes. The
|
||||
// caller must hold hh.Lock.
|
||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) processResponse(via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostInfo, machine *handshake.Machine, packet []byte) {
|
||||
f := hm.f
|
||||
hostinfo := hh.hostinfo
|
||||
if !via.IsRelayed {
|
||||
if !f.lightHouse.GetRemoteAllowList().AllowAll(hostinfo.vpnAddrs, via.UdpAddr.Addr()) {
|
||||
@@ -832,7 +928,6 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) continueHandshake(via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostIn
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
machine := hh.machine
|
||||
if machine == nil {
|
||||
f.l.Error("No handshake machine available for continuation",
|
||||
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "from", via)
|
||||
@@ -855,7 +950,7 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) continueHandshake(via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostIn
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if response != nil {
|
||||
hm.sendHandshakeResponse(via, response, hostinfo, false)
|
||||
hm.sendHandshakeResponse(via, response, hostinfo, false, 0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if result == nil {
|
||||
@@ -863,7 +958,13 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) continueHandshake(via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostIn
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Handshake complete; build the ConnectionState now that we have keys and a verified peer cert.
|
||||
hostinfo.ConnectionState = newConnectionStateFromResult(result)
|
||||
cs, err := newConnectionStateFromResult(result)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
f.l.Error("Discarding handshake with an invalid message index", "error", err, "vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs)
|
||||
hm.DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
hostinfo.ConnectionState = cs
|
||||
|
||||
remoteCert := result.RemoteCert
|
||||
if remoteCert == nil {
|
||||
@@ -929,13 +1030,14 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) continueHandshake(via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostIn
|
||||
|
||||
hm.DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo)
|
||||
hm.StartHandshake(hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0], func(newHH *HandshakeHostInfo) {
|
||||
newHH.hostinfo.remotes = hostinfo.remotes
|
||||
newHH.hostinfo.remotes.BlockRemote(via)
|
||||
newHH.packetStore = hh.packetStore
|
||||
hh.packetStore = []*cachedPacket{}
|
||||
hostinfo.vpnAddrs = vpnAddrs
|
||||
f.sendCloseTunnel(hostinfo)
|
||||
})
|
||||
// sendCloseTunnel may take the hostmap lock, so it must not run under the handshake
|
||||
// manager lock that StartHandshake holds around the callback.
|
||||
hostinfo.vpnAddrs = vpnAddrs
|
||||
f.sendCloseTunnel(hostinfo)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -961,7 +1063,10 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) continueHandshake(via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostIn
|
||||
hostinfo.vpnAddrs = vpnAddrs
|
||||
hostinfo.buildNetworks(f.myVpnNetworksTable, remoteCert.Certificate)
|
||||
|
||||
// The classical and PQ attempts each hold an index; keep the one that won.
|
||||
hm.settleIndex(hh, result.LocalIndex)
|
||||
hm.Complete(hostinfo, f)
|
||||
hm.notePQPeer(machine.Subtype(), vpnAddrs)
|
||||
|
||||
if len(hh.packetStore) > 0 {
|
||||
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
|
||||
@@ -970,6 +1075,9 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) continueHandshake(via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostIn
|
||||
nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
|
||||
out := make([]byte, mtu)
|
||||
for _, cp := range hh.packetStore {
|
||||
// TODO: use a SendBatch here. Each callback lands in
|
||||
// sendNoMetrics -> WriteTo: one syscall per cached packet,
|
||||
// where one sendmmsg could flush the whole store.
|
||||
cp.callback(cp.messageType, cp.messageSubType, hostinfo, cp.packet, nb, out)
|
||||
}
|
||||
f.cachedPacketMetrics.sent.Inc(int64(len(hh.packetStore)))
|
||||
@@ -1037,20 +1145,23 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) validatePeerCert(via ViaSender, remoteCert *cert.Cac
|
||||
// cached is true when msg is a stored response being retransmitted because
|
||||
// the peer's stage-1 retransmit landed (the ErrAlreadySeen path); false on a
|
||||
// fresh response.
|
||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) sendHandshakeResponse(via ViaSender, msg []byte, hostinfo *HostInfo, cached bool) {
|
||||
//
|
||||
// received is the number of bytes a fragmented msg1 arrived in; it bounds what a
|
||||
// fragmented response may send back. It is ignored for unfragmented subtypes.
|
||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) sendHandshakeResponse(via ViaSender, msg []byte, hostinfo *HostInfo, cached bool, received int) {
|
||||
if msg == nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
f := hm.f
|
||||
f.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Handshake, header.MessageSubType(msg[1]), 1)
|
||||
subtype := header.MessageSubType(msg[1])
|
||||
|
||||
// Common log fields. peerCert may be nil during intermediate
|
||||
// multi-message flows (handshake hasn't completed yet); skip the cert
|
||||
// block if so.
|
||||
logFields := []any{
|
||||
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
|
||||
"handshake", m{"stage": uint64(2), "style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, header.HandshakeIXPSK0)},
|
||||
"handshake", m{"stage": uint64(2), "style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, subtype)},
|
||||
"cached", cached,
|
||||
"initiatorIndex", hostinfo.remoteIndexId,
|
||||
"responderIndex", hostinfo.localIndexId,
|
||||
@@ -1064,6 +1175,17 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) sendHandshakeResponse(via ViaSender, msg []byte, hos
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if header.IsFragmented(subtype) {
|
||||
fields := append(logFields, "from", via)
|
||||
if err := hm.sendFragmentedResponse(via, msg, hostinfo, cached, received); err != nil {
|
||||
f.l.Debug("Did not send handshake message", append(fields, "error", err)...)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
f.l.Info("Handshake message sent", fields...)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
f.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Handshake, subtype, 1)
|
||||
if !via.IsRelayed {
|
||||
fields := append(logFields, "from", via)
|
||||
err := f.outside.WriteTo(msg, via.UdpAddr)
|
||||
@@ -1080,8 +1202,8 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) sendHandshakeResponse(via ViaSender, msg []byte, hos
|
||||
hostinfo.relayState.InsertRelayTo(via.relayHI.vpnAddrs[0])
|
||||
// We received a valid handshake on this relay, so make sure the relay
|
||||
// state reflects that, in case it had been marked Disestablished.
|
||||
via.relayHI.relayState.UpdateRelayForByIdxState(via.remoteIdx, Established)
|
||||
f.SendVia(via.relayHI, via.relay, msg, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu), false)
|
||||
via.relayHI.relayState.UpdateRelayForByIdxState(via.relay.LocalIndex, Established)
|
||||
f.SendVia(via.relayHI, via.relay, msg, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu), false, 0)
|
||||
f.l.Info("Handshake message sent", append(logFields, "relay", via.relayHI.vpnAddrs[0])...)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1090,10 +1212,10 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) sendHandshakeResponse(via ViaSender, msg []byte, hos
|
||||
// This only fires from the responder-side beginHandshake path, after the
|
||||
// peer cert has been validated and ConnectionState populated, so peerCert
|
||||
// is always non-nil for the cases that log it.
|
||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleCheckAndCompleteError(err error, existing, hostinfo *HostInfo, via ViaSender) {
|
||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleCheckAndCompleteError(err error, existing, hostinfo *HostInfo, via ViaSender, subtype header.MessageSubType, received int) {
|
||||
f := hm.f
|
||||
peerCert := hostinfo.ConnectionState.peerCert
|
||||
hsFields := m{"stage": uint64(1), "style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, header.HandshakeIXPSK0)}
|
||||
hsFields := m{"stage": uint64(1), "style": header.SubTypeName(header.Handshake, subtype)}
|
||||
|
||||
switch err {
|
||||
case ErrAlreadySeen:
|
||||
@@ -1104,7 +1226,7 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleCheckAndCompleteError(err error, existing, hos
|
||||
// ephemeral keys; a freshly-built one would have different keys and break
|
||||
// the tunnel even though both sides "completed" the handshake.
|
||||
if msg := existing.HandshakePacket[handshakePacketStage2]; msg != nil {
|
||||
hm.sendHandshakeResponse(via, msg, existing, true)
|
||||
hm.sendHandshakeResponse(via, msg, existing, true, received)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
case ErrExistingHostInfo:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,699 @@
|
||||
package nebula
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"crypto/hmac"
|
||||
"crypto/rand"
|
||||
"crypto/sha256"
|
||||
"encoding/binary"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake/fragment"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
// pqSubtype is the post-quantum handshake this node speaks.
|
||||
pqSubtype = header.HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024
|
||||
|
||||
// DefaultPQRepairDelay is how long repair fragments trail the data fragments.
|
||||
DefaultPQRepairDelay = 10 * time.Millisecond
|
||||
|
||||
// pqAmplification bounds what a responder sends in reply to an unvalidated
|
||||
// address, as a multiple of what it received from it.
|
||||
pqAmplification = 3
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// pqTableConfig bounds the responder's reassembly of msg1 fragments from senders
|
||||
// that have not authenticated yet.
|
||||
var pqTableConfig = fragment.TableConfig{
|
||||
MaxBytes: 4 << 20,
|
||||
MaxEntries: 1024,
|
||||
MaxPerSource: 4,
|
||||
MaxMsgLen: 16384,
|
||||
TTL: 3 * time.Second,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type pqHandshakeConfig struct {
|
||||
initiate bool // start PQ handshakes
|
||||
accept bool // answer PQ handshakes
|
||||
require bool // only PQ handshakes, in either direction
|
||||
sticky bool // never fall back to classical for a peer that completed PQ
|
||||
repairDelay time.Duration // delay between data and repair fragments
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func pqHandshakeConfigFrom(c *config.C) pqHandshakeConfig {
|
||||
cfg := pqHandshakeConfig{
|
||||
initiate: c.GetBool("handshakes.pq.initiate", false),
|
||||
accept: c.GetBool("handshakes.pq.accept", false),
|
||||
require: c.GetBool("handshakes.pq.require", false),
|
||||
sticky: c.GetBool("handshakes.pq.sticky", false),
|
||||
repairDelay: c.GetDuration("handshakes.pq.repair_delay", DefaultPQRepairDelay),
|
||||
}
|
||||
if cfg.require {
|
||||
cfg.initiate = true
|
||||
cfg.accept = true
|
||||
}
|
||||
return cfg
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// pqConfig returns the post-quantum settings in effect.
|
||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) pqConfig() *pqHandshakeConfig {
|
||||
return hm.pq.Load()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// reloadPQ applies changed post-quantum settings. Handshakes already in flight
|
||||
// keep going; the new settings apply to the next attempt and packet.
|
||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) reloadPQ(c *config.C) {
|
||||
if !c.HasChanged("handshakes.pq") {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
old := hm.pqConfig()
|
||||
cfg := pqHandshakeConfigFrom(c)
|
||||
hm.pq.Store(&cfg)
|
||||
hm.l.Info("Post-quantum handshake settings changed",
|
||||
"initiate", cfg.initiate, "oldInitiate", old.initiate,
|
||||
"accept", cfg.accept, "oldAccept", old.accept,
|
||||
"require", cfg.require, "oldRequire", old.require,
|
||||
"sticky", cfg.sticky, "oldSticky", old.sticky,
|
||||
"repairDelay", cfg.repairDelay, "oldRepairDelay", old.repairDelay,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// pqAttempt is the initiator's post-quantum attempt for a pending handshake. It
|
||||
// lives alongside the classical attempt in HandshakeHostInfo and has its own
|
||||
// local index, so whichever answer arrives first wins.
|
||||
type pqAttempt struct {
|
||||
machine *handshake.Machine
|
||||
index uint32
|
||||
sender *fragment.Sender
|
||||
msg2 *fragment.Assembly
|
||||
cookieResendAt time.Time // last resend prompted by a cookie reply
|
||||
heard bool // a msg2 fragment or cookie reply arrived, so the peer speaks PQ
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// pqFragKey identifies one msg1 being reassembled.
|
||||
type pqFragKey struct {
|
||||
addr netip.AddrPort
|
||||
relay uint32
|
||||
fragID uint32
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// pqFragSource groups msg1 reassemblies for the per-source quota: an IPv4 /32,
|
||||
// an IPv6 /64, or one relay channel.
|
||||
type pqFragSource struct {
|
||||
prefix netip.Prefix
|
||||
relay uint32
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func pqFragKeyFor(via ViaSender, fragID uint32) (pqFragKey, pqFragSource) {
|
||||
if via.IsRelayed {
|
||||
return pqFragKey{relay: via.relay.LocalIndex, fragID: fragID},
|
||||
pqFragSource{relay: via.relay.LocalIndex}
|
||||
}
|
||||
addr := via.UdpAddr.Addr().Unmap()
|
||||
bits := 64
|
||||
if addr.Is4() {
|
||||
bits = 32
|
||||
}
|
||||
prefix, _ := addr.Prefix(bits)
|
||||
return pqFragKey{addr: via.UdpAddr, fragID: fragID}, pqFragSource{prefix: prefix}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// reassembled rebuilds the packet the handshake Machine expects from the header
|
||||
// of a fragment and the decoded message.
|
||||
func reassembled(h *header.H, msg []byte) []byte {
|
||||
p := make([]byte, header.Len, header.Len+len(msg))
|
||||
header.Encode(p, header.Version, header.Handshake, h.Subtype, h.RemoteIndex, h.MessageCounter)
|
||||
return append(p, msg...)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// usePQ decides whether this outbound attempt is post-quantum. A peer that does
|
||||
// not speak PQ silently drops it, so timer retries alternate between PQ and
|
||||
// classical, starting with PQ. An attempt triggered early by a lighthouse reply
|
||||
// is sending to addresses nothing has been sent to yet, and a new path gets the
|
||||
// PQ attempt first. With require, or for a peer that completed a PQ handshake
|
||||
// when sticky is on, every attempt is PQ. Once anything has come back for the PQ
|
||||
// attempt the peer evidently speaks PQ, and a classical attempt would only race
|
||||
// it, so classical stops getting turns.
|
||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) usePQ(hh *HandshakeHostInfo, vpnIp netip.Addr, triggered bool) bool {
|
||||
cfg := hm.pqConfig()
|
||||
switch {
|
||||
case !cfg.initiate:
|
||||
return false
|
||||
case cfg.require:
|
||||
return true
|
||||
case hh.pq != nil && hh.pq.heard:
|
||||
return true
|
||||
case cfg.sticky:
|
||||
if _, ok := hm.pqPeers.Load(vpnIp); ok {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return hh.counter <= 1 || triggered || !hh.lastPQ
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// relayEstablished pushes the pending handshake with target through a relay that
|
||||
// just came up, rather than leaving it for the next retry. Nothing has gone over
|
||||
// the relay yet, so like any new path it gets the PQ attempt first, which then
|
||||
// counts as the PQ turn: the next retry is classical, as if it had been sent on
|
||||
// schedule. Without this, relays coming up while the first attempt is in flight
|
||||
// handed every relayed handshake to the classical retry.
|
||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) relayEstablished(target netip.Addr, relayHI *HostInfo, relay *Relay) {
|
||||
hh := hm.queryVpnIp(target)
|
||||
if hh == nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
hh.Lock()
|
||||
defer hh.Unlock()
|
||||
if hm.queryVpnIp(target) != hh {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var now, later [][]byte
|
||||
switch {
|
||||
case hh.pq != nil:
|
||||
var err error
|
||||
now, later, err = hh.pq.sender.Attempt(fragment.DefaultRepair(hh.pq.sender.Layout().K))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
hh.lastPQ = true
|
||||
case hh.ready:
|
||||
now = [][]byte{hh.hostinfo.HandshakePacket[handshakePacketStage0]}
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
f := hm.f
|
||||
hh.hostinfo.logger(hm.l).Info("Send handshake via new relay", "relay", relayHI.vpnAddrs[0])
|
||||
_ = hm.sendFragmented(now, later, func(p []byte) error {
|
||||
f.SendVia(relayHI, relay, p, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu), false, 0)
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// buildPQAttempt creates the initiator's PQ Machine and msg1 sender.
|
||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) buildPQAttempt(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) bool {
|
||||
cs := hm.f.pki.getCertState()
|
||||
v := hm.initiatingVersion(hh, cs)
|
||||
if cs.GetCredential(v) == nil {
|
||||
hm.f.l.Error("Unable to handshake with host because no certificate is available",
|
||||
"vpnAddrs", hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "certVersion", v)
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pq := &pqAttempt{}
|
||||
machine, err := handshake.NewMachine(
|
||||
v, cs.GetCredential,
|
||||
hm.certVerifier(), func() (uint32, error) { return hm.allocatePQIndex(hh, pq) },
|
||||
true, pqSubtype,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
hm.f.l.Error("Failed to create handshake machine",
|
||||
"vpnAddrs", hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "error", err)
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
msg, err := machine.Initiate(nil)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
hm.f.l.Error("Failed to initiate handshake",
|
||||
"vpnAddrs", hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "error", err)
|
||||
hm.releasePQIndex(hh, pq)
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
sender, err := fragment.NewSender(msg[header.Len:], pqSubtype, 0, 1, pq.index)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
hm.f.l.Error("Failed to fragment handshake",
|
||||
"vpnAddrs", hh.hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "error", err)
|
||||
hm.releasePQIndex(hh, pq)
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pq.machine = machine
|
||||
pq.sender = sender
|
||||
hh.pq = pq
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// allocatePQIndex registers a local index for the PQ attempt. Unlike
|
||||
// allocateIndex it leaves hostinfo.localIndexId alone; that is settled when one
|
||||
// of the attempts completes.
|
||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) allocatePQIndex(hh *HandshakeHostInfo, pq *pqAttempt) (uint32, error) {
|
||||
hm.mainHostMap.RLock()
|
||||
defer hm.mainHostMap.RUnlock()
|
||||
hm.Lock()
|
||||
defer hm.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
for range 32 {
|
||||
index, err := generateIndex(hm.l)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return 0, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
_, inPending := hm.indexes[index]
|
||||
_, inMain := hm.mainHostMap.Indexes[index]
|
||||
|
||||
if !inMain && !inPending {
|
||||
pq.index = index
|
||||
hm.indexes[index] = hh
|
||||
return index, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 0, errors.New("failed to generate unique localIndexId")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) releasePQIndex(hh *HandshakeHostInfo, pq *pqAttempt) {
|
||||
hm.Lock()
|
||||
defer hm.Unlock()
|
||||
if pq.index != 0 && hm.indexes[pq.index] == hh {
|
||||
delete(hm.indexes, pq.index)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// settleIndex makes winner the hostinfo's local index and releases the index of
|
||||
// the attempt that lost.
|
||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) settleIndex(hh *HandshakeHostInfo, winner uint32) {
|
||||
hm.Lock()
|
||||
defer hm.Unlock()
|
||||
for _, idx := range []uint32{hh.hostinfo.localIndexId, hh.pqIndex()} {
|
||||
if idx != 0 && idx != winner && hm.indexes[idx] == hh {
|
||||
delete(hm.indexes, idx)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
hh.hostinfo.localIndexId = winner
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hh *HandshakeHostInfo) pqIndex() uint32 {
|
||||
if hh.pq == nil {
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
return hh.pq.index
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// handleFragment routes one fragment of a PQ handshake message.
|
||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleFragment(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H) {
|
||||
if h.MessageCounter == pqCookieCounter {
|
||||
hm.handleCookie(via, packet, h)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fh, sym, err := fragment.Parse(packet[header.Len:])
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
hm.l.Debug("dropping malformed handshake fragment", "from", via, "error", err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
switch h.MessageCounter {
|
||||
case 1:
|
||||
if !hm.pqConfig().accept {
|
||||
hm.l.Debug("dropping post-quantum handshake, not accepting them", "from", via)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if h.RemoteIndex != 0 {
|
||||
hm.l.Debug("dropping stage-1 handshake with non-zero RemoteIndex",
|
||||
"from", via, "remoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
now := time.Now()
|
||||
key, src := pqFragKeyFor(via, fh.FragID)
|
||||
if hm.pqTable.Load() >= pqCookieLoad && !(fh.HasCookie() && hm.pqCookies.valid(key, fh.Cookie, now)) {
|
||||
hm.sendCookie(via, fh, key, len(packet), now)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
res, err := hm.pqTable.Add(key, src, now, fh, sym)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
hm.l.Debug("dropping handshake fragment", "from", via, "error", err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if res == nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if existing := hm.pqAnswered.lookup(res.Msg, time.Now()); existing != nil {
|
||||
// Already answered: resend, rate limited, with fresh symbols.
|
||||
if msg := existing.HandshakePacket[handshakePacketStage2]; msg != nil {
|
||||
hm.sendHandshakeResponse(via, msg, existing, true, res.Received)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
hm.beginHandshake(via, reassembled(h, res.Msg), h, res.Received)
|
||||
|
||||
case 2:
|
||||
if hh := hm.queryIndex(h.RemoteIndex); hh != nil {
|
||||
hm.continuePQ(via, hh, h, fh, sym)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// continuePQ collects msg2 fragments for the initiator's PQ attempt.
|
||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) continuePQ(via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostInfo, h *header.H, fh fragment.Header, sym []byte) {
|
||||
hh.Lock()
|
||||
defer hh.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
pq := hh.pq
|
||||
if pq == nil || pq.index != h.RemoteIndex || !hm.stillPending(hh, pq.index) {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
pq.heard = true
|
||||
|
||||
if pq.msg2 == nil {
|
||||
a, err := fragment.NewAssembly(fh)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
pq.msg2 = a
|
||||
}
|
||||
ready, err := pq.msg2.Add(fh, sym)
|
||||
if errors.Is(err, fragment.ErrMismatch) {
|
||||
// The responder's FragID and MsgLen never change, so this is a stray or a
|
||||
// forgery. Start over from this fragment rather than wedge.
|
||||
pq.msg2 = nil
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err != nil || !ready {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
msg, err := pq.msg2.Decode()
|
||||
pq.msg2 = nil
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
hm.l.Debug("failed to decode handshake fragments", "from", via, "error", err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
hm.processResponse(via, hh, pq.machine, reassembled(h, msg))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// sendFragmented sends packets to a peer: now immediately and later after the
|
||||
// repair delay. It returns the first error from the immediate sends; errors from
|
||||
// delayed sends are only logged.
|
||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) sendFragmented(now, later [][]byte, send func([]byte) error) error {
|
||||
var first error
|
||||
for _, p := range now {
|
||||
if err := send(p); err != nil && first == nil {
|
||||
first = err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
sendLater := func() {
|
||||
for _, p := range later {
|
||||
if err := send(p); err != nil {
|
||||
hm.l.Debug("Failed to send handshake repair fragment", "error", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
delay := hm.pqConfig().repairDelay
|
||||
switch {
|
||||
case len(later) == 0:
|
||||
case delay <= 0:
|
||||
sendLater()
|
||||
default:
|
||||
time.AfterFunc(delay, sendLater)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return first
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// sendFragmentedResponse sends the responder's msg2 as fragments. A resend of a
|
||||
// cached response (cached) offers fresh symbols and is rate limited to one per
|
||||
// retry interval. received is how many bytes the triggering msg1 took, which
|
||||
// bounds what may be sent back before the address is validated.
|
||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) sendFragmentedResponse(via ViaSender, msg []byte, hostinfo *HostInfo, cached bool, received int) error {
|
||||
now := time.Now()
|
||||
if cached {
|
||||
last := hostinfo.handshakeResendAt.Load()
|
||||
if now.UnixNano()-last < int64(hm.config.tryInterval) ||
|
||||
!hostinfo.handshakeResendAt.CompareAndSwap(last, now.UnixNano()) {
|
||||
return errors.New("handshake response resend rate limited")
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
hostinfo.handshakeResendAt.Store(now.UnixNano())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var h header.H
|
||||
if err := h.Parse(msg); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
s, err := fragment.NewSender(msg[header.Len:], h.Subtype, h.RemoteIndex, h.MessageCounter, hostinfo.localIndexId)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
l := s.Layout()
|
||||
repair := fragment.DefaultRepair(l.K)
|
||||
if received > 0 {
|
||||
pktLen := header.Len + fragment.HeaderLen + l.SymbolSize
|
||||
budget := pqAmplification * received / pktLen
|
||||
if budget < l.K {
|
||||
return errors.New("handshake response exceeds the amplification budget")
|
||||
}
|
||||
repair = min(repair, budget-l.K)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
n := uint32(l.K + repair)
|
||||
s.SetNext(int(hostinfo.handshakeNextSymbol.Add(n) - n))
|
||||
pkts, later, err := s.Attempt(repair)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if via.IsRelayed {
|
||||
if via.relay == nil {
|
||||
return errors.New("both addr and via.relay are nil")
|
||||
}
|
||||
// We received a valid handshake on this relay, so make sure the relay
|
||||
// state reflects that, in case it had been marked Disestablished.
|
||||
hostinfo.relayState.InsertRelayTo(via.relayHI.vpnAddrs[0])
|
||||
via.relayHI.relayState.UpdateRelayForByIdxState(via.relay.LocalIndex, Established)
|
||||
}
|
||||
hm.f.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Handshake, h.Subtype, int64(len(pkts)+len(later)))
|
||||
return hm.sendFragmented(pkts, later, hm.sendTo(via))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// notePQPeer remembers peers that completed a PQ handshake, for sticky mode.
|
||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) notePQPeer(subtype header.MessageSubType, vpnAddrs []netip.Addr) {
|
||||
if !hm.pqConfig().sticky || subtype != pqSubtype {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, a := range vpnAddrs {
|
||||
hm.pqPeers.Store(a, struct{}{})
|
||||
}
|
||||
if hm.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
|
||||
hm.l.Debug("Remembering post-quantum peer", "vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// pqAnswered remembers the msg1s a responder recently answered, keyed by hash,
|
||||
// so a repeat is recognised before any noise, KEM or certificate work. Repeats
|
||||
// are routine: the trailing repair fragments of an attempt rebuild a msg1 that
|
||||
// its data fragments already completed, and a retrying initiator offers fresh
|
||||
// symbols for the same msg1. Entries only exist for completed handshakes, which
|
||||
// need a valid certificate, and live as long as an initiator keeps retrying.
|
||||
type pqAnswered struct {
|
||||
sync.Mutex
|
||||
ttl time.Duration
|
||||
entries map[[sha256.Size]byte]pqAnsweredEntry
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type pqAnsweredEntry struct {
|
||||
hostinfo *HostInfo
|
||||
at time.Time
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const pqAnsweredMax = 4096
|
||||
|
||||
func newPQAnswered(ttl time.Duration) *pqAnswered {
|
||||
return &pqAnswered{ttl: ttl, entries: map[[sha256.Size]byte]pqAnsweredEntry{}}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (a *pqAnswered) add(msg1 []byte, hostinfo *HostInfo, now time.Time) {
|
||||
a.Lock()
|
||||
defer a.Unlock()
|
||||
if len(a.entries) >= pqAnsweredMax {
|
||||
for k := range a.entries {
|
||||
delete(a.entries, k)
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
a.entries[sha256.Sum256(msg1)] = pqAnsweredEntry{hostinfo: hostinfo, at: now}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (a *pqAnswered) lookup(msg1 []byte, now time.Time) *HostInfo {
|
||||
a.Lock()
|
||||
defer a.Unlock()
|
||||
e, ok := a.entries[sha256.Sum256(msg1)]
|
||||
if !ok || now.Sub(e.at) > a.ttl {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return e.hostinfo
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (a *pqAnswered) expire(now time.Time) {
|
||||
a.Lock()
|
||||
defer a.Unlock()
|
||||
for k, e := range a.entries {
|
||||
if now.Sub(e.at) > a.ttl {
|
||||
delete(a.entries, k)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A responder whose msg1 table is under load stops keeping state for senders
|
||||
// that have not shown they receive at their address. It answers a fragment
|
||||
// without a valid cookie with a cookie reply and keeps nothing; the initiator
|
||||
// resends with the cookie attached. This is WireGuard's under-load cookie, QUIC's
|
||||
// Retry and SCTP's state cookie: one extra round trip, only while under attack.
|
||||
const (
|
||||
// pqCookieLoad is the table load above which msg1 fragments need a cookie.
|
||||
pqCookieLoad = 0.5
|
||||
|
||||
// pqCookieCounter marks a cookie reply in the header's message counter.
|
||||
// Handshake messages count from 1.
|
||||
pqCookieCounter = 0
|
||||
|
||||
// pqCookieRotate is how often the cookie secret changes. A cookie stays
|
||||
// valid for between one and two rotations.
|
||||
pqCookieRotate = 2 * time.Minute
|
||||
|
||||
pqCookieReplyLen = header.Len + fragment.CookieLen
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// pqCookies mints and checks cookies: an HMAC over the sender's address (or relay
|
||||
// channel) and FragID under a rotating secret, with the previous secret still
|
||||
// accepted.
|
||||
type pqCookies struct {
|
||||
sync.Mutex
|
||||
secrets [2][32]byte
|
||||
rotatedAt time.Time
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func newPQCookies(now time.Time) *pqCookies {
|
||||
c := &pqCookies{rotatedAt: now}
|
||||
_, _ = rand.Read(c.secrets[0][:])
|
||||
_, _ = rand.Read(c.secrets[1][:])
|
||||
return c
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *pqCookies) rotate(now time.Time) {
|
||||
if now.Sub(c.rotatedAt) < pqCookieRotate {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.secrets[1] = c.secrets[0]
|
||||
_, _ = rand.Read(c.secrets[0][:])
|
||||
c.rotatedAt = now
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func cookieMAC(secret []byte, key pqFragKey) fragment.Cookie {
|
||||
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, secret)
|
||||
addr := key.addr.Addr().As16()
|
||||
mac.Write(addr[:])
|
||||
var b [10]byte
|
||||
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(b[0:], key.addr.Port())
|
||||
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(b[2:], key.relay)
|
||||
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(b[6:], key.fragID)
|
||||
mac.Write(b[:])
|
||||
var c fragment.Cookie
|
||||
copy(c[:], mac.Sum(nil))
|
||||
return c
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *pqCookies) make(key pqFragKey, now time.Time) fragment.Cookie {
|
||||
c.Lock()
|
||||
defer c.Unlock()
|
||||
c.rotate(now)
|
||||
return cookieMAC(c.secrets[0][:], key)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *pqCookies) valid(key pqFragKey, cookie fragment.Cookie, now time.Time) bool {
|
||||
c.Lock()
|
||||
defer c.Unlock()
|
||||
c.rotate(now)
|
||||
for _, s := range c.secrets {
|
||||
want := cookieMAC(s[:], key)
|
||||
if hmac.Equal(want[:], cookie[:]) {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// sendCookie answers a msg1 fragment that arrived without a valid cookie while
|
||||
// under load. The reply is never larger than what triggered it, and replies are
|
||||
// rate limited as a whole.
|
||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) sendCookie(via ViaSender, fh fragment.Header, key pqFragKey, received int, now time.Time) {
|
||||
if received < pqCookieReplyLen {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, ok := hm.pqCookieLimiter.Allow(); !ok {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
c := hm.pqCookies.make(key, now)
|
||||
reply := make([]byte, header.Len, pqCookieReplyLen)
|
||||
header.Encode(reply, header.Version, header.Handshake, pqSubtype, fh.FragID, pqCookieCounter)
|
||||
reply = append(reply, c[:]...)
|
||||
hm.f.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Handshake, pqSubtype, 1)
|
||||
if err := hm.sendTo(via)(reply); err != nil {
|
||||
hm.l.Debug("Failed to send handshake cookie", "to", via, "error", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// handleCookie attaches a responder's cookie to the PQ attempt it names and
|
||||
// resends right away, at most once per retry interval, rather than waiting for
|
||||
// the next attempt.
|
||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) handleCookie(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H) {
|
||||
if len(packet) != pqCookieReplyLen {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
hh := hm.queryIndex(h.RemoteIndex)
|
||||
if hh == nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
hh.Lock()
|
||||
defer hh.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
pq := hh.pq
|
||||
if pq == nil || pq.index != h.RemoteIndex || !hm.stillPending(hh, pq.index) {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
var c fragment.Cookie
|
||||
copy(c[:], packet[header.Len:])
|
||||
pq.sender.SetCookie(c)
|
||||
pq.heard = true
|
||||
|
||||
now := time.Now()
|
||||
if now.Sub(pq.cookieResendAt) < hm.config.tryInterval {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
pq.cookieResendAt = now
|
||||
pkts, later, err := pq.sender.Attempt(fragment.DefaultRepair(pq.sender.Layout().K))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
hm.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Handshake, pqSubtype, int64(len(pkts)+len(later)))
|
||||
if err := hm.sendFragmented(pkts, later, hm.sendTo(via)); err != nil {
|
||||
hm.l.Debug("Failed to resend handshake with cookie", "to", via, "error", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// sendTo returns a function sending a packet back the way via came: directly, or
|
||||
// through the relay it arrived on.
|
||||
func (hm *HandshakeManager) sendTo(via ViaSender) func([]byte) error {
|
||||
f := hm.f
|
||||
if !via.IsRelayed {
|
||||
return func(p []byte) error {
|
||||
return f.outside.WriteTo(p, via.UdpAddr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return func(p []byte) error {
|
||||
if via.relay == nil {
|
||||
return errors.New("both addr and via.relay are nil")
|
||||
}
|
||||
f.SendVia(via.relayHI, via.relay, p, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu), false, 0)
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,398 @@
|
||||
package nebula
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"math/rand/v2"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake/fragment"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// recordingConn captures what is written to it.
|
||||
type recordingConn struct {
|
||||
udp.NoopConn
|
||||
sync.Mutex
|
||||
sent [][]byte
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *recordingConn) WriteTo(b []byte, _ netip.AddrPort) error {
|
||||
c.Lock()
|
||||
defer c.Unlock()
|
||||
c.sent = append(c.sent, append([]byte(nil), b...))
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *recordingConn) take() [][]byte {
|
||||
c.Lock()
|
||||
defer c.Unlock()
|
||||
s := c.sent
|
||||
c.sent = nil
|
||||
return s
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func newPQTestManager(t *testing.T) (*HandshakeManager, *recordingConn) {
|
||||
l := test.NewLogger()
|
||||
conn := &recordingConn{}
|
||||
cfg := defaultHandshakeConfig
|
||||
cfg.pq = pqHandshakeConfig{initiate: true, accept: true}
|
||||
hm := NewHandshakeManager(l, newHostMap(l), newTestLighthouse(), conn, cfg)
|
||||
hm.f = &Interface{
|
||||
handshakeManager: hm,
|
||||
outside: conn,
|
||||
messageMetrics: newMessageMetricsOnlyRecvError(),
|
||||
l: l,
|
||||
}
|
||||
return hm, conn
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// fragmentIndexes checks every packet is a fragment of the expected response and
|
||||
// returns their symbol indexes.
|
||||
func fragmentIndexes(t *testing.T, pkts [][]byte, fragID, remoteIndex uint32) []int {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
var out []int
|
||||
for _, p := range pkts {
|
||||
require.LessOrEqual(t, len(p), fragment.MaxPacketLen)
|
||||
var h header.H
|
||||
require.NoError(t, h.Parse(p))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, pqSubtype, h.Subtype)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, remoteIndex, h.RemoteIndex)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, uint64(2), h.MessageCounter)
|
||||
fh, _, err := fragment.Parse(p[header.Len:])
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, fragID, fh.FragID)
|
||||
out = append(out, int(fh.Index))
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestSendFragmentedResponse(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
hm, conn := newPQTestManager(t)
|
||||
via := ViaSender{UdpAddr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.1:4242")}
|
||||
hostinfo := &HostInfo{localIndexId: 77}
|
||||
|
||||
// A 2000 byte message is 2 symbols of 1000, so packets of 1024 bytes.
|
||||
msg := make([]byte, header.Len, header.Len+2000)
|
||||
header.Encode(msg, header.Version, header.Handshake, pqSubtype, 5, 2)
|
||||
r := rand.New(rand.NewPCG(1, 1))
|
||||
for range 2000 {
|
||||
msg = append(msg, byte(r.Uint32()))
|
||||
}
|
||||
const pktLen = header.Len + fragment.HeaderLen + 1000
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("first send", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
require.NoError(t, hm.sendFragmentedResponse(via, msg, hostinfo, false, 0))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []int{0, 1, 2, 3}, fragmentIndexes(t, conn.take(), 77, 5))
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("resends are rate limited", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
require.Error(t, hm.sendFragmentedResponse(via, msg, hostinfo, true, 10*pktLen))
|
||||
assert.Empty(t, conn.take())
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
allowResend := func() {
|
||||
hostinfo.handshakeResendAt.Store(time.Now().Add(-time.Second).UnixNano())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("resend offers fresh symbols", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
allowResend()
|
||||
require.NoError(t, hm.sendFragmentedResponse(via, msg, hostinfo, true, 10*pktLen))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []int{4, 5, 6, 7}, fragmentIndexes(t, conn.take(), 77, 5))
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("amplification budget trims repair", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
allowResend()
|
||||
// 3x of a little over one packet allows 3 packets: both data and 1 repair.
|
||||
require.NoError(t, hm.sendFragmentedResponse(via, msg, hostinfo, true, pktLen+10))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []int{8, 9, 10}, fragmentIndexes(t, conn.take(), 77, 5))
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("amplification budget below the data refuses", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
allowResend()
|
||||
require.Error(t, hm.sendFragmentedResponse(via, msg, hostinfo, true, pktLen/2))
|
||||
assert.Empty(t, conn.take())
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestPQAnswered(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
now := time.Unix(1000, 0)
|
||||
a := newPQAnswered(5 * time.Second)
|
||||
hi := &HostInfo{}
|
||||
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, a.lookup([]byte("msg1"), now))
|
||||
a.add([]byte("msg1"), hi, now)
|
||||
assert.Same(t, hi, a.lookup([]byte("msg1"), now.Add(time.Second)))
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, a.lookup([]byte("other"), now))
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, a.lookup([]byte("msg1"), now.Add(6*time.Second)), "stale entries are not answered")
|
||||
|
||||
a.expire(now.Add(6 * time.Second))
|
||||
assert.Empty(t, a.entries)
|
||||
|
||||
for i := range pqAnsweredMax + 10 {
|
||||
a.add([]byte{byte(i), byte(i >> 8)}, hi, now)
|
||||
}
|
||||
assert.Len(t, a.entries, pqAnsweredMax)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestPQFragKeyFor(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
k1, s1 := pqFragKeyFor(ViaSender{UdpAddr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.1:4242")}, 9)
|
||||
k2, s2 := pqFragKeyFor(ViaSender{UdpAddr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.1:4243")}, 9)
|
||||
assert.NotEqual(t, k1, k2, "different ports are different messages")
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, s1, s2, "but share an IPv4 /32 quota")
|
||||
|
||||
_, s3 := pqFragKeyFor(ViaSender{UdpAddr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("[2001:db8::1]:1")}, 9)
|
||||
_, s4 := pqFragKeyFor(ViaSender{UdpAddr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("[2001:db8::ffff]:1")}, 9)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, s3, s4, "an IPv6 /64 shares a quota")
|
||||
|
||||
_, s5 := pqFragKeyFor(ViaSender{UdpAddr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("[::ffff:192.0.2.1]:1")}, 9)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, s1, s5, "v4-mapped addresses count as IPv4")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestPQCookies(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
now := time.Unix(1000, 0)
|
||||
c := newPQCookies(now)
|
||||
key := pqFragKey{addr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.1:4242"), fragID: 9}
|
||||
|
||||
cookie := c.make(key, now)
|
||||
assert.True(t, c.valid(key, cookie, now))
|
||||
|
||||
for _, other := range []pqFragKey{
|
||||
{addr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.2:4242"), fragID: 9},
|
||||
{addr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.1:4243"), fragID: 9},
|
||||
{addr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.1:4242"), fragID: 10},
|
||||
{addr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.1:4242"), relay: 1, fragID: 9},
|
||||
} {
|
||||
assert.False(t, c.valid(other, cookie, now), "%+v", other)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
now = now.Add(pqCookieRotate)
|
||||
assert.True(t, c.valid(key, cookie, now), "the previous secret is still accepted")
|
||||
assert.NotEqual(t, cookie, c.make(key, now), "new cookies come from the new secret")
|
||||
|
||||
now = now.Add(pqCookieRotate)
|
||||
assert.False(t, c.valid(key, cookie, now), "two rotations retire a cookie")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// pqMsg1Fragment builds the first fragment of a msg1, optionally with a cookie.
|
||||
func pqMsg1Fragment(t *testing.T, fragID uint32, cookie *fragment.Cookie) ([]byte, *header.H) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
s, err := fragment.NewSender(make([]byte, 2000), pqSubtype, 0, 1, fragID)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
if cookie != nil {
|
||||
s.SetCookie(*cookie)
|
||||
}
|
||||
pkts, _, err := s.Attempt(0)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
var h header.H
|
||||
require.NoError(t, h.Parse(pkts[0]))
|
||||
return pkts[0], &h
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// fillPQTable puts the responder's msg1 table at the cookie threshold.
|
||||
func fillPQTable(t *testing.T, hm *HandshakeManager) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
now := time.Now()
|
||||
for i := 0; hm.pqTable.Load() < pqCookieLoad; i++ {
|
||||
p, _ := pqMsg1Fragment(t, uint32(i+1), nil)
|
||||
fh, sym, err := fragment.Parse(p[header.Len:])
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
addr := netip.AddrPortFrom(netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{198, 18, byte(i >> 8), byte(i)}), 4242)
|
||||
key, src := pqFragKeyFor(ViaSender{UdpAddr: addr}, fh.FragID)
|
||||
_, err = hm.pqTable.Add(key, src, now, fh, sym)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestPQCookieUnderLoad(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
hm, conn := newPQTestManager(t)
|
||||
via := ViaSender{UdpAddr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.1:4242")}
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("no cookie needed below the threshold", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
p, h := pqMsg1Fragment(t, 5000, nil)
|
||||
before := hm.pqTable.Len()
|
||||
hm.handleFragment(via, p, h)
|
||||
assert.Empty(t, conn.take())
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, before+1, hm.pqTable.Len())
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
fillPQTable(t, hm)
|
||||
|
||||
var cookie fragment.Cookie
|
||||
t.Run("a fragment without a cookie gets one and leaves no state", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
p, h := pqMsg1Fragment(t, 7, nil)
|
||||
before := hm.pqTable.Len()
|
||||
hm.handleFragment(via, p, h)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, before, hm.pqTable.Len())
|
||||
|
||||
sent := conn.take()
|
||||
require.Len(t, sent, 1)
|
||||
reply := sent[0]
|
||||
require.Len(t, reply, pqCookieReplyLen)
|
||||
var rh header.H
|
||||
require.NoError(t, rh.Parse(reply))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, header.Handshake, rh.Type)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, pqSubtype, rh.Subtype)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, uint32(7), rh.RemoteIndex, "the reply names the initiator's FragID")
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, uint64(pqCookieCounter), rh.MessageCounter)
|
||||
copy(cookie[:], reply[header.Len:])
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("a forged cookie gets a fresh one", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
bad := cookie
|
||||
bad[0] ^= 1
|
||||
p, h := pqMsg1Fragment(t, 7, &bad)
|
||||
before := hm.pqTable.Len()
|
||||
hm.handleFragment(via, p, h)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, before, hm.pqTable.Len())
|
||||
assert.Len(t, conn.take(), 1)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("the cookie gets the fragment in", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
p, h := pqMsg1Fragment(t, 7, &cookie)
|
||||
before := hm.pqTable.Len()
|
||||
hm.handleFragment(via, p, h)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, before+1, hm.pqTable.Len())
|
||||
assert.Empty(t, conn.take())
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("a cookie is bound to its address", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
p, h := pqMsg1Fragment(t, 7, &cookie)
|
||||
hm.handleFragment(ViaSender{UdpAddr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.99:4242")}, p, h)
|
||||
assert.Len(t, conn.take(), 1, "another address gets its own cookie instead")
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("a reply never outgrows what prompted it", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
p, h := pqMsg1Fragment(t, 8, nil)
|
||||
hm.sendCookie(via, fragment.Header{FragID: 8}, pqFragKey{}, pqCookieReplyLen-1, time.Now())
|
||||
assert.Empty(t, conn.take())
|
||||
hm.handleFragment(via, p, h)
|
||||
assert.Len(t, conn.take(), 1)
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestPQHandleCookie(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
hm, conn := newPQTestManager(t)
|
||||
via := ViaSender{UdpAddr: netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.1:4242")}
|
||||
|
||||
s, err := fragment.NewSender(make([]byte, 2000), pqSubtype, 0, 1, 99)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
_, _, err = s.Attempt(2)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
hh := &HandshakeHostInfo{hostinfo: &HostInfo{}, pq: &pqAttempt{index: 99, sender: s}}
|
||||
hm.indexes[99] = hh
|
||||
|
||||
reply := make([]byte, header.Len, pqCookieReplyLen)
|
||||
header.Encode(reply, header.Version, header.Handshake, pqSubtype, 99, pqCookieCounter)
|
||||
reply = append(reply, bytes16(0xab)...)
|
||||
var h header.H
|
||||
require.NoError(t, h.Parse(reply))
|
||||
|
||||
hm.handleFragment(via, reply, &h)
|
||||
assert.True(t, hh.pq.heard, "a cookie reply shows the peer speaks PQ")
|
||||
sent := conn.take()
|
||||
require.Len(t, sent, 4, "an immediate resend of fresh symbols")
|
||||
for i, p := range sent {
|
||||
fh, _, err := fragment.Parse(p[header.Len:])
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.True(t, fh.HasCookie())
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, fragment.Cookie(bytes16(0xab)), fh.Cookie)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, uint8(4+i), fh.Index)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hm.handleFragment(via, reply, &h)
|
||||
assert.Empty(t, conn.take(), "immediate resends are rate limited")
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("replies for other indexes are ignored", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
other := append([]byte(nil), reply...)
|
||||
header.Encode(other, header.Version, header.Handshake, pqSubtype, 98, pqCookieCounter)
|
||||
var oh header.H
|
||||
require.NoError(t, oh.Parse(other))
|
||||
hh.pq.cookieResendAt = time.Time{}
|
||||
hm.handleFragment(via, other, &oh)
|
||||
assert.Empty(t, conn.take())
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func bytes16(b byte) []byte {
|
||||
out := make([]byte, 16)
|
||||
for i := range out {
|
||||
out[i] = b
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestReloadPQ(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
l := test.NewLogger()
|
||||
c := config.NewC(l)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, c.LoadString(`handshakes: {pq: {initiate: false}}`))
|
||||
cfg := defaultHandshakeConfig
|
||||
cfg.pq = pqHandshakeConfigFrom(c)
|
||||
hm := NewHandshakeManager(l, newHostMap(l), newTestLighthouse(), &udp.NoopConn{}, cfg)
|
||||
c.RegisterReloadCallback(hm.reloadPQ)
|
||||
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, pqHandshakeConfig{repairDelay: DefaultPQRepairDelay}, *hm.pqConfig())
|
||||
|
||||
require.NoError(t, c.ReloadConfigString(`handshakes: {pq: {initiate: true, accept: true, sticky: true, repair_delay: 25ms}}`))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, pqHandshakeConfig{initiate: true, accept: true, sticky: true, repairDelay: 25 * time.Millisecond}, *hm.pqConfig())
|
||||
|
||||
before := hm.pqConfig()
|
||||
require.NoError(t, c.ReloadConfigString(`handshakes: {try_interval: 1s, pq: {initiate: true, accept: true, sticky: true, repair_delay: 25ms}}`))
|
||||
assert.Same(t, before, hm.pqConfig(), "an unrelated change leaves the settings alone")
|
||||
|
||||
require.NoError(t, c.ReloadConfigString(`handshakes: {}`))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, pqHandshakeConfig{repairDelay: DefaultPQRepairDelay}, *hm.pqConfig(), "removing the section restores the defaults")
|
||||
|
||||
require.NoError(t, c.ReloadConfigString(`handshakes: {pq: {require: true}}`))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, pqHandshakeConfig{initiate: true, accept: true, require: true, repairDelay: DefaultPQRepairDelay}, *hm.pqConfig(), "require implies initiate and accept")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestUsePQ(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
hm, _ := newPQTestManager(t)
|
||||
peer := netip.MustParseAddr("10.1.0.1")
|
||||
set := func(cfg pqHandshakeConfig) { hm.pq.Store(&cfg) }
|
||||
|
||||
// attempts plays a run of attempts, given whether each was triggered early,
|
||||
// and returns which were PQ.
|
||||
attempts := func(triggered ...bool) []bool {
|
||||
hh := &HandshakeHostInfo{}
|
||||
var out []bool
|
||||
for _, tr := range triggered {
|
||||
hh.counter++
|
||||
hh.lastPQ = hm.usePQ(hh, peer, tr)
|
||||
out = append(out, hh.lastPQ)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
set(pqHandshakeConfig{})
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []bool{false, false, false}, attempts(false, false, false), "off")
|
||||
|
||||
set(pqHandshakeConfig{initiate: true})
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []bool{true, false, true, false}, attempts(false, false, false, false), "timer retries alternate, PQ first")
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []bool{true, true, false, true, false}, attempts(false, true, false, true, false), "an early trigger is a new path, which gets PQ first")
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []bool{true, true, false}, attempts(true, true, false), "a triggered first attempt is PQ")
|
||||
|
||||
t.Run("hearing back stops the classical turns", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
hh := &HandshakeHostInfo{pq: &pqAttempt{}}
|
||||
hh.counter, hh.lastPQ = 1, true
|
||||
hh.counter++
|
||||
assert.False(t, hm.usePQ(hh, peer, false), "unheard, the classical attempt gets its turn")
|
||||
hh.pq.heard = true
|
||||
assert.True(t, hm.usePQ(hh, peer, false))
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
set(pqHandshakeConfig{initiate: true, accept: true, require: true})
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []bool{true, true, true, true}, attempts(false, false, true, false), "require never offers classical")
|
||||
|
||||
set(pqHandshakeConfig{initiate: true, sticky: true})
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []bool{true, false}, attempts(false, false), "sticky alternates until the peer has done PQ")
|
||||
hm.notePQPeer(pqSubtype, []netip.Addr{peer})
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []bool{true, true, true}, attempts(false, false, false), "then only PQ")
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func Test_NewHandshakeManagerVpnIp(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
@@ -42,8 +43,6 @@ func Test_NewHandshakeManagerVpnIp(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
i2 := blah.StartHandshake(ip, nil)
|
||||
assert.Same(t, i, i2)
|
||||
|
||||
i.remotes = NewRemoteList([]netip.Addr{}, nil)
|
||||
|
||||
// Adding something to pending should not affect the main hostmap
|
||||
assert.Empty(t, mainHM.Hosts)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -84,7 +83,7 @@ func (mw *mockEncWriter) SendMessageToVpnAddr(_ header.MessageType, _ header.Mes
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (mw *mockEncWriter) SendVia(_ *HostInfo, _ *Relay, _, _, _ []byte, _ bool) {
|
||||
func (mw *mockEncWriter) SendVia(via *HostInfo, relay *Relay, ad, nb, out []byte, nocopy bool, q int) {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -235,3 +234,70 @@ func TestHandleIncomingDispatch(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
assert.Empty(t, hm.indexes, "orphan stage-2 must not create state")
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Test_PendingHandshakeHasRemotes covers create-tunnel -address: a pending hostinfo must already
|
||||
// carry its RemoteList when StartHandshake runs its callback, so SetRemote there, before the
|
||||
// handshake loop has run, is safe and the address becomes one the handshake is sent to.
|
||||
func Test_PendingHandshakeHasRemotes(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
l := test.NewLogger()
|
||||
mainHM := newHostMap(l)
|
||||
preferredRanges := []netip.Prefix{}
|
||||
mainHM.preferredRanges.Store(&preferredRanges)
|
||||
|
||||
hm := NewHandshakeManager(l, mainHM, newTestLighthouse(), &udp.NoopConn{}, defaultHandshakeConfig)
|
||||
|
||||
vpnIp := netip.MustParseAddr("172.1.1.2")
|
||||
remote := netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.168.1.9:4242")
|
||||
|
||||
hi := hm.StartHandshake(vpnIp, func(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) {
|
||||
require.NotNil(t, hh.hostinfo.remotes, "a pending handshake must never be without its RemoteList")
|
||||
hh.hostinfo.SetRemote(remote)
|
||||
})
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, hi.remotes.CopyAddrs(preferredRanges), remote, "the handshake must be sent to the supplied remote")
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, remote, hi.GetRemote())
|
||||
|
||||
// A RemoteList keeps one learned address per host, so a second remote replaces the
|
||||
// first — the same behaviour change-remote has on an established tunnel.
|
||||
other := netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.168.1.10:4242")
|
||||
hi.SetRemote(other)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []netip.AddrPort{other}, hi.remotes.CopyAddrs(preferredRanges))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, other, hi.GetRemote())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newRemotesRaceFixture builds a handshake manager with an established tunnel to vpnAddr whose
|
||||
// RemoteList is the lighthouse's cached list, the state every teardown-during-handshake race starts from.
|
||||
func newRemotesRaceFixture(t *testing.T, vpnAddr netip.Addr) (*HandshakeManager, *Interface, *HostInfo) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
l := test.NewLogger()
|
||||
mainHM := newHostMap(l)
|
||||
preferredRanges := []netip.Prefix{}
|
||||
mainHM.preferredRanges.Store(&preferredRanges)
|
||||
|
||||
lh := newTestLighthouse()
|
||||
hm := NewHandshakeManager(l, mainHM, lh, &udp.NoopConn{}, defaultHandshakeConfig)
|
||||
f := &Interface{hostMap: mainHM, lightHouse: lh, handshakeManager: hm, l: l}
|
||||
hm.f = f
|
||||
|
||||
established := &HostInfo{
|
||||
vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{vpnAddr},
|
||||
localIndexId: 1,
|
||||
remoteIndexId: 101,
|
||||
remotes: lh.QueryCache([]netip.Addr{vpnAddr}),
|
||||
HandshakePacket: map[uint8][]byte{},
|
||||
}
|
||||
mainHM.Lock()
|
||||
mainHM.unlockedAddHostInfo(established, f)
|
||||
mainHM.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
return hm, f, established
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// With no handshake pending, tearing down the last tunnel still evicts the list.
|
||||
func Test_CloseTunnelEvictsWithoutPendingHandshake(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
vpnAddr := netip.MustParseAddr("172.1.1.2")
|
||||
_, f, established := newRemotesRaceFixture(t, vpnAddr)
|
||||
|
||||
f.closeTunnel(established)
|
||||
assert.NotContains(t, f.hostMap.Hosts, vpnAddr)
|
||||
assert.NotContains(t, f.lightHouse.addrMap, vpnAddr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
+29
-7
@@ -24,6 +24,11 @@ type m = map[string]any
|
||||
const (
|
||||
Version uint8 = 1
|
||||
Len = 16
|
||||
|
||||
// MaxOverhead is the most a payload grows on its way to the underlay.
|
||||
// A relayed packet has two headers and two AEAD tags, one for the inner tunnel and another for the relay tunnel.
|
||||
// Every supported cipher (today) has a 16 byte tag.
|
||||
MaxOverhead = 2 * (Len + 16)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
type MessageType uint8
|
||||
@@ -62,8 +67,19 @@ const (
|
||||
const (
|
||||
HandshakeIXPSK0 MessageSubType = 0
|
||||
HandshakeXXPSK0 MessageSubType = 1
|
||||
|
||||
// HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024 is IX with an ephemeral ML-KEM-1024 exchange mixed
|
||||
// in through the psk2 slot. Its messages exceed the MTU and travel as
|
||||
// fragments (see handshake/fragment).
|
||||
HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024 MessageSubType = 2
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// IsFragmented reports whether handshake messages of this subtype travel as
|
||||
// fragments.
|
||||
func IsFragmented(st MessageSubType) bool {
|
||||
return st == HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var ErrHeaderTooShort = errors.New("header is too short")
|
||||
|
||||
var subTypeTestMap = map[MessageSubType]string{
|
||||
@@ -83,7 +99,8 @@ var subTypeMap = map[MessageType]*map[MessageSubType]string{
|
||||
Test: &subTypeTestMap,
|
||||
CloseTunnel: &subTypeNoneMap,
|
||||
Handshake: {
|
||||
HandshakeIXPSK0: "ix_psk0",
|
||||
HandshakeIXPSK0: "ix_psk0",
|
||||
HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024: "ix_psk2_mlkem1024",
|
||||
},
|
||||
Control: &subTypeNoneMap,
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -190,13 +207,18 @@ func SubTypeName(t MessageType, s MessageSubType) string {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func IsValidSubType(t MessageType, s MessageSubType) bool {
|
||||
if n, ok := subTypeMap[t]; ok {
|
||||
if _, ok := (*n)[s]; ok {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
switch t {
|
||||
case Message:
|
||||
return s == MessageNone || s == MessageRelay
|
||||
case Handshake:
|
||||
return s == HandshakeIXPSK0 || s == HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024
|
||||
case Test:
|
||||
return s == TestReply || s == TestRequest
|
||||
case Control, CloseTunnel, RecvError, LightHouse:
|
||||
return s == 0
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NewHeader turns bytes into a header
|
||||
|
||||
+54
-1
@@ -96,12 +96,65 @@ func TestTypeMap(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
Test: &subTypeTestMap,
|
||||
CloseTunnel: &subTypeNoneMap,
|
||||
Handshake: {
|
||||
HandshakeIXPSK0: "ix_psk0",
|
||||
HandshakeIXPSK0: "ix_psk0",
|
||||
HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024: "ix_psk2_mlkem1024",
|
||||
},
|
||||
Control: &subTypeNoneMap,
|
||||
}, subTypeMap)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// mapIsValidSubType is the pre-refactor, map-driven definition of a valid
|
||||
// subtype. IsValidSubType was reimplemented as an explicit switch; this keeps
|
||||
// the original behavior around so we can prove the switch is equivalent to it.
|
||||
func mapIsValidSubType(t MessageType, s MessageSubType) bool {
|
||||
if n, ok := subTypeMap[t]; ok {
|
||||
if _, ok := (*n)[s]; ok {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestIsValidSubType(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// Explicit intent table: documents exactly which subtypes are valid so the
|
||||
// test stays meaningful even if both the switch and subTypeMap change.
|
||||
assert.True(t, IsValidSubType(Message, MessageNone))
|
||||
assert.True(t, IsValidSubType(Message, MessageRelay))
|
||||
assert.False(t, IsValidSubType(Message, 2))
|
||||
|
||||
assert.True(t, IsValidSubType(Handshake, HandshakeIXPSK0))
|
||||
assert.True(t, IsValidSubType(Handshake, HandshakeIXPSK2MLKEM1024))
|
||||
// HandshakeXXPSK0 is defined but not a wire-valid subtype.
|
||||
assert.False(t, IsValidSubType(Handshake, HandshakeXXPSK0))
|
||||
|
||||
assert.True(t, IsValidSubType(Test, TestRequest))
|
||||
assert.True(t, IsValidSubType(Test, TestReply))
|
||||
assert.False(t, IsValidSubType(Test, 2))
|
||||
|
||||
// These types only ever carry subtype 0.
|
||||
for _, mt := range []MessageType{Control, CloseTunnel, RecvError, LightHouse} {
|
||||
assert.True(t, IsValidSubType(mt, 0), "type %d subtype 0 should be valid", mt)
|
||||
assert.False(t, IsValidSubType(mt, 1), "type %d subtype 1 should be invalid", mt)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Unknown/unassigned types are never valid.
|
||||
assert.False(t, IsValidSubType(99, 0))
|
||||
|
||||
// Exhaustive proof of equivalence with the original map-driven logic across
|
||||
// the entire (type, subtype) input space.
|
||||
for ti := 0; ti <= 0xff; ti++ {
|
||||
for si := 0; si <= 0xff; si++ {
|
||||
mt, mst := MessageType(ti), MessageSubType(si)
|
||||
assert.Equalf(t, mapIsValidSubType(mt, mst), IsValidSubType(mt, mst),
|
||||
"IsValidSubType(%d, %d) diverged from map-driven definition", ti, si)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// H method must delegate to the package function.
|
||||
assert.True(t, (&H{Type: Test, Subtype: TestReply}).IsValidSubType())
|
||||
assert.False(t, (&H{Type: Handshake, Subtype: HandshakeXXPSK0}).IsValidSubType())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestHeader_String(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
assert.Equal(
|
||||
t,
|
||||
|
||||
+248
-189
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"net"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"slices"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
@@ -18,7 +17,6 @@ import (
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/logging"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
const defaultPromoteEvery = 1000 // Count of packets sent before we try moving a tunnel to a preferred underlay ip address
|
||||
@@ -56,11 +54,20 @@ type Relay struct {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type HostMap struct {
|
||||
sync.RWMutex //Because we concurrently read and write to our maps
|
||||
Indexes map[uint32]*HostInfo
|
||||
Relays map[uint32]*HostInfo // Maps a Relay IDX to a Relay HostInfo object
|
||||
RemoteIndexes map[uint32]*HostInfo
|
||||
sync.RWMutex //Because we concurrently read and write to our maps
|
||||
Indexes map[uint32]*HostInfo
|
||||
Relays map[uint32]*HostInfo // Maps a Relay IDX to a Relay HostInfo object
|
||||
RemoteIndexes map[uint32]*HostInfo
|
||||
// Hosts maps a vpn address to its primary hostinfo, one entry per address we hold a tunnel
|
||||
// for. moreHosts only has an entry while an address is held by 2 or more hostinfos and stores
|
||||
// the full most-recent-first list; moreHosts[a][0] is always the same hostinfo as Hosts[a].
|
||||
// Each address gets its own independent list, so a hostinfo owning multiple addresses can
|
||||
// never corrupt another address's ordering the way the old shared next/prev chain could.
|
||||
// Entries in moreHosts are only ever written by unlockedSetHostsForAddr; Hosts is written
|
||||
// directly only in the single-hostinfo fast paths where moreHosts is known to have no entry,
|
||||
// and unlockedDeleteHostInfo swaps either map for a fresh one when it fully drains.
|
||||
Hosts map[netip.Addr]*HostInfo
|
||||
moreHosts map[netip.Addr][]*HostInfo
|
||||
preferredRanges atomic.Pointer[[]netip.Prefix]
|
||||
l *slog.Logger
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -229,12 +236,16 @@ const (
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
type HostInfo struct {
|
||||
remote netip.AddrPort
|
||||
remotes *RemoteList
|
||||
promoteCounter atomic.Uint32
|
||||
remote atomic.Pointer[netip.AddrPort]
|
||||
ConnectionState *ConnectionState
|
||||
remoteIndexId uint32
|
||||
localIndexId uint32
|
||||
|
||||
// Traffic bits, pendingDeletion, and the rebind epoch we last sent under
|
||||
state atomic.Uint32
|
||||
|
||||
promoteCounter atomic.Uint32
|
||||
remoteIndexId uint32
|
||||
localIndexId uint32
|
||||
remotes *RemoteList
|
||||
|
||||
// vpnAddrs is a list of vpn addresses assigned to this host that are within our own vpn networks
|
||||
// The host may have other vpn addresses that are outside our
|
||||
@@ -249,15 +260,15 @@ type HostInfo struct {
|
||||
// We need these to avoid replayed handshake packets creating new hostinfos which causes churn
|
||||
HandshakePacket map[uint8][]byte
|
||||
|
||||
// A responder resending a fragmented handshake response offers symbols it has
|
||||
// not sent before, at most once per retry interval.
|
||||
handshakeResendAt atomic.Int64 // unix nanos of the last send
|
||||
handshakeNextSymbol atomic.Uint32 // next fragment symbol index to offer
|
||||
|
||||
// nextLHQuery is the earliest we can ask the lighthouse for new information.
|
||||
// This is used to limit lighthouse re-queries in chatty clients
|
||||
nextLHQuery atomic.Int64
|
||||
|
||||
// lastRebindCount is the other side of Interface.rebindCount, if these values don't match then we need to ask LH
|
||||
// for a punch from the remote end of this tunnel. The goal being to prime their conntrack for our traffic just like
|
||||
// with a handshake
|
||||
lastRebindCount int8
|
||||
|
||||
// lastHandshakeTime records the time the remote side told us about at the stage when the handshake was completed locally
|
||||
// Stage 1 packet will contain it if I am a responder, stage 2 packet if I am an initiator
|
||||
// This is used to avoid an attack where a handshake packet is replayed after some time
|
||||
@@ -266,13 +277,6 @@ type HostInfo struct {
|
||||
lastRoam time.Time
|
||||
lastRoamRemote netip.AddrPort
|
||||
|
||||
// Used to track other hostinfos for this vpn ip since only 1 can be primary
|
||||
// Synchronised via hostmap lock and not the hostinfo lock.
|
||||
next, prev *HostInfo
|
||||
|
||||
//TODO: in, out, and others might benefit from being an atomic.Int32. We could collapse connectionManager pendingDeletion, relayUsed, and in/out into this 1 thing
|
||||
in, out, pendingDeletion atomic.Bool
|
||||
|
||||
// lastUsed tracks the last time ConnectionManager checked the tunnel and it was in use.
|
||||
// This value will be behind against actual tunnel utilization in the hot path.
|
||||
// This should only be used by the ConnectionManagers ticker routine.
|
||||
@@ -282,7 +286,6 @@ type HostInfo struct {
|
||||
type ViaSender struct {
|
||||
UdpAddr netip.AddrPort
|
||||
relayHI *HostInfo // relayHI is the host info object of the relay
|
||||
remoteIdx uint32 // remoteIdx is the index included in the header of the received packet
|
||||
relay *Relay // relay contains the rest of the relay information, including the PeerIP of the host trying to communicate with us.
|
||||
IsRelayed bool // IsRelayed is true if the packet was sent through a relay
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -334,6 +337,7 @@ func newHostMap(l *slog.Logger) *HostMap {
|
||||
Relays: map[uint32]*HostInfo{},
|
||||
RemoteIndexes: map[uint32]*HostInfo{},
|
||||
Hosts: map[netip.Addr]*HostInfo{},
|
||||
moreHosts: map[netip.Addr][]*HostInfo{},
|
||||
l: l,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -382,13 +386,55 @@ func (hm *HostMap) EmitStats() {
|
||||
metrics.GetOrRegisterGauge("hostmap.main.relayIndexes", nil).Update(int64(relaysLen))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// DeleteHostInfo will fully unlink the hostinfo and return true if it was the final hostinfo for this vpn ip
|
||||
// unlockedSetHostsForAddr stores the per-address hostinfo list (list[0] is the primary). An empty
|
||||
// list removes the address. This is the one place Hosts and moreHosts are written together, keep
|
||||
// it that way. Callers must hold the write lock.
|
||||
func (hm *HostMap) unlockedSetHostsForAddr(addr netip.Addr, list []*HostInfo) {
|
||||
if len(list) == 0 {
|
||||
delete(hm.Hosts, addr)
|
||||
delete(hm.moreHosts, addr)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
hm.Hosts[addr] = list[0]
|
||||
if len(list) > 1 {
|
||||
hm.moreHosts[addr] = list
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
delete(hm.moreHosts, addr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// unlockedGetHostList returns every hostinfo holding addr, primary first, or nil if we have no
|
||||
// tunnel for addr. The common single-hostinfo case builds a fresh one element list, so keep this
|
||||
// off the packet hot path; the primary is a direct Hosts read. Callers must hold the lock (read
|
||||
// or write).
|
||||
func (hm *HostMap) unlockedGetHostList(addr netip.Addr) []*HostInfo {
|
||||
if list, ok := hm.moreHosts[addr]; ok {
|
||||
return list
|
||||
}
|
||||
if h, ok := hm.Hosts[addr]; ok {
|
||||
return []*HostInfo{h}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// removeHostInfo returns list with hi removed (order preserved), or list unchanged if hi is
|
||||
// absent. It deletes in place: every mutator holds the hostmap write lock and no reader ever
|
||||
// retains a slice across a mutation (readers iterate under RLock), so there is no snapshot to
|
||||
// invalidate.
|
||||
func removeHostInfo(list []*HostInfo, hi *HostInfo) []*HostInfo {
|
||||
idx := slices.Index(list, hi)
|
||||
if idx < 0 {
|
||||
return list
|
||||
}
|
||||
return slices.Delete(list, idx, idx+1)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// DeleteHostInfo will fully unlink the hostinfo and return true if no other hostinfo still holds
|
||||
// any of its vpn addrs, meaning we no longer have a tunnel to the peer
|
||||
func (hm *HostMap) DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo *HostInfo) bool {
|
||||
// Delete the host itself, ensuring it's not modified anymore
|
||||
hm.Lock()
|
||||
// If we have a previous or next hostinfo then we are not the last one for this vpn ip
|
||||
final := (hostinfo.next == nil && hostinfo.prev == nil)
|
||||
hm.unlockedDeleteHostInfo(hostinfo)
|
||||
final := hm.unlockedDeleteHostInfo(hostinfo)
|
||||
hm.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
return final
|
||||
@@ -400,85 +446,66 @@ func (hm *HostMap) MakePrimary(hostinfo *HostInfo) {
|
||||
hm.unlockedMakePrimary(hostinfo)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hm *HostMap) unlockedMakePrimary(hostinfo *HostInfo) {
|
||||
// Get the current primary, if it exists
|
||||
oldHostinfo := hm.Hosts[hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0]]
|
||||
|
||||
// Every address in the hostinfo gets elevated to primary
|
||||
for _, vpnAddr := range hostinfo.vpnAddrs {
|
||||
//NOTE: It is possible that we leave a dangling hostinfo here but connection manager works on
|
||||
// indexes so it should be fine.
|
||||
hm.Hosts[vpnAddr] = hostinfo
|
||||
// unlockedMakePrimary reports whether hostinfo is (now) the primary for each of its addresses,
|
||||
// false only when it is no longer in the hostmap at all.
|
||||
func (hm *HostMap) unlockedMakePrimary(hostinfo *HostInfo) bool {
|
||||
// A hostinfo that is no longer in the hostmap must not be re-inserted here. Callers can race
|
||||
// tunnel teardown, deciding to promote under the read lock and only taking the write lock
|
||||
// after a delete fully unlinked the hostinfo (connection manager swapPrimary, AddRelay). Every
|
||||
// live hostinfo is registered in Indexes by unlockedAddHostInfo, so this is a membership test.
|
||||
if hm.Indexes[hostinfo.localIndexId] != hostinfo {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// If we are already primary then we won't bother re-linking
|
||||
if oldHostinfo == hostinfo {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Unlink this hostinfo
|
||||
if hostinfo.prev != nil {
|
||||
hostinfo.prev.next = hostinfo.next
|
||||
}
|
||||
if hostinfo.next != nil {
|
||||
hostinfo.next.prev = hostinfo.prev
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// If there wasn't a previous primary then clear out any links
|
||||
if oldHostinfo == nil {
|
||||
hostinfo.next = nil
|
||||
hostinfo.prev = nil
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Relink the hostinfo as primary
|
||||
hostinfo.next = oldHostinfo
|
||||
oldHostinfo.prev = hostinfo
|
||||
hostinfo.prev = nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hm *HostMap) unlockedDeleteHostInfo(hostinfo *HostInfo) {
|
||||
// Move hostinfo to the front (primary) of each of its address lists. The lists are
|
||||
// independent per address, so this can never leave a dangling entry the way promoting
|
||||
// against a single shared chain could.
|
||||
for _, addr := range hostinfo.vpnAddrs {
|
||||
h := hm.Hosts[addr]
|
||||
for h != nil {
|
||||
if h == hostinfo {
|
||||
hm.unlockedInnerDeleteHostInfo(h, addr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
h = h.next
|
||||
if hm.Hosts[addr] == hostinfo {
|
||||
// Already primary for this address, the list is already in the right order
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
list := removeHostInfo(hm.unlockedGetHostList(addr), hostinfo)
|
||||
list = append([]*HostInfo{hostinfo}, list...)
|
||||
hm.unlockedSetHostsForAddr(addr, list)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hm *HostMap) unlockedInnerDeleteHostInfo(hostinfo *HostInfo, addr netip.Addr) {
|
||||
primary, ok := hm.Hosts[addr]
|
||||
isLastHostinfo := hostinfo.next == nil && hostinfo.prev == nil
|
||||
if ok && primary == hostinfo {
|
||||
// The vpn addr pointer points to the same hostinfo as the local index id, we can remove it
|
||||
delete(hm.Hosts, addr)
|
||||
if len(hm.Hosts) == 0 {
|
||||
hm.Hosts = map[netip.Addr]*HostInfo{}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if hostinfo.next != nil {
|
||||
// We had more than 1 hostinfo at this vpn addr, promote the next in the list to primary
|
||||
hm.Hosts[addr] = hostinfo.next
|
||||
// It is primary, there is no previous hostinfo now
|
||||
hostinfo.next.prev = nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// Relink if we were in the middle of multiple hostinfos for this vpn addr
|
||||
if hostinfo.prev != nil {
|
||||
hostinfo.prev.next = hostinfo.next
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if hostinfo.next != nil {
|
||||
hostinfo.next.prev = hostinfo.prev
|
||||
// unlockedDeleteHostInfo removes hostinfo from every one of its address lists and from the index
|
||||
// maps. It returns true if this was the last hostinfo for all of its addresses (we no longer have
|
||||
// any tunnel to the peer), which the caller uses to decide whether to clear learned lighthouse
|
||||
// state and disestablish relays.
|
||||
func (hm *HostMap) unlockedDeleteHostInfo(hostinfo *HostInfo) bool {
|
||||
// Remove this hostinfo from each of its address lists. The lists are independent, so a
|
||||
// sibling is never promoted to an address it does not own and no other list is touched.
|
||||
final := true
|
||||
for _, addr := range hostinfo.vpnAddrs {
|
||||
if list, ok := hm.moreHosts[addr]; ok {
|
||||
list = removeHostInfo(list, hostinfo)
|
||||
hm.unlockedSetHostsForAddr(addr, list)
|
||||
if len(list) > 0 {
|
||||
final = false
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else if existing, ok := hm.Hosts[addr]; ok {
|
||||
if existing == hostinfo {
|
||||
// Common case, the only hostinfo for this address. moreHosts has no entry to clean up.
|
||||
delete(hm.Hosts, addr)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// We don't hold this address but another hostinfo does, we still have a tunnel to the peer
|
||||
final = false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hostinfo.next = nil
|
||||
hostinfo.prev = nil
|
||||
// Go maps never shrink their buckets, replace fully drained maps so a node that churned
|
||||
// through a large peer count gives the memory back. Same idiom as the index maps below.
|
||||
if len(hm.Hosts) == 0 {
|
||||
hm.Hosts = map[netip.Addr]*HostInfo{}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(hm.moreHosts) == 0 {
|
||||
hm.moreHosts = map[netip.Addr][]*HostInfo{}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The remote index uses index ids outside our control so lets make sure we are only removing
|
||||
// the remote index pointer here if it points to the hostinfo we are deleting
|
||||
@@ -502,7 +529,7 @@ func (hm *HostMap) unlockedInnerDeleteHostInfo(hostinfo *HostInfo, addr netip.Ad
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if isLastHostinfo {
|
||||
if final {
|
||||
// I have lost connectivity to my peers. My relay tunnel is likely broken. Mark the next
|
||||
// hops as 'Requested' so that new relay tunnels are created in the future.
|
||||
hm.unlockedDisestablishVpnAddrRelayFor(hostinfo)
|
||||
@@ -511,6 +538,19 @@ func (hm *HostMap) unlockedInnerDeleteHostInfo(hostinfo *HostInfo, addr netip.Ad
|
||||
for _, localRelayIdx := range hostinfo.relayState.CopyRelayForIdxs() {
|
||||
delete(hm.Relays, localRelayIdx)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return final
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hm *HostMap) QueryIndexCached(index uint32, cache map[uint32]*HostInfo) *HostInfo {
|
||||
if out, ok := cache[index]; ok {
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
out := hm.QueryIndex(index)
|
||||
if out != nil {
|
||||
cache[index] = out
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hm *HostMap) QueryIndex(index uint32) *HostInfo {
|
||||
@@ -554,19 +594,30 @@ func (hm *HostMap) QueryVpnAddrsRelayFor(targetIps []netip.Addr, relayHostIp net
|
||||
hm.RLock()
|
||||
defer hm.RUnlock()
|
||||
|
||||
// This runs per relayed packet, so check the primary with a single map probe and only consult
|
||||
// moreHosts when the primary can't relay for us.
|
||||
h, ok := hm.Hosts[relayHostIp]
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return nil, nil, errors.New("unable to find host")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for h != nil {
|
||||
for _, targetIp := range targetIps {
|
||||
r, ok := h.relayState.QueryRelayForByIp(targetIp)
|
||||
if ok && r.State == Established {
|
||||
return h, r, nil
|
||||
for _, targetIp := range targetIps {
|
||||
r, ok := h.relayState.QueryRelayForByIp(targetIp)
|
||||
if ok && r.State == Established {
|
||||
return h, r, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if list, ok := hm.moreHosts[relayHostIp]; ok {
|
||||
// list[0] is the primary we already checked
|
||||
for _, h := range list[1:] {
|
||||
for _, targetIp := range targetIps {
|
||||
r, ok := h.relayState.QueryRelayForByIp(targetIp)
|
||||
if ok && r.State == Established {
|
||||
return h, r, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
h = h.next
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return nil, nil, errors.New("unable to find host with relay")
|
||||
@@ -574,20 +625,14 @@ func (hm *HostMap) QueryVpnAddrsRelayFor(targetIps []netip.Addr, relayHostIp net
|
||||
|
||||
func (hm *HostMap) unlockedDisestablishVpnAddrRelayFor(hi *HostInfo) {
|
||||
for _, relayHostIp := range hi.relayState.CopyRelayIps() {
|
||||
if h, ok := hm.Hosts[relayHostIp]; ok {
|
||||
for h != nil {
|
||||
h.relayState.UpdateRelayForByIpState(hi.vpnAddrs[0], Disestablished)
|
||||
h = h.next
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, h := range hm.unlockedGetHostList(relayHostIp) {
|
||||
h.relayState.UpdateRelayForByIpState(hi.vpnAddrs[0], Disestablished)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, rs := range hi.relayState.CopyAllRelayFor() {
|
||||
if rs.Type == ForwardingType {
|
||||
if h, ok := hm.Hosts[rs.PeerAddr]; ok {
|
||||
for h != nil {
|
||||
h.relayState.UpdateRelayForByIpState(hi.vpnAddrs[0], Disestablished)
|
||||
h = h.next
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, h := range hm.unlockedGetHostList(rs.PeerAddr) {
|
||||
h.relayState.UpdateRelayForByIpState(hi.vpnAddrs[0], Disestablished)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -623,7 +668,7 @@ func (hm *HostMap) unlockedAddHostInfo(hostinfo *HostInfo, f *Interface) {
|
||||
hm.Indexes[hostinfo.localIndexId] = hostinfo
|
||||
hm.RemoteIndexes[hostinfo.remoteIndexId] = hostinfo
|
||||
|
||||
hostinfo.out.Store(true)
|
||||
hostinfo.markOut(f.rebindEpoch.Load())
|
||||
if f.connectionManager != nil { // f.connectionManager is only nil in some unit tests
|
||||
f.connectionManager.trafficTimer.Add(hostinfo.localIndexId, f.connectionManager.checkInterval)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -637,22 +682,27 @@ func (hm *HostMap) unlockedAddHostInfo(hostinfo *HostInfo, f *Interface) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (hm *HostMap) unlockedInnerAddHostInfo(vpnAddr netip.Addr, hostinfo *HostInfo, f *Interface) {
|
||||
existing := hm.Hosts[vpnAddr]
|
||||
hm.Hosts[vpnAddr] = hostinfo
|
||||
|
||||
if existing != nil && existing != hostinfo {
|
||||
hostinfo.next = existing
|
||||
existing.prev = hostinfo
|
||||
existing, ok := hm.Hosts[vpnAddr]
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
// Common case, the first hostinfo for this address. moreHosts stays empty.
|
||||
hm.Hosts[vpnAddr] = hostinfo
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
i := 1
|
||||
check := hostinfo
|
||||
for check != nil {
|
||||
if i > MaxHostInfosPerVpnIp {
|
||||
hm.unlockedDeleteHostInfo(check)
|
||||
}
|
||||
check = check.next
|
||||
i++
|
||||
// The new hostinfo becomes the primary for this address. Remove any stale copy of it first so
|
||||
// we never hold a duplicate, then prepend.
|
||||
list, ok := hm.moreHosts[vpnAddr]
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
list = []*HostInfo{existing}
|
||||
}
|
||||
list = removeHostInfo(list, hostinfo)
|
||||
list = append([]*HostInfo{hostinfo}, list...)
|
||||
hm.unlockedSetHostsForAddr(vpnAddr, list)
|
||||
|
||||
// Enforce the per-address cap by fully retiring the oldest hostinfo once we exceed it.
|
||||
// Deleting it removes it from all of its addresses and the index maps, matching prior behavior.
|
||||
if len(list) > MaxHostInfosPerVpnIp {
|
||||
hm.unlockedDeleteHostInfo(list[len(list)-1])
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -684,7 +734,7 @@ func (hm *HostMap) ForEachIndex(f controlEach) {
|
||||
func (i *HostInfo) TryPromoteBest(preferredRanges []netip.Prefix, ifce *Interface) {
|
||||
c := i.promoteCounter.Add(1)
|
||||
if c%ifce.tryPromoteEvery.Load() == 0 {
|
||||
remote := i.remote
|
||||
remote := i.GetRemote()
|
||||
|
||||
// return early if we are already on a preferred remote
|
||||
if remote.IsValid() {
|
||||
@@ -719,6 +769,64 @@ func (i *HostInfo) TryPromoteBest(preferredRanges []netip.Prefix, ifce *Interfac
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Bits within HostInfo.state, everything above stateEpochShift is the epoch
|
||||
const (
|
||||
stateIn uint32 = 1 << iota
|
||||
stateOut
|
||||
statePendingDeletion
|
||||
|
||||
stateFlags = stateIn | stateOut | statePendingDeletion
|
||||
// The epoch is the top 29 bits, it would take 2^29 rebinds to wrap and we will never get there
|
||||
stateEpochShift = 3
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// markIn records inbound traffic
|
||||
func (i *HostInfo) markIn() {
|
||||
if i.state.Load()&stateIn == 0 {
|
||||
i.state.Or(stateIn)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// markOut records a send and reports whether the epoch moved, meaning we want a punch from the far side
|
||||
func (i *HostInfo) markOut(epoch uint32) bool {
|
||||
e := epoch << stateEpochShift
|
||||
for {
|
||||
old := i.state.Load()
|
||||
if old&stateOut != 0 && old&^stateFlags == e {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if i.state.CompareAndSwap(old, old&stateFlags|stateOut|e) {
|
||||
return old&^stateFlags != e
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// markOutOnly records a send without consuming the rebind epoch, for paths that cannot act on a requery
|
||||
func (i *HostInfo) markOutOnly() {
|
||||
if i.state.Load()&stateOut == 0 {
|
||||
i.state.Or(stateOut)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// takeTraffic clears both traffic bits, leaving the epoch alone, and reports what they were
|
||||
func (i *HostInfo) takeTraffic() (in bool, out bool) {
|
||||
old := i.state.And(^(stateIn | stateOut))
|
||||
return old&stateIn != 0, old&stateOut != 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (i *HostInfo) setPendingDeletion(v bool) {
|
||||
if v {
|
||||
i.state.Or(statePendingDeletion)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
i.state.And(^statePendingDeletion)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (i *HostInfo) isPendingDeletion() bool {
|
||||
return i.state.Load()&statePendingDeletion != 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (i *HostInfo) GetCert() *cert.CachedCertificate {
|
||||
if i.ConnectionState != nil {
|
||||
return i.ConnectionState.peerCert
|
||||
@@ -726,11 +834,18 @@ func (i *HostInfo) GetCert() *cert.CachedCertificate {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (i *HostInfo) GetRemote() netip.AddrPort {
|
||||
if p := i.remote.Load(); p != nil {
|
||||
return *p
|
||||
}
|
||||
return netip.AddrPort{}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TODO: Maybe use ViaSender here?
|
||||
func (i *HostInfo) SetRemote(remote netip.AddrPort) {
|
||||
// We copy here because we likely got this remote from a source that reuses the object
|
||||
if i.remote != remote {
|
||||
i.remote = remote
|
||||
if i.GetRemote() != remote {
|
||||
i.remote.Store(&remote)
|
||||
i.remotes.LearnRemote(i.vpnAddrs[0], remote)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -742,7 +857,7 @@ func (i *HostInfo) SetRemoteIfPreferred(hm *HostMap, via ViaSender) bool {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
currentRemote := i.remote
|
||||
currentRemote := i.GetRemote()
|
||||
if !currentRemote.IsValid() {
|
||||
i.SetRemote(via.UdpAddr)
|
||||
return true
|
||||
@@ -818,59 +933,3 @@ func (i *HostInfo) logger(l *slog.Logger) *slog.Logger {
|
||||
|
||||
return li
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Utility functions
|
||||
|
||||
func localAddrs(l *slog.Logger, allowList *LocalAllowList) []netip.Addr {
|
||||
//FIXME: This function is pretty garbage
|
||||
var finalAddrs []netip.Addr
|
||||
ifaces, _ := net.Interfaces()
|
||||
for _, i := range ifaces {
|
||||
allow := allowList.AllowName(i.Name)
|
||||
if l.Enabled(context.Background(), logging.LevelTrace) {
|
||||
l.Log(context.Background(), logging.LevelTrace, "localAllowList.AllowName",
|
||||
"interfaceName", i.Name,
|
||||
"allow", allow,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if !allow {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
addrs, _ := i.Addrs()
|
||||
for _, rawAddr := range addrs {
|
||||
var addr netip.Addr
|
||||
switch v := rawAddr.(type) {
|
||||
case *net.IPNet:
|
||||
//continue
|
||||
addr, _ = netip.AddrFromSlice(v.IP)
|
||||
case *net.IPAddr:
|
||||
addr, _ = netip.AddrFromSlice(v.IP)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if !addr.IsValid() {
|
||||
if l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
|
||||
l.Debug("addr was invalid", "localAddr", rawAddr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
addr = addr.Unmap()
|
||||
|
||||
if addr.IsLoopback() == false && addr.IsLinkLocalUnicast() == false {
|
||||
isAllowed := allowList.Allow(addr)
|
||||
if l.Enabled(context.Background(), logging.LevelTrace) {
|
||||
l.Log(context.Background(), logging.LevelTrace, "localAllowList.Allow",
|
||||
"localAddr", addr,
|
||||
"allowed", isAllowed,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !isAllowed {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
finalAddrs = append(finalAddrs, addr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return finalAddrs
|
||||
}
|
||||
+340
-137
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package nebula
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"slices"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
|
||||
@@ -10,78 +11,84 @@ import (
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// chainIds returns the localIndexIds of the hostinfos holding addr, primary (index 0) first. It
|
||||
// also validates the Hosts/moreHosts sync contract on every call so a mutation that broke it
|
||||
// fails fast.
|
||||
func chainIds(t *testing.T, hm *HostMap, addr netip.Addr) []uint32 {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
assertHostMapInvariants(t, hm)
|
||||
list := hm.unlockedGetHostList(addr)
|
||||
ids := make([]uint32, len(list))
|
||||
for i, h := range list {
|
||||
ids[i] = h.localIndexId
|
||||
}
|
||||
return ids
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// assertHostMapInvariants checks the Hosts/moreHosts contract: moreHosts only holds addresses
|
||||
// with 2 or more hostinfos, its first entry is always the primary in Hosts, lists never hold
|
||||
// duplicates, every hostinfo in a list owns the address and is registered in Indexes, and every
|
||||
// indexed hostinfo is reachable through each of its addresses.
|
||||
func assertHostMapInvariants(t *testing.T, hm *HostMap) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
for addr, list := range hm.moreHosts {
|
||||
require.GreaterOrEqualf(t, len(list), 2, "moreHosts[%s] must hold at least 2 hostinfos", addr)
|
||||
require.Samef(t, hm.Hosts[addr], list[0], "moreHosts[%s][0] must match the primary in Hosts", addr)
|
||||
seen := map[*HostInfo]bool{}
|
||||
for _, h := range list {
|
||||
require.NotNilf(t, h, "moreHosts[%s] must never hold a nil hostinfo", addr)
|
||||
require.Falsef(t, seen[h], "moreHosts[%s] holds hostinfo %d twice", addr, h.localIndexId)
|
||||
seen[h] = true
|
||||
require.Samef(t, hm.Indexes[h.localIndexId], h, "moreHosts[%s] member %d is not registered in Indexes", addr, h.localIndexId)
|
||||
require.Truef(t, slices.Contains(h.vpnAddrs, addr), "moreHosts[%s] member %d does not own the address", addr, h.localIndexId)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
for addr, h := range hm.Hosts {
|
||||
require.NotNilf(t, h, "Hosts[%s] must never be nil", addr)
|
||||
require.Samef(t, hm.Indexes[h.localIndexId], h, "Hosts[%s] primary %d is not registered in Indexes", addr, h.localIndexId)
|
||||
require.Truef(t, slices.Contains(h.vpnAddrs, addr), "Hosts[%s] primary (index %d) does not own the address", addr, h.localIndexId)
|
||||
}
|
||||
for idx, h := range hm.Indexes {
|
||||
require.Equalf(t, idx, h.localIndexId, "Indexes[%d] holds hostinfo with localIndexId %d", idx, h.localIndexId)
|
||||
for _, va := range h.vpnAddrs {
|
||||
require.Truef(t, slices.Contains(hm.unlockedGetHostList(va), h), "indexed hostinfo %d is missing from the list for %s", idx, va)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestHostMap_MakePrimary(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
l := test.NewLogger()
|
||||
hm := newHostMap(l)
|
||||
|
||||
f := &Interface{}
|
||||
a := netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.1")
|
||||
|
||||
h1 := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.1")}, localIndexId: 1}
|
||||
h2 := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.1")}, localIndexId: 2}
|
||||
h3 := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.1")}, localIndexId: 3}
|
||||
h4 := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.1")}, localIndexId: 4}
|
||||
h1 := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{a}, localIndexId: 1}
|
||||
h2 := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{a}, localIndexId: 2}
|
||||
h3 := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{a}, localIndexId: 3}
|
||||
h4 := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{a}, localIndexId: 4}
|
||||
|
||||
hm.unlockedAddHostInfo(h4, f)
|
||||
hm.unlockedAddHostInfo(h3, f)
|
||||
hm.unlockedAddHostInfo(h2, f)
|
||||
hm.unlockedAddHostInfo(h1, f)
|
||||
|
||||
// Make sure we go h1 -> h2 -> h3 -> h4
|
||||
prim := hm.QueryVpnAddr(netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.1"))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h1.localIndexId, prim.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h2.localIndexId, prim.next.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, prim.prev)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h1.localIndexId, h2.prev.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h3.localIndexId, h2.next.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h2.localIndexId, h3.prev.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h4.localIndexId, h3.next.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h3.localIndexId, h4.prev.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, h4.next)
|
||||
// Most-recently-added is primary: h1, h2, h3, h4
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []uint32{1, 2, 3, 4}, chainIds(t, hm, a))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h1, hm.QueryVpnAddr(a))
|
||||
|
||||
// Swap h3/middle to primary
|
||||
// Swap the middle to primary: h3, h1, h2, h4
|
||||
hm.MakePrimary(h3)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []uint32{3, 1, 2, 4}, chainIds(t, hm, a))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h3, hm.QueryVpnAddr(a))
|
||||
|
||||
// Make sure we go h3 -> h1 -> h2 -> h4
|
||||
prim = hm.QueryVpnAddr(netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.1"))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h3.localIndexId, prim.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h1.localIndexId, prim.next.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, prim.prev)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h2.localIndexId, h1.next.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h3.localIndexId, h1.prev.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h4.localIndexId, h2.next.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h1.localIndexId, h2.prev.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h2.localIndexId, h4.prev.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, h4.next)
|
||||
|
||||
// Swap h4/tail to primary
|
||||
// Swap the tail to primary: h4, h3, h1, h2
|
||||
hm.MakePrimary(h4)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []uint32{4, 3, 1, 2}, chainIds(t, hm, a))
|
||||
|
||||
// Make sure we go h4 -> h3 -> h1 -> h2
|
||||
prim = hm.QueryVpnAddr(netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.1"))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h4.localIndexId, prim.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h3.localIndexId, prim.next.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, prim.prev)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h1.localIndexId, h3.next.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h4.localIndexId, h3.prev.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h2.localIndexId, h1.next.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h3.localIndexId, h1.prev.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h1.localIndexId, h2.prev.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, h2.next)
|
||||
|
||||
// Swap h4 again should be no-op
|
||||
// Swapping the current primary again is a no-op
|
||||
hm.MakePrimary(h4)
|
||||
|
||||
// Make sure we go h4 -> h3 -> h1 -> h2
|
||||
prim = hm.QueryVpnAddr(netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.1"))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h4.localIndexId, prim.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h3.localIndexId, prim.next.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, prim.prev)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h1.localIndexId, h3.next.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h4.localIndexId, h3.prev.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h2.localIndexId, h1.next.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h3.localIndexId, h1.prev.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h1.localIndexId, h2.prev.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, h2.next)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []uint32{4, 3, 1, 2}, chainIds(t, hm, a))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestHostMap_DeleteHostInfo(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
@@ -89,13 +96,14 @@ func TestHostMap_DeleteHostInfo(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
hm := newHostMap(l)
|
||||
|
||||
f := &Interface{}
|
||||
a := netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.1")
|
||||
|
||||
h1 := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.1")}, localIndexId: 1}
|
||||
h2 := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.1")}, localIndexId: 2}
|
||||
h3 := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.1")}, localIndexId: 3}
|
||||
h4 := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.1")}, localIndexId: 4}
|
||||
h5 := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.1")}, localIndexId: 5}
|
||||
h6 := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.1")}, localIndexId: 6}
|
||||
h1 := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{a}, localIndexId: 1}
|
||||
h2 := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{a}, localIndexId: 2}
|
||||
h3 := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{a}, localIndexId: 3}
|
||||
h4 := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{a}, localIndexId: 4}
|
||||
h5 := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{a}, localIndexId: 5}
|
||||
h6 := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{a}, localIndexId: 6}
|
||||
|
||||
hm.unlockedAddHostInfo(h6, f)
|
||||
hm.unlockedAddHostInfo(h5, f)
|
||||
@@ -104,94 +112,243 @@ func TestHostMap_DeleteHostInfo(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
hm.unlockedAddHostInfo(h2, f)
|
||||
hm.unlockedAddHostInfo(h1, f)
|
||||
|
||||
// h6 should be deleted
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, h6.next)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, h6.prev)
|
||||
h := hm.QueryIndex(h6.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, h)
|
||||
// h6 is evicted by the MaxHostInfosPerVpnIp cap; the rest are newest-first.
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, hm.QueryIndex(h6.localIndexId))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []uint32{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, chainIds(t, hm, a))
|
||||
|
||||
// Make sure we go h1 -> h2 -> h3 -> h4 -> h5
|
||||
prim := hm.QueryVpnAddr(netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.1"))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h1.localIndexId, prim.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h2.localIndexId, prim.next.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, prim.prev)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h1.localIndexId, h2.prev.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h3.localIndexId, h2.next.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h2.localIndexId, h3.prev.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h4.localIndexId, h3.next.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h3.localIndexId, h4.prev.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h5.localIndexId, h4.next.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h4.localIndexId, h5.prev.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, h5.next)
|
||||
// Delete primary; not final since siblings remain.
|
||||
assert.False(t, hm.DeleteHostInfo(h1))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []uint32{2, 3, 4, 5}, chainIds(t, hm, a))
|
||||
|
||||
// Delete primary
|
||||
hm.DeleteHostInfo(h1)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, h1.prev)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, h1.next)
|
||||
// Deleting the same hostinfo again must not report final while siblings remain and must not
|
||||
// disturb the list. The old chain code got this wrong: the first delete nil'd next/prev, so a
|
||||
// second delete looked final and wiped lighthouse state out from under the live sibling.
|
||||
assert.False(t, hm.DeleteHostInfo(h1))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []uint32{2, 3, 4, 5}, chainIds(t, hm, a))
|
||||
|
||||
// Make sure we go h2 -> h3 -> h4 -> h5
|
||||
prim = hm.QueryVpnAddr(netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.1"))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h2.localIndexId, prim.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h3.localIndexId, prim.next.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, prim.prev)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h3.localIndexId, h2.next.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h2.localIndexId, h3.prev.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h4.localIndexId, h3.next.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h3.localIndexId, h4.prev.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h5.localIndexId, h4.next.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h4.localIndexId, h5.prev.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, h5.next)
|
||||
// Delete a middle node.
|
||||
assert.False(t, hm.DeleteHostInfo(h3))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []uint32{2, 4, 5}, chainIds(t, hm, a))
|
||||
|
||||
// Delete in the middle
|
||||
hm.DeleteHostInfo(h3)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, h3.prev)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, h3.next)
|
||||
// Delete the tail.
|
||||
assert.False(t, hm.DeleteHostInfo(h5))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []uint32{2, 4}, chainIds(t, hm, a))
|
||||
|
||||
// Make sure we go h2 -> h4 -> h5
|
||||
prim = hm.QueryVpnAddr(netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.1"))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h2.localIndexId, prim.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h4.localIndexId, prim.next.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, prim.prev)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h4.localIndexId, h2.next.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h2.localIndexId, h4.prev.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h5.localIndexId, h4.next.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h4.localIndexId, h5.prev.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, h5.next)
|
||||
// Delete the head; h4 remains and becomes primary.
|
||||
assert.False(t, hm.DeleteHostInfo(h2))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []uint32{4}, chainIds(t, hm, a))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h4, hm.QueryVpnAddr(a))
|
||||
|
||||
// Delete the tail
|
||||
hm.DeleteHostInfo(h5)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, h5.prev)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, h5.next)
|
||||
// Delete the only remaining item; final is true and the address is gone.
|
||||
assert.True(t, hm.DeleteHostInfo(h4))
|
||||
assert.Empty(t, chainIds(t, hm, a))
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, hm.QueryVpnAddr(a))
|
||||
|
||||
// Make sure we go h2 -> h4
|
||||
prim = hm.QueryVpnAddr(netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.1"))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h2.localIndexId, prim.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h4.localIndexId, prim.next.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, prim.prev)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h4.localIndexId, h2.next.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h2.localIndexId, h4.prev.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, h4.next)
|
||||
// Deleting an already-gone hostinfo is still final; nothing holds the address anymore.
|
||||
assert.True(t, hm.DeleteHostInfo(h4))
|
||||
assert.Empty(t, chainIds(t, hm, a))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Delete the head
|
||||
hm.DeleteHostInfo(h2)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, h2.prev)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, h2.next)
|
||||
// TestHostMap_MakePrimary_DeletedHostInfo covers promoting a hostinfo that lost a race with
|
||||
// tunnel teardown: swapPrimary and AddRelay decide to promote while holding a stale pointer and
|
||||
// only take the write lock after a delete fully unlinked the hostinfo. MakePrimary must be a
|
||||
// no-op, not a resurrection that installs an unmanaged primary.
|
||||
func TestHostMap_MakePrimary_DeletedHostInfo(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
l := test.NewLogger()
|
||||
hm := newHostMap(l)
|
||||
f := &Interface{}
|
||||
a := netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.1")
|
||||
|
||||
// Make sure we only have h4
|
||||
prim = hm.QueryVpnAddr(netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.1"))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h4.localIndexId, prim.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, prim.prev)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, prim.next)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, h4.next)
|
||||
h1 := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{a}, localIndexId: 1}
|
||||
h2 := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{a}, localIndexId: 2}
|
||||
hm.unlockedAddHostInfo(h1, f)
|
||||
hm.unlockedAddHostInfo(h2, f)
|
||||
|
||||
// Delete the only item
|
||||
hm.DeleteHostInfo(h4)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, h4.prev)
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, h4.next)
|
||||
// h1 is fully deleted while another goroutine still holds a pointer to it.
|
||||
assert.False(t, hm.DeleteHostInfo(h1))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []uint32{2}, chainIds(t, hm, a))
|
||||
|
||||
// Make sure we have nil
|
||||
prim = hm.QueryVpnAddr(netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.1"))
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, prim)
|
||||
// The stale promote must not bring it back.
|
||||
hm.MakePrimary(h1)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []uint32{2}, chainIds(t, hm, a))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, h2, hm.QueryVpnAddr(a))
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, hm.QueryIndex(h1.localIndexId))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestHostMap_QueryVpnAddrsRelayFor_NonPrimary makes sure a relay established on an older
|
||||
// hostinfo is still found after a newer tunnel without relay state takes primary for the same
|
||||
// address. The lookup checks the primary first and falls back to the rest of the list.
|
||||
func TestHostMap_QueryVpnAddrsRelayFor_NonPrimary(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
l := test.NewLogger()
|
||||
hm := newHostMap(l)
|
||||
f := &Interface{}
|
||||
relayAddr := netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.9")
|
||||
target := netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.1")
|
||||
|
||||
older := &HostInfo{
|
||||
vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{relayAddr},
|
||||
localIndexId: 1,
|
||||
relayState: RelayState{
|
||||
relayForByAddr: map[netip.Addr]*Relay{},
|
||||
relayForByIdx: map[uint32]*Relay{},
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
older.relayState.InsertRelay(target, 100, &Relay{Type: ForwardingType, State: Established, LocalIndex: 100, PeerAddr: target})
|
||||
hm.unlockedAddHostInfo(older, f)
|
||||
|
||||
// The relay is found on the primary.
|
||||
h, r, err := hm.QueryVpnAddrsRelayFor([]netip.Addr{target}, relayAddr)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, older, h)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, uint32(100), r.LocalIndex)
|
||||
|
||||
// A re-handshake with no relay state takes primary; the established relay on the older
|
||||
// hostinfo must still be found through the fallback.
|
||||
newer := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{relayAddr}, localIndexId: 2}
|
||||
hm.unlockedAddHostInfo(newer, f)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []uint32{2, 1}, chainIds(t, hm, relayAddr))
|
||||
|
||||
h, r, err = hm.QueryVpnAddrsRelayFor([]netip.Addr{target}, relayAddr)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, older, h)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, uint32(100), r.LocalIndex)
|
||||
|
||||
// No hostinfo at all is a plain miss.
|
||||
_, _, err = hm.QueryVpnAddrsRelayFor([]netip.Addr{target}, netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.42"))
|
||||
require.Error(t, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestHostMap_DeleteHostInfo_MultipleVpnAddrs exercises the case where a hostinfo carries more than one
|
||||
// vpnAddr and shares its next/prev chain with a live sibling. Deleting the head must not corrupt the
|
||||
// sibling: every address the sibling owns has to keep pointing at it. The pre-fix code unlinked the shared
|
||||
// chain once per vpnAddr, so on the first address it nil'd next/prev, and on the second address the node
|
||||
// looked already-detached: it dropped the map entry instead of promoting the sibling (and tripped the
|
||||
// isLastHostinfo relay teardown). See unlockedDeleteHostInfo.
|
||||
func TestHostMap_DeleteHostInfo_MultipleVpnAddrs(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
l := test.NewLogger()
|
||||
hm := newHostMap(l)
|
||||
|
||||
f := &Interface{}
|
||||
|
||||
a := netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.1")
|
||||
b := netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.2")
|
||||
|
||||
// Two tunnels for the same peer, each reachable at both a and b.
|
||||
other := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{a, b}, localIndexId: 1}
|
||||
head := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{a, b}, localIndexId: 2}
|
||||
|
||||
hm.unlockedAddHostInfo(other, f)
|
||||
hm.unlockedAddHostInfo(head, f)
|
||||
|
||||
// head is primary for both addresses, other is next in each address's list.
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, head, hm.QueryVpnAddr(a))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, head, hm.QueryVpnAddr(b))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []uint32{2, 1}, chainIds(t, hm, a))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []uint32{2, 1}, chainIds(t, hm, b))
|
||||
|
||||
// Delete the head. other is still live, so it must become primary for BOTH addresses.
|
||||
assert.False(t, hm.DeleteHostInfo(head))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, other, hm.QueryVpnAddr(a))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, other, hm.QueryVpnAddr(b))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []uint32{1}, chainIds(t, hm, a))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []uint32{1}, chainIds(t, hm, b))
|
||||
|
||||
// head is fully removed from the index map.
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, hm.QueryIndex(head.localIndexId))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestHostMap_DeleteHostInfo_DivergentVpnAddrs covers chained hostinfos for the same peer whose
|
||||
// vpnAddrs sets differ (a re-handshake cert added a second address). Deleting the superset node
|
||||
// must not promote a sibling to an address it does not own.
|
||||
func TestHostMap_DeleteHostInfo_DivergentVpnAddrs(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
l := test.NewLogger()
|
||||
hm := newHostMap(l)
|
||||
f := &Interface{}
|
||||
a := netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.1")
|
||||
b := netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.2")
|
||||
|
||||
// sub owns only a; super (a newer handshake) owns a and b.
|
||||
sub := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{a}, localIndexId: 1}
|
||||
super := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{a, b}, localIndexId: 2}
|
||||
hm.unlockedAddHostInfo(sub, f)
|
||||
hm.unlockedAddHostInfo(super, f)
|
||||
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []uint32{2, 1}, chainIds(t, hm, a))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []uint32{2}, chainIds(t, hm, b))
|
||||
|
||||
// Delete super: a promotes to sub (which owns it); b has no remaining owner and must be
|
||||
// removed, not dangled at sub (which does not own b).
|
||||
assert.False(t, hm.DeleteHostInfo(super))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []uint32{1}, chainIds(t, hm, a))
|
||||
assert.Empty(t, chainIds(t, hm, b))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, sub, hm.QueryVpnAddr(a))
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, hm.QueryVpnAddr(b))
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, hm.QueryIndex(super.localIndexId))
|
||||
|
||||
// Deleting sub cleans up fully.
|
||||
assert.True(t, hm.DeleteHostInfo(sub))
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, hm.QueryVpnAddr(a))
|
||||
assertHostMapInvariants(t, hm)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestHostMap_AddDivergentOverlap covers a new hostinfo claiming addresses currently owned by two
|
||||
// DIFFERENT hostinfos. The old single shared next/prev chain overwrote a pointer and orphaned one
|
||||
// of them (in Indexes but unreachable via its address); independent per-address lists cannot.
|
||||
func TestHostMap_AddDivergentOverlap(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
l := test.NewLogger()
|
||||
hm := newHostMap(l)
|
||||
f := &Interface{}
|
||||
a := netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.1")
|
||||
b := netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.2")
|
||||
|
||||
hiA := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{a}, localIndexId: 1}
|
||||
hiP := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{b}, localIndexId: 2}
|
||||
hm.unlockedAddHostInfo(hiA, f)
|
||||
hm.unlockedAddHostInfo(hiP, f)
|
||||
|
||||
hiB := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{a, b}, localIndexId: 3}
|
||||
hm.unlockedAddHostInfo(hiB, f)
|
||||
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []uint32{3, 1}, chainIds(t, hm, a))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []uint32{3, 2}, chainIds(t, hm, b))
|
||||
// hiA is still reachable via its address (not orphaned) and still indexed.
|
||||
assert.Contains(t, chainIds(t, hm, a), hiA.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.NotNil(t, hm.QueryIndex(hiA.localIndexId))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestHostMap_MaxHostInfosPerVpnIp_MultipleVpnAddrs verifies the MaxHostInfosPerVpnIp overflow prune
|
||||
// (unlockedInnerAddHostInfo calls unlockedDeleteHostInfo on the oldest node once the chain is too long)
|
||||
// still behaves when hostinfos carry more than one vpnAddr. The pruned node is always the tail, so it is
|
||||
// primary for none of the addresses, and both address chains must stay consistent afterwards.
|
||||
func TestHostMap_MaxHostInfosPerVpnIp_MultipleVpnAddrs(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
l := test.NewLogger()
|
||||
hm := newHostMap(l)
|
||||
|
||||
f := &Interface{}
|
||||
|
||||
a := netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.1")
|
||||
b := netip.MustParseAddr("0.0.0.2")
|
||||
|
||||
// Add one more than the cap, newest last so it becomes head. Every hostinfo owns both a and b.
|
||||
hostinfos := make([]*HostInfo, 0, MaxHostInfosPerVpnIp+1)
|
||||
for i := 0; i <= MaxHostInfosPerVpnIp; i++ {
|
||||
hostinfos = append(hostinfos, &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{a, b}, localIndexId: uint32(i + 1)})
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Add oldest first (highest index in our slice) so the very first one added is the overflow victim.
|
||||
for i := len(hostinfos) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
|
||||
hm.unlockedAddHostInfo(hostinfos[i], f)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
oldest := hostinfos[len(hostinfos)-1]
|
||||
|
||||
// The oldest hostinfo was pruned from both lists and the index map.
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, hm.QueryIndex(oldest.localIndexId))
|
||||
|
||||
// Both addresses hold exactly MaxHostInfosPerVpnIp survivors in the same order; oldest is absent.
|
||||
require.Len(t, chainIds(t, hm, a), MaxHostInfosPerVpnIp)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, chainIds(t, hm, a), chainIds(t, hm, b), "both addresses must list the same survivors in the same order")
|
||||
assert.NotContains(t, chainIds(t, hm, a), oldest.localIndexId)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, hm.QueryVpnAddr(a), hm.QueryVpnAddr(b))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestHostMap_reload(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
@@ -244,3 +401,49 @@ func TestHostMap_RelayState(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []netip.Addr{}, h1.relayState.relays)
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// sentSinceCheck reports whether anything has been sent since the connection manager last looked. Test only:
|
||||
// production reads the out bit through takeTraffic on the connection manager tick.
|
||||
func (i *HostInfo) sentSinceCheck() bool {
|
||||
return i.state.Load()&stateOut != 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestHostInfo_markOut(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h := &HostInfo{}
|
||||
h.markOut(5) // stamped when the tunnel was added
|
||||
|
||||
// A tunnel already on the current epoch has nothing to report, which is what keeps a fresh tunnel from
|
||||
// requerying on its first packet
|
||||
assert.False(t, h.markOut(5), "an unchanged epoch should not report a move")
|
||||
assert.True(t, h.sentSinceCheck(), "the send is still recorded as traffic")
|
||||
|
||||
// A rebind is observed exactly once, so we requery once per rebind
|
||||
assert.True(t, h.markOut(6), "a bumped epoch should report a move")
|
||||
assert.False(t, h.markOut(6), "the epoch move should only be reported once")
|
||||
|
||||
// Traffic and pendingDeletion live in the same word and must survive an epoch change
|
||||
h.setPendingDeletion(true)
|
||||
h.markIn()
|
||||
assert.True(t, h.markOut(7))
|
||||
assert.True(t, h.isPendingDeletion(), "pendingDeletion must survive an epoch change")
|
||||
in, out := h.takeTraffic()
|
||||
assert.True(t, in, "inbound traffic must survive an epoch change")
|
||||
assert.True(t, out)
|
||||
|
||||
// Clearing the traffic bits leaves the epoch alone, otherwise an idle tunnel would requery forever
|
||||
assert.False(t, h.markOut(7), "takeTraffic must not disturb the epoch")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A relayed send records traffic but must leave the rebind epoch for the direct path to consume, otherwise
|
||||
// relaying to a host swallows the requery that gets the far side punching at our new address.
|
||||
func TestHostInfo_markOutOnly(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
h := &HostInfo{}
|
||||
h.markOut(5)
|
||||
|
||||
h.markOutOnly()
|
||||
assert.True(t, h.sentSinceCheck(), "a relayed send is still outbound traffic")
|
||||
assert.False(t, h.markOut(5), "a relayed send must not disturb the epoch")
|
||||
|
||||
assert.True(t, h.markOut(6), "a relayed send must not consume the epoch edge")
|
||||
assert.False(t, h.markOut(6))
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -2,17 +2,34 @@ package nebula
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/iputil"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/logging"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/noiseutil"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/batch"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(packet []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, nb, out []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
|
||||
func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(pkt tio.Packet, fwPacket *firewall.ParsedPacket, nb []byte, sendBatch *batch.SendBatch, rejectBuf []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
|
||||
// borrowed: pkt.Bytes is owned by the originating tio.Queue and is
|
||||
// only valid until the next Read on that queue. Every consumer below
|
||||
// (parse, self-forward, handshake cache, sendInsideMessage) reads it
|
||||
// synchronously; do not retain pkt outside this call. If a future
|
||||
// caller needs to keep the packet, use pkt.Clone() to detach it from
|
||||
// the borrow.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// pkt.Bytes is either one IP datagram (GSO zero) or a TSO/USO
|
||||
// superpacket. In both cases the L3+L4 headers at the start describe
|
||||
// the same 5-tuple every segment will share, so a single newPacket /
|
||||
// firewall check covers the whole superpacket.
|
||||
packet := pkt.Bytes
|
||||
err := newPacket(packet, false, fwPacket)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
|
||||
@@ -37,7 +54,17 @@ func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(packet []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet
|
||||
// routes packets from the Nebula addr to the Nebula addr through the Nebula
|
||||
// TUN device.
|
||||
if immediatelyForwardToSelf {
|
||||
_, err := f.readers[q].Write(packet)
|
||||
// Write copies into the kernel queue synchronously, so seg's lifetime ends at return.
|
||||
// A self-forwarded superpacket would be re-handed to the
|
||||
// kernel as one giant blob; segment first so the loopback
|
||||
// path sees one IP datagram per Write.
|
||||
err := tio.SegmentSuperpacket(pkt, func(seg []byte) error {
|
||||
// The kernel may have left the transport checksum for hardware
|
||||
// offload to finish; nothing between here and the tun will.
|
||||
iputil.SetTransportChecksum(seg)
|
||||
_, werr := f.queues[q].Write(seg)
|
||||
return werr
|
||||
})
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
f.l.Error("Failed to forward to tun", "error", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -52,12 +79,24 @@ func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(packet []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hostinfo, ready := f.getOrHandshakeConsiderRouting(fwPacket, func(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) {
|
||||
hh.cachePacket(f.l, header.Message, 0, packet, f.sendMessageNow, f.cachedPacketMetrics)
|
||||
hostinfo, ready := f.getOrHandshakeConsiderRouting(&fwPacket.Packet, func(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) {
|
||||
// borrowed: SegmentSuperpacket builds each segment in the kernel-supplied pkt
|
||||
// bytes underneath. cachePacket explicitly copies its argument (handshake_manager.go cachePacket),
|
||||
// so retaining segments past the loop is safe.
|
||||
err := tio.SegmentSuperpacket(pkt, func(seg []byte) error {
|
||||
hh.cachePacket(f.l, header.Message, 0, seg, f.sendMessageNow, f.cachedPacketMetrics)
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
})
|
||||
if err != nil && f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
|
||||
f.l.Debug("Failed to segment superpacket for handshake cache",
|
||||
"error", err,
|
||||
"vpnAddr", fwPacket.RemoteAddr,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
if hostinfo == nil {
|
||||
f.rejectInside(packet, out, q)
|
||||
f.rejectInside(packet, rejectBuf, q)
|
||||
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
|
||||
f.l.Debug("dropping outbound packet, vpnAddr not in our vpn networks or in unsafe networks",
|
||||
"vpnAddr", fwPacket.RemoteAddr,
|
||||
@@ -71,12 +110,11 @@ func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(packet []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(*fwPacket, false, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), localCache)
|
||||
dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(fwPacket.Packet, false, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), localCache)
|
||||
if dropReason == nil {
|
||||
f.sendNoMetrics(header.Message, 0, hostinfo.ConnectionState, hostinfo, netip.AddrPort{}, packet, nb, out, q)
|
||||
|
||||
f.sendInsideMessage(hostinfo, pkt, nb, sendBatch)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
f.rejectInside(packet, out, q)
|
||||
f.rejectInside(packet, rejectBuf, q)
|
||||
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
|
||||
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("dropping outbound packet",
|
||||
"fwPacket", fwPacket,
|
||||
@@ -86,8 +124,124 @@ func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(packet []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *Interface) sendInsideEncrypt(hostinfo *HostInfo, ci *ConnectionState, seg, scratch, nb []byte) []byte {
|
||||
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
|
||||
ci.writeLock.Lock()
|
||||
}
|
||||
c := ci.messageCounter.Add(1)
|
||||
|
||||
out := header.Encode(scratch, header.Version, header.Message, 0, hostinfo.remoteIndexId, c)
|
||||
|
||||
out, encErr := ci.eKey.EncryptDanger(out, out, seg, c, nb)
|
||||
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
|
||||
ci.writeLock.Unlock()
|
||||
}
|
||||
if encErr != nil {
|
||||
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to encrypt outgoing packet",
|
||||
"error", encErr,
|
||||
"udpAddr", hostinfo.GetRemote(),
|
||||
"counter", c,
|
||||
)
|
||||
// Skip this segment; the rest of the superpacket can still go out. TCP will retransmit anything we drop here.
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// sendInsideMessage encrypts a firewall-approved inside packet (or every
|
||||
// segment of a TSO/USO superpacket) into the caller's batch slot for
|
||||
// later sendmmsg flush. Segmentation is fused with encryption here so the
|
||||
// kernel-supplied superpacket bytes never get written into a separate
|
||||
// scratch arena: SegmentSuperpacket builds each segment's plaintext in
|
||||
// segScratch[:segLen] in turn, and we encrypt directly into a fresh SendBatch slot.
|
||||
func (f *Interface) sendInsideMessage(hostinfo *HostInfo, pkt tio.Packet, nb []byte, sendBatch *batch.SendBatch) {
|
||||
ci := hostinfo.ConnectionState
|
||||
if ci.eKey == nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// One traffic-out mark covers every segment of the superpacket; doing it
|
||||
// per segment in sendInsideEncrypt paid an atomic store up to ~45 extra
|
||||
// times per TSO packet, inside writeLock under boring crypto.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// We rebound since this tunnel last sent, ask the lighthouse to get the far side punching at us again
|
||||
if f.connectionManager.Out(hostinfo) {
|
||||
f.lightHouse.QueryServer(hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0])
|
||||
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
|
||||
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("Lighthouse update triggered for punch due to rebind epoch",
|
||||
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
remote := hostinfo.GetRemote()
|
||||
if !remote.IsValid() { //the relay path
|
||||
//first, find our relay hostinfo:
|
||||
var relayHostInfo *HostInfo
|
||||
var relay *Relay
|
||||
var err error
|
||||
for _, relayIP := range hostinfo.relayState.CopyRelayIps() {
|
||||
relayHostInfo, relay, err = f.hostMap.QueryVpnAddrsRelayFor(hostinfo.vpnAddrs, relayIP)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
hostinfo.relayState.DeleteRelay(relayIP)
|
||||
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Info("sendNoMetrics failed to find HostInfo",
|
||||
"relay", relayIP,
|
||||
"error", err,
|
||||
)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
if relayHostInfo == nil || relay == nil {
|
||||
//failure already logged
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
err = tio.SegmentSuperpacket(pkt, func(seg []byte) error {
|
||||
//relay header + header + plaintext + AEAD tag + relay tag
|
||||
scratch := sendBatch.Reserve(len(seg) + header.MaxOverhead)
|
||||
|
||||
innerPacket := f.sendInsideEncrypt(hostinfo, ci, seg, scratch[header.Len:], nb)
|
||||
if innerPacket == nil {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
//now we need to do a relay-encrypt:
|
||||
toSend, err := f.prepareSendVia(relayHostInfo, relay, innerPacket, nb, scratch, true)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
//already logged
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
sendBatch.Commit(toSend, relayHostInfo.GetRemote())
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
})
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to segment superpacket for relay send", "error", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
err := tio.SegmentSuperpacket(pkt, func(seg []byte) error {
|
||||
// header + plaintext + AEAD tag (16 bytes for both AES-GCM and ChaCha20-Poly1305)
|
||||
scratch := sendBatch.Reserve(header.Len + len(seg) + 16)
|
||||
|
||||
out := f.sendInsideEncrypt(hostinfo, ci, seg, scratch, nb)
|
||||
if out == nil {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
sendBatch.Commit(out, remote)
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
})
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to segment superpacket for send", "error", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *Interface) rejectInside(packet []byte, out []byte, q int) {
|
||||
if !f.firewall.InSendReject {
|
||||
if !f.firewall.OutboundSendReject {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -96,33 +250,36 @@ func (f *Interface) rejectInside(packet []byte, out []byte, q int) {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
_, err := f.readers[q].Write(out)
|
||||
_, err := f.queues[q].Write(out)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
f.l.Error("Failed to write to tun", "error", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *Interface) rejectOutside(packet []byte, ci *ConnectionState, hostinfo *HostInfo, nb, out []byte, q int) {
|
||||
if !f.firewall.OutSendReject {
|
||||
func (f *Interface) rejectOutside(packet []byte, ci *ConnectionState, hostinfo *HostInfo, nb, rejectBuf []byte, q int) {
|
||||
if !f.firewall.InboundSendReject {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
out = iputil.CreateRejectPacket(packet, out)
|
||||
// split rejectBuf to make sure we have room to write the plaintext rejection, then encrypt it, without trampling anything
|
||||
// we can't re-use packet, if we need to send an icmp reject, it won't be long enough.
|
||||
half := len(rejectBuf) / 2
|
||||
encryptBuf := rejectBuf[0:0:half] //the first half of rejectBuf's capacity, len set to 0
|
||||
buildBuf := rejectBuf[half:]
|
||||
|
||||
out := iputil.CreateRejectPacket(packet, buildBuf)
|
||||
if len(out) == 0 {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if len(out) > iputil.MaxRejectPacketSize {
|
||||
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelInfo) {
|
||||
f.l.Info("rejectOutside: packet too big, not sending",
|
||||
"packet", packet,
|
||||
"outPacket", out,
|
||||
)
|
||||
f.l.Info("rejectOutside: packet too big, not sending", "packet", packet, "outPacket", out)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
f.sendNoMetrics(header.Message, 0, ci, hostinfo, netip.AddrPort{}, out, nb, packet, q)
|
||||
f.sendNoMetrics(header.Message, 0, ci, hostinfo, netip.AddrPort{}, out, nb, encryptBuf, q)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Handshake will attempt to initiate a tunnel with the provided vpn address. This is a no-op if the tunnel is already established or being established
|
||||
@@ -216,7 +373,7 @@ func (f *Interface) getOrHandshakeConsiderRouting(fwPacket *firewall.Packet, cac
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *Interface) sendMessageNow(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, hostinfo *HostInfo, p, nb, out []byte) {
|
||||
fp := &firewall.Packet{}
|
||||
fp := &firewall.ParsedPacket{}
|
||||
err := newPacket(p, false, fp)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
f.l.Warn("error while parsing outgoing packet for firewall check", "error", err)
|
||||
@@ -224,7 +381,7 @@ func (f *Interface) sendMessageNow(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubTyp
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// check if packet is in outbound fw rules
|
||||
dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(*fp, false, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), nil)
|
||||
dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(fp.Packet, false, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), nil)
|
||||
if dropReason != nil {
|
||||
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
|
||||
f.l.Debug("dropping cached packet",
|
||||
@@ -275,29 +432,36 @@ func (f *Interface) sendTo(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, ci *C
|
||||
f.sendNoMetrics(t, st, ci, hostinfo, remote, p, nb, out, 0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// SendVia sends a payload through a Relay tunnel. No authentication or encryption is done
|
||||
// to the payload for the ultimate target host, making this a useful method for sending
|
||||
// handshake messages to peers through relay tunnels.
|
||||
// via is the HostInfo through which the message is relayed.
|
||||
// ad is the plaintext data to authenticate, but not encrypt
|
||||
// nb is a buffer used to store the nonce value, re-used for performance reasons.
|
||||
// out is a buffer used to store the result of the Encrypt operation
|
||||
// q indicates which writer to use to send the packet.
|
||||
func (f *Interface) SendVia(via *HostInfo,
|
||||
// dropExhausted records an exhaustion drop and logs once, on the crossing send, for a spent tunnel.
|
||||
func (f *Interface) dropExhausted(hostinfo *HostInfo, c uint64, msg string) {
|
||||
f.messageMetrics.TxExhausted(1)
|
||||
if c == RejectAfterMessages {
|
||||
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error(msg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *Interface) prepareSendVia(via *HostInfo,
|
||||
relay *Relay,
|
||||
ad,
|
||||
nb,
|
||||
out []byte,
|
||||
nocopy bool,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
) ([]byte, error) {
|
||||
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
|
||||
// NOTE: for goboring AESGCMTLS we need to lock because of the nonce check
|
||||
via.ConnectionState.writeLock.Lock()
|
||||
}
|
||||
c := via.ConnectionState.messageCounter.Add(1)
|
||||
c, ok := via.ConnectionState.NextMessageCounter()
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
|
||||
via.ConnectionState.writeLock.Unlock()
|
||||
}
|
||||
f.dropExhausted(via, c, "Dropping outbound relay packets, tunnel message counter is exhausted")
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("tunnel message counter is exhausted")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
out = header.Encode(out, header.Version, header.Message, header.MessageRelay, relay.RemoteIndex, c)
|
||||
f.connectionManager.Out(via)
|
||||
f.connectionManager.OutNoRebind(via)
|
||||
|
||||
// Authenticate the header and payload, but do not encrypt for this message type.
|
||||
// The payload consists of the inner, unencrypted Nebula header, as well as the end-to-end encrypted payload.
|
||||
@@ -311,7 +475,7 @@ func (f *Interface) SendVia(via *HostInfo,
|
||||
"headerLen", len(out),
|
||||
"cipherOverhead", via.ConnectionState.eKey.Overhead(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
return
|
||||
return nil, io.ErrShortBuffer
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The header bytes are written to the 'out' slice; Grow the slice to hold the header and associated data payload.
|
||||
@@ -331,51 +495,84 @@ func (f *Interface) SendVia(via *HostInfo,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
via.logger(f.l).Info("Failed to EncryptDanger in sendVia", "error", err)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
err = f.writers[0].WriteTo(out, via.remote)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
via.logger(f.l).Info("Failed to WriteTo in sendVia", "error", err)
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
f.connectionManager.RelayUsed(relay.LocalIndex)
|
||||
return out, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// SendVia sends a payload through a Relay tunnel. No authentication or encryption is done
|
||||
// to the payload for the ultimate target host, making this a useful method for sending
|
||||
// handshake messages to peers through relay tunnels.
|
||||
// via is the HostInfo through which the message is relayed.
|
||||
// ad is the plaintext data to authenticate, but not encrypt
|
||||
// nb is a buffer used to store the nonce value, re-used for performance reasons.
|
||||
// out is a buffer used to store the result of the Encrypt operation
|
||||
// q indicates which writer to use to send the packet.
|
||||
func (f *Interface) SendVia(via *HostInfo, relay *Relay, ad, nb, out []byte, nocopy bool, q int) {
|
||||
toSend, err := f.prepareSendVia(via, relay, ad, nb, out, nocopy)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
// already logged by prepareSendVia
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
err = f.writers[q].WriteTo(toSend, via.GetRemote())
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
if l, ok := logging.RateLimited(f.l, f.udpRelayTxErrLimiter); ok {
|
||||
via.logger(l).Info("Failed to WriteTo in sendVia", "error", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *Interface) sendNoMetrics(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, ci *ConnectionState, hostinfo *HostInfo, remote netip.AddrPort, p, nb, out []byte, q int) {
|
||||
if ci.eKey == nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
useRelay := !remote.IsValid() && !hostinfo.remote.IsValid()
|
||||
fullOut := out
|
||||
useRelay := !remote.IsValid() && !hostinfo.GetRemote().IsValid()
|
||||
|
||||
// The encrypt appends to out in place and a relayed packet is then wrapped in place,
|
||||
// so out has to fit the whole packet up front or the encrypt reallocates out from under SendVia.
|
||||
// We cap the MTU of tun devices and routes we create ourselves, so only a host that set a bigger MTU than we allow gets here.
|
||||
need := header.Len + len(p) + ci.eKey.Overhead()
|
||||
if useRelay {
|
||||
if len(out) < header.Len {
|
||||
// out always has a capacity of mtu, but not always a length greater than the header.Len.
|
||||
// Grow it to make sure the next operation works.
|
||||
out = out[:header.Len]
|
||||
// The relay tunnel runs the same cipher, and adds its own header and tag
|
||||
need += header.Len + ci.eKey.Overhead()
|
||||
}
|
||||
if cap(out) < need {
|
||||
if l, ok := logging.RateLimited(f.l, f.txOversizeLimiter); ok {
|
||||
hostinfo.logger(l).Error("Dropping outbound packet, out buffer not large enough", "outCap", cap(out), "payloadLen", len(p), "relayed", useRelay)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fullOut := out
|
||||
if useRelay {
|
||||
// Save a header's worth of data at the front of the 'out' buffer.
|
||||
out = out[header.Len:]
|
||||
out = out[header.Len:header.Len]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
|
||||
// NOTE: for goboring AESGCMTLS we need to lock because of the nonce check
|
||||
ci.writeLock.Lock()
|
||||
}
|
||||
c := ci.messageCounter.Add(1)
|
||||
c, ok := ci.NextMessageCounter()
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
|
||||
ci.writeLock.Unlock()
|
||||
}
|
||||
f.dropExhausted(hostinfo, c, "Dropping outbound packets, tunnel message counter is exhausted")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
//l.WithField("trace", string(debug.Stack())).Error("out Header ", &Header{Version, t, st, 0, hostinfo.remoteIndexId, c}, p)
|
||||
out = header.Encode(out, header.Version, t, st, hostinfo.remoteIndexId, c)
|
||||
f.connectionManager.Out(hostinfo)
|
||||
|
||||
// Query our LH if we haven't since the last time we've been rebound, this will cause the remote to punch against
|
||||
// all our addrs and enable a faster roaming.
|
||||
if t != header.CloseTunnel && hostinfo.lastRebindCount != f.rebindCount {
|
||||
//NOTE: there is an update hole if a tunnel isn't used and exactly 256 rebinds occur before the tunnel is
|
||||
// finally used again. This tunnel would eventually be torn down and recreated if this action didn't help.
|
||||
// A closing tunnel is torn down right after this, so skip the connection manager entirely: no point recording
|
||||
// traffic or asking the lighthouse for a punch. Otherwise, if we rebound since this tunnel last sent, ask the
|
||||
// lighthouse to get the far side punching at us again.
|
||||
if t != header.CloseTunnel && f.connectionManager.Out(hostinfo) {
|
||||
f.lightHouse.QueryServer(hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0])
|
||||
hostinfo.lastRebindCount = f.rebindCount
|
||||
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
|
||||
f.l.Debug("Lighthouse update triggered for punch due to rebind counter",
|
||||
f.l.Debug("Lighthouse update triggered for punch due to rebind epoch",
|
||||
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -398,18 +595,22 @@ func (f *Interface) sendNoMetrics(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType
|
||||
if remote.IsValid() {
|
||||
err = f.writers[q].WriteTo(out, remote)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to write outgoing packet",
|
||||
"error", err,
|
||||
"udpAddr", remote,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if l, ok := logging.RateLimited(f.l, f.udpTxErrLimiter); ok {
|
||||
hostinfo.logger(l).Error("Failed to write outgoing packet",
|
||||
"error", err,
|
||||
"udpAddr", remote,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else if hostinfo.remote.IsValid() {
|
||||
err = f.writers[q].WriteTo(out, hostinfo.remote)
|
||||
} else if hr := hostinfo.GetRemote(); hr.IsValid() {
|
||||
err = f.writers[q].WriteTo(out, hr)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to write outgoing packet",
|
||||
"error", err,
|
||||
"udpAddr", remote,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if l, ok := logging.RateLimited(f.l, f.udpTxErrLimiter); ok {
|
||||
hostinfo.logger(l).Error("Failed to write outgoing packet",
|
||||
"error", err,
|
||||
"udpAddr", hr,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// Try to send via a relay
|
||||
@@ -423,7 +624,7 @@ func (f *Interface) sendNoMetrics(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType
|
||||
)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
f.SendVia(relayHostInfo, relay, out, nb, fullOut[:header.Len+len(out)], true)
|
||||
f.SendVia(relayHostInfo, relay, out, nb, fullOut[:header.Len+len(out)], true, q)
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+265
@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
|
||||
package nebula
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"encoding/binary"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/iputil"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
ipv4HeaderLen = 20
|
||||
ipv6HeaderLen = 40
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// capturingTun is a tio.Queue that records what is written to it. A queue that
|
||||
// discards writes is indistinguishable from a packet that was never forwarded.
|
||||
type capturingTun struct {
|
||||
writes [][]byte
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *capturingTun) Read() ([]tio.Packet, error) { return nil, io.EOF }
|
||||
func (c *capturingTun) Close() error { return nil }
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *capturingTun) Write(b []byte) (int, error) {
|
||||
c.writes = append(c.writes, append([]byte(nil), b...))
|
||||
return len(b), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func newSelfForwardInterface(myAddrs ...netip.Addr) (*Interface, *capturingTun) {
|
||||
vpnAddrs := &bart.Lite{}
|
||||
for _, a := range myAddrs {
|
||||
vpnAddrs.Insert(netip.PrefixFrom(a, a.BitLen()))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
tun := &capturingTun{}
|
||||
return &Interface{
|
||||
l: test.NewLogger(),
|
||||
myVpnAddrsTable: vpnAddrs,
|
||||
myBroadcastAddrsTable: &bart.Lite{},
|
||||
queues: []tio.Queue{tun},
|
||||
}, tun
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func consumeInside(f *Interface, packet []byte) {
|
||||
f.consumeInsidePacket(tio.Packet{Bytes: packet}, &firewall.ParsedPacket{}, make([]byte, 12), nil, make([]byte, mtu), 0, nil)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// l4Proto describes one upper-layer header for these tests: its IP next-header
|
||||
// value, where its checksum field sits within the header, and how to build a
|
||||
// minimal instance of it.
|
||||
type l4Proto struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
nextHdr uint8
|
||||
cksumAt int
|
||||
build func() []byte
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var (
|
||||
tcpSyn = l4Proto{"tcp", iputil.IPProtocolTCP, 16, func() []byte {
|
||||
h := make([]byte, 20)
|
||||
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(h[0:2], 49152)
|
||||
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(h[2:4], 443)
|
||||
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(h[4:8], 0x11223344) // sequence
|
||||
h[12] = 5 << 4 // data offset, no options
|
||||
h[13] = 0x02 // SYN
|
||||
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(h[14:16], 65535) // window
|
||||
return h
|
||||
}}
|
||||
|
||||
udpDatagram = l4Proto{"udp", iputil.IPProtocolUDP, 6, func() []byte {
|
||||
h := make([]byte, 8+4)
|
||||
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(h[0:2], 49152)
|
||||
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(h[2:4], 53)
|
||||
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(h[4:6], uint16(len(h)))
|
||||
copy(h[8:], "ping")
|
||||
return h
|
||||
}}
|
||||
|
||||
icmpEcho = l4Proto{"icmp", iputil.IPProtocolICMP, 2, func() []byte { return echoRequest(8) }}
|
||||
icmpv6Echo = l4Proto{"icmpv6", iputil.IPProtocolICMPv6, 2, func() []byte { return echoRequest(128) }}
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// echoRequest builds an echo request body. The type differs between ICMP and
|
||||
// ICMPv6, the rest of the header does not.
|
||||
func echoRequest(typ uint8) []byte {
|
||||
h := make([]byte, 8)
|
||||
h[0] = typ
|
||||
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(h[4:6], 0xbeef) // identifier
|
||||
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(h[6:8], 1) // sequence
|
||||
return h
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func buildIPv6(src, dst netip.Addr, p l4Proto) []byte {
|
||||
l4 := p.build()
|
||||
pkt := make([]byte, ipv6HeaderLen+len(l4))
|
||||
pkt[0] = 0x60
|
||||
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(len(l4)))
|
||||
pkt[6] = p.nextHdr
|
||||
pkt[7] = 64
|
||||
copy(pkt[8:24], src.AsSlice())
|
||||
copy(pkt[24:40], dst.AsSlice())
|
||||
copy(pkt[ipv6HeaderLen:], l4)
|
||||
if l4 := pkt[ipv6HeaderLen:]; p.nextHdr == iputil.IPProtocolTCP || p.nextHdr == iputil.IPProtocolUDP {
|
||||
sum := ipv6PseudoheaderSum(src, dst, uint32(p.nextHdr), uint32(len(l4)))
|
||||
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(l4[p.cksumAt:], ^fold(sumBytes(l4, sum)))
|
||||
}
|
||||
return pkt
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func buildIPv4(src, dst netip.Addr, p l4Proto) []byte {
|
||||
l4 := p.build()
|
||||
pkt := make([]byte, ipv4HeaderLen+len(l4))
|
||||
pkt[0] = 0x45
|
||||
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[2:4], uint16(len(pkt)))
|
||||
pkt[8] = 64
|
||||
pkt[9] = p.nextHdr
|
||||
copy(pkt[12:16], src.AsSlice())
|
||||
copy(pkt[16:20], dst.AsSlice())
|
||||
copy(pkt[ipv4HeaderLen:], l4)
|
||||
if l4 := pkt[ipv4HeaderLen:]; p.nextHdr == iputil.IPProtocolTCP || p.nextHdr == iputil.IPProtocolUDP {
|
||||
sum := sumBytes(pkt[12:20], uint32(p.nextHdr)+uint32(len(l4)))
|
||||
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(l4[p.cksumAt:], ^fold(sumBytes(l4, sum)))
|
||||
}
|
||||
return pkt
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ipv6PseudoheaderSum is the RFC 2460 section 8.1 pseudo-header sum: source,
|
||||
// destination, a 32 bit upper-layer packet length and a 32 bit zero-padded next
|
||||
// header. Kept local to the test so these assertions do not check nebula's
|
||||
// checksum code against itself.
|
||||
func ipv6PseudoheaderSum(src, dst netip.Addr, nextHeader, length uint32) uint32 {
|
||||
var csum uint32
|
||||
s, d := src.AsSlice(), dst.AsSlice()
|
||||
for i := 0; i < 16; i += 2 {
|
||||
csum += uint32(s[i])<<8 | uint32(s[i+1])
|
||||
csum += uint32(d[i])<<8 | uint32(d[i+1])
|
||||
}
|
||||
return csum + length + nextHeader
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func sumBytes(b []byte, csum uint32) uint32 {
|
||||
for i := 0; i+1 < len(b); i += 2 {
|
||||
csum += uint32(b[i])<<8 | uint32(b[i+1])
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(b)%2 == 1 {
|
||||
csum += uint32(b[len(b)-1]) << 8
|
||||
}
|
||||
return csum
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func fold(csum uint32) uint16 {
|
||||
for csum > 0xffff {
|
||||
csum = (csum >> 16) + (csum & 0xffff)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return uint16(csum)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// l4ChecksumValid6 verifies an IPv6 upper-layer checksum the way a receiver
|
||||
// does: the pseudo-header plus the whole upper-layer segment, checksum field
|
||||
// included, folds to 0xffff. The next header field is the upper-layer protocol
|
||||
// only while there are no extension headers, which is all this file builds.
|
||||
func l4ChecksumValid6(pkt []byte) bool {
|
||||
src, _ := netip.AddrFromSlice(pkt[8:24])
|
||||
dst, _ := netip.AddrFromSlice(pkt[24:40])
|
||||
l4 := pkt[ipv6HeaderLen:]
|
||||
return fold(sumBytes(l4, ipv6PseudoheaderSum(src, dst, uint32(pkt[6]), uint32(len(l4))))) == 0xffff
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// l4ChecksumValid4 is the IPv4 counterpart: the RFC 793/768 pseudo-header is
|
||||
// source, destination, a zero byte, the protocol and the upper-layer length.
|
||||
func l4ChecksumValid4(pkt []byte) bool {
|
||||
ihl := int(pkt[0]&0x0f) << 2
|
||||
l4 := pkt[ihl:]
|
||||
return fold(sumBytes(l4, sumBytes(pkt[12:20], uint32(pkt[9])+uint32(len(l4))))) == 0xffff
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestConsumeInsidePacketSelfTraffic covers the self-addressed branch of
|
||||
// consumeInsidePacket, taken where immediatelyForwardToSelf is set (see
|
||||
// inside_bsd.go): the packet goes straight back to the tun, ahead of the
|
||||
// firewall and the handshake.
|
||||
func TestConsumeInsidePacketSelfTraffic(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
v4 := netip.MustParseAddr("100.100.1.42")
|
||||
v6 := netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::42")
|
||||
|
||||
tests := []struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
addr netip.Addr
|
||||
pkt []byte
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{"ipv4/tcp", v4, buildIPv4(v4, v4, tcpSyn)},
|
||||
{"ipv4/udp", v4, buildIPv4(v4, v4, udpDatagram)},
|
||||
{"ipv4/icmp", v4, buildIPv4(v4, v4, icmpEcho)},
|
||||
{"ipv6/tcp", v6, buildIPv6(v6, v6, tcpSyn)},
|
||||
{"ipv6/udp", v6, buildIPv6(v6, v6, udpDatagram)},
|
||||
{"ipv6/icmpv6", v6, buildIPv6(v6, v6, icmpv6Echo)},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tt := range tests {
|
||||
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
f, tun := newSelfForwardInterface(tt.addr)
|
||||
// consumeInsidePacket writes through the slice it is handed, so a
|
||||
// packet that arrived with a valid checksum must come back out of
|
||||
// bytes taken before the call, unchanged.
|
||||
want := append([]byte(nil), tt.pkt...)
|
||||
consumeInside(f, tt.pkt)
|
||||
|
||||
if immediatelyForwardToSelf {
|
||||
require.Len(t, tun.writes, 1)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, want, tun.writes[0])
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
assert.Empty(t, tun.writes, "self traffic reaches the tun over loopback here and must be dropped")
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestConsumeInsidePacketSelfTrafficChecksum shows that the self-forward
|
||||
// returns the bytes it was handed, so a packet that arrived with a wrong
|
||||
// upper-layer checksum is written back with that same wrong checksum and the
|
||||
// kernel drops it on re-entry.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This is how a macOS host loses TCP and UDP to its own IPv6 overlay address:
|
||||
// the kernel writes only the pseudo-header sum into the checksum field and
|
||||
// defers completion to hardware offload, state that does not survive the
|
||||
// crossing into userspace. Which kernels do this, for which protocols and IP
|
||||
// versions, is a property of the kernel and belongs to a test against a live
|
||||
// one; here the checksum is simply wrong, and the forward must make it right.
|
||||
func TestConsumeInsidePacketSelfTrafficChecksum(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
if !immediatelyForwardToSelf {
|
||||
t.Skip("self traffic never reaches the tun on this platform")
|
||||
}
|
||||
versions := []struct {
|
||||
name string
|
||||
addr netip.Addr
|
||||
build func(src, dst netip.Addr, p l4Proto) []byte
|
||||
l4At int
|
||||
valid func(pkt []byte) bool
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{"v4", netip.MustParseAddr("100.100.1.42"), buildIPv4, ipv4HeaderLen, l4ChecksumValid4},
|
||||
{"v6", netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::42"), buildIPv6, ipv6HeaderLen, l4ChecksumValid6},
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, v := range versions {
|
||||
for _, p := range []l4Proto{tcpSyn, udpDatagram} {
|
||||
t.Run(v.name+"/"+p.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
pkt := v.build(v.addr, v.addr, p)
|
||||
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[v.l4At+p.cksumAt:], 0x1234)
|
||||
require.False(t, v.valid(pkt), "the packet under test must start with a wrong checksum")
|
||||
f, tun := newSelfForwardInterface(v.addr)
|
||||
consumeInside(f, pkt)
|
||||
require.Len(t, tun.writes, 1)
|
||||
assert.True(t, v.valid(tun.writes[0]),
|
||||
"a forwarded %s packet must carry a valid checksum, got 0x%04x",
|
||||
p.name, binary.BigEndian.Uint16(tun.writes[0][v.l4At+p.cksumAt:]))
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+224
-78
@@ -2,11 +2,12 @@ package nebula
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"crypto/fips140"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"runtime"
|
||||
"slices"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"sync/atomic"
|
||||
@@ -14,12 +15,16 @@ import (
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
|
||||
"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/batch"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/ratelimit"
|
||||
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -49,7 +54,19 @@ type InterfaceConfig struct {
|
||||
reQueryWait time.Duration
|
||||
|
||||
ConntrackCacheTimeout time.Duration
|
||||
l *slog.Logger
|
||||
|
||||
// CpuAffinity, when non-empty, names the CPUs each TUN reader goroutine
|
||||
// should pin to. Queue i pins to CpuAffinity[i % len(CpuAffinity)] —
|
||||
// shorter lists than `routines` cycle. Empty list keeps the default
|
||||
// pin-to-(i % NumCPU) behavior. Only consulted when PinThreads is true.
|
||||
CpuAffinity []int
|
||||
// PinThreads controls whether each TUN reader OS thread is pinned to a
|
||||
// single CPU (via tun.pin_threads, default true). Pinning keeps each
|
||||
// goroutine's sendmmsg on one XPS-selected NIC TX ring so per-flow
|
||||
// packets stay ordered on the wire.
|
||||
PinThreads bool
|
||||
|
||||
l *slog.Logger
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type Interface struct {
|
||||
@@ -73,7 +90,16 @@ type Interface struct {
|
||||
routines int
|
||||
disconnectInvalid atomic.Bool
|
||||
closed atomic.Bool
|
||||
relayManager *relayManager
|
||||
// cpuAffinity, when non-empty, names the CPUs each TUN reader goroutine
|
||||
// should pin to. Queue i pins to cpuAffinity[i % len(cpuAffinity)].
|
||||
// Empty falls back to the default pin-to-(allowed CPU) behavior.
|
||||
// Only consulted when pinThreads is true.
|
||||
cpuAffinity []int
|
||||
// pinThreads controls whether listenIn pins each TUN reader OS thread to
|
||||
// a CPU at all (tun.pin_threads, default true). When false, threads are
|
||||
// left free to migrate as on stock nebula.
|
||||
pinThreads bool
|
||||
relayManager *relayManager
|
||||
|
||||
tryPromoteEvery atomic.Uint32
|
||||
reQueryEvery atomic.Uint32
|
||||
@@ -82,16 +108,26 @@ type Interface struct {
|
||||
sendRecvErrorConfig recvErrorConfig
|
||||
acceptRecvErrorConfig recvErrorConfig
|
||||
|
||||
// rebindCount is used to decide if an active tunnel should trigger a punch notification through a lighthouse
|
||||
rebindCount int8
|
||||
// Bumped on every udp rebind, tunnels compare it to decide they need a punch from the far side
|
||||
rebindEpoch atomic.Uint32
|
||||
version string
|
||||
|
||||
conntrackCacheTimeout time.Duration
|
||||
|
||||
ctx context.Context
|
||||
writers []udp.Conn
|
||||
readers []io.ReadWriteCloser
|
||||
wg sync.WaitGroup
|
||||
queues []tio.Queue
|
||||
// batchers is one per tun queue, wrapping queues[i]. readOutsidePackets
|
||||
// commits plaintext into the batcher; the plaintext is decrypted
|
||||
// in place inside the UDP receive buffers, so listenOut must call Flush
|
||||
// at the end of each UDP recvmmsg batch, before those buffers are
|
||||
// reused (every udp.Conn ListenOut guarantees that ordering).
|
||||
batchers []*batch.MultiCoalescer
|
||||
wg sync.WaitGroup
|
||||
|
||||
udpTxErrLimiter *ratelimit.Limiter // udp direct transmit error log limiter
|
||||
udpRelayTxErrLimiter *ratelimit.Limiter // udp relay transmit error log limiter
|
||||
txOversizeLimiter *ratelimit.Limiter // oversized outbound packet drop log limiter
|
||||
|
||||
// fatalErr holds the first unexpected reader error that caused shutdown.
|
||||
// nil means "no fatal error" (yet)
|
||||
@@ -102,18 +138,13 @@ type Interface struct {
|
||||
metricHandshakes metrics.Histogram
|
||||
messageMetrics *MessageMetrics
|
||||
cachedPacketMetrics *cachedPacketMetrics
|
||||
metricTxDropped metrics.Counter
|
||||
|
||||
l *slog.Logger
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type EncWriter interface {
|
||||
SendVia(via *HostInfo,
|
||||
relay *Relay,
|
||||
ad,
|
||||
nb,
|
||||
out []byte,
|
||||
nocopy bool,
|
||||
)
|
||||
SendVia(via *HostInfo, relay *Relay, ad, nb, out []byte, nocopy bool, q int)
|
||||
SendMessageToVpnAddr(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, vpnAddr netip.Addr, p, nb, out []byte)
|
||||
SendMessageToHostInfo(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, hostinfo *HostInfo, p, nb, out []byte)
|
||||
Handshake(vpnAddr netip.Addr)
|
||||
@@ -172,6 +203,23 @@ func NewInterface(ctx context.Context, c *InterfaceConfig) (*Interface, error) {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("no connection manager")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
udpTxErrLimiter, err := ratelimit.New(1, time.Second)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
udpRelayTxErrLimiter, err := ratelimit.New(1, time.Second)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
txOversizeLimiter, err := ratelimit.New(1, time.Second)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if c.routines <= 1 {
|
||||
c.PinThreads = false //pinning is not useful unless there's more than one tun reader
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cs := c.pki.getCertState()
|
||||
ifce := &Interface{
|
||||
ctx: ctx,
|
||||
@@ -189,7 +237,7 @@ func NewInterface(ctx context.Context, c *InterfaceConfig) (*Interface, error) {
|
||||
routines: c.routines,
|
||||
version: c.version,
|
||||
writers: make([]udp.Conn, c.routines),
|
||||
readers: make([]io.ReadWriteCloser, c.routines),
|
||||
batchers: make([]*batch.MultiCoalescer, c.routines),
|
||||
myVpnNetworks: cs.myVpnNetworks,
|
||||
myVpnNetworksTable: cs.myVpnNetworksTable,
|
||||
myVpnAddrs: cs.myVpnAddrs,
|
||||
@@ -198,8 +246,14 @@ func NewInterface(ctx context.Context, c *InterfaceConfig) (*Interface, error) {
|
||||
relayManager: c.relayManager,
|
||||
connectionManager: c.connectionManager,
|
||||
conntrackCacheTimeout: c.ConntrackCacheTimeout,
|
||||
cpuAffinity: c.CpuAffinity,
|
||||
pinThreads: c.PinThreads,
|
||||
udpTxErrLimiter: udpTxErrLimiter,
|
||||
udpRelayTxErrLimiter: udpRelayTxErrLimiter,
|
||||
txOversizeLimiter: txOversizeLimiter,
|
||||
|
||||
metricHandshakes: metrics.GetOrRegisterHistogram("handshakes", nil, metrics.NewExpDecaySample(1028, 0.015)),
|
||||
metricTxDropped: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("udp.tx.dropped", nil),
|
||||
messageMetrics: c.MessageMetrics,
|
||||
cachedPacketMetrics: &cachedPacketMetrics{
|
||||
sent: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("hostinfo.cached_packets.sent", nil),
|
||||
@@ -215,6 +269,9 @@ func NewInterface(ctx context.Context, c *InterfaceConfig) (*Interface, error) {
|
||||
|
||||
ifce.connectionManager.intf = ifce
|
||||
|
||||
// Held until Close so waiting on the interface blocks until the resources are actually released
|
||||
ifce.wg.Add(1)
|
||||
|
||||
return ifce, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -235,40 +292,53 @@ func (f *Interface) activate() error {
|
||||
"build", f.version,
|
||||
"udpAddr", addr,
|
||||
"boringcrypto", boringEnabled(),
|
||||
"fips140Version", fips140.Version(),
|
||||
"fips140Enabled", fips140.Enabled(),
|
||||
"fips140Enforced", fips140.Enforced(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if f.routines > 1 {
|
||||
if !f.inside.SupportsMultiqueue() || !f.outside.SupportsMultipleReaders() {
|
||||
f.routines = 1
|
||||
f.l.Warn("routines is not supported on this platform, falling back to a single routine")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if f.routines > 1 && !f.outside.SupportsMultipleReaders() {
|
||||
f.routines = 1
|
||||
f.l.Warn("multiple udp readers are not supported on this platform, falling back to a single routine")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Prepare the tun queues. A device that can't open that many hands back
|
||||
// fewer (a single queue on platforms without multiqueue support) and we
|
||||
// size the reader routines to what we actually got.
|
||||
queues, err := f.inside.Queues(f.routines)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(queues) < f.routines {
|
||||
// TODO: this clamp is only safe because it is unreachable when the
|
||||
// udp side has multiple readers (linux Queues opens exactly n or
|
||||
// errors; every other platform already clamped routines to 1 above).
|
||||
// If a platform ever returns fewer queues than routines with
|
||||
// SO_REUSEPORT sockets already bound, the surplus sockets get no
|
||||
// listenOut and the kernel blackholes every flow it hashes to them —
|
||||
// fail loudly or close the extra sockets instead.
|
||||
f.l.Warn("tun multiqueue is not supported on this platform, falling back to fewer routines",
|
||||
"requested", f.routines, "opened", len(queues))
|
||||
f.routines = len(queues)
|
||||
}
|
||||
f.queues = queues
|
||||
|
||||
metrics.GetOrRegisterGauge("routines", nil).Update(int64(f.routines))
|
||||
|
||||
// Prepare n tun queues
|
||||
var reader io.ReadWriteCloser = f.inside
|
||||
for i := 0; i < f.routines; i++ {
|
||||
if i > 0 {
|
||||
reader, err = f.inside.NewMultiQueueReader()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
f.readers[i] = reader
|
||||
for i := range f.queues {
|
||||
f.batchers[i] = batch.NewMultiCoalescer(f.queues[i], f.l)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
f.wg.Add(1) // for us to wait on Close() to return
|
||||
// On error the caller owns the cleanup, Control.Start cancels the service context
|
||||
// before releasing our resources so a waiter never observes a live context
|
||||
if err = f.inside.Activate(); err != nil {
|
||||
f.wg.Done()
|
||||
f.inside.Close()
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *Interface) run() (func() error, error) {
|
||||
func (f *Interface) run() {
|
||||
// Launch n queues to read packets from udp
|
||||
for i := 0; i < f.routines; i++ {
|
||||
f.wg.Go(func() {
|
||||
@@ -279,17 +349,18 @@ func (f *Interface) run() (func() error, error) {
|
||||
// Launch n queues to read packets from tun dev
|
||||
for i := 0; i < f.routines; i++ {
|
||||
f.wg.Go(func() {
|
||||
f.listenIn(f.readers[i], i)
|
||||
f.listenIn(f.queues[i], i)
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return func() error {
|
||||
f.wg.Wait()
|
||||
if e := f.fatalErr.Load(); e != nil {
|
||||
return *e
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *Interface) wait() error {
|
||||
f.wg.Wait()
|
||||
if e := f.fatalErr.Load(); e != nil {
|
||||
return *e
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// onFatal stores the first fatal reader error, and calls triggerShutdown if it was the first one
|
||||
@@ -303,6 +374,31 @@ func (f *Interface) onFatal(err error) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type rxContext struct {
|
||||
q int
|
||||
scratch []byte
|
||||
// nb is a re-usable nonce buffer for decrypt calls to use
|
||||
nb []byte
|
||||
h *header.H
|
||||
fwPacket *firewall.ParsedPacket
|
||||
hostmapCache map[uint32]*HostInfo
|
||||
lhh *LightHouseHandler
|
||||
ctCache *firewall.ConntrackCacheTicker
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func newRxContext(f *Interface, q int) *rxContext {
|
||||
return &rxContext{
|
||||
q: q,
|
||||
scratch: make([]byte, mtu),
|
||||
nb: make([]byte, 12, 12),
|
||||
h: &header.H{},
|
||||
fwPacket: &firewall.ParsedPacket{},
|
||||
hostmapCache: map[uint32]*HostInfo{},
|
||||
lhh: f.lightHouse.NewRequestHandler(),
|
||||
ctCache: firewall.NewConntrackCacheTicker(f.ctx, f.l, f.conntrackCacheTimeout),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *Interface) listenOut(i int) {
|
||||
var li udp.Conn
|
||||
if i > 0 {
|
||||
@@ -311,18 +407,25 @@ func (f *Interface) listenOut(i int) {
|
||||
li = f.outside
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ctCache := firewall.NewConntrackCacheTicker(f.ctx, f.l, f.conntrackCacheTimeout)
|
||||
lhh := f.lightHouse.NewRequestHandler()
|
||||
plaintext := make([]byte, udp.MTU)
|
||||
h := &header.H{}
|
||||
fwPacket := &firewall.Packet{}
|
||||
nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
|
||||
rxc := newRxContext(f, i)
|
||||
|
||||
err := li.ListenOut(func(fromUdpAddr netip.AddrPort, payload []byte) {
|
||||
f.readOutsidePackets(ViaSender{UdpAddr: fromUdpAddr}, plaintext[:0], payload, h, fwPacket, lhh, nb, i, ctCache.Get())
|
||||
})
|
||||
listener := func(fromUdpAddr netip.AddrPort, payload []byte) {
|
||||
f.readOutsidePackets(ViaSender{UdpAddr: fromUdpAddr}, payload, rxc)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if err != nil && !f.closed.Load() {
|
||||
flusher := func() {
|
||||
if err := f.batchers[i].Flush(); err != nil {
|
||||
f.l.Error("Failed to flush tun coalescer", "error", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
clear(rxc.hostmapCache)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
err := li.ListenOut(listener, flusher)
|
||||
|
||||
// An error after teardown began is shutdown noise, the closed flag covers resources
|
||||
// Close releases itself and the cancelled ctx covers ones torn down by their owners
|
||||
// reacting to it, like the user device pipes
|
||||
if err != nil && !f.closed.Load() && f.ctx.Err() == nil {
|
||||
f.l.Error("Error while reading inbound packet, closing", "error", err)
|
||||
f.onFatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -330,30 +433,80 @@ func (f *Interface) listenOut(i int) {
|
||||
f.l.Debug("underlay reader is done", "reader", i)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *Interface) listenIn(reader io.ReadWriteCloser, i int) {
|
||||
packet := make([]byte, mtu)
|
||||
out := make([]byte, mtu)
|
||||
fwPacket := &firewall.Packet{}
|
||||
func (f *Interface) pinThisThread(i int) {
|
||||
var cpu int
|
||||
if n := len(f.cpuAffinity); n > 0 {
|
||||
// Explicit tun.cpu_affinity list wins; parseCpuAffinity already
|
||||
// validated the entries against the allowed CPU set.
|
||||
cpu = f.cpuAffinity[i%n]
|
||||
} else if allowed, err := util.AllowedCPUs(); err == nil && len(allowed) > 0 {
|
||||
// Default: spread queues across the CPUs we're actually allowed to
|
||||
// run on. Under a cpuset/taskset mask these aren't 0..NumCPU-1, so
|
||||
// i % NumCPU would pick unrunnable IDs and every pin would fail.
|
||||
cpu = allowed[i%len(allowed)]
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
cpu = i % runtime.NumCPU()
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := util.PinThreadToCPU(cpu); err != nil {
|
||||
f.l.Warn("failed to pin tun reader to CPU", "queue", i, "cpu", cpu, "err", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *Interface) listenIn(queue tio.Queue, i int) {
|
||||
// Pinning this thread (and goroutine) to a single CPU keeps every sendmmsg from this goroutine going through the
|
||||
// same TX ring on the nic, so the wire sees per-flow order. Skip entirely when tun.pin_threads is false.
|
||||
if f.pinThreads {
|
||||
f.pinThisThread(i)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rejectBuf := make([]byte, mtu)
|
||||
arenaSize := batch.SendBatchCap * (udp.MTU + 32)
|
||||
sb := batch.NewSendBatch(f.writers[i], batch.SendBatchCap, arenaSize)
|
||||
fwPacket := &firewall.ParsedPacket{}
|
||||
nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
|
||||
|
||||
conntrackCache := firewall.NewConntrackCacheTicker(f.ctx, f.l, f.conntrackCacheTimeout)
|
||||
|
||||
for {
|
||||
n, err := reader.Read(packet)
|
||||
pkts, err := queue.Read()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
if !f.closed.Load() {
|
||||
// Same shutdown noise handling as listenOut
|
||||
if !f.closed.Load() && f.ctx.Err() == nil {
|
||||
f.l.Error("Error while reading outbound packet, closing", "error", err, "reader", i)
|
||||
f.onFatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
f.consumeInsidePacket(packet[:n], fwPacket, nb, out, i, conntrackCache.Get())
|
||||
for _, pkt := range pkts {
|
||||
f.consumeInsidePacket(pkt, fwPacket, nb, sb, rejectBuf, i, conntrackCache.Get())
|
||||
// Flush incrementally once a full sendmmsg batch has
|
||||
// accumulated so the first packets of a deep read drain
|
||||
// hit the wire while the rest are still being encrypted.
|
||||
if sb.Len() >= batch.SendBatchCap {
|
||||
f.flushSendBatch(sb, i)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
f.flushSendBatch(sb, i)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
f.l.Debug("overlay reader is done", "reader", i)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// flushSendBatch drains sb to the underlay and accounts for anything it could not deliver. A shortfall means
|
||||
// specific destinations were undeliverable (a stale remote, a reject rule), which the backend logs per peer at
|
||||
// debug; here it is only a counter, so one unreachable peer cannot spam a log line per batch.
|
||||
func (f *Interface) flushSendBatch(sb *batch.SendBatch, q int) {
|
||||
queued := sb.Len()
|
||||
written, err := sb.Flush()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
f.l.Error("Failed to write outgoing batch", "error", err, "writer", q)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if dropped := queued - written; dropped > 0 {
|
||||
f.metricTxDropped.Inc(int64(dropped))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *Interface) RegisterConfigChangeCallbacks(c *config.C) {
|
||||
c.RegisterReloadCallback(f.reloadFirewall)
|
||||
c.RegisterReloadCallback(f.reloadSendRecvError)
|
||||
@@ -492,17 +645,15 @@ func (f *Interface) reloadMisc(c *config.C) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *Interface) emitStats(ctx context.Context, i time.Duration) {
|
||||
ticker := time.NewTicker(i)
|
||||
defer ticker.Stop()
|
||||
|
||||
// statsEmitter updates the interface's gauges, the stats server runs it on its capture loop.
|
||||
func (f *Interface) statsEmitter() func() {
|
||||
udpStats := udp.NewUDPStatsEmitter(f.writers)
|
||||
|
||||
certExpirationGauge := metrics.GetOrRegisterGauge("certificate.ttl_seconds", nil)
|
||||
certInitiatingVersion := metrics.GetOrRegisterGauge("certificate.initiating_version", nil)
|
||||
certMaxVersion := metrics.GetOrRegisterGauge("certificate.max_version", nil)
|
||||
|
||||
emit := func() {
|
||||
return func() {
|
||||
f.firewall.EmitStats()
|
||||
f.handshakeManager.EmitStats()
|
||||
udpStats()
|
||||
@@ -519,19 +670,6 @@ func (f *Interface) emitStats(ctx context.Context, i time.Duration) {
|
||||
certMaxVersion.Update(int64(certState.v1Cert.Version()))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Prime gauges so a Prometheus scrape that lands before the first tick
|
||||
// sees real values instead of the zero defaults (issue #907).
|
||||
emit()
|
||||
|
||||
for {
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case <-ctx.Done():
|
||||
return
|
||||
case <-ticker.C:
|
||||
emit()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *Interface) GetHostInfo(vpnIp netip.Addr) *HostInfo {
|
||||
@@ -542,9 +680,15 @@ func (f *Interface) GetCertState() *CertState {
|
||||
return f.pki.getCertState()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Close releases the interface's resources: the udp sockets and the tun device.
|
||||
// It is idempotent and safe to call at any point in the lifecycle, including on an interface that never activated,
|
||||
// calls after the first return nil without doing anything.
|
||||
func (f *Interface) Close() error {
|
||||
if !f.closed.CompareAndSwap(false, true) {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var errs []error
|
||||
f.closed.Store(true)
|
||||
|
||||
// Release the udp readers
|
||||
for i, u := range f.writers {
|
||||
@@ -560,6 +704,8 @@ func (f *Interface) Close() error {
|
||||
if closeErr != nil {
|
||||
errs = append(errs, closeErr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Release the construction token so waiters know the resources are gone
|
||||
f.wg.Done()
|
||||
return errors.Join(errs...)
|
||||
}
|
||||
+5
-14
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
|
||||
package nebula
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
@@ -18,11 +17,8 @@ import (
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Test_emitStats_primesGauges covers issue #907: a Prometheus scrape that
|
||||
// landed before the first ticker fire used to read 0 for the cert gauges.
|
||||
// emitStats now primes the gauges before entering the ticker loop. We assert
|
||||
// the gauge is zero before the first call and non-zero after.
|
||||
func Test_emitStats_primesGauges(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// Priming before the first tick (issue #907) is Start's job, see TestStatsServer_Start_primes.
|
||||
func Test_statsEmitter_setsGauges(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
defer metrics.DefaultRegistry.UnregisterAll()
|
||||
|
||||
l := test.NewLogger()
|
||||
@@ -56,17 +52,12 @@ func Test_emitStats_primesGauges(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
ifce.pki.cs.Store(cs)
|
||||
|
||||
ttlGauge := metrics.GetOrRegisterGauge("certificate.ttl_seconds", nil)
|
||||
require.Zero(t, ttlGauge.Value(), "gauge should be zero before emitStats runs")
|
||||
require.Zero(t, ttlGauge.Value(), "gauge should be zero before the emitter runs")
|
||||
|
||||
// Pre-cancel the context so emitStats returns after priming the gauges
|
||||
// without ever reading from ticker.C. The one hour interval is just a
|
||||
// belt-and-suspenders, the test does not expect the ticker to fire.
|
||||
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
|
||||
cancel()
|
||||
ifce.emitStats(ctx, time.Hour)
|
||||
ifce.statsEmitter()()
|
||||
|
||||
ttl := ttlGauge.Value()
|
||||
assert.Positive(t, ttl, "ttl gauge should be primed by emitStats before its first tick")
|
||||
assert.Positive(t, ttl, "ttl gauge should be set by one run of the emitter")
|
||||
assert.LessOrEqual(t, ttl, int64(3600))
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, int64(cert.Version1), metrics.GetOrRegisterGauge("certificate.initiating_version", nil).Value())
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, int64(cert.Version1), metrics.GetOrRegisterGauge("certificate.max_version", nil).Value())
|
||||
|
||||
Loaded 100 of 239 files, more files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff.
Show more
Reference in new issue
Block a user