Compare commits

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Author SHA1 Message Date
JackDoan eff67f1159 Size the buffer of a hybrid confirmation for an empty reply, not the mtu 2026-10-15 10:43:27 -05:00
JackDoan a3dc54b012 Keep a hybrid responder's reassembled msg1 rather than a copy of it 2026-10-15 10:43:17 -05:00
JackDoan e8d6cd9b58 Size the buffers of a handshake packet sent through a relay for the packet, not the mtu 2026-10-15 10:43:07 -05:00
JackDoan d190ac7446 handshake/fragment: Back every packet of an attempt with one allocation 2026-10-15 10:42:58 -05:00
JackDoan 05410034e3 handshake/fec: Encode a message from its own bytes, copying only a padded last symbol 2026-10-15 10:42:48 -05:00
JackDoan cbcf441d7c Decode a fragmented handshake message straight into its packet, behind room for the Nebula header, instead of copying it there 2026-10-15 10:42:39 -05:00
JackDoan 4b295e086e handshake: Take the peer's static key from noise once per certificate check 2026-10-15 10:42:29 -05:00
JackDoan 35b3d92bdd handshake: Let a payload's certificate alias the decrypted message rather than copying it 2026-10-15 10:42:20 -05:00
JackDoan 7c2dcd7ba1 handshake: Marshal a payload in one pass, straight into out 2026-10-15 10:42:10 -05:00
JackDoan 4d42378537 handshake: Keep the ephemeral ML-KEM-1024 key a handshake generates expanded, instead of expanding it again from its seed for msg2 2026-10-15 10:42:01 -05:00
JackDoan cb9ab9c516 handshake: Keep the static ML-KEM-1024 key expanded in the Credential, instead of expanding it from its seed in every handshake 2026-10-15 10:41:51 -05:00
JackDoan 6c6bf5e486 cert: Check an ML-KEM-1024 public key with the FIPS 203 modulus check alone, without expanding it 2026-10-15 10:41:41 -05:00
JackDoan d102107f2e e2e: A hybrid tunnel whose msg2 completed by the relay promotes to direct 2026-10-15 10:30:01 -05:00
JackDoan b92806d199 Record accepting per-path msg2 resends to replayed msg1s 2026-10-15 10:26:37 -05:00
JackDoan 437d47ffc5 Send by the relay when hybrid msg3 came by one, the direct address learned from msg1 may only work toward us 2026-10-14 15:41:03 -05:00
JackDoan bd82089a3f Clock cached msg2 resends per path in the fragment table, so a copy of msg1 arriving by a relay or a second address is answered even when the direct path only works one way 2026-10-14 15:17:24 -05:00
JackDoan 1d0281cba5 Document post-quantum handshakes as hybrid only, and the crossing window 2026-10-14 14:59:32 -05:00
JackDoan dff5c51dd6 Make post-quantum handshakes hybrid only: drop ix_psk2_mlkem1024, need a v3 certificate, and leave a classical msg1 crossing a hybrid one unanswered 2026-10-14 14:58:29 -05:00
JackDoan 656164b259 cert: Name the post-quantum algorithms of a version 3 certificate with a PQSuite, like its curve, and pick the hybrid subtype by the suite's KEM 2026-10-14 14:40:52 -05:00
JackDoan 84e28c62ea Reassemble msg2 in a slot per responder FragID, so two hosts answering one msg1 do not wipe each other out 2026-10-14 14:35:45 -05:00
JackDoan 6885bac85d Record the hybrid field test and the crossing-attempt race in open items 2026-10-14 14:22:07 -05:00
JackDoan 5c5d6e3314 Fold the 2026-10-14 crypto review into the spec: deterministic signing, which fingerprint to block, the skem oracle, the psk2 static key, pending responders, the sticky default and the fork's rollback gap 2026-10-14 14:00:43 -05:00
JackDoan 0aa15ef247 nebula-cert: Lead print output for a version 3 certificate with both fingerprints, and say the v2 one blocks both forms 2026-10-14 14:00:43 -05:00
JackDoan 2ecf2f738e cert: Sign version 3 certificates with deterministic ML-DSA-87, so extending a certificate twice gives the same certificate 2026-10-14 14:00:43 -05:00
JackDoan 1bf0bf382c Send hybrid msg3 without a repair delay, so the packets cached behind it do not reach the responder before it completes 2026-10-14 13:21:14 -05:00
JackDoan 19578b3b6b Document remembering answered msg1s and crossing attempts 2026-10-14 12:56:22 -05:00
JackDoan 5edcaefa33 e2e: Back to back hybrid handshakes, and a classical attempt crossing a hybrid one 2026-10-14 12:56:12 -05:00
JackDoan bbade4dc9a Take a hybrid tunnel on msg3 even over a newer one, the initiator has committed to it 2026-10-14 12:56:12 -05:00
JackDoan cbf8146bda udp: Buffer a fragmented handshake burst in the tester, so crossing bursts cannot deadlock the e2e router 2026-10-14 12:56:12 -05:00
JackDoan 3b850c6ecf handshake/fragment: Remember answered messages, so repair fragments trailing a completed msg1 do not eat the source quota 2026-10-14 12:56:12 -05:00
JackDoan a508a4e22c Update post-quantum open items 2026-10-14 12:37:30 -05:00
JackDoan e7b2abb0b2 e2e: msg2 is 9 data fragments now 2026-10-14 12:31:59 -05:00
JackDoan 5cc53c22db Document the classical-only responder e in hybrid IX, msg2 is now 9 fragments 2026-10-14 12:27:56 -05:00
JackDoan 70e7d3f2ea Hold a pending hybrid responder locked until it is filled in 2026-10-14 11:09:18 -05:00
JackDoan 4ce04760ae Document version 3 certificates and hybrid handshakes 2026-10-14 11:08:51 -05:00
JackDoan 1e6a95df15 Test loading v3 certificates and composite keys from config 2026-10-14 11:07:01 -05:00
JackDoan 4d37a3140f nebula-cert: Make version 3 CAs, keys and certificates, and pq-extend v2 certificates in place 2026-10-14 11:06:40 -05:00
JackDoan b26c1e9c3e Run hybrid handshakes: v3 holders initiate them, responders wait for msg3, initiators resend it until confirmed 2026-10-14 11:03:04 -05:00
JackDoan 5c5254dc18 Load v3 certificates and composite keys, speak v2 messages over v3 tunnels, and match ca_sha on either CA fingerprint 2026-10-14 11:03:04 -05:00
JackDoan ab89556c5c handshake: Add ix_hybrid_mlkem1024, DefinedNet/noise hybrid IX with ML-KEM-1024 over version 3 certificates 2026-10-14 10:50:33 -05:00
JackDoan 1a8fb8d67e cert: Add version 3 certificates, a v2 certificate extended with ML-KEM-1024 or ML-DSA-87 keys and an ML-DSA-87 CA signature 2026-10-14 10:47:41 -05:00
JackDoan 73ddb56c34 Build with Go 1.27 and DefinedNet/noise, for crypto/mldsa and hybrid Noise patterns 2026-10-14 10:41:11 -05:00
JackDoan 13658b74a0 Add handshakes.pq.require, and give new paths and responsive peers the PQ attempt 2026-10-14 10:18:00 -05:00
JackDoan 22cdb0739a Demand cookies for post-quantum msg1s while under load, and reload handshakes.pq settings 2026-10-13 22:50:28 -05:00
JackDoan 45e449a591 handshake/fragment: Carry an optional cookie, with room for it reserved in every fragment 2026-10-13 22:50:28 -05:00
JackDoan a36ce25af4 Speak post-quantum handshakes over fragments, alternating with classical until one answers 2026-10-13 22:42:07 -05:00
JackDoan 2e5adfddc6 handshake: Add ix_psk2_mlkem1024, IX with an ephemeral ML-KEM-1024 exchange in the psk2 slot 2026-10-13 22:42:06 -05:00
JackDoan 31f3d6435e handshake/fragment: Carry oversized handshake messages as FEC coded fragments 2026-10-13 22:42:06 -05:00
JackDoan 8f9a631f6e handshake/fec: Systematic Cauchy Reed-Solomon erasure code over GF(2^8) 2026-10-13 22:42:06 -05:00
Ryan Huber 8a2de9b1b5 examples: set socket buffers and raise tun tx_queue (#1928)
* examples: set socket buffers and raise tun tx_queue

* examples: use the default tcp max window for socket buffers

* examples: note buffers are linux only, clarify tx_queue default

* tun: default tx_queue to 5000
2026-10-11 00:30:07 -04:00
Nate Brown a8c52f5c13 overlay: Handle routes Windows already has, and parse quoted route numbers (#1924) 2026-10-08 18:52:53 -05:00
Jack Doan 13af8dd6f3 Cap configured MTUs at 8937 so relayed sends never outgrow their buffers (#1899) 2026-10-08 15:41:08 -05:00
Nate Brown 5bb0622192 stats: Follow stats.interval on reload, interface gauges ride the capture loop (#1919) 2026-10-08 10:00:48 -05:00
Nate Brown f3705cbb67 graphite: Time out a send, and abandon it on stop (#1920) 2026-10-07 18:01:09 -05:00
Nate Brown 94be454f4f lighthouse: Recompute relays for me when relay.am_relay changes (#1917) 2026-10-07 14:06:27 -05:00
Nate Brown 5f26c1a7e5 Add a simple rate limiter with a helper to use it in logging (#1915) 2026-10-07 10:53:37 -05:00
Nate Brown d47c8c71f1 lighthouse: Send an update when the relays we advertise change on reload (#1916) 2026-10-07 10:52:42 -05:00
Nate Brown f57539a163 overlay/linux: Keep unsafe routes when a reload only changes tun.mtu (#1918) 2026-10-07 10:43:11 -05:00
John Maguire 8d8ae0f744 Disable DNS registration on the Windows tunnel adapter (#1914)
On a domain-joined Windows host the DNS Client registers every adapter's
addresses under the host name in AD DNS when "Register this connection's
addresses in DNS" is on, which is the default for a new adapter. When the
Nebula adapter registers, LAN clients that are not on the overlay resolve
the host name to its overlay IP and RDP, SMB and PowerShell Remoting to it
fail intermittently, with nothing pointing at the tunnel as the cause.
Windows registers on address assignment, periodically, and on every
ipconfig /registerdns.

Right after the wintun adapter is created and before Activate assigns any
address, write RegistrationEnabled=0, DisableDynamicUpdate=1 and
MaxNumberOfAddressesToRegister=0 under both the Tcpip and Tcpip6
Parameters\Interfaces\{GUID} keys. The adapter checkbox alone has proven
insufficient in practice, as has disabling dynamic updates alone, so all
three are set, matching what Tailscale and NetBird do. A failure to write
the keys is logged as a warning and does not fail adapter creation.
2026-10-07 11:42:08 -04:00
Matt Richardson f9b0853476 Attach a pending handshake's RemoteList when the handshake starts (#1909)
StartHandshake returned a hostinfo with no RemoteList; handleOutbound attached
one lazily on its first tick. Anything that touched the pending host before
then, notably create-tunnel -address, dereferenced nil and took the daemon
down. StartHandshake now attaches the lighthouse's list as it builds the
hostinfo. To keep the surrounding locking sound, a lighthouse now resolves a
punch target before taking the querier's RemoteList lock, and closeTunnel
deletes the host and evicts its RemoteList under a single hostmap write lock so
a completing handshake cannot land in between. The lock order, now documented
on the handshake manager mutex, is hostmap, then handshake manager, then
lighthouse, then RemoteList; no RemoteList lock is ever held across a hostmap
lookup.
2026-10-07 11:22:50 -04:00
Nate Brown d5062dacf0 lighthouse: Never block in QueryServer, drop queries when the channel is full (#1910) 2026-09-30 15:26:34 -05:00
Jack Doan 7cfa47d569 tweaks to error handling in iputil.IPv6FindUpperProtocol (#1893) 2026-09-22 15:45:01 -05:00
Caleb JasikandNate Brown e20569ce51 Let the darwin tun adopt an fd the host already configured (#1890)
newTunFromFd was a stub on darwin, so an embedder handed a utun by the OS had
no way to use it. A darwin network extension is given exactly that:
NEPacketTunnelProvider creates the device and applies addressing, mtu and
routes from its network settings, and a sandboxed extension cannot change them
afterwards. Adopting that fd means everything about moving packets is shared
with newTun and only the setup differs, so the tun tracks whether the host owns
it and leaves the system routing table and interface config alone when it does.

Co-authored-by: Nate Brown <nbrown.us@gmail.com>
2026-09-22 11:54:30 -05:00
Caleb JasikandNate Brown 9651ffdb0d Cancel the context when Main hands back no Control (#1889)
The goroutines Main starts stop only when its context does, and only a caller
holding the Control can arrange that. Cancelling solely on error left a config
test, which returns no Control and no error, with the lighthouse query worker
and a hostname resolver per dns named static host running for the life of the
process. Every embedder that validates a config in process rather than by
exec'ing pays for that on each config load, dnclient and the apple clients
included.

Co-authored-by: Nate Brown <nbrown.us@gmail.com>
2026-09-22 11:52:28 -05:00
Jack Doan 3a45c01656 Advertise underlay addresses on Android (#1881) 2026-09-21 14:59:56 -05:00
Jack Doan 019cc46a7f smoke: Prove windows honors NlMtu with a 9000 byte ping (#1873) 2026-09-21 12:59:31 -05:00
Nate Brown cf3f315cd3 IPv6FindUpperProtocol: fail closed when the extension header walk runs out of budget (#1883) 2026-09-21 12:09:51 -05:00
Wade Simmons 3fc627e08d Add script to backport a merged PR to a release branch (#1851)
* Add script to backport a merged PR to a release branch

.github/backport.sh cherry-picks a merged PR's commit onto a release
branch and opens a backport PR mirroring the shape of #1842.

- Infers the target release from the PR's milestone (v1.12.0 -> release-1.11);
  an explicit target-version argument overrides it.
- Requires a clean working tree (untracked files allowed) before starting.
- Prompts with the exact push and gh pr create commands before running them.
- Sets the new PR's milestone to the highest open v<target>.* milestone.
- Removes the needs-backport label from the original PR once the backport opens.
- Supports --continue to resume after resolving cherry-pick conflicts.

* cleanup

* just fetch all of origin

We need to ensure we have MERGE_SHA available too
2026-09-14 16:14:43 -04:00
dependabot[bot] abff1a4555 Bump Vampire/setup-wsl from 3 to 7 (#1720)
Bumps [Vampire/setup-wsl](https://github.com/vampire/setup-wsl) from 3 to 7.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vampire/setup-wsl/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vampire/setup-wsl/compare/v3...v7)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: Vampire/setup-wsl
  dependency-version: '7'
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-major
...

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2026-09-14 10:11:27 -04:00
dependabot[bot] 227134a1d5 Bump golang.org/x/net in the golang-x-dependencies group (#1876)
Bumps the golang-x-dependencies group with 1 update: [golang.org/x/net](https://github.com/golang/net).


Updates `golang.org/x/net` from 0.58.0 to 0.59.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/net/compare/v0.58.0...v0.59.0)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/net
  dependency-version: 0.59.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
...

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2026-09-14 10:01:25 -04:00
dependabot[bot] 232bacfdd0 Bump github.com/gaissmai/bart from 0.28.0 to 0.29.0 (#1829)
Bumps [github.com/gaissmai/bart](https://github.com/gaissmai/bart) from 0.28.0 to 0.29.0.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/gaissmai/bart/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/gaissmai/bart/compare/v0.28.0...v0.29.0)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: github.com/gaissmai/bart
  dependency-version: 0.29.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
...

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Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-14 09:39:13 -04:00
dependabot[bot] 4e1ef9cd73 Bump the golang-x-dependencies group across 1 directory with 5 updates (#1875)
Bumps the golang-x-dependencies group with 2 updates in the / directory: [golang.org/x/crypto](https://github.com/golang/crypto) and [golang.org/x/sync](https://github.com/golang/sync).


Updates `golang.org/x/crypto` from 0.54.0 to 0.57.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/crypto/compare/v0.54.0...v0.57.0)

Updates `golang.org/x/net` from 0.57.0 to 0.58.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/net/compare/v0.57.0...v0.58.0)

Updates `golang.org/x/sync` from 0.22.0 to 0.23.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/sync/compare/v0.22.0...v0.23.0)

Updates `golang.org/x/sys` from 0.47.0 to 0.48.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/sys/compare/v0.47.0...v0.48.0)

Updates `golang.org/x/term` from 0.45.0 to 0.46.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/term/compare/v0.45.0...v0.46.0)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/crypto
  dependency-version: 0.57.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/net
  dependency-version: 0.58.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/sync
  dependency-version: 0.23.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/sys
  dependency-version: 0.48.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/term
  dependency-version: 0.46.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
...

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2026-09-14 09:37:37 -04:00
dependabot[bot] 614e0ea3aa Bump google.golang.org/protobuf (#1846)
Bumps the protobuf-dependencies group with 1 update in the / directory: google.golang.org/protobuf.


Updates `google.golang.org/protobuf` from 1.36.11 to 1.36.12

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: google.golang.org/protobuf
  dependency-version: 1.36.12
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: protobuf-dependencies
...

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2026-09-14 09:31:44 -04:00
dependabot[bot] 2999fc0b6a Bump github.com/stretchr/testify from 1.12.0 to 1.12.1 (#1859)
Bumps [github.com/stretchr/testify](https://github.com/stretchr/testify) from 1.12.0 to 1.12.1.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/stretchr/testify/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/stretchr/testify/compare/v1.12.0...v1.12.1)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: github.com/stretchr/testify
  dependency-version: 1.12.1
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
...

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2026-09-14 09:29:03 -04:00
dependabot[bot] f474b534e1 Bump github.com/miekg/dns from 1.1.72 to 1.1.73 (#1860)
Bumps [github.com/miekg/dns](https://github.com/miekg/dns) from 1.1.72 to 1.1.73.
- [Commits](https://github.com/miekg/dns/compare/v1.1.72...v1.1.73)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: github.com/miekg/dns
  dependency-version: 1.1.73
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
...

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Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-14 09:28:03 -04:00
Wade Simmons 0dc8a28d1f apply go fix for Go 1.26 (#1867)
* apply `go fix` for Go 1.26

This applies the `go fix` recommendations for go1.26

* for all of ./...
2026-09-14 09:25:35 -04:00
Nate Brown 89178f45ba windows: Fix NLMTU for ipv6 (#1871)
smoke-extra / linux-amd64-ipv6disable (push) Failing after 15s
smoke-extra / linux-386 (push) Failing after 16s
smoke / Run multi node smoke test (push) Failing after 1m33s
Build and test / Test linux-fips140 (push) Failing after 2m52s
Build and test / Cross-build linux-arm (push) Successful in 2m54s
Build and test / Cross-build linux-mips (push) Successful in 3m35s
Build and test / Cross-build openbsd (push) Successful in 1m28s
Build and test / Cross-build mobile (push) Successful in 3m7s
smoke-extra / netbsd-amd64 (push) Failing after 14s
smoke-extra / openbsd-amd64 (push) Failing after 17s
smoke / Run self traffic smoke test on macOS (push) Canceled after 0s
Build and test / CI status (push) Canceled after 0s
Build and test / Static checks (push) Successful in 21s
Build and test / Test linux (push) Failing after 59s
Build and test / Test linux-pkcs11 (push) Failing after 1m49s
Build and test / Test linux-boringcrypto (push) Failing after 2m38s
Build and test / Cross-build windows (push) Successful in 59s
Build and test / Test macos (push) Canceled after 0s
Build and test / Cross-build freebsd (push) Successful in 1m28s
smoke-extra / freebsd-amd64 (push) Failing after 16s
Build and test / Cross-build linux-other (push) Successful in 2m58s
Build and test / Cross-build netbsd (push) Successful in 1m28s
smoke-extra / Run windows smoke test (push) Canceled after 0s
Build and test / Test windows (push) Canceled after 0s
2026-09-08 18:30:16 -05:00
Wade Simmons 6a72e1c304 v1.11.1 Changelog (#1857)
smoke-extra / linux-amd64-ipv6disable (push) Failing after 17s
smoke-extra / linux-386 (push) Failing after 17s
smoke / Run multi node smoke test (push) Failing after 1m33s
Build and test / Test linux-fips140 (push) Failing after 3m0s
Build and test / Cross-build linux-arm (push) Successful in 2m50s
Build and test / Cross-build linux-mips (push) Successful in 3m34s
Build and test / Cross-build openbsd (push) Successful in 1m28s
Build and test / Cross-build mobile (push) Successful in 3m9s
smoke-extra / netbsd-amd64 (push) Failing after 14s
smoke-extra / openbsd-amd64 (push) Failing after 16s
smoke / Run self traffic smoke test on macOS (push) Canceled after 0s
Build and test / CI status (push) Canceled after 0s
Build and test / Static checks (push) Successful in 23s
Build and test / Test linux (push) Failing after 58s
Build and test / Test linux-pkcs11 (push) Failing after 1m50s
Build and test / Test linux-boringcrypto (push) Failing after 2m36s
Build and test / Cross-build windows (push) Successful in 1m0s
Build and test / Test macos (push) Canceled after 0s
Build and test / Cross-build freebsd (push) Successful in 1m28s
smoke-extra / freebsd-amd64 (push) Failing after 18s
Build and test / Cross-build linux-other (push) Successful in 2m59s
Build and test / Cross-build netbsd (push) Successful in 1m28s
smoke-extra / Run windows smoke test (push) Canceled after 0s
Build and test / Test windows (push) Canceled after 0s
Copy the v1.11.1 CHANGELOG updates from release-v1.11
2026-09-08 13:50:27 -04:00
Matt Richardson e50f8128f4 Drop hostQueries to our overlay addresses (#1866)
smoke-extra / linux-amd64-ipv6disable (push) Failing after 23s
smoke-extra / linux-386 (push) Failing after 22s
smoke / Run multi node smoke test (push) Failing after 1m37s
Build and test / Test linux-fips140 (push) Failing after 2m51s
Build and test / Cross-build linux-arm (push) Successful in 2m55s
Build and test / Cross-build linux-mips (push) Successful in 3m41s
Build and test / Cross-build openbsd (push) Successful in 1m30s
Build and test / Cross-build mobile (push) Successful in 3m10s
smoke-extra / netbsd-amd64 (push) Failing after 16s
smoke-extra / openbsd-amd64 (push) Failing after 11s
smoke / Run self traffic smoke test on macOS (push) Canceled after 0s
Build and test / CI status (push) Canceled after 0s
Build and test / Static checks (push) Successful in 2m16s
Build and test / Test linux (push) Failing after 1m20s
Build and test / Test linux-pkcs11 (push) Failing after 1m50s
Build and test / Test linux-boringcrypto (push) Failing after 2m39s
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* Drop hostQueries to our overlay addresses

Don't bother responding to hostQuery's for our overlay addresses.
2026-09-04 11:26:08 -04:00
Jack Doan dd8f660c0a save about 10MB of RAM by not importing gopacket except for tests (#1864)
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* save about 10MB of RAM by not importing gopacket except for tests

* big ol find-replace
2026-08-28 14:00:09 -05:00
Caleb Jasik ec3304e3a9 Recompute the transport checksum on self-forwarded packets (#1862)
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2026-08-27 16:10:32 -05:00
Jack Doan aaa2ff7fff respect setting for tun.pin_threads_key (#1861) 2026-08-27 12:31:08 -05:00
Nate Brown 657f6ad044 Fold the rebind counter and traffic flags into one atomic word (#1820)
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2026-08-26 15:15:37 -05:00
Jack Doan 19e04db115 disable offloads by default for first release (#1858) 2026-08-24 12:33:08 -05:00
Wade Simmons 9c5d701648 Support native Golang "fips140" mode (#1696)
Add support for the "fips140" mode of Go:

- https://go.dev/doc/security/fips140
- https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/certificate/5247

You can build with `make fips140`, see the README changes for more info.

Some differences from the boringcrypto builds:

- We switch to using `go:linkname crypto/tls.aeadAESGCMTLS13`, which gives us the fips implementation for both `boringcrypto` and `fips140` modes. This means we also no longer need `-checklinkname=0`
- Go native `fips140` doesn't need CGO_ENABLED=1
- We decide if we should use the fips140 GCM at runtime, if `fips140.Enabled()` is true. If you use the `make release-fips140`, we build with build tag `fips140enforce` which ensures the binary is running with fips140 enabled and that only P256 / AES-GCM is being used. If you don't want this enforce mode, you can build without the build tag.
2026-08-21 19:33:40 -04:00
Jack Doan edc3c5e018 the definitive tun offloads branch (#1704) 2026-08-21 11:57:38 -05:00
Nate Brown b8b159a486 release: retry the STS assume until the secret key survives Windows (#1855) 2026-08-21 11:03:43 -05:00
Nate Brown 49e35d1283 parseV6: only walk real ipv6 extension headers, fail closed on unknown protocols (#1840) 2026-08-20 13:21:08 -05:00
sn0w 6fcb926334 cmd/ca: prevent out-of-memory on 32bit systems (#1834) 2026-08-20 14:07:31 -04:00
Jay R. WrenandClaude 28d82f7b8a Drop dependency on github.com/cyberdelia/go-metrics-graphite (#1832)
The go-metrics-graphite package has been unmaintained for 10+ years,
which is a packaging and supply-chain concern for downstream
distributors (see #1831). Nebula only used its Config struct and Once()
entrypoint, so inline just those (~65 lines) into a local graphite.go,
preserving the upstream BSD-2-Clause copyright notice, and remove the
dependency.

Fixes #1831

Co-authored-by: Claude <svc-devxp-claude@slack-corp.com>
2026-08-20 09:46:41 -04:00
Nate Brown f15d10fc54 Enforce outbound message counter limits to prevent nonce reuse (#1841) 2026-08-19 20:48:02 -05:00
dependabot[bot] bfe7790848 Bump github.com/stretchr/testify from 1.11.1 to 1.12.0 (#1847)
Bumps [github.com/stretchr/testify](https://github.com/stretchr/testify) from 1.11.1 to 1.12.0.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/stretchr/testify/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/stretchr/testify/compare/v1.11.1...v1.12.0)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: github.com/stretchr/testify
  dependency-version: 1.12.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-19 20:19:10 -05:00
Nate Brown e7b4e094b9 Take Apple signing credentials from Secrets Manager (#1833) 2026-08-18 15:35:57 -05:00
Wade Simmons 6740518403 use stdlib maps.Values (#1843)
* use stdlib maps.Values

This has been in stdlib since go1.23, no need to use golang.org/x/exp
anymore just for this:

- https://pkg.go.dev/maps#Values

* use slices.AppendSeq to match old behavior
2026-08-18 14:49:41 -04:00
dependabot[bot]andWade Simmons 5cbf029d06 Bump github.com/prometheus/client_golang from 1.23.2 to 1.24.1 (#1828)
Bumps [github.com/prometheus/client_golang](https://github.com/prometheus/client_golang) from 1.23.2 to 1.24.1.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/prometheus/client_golang/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/prometheus/client_golang/blob/v1.24.1/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/prometheus/client_golang/compare/v1.23.2...v1.24.1)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: github.com/prometheus/client_golang
  dependency-version: 1.24.1
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Wade Simmons <wadey@slack-corp.com>
2026-08-17 13:51:48 -04:00
dependabot[bot] 368855c2e8 Bump go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 from 3.0.4 to 3.0.5 (#1827)
Bumps [go.yaml.in/yaml/v3](https://github.com/yaml/go-yaml) from 3.0.4 to 3.0.5.
- [Commits](https://github.com/yaml/go-yaml/compare/v3.0.4...v3.0.5)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: go.yaml.in/yaml/v3
  dependency-version: 3.0.5
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-17 13:24:15 -04:00
John Maguire 6d124d0441 Tolerate ErrDumpInterrupted when listing tun addresses (#1835)
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2026-07-31 19:09:28 +00:00
Nate Brown 72bf111209 Add an e2e Drop exit type and a roaming recovery measurement (#1819)
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2026-07-23 17:02:02 -05:00
Nate Brown 1617897043 v1.11.0 changelog (#1792)
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2026-07-23 13:13:45 -05:00
Nate Brown f8775bb6ca Use go 1.26 (latest 1.26.5) (#1818) 2026-07-23 10:36:20 -05:00
Nate Brown 15f0f0d5d0 Be less verbose with handshake send errors (#1810) 2026-07-23 09:26:45 -05:00
Nate BrownandJack Doan 7902ce674e Rebind for MacOS (#1816)
Co-authored-by: Jack Doan <me@jackdoan.com>
2026-07-23 09:26:24 -05:00
Nate Brown c2fbe215e6 Fix a test race, make dns server reload/restart safer (#1815)
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2026-07-22 15:05:10 -05:00
dependabot[bot] 94ac6db4ca Bump the golang-x-dependencies group across 1 directory with 5 updates (#1800)
Bumps the golang-x-dependencies group with 3 updates in the / directory: [golang.org/x/crypto](https://github.com/golang/crypto), [golang.org/x/net](https://github.com/golang/net) and [golang.org/x/sync](https://github.com/golang/sync).


Updates `golang.org/x/crypto` from 0.53.0 to 0.54.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/crypto/compare/v0.53.0...v0.54.0)

Updates `golang.org/x/net` from 0.56.0 to 0.57.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/net/compare/v0.56.0...v0.57.0)

Updates `golang.org/x/sync` from 0.21.0 to 0.22.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/sync/compare/v0.21.0...v0.22.0)

Updates `golang.org/x/sys` from 0.46.0 to 0.47.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/sys/compare/v0.46.0...v0.47.0)

Updates `golang.org/x/term` from 0.44.0 to 0.45.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/term/compare/v0.44.0...v0.45.0)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/crypto
  dependency-version: 0.54.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/net
  dependency-version: 0.57.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/sync
  dependency-version: 0.22.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/sys
  dependency-version: 0.47.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/term
  dependency-version: 0.45.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-22 15:51:22 -04:00
dependabot[bot] a60350e34e Bump actions/setup-go from 6 to 7 (#1807)
Bumps [actions/setup-go](https://github.com/actions/setup-go) from 6 to 7.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/actions/setup-go/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/actions/setup-go/compare/v6...v7)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: actions/setup-go
  dependency-version: '7'
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-major
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-22 15:49:45 -04:00
John Maguire 58f3b6fda7 Document rootless Nebula in example service script (#1814) 2026-07-21 19:32:33 -04:00
Jack Doan a99699e370 before removing a pending hostinfo in handshake_manager, make sure it's the one we wanted to delete (#1811) 2026-07-21 10:31:00 -05:00
Jack Doan 3615a79b8b add locks around replay window updates (#1802) 2026-07-20 10:28:53 -05:00
Nate BrownandJack Doan 147c202c27 Swap back to a blocking udp socket, test shutdown(2) (#1806)
Co-authored-by: Jack Doan <me@jackdoan.com>
2026-07-17 15:16:45 -05:00
John Maguire e290a6892f Fix relay re-establishment for handshake on Disestablised entry (#1805)
handleOutsideRelayPacket filled ViaSender.remoteIdx with relay.RemoteIndex,
an index from the relay peer's index space, but the rescue in
sendHandshakeResponse looks that value up in relayForByIdx, which is keyed
by local index. The lookup could never hit, so a terminal relay entry left
Disestablished by a one-sided teardown stayed Disestablished even after a
valid handshake arrived over it. The responder's first transmit then failed
to find an Established relay, deleted its only relay entry, and every
subsequent send was silently dropped until dead-tunnel detection forced a
re-handshake.
2026-07-17 11:57:47 -04:00
Nate Brown 6c3972f464 code-sign: default the S3 key-prefix to the calling repo (#1799) 2026-07-13 11:49:59 -05:00
Jack Doan 861d3aabd7 correct directionality of firewall.inbound_action and firewall.outbound_action (#1798) 2026-07-13 08:40:42 -05:00
Jack Doan 86733864fe don't make new relay state on a just-discarded tunnel (#1796) 2026-07-10 12:02:17 -05:00
Nate Brown ab736e4c6b Make Control safe to stop and wait on from any lifecycle state (#1794) 2026-07-10 10:35:17 -05:00
Nate Brown 5ecdd4eaa9 Fix e2e test races when looking at hostmap counts (#1795) 2026-07-09 18:48:14 -05:00
Nate Brown 1b84bd0050 Remove dev fmt.Println (#1793) 2026-07-09 11:04:25 -05:00
Nate Brown 384610f81a hostmap: replace the shared next/prev hostinfo chain with independent per-address lists so divergent or overlapping vpnAddr sets cannot corrupt the map (#1790) 2026-07-09 09:34:30 -05:00
Nate Brown c1eea118f4 fix firewall port/proto bypass in parseV6 from uint8 extension-header length overflow (#1789) 2026-07-07 20:43:26 -05:00
Nate Brown 1e66c0d3ee hostmap: unlink a multi-vpnAddr hostinfo from the shared chain exactly once on delete (#1788) 2026-07-07 17:32:25 -05:00
Nate Brown e5c0fdad8d Darwin and openbsd in line with the other bsds for tun support (#1703) 2026-07-07 17:05:12 -05:00
Nate Brown 7bd0bc285a sshd: guard trustedKeys/trustedCAs with a mutex to fix a concurrent map crash on reload (#1787) 2026-07-07 15:50:06 -05:00
Nate Brown 942ee522e0 lighthouse: unmap 4-in-6 addresses in protoV6AddrPortToNetAddrPort so remote_allow_list v4 rules apply (#1786) 2026-07-07 15:23:39 -05:00
dependabot[bot] 32149f3a93 Bump github.com/kardianos/service from 1.2.4 to 1.3.0 (#1782)
Bumps [github.com/kardianos/service](https://github.com/kardianos/service) from 1.2.4 to 1.3.0.
- [Commits](https://github.com/kardianos/service/compare/v1.2.4...v1.3.0)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: github.com/kardianos/service
  dependency-version: 1.3.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-07 14:42:33 -05:00
Jack Doan 19ad3bb904 correctly discard nil proto addresses (#1785) 2026-07-07 14:41:01 -05:00
dependabot[bot] 647775d8c3 Bump golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/windows (#1665)
Bumps the zx2c4-dependencies group with 1 update in the / directory: golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/windows.


Updates `golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/windows` from 0.6.1 to 1.0.1

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/windows
  dependency-version: 1.0.1
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-major
  dependency-group: zx2c4-dependencies
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-07 13:40:12 -05:00
Nate Brown abfeb502a8 iputil: fix infinite loop in ipv6FindUpperProtocol from uint8 extension-header length overflow (#1784) 2026-07-07 13:28:52 -05:00
John Maguire 0a953915bb Make HostInfo.remote atomic to fix torn reads on the send path (#1773) 2026-07-07 14:27:53 -04:00
Nate Brown 6aa3363d85 Add explicit unmarshaller for signing and key agreement public keys (#1777) 2026-07-07 13:16:57 -05:00
Jack Doan 95d98b1f4b firewall: move conntrack check after cert+IP verification (#1779) 2026-07-07 13:10:11 -05:00
Jack Doan 6afca0f461 correctly handle a test packet with a payload longer than the header (#1778)
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2026-07-03 11:06:22 -05:00
zorvios 02471b4121 wireshark: fix Lua 5.4 bitwise operation (#1776)
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The Nebula Wireshark dissector uses bit32.band() when parsing the
Nebula packet type. On Wireshark builds using Lua 5.4, bit32 is not
available, which causes dissection to fail with:

Lua Error: nebula.lua:65: attempt to index a nil value (global 'bit32')

Wireshark bundles Lua BitOp and exposes it globally as bit for Lua
dissectors. This is the documented API for maximum backwards
compatibility across supported Lua versions.

Use bit.band() instead of bit32.band().
2026-07-01 16:12:14 -05:00
dependabot[bot] 58ab7250f5 Bump actions/checkout from 6 to 7 (#1771)
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Bumps [actions/checkout](https://github.com/actions/checkout) from 6 to 7.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/actions/checkout/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/actions/checkout/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/actions/checkout/compare/v6...v7)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: actions/checkout
  dependency-version: '7'
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-major
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-29 12:47:13 -05:00
John Maguire 184cdc8586 Add OCI image labels with version info (#1772)
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2026-06-23 14:21:28 -04:00
Wade Simmons 7d3166a19d cleanup ipv6 iputil helpers / skip reject for ICMP error packets and fragments (#1768)
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* cleanup ipv6 iputil helpers

With my refactoring in this PR I accidentally had some duplicate logic,
this PR cleans it up:

- https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/pull/1766

* skip ICMP reject for ICMP error packets and fragments

Per RFC 1122, ICMP error messages must not be generated in response to
other ICMP error messages to prevent infinite error loops. This applies
to both IPv4 (types 3, 4, 5, 11, 12) and IPv6 (types 1-4).

Do not generate reject packets for IPv4 or IPv6 fragments. For IPv4,
check MF flag and fragment offset. For IPv6, add isFragment return to
ipv6FindUpperProtocol so a single traversal handles both protocol
lookup and fragment detection.

* do send rejects for the initial fragment

RFC says "non-initial fragment"s

* fix fragment checks
2026-06-16 16:51:14 -04:00
Wade Simmons fe1c5682f0 add IPv6 support to CreateICMPEchoResponse (#1767)
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The function previously only handled IPv4 ICMP Echo Request packets.
This adds handling for IPv6 ICMPv6 Echo Request (type 128) by generating
a proper Echo Reply (type 129) with correct pseudo-header checksum.
2026-06-16 13:16:47 -04:00
Wade Simmons e4cc80aaca add IPv6 reject packet generation (#1766)
* add IPv6 reject packet generation (ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable and TCP RST)

* use ICMPv6 code 1 (administratively prohibited) and cap body at 1000 bytes

* cleanup, use ICMP error code 13 for ipv4

* better docs

* cleanup
2026-06-16 13:04:21 -04:00
Jack Doan 16b302c11d Relay log fix (#1765)
* ensure CreateRelayRequest gets logged correctly

* ensure CreateRelayResponse gets logged correctly
2026-06-16 11:38:34 -05:00
Wade Simmons ab539f8a3f Add smoke test for ipv6 (#1764)
* Add smoke test for ipv6

* fix ncat listen for ipv6
2026-06-16 12:13:05 -04:00
dependabot[bot] b7d83b0500 Bump golang.org/x/net in the golang-x-dependencies group (#1763)
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Bumps the golang-x-dependencies group with 1 update: [golang.org/x/net](https://github.com/golang/net).


Updates `golang.org/x/net` from 0.55.0 to 0.56.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/net/compare/v0.55.0...v0.56.0)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/net
  dependency-version: 0.56.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-15 14:59:19 -04:00
dependabot[bot] ef95b25fa3 Bump github.com/gaissmai/bart from 0.27.1 to 0.28.0 (#1743)
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Bumps [github.com/gaissmai/bart](https://github.com/gaissmai/bart) from 0.27.1 to 0.28.0.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/gaissmai/bart/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/gaissmai/bart/compare/v0.27.1...v0.28.0)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: github.com/gaissmai/bart
  dependency-version: 0.28.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-15 10:09:39 -04:00
dependabot[bot] 36b38396af Bump the golang-x-dependencies group with 4 updates (#1750)
Bumps the golang-x-dependencies group with 4 updates: [golang.org/x/crypto](https://github.com/golang/crypto), [golang.org/x/sync](https://github.com/golang/sync), [golang.org/x/sys](https://github.com/golang/sys) and [golang.org/x/term](https://github.com/golang/term).


Updates `golang.org/x/crypto` from 0.52.0 to 0.53.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/crypto/compare/v0.52.0...v0.53.0)

Updates `golang.org/x/sync` from 0.20.0 to 0.21.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/sync/compare/v0.20.0...v0.21.0)

Updates `golang.org/x/sys` from 0.45.0 to 0.46.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/sys/compare/v0.45.0...v0.46.0)

Updates `golang.org/x/term` from 0.43.0 to 0.44.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/term/compare/v0.43.0...v0.44.0)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/crypto
  dependency-version: 0.53.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/sync
  dependency-version: 0.21.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/sys
  dependency-version: 0.46.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/term
  dependency-version: 0.44.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-15 10:04:22 -04:00
Jack Doan 2e9117da5b fix tunnels that could permanently escape connection-manager monitoring (#1752)
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2026-06-10 11:03:23 -05:00
Jack Doan a690c904ba improve rejection of malformed handshakes (#1756)
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2026-06-10 09:28:07 -05:00
Jack Doan e028e6bf1a disallow negative stats intervals (#1754) 2026-06-10 09:27:40 -05:00
Jack Doan 3db406b8ac fix a race in RelayState.CopyRelayIps (#1753) 2026-06-10 09:27:15 -05:00
Jack Doan eaad4896c1 udp_darwin: don't call the EncReader on a UDP error (#1755) 2026-06-10 09:26:31 -05:00
Jack Doan e6032f81aa correctly record window counters for relayed packets in a tunnel (#1751)
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2026-06-09 16:18:59 -05:00
dependabot[bot] b041f306cb Bump the golang-x-dependencies group with 3 updates (#1742)
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Bumps the golang-x-dependencies group with 3 updates: [golang.org/x/crypto](https://github.com/golang/crypto), [golang.org/x/net](https://github.com/golang/net) and [golang.org/x/sys](https://github.com/golang/sys).


Updates `golang.org/x/crypto` from 0.51.0 to 0.52.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/crypto/compare/v0.51.0...v0.52.0)

Updates `golang.org/x/net` from 0.54.0 to 0.55.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/net/compare/v0.54.0...v0.55.0)

Updates `golang.org/x/sys` from 0.44.0 to 0.45.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/sys/compare/v0.44.0...v0.45.0)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/crypto
  dependency-version: 0.52.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/net
  dependency-version: 0.55.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/sys
  dependency-version: 0.45.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-03 10:25:27 -04:00
Nate Brown 3a95495c63 Fix duplicate log fields which slog duplicates (#1734)
smoke-extra / linux-amd64-ipv6disable (push) Failing after 16s
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smoke-extra / netbsd-amd64 (push) Failing after 15s
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Build and test / CI status (push) Has been cancelled
Build and test / Static checks (push) Successful in 40s
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smoke-extra / Run windows smoke test (push) Has been cancelled
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2026-05-22 10:19:53 -05:00
Nate Brown 873f94f465 Reduce relay log spam (#1733) 2026-05-22 10:19:06 -05:00
dependabot[bot] 72bad1603a Bump github.com/gaissmai/bart from 0.26.1 to 0.27.1 (#1732)
smoke-extra / linux-amd64-ipv6disable (push) Failing after 23s
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smoke-extra / netbsd-amd64 (push) Failing after 12s
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Build and test / CI status (push) Has been cancelled
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smoke-extra / Run windows smoke test (push) Has been cancelled
smoke / Run multi node smoke test (push) Failing after 1m27s
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smoke-extra / freebsd-amd64 (push) Failing after 13s
smoke-extra / openbsd-amd64 (push) Failing after 12s
Build and test / Test linux (push) Failing after 1m51s
Build and test / Test windows (push) Has been cancelled
Bumps [github.com/gaissmai/bart](https://github.com/gaissmai/bart) from 0.26.1 to 0.27.1.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/gaissmai/bart/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/gaissmai/bart/compare/v0.26.1...v0.27.1)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: github.com/gaissmai/bart
  dependency-version: 0.27.1
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-22 08:53:50 -05:00
Nate Brown 0c1ad9bb48 Parallelize the tests a bit more (#1730)
smoke-extra / linux-amd64-ipv6disable (push) Failing after 12s
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Build and test / Cross-build linux-mips (push) Successful in 3m35s
Build and test / Cross-build windows (push) Successful in 56s
smoke-extra / netbsd-amd64 (push) Failing after 12s
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Build and test / Cross-build freebsd (push) Successful in 1m29s
Build and test / Cross-build netbsd (push) Successful in 1m27s
Build and test / CI status (push) Has been cancelled
Build and test / Static checks (push) Successful in 1m39s
Build and test / Cross-build linux-arm (push) Successful in 2m56s
Build and test / Cross-build linux-other (push) Successful in 2m57s
Build and test / Cross-build openbsd (push) Successful in 1m29s
Build and test / Cross-build mobile (push) Successful in 3m6s
smoke-extra / Run windows smoke test (push) Has been cancelled
smoke / Run multi node smoke test (push) Failing after 1m26s
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Build and test / Test windows (push) Has been cancelled
2026-05-19 08:35:04 -05:00
randomizedcoder 074a123a4b Reject port numbers outside [0, 65535] in firewall rule parsing (#1724)
smoke-extra / linux-amd64-ipv6disable (push) Failing after 14s
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Build and test / Build and test on windows-latest (push) Has been cancelled
smoke-extra / netbsd-amd64 (push) Failing after 12s
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gofmt / Run gofmt (push) Successful in 10s
Build and test / Build and test on linux with pkcs11 (push) Failing after 3m13s
smoke-extra / Run windows smoke test (push) Has been cancelled
smoke / Run multi node smoke test (push) Failing after 1m33s
Build and test / Build and test on linux with boringcrypto (push) Failing after 3m5s
Build and test / Build and test on macos-latest (push) Has been cancelled
smoke-extra / freebsd-amd64 (push) Failing after 13s
smoke-extra / openbsd-amd64 (push) Failing after 13s
2026-05-18 12:23:10 -05:00
Nate Brown 04dea41f74 Make firewall reload when unsafe networks in the cert changes (#1719) 2026-05-18 11:25:34 -05:00
Nate Brown 0d23377c65 Fix flakey cert tests (#1728) 2026-05-18 11:10:30 -05:00
Nate Brown ffd5249cf5 Search for config.yaml/yml in both service and cli mode (#1717)
smoke-extra / linux-amd64-ipv6disable (push) Failing after 12s
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Build and test / Build and test on windows-latest (push) Has been cancelled
smoke-extra / netbsd-amd64 (push) Failing after 14s
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gofmt / Run gofmt (push) Successful in 11s
smoke-extra / Run windows smoke test (push) Has been cancelled
Build and test / Build and test on linux with boringcrypto (push) Failing after 5m14s
Build and test / Build and test on linux with pkcs11 (push) Failing after 3m12s
Build and test / Build and test on macos-latest (push) Has been cancelled
smoke-extra / freebsd-amd64 (push) Failing after 13s
smoke-extra / openbsd-amd64 (push) Failing after 12s
smoke / Run multi node smoke test (push) Failing after 1m27s
2026-05-15 15:37:01 -05:00
Nate Brown 625f58b84a Record my local details in the dns server if enabled (#1716) 2026-05-15 15:36:44 -05:00
Nate Brown 99c5854e5c Prime some critical stats before the first scrape (#1715) 2026-05-15 15:36:26 -05:00
Nate Brown 3c121e7ab1 Allow for - to stand in for stdin/out (#1714) 2026-05-15 15:36:08 -05:00
Nate Brown 6c7ebb0875 Reset static host list addresses on change (#1713) 2026-05-15 15:35:49 -05:00
dependabot[bot] 110ea8f45c Bump the golang-x-dependencies group with 4 updates (#1721)
smoke-extra / linux-amd64-ipv6disable (push) Failing after 13s
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Build and test / Build and test on windows-latest (push) Has been cancelled
smoke-extra / netbsd-amd64 (push) Failing after 13s
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gofmt / Run gofmt (push) Successful in 51s
smoke-extra / Run windows smoke test (push) Has been cancelled
smoke / Run multi node smoke test (push) Failing after 1m23s
Build and test / Build and test on linux with boringcrypto (push) Failing after 3m6s
Build and test / Build and test on linux with pkcs11 (push) Failing after 2m33s
Build and test / Build and test on macos-latest (push) Has been cancelled
smoke-extra / freebsd-amd64 (push) Failing after 13s
smoke-extra / openbsd-amd64 (push) Failing after 14s
Bumps the golang-x-dependencies group with 4 updates: [golang.org/x/crypto](https://github.com/golang/crypto), [golang.org/x/net](https://github.com/golang/net), [golang.org/x/sys](https://github.com/golang/sys) and [golang.org/x/term](https://github.com/golang/term).


Updates `golang.org/x/crypto` from 0.50.0 to 0.51.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/crypto/compare/v0.50.0...v0.51.0)

Updates `golang.org/x/net` from 0.53.0 to 0.54.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/net/compare/v0.53.0...v0.54.0)

Updates `golang.org/x/sys` from 0.43.0 to 0.44.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/sys/compare/v0.43.0...v0.44.0)

Updates `golang.org/x/term` from 0.42.0 to 0.43.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/term/compare/v0.42.0...v0.43.0)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/crypto
  dependency-version: 0.51.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/net
  dependency-version: 0.54.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/sys
  dependency-version: 0.44.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/term
  dependency-version: 0.43.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-15 14:14:32 -04:00
Nate Brown 398d67e2da Windows code signing (#1718)
smoke-extra / linux-amd64-ipv6disable (push) Failing after 3s
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Build and test / Build and test on windows-latest (push) Has been cancelled
smoke-extra / netbsd-amd64 (push) Failing after 3s
smoke-extra / linux-386 (push) Failing after 2s
gofmt / Run gofmt (push) Failing after 3s
smoke-extra / Run windows smoke test (push) Has been cancelled
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Build and test / Build and test on linux with boringcrypto (push) Failing after 3s
Build and test / Build and test on linux with pkcs11 (push) Failing after 2s
Build and test / Build and test on macos-latest (push) Has been cancelled
smoke-extra / freebsd-amd64 (push) Failing after 3s
smoke-extra / openbsd-amd64 (push) Failing after 2s
2026-05-08 14:43:19 -05:00
Nate Brown 696903d6d9 Add a way to set the network type on windows + tests (#1710)
smoke-extra / linux-amd64-ipv6disable (push) Failing after 3s
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Build and test / Build and test on windows-latest (push) Has been cancelled
smoke-extra / netbsd-amd64 (push) Failing after 3s
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gofmt / Run gofmt (push) Failing after 2s
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Build and test / Build and test on linux with boringcrypto (push) Failing after 2s
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smoke-extra / freebsd-amd64 (push) Failing after 2s
smoke-extra / openbsd-amd64 (push) Failing after 3s
2026-05-07 20:17:38 -05:00
Nate Brown c82db210ef Change windows unsafe routes to link routes, fix sshd reload bug (#1709)
smoke-extra / linux-amd64-ipv6disable (push) Failing after 2s
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Build and test / Build and test on linux with boringcrypto (push) Failing after 3s
Build and test / Build and test on linux with pkcs11 (push) Failing after 3s
Build and test / Build and test on macos-latest (push) Has been cancelled
smoke-extra / freebsd-amd64 (push) Failing after 3s
smoke-extra / openbsd-amd64 (push) Failing after 3s
2026-05-07 11:30:26 -05:00
Nate Brown 1ada3d4dd9 Use DefinedNets fancy new netbsd10 vagrant box for smokes (#1711) 2026-05-07 10:30:29 -05:00
Nate Brown 5f920fdd7d Remove the global noiseEndianness var (#1707)
Build and test / Build all and test on ubuntu-linux (push) Failing after 2s
Build and test / Build and test on windows-latest (push) Has been cancelled
smoke-extra / Run extra smoke tests (push) Failing after 3s
gofmt / Run gofmt (push) Failing after 3s
smoke / Run multi node smoke test (push) Failing after 3s
Build and test / Build and test on linux with boringcrypto (push) Failing after 2s
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Build and test / Build and test on macos-latest (push) Has been cancelled
2026-05-06 17:37:03 -05:00
dependabot[bot] cba9ea5b1f Bump github.com/gaissmai/bart from 0.26.0 to 0.26.1 (#1604)
Bumps [github.com/gaissmai/bart](https://github.com/gaissmai/bart) from 0.26.0 to 0.26.1.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/gaissmai/bart/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/gaissmai/bart/compare/v0.26.0...v0.26.1)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: github.com/gaissmai/bart
  dependency-version: 0.26.1
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-06 17:36:07 -05:00
dependabot[bot] 83809a599a Bump actions/download-artifact from 7 to 8 (#1617)
Bumps [actions/download-artifact](https://github.com/actions/download-artifact) from 7 to 8.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/actions/download-artifact/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/actions/download-artifact/compare/v7...v8)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: actions/download-artifact
  dependency-version: '8'
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-major
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-06 17:34:06 -05:00
dependabot[bot] 23c67bd8d8 Bump actions/upload-artifact from 6 to 7 (#1618)
Bumps [actions/upload-artifact](https://github.com/actions/upload-artifact) from 6 to 7.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/actions/upload-artifact/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/actions/upload-artifact/compare/v6...v7)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: actions/upload-artifact
  dependency-version: '7'
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-major
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-06 17:33:47 -05:00
dependabot[bot] dd3a7ad03c Bump docker/setup-buildx-action from 3 to 4 (#1627)
Bumps [docker/setup-buildx-action](https://github.com/docker/setup-buildx-action) from 3 to 4.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/docker/setup-buildx-action/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/docker/setup-buildx-action/compare/v3...v4)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: docker/setup-buildx-action
  dependency-version: '4'
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-major
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-06 17:33:16 -05:00
dependabot[bot] dd2ac5d655 Bump docker/login-action from 3 to 4 (#1628)
Bumps [docker/login-action](https://github.com/docker/login-action) from 3 to 4.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/docker/login-action/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/docker/login-action/compare/v3...v4)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: docker/login-action
  dependency-version: '4'
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-major
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-06 17:32:45 -05:00
dependabot[bot] 76e82a5256 Bump golang.org/x/net (#1664)
Bumps the golang-x-dependencies group with 1 update in the / directory: [golang.org/x/net](https://github.com/golang/net).


Updates `golang.org/x/net` from 0.52.0 to 0.53.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/net/compare/v0.52.0...v0.53.0)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/net
  dependency-version: 0.53.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-06 17:32:21 -05:00
dependabot[bot] eaf756ea6c Bump Apple-Actions/import-codesign-certs from 6 to 7 (#1697) 2026-05-06 17:31:48 -05:00
Jack Doan a82a8dc547 don't panic on bad ed25519 key lengths (#1601)
Build and test / Build all and test on ubuntu-linux (push) Failing after 3s
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* don't panic on bad ed25519 key lengths

* don't allow mismatched curves

* add test
2026-05-06 17:00:07 -05:00
Nate Brown 213dd46588 Stop leaking goroutines past Control.Stop, consolidate punching in Punchy (#1708) 2026-05-06 16:21:16 -05:00
Wade Simmons 4fb5cdb4fa refactor readOutsidePackets (#1642)
* refactor readOutsidePackets

They layout of this method is confusing and relys on certain parts to
return early for things to work correctly.

Change the ordering of the logic so that we do this:

- Handle unencrypted packets
- Decrypt packet
- Handle encrypted packets

This way, nothing can sneak through unencrypted to where it shouldn't
be.

* fix comment

* code review comments

* check for expected type/subtype

* check header version

* log header

* need to handle TestReply

* clean roaming / connectionManager

* dont need to roam here now, we do it earlier

* cleanup metrics and errors

* rxInvalid

* debug logger checks

* ErrOutOfWindow
2026-05-06 12:23:27 -04:00
Jack Doan ff91c37529 switch Bits to a packed u64 (#1705) 2026-05-06 10:22:26 -05:00
Nate Brown b7e9939e92 More stable e2e test harness, better for benchmarking (#1702)
Build and test / Build all and test on ubuntu-linux (push) Failing after 2s
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Build and test / Build and test on linux with pkcs11 (push) Failing after 3s
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2026-05-04 10:12:58 -05:00
Nate Brown 33c2d7277c Reduce HandshakeManager complexity a little bit (#1701)
Build and test / Build all and test on ubuntu-linux (push) Failing after 3s
Build and test / Build and test on windows-latest (push) Has been cancelled
smoke-extra / Run extra smoke tests (push) Failing after 3s
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Build and test / Build and test on macos-latest (push) Has been cancelled
2026-05-01 13:21:38 -05:00
Nate Brown f141cebe8d Run e2e tests in parallel, include a goroutine leak detector test (#1700)
Build and test / Build all and test on ubuntu-linux (push) Failing after 3s
Build and test / Build and test on windows-latest (push) Has been cancelled
smoke-extra / Run extra smoke tests (push) Failing after 3s
gofmt / Run gofmt (push) Failing after 41s
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smoke / Run multi node smoke test (push) Failing after 3s
2026-04-30 21:30:56 -05:00
Nate Brown 9ec8cf10f3 Handshake state machine (#1656) 2026-04-30 21:30:27 -05:00
Nate Brown 1ab1f71dba Make stats a server we can reconfigure and start/stop (#1670)
Build and test / Build all and test on ubuntu-linux (push) Failing after 2s
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smoke-extra / Run extra smoke tests (push) Failing after 2s
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2026-04-27 12:25:24 -05:00
Nate Brown d0f02ba873 Switch to slog, remove logrus (#1672) 2026-04-27 09:41:47 -05:00
Jack Doan 5f890dbc34 noise: only type-assert once (#1691)
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2026-04-24 13:12:42 -05:00
brad-defined db85d61c23 SSH handshake in goroutine and defer close (#1640)
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* SSH handshake in goroutine and defer close
2026-04-23 14:53:52 -04:00
Nate Brown db9218b0be Another shot at the flakey smoke test (#1688) 2026-04-23 13:51:15 -05:00
Nate Brown 5f00ab4b74 Fix e2e tests writing after the tester tun is closed causing a panic (#1681)
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2026-04-22 17:18:06 -05:00
Guy NesherandJackDoan 2a1cc62001 fix: guard QueryCert against panic on short/empty QNAME (#1635)
* fix: guard QueryCert against panic on short/empty QNAME

QueryCert slices data[:len(data)-1] to strip a trailing dot, which
panics when data is empty (slice bounds [:-1]). Add a length check
to return early for inputs shorter than a minimal valid "x." form.

While miekg/dns currently rejects wire-format packets that would
produce an empty QNAME, the Nebula code should not rely on library
behavior for crash safety.

Made-with: Cursor

* fix merge conflicts

---------

Co-authored-by: JackDoan <me@jackdoan.com>
2026-04-22 12:42:14 -05:00
John Maguire e753e6e93c Immediate Lighthouse update after reconfig/reconnect (#1645)
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2026-04-21 16:33:32 -04:00
John Maguire 32a7c04498 Return NODATA instead of NXDOMAIN for missing record types (#1668)
The DNS responder was setting RCODE=NXDOMAIN (Name Error) any time the
answer section was empty, including for names that exist in the
lighthouse but lack a record of the requested type (e.g. an AAAA query
for a v4-only host). Per RFC 2308 §2.1, NXDOMAIN means "the domain
referred to by the QNAME does not exist", and per RFC 2308 §2.2 a name
that exists with no record of the requested type must be answered with
RCODE=NOERROR and an empty answer section (NODATA).

The practical fallout: busybox ping in Alpine issues AAAA first, treats
NXDOMAIN as a hard failure, and never falls through to A. Returning
NODATA lets the resolver continue to the A query as it should.

Track whether any queried A/AAAA name is known in either map and only
set RcodeNameError when no queried name exists at all.
2026-04-21 16:32:48 -04:00
Nate Brown 8c50fc3f60 Plug the conntrack cache ticker leak and nebula-service log.Fatal calls (#1669) 2026-04-21 13:19:54 -05:00
Nate Brown 2f4532f102 No more dns globals, proper cleanup on shutdown (#1667) 2026-04-21 12:41:10 -05:00
Nate Brown 8c71f2f3f9 FreeBSD tun needs to be non blocking as well (#1666) 2026-04-21 10:45:46 -05:00
Nate Brown 3d34cc9b74 Try to make smoke less flakey (#1663)
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2026-04-20 16:38:14 -05:00
Jack Doan e80b9830a3 Remove more os.Exit calls and give a more reliable wait for stop function (attempt 3) (#1661) 2026-04-20 16:08:26 -05:00
Nate Brown 49e3c4649b Try the hot new DefinedNet openbsd78 box (#1657)
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2026-04-17 09:18:23 -05:00
dependabot[bot] 72c04b90bd Bump golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/windows in the zx2c4-dependencies group (#1652)
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Bumps the zx2c4-dependencies group with 1 update: golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/windows.


Updates `golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/windows` from 0.5.3 to 0.6.1

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/windows
  dependency-version: 0.6.1
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: zx2c4-dependencies
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-15 13:27:14 -05:00
dependabot[bot] 36ab1dbb97 Bump the golang-x-dependencies group across 1 directory with 5 updates (#1629)
Bumps the golang-x-dependencies group with 3 updates in the / directory: [golang.org/x/crypto](https://github.com/golang/crypto), [golang.org/x/net](https://github.com/golang/net) and [golang.org/x/sync](https://github.com/golang/sync).


Updates `golang.org/x/crypto` from 0.47.0 to 0.48.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/crypto/compare/v0.47.0...v0.48.0)

Updates `golang.org/x/net` from 0.49.0 to 0.51.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/net/compare/v0.49.0...v0.51.0)

Updates `golang.org/x/sync` from 0.19.0 to 0.20.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/sync/compare/v0.19.0...v0.20.0)

Updates `golang.org/x/sys` from 0.40.0 to 0.41.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/sys/compare/v0.40.0...v0.41.0)

Updates `golang.org/x/term` from 0.39.0 to 0.40.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/term/compare/v0.39.0...v0.40.0)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/crypto
  dependency-version: 0.48.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/net
  dependency-version: 0.51.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/sync
  dependency-version: 0.20.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/sys
  dependency-version: 0.41.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/term
  dependency-version: 0.40.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-15 13:02:29 -05:00
dependabot[bot] f77fe74192 Bump github.com/miekg/pkcs11 (#1586)
Bumps [github.com/miekg/pkcs11](https://github.com/miekg/pkcs11) from 1.1.2-0.20231115102856-9078ad6b9d4b to 1.1.2.
- [Changelog](https://github.com/miekg/pkcs11/blob/master/release.go)
- [Commits](https://github.com/miekg/pkcs11/commits/v1.1.2)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: github.com/miekg/pkcs11
  dependency-version: 1.1.2
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-15 12:27:19 -05:00
dependabot[bot] 24c9c704a0 Bump github.com/miekg/dns from 1.1.70 to 1.1.72 (#1587)
Bumps [github.com/miekg/dns](https://github.com/miekg/dns) from 1.1.70 to 1.1.72.
- [Commits](https://github.com/miekg/dns/compare/v1.1.70...v1.1.72)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: github.com/miekg/dns
  dependency-version: 1.1.72
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-15 11:54:47 -05:00
Nate Brown a5e81efe7b Try rsync from somewhere else (#1655) 2026-04-15 09:23:33 -05:00
Jack Doan b3194236aa udp_linux: wrap socket operations with syscall.RawConn for clean teardown (#1654)
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remove runtime.LockOSThread() because it makes things worse now

remove the "custom" Write() method from tun_linux.go, the stdlib path via os.File performs better

We should change our guidance around number of routines, ~2 per thread (that you wish to use for Nebula) seems to be about right now
2026-04-14 18:25:24 -05:00
Nate Brown 3fae693c42 Additional e2e tests to assert current handshake behavior (#1653)
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2026-04-14 13:32:01 -05:00
0ad5c771e9 Refactor CA pool handling to use streaming (#1644)
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Co-authored-by: maggie44 <64841595+maggie44@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: JackDoan <me@jackdoan.com>
2026-04-13 13:19:55 -04:00
Jay R. Wren 6727113b2b gh workflow release: protect from ref_name attack (#1650)
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It is not likely, but better to be safe.
2026-04-06 12:24:28 -04:00
Jay R. WrenandClaude f8587956ba add sshd.sandbox_dir config option (#1622)
* add sshd.sandbox_dir config option

Sanitize SSH profile paths (ssh.go:514,683,719) — restrict os.Create(a[0]) to a safe directory.
Add a config option in the config file to specify the sandbox directory. For backwards compatibility, if the config is not specified, keep the current behavior.

* update default and example

* use os.TempDir() for sshd.sandbox_dir default

* split sandbox path validation into separate conditionals

Separate the combined && check in sshSanitizeFilePath into two distinct
conditionals with specific error messages: one for paths resolving to the
sandbox directory itself, and one for paths outside the sandbox.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <svc-devxp-claude@slack-corp.com>

* fix: trim leading zeros from p256 signature swap result

bigmod.Nat.Bytes() returns fixed-size 32-byte slices, but ASN.1 INTEGER
parsing strips leading zeros. This caused a flaky test failure (~1/256
chance) when the S value's high byte was zero.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <svc-devxp-claude@slack-corp.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <svc-devxp-claude@slack-corp.com>
2026-04-03 09:37:18 -04:00
John Maguire 951d368faf Add a small link to DN Managed Nebula (#1641)
* Add a small link to DN Managed Nebula

Also link the mobile source code
2026-03-30 16:20:21 -04:00
Jack Doan 91d1f4675a properly handle closetunnel packets (#1638) 2026-03-25 11:59:37 -05:00
John Maguire 9f1aef53fa Fix dissector logic (#1626)
* Fix typo in Wireshark dissector

* Fix wireshark dissector prefs_changed logic

The previous logic had several issues:
- Changing only the port number (without toggling all_ports) would
  not re-register the dissector on the new port.
- Turning all_ports off would remove all registrations but only
  re-add the specific port inside a branch that also required
  all_ports to have changed, and never updated default_settings.port.

Simplify to: remove all registrations, then register based on current
prefs, then update the cached state.
2026-03-23 11:15:40 -04:00
Jay R. Wren 1aa1a0476f #ECCN:Open Source in CODEOWNERS (#1632)
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Salesforce is requesting this in all opensource repositories
2026-03-16 17:07:40 -04:00
Jay R. Wren 7760ccefba fix logging copy pasta (#1621)
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2026-03-06 14:03:32 -05:00
Jack Doan 51308b845b connection-track ICMP traffic (#1602)
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* connection-track ICMP and ICMPv6 traffic

* icmpv6 only has identifier on echo
2026-02-18 23:19:37 -06:00
Wade Simmons 422fc2ad1e go fix (#1608)
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2026-02-17 11:42:14 -05:00
Wade Simmons e8bb874e14 smoke-extra: try AMD-V workaround (#1610)
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* smoke-extra: try AMD-V workaround

- https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/actions/runs/21995850645/job/63555492676?pr=1602
- https://github.com/actions/runner-images/issues/13202
- https://github.com/cri-o/packaging/pull/306/changes
2026-02-13 12:55:19 -06:00
Jack Doan 353ad1f271 firewall: icmp no longer requires a port spec (#1609) 2026-02-13 11:10:40 -06:00
Jack Doan f573e8a266 Merge commit from fork
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Newly signed P256 based certificates will have their signature clamped to the low-s form.

Update CHANGELOG.md
2026-02-06 14:26:51 -05:00
Jack Doan 42bee7cf17 Report if Nebula start fails because of tun device name (#1588)
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* specifically report if nebula start fails because of tun device name

* close all routines when closing the tun
2026-01-28 10:03:36 -06:00
Caleb Jasik 02d8bcac68 Remove lighthouse goroutine leaks in lighthouse_test.go (#1589)
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Using <https://go.dev/doc/go1.26#goroutineleak-profiles> + Claude, I was able to run nebula's unit tests and e2e tests with the leak detector enabled.

Added a TestMain that queries pprof to see if there are any reported goroutine leaks.
I'd love to get some form of this in CI whenever go 1.26 comes out, though I'd also like to prove this is properly useful past the just five detections it got here.

<details>
<summary>TestMain</summary>


```go
package nebula

import (
    "fmt"
    "os"
    "runtime/pprof"
    "strings"
    "testing"
)

// TestMain runs after all tests and checks for goroutine leaks
func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
    // Run all tests
    exitCode := m.Run()

    // Check for goroutine leaks after all tests complete
    prof := pprof.Lookup("goroutineleak")
    if prof != nil {
        var sb strings.Builder
        if err := prof.WriteTo(&sb, 2); err != nil {
            fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Failed to write goroutineleak profile: %v\n", err)
            os.Exit(1)
        }

        content := sb.String()
        leakedCount := strings.Count(content, "(leaked)")

        if leakedCount > 0 {
            fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "\n=== GOROUTINE LEAK DETECTED ===\n")
            fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Found %d leaked goroutine(s) in package nebula\n\n", leakedCount)

            goros := strings.Split(content, "\n\n")
            for _, goro := range goros {
                if strings.Contains(goro, "(leaked)") {
                    fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, goro)
                    fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr)
                }
            }
            os.Exit(1)
        } else {
            fmt.Println("✓ No goroutine leaks detected in package nebula")
        }
    }

    os.Exit(exitCode)
}
```

</details>

Also had to install go1.26rc2 and update the makefile to use that go binary + set ex:

```makefile
test-goroutineleak:
	GOEXPERIMENT=goroutineleakprofile go1.26rc2 test -v ./...
```
2026-01-27 23:44:43 -06:00
Wade Simmons 0b02d982b2 v1.10.2 (#1584)
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Update CHANGELOG for Nebula v1.10.2
2026-01-21 12:42:34 -05:00
Wade Simmons e1e92f017c initialize routesFromSystem (#1580)
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This is a regression introduced by #1573. We need to initialize this
map.

Fixes: #1579
2026-01-20 11:15:20 -05:00
zhetaicheleba e5f60fa54f chore: fix some typos in comments (#1582)
Signed-off-by: zhetaicheleba <taicheleba@outlook.com>
2026-01-20 11:03:31 -05:00
dependabot[bot] bf49e78243 Bump github.com/sirupsen/logrus from 1.9.3 to 1.9.4 (#1581)
Bumps [github.com/sirupsen/logrus](https://github.com/sirupsen/logrus) from 1.9.3 to 1.9.4.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/sirupsen/logrus/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/sirupsen/logrus/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/sirupsen/logrus/compare/v1.9.3...v1.9.4)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: github.com/sirupsen/logrus
  dependency-version: 1.9.4
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
...

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2026-01-20 10:40:24 -05:00
Nate Brown 72a40007ea v1.10.1 (#1575)
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Update CHANGELOG for Nebula v1.10.1
2026-01-16 10:33:54 -05:00
Nate Brown ac3bd9cdd0 Avoid losing system originated unsafe routes on reload (#1573)
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2026-01-15 13:48:17 -06:00
dependabot[bot] 88379b89f5 Bump golang.org/x/net in the golang-x-dependencies group (#1571)
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Bumps the golang-x-dependencies group with 1 update: [golang.org/x/net](https://github.com/golang/net).


Updates `golang.org/x/net` from 0.48.0 to 0.49.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/net/compare/v0.48.0...v0.49.0)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/net
  dependency-version: 0.49.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
...

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2026-01-13 00:02:44 -06:00
Nate Brown 1283ff0db4 Add option to control accepting recv_error (#1569) 2026-01-13 00:00:27 -06:00
dependabot[bot] 523209ec0b Bump github.com/miekg/dns from 1.1.68 to 1.1.69 (#1561)
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Bumps [github.com/miekg/dns](https://github.com/miekg/dns) from 1.1.68 to 1.1.69.
- [Commits](https://github.com/miekg/dns/compare/v1.1.68...v1.1.69)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: github.com/miekg/dns
  dependency-version: 1.1.69
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
...

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2026-01-12 16:16:42 -05:00
dependabot[bot] a4a6143b6a Bump google.golang.org/protobuf in the protobuf-dependencies group (#1560)
Bumps the protobuf-dependencies group with 1 update: google.golang.org/protobuf.


Updates `google.golang.org/protobuf` from 1.36.10 to 1.36.11

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: google.golang.org/protobuf
  dependency-version: 1.36.11
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: protobuf-dependencies
...

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2026-01-12 16:16:01 -05:00
dependabot[bot] 1b2d639b14 Bump actions/download-artifact from 6 to 7 (#1557)
Bumps [actions/download-artifact](https://github.com/actions/download-artifact) from 6 to 7.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/actions/download-artifact/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/actions/download-artifact/compare/v6...v7)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: actions/download-artifact
  dependency-version: '7'
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-major
...

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2026-01-12 15:40:47 -05:00
dependabot[bot] 9933970e67 Bump actions/upload-artifact from 5 to 6 (#1558)
Bumps [actions/upload-artifact](https://github.com/actions/upload-artifact) from 5 to 6.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/actions/upload-artifact/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/actions/upload-artifact/compare/v5...v6)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: actions/upload-artifact
  dependency-version: '6'
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-major
...

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2026-01-12 15:40:13 -05:00
dependabot[bot] d7a3f01465 Bump the golang-x-dependencies group across 1 directory with 4 updates (#1570)
Bumps the golang-x-dependencies group with 1 update in the / directory: [golang.org/x/crypto](https://github.com/golang/crypto).


Updates `golang.org/x/crypto` from 0.45.0 to 0.47.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/crypto/compare/v0.45.0...v0.47.0)

Updates `golang.org/x/net` from 0.47.0 to 0.48.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/net/compare/v0.47.0...v0.48.0)

Updates `golang.org/x/sys` from 0.39.0 to 0.40.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/sys/compare/v0.39.0...v0.40.0)

Updates `golang.org/x/term` from 0.38.0 to 0.39.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/term/compare/v0.38.0...v0.39.0)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/crypto
  dependency-version: 0.47.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/net
  dependency-version: 0.48.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/sys
  dependency-version: 0.40.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/term
  dependency-version: 0.39.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
...

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2026-01-12 15:35:34 -05:00
Nate Brownandbrad-defined 69259e6307 Quietly log error on UDP_NETRESET ioctl on Windows. (#1453) (#1568)
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2026-01-09 10:35:09 -06:00
brad-defined 2f71d6b22d Ensure pubkey coherency when rehydrating a handshake cert (#1566)
* Ensure pubkey coherency when rehydrating a handshake cert
* Include a check during handshakes after cert verification that the noise pubkey matches the cert pubkey.
2026-01-09 09:52:03 -05:00
Jack Doan 3ec527e42c cert.MarshalSigningPublicKeyToPEM should emit the 'ECDSA' variant of the banner (#1552)
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* cert.MarshalSigningPublicKeyToPEM should emit the 'ECDSA' variant of the banner

* oof owie ouch my tests
2025-12-10 10:39:36 -06:00
Nate Brown 2d16940232 Slight improvement to hot path benchmark, add a relay hot path benchmark (#1539)
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2025-12-09 22:29:26 -06:00
dependabot[bot] cba294ffa4 Bump actions/checkout from 5 to 6 (#1541)
Bumps [actions/checkout](https://github.com/actions/checkout) from 5 to 6.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/actions/checkout/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/actions/checkout/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/actions/checkout/compare/v5...v6)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: actions/checkout
  dependency-version: '6'
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-major
...

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2025-12-09 22:25:48 -06:00
dependabot[bot] 48406f85da Bump the golang-x-dependencies group with 3 updates (#1550)
Bumps the golang-x-dependencies group with 3 updates: [golang.org/x/sync](https://github.com/golang/sync), [golang.org/x/sys](https://github.com/golang/sys) and [golang.org/x/term](https://github.com/golang/term).


Updates `golang.org/x/sync` from 0.18.0 to 0.19.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/sync/compare/v0.18.0...v0.19.0)

Updates `golang.org/x/sys` from 0.38.0 to 0.39.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/sys/compare/v0.38.0...v0.39.0)

Updates `golang.org/x/term` from 0.37.0 to 0.38.0
- [Commits](https://github.com/golang/term/compare/v0.37.0...v0.38.0)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/sync
  dependency-version: 0.19.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/sys
  dependency-version: 0.39.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
- dependency-name: golang.org/x/term
  dependency-version: 0.38.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: golang-x-dependencies
...

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2025-12-09 22:19:53 -06:00
dependabot[bot] 14a1af132e Bump Apple-Actions/import-codesign-certs from 5 to 6 (#1549)
Bumps [Apple-Actions/import-codesign-certs](https://github.com/apple-actions/import-codesign-certs) from 5 to 6.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/apple-actions/import-codesign-certs/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/apple-actions/import-codesign-certs/compare/v5...v6)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: Apple-Actions/import-codesign-certs
  dependency-version: '6'
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-major
...

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2025-12-09 22:17:50 -06:00
Nate Brown 59e24b98bd v1.10.0 (#1534)
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Update CHANGELOG for Nebula v1.10.0
2025-12-04 14:42:31 -05:00
Nate Brown 56067afca2 Stab at better logging when a relay is being used (#1533)
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2025-12-03 17:48:29 -06:00
325 changed files with 46899 additions and 6283 deletions

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+123
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name: Code-sign Windows binaries
description: >
Sign every .exe under a given path in place via the DefinedNet code-signer
Lambda. If `role` or `bucket` is empty, logs a notice and skips signing so
forks and dev branches without AWS access still produce usable builds.
inputs:
path:
description: "Directory whose .exe files should be signed in place"
required: true
role:
description: "IAM role ARN to assume via OIDC; empty disables signing"
required: false
default: ""
bucket:
description: "S3 staging bucket the code-signer Lambda reads from; empty disables signing"
required: false
default: ""
region:
description: "AWS region for the role and Lambda"
required: false
default: "us-east-2"
function-name:
description: "Code-signer Lambda function name"
required: false
default: "code-signer"
key-prefix:
description: "S3 key prefix to write under; defaults to code-signing/<owner>/<repo> of the calling repo"
required: false
default: ""
runs:
using: composite
steps:
- name: Skip notice
if: inputs.role == '' || inputs.bucket == ''
shell: sh
run: echo "::notice::code-signer role or bucket not set; skipping code signing."
- name: Configure AWS credentials
if: inputs.role != '' && inputs.bucket != ''
uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v6
with:
role-to-assume: ${{ inputs.role }}
aws-region: ${{ inputs.region }}
# An STS secret key with special characters does not survive the
# pwsh -> make -> MSYS sh -> aws.exe chain, and SigV4 then signs with a
# key that no longer matches, so the first S3 upload fails with
# SignatureDoesNotMatch. Retries the assume until it comes back clean.
# Same fix as DefinedNet/dnclient#867.
special-characters-workaround: true
# Overridden by the workaround above and kept for whenever that goes:
# the default 12 rides out IAM trust-policy propagation, and once the
# role is stable a real misconfiguration should fail fast.
retry-max-attempts: 5
- name: Sign .exe files
if: inputs.role != '' && inputs.bucket != ''
shell: sh
env:
SIGN_PATH: ${{ inputs.path }}
BUCKET: ${{ inputs.bucket }}
FUNCTION_NAME: ${{ inputs.function-name }}
KEY_PREFIX: ${{ inputs.key-prefix }}
run: |
set -eu
# Default the prefix to this repo so the S3 key attributes the sign correctly.
# nebula-nightly runs this same action but writes under its own repo's prefix.
KEY_PREFIX="${KEY_PREFIX:-code-signing/$GITHUB_REPOSITORY}"
RUN="${GITHUB_RUN_ID}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT}"
find "$SIGN_PATH" -name '*.exe' -print | while read -r path
do
rel=${path#"$SIGN_PATH"/}
file=$(basename "$path")
name=${file%.exe}
prefix="${KEY_PREFIX}/${RUN}"
src="${prefix}/unsigned/${rel}"
dst="${prefix}/signed/${rel}"
echo "::group::Sign ${rel}"
echo "Uploading unsigned to s3://${BUCKET}/${src}"
aws s3 cp --no-progress "$path" "s3://${BUCKET}/${src}" >/dev/null
echo "Invoking ${FUNCTION_NAME} Lambda"
payload=$(jq -nc \
--arg s "$src" \
--arg d "$dst" \
--arg p "$name" \
'{source_key: $s, dest_key: $d, program_name: $p}')
meta=$(aws lambda invoke \
--function-name "$FUNCTION_NAME" \
--cli-binary-format raw-in-base64-out \
--payload "$payload" \
--output json \
/tmp/sign-resp.json)
if echo "$meta" | jq -e '.FunctionError != null' >/dev/null
then
echo "::endgroup::"
echo "::error::code-signer Lambda failed for ${rel}"
cat /tmp/sign-resp.json >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "Downloading signed back to ${path}"
aws s3 cp --no-progress "s3://${BUCKET}/${dst}" "$path" >/dev/null
aws s3 rm "s3://${BUCKET}/${src}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
aws s3 rm "s3://${BUCKET}/${dst}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
# Sanity-check the bytes we got back actually carry an Authenticode
# signature that this machine can validate end to end.
status=$(powershell -NoProfile -Command "(Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath '$path').Status" | tr -d '\r')
if [ "$status" != "Valid" ]
then
echo "::endgroup::"
echo "::error::${rel} signature status: ${status} (expected Valid)"
exit 1
fi
echo "Signed ${rel} (sha256=$(jq -r '.sha256' /tmp/sign-resp.json), status=${status})"
echo "::endgroup::"
done
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
#
# Backport a merged PR to a release branch.
#
# Cherry-picks the merge commit of a merged PR onto release-1.11 and opens a
# backport PR, mirroring the shape of #1842.
#
# Usage: ./backport.sh <pr-number> [target-version] [--continue]
# pr-number The merged PR to backport
# target-version Release version to target (default: 1.11)
# --continue Resume after resolving cherry-pick conflicts: assumes the
# fixes are staged, runs `git cherry-pick --continue`, and
# proceeds to push and open the backport PR.
#
# Requires: gh (authenticated), git, jq.
set -euo pipefail
PR_NUMBER=${1:?usage: backport.sh <pr-number> [target-version] [--continue]}
shift
CONTINUE=0
TARGET_VERSION=""
for arg in "$@"; do
case "$arg" in
--continue) CONTINUE=1 ;;
*) TARGET_VERSION=$arg ;;
esac
done
for cmd in gh git jq; do
command -v "$cmd" >/dev/null || { echo "error: $cmd is required" >&2; exit 1; }
done
# Pull the source PR's metadata. Refuse to backport a PR that never merged.
pr_json=$(gh pr view "$PR_NUMBER" --json title,body,mergedAt,mergeCommit,milestone)
PR_TITLE=$(jq -r '.title' <<<"$pr_json")
PR_BODY=$(jq -r '.body' <<<"$pr_json")
MERGE_SHA=$(jq -r '.mergeCommit.oid // empty' <<<"$pr_json")
PR_MILESTONE=$(jq -r '.milestone.title // empty' <<<"$pr_json")
if [ "$(jq -r '.mergedAt // empty' <<<"$pr_json")" = "" ] || [ -z "$MERGE_SHA" ]; then
echo "error: PR #${PR_NUMBER} is not merged (no merge commit to cherry-pick)" >&2
exit 1
fi
# Default the target to one minor below the PR's milestone: a PR landing in
# v1.12.0 backports to release-1.11. An explicit target-version arg overrides.
if [ -z "$TARGET_VERSION" ]; then
if [[ $PR_MILESTONE =~ ^v?([0-9]+)\.([0-9]+) ]]; then
TARGET_VERSION="${BASH_REMATCH[1]}.$(( BASH_REMATCH[2] - 1 ))"
else
echo "error: PR #${PR_NUMBER} has no v<major>.<minor>.* milestone to infer the target from." >&2
echo "Pass the target version explicitly, e.g. $0 ${PR_NUMBER} 1.11" >&2
exit 1
fi
fi
TARGET_BRANCH="release-${TARGET_VERSION}"
# Slug from the PR title: lower-case, non-alphanumerics to dashes, trimmed.
slug=$(printf '%s' "$PR_TITLE" \
| tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]' \
| sed -E 's/[^a-z0-9]+/-/g; s/^-+//; s/-+$//' \
| cut -c1-50 \
| sed -E 's/-+$//')
BRANCH="backport-${TARGET_VERSION//./-}-${slug}"
if [ "$CONTINUE" -eq 1 ]; then
# Resuming: the branch already exists and a cherry-pick is mid-conflict.
current=$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)
if [ "$current" != "$BRANCH" ]; then
echo "error: --continue expects to be on ${BRANCH}, but HEAD is ${current}" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "Resuming backport of #${PR_NUMBER} on ${BRANCH}"
# Conflicts assumed resolved and staged; core.editor=true keeps the commit message.
git -c core.editor=true cherry-pick --continue
else
# A fresh run switches branches and cherry-picks, so tracked changes must be
# clean. Untracked files are fine, and --continue is exempt (its resolved
# conflicts are meant to be staged).
if [ -n "$(git status --porcelain --untracked-files=no)" ]; then
echo "error: working tree has uncommitted changes to tracked files; commit or stash them first." >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "Backporting #${PR_NUMBER} (${MERGE_SHA}) onto ${TARGET_BRANCH} as ${BRANCH}"
git fetch origin
git checkout -b "$BRANCH" "origin/${TARGET_BRANCH}"
# -m 1 handles a real merge commit; plain cherry-pick handles a squash merge.
if ! { git cherry-pick -x -m 1 "$MERGE_SHA" 2>/dev/null || git cherry-pick -x "$MERGE_SHA"; }; then
echo "error: ${MERGE_SHA} did not cherry-pick cleanly onto ${TARGET_BRANCH}." >&2
echo "Resolve the conflicts, 'git add' them, then re-run:" >&2
echo " $0 ${PR_NUMBER} ${TARGET_VERSION} --continue" >&2
exit 1
fi
fi
title="backport v${TARGET_VERSION}: ${PR_TITLE}"
body=$(printf 'Backport from #%s to release v%s\n\n---\n\n%s' \
"$PR_NUMBER" "$TARGET_VERSION" "$PR_BODY")
# Highest open milestone matching v<version>.* (e.g. v1.11.1), if any.
MILESTONE=$(gh api "repos/{owner}/{repo}/milestones?state=open" \
--jq ".[].title | select(startswith(\"v${TARGET_VERSION}.\"))" \
| sort -V | tail -n1)
milestone_args=()
if [ -n "$MILESTONE" ]; then
milestone_args=(--milestone "$MILESTONE")
else
echo "warning: no open milestone matching v${TARGET_VERSION}.* found; PR will have no milestone" >&2
fi
echo
echo "About to run:"
printf ' git push -u --force-with-lease origin %q\n' "$BRANCH"
printf ' gh pr create --base %q --head %q --title %q --body %q' \
"$TARGET_BRANCH" "$BRANCH" "$title" "$body"
[ -n "$MILESTONE" ] && printf ' --milestone %q' "$MILESTONE"
printf '\n'
echo
read -r -p "Open this pull request? [y/N] " reply
case "$reply" in
[yY] | [yY][eE][sS]) ;;
*) echo "Aborted. The cherry-pick is on local branch ${BRANCH}; push it manually if desired."; exit 0 ;;
esac
git push -u --force-with-lease origin "$BRANCH"
gh pr create \
--base "$TARGET_BRANCH" \
--head "$BRANCH" \
--title "$title" \
--body "$body" \
${milestone_args[@]+"${milestone_args[@]}"}
# The backport now exists, so drop the label that flagged this PR for one.
gh pr edit "$PR_NUMBER" --remove-label needs-backport
# Switch back to the original branch we were on before doing the backport
git checkout -
-34
View File
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
name: gofmt
on:
push:
branches:
- master
pull_request:
paths:
- '.github/workflows/gofmt.yml'
- '**.go'
jobs:
gofmt:
name: Run gofmt
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
go-version: '1.25'
check-latest: true
- name: Install goimports
run: |
go install golang.org/x/tools/cmd/goimports@latest
- name: gofmt
run: |
if [ "$(find . -iname '*.go' | grep -v '\.pb\.go$' | xargs goimports -l)" ]
then
find . -iname '*.go' | grep -v '\.pb\.go$' | xargs goimports -d
exit 1
fi
+118 -33
View File
@@ -10,11 +10,11 @@ jobs:
name: Build Linux/BSD All name: Build Linux/BSD All
runs-on: ubuntu-latest runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps: steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 - uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6 - uses: actions/setup-go@v7
with: with:
go-version: '1.25' go-version: '1.27'
check-latest: true check-latest: true
- name: Build - name: Build
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ jobs:
mv build/*.tar.gz release mv build/*.tar.gz release
- name: Upload artifacts - name: Upload artifacts
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v5 uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
with: with:
name: linux-latest name: linux-latest
path: release path: release
@@ -32,12 +32,15 @@ jobs:
build-windows: build-windows:
name: Build Windows name: Build Windows
runs-on: windows-latest runs-on: windows-latest
permissions:
id-token: write
contents: read
steps: steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 - uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6 - uses: actions/setup-go@v7
with: with:
go-version: '1.25' go-version: '1.27'
check-latest: true check-latest: true
- name: Build - name: Build
@@ -54,8 +57,15 @@ jobs:
mkdir build\dist\windows mkdir build\dist\windows
mv dist\windows\wintun build\dist\windows\ mv dist\windows\wintun build\dist\windows\
- name: Code-sign
uses: ./.github/actions/code-sign
with:
path: build
role: ${{ secrets.DEFINED_CODE_SIGNER_ROLE }}
bucket: ${{ secrets.DEFINED_CODE_SIGNER_BUCKET }}
- name: Upload artifacts - name: Upload artifacts
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v5 uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
with: with:
name: windows-latest name: windows-latest
path: build path: build
@@ -63,27 +73,81 @@ jobs:
build-darwin: build-darwin:
name: Build Universal Darwin name: Build Universal Darwin
env: env:
HAS_SIGNING_CREDS: ${{ secrets.AC_USERNAME != '' }} HAS_SIGNING_CREDS: ${{ secrets.APPLE_SIGNING_ROLE_ARN != '' }}
runs-on: macos-latest runs-on: macos-latest
permissions:
id-token: write
contents: read
steps: steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 - uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6 - uses: actions/setup-go@v7
with: with:
go-version: '1.25' go-version: '1.27'
check-latest: true check-latest: true
# GitHub holds ARNs, not credentials, and ARNs outlive a rotation
- name: Configure AWS credentials
if: env.HAS_SIGNING_CREDS == 'true'
uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v6
with:
role-to-assume: ${{ secrets.APPLE_SIGNING_ROLE_ARN }}
aws-region: us-east-2
# parse-json-secrets unpacks into SIGNING_* and ASC_*, masked on the way in
- name: Fetch signing credentials
if: env.HAS_SIGNING_CREDS == 'true'
uses: aws-actions/aws-secretsmanager-get-secrets@v3
with:
parse-json-secrets: true
secret-ids: |
SIGNING,${{ secrets.APPLE_SIGNING_DEVELOPER_ID_ARN }}
ASC,${{ secrets.APPLE_NOTARY_KEY_ARN }}
- name: Import certificates - name: Import certificates
if: env.HAS_SIGNING_CREDS == 'true' if: env.HAS_SIGNING_CREDS == 'true'
uses: Apple-Actions/import-codesign-certs@v5 uses: Apple-Actions/import-codesign-certs@v7
with: with:
p12-file-base64: ${{ secrets.APPLE_DEVELOPER_CERTIFICATE_P12_BASE64 }} p12-file-base64: ${{ env.SIGNING_P12_BASE64 }}
p12-password: ${{ secrets.APPLE_DEVELOPER_CERTIFICATE_PASSWORD }} p12-password: ${{ env.SIGNING_PASSWORD }}
# The action imports but does not check the chain validates, which is how a p12
# missing its intermediate reaches a failing codesign
- name: Check the identity is usable
if: env.HAS_SIGNING_CREDS == 'true'
run: |
: "${SIGNING_IDENTITY_SHA1:?empty, so the secret has no identity_sha1}"
identities=$(security find-identity -v -p codesigning signing_temp.keychain)
case "$identities" in
*"$SIGNING_IDENTITY_SHA1"*) ;;
*) printf '%s\n' "$identities" >&2; exit 1 ;;
esac
# notarytool wants the key as a file
- name: Write the App Store Connect key
if: env.HAS_SIGNING_CREDS == 'true'
run: |
mkdir -p ~/private_keys
chmod 700 ~/private_keys
key_path="$HOME/private_keys/AuthKey_${ASC_KEY_ID}.p8"
(umask 077; printf '%s\n' "$ASC_PRIVATE_KEY" > "$key_path")
echo "ASC_P8=$key_path" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
- name: Drop the credentials from the environment
if: env.HAS_SIGNING_CREDS == 'true'
run: |
# The action's own inventory, so a new field in a secret is covered
python3 -c '
import json, os
raw = os.environ.get("SECRETS_LIST_CLEAN_UP")
if raw is None and os.environ.get("SIGNING_P12_BASE64"):
raise SystemExit("SECRETS_LIST_CLEAN_UP is gone, fetched secrets are not being scrubbed")
keep = {"SIGNING_IDENTITY_SHA1", "ASC_KEY_ID", "ASC_ISSUER_ID"}
names = [n for n in json.loads(raw or "[]") if n not in keep]
print("\n".join(f"{n}=" for n in dict.fromkeys(names)))
' >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
- name: Build, sign, and notarize - name: Build, sign, and notarize
env:
AC_USERNAME: ${{ secrets.AC_USERNAME }}
AC_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.AC_PASSWORD }}
run: | run: |
rm -rf release rm -rf release
mkdir release mkdir release
@@ -92,19 +156,36 @@ jobs:
lipo -create -output ./release/nebula ./build/darwin-amd64/nebula ./build/darwin-arm64/nebula lipo -create -output ./release/nebula ./build/darwin-amd64/nebula ./build/darwin-arm64/nebula
lipo -create -output ./release/nebula-cert ./build/darwin-amd64/nebula-cert ./build/darwin-arm64/nebula-cert lipo -create -output ./release/nebula-cert ./build/darwin-amd64/nebula-cert ./build/darwin-arm64/nebula-cert
if [ -n "$AC_USERNAME" ]; then # Unset in a fork, which has no credentials to sign with
codesign -s "10BC1FDDEB6CE753550156C0669109FAC49E4D1E" -f -v --timestamp --options=runtime -i "net.defined.nebula" ./release/nebula if [ -n "$SIGNING_IDENTITY_SHA1" ]; then
codesign -s "10BC1FDDEB6CE753550156C0669109FAC49E4D1E" -f -v --timestamp --options=runtime -i "net.defined.nebula-cert" ./release/nebula-cert codesign -s "$SIGNING_IDENTITY_SHA1" -f -v --timestamp --options=runtime -i "net.defined.nebula" ./release/nebula
codesign -s "$SIGNING_IDENTITY_SHA1" -f -v --timestamp --options=runtime -i "net.defined.nebula-cert" ./release/nebula-cert
fi fi
zip -j release/nebula-darwin.zip release/nebula-cert release/nebula zip -j release/nebula-darwin.zip release/nebula-cert release/nebula
if [ -n "$AC_USERNAME" ]; then if [ -n "$ASC_P8" ]; then
xcrun notarytool submit ./release/nebula-darwin.zip --team-id "576H3XS7FP" --apple-id "$AC_USERNAME" --password "$AC_PASSWORD" --wait xcrun notarytool submit ./release/nebula-darwin.zip --key "$ASC_P8" --key-id "$ASC_KEY_ID" --issuer "$ASC_ISSUER_ID" --wait
fi fi
- name: Drop the signing key
if: always() && env.HAS_SIGNING_CREDS == 'true'
run: |
# Locked, not deleted: import-codesign-certs deletes it in its own post
# step and fails the job if it is already gone. Locked is unusable.
security lock-keychain signing_temp.keychain || true
rm -f "$ASC_P8"
# Nothing later in this job needs AWS
python3 -c '
import json, os
names = json.loads(os.environ.get("SECRETS_LIST_CLEAN_UP") or "[]")
names += ["ASC_P8", "SIGNING_IDENTITY_SHA1", "ASC_KEY_ID", "ASC_ISSUER_ID",
"AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID", "AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY", "AWS_SESSION_TOKEN"]
print("\n".join(f"{n}=" for n in dict.fromkeys(names)))
' >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
- name: Upload artifacts - name: Upload artifacts
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v5 uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
with: with:
name: darwin-latest name: darwin-latest
path: ./release/* path: ./release/*
@@ -124,25 +205,25 @@ jobs:
# be overwritten # be overwritten
- name: Checkout code - name: Checkout code
if: ${{ env.HAS_DOCKER_CREDS == 'true' }} if: ${{ env.HAS_DOCKER_CREDS == 'true' }}
uses: actions/checkout@v5 uses: actions/checkout@v7
- name: Download artifacts - name: Download artifacts
if: ${{ env.HAS_DOCKER_CREDS == 'true' }} if: ${{ env.HAS_DOCKER_CREDS == 'true' }}
uses: actions/download-artifact@v6 uses: actions/download-artifact@v8
with: with:
name: linux-latest name: linux-latest
path: artifacts path: artifacts
- name: Login to Docker Hub - name: Login to Docker Hub
if: ${{ env.HAS_DOCKER_CREDS == 'true' }} if: ${{ env.HAS_DOCKER_CREDS == 'true' }}
uses: docker/login-action@v3 uses: docker/login-action@v4
with: with:
username: ${{ vars.DOCKERHUB_USERNAME }} username: ${{ vars.DOCKERHUB_USERNAME }}
password: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_TOKEN }} password: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Set up Docker Buildx - name: Set up Docker Buildx
if: ${{ env.HAS_DOCKER_CREDS == 'true' }} if: ${{ env.HAS_DOCKER_CREDS == 'true' }}
uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3 uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v4
- name: Build and push images - name: Build and push images
if: ${{ env.HAS_DOCKER_CREDS == 'true' }} if: ${{ env.HAS_DOCKER_CREDS == 'true' }}
@@ -153,17 +234,20 @@ jobs:
mkdir -p build/linux-{amd64,arm64} mkdir -p build/linux-{amd64,arm64}
tar -zxvf artifacts/nebula-linux-amd64.tar.gz -C build/linux-amd64/ tar -zxvf artifacts/nebula-linux-amd64.tar.gz -C build/linux-amd64/
tar -zxvf artifacts/nebula-linux-arm64.tar.gz -C build/linux-arm64/ tar -zxvf artifacts/nebula-linux-arm64.tar.gz -C build/linux-arm64/
docker buildx build . --push -f docker/Dockerfile --platform linux/amd64,linux/arm64 --tag "${DOCKER_IMAGE_REPO}:${DOCKER_IMAGE_TAG}" --tag "${DOCKER_IMAGE_REPO}:${GITHUB_REF#refs/tags/v}" docker buildx build . --push -f docker/Dockerfile --platform linux/amd64,linux/arm64 \
--build-arg VERSION="${GITHUB_REF#refs/tags/v}" \
--build-arg REVISION="${GITHUB_SHA}" \
--tag "${DOCKER_IMAGE_REPO}:${DOCKER_IMAGE_TAG}" --tag "${DOCKER_IMAGE_REPO}:${GITHUB_REF#refs/tags/v}"
release: release:
name: Create and Upload Release name: Create and Upload Release
needs: [build-linux, build-darwin, build-windows] needs: [build-linux, build-darwin, build-windows]
runs-on: ubuntu-latest runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps: steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 - uses: actions/checkout@v7
- name: Download artifacts - name: Download artifacts
uses: actions/download-artifact@v6 uses: actions/download-artifact@v8
with: with:
path: artifacts path: artifacts
@@ -209,10 +293,11 @@ jobs:
id: create_release id: create_release
env: env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
GITHUB_REF_NAME: ${{ github.ref_name }}
run: | run: |
cd artifacts cd artifacts
gh release create \ gh release create \
--verify-tag \ --verify-tag \
--title "Release ${{ github.ref_name }}" \ --title "Release ${GITHUB_REF_NAME}" \
"${{ github.ref_name }}" \ "${GITHUB_REF_NAME}" \
SHASUM256.txt *-latest/*.zip *-latest/*.tar.gz SHASUM256.txt *-latest/*.zip *-latest/*.tar.gz
+97 -16
View File
@@ -14,38 +14,119 @@ on:
- 'go.sum' - 'go.sum'
jobs: jobs:
smoke-extra: smoke-extra-libvirt:
if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/master' || contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'smoke-test-extra') if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/master' || contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'smoke-test-extra')
name: Run extra smoke tests name: ${{ matrix.target }}
runs-on: ubuntu-latest runs-on: ubuntu-latest
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
target:
- freebsd-amd64
- openbsd-amd64
- netbsd-amd64
- linux-amd64-ipv6disable
env:
VAGRANT_DEFAULT_PROVIDER: libvirt
steps: steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 - uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6 - uses: actions/setup-go@v7
with: with:
go-version: '1.25' go-version: '1.27'
check-latest: true check-latest: true
- name: add hashicorp source - name: add hashicorp source
run: wget -O- https://apt.releases.hashicorp.com/gpg | gpg --dearmor | sudo tee /usr/share/keyrings/hashicorp-archive-keyring.gpg && echo "deb [signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/hashicorp-archive-keyring.gpg] https://apt.releases.hashicorp.com $(lsb_release -cs) main" | sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/hashicorp.list run: wget -O- https://apt.releases.hashicorp.com/gpg | gpg --dearmor | sudo tee /usr/share/keyrings/hashicorp-archive-keyring.gpg && echo "deb [signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/hashicorp-archive-keyring.gpg] https://apt.releases.hashicorp.com $(lsb_release -cs) main" | sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/hashicorp.list
- name: install vagrant - name: install vagrant and libvirt
run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y vagrant virtualbox run: |
sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y vagrant libvirt-daemon-system libvirt-dev
sudo chmod 666 /dev/kvm
sudo usermod -aG libvirt $(whoami)
sudo chmod 666 /var/run/libvirt/libvirt-sock
vagrant plugin install vagrant-libvirt
- name: freebsd-amd64 - name: ${{ matrix.target }}
run: make smoke-vagrant/freebsd-amd64 run: make smoke-vagrant/${{ matrix.target }}
- name: openbsd-amd64 timeout-minutes: 30
run: make smoke-vagrant/openbsd-amd64
- name: netbsd-amd64 # linux-386 needs VirtualBox, which conflicts with KVM/libvirt -- isolated job.
run: make smoke-vagrant/netbsd-amd64 smoke-extra-virtualbox:
if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/master' || contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'smoke-test-extra')
name: linux-386
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
env:
VAGRANT_DEFAULT_PROVIDER: virtualbox
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/setup-go@v7
with:
go-version: '1.27'
check-latest: true
- name: add hashicorp source
run: wget -O- https://apt.releases.hashicorp.com/gpg | gpg --dearmor | sudo tee /usr/share/keyrings/hashicorp-archive-keyring.gpg && echo "deb [signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/hashicorp-archive-keyring.gpg] https://apt.releases.hashicorp.com $(lsb_release -cs) main" | sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/hashicorp.list
- name: install vagrant and virtualbox
run: |
sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y vagrant virtualbox
sudo rmmod kvm_amd kvm_intel kvm 2>/dev/null || true
- name: linux-386 - name: linux-386
run: make smoke-vagrant/linux-386 run: make smoke-vagrant/linux-386
- name: linux-amd64-ipv6disable
run: make smoke-vagrant/linux-amd64-ipv6disable
timeout-minutes: 30 timeout-minutes: 30
smoke-windows:
if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/master' || contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'smoke-test-extra')
name: Run windows smoke test
runs-on: windows-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/setup-go@v7
with:
go-version: '1.27'
check-latest: true
# WSL2 + Ubuntu so the smoke can run a real linux peer with its own
# netns. iputils-ping is needed for the in-WSL ping check. WSL1 has no
# real kernel and would lack /dev/net/tun, so we have to force WSL2.
- uses: Vampire/setup-wsl@v7
with:
distribution: Ubuntu-24.04
additional-packages: iputils-ping iproute2
# Vampire/setup-wsl provisions WSL1 even when the WSL2 platform is present.
# Convert the distro to WSL2 explicitly before we try to use /dev/net/tun.
- name: convert distro to WSL2
shell: pwsh
run: |
wsl --set-version Ubuntu-24.04 2
wsl --shutdown
wsl --list --verbose
- name: build windows nebula
run: make bin-windows
- name: build linux nebula for WSL
shell: bash
env:
GOOS: linux
GOARCH: amd64
run: |
mkdir -p build/linux-amd64
go build -o build/linux-amd64/nebula ./cmd/nebula
- name: run smoke-windows
shell: pwsh
working-directory: ./.github/workflows/smoke
run: ./smoke-windows.ps1
timeout-minutes: 15
+35 -26
View File
@@ -18,38 +18,47 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps: steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 - uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6 - uses: actions/setup-go@v7
with: with:
go-version: '1.25' go-version: '1.27'
check-latest: true
- name: Smoke Docker
run: make smoke-docker
- name: Smoke Docker IPv6 overlay
run: make smoke-docker-ipv6
- name: Smoke Relay Docker
run: make smoke-relay-docker
- name: Smoke Docker boringcrypto
run: make boringcrypto smoke-docker
- name: Smoke Docker fips140
run: make fips140-all GOALS=smoke-docker
timeout-minutes: 10
smoke-self:
name: Run self traffic smoke test on macOS
runs-on: macos-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/setup-go@v7
with:
go-version: '1.27'
check-latest: true check-latest: true
- name: build - name: build
run: make bin-docker CGO_ENABLED=1 BUILD_ARGS=-race run: make bin
- name: setup docker image - name: run smoke-self
working-directory: ./.github/workflows/smoke working-directory: ./.github/workflows/smoke
run: ./build.sh run: ./smoke-self.sh
- name: run smoke
working-directory: ./.github/workflows/smoke
run: ./smoke.sh
- name: setup relay docker image
working-directory: ./.github/workflows/smoke
run: ./build-relay.sh
- name: run smoke relay
working-directory: ./.github/workflows/smoke
run: ./smoke-relay.sh
- name: setup docker image for P256
working-directory: ./.github/workflows/smoke
run: NAME="smoke-p256" CURVE=P256 ./build.sh
- name: run smoke-p256
working-directory: ./.github/workflows/smoke
run: NAME="smoke-p256" ./smoke.sh
timeout-minutes: 10 timeout-minutes: 10
+5 -3
View File
@@ -16,8 +16,10 @@ relay:
am_relay: true am_relay: true
EOF EOF
export LIGHTHOUSES="192.168.100.1 172.17.0.2:4242" # TEST-NET-3 placeholder IPs; smoke-relay.sh seds them to real container IPs.
export REMOTE_ALLOW_LIST='{"172.17.0.4/32": false, "172.17.0.5/32": false}' # Mapping: .2 lighthouse1, .3 host2, .4 host3, .5 host4.
export LIGHTHOUSES="192.168.100.1 203.0.113.2:4242"
export REMOTE_ALLOW_LIST='{"203.0.113.4/32": false, "203.0.113.5/32": false}'
HOST="host2" ../genconfig.sh >host2.yml <<EOF HOST="host2" ../genconfig.sh >host2.yml <<EOF
relay: relay:
@@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ relay:
- 192.168.100.1 - 192.168.100.1
EOF EOF
export REMOTE_ALLOW_LIST='{"172.17.0.3/32": false}' export REMOTE_ALLOW_LIST='{"203.0.113.3/32": false}'
HOST="host3" ../genconfig.sh >host3.yml HOST="host3" ../genconfig.sh >host3.yml
+29 -10
View File
@@ -5,9 +5,28 @@ set -e -x
rm -rf ./build rm -rf ./build
mkdir ./build mkdir ./build
# TODO: Assumes your docker bridge network is a /24, and the first container that launches will be .1 if [ "$SMOKE_OVERLAY_IPV6" ]
# - We could make this better by launching the lighthouse first and then fetching what IP it is. then
NET="$(docker network inspect bridge -f '{{ range .IPAM.Config }}{{ .Subnet }}{{ end }}' | cut -d. -f1-3)" LIGHTHOUSE_NIP="fd00:4242:0:0:0:ffff:c0a8:6401"
HOST2_NIP="fd00:4242:0:0:0:ffff:c0a8:6402"
HOST3_NIP="fd00:4242:0:0:0:ffff:c0a8:6403"
HOST4_NIP="fd00:4242:0:0:0:ffff:c0a8:6404"
else
LIGHTHOUSE_NIP="192.168.100.1"
HOST2_NIP="192.168.100.2"
HOST3_NIP="192.168.100.3"
HOST4_NIP="192.168.100.4"
fi
# Smoke containers run on a dedicated docker network whose subnet is allocated
# at smoke time, not known at build time. Configs are written with TEST-NET-3
# placeholder IPs (RFC 5737) and smoke.sh / smoke-vagrant.sh / smoke-relay.sh
# sed the real container IPs in before starting nebula.
#
# Placeholder mapping (last octet == fixed container slot):
# 203.0.113.2 -> lighthouse1, 203.0.113.3 -> host2,
# 203.0.113.4 -> host3, 203.0.113.5 -> host4.
LIGHTHOUSE_IP="203.0.113.2"
( (
cd build cd build
@@ -25,24 +44,24 @@ NET="$(docker network inspect bridge -f '{{ range .IPAM.Config }}{{ .Subnet }}{{
../genconfig.sh >lighthouse1.yml ../genconfig.sh >lighthouse1.yml
HOST="host2" \ HOST="host2" \
LIGHTHOUSES="192.168.100.1 $NET.2:4242" \ LIGHTHOUSES="$LIGHTHOUSE_NIP $LIGHTHOUSE_IP:4242" \
../genconfig.sh >host2.yml ../genconfig.sh >host2.yml
HOST="host3" \ HOST="host3" \
LIGHTHOUSES="192.168.100.1 $NET.2:4242" \ LIGHTHOUSES="$LIGHTHOUSE_NIP $LIGHTHOUSE_IP:4242" \
INBOUND='[{"port": "any", "proto": "icmp", "group": "lighthouse"}]' \ INBOUND='[{"port": "any", "proto": "icmp", "group": "lighthouse"}]' \
../genconfig.sh >host3.yml ../genconfig.sh >host3.yml
HOST="host4" \ HOST="host4" \
LIGHTHOUSES="192.168.100.1 $NET.2:4242" \ LIGHTHOUSES="$LIGHTHOUSE_NIP $LIGHTHOUSE_IP:4242" \
OUTBOUND='[{"port": "any", "proto": "icmp", "group": "lighthouse"}]' \ OUTBOUND='[{"port": "any", "proto": "icmp", "group": "lighthouse"}]' \
../genconfig.sh >host4.yml ../genconfig.sh >host4.yml
../../../../nebula-cert ca -curve "${CURVE:-25519}" -name "Smoke Test" ../../../../nebula-cert ca -curve "${CURVE:-25519}" -name "Smoke Test"
../../../../nebula-cert sign -name "lighthouse1" -groups "lighthouse,lighthouse1" -ip "192.168.100.1/24" ../../../../nebula-cert sign -name "lighthouse1" -groups "lighthouse,lighthouse1" -ip "$LIGHTHOUSE_NIP/24"
../../../../nebula-cert sign -name "host2" -groups "host,host2" -ip "192.168.100.2/24" ../../../../nebula-cert sign -name "host2" -groups "host,host2" -ip "$HOST2_NIP/24"
../../../../nebula-cert sign -name "host3" -groups "host,host3" -ip "192.168.100.3/24" ../../../../nebula-cert sign -name "host3" -groups "host,host3" -ip "$HOST3_NIP/24"
../../../../nebula-cert sign -name "host4" -groups "host,host4" -ip "192.168.100.4/24" ../../../../nebula-cert sign -name "host4" -groups "host,host4" -ip "$HOST4_NIP/24"
) )
docker build -t "nebula:${NAME:-smoke}" . docker build -t "nebula:${NAME:-smoke}" .
+48 -9
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ set -o pipefail
mkdir -p logs mkdir -p logs
NETWORK="nebula-smoke-relay"
cleanup() { cleanup() {
echo echo
echo " *** cleanup" echo " *** cleanup"
@@ -16,22 +18,53 @@ cleanup() {
then then
docker kill lighthouse1 host2 host3 host4 docker kill lighthouse1 host2 host3 host4
fi fi
docker network rm "$NETWORK" >/dev/null 2>&1
} }
trap cleanup EXIT trap cleanup EXIT
docker run --name lighthouse1 --rm nebula:smoke-relay -config lighthouse1.yml -test # Create a dedicated smoke network with an explicit subnet (required for --ip
docker run --name host2 --rm nebula:smoke-relay -config host2.yml -test # below). Probe a short list of candidates so a locally-used range doesn't
docker run --name host3 --rm nebula:smoke-relay -config host3.yml -test # fail the whole test — we only need one to be free.
docker run --name host4 --rm nebula:smoke-relay -config host4.yml -test docker network rm "$NETWORK" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
for candidate in 172.30.0.0/24 172.31.0.0/24 10.98.0.0/24 10.99.0.0/24 192.168.230.0/24; do
if docker network create --subnet "$candidate" "$NETWORK" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
break
fi
done
if ! docker network inspect "$NETWORK" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "failed to create $NETWORK: every candidate subnet is in use" >&2
exit 1
fi
docker run --name lighthouse1 --device /dev/net/tun:/dev/net/tun --cap-add NET_ADMIN --rm nebula:smoke-relay -config lighthouse1.yml 2>&1 | tee logs/lighthouse1 | sed -u 's/^/ [lighthouse1] /' & # Derive container IPs from the network's assigned subnet. Slots: .2 lighthouse1,
# .3 host2, .4 host3, .5 host4 — matches the placeholders in build-relay.sh.
SUBNET="$(docker network inspect -f '{{(index .IPAM.Config 0).Subnet}}' "$NETWORK")"
PREFIX="${SUBNET%/*}"
PREFIX="${PREFIX%.*}"
LIGHTHOUSE_IP="$PREFIX.2"
HOST2_IP="$PREFIX.3"
HOST3_IP="$PREFIX.4"
HOST4_IP="$PREFIX.5"
# Sed the placeholder TEST-NET-3 IPs in the host configs to the real ones.
for f in build/host2.yml build/host3.yml build/host4.yml; do
sed "s|203\.0\.113\.|$PREFIX.|g" "$f" >"$f.tmp"
mv "$f.tmp" "$f"
done
docker run --name lighthouse1 --rm nebula:smoke-relay -config lighthouse1.yml -test
docker run --name host2 --rm -v "$PWD/build/host2.yml:/nebula/host2.yml:ro" nebula:smoke-relay -config host2.yml -test
docker run --name host3 --rm -v "$PWD/build/host3.yml:/nebula/host3.yml:ro" nebula:smoke-relay -config host3.yml -test
docker run --name host4 --rm -v "$PWD/build/host4.yml:/nebula/host4.yml:ro" nebula:smoke-relay -config host4.yml -test
docker run --name lighthouse1 --network "$NETWORK" --ip "$LIGHTHOUSE_IP" --device /dev/net/tun:/dev/net/tun --cap-add NET_ADMIN --rm nebula:smoke-relay -config lighthouse1.yml 2>&1 | tee logs/lighthouse1 | sed -u 's/^/ [lighthouse1] /' &
sleep 1 sleep 1
docker run --name host2 --device /dev/net/tun:/dev/net/tun --cap-add NET_ADMIN --rm nebula:smoke-relay -config host2.yml 2>&1 | tee logs/host2 | sed -u 's/^/ [host2] /' & docker run --name host2 --network "$NETWORK" --ip "$HOST2_IP" -v "$PWD/build/host2.yml:/nebula/host2.yml:ro" --device /dev/net/tun:/dev/net/tun --cap-add NET_ADMIN --rm nebula:smoke-relay -config host2.yml 2>&1 | tee logs/host2 | sed -u 's/^/ [host2] /' &
sleep 1 sleep 1
docker run --name host3 --device /dev/net/tun:/dev/net/tun --cap-add NET_ADMIN --rm nebula:smoke-relay -config host3.yml 2>&1 | tee logs/host3 | sed -u 's/^/ [host3] /' & docker run --name host3 --network "$NETWORK" --ip "$HOST3_IP" -v "$PWD/build/host3.yml:/nebula/host3.yml:ro" --device /dev/net/tun:/dev/net/tun --cap-add NET_ADMIN --rm nebula:smoke-relay -config host3.yml 2>&1 | tee logs/host3 | sed -u 's/^/ [host3] /' &
sleep 1 sleep 1
docker run --name host4 --device /dev/net/tun:/dev/net/tun --cap-add NET_ADMIN --rm nebula:smoke-relay -config host4.yml 2>&1 | tee logs/host4 | sed -u 's/^/ [host4] /' & docker run --name host4 --network "$NETWORK" --ip "$HOST4_IP" -v "$PWD/build/host4.yml:/nebula/host4.yml:ro" --device /dev/net/tun:/dev/net/tun --cap-add NET_ADMIN --rm nebula:smoke-relay -config host4.yml 2>&1 | tee logs/host4 | sed -u 's/^/ [host4] /' &
sleep 1 sleep 1
set +x set +x
@@ -76,7 +109,13 @@ docker exec host4 sh -c 'kill 1'
docker exec host3 sh -c 'kill 1' docker exec host3 sh -c 'kill 1'
docker exec host2 sh -c 'kill 1' docker exec host2 sh -c 'kill 1'
docker exec lighthouse1 sh -c 'kill 1' docker exec lighthouse1 sh -c 'kill 1'
sleep 5
# Wait up to 30s for all backgrounded jobs to exit rather than relying on a
# fixed sleep.
for _ in $(seq 1 30); do
[ -z "$(jobs -r)" ] && break
sleep 1
done
if [ "$(jobs -r)" ] if [ "$(jobs -r)" ]
then then
+130
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
#!/bin/bash
# A host must be able to reach its own overlay address. Where the kernel sends
# that traffic through the tun rather than over loopback, nebula sees it and
# hands it straight back (immediatelyForwardToSelf), and whether the kernel
# accepts what comes back is only answerable against a real kernel. Runs one
# nebula on this machine as root and aims every probe at its own address.
set -e -x
set -o pipefail
V4=192.0.2.1
V6=2001:db8::1
case "$(uname -s)" in
Darwin) TUN_DEV=utun ;;
*) TUN_DEV=tun0 ;;
esac
ROOT="$(cd ../../.. && pwd)"
rm -rf build/self
mkdir -p build/self
cd build/self
cleanup() {
echo
echo " *** cleanup"
echo
set +e
if [ -n "$NEBULA_PID" ]
then
sudo kill "$NEBULA_PID"
fi
{ kill $(jobs -p); wait; } 2>/dev/null
sed 's/^/ [self] /' nebula.log
}
trap cleanup EXIT
# perl is on every platform this runs on; timeout(1) is not.
alarm() {
perl -e 'alarm shift; exec @ARGV' "$@"
}
RESULTS=""
FAILED=""
probe() {
local name="$1"
shift
if "$@"
then
RESULTS="$RESULTS $name=ok"
else
RESULTS="$RESULTS $name=FAIL"
FAILED="$FAILED $name"
fi
}
# Send one datagram, then wait for the listener to have written it out.
udp_probe() {
echo self | alarm 5 nc -u -w1 "$1" 3000 || true
set +x
for _ in $(seq 1 20)
do
if grep -q self "$2"
then
set -x
return 0
fi
sleep 0.25
done
set -x
return 1
}
"$ROOT/nebula-cert" ca -name "Smoke Test"
"$ROOT/nebula-cert" sign -name self -networks "$V4/24,$V6/64"
HOST=self AM_LIGHTHOUSE=true TUN_DEV="$TUN_DEV" ../../genconfig.sh >self.yml
"$ROOT/nebula" -config self.yml -test
sudo -v
sudo "$ROOT/nebula" -config self.yml >nebula.log 2>&1 &
NEBULA_PID=$!
for _ in $(seq 1 40)
do
ifconfig | grep "inet6 $V6 " >/dev/null && break
sleep 0.25
done
ifconfig | grep "inet $V4 "
ifconfig | grep "inet6 $V6 "
nc -l "$V4" 2000 >/dev/null &
nc -l "$V6" 2000 >/dev/null &
nc -u -l "$V4" 3000 >udp4.txt &
nc -u -l "$V6" 3000 >udp6.txt &
sleep 1
set +x
echo
echo " *** Testing self traffic from $V4"
echo
set -x
probe icmp4 alarm 5 ping -c1 "$V4"
probe tcp4 alarm 5 nc -z "$V4" 2000
probe udp4 udp_probe "$V4" udp4.txt
set +x
echo
echo " *** Testing self traffic from $V6"
echo
set -x
probe icmp6 alarm 5 ping6 -c1 "$V6"
probe tcp6 alarm 5 nc -z "$V6" 2000
probe udp6 udp_probe "$V6" udp6.txt
set +x
echo
echo " *** self traffic:$RESULTS"
echo
if [ -n "$FAILED" ]
then
echo "self traffic failed:$FAILED" >&2
exit 1
fi
+43 -4
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ export VAGRANT_CWD="$PWD/vagrant-$1"
mkdir -p logs mkdir -p logs
NETWORK="nebula-smoke"
cleanup() { cleanup() {
echo echo
echo " *** cleanup" echo " *** cleanup"
@@ -19,21 +21,51 @@ cleanup() {
docker kill lighthouse1 host2 docker kill lighthouse1 host2
fi fi
vagrant destroy -f vagrant destroy -f
docker network rm "$NETWORK" >/dev/null 2>&1
} }
trap cleanup EXIT trap cleanup EXIT
# Create a dedicated smoke network with an explicit subnet (required for --ip
# below). Probe a short list of candidates so a locally-used range doesn't
# fail the whole test — we only need one to be free.
docker network rm "$NETWORK" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
for candidate in 172.30.0.0/24 172.31.0.0/24 10.98.0.0/24 10.99.0.0/24 192.168.230.0/24; do
if docker network create --subnet "$candidate" "$NETWORK" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
break
fi
done
if ! docker network inspect "$NETWORK" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "failed to create $NETWORK: every candidate subnet is in use" >&2
exit 1
fi
# Derive container IPs from the network's assigned subnet. Slots: .2 lighthouse1,
# .3 host2 — matches the placeholders in build.sh.
SUBNET="$(docker network inspect -f '{{(index .IPAM.Config 0).Subnet}}' "$NETWORK")"
PREFIX="${SUBNET%/*}"
PREFIX="${PREFIX%.*}"
LIGHTHOUSE_IP="$PREFIX.2"
HOST2_IP="$PREFIX.3"
# Sed the placeholder TEST-NET-3 IPs in the host configs to the real ones.
# This must happen before `vagrant up` rsyncs build/ into the VM for host3.
for f in build/host2.yml build/host3.yml; do
sed "s|203\.0\.113\.|$PREFIX.|g" "$f" >"$f.tmp"
mv "$f.tmp" "$f"
done
CONTAINER="nebula:${NAME:-smoke}" CONTAINER="nebula:${NAME:-smoke}"
docker run --name lighthouse1 --rm "$CONTAINER" -config lighthouse1.yml -test docker run --name lighthouse1 --rm "$CONTAINER" -config lighthouse1.yml -test
docker run --name host2 --rm "$CONTAINER" -config host2.yml -test docker run --name host2 --rm -v "$PWD/build/host2.yml:/nebula/host2.yml:ro" "$CONTAINER" -config host2.yml -test
vagrant up vagrant up
vagrant ssh -c "cd /nebula && /nebula/$1-nebula -config host3.yml -test" -- -T vagrant ssh -c "cd /nebula && /nebula/$1-nebula -config host3.yml -test" -- -T
docker run --name lighthouse1 --device /dev/net/tun:/dev/net/tun --cap-add NET_ADMIN --rm "$CONTAINER" -config lighthouse1.yml 2>&1 | tee logs/lighthouse1 | sed -u 's/^/ [lighthouse1] /' & docker run --name lighthouse1 --network "$NETWORK" --ip "$LIGHTHOUSE_IP" --device /dev/net/tun:/dev/net/tun --cap-add NET_ADMIN --rm "$CONTAINER" -config lighthouse1.yml 2>&1 | tee logs/lighthouse1 | sed -u 's/^/ [lighthouse1] /' &
sleep 1 sleep 1
docker run --name host2 --device /dev/net/tun:/dev/net/tun --cap-add NET_ADMIN --rm "$CONTAINER" -config host2.yml 2>&1 | tee logs/host2 | sed -u 's/^/ [host2] /' & docker run --name host2 --network "$NETWORK" --ip "$HOST2_IP" -v "$PWD/build/host2.yml:/nebula/host2.yml:ro" --device /dev/net/tun:/dev/net/tun --cap-add NET_ADMIN --rm "$CONTAINER" -config host2.yml 2>&1 | tee logs/host2 | sed -u 's/^/ [host2] /' &
sleep 1 sleep 1
vagrant ssh -c "cd /nebula && sudo sh -c 'echo \$\$ >/nebula/pid && exec /nebula/$1-nebula -config host3.yml'" 2>&1 -- -T | tee logs/host3 | sed -u 's/^/ [host3] /' & vagrant ssh -c "cd /nebula && sudo sh -c 'echo \$\$ >/nebula/pid && exec /nebula/$1-nebula -config host3.yml'" 2>&1 -- -T | tee logs/host3 | sed -u 's/^/ [host3] /' &
sleep 15 sleep 15
@@ -96,7 +128,14 @@ vagrant ssh -c "ping -c1 192.168.100.2" -- -T
vagrant ssh -c "sudo xargs kill </nebula/pid" -- -T vagrant ssh -c "sudo xargs kill </nebula/pid" -- -T
docker exec host2 sh -c 'kill 1' docker exec host2 sh -c 'kill 1'
docker exec lighthouse1 sh -c 'kill 1' docker exec lighthouse1 sh -c 'kill 1'
sleep 1
# Wait up to 30s for all backgrounded jobs to exit. vagrant ssh in particular
# takes a beat to tear down after nebula exits on the VM, so a fixed sleep is
# racy.
for _ in $(seq 1 30); do
[ -z "$(jobs -r)" ] && break
sleep 1
done
if [ "$(jobs -r)" ] if [ "$(jobs -r)" ]
then then
+315
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,315 @@
#!/usr/bin/env pwsh
# Windows smoke test for the nebula tun + UDP + NLM code paths.
#
# Topology:
# - lighthouse runs natively on the Windows host (wintun + windows UDP)
# - peer runs inside WSL2 (Linux build of nebula, /dev/net/tun)
#
# WSL2 gives us a real netns boundary so the loopback fast-path on Windows
# does not short-circuit the overlay -- when WSL pings the lighthouse VPN IP,
# Linux has no idea that IP is local to the Windows host, so the packet is
# forced through nebula. Same in reverse.
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
# wsl.exe emits UTF-16 LE by default which PowerShell reads as bytes, mangling
# every captured string. WSL_UTF8 makes wsl.exe emit UTF-8 instead.
$env:WSL_UTF8 = '1'
$RepoRoot = Resolve-Path "$PSScriptRoot\..\..\.."
$Nebula = Join-Path $RepoRoot 'nebula.exe'
$NebulaCert = Join-Path $RepoRoot 'nebula-cert.exe'
$NebulaLinux = Join-Path $RepoRoot 'build\linux-amd64\nebula'
if (-not (Test-Path $Nebula)) { throw "missing $Nebula; run 'make bin-windows' first" }
if (-not (Test-Path $NebulaCert)) { throw "missing $NebulaCert; run 'make bin-windows' first" }
if (-not (Test-Path $NebulaLinux)) { throw "missing $NebulaLinux; build the linux nebula first" }
# Matches the distro installed by Vampire/setup-wsl in smoke-extra.yml.
$Distro = 'Ubuntu-24.04'
$listed = (wsl --list --quiet 2>$null) -join "`n"
if ($listed -notmatch [regex]::Escape($Distro)) {
throw "WSL distro $Distro not registered. Got: $listed"
}
Write-Host "Using WSL distro: $Distro"
# Windows host as seen from inside WSL: WSL's default-route gateway. We extract
# it with a regex rather than awk fields so PowerShell does not eat any '$N'
# tokens, and tabs/double-spaces in `ip route` output do not confuse a cut.
$ipCmd = 'ip route show default | grep -oE "([0-9]+\.){3}[0-9]+" | head -1'
$WindowsIp = (wsl -d $Distro -- bash -c $ipCmd).Trim()
if (-not $WindowsIp) { throw "could not determine Windows host IP from WSL" }
Write-Host "Windows host IP from WSL: $WindowsIp"
$WorkDir = Join-Path $env:TEMP 'nebula-smoke-windows'
if (Test-Path $WorkDir) { Remove-Item -Recurse -Force $WorkDir }
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $WorkDir | Out-Null
$WslDir = '/tmp/nebula-smoke'
wsl -d $Distro -- bash -c "rm -rf $WslDir && mkdir -p $WslDir" | Out-Null
$DevName = 'nebula-smoke'
$Ip1 = '192.168.241.1'
$Ip2 = '192.168.241.2'
# Dual stack on purpose: a v4-only overlay never exercises the v6 side of tun.mtu.
$Ip6_1 = 'fd42:4242:241::1'
$Ip6_2 = 'fd42:4242:241::2'
$Mtu = 1300
$Port = 4242
& $NebulaCert ca -name 'smoke-ca' -out-crt "$WorkDir\ca.crt" -out-key "$WorkDir\ca.key"
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "nebula-cert ca failed (exit $LASTEXITCODE)" }
& $NebulaCert sign -name 'lighthouse' -networks "$Ip1/24,$Ip6_1/64" -ca-crt "$WorkDir\ca.crt" -ca-key "$WorkDir\ca.key" -out-crt "$WorkDir\lighthouse.crt" -out-key "$WorkDir\lighthouse.key"
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "nebula-cert sign lighthouse failed (exit $LASTEXITCODE)" }
& $NebulaCert sign -name 'peer' -networks "$Ip2/24,$Ip6_2/64" -ca-crt "$WorkDir\ca.crt" -ca-key "$WorkDir\ca.key" -out-crt "$WorkDir\peer.crt" -out-key "$WorkDir\peer.key"
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "nebula-cert sign peer failed (exit $LASTEXITCODE)" }
# Windows lighthouse config.
@"
pki:
ca: $WorkDir\ca.crt
cert: $WorkDir\lighthouse.crt
key: $WorkDir\lighthouse.key
static_host_map: {}
lighthouse:
am_lighthouse: true
interval: 60
hosts: []
listen:
host: 0.0.0.0
port: $Port
tun:
disabled: false
dev: $DevName
drop_local_broadcast: false
drop_multicast: false
tx_queue: 500
mtu: $Mtu
network_category: private
logging:
level: info
format: text
firewall:
outbound_action: drop
inbound_action: drop
conntrack:
tcp_timeout: 12m
udp_timeout: 3m
default_timeout: 10m
outbound:
- port: any
proto: any
host: any
inbound:
- port: any
proto: any
host: any
"@ | Out-File -FilePath "$WorkDir\lighthouse.yml" -Encoding utf8
# WSL peer config (paths are POSIX, deliberately).
@"
pki:
ca: $WslDir/ca.crt
cert: $WslDir/peer.crt
key: $WslDir/peer.key
static_host_map:
"${Ip1}": ["${WindowsIp}:$Port"]
lighthouse:
am_lighthouse: false
interval: 60
hosts:
- "${Ip1}"
listen:
host: 0.0.0.0
port: 0
tun:
disabled: false
dev: nebula1
drop_local_broadcast: false
drop_multicast: false
tx_queue: 500
mtu: $Mtu
logging:
level: info
format: text
firewall:
outbound_action: drop
inbound_action: drop
conntrack:
tcp_timeout: 12m
udp_timeout: 3m
default_timeout: 10m
outbound:
- port: any
proto: any
host: any
inbound:
- port: any
proto: any
host: any
"@ | Out-File -FilePath "$WorkDir\peer.yml" -Encoding utf8
# Stage WSL artifacts. Convert Windows paths to WSL paths ourselves rather than
# calling `wslpath`, because PowerShell's argument-passing to external EXEs
# strips backslashes from path arguments in ways that are hard to escape around.
function ConvertTo-WslPath {
param([string]$WindowsPath)
if ($WindowsPath -notmatch '^([A-Za-z]):\\(.*)$') {
throw "cannot convert path to WSL: $WindowsPath"
}
return "/mnt/$($matches[1].ToLower())/$($matches[2].Replace('\','/'))"
}
$WslWorkDir = ConvertTo-WslPath $WorkDir
$WslNebulaPath = ConvertTo-WslPath $NebulaLinux
wsl -d $Distro -- bash -c "cp '$WslWorkDir/ca.crt' '$WslWorkDir/peer.crt' '$WslWorkDir/peer.key' '$WslWorkDir/peer.yml' $WslDir/ && cp '$WslNebulaPath' $WslDir/nebula && chmod +x $WslDir/nebula"
# Make sure WSL has tun support and /dev/net/tun is usable before starting
# nebula. Diagnostics first so a fail here points at the real problem (e.g.
# WSL1 distros do not have a real kernel and will not have tun).
Write-Host '=== WSL diagnostic ==='
wsl --version 2>&1 | Out-Host
wsl --list --verbose 2>&1 | Out-Host
wsl -d $Distro -u root -- uname -a | Out-Host
wsl -d $Distro -u root -- bash -c "modprobe tun 2>&1 || true; mkdir -p /dev/net; [ -c /dev/net/tun ] || mknod /dev/net/tun c 10 200; chmod 600 /dev/net/tun; { echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/disable_ipv6; echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/default/disable_ipv6; } 2>/dev/null || true; ls -l /dev/net/tun"
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "failed to prepare /dev/net/tun in WSL (TUN support missing?)" }
# Deliberately no New-NetFirewallRule calls here -- nebula's windows_bypass_wdf
# feature is supposed to install WFP permit filters that let inbound traffic
# through Windows Defender Firewall on its own. If this smoke regresses, that
# feature regressed.
$lhOut = Join-Path $WorkDir 'lighthouse.out.log'
$lhErr = Join-Path $WorkDir 'lighthouse.err.log'
$lhProc = Start-Process -FilePath $Nebula -ArgumentList @('-config', "$WorkDir\lighthouse.yml") `
-PassThru -NoNewWindow `
-RedirectStandardOutput $lhOut `
-RedirectStandardError $lhErr
# Run nebula in WSL as root with no sudo + no shell wrapper. PowerShell's
# Start-Process arg quoting mangles `bash -c "..."` strings that contain
# spaces/redirections, so we skip bash entirely and let Start-Process do the
# stdout/stderr capture itself.
$peerOut = Join-Path $WorkDir 'peer.out.log'
$peerErr = Join-Path $WorkDir 'peer.err.log'
$peerProc = Start-Process -FilePath 'wsl' `
-ArgumentList @('-d', $Distro, '-u', 'root', '--', "$WslDir/nebula", '-config', "$WslDir/peer.yml") `
-PassThru -NoNewWindow `
-RedirectStandardOutput $peerOut `
-RedirectStandardError $peerErr
function Wait-Until {
param([scriptblock]$Predicate, [int]$TimeoutSec, [string]$What)
$deadline = (Get-Date).AddSeconds($TimeoutSec)
while ((Get-Date) -lt $deadline) {
if (& $Predicate) { return }
Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500
}
throw "timed out waiting for: $What"
}
try {
Wait-Until -TimeoutSec 30 -What "windows wintun adapter $DevName with NetworkCategory=Private" -Predicate {
if ($lhProc.HasExited) { throw "lighthouse exited (code $($lhProc.ExitCode)) before tun was ready" }
$p = Get-NetConnectionProfile -InterfaceAlias $DevName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$p -and ("$($p.NetworkCategory)" -ieq 'Private')
}
Write-Host "OK: $DevName NetworkCategory=Private"
# v6 silently kept the adapter default of 65535 while v4 was correct.
foreach ($family in @('IPv4', 'IPv6')) {
Wait-Until -TimeoutSec 30 -What "$DevName $family NlMtu=$Mtu" -Predicate {
if ($lhProc.HasExited) { throw "lighthouse exited (code $($lhProc.ExitCode)) before $family mtu was set" }
$rows = @(Get-NetIPInterface -InterfaceAlias $DevName -AddressFamily $family -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
$rows.Count -gt 0 -and -not ($rows | Where-Object { $_.NlMtu -ne $Mtu })
}
Write-Host "OK: $DevName $family NlMtu=$Mtu"
}
Wait-Until -TimeoutSec 30 -What "WSL nebula1 with $Ip2" -Predicate {
if ($peerProc.HasExited) { throw "peer exited (code $($peerProc.ExitCode)) before tun was ready" }
$r = wsl -d $Distro -u root -- bash -c "ip -o addr show nebula1 2>/dev/null | grep -q 'inet $Ip2' && echo yes"
("$r").Trim() -eq 'yes'
}
Write-Host "OK: WSL nebula1 has $Ip2"
Wait-Until -TimeoutSec 30 -What "WSL nebula1 with $Ip6_2" -Predicate {
if ($peerProc.HasExited) { throw "peer exited (code $($peerProc.ExitCode)) before the v6 address was up" }
$r = wsl -d $Distro -u root -- bash -c "ip -o addr show nebula1 2>/dev/null | grep -q 'inet6 $Ip6_2' && echo yes"
("$r").Trim() -eq 'yes'
}
Write-Host "OK: WSL nebula1 has $Ip6_2"
Wait-Until -TimeoutSec 30 -What "ping from WSL peer to windows lighthouse ($Ip1)" -Predicate {
if ($peerProc.HasExited) { throw "peer exited (code $($peerProc.ExitCode)) before ping succeeded" }
$r = wsl -d $Distro -u root -- bash -c "ping -c1 -W1 $Ip1 >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo OK"
("$r").Trim() -eq 'OK'
}
Write-Host "OK: WSL peer -> windows lighthouse"
Wait-Until -TimeoutSec 30 -What "ping from windows lighthouse to WSL peer ($Ip2)" -Predicate {
$null = & ping.exe -n 1 -w 1000 $Ip2
$LASTEXITCODE -eq 0
}
Write-Host "OK: windows lighthouse -> WSL peer"
# Otherwise the v6 networks only prove the interface exists, not that it forwards.
Wait-Until -TimeoutSec 30 -What "v6 ping from WSL peer to windows lighthouse ($Ip6_1)" -Predicate {
if ($peerProc.HasExited) { throw "peer exited (code $($peerProc.ExitCode)) before the v6 ping succeeded" }
$r = wsl -d $Distro -u root -- bash -c "ping -6 -c1 -W1 $Ip6_1 >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo OK"
("$r").Trim() -eq 'OK'
}
Write-Host "OK: WSL peer -> windows lighthouse over v6"
# The NlMtu check above proves the value was written, not that windows honors it. A payload this size only
# crosses the tunnel as fragments cut at NlMtu on the way out of the adapter. Left at the adapter default it
# reaches nebula whole, overflows the udp.MTU (9001) write buffer and is dropped, so the ping never answers.
# Anything smaller would ride out as one oversized datagram and survive on IP fragmentation of the underlay.
$BigPayload = 9000
foreach ($target in @(@{ Family = 'v4'; Ip = $Ip2 }, @{ Family = 'v6'; Ip = $Ip6_2 })) {
Wait-Until -TimeoutSec 30 -What "$($target.Family) ping with a $BigPayload byte payload from windows lighthouse to WSL peer ($($target.Ip))" -Predicate {
if ($peerProc.HasExited) { throw "peer exited (code $($peerProc.ExitCode)) before the large $($target.Family) ping succeeded" }
$null = & ping.exe -n 1 -w 1000 -l $BigPayload $target.Ip
$LASTEXITCODE -eq 0
}
Write-Host "OK: windows lighthouse -> WSL peer, $BigPayload byte $($target.Family) payload"
}
Write-Host ''
Write-Host 'All smoke checks passed.'
}
catch {
Write-Host ''
Write-Host '=== lighthouse stdout ==='
Get-Content $lhOut -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Host
Write-Host '=== lighthouse stderr ==='
Get-Content $lhErr -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Host
Write-Host '=== peer stdout ==='
Get-Content $peerOut -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Host
Write-Host '=== peer stderr ==='
Get-Content $peerErr -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Host
Write-Host '=== nebula WFP filters ==='
# Dump nebula-installed filters so we can verify they got registered with
# the conditions we expect.
$wfpDump = Join-Path $WorkDir 'wfp.xml'
netsh wfp show filters file=$wfpDump 2>&1 | Out-Null
if (Test-Path $wfpDump) {
Select-String -Path $wfpDump -Pattern 'Nebula' -Context 0,80 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Host
}
throw
}
finally {
if (-not $lhProc.HasExited) {
Stop-Process -Id $lhProc.Id -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$lhProc.WaitForExit(5000) | Out-Null
}
wsl -d $Distro -u root -- bash -c "pkill -f $WslDir/nebula 2>/dev/null; true" | Out-Null
# pkill returns 1 when no match and wsl propagates that; the smoke is done
# so we don't want it to leak into the script's exit code.
$global:LASTEXITCODE = 0
if ($peerProc -and -not $peerProc.HasExited) {
Stop-Process -Id $peerProc.Id -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
}
}
+93 -38
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ set -o pipefail
mkdir -p logs mkdir -p logs
NETWORK="nebula-smoke"
cleanup() { cleanup() {
echo echo
echo " *** cleanup" echo " *** cleanup"
@@ -16,57 +18,103 @@ cleanup() {
then then
docker kill lighthouse1 host2 host3 host4 docker kill lighthouse1 host2 host3 host4
fi fi
docker network rm "$NETWORK" >/dev/null 2>&1
} }
trap cleanup EXIT trap cleanup EXIT
# Create a dedicated smoke network with an explicit subnet (required for --ip
# below). Probe a short list of candidates so a locally-used range doesn't
# fail the whole test — we only need one to be free.
docker network rm "$NETWORK" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
for candidate in 172.30.0.0/24 172.31.0.0/24 10.98.0.0/24 10.99.0.0/24 192.168.230.0/24; do
if docker network create --subnet "$candidate" "$NETWORK" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
break
fi
done
if ! docker network inspect "$NETWORK" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "failed to create $NETWORK: every candidate subnet is in use" >&2
exit 1
fi
# Derive container IPs from the network's assigned subnet. Slots: .2 lighthouse1,
# .3 host2, .4 host3, .5 host4 — matches the placeholders in build.sh.
SUBNET="$(docker network inspect -f '{{(index .IPAM.Config 0).Subnet}}' "$NETWORK")"
PREFIX="${SUBNET%/*}"
PREFIX="${PREFIX%.*}"
LIGHTHOUSE_IP="$PREFIX.2"
HOST2_IP="$PREFIX.3"
HOST3_IP="$PREFIX.4"
HOST4_IP="$PREFIX.5"
if [ "$SMOKE_OVERLAY_IPV6" ]
then
LIGHTHOUSE_NIP="fd00:4242:0:0:0:ffff:c0a8:6401"
HOST2_NIP="fd00:4242:0:0:0:ffff:c0a8:6402"
HOST3_NIP="fd00:4242:0:0:0:ffff:c0a8:6403"
HOST4_NIP="fd00:4242:0:0:0:ffff:c0a8:6404"
else
LIGHTHOUSE_NIP="192.168.100.1"
HOST2_NIP="192.168.100.2"
HOST3_NIP="192.168.100.3"
HOST4_NIP="192.168.100.4"
fi
# Sed the placeholder TEST-NET-3 IPs in the host configs to the real ones.
# build/lighthouse1.yml has no IPs to rewrite so it's skipped.
for f in build/host2.yml build/host3.yml build/host4.yml; do
sed "s|203\.0\.113\.|$PREFIX.|g" "$f" >"$f.tmp"
mv "$f.tmp" "$f"
done
CONTAINER="nebula:${NAME:-smoke}" CONTAINER="nebula:${NAME:-smoke}"
docker run --name lighthouse1 --rm "$CONTAINER" -config lighthouse1.yml -test docker run --name lighthouse1 --rm "$CONTAINER" -config lighthouse1.yml -test
docker run --name host2 --rm "$CONTAINER" -config host2.yml -test docker run --name host2 --rm -v "$PWD/build/host2.yml:/nebula/host2.yml:ro" "$CONTAINER" -config host2.yml -test
docker run --name host3 --rm "$CONTAINER" -config host3.yml -test docker run --name host3 --rm -v "$PWD/build/host3.yml:/nebula/host3.yml:ro" "$CONTAINER" -config host3.yml -test
docker run --name host4 --rm "$CONTAINER" -config host4.yml -test docker run --name host4 --rm -v "$PWD/build/host4.yml:/nebula/host4.yml:ro" "$CONTAINER" -config host4.yml -test
docker run --name lighthouse1 --device /dev/net/tun:/dev/net/tun --cap-add NET_ADMIN --rm "$CONTAINER" -config lighthouse1.yml 2>&1 | tee logs/lighthouse1 | sed -u 's/^/ [lighthouse1] /' & docker run --name lighthouse1 --network "$NETWORK" --ip "$LIGHTHOUSE_IP" --device /dev/net/tun:/dev/net/tun --cap-add NET_ADMIN --rm "$CONTAINER" -config lighthouse1.yml 2>&1 | tee logs/lighthouse1 | sed -u 's/^/ [lighthouse1] /' &
sleep 1 sleep 1
docker run --name host2 --device /dev/net/tun:/dev/net/tun --cap-add NET_ADMIN --rm "$CONTAINER" -config host2.yml 2>&1 | tee logs/host2 | sed -u 's/^/ [host2] /' & docker run --name host2 --network "$NETWORK" --ip "$HOST2_IP" -v "$PWD/build/host2.yml:/nebula/host2.yml:ro" --device /dev/net/tun:/dev/net/tun --cap-add NET_ADMIN --rm "$CONTAINER" -config host2.yml 2>&1 | tee logs/host2 | sed -u 's/^/ [host2] /' &
sleep 1 sleep 1
docker run --name host3 --device /dev/net/tun:/dev/net/tun --cap-add NET_ADMIN --rm "$CONTAINER" -config host3.yml 2>&1 | tee logs/host3 | sed -u 's/^/ [host3] /' & docker run --name host3 --network "$NETWORK" --ip "$HOST3_IP" -v "$PWD/build/host3.yml:/nebula/host3.yml:ro" --device /dev/net/tun:/dev/net/tun --cap-add NET_ADMIN --rm "$CONTAINER" -config host3.yml 2>&1 | tee logs/host3 | sed -u 's/^/ [host3] /' &
sleep 1 sleep 1
docker run --name host4 --device /dev/net/tun:/dev/net/tun --cap-add NET_ADMIN --rm "$CONTAINER" -config host4.yml 2>&1 | tee logs/host4 | sed -u 's/^/ [host4] /' & docker run --name host4 --network "$NETWORK" --ip "$HOST4_IP" -v "$PWD/build/host4.yml:/nebula/host4.yml:ro" --device /dev/net/tun:/dev/net/tun --cap-add NET_ADMIN --rm "$CONTAINER" -config host4.yml 2>&1 | tee logs/host4 | sed -u 's/^/ [host4] /' &
sleep 1 sleep 1
# grab tcpdump pcaps for debugging # grab tcpdump pcaps for debugging
docker exec lighthouse1 tcpdump -i nebula1 -q -w - -U 2>logs/lighthouse1.inside.log >logs/lighthouse1.inside.pcap & docker exec lighthouse1 tcpdump -i tun0 -q -w - -U 2>logs/lighthouse1.inside.log >logs/lighthouse1.inside.pcap &
docker exec lighthouse1 tcpdump -i eth0 -q -w - -U 2>logs/lighthouse1.outside.log >logs/lighthouse1.outside.pcap & docker exec lighthouse1 tcpdump -i eth0 -q -w - -U 2>logs/lighthouse1.outside.log >logs/lighthouse1.outside.pcap &
docker exec host2 tcpdump -i nebula1 -q -w - -U 2>logs/host2.inside.log >logs/host2.inside.pcap & docker exec host2 tcpdump -i tun0 -q -w - -U 2>logs/host2.inside.log >logs/host2.inside.pcap &
docker exec host2 tcpdump -i eth0 -q -w - -U 2>logs/host2.outside.log >logs/host2.outside.pcap & docker exec host2 tcpdump -i eth0 -q -w - -U 2>logs/host2.outside.log >logs/host2.outside.pcap &
docker exec host3 tcpdump -i nebula1 -q -w - -U 2>logs/host3.inside.log >logs/host3.inside.pcap & docker exec host3 tcpdump -i tun0 -q -w - -U 2>logs/host3.inside.log >logs/host3.inside.pcap &
docker exec host3 tcpdump -i eth0 -q -w - -U 2>logs/host3.outside.log >logs/host3.outside.pcap & docker exec host3 tcpdump -i eth0 -q -w - -U 2>logs/host3.outside.log >logs/host3.outside.pcap &
docker exec host4 tcpdump -i nebula1 -q -w - -U 2>logs/host4.inside.log >logs/host4.inside.pcap & docker exec host4 tcpdump -i tun0 -q -w - -U 2>logs/host4.inside.log >logs/host4.inside.pcap &
docker exec host4 tcpdump -i eth0 -q -w - -U 2>logs/host4.outside.log >logs/host4.outside.pcap & docker exec host4 tcpdump -i eth0 -q -w - -U 2>logs/host4.outside.log >logs/host4.outside.pcap &
docker exec host2 ncat -nklv 0.0.0.0 2000 & docker exec host2 ncat -nklv 2000 &
docker exec host3 ncat -nklv 0.0.0.0 2000 & docker exec host3 ncat -nklv 2000 &
docker exec host2 ncat -e '/usr/bin/echo host2' -nkluv 0.0.0.0 3000 & docker exec host4 ncat -e '/usr/bin/echo helloagainfromhost4' -nkluv 4000 &
docker exec host3 ncat -e '/usr/bin/echo host3' -nkluv 0.0.0.0 3000 & docker exec host2 ncat -e '/usr/bin/echo host2' -nkluv 3000 &
docker exec host3 ncat -e '/usr/bin/echo host3' -nkluv 3000 &
set +x set +x
echo echo
echo " *** Testing ping from lighthouse1" echo " *** Testing ping from lighthouse1"
echo echo
set -x set -x
docker exec lighthouse1 ping -c1 192.168.100.2 docker exec lighthouse1 ping -c1 $HOST2_NIP
docker exec lighthouse1 ping -c1 192.168.100.3 docker exec lighthouse1 ping -c1 $HOST3_NIP
set +x set +x
echo echo
echo " *** Testing ping from host2" echo " *** Testing ping from host2"
echo echo
set -x set -x
docker exec host2 ping -c1 192.168.100.1 docker exec host2 ping -c1 $LIGHTHOUSE_NIP
# Should fail because not allowed by host3 inbound firewall # Should fail because not allowed by host3 inbound firewall
! docker exec host2 ping -c1 192.168.100.3 -w5 || exit 1 ! docker exec host2 ping -c1 $HOST3_NIP -w5 || exit 1
set +x set +x
echo echo
@@ -74,34 +122,34 @@ echo " *** Testing ncat from host2"
echo echo
set -x set -x
# Should fail because not allowed by host3 inbound firewall # Should fail because not allowed by host3 inbound firewall
! docker exec host2 ncat -nzv -w5 192.168.100.3 2000 || exit 1 ! docker exec host2 ncat -nzv -w5 $HOST3_NIP 2000 || exit 1
! docker exec host2 ncat -nzuv -w5 192.168.100.3 3000 | grep -q host3 || exit 1 ! docker exec host2 ncat -nzuv -w5 $HOST3_NIP 3000 | grep -q host3 || exit 1
set +x set +x
echo echo
echo " *** Testing ping from host3" echo " *** Testing ping from host3"
echo echo
set -x set -x
docker exec host3 ping -c1 192.168.100.1 docker exec host3 ping -c1 $LIGHTHOUSE_NIP
docker exec host3 ping -c1 192.168.100.2 docker exec host3 ping -c1 $HOST2_NIP
set +x set +x
echo echo
echo " *** Testing ncat from host3" echo " *** Testing ncat from host3"
echo echo
set -x set -x
docker exec host3 ncat -nzv -w5 192.168.100.2 2000 docker exec host3 ncat -nzv -w5 $HOST2_NIP 2000
docker exec host3 ncat -nzuv -w5 192.168.100.2 3000 | grep -q host2 docker exec host3 ncat -nzuv -w5 $HOST2_NIP 3000 | grep -q host2
set +x set +x
echo echo
echo " *** Testing ping from host4" echo " *** Testing ping from host4"
echo echo
set -x set -x
docker exec host4 ping -c1 192.168.100.1 docker exec host4 ping -c1 $LIGHTHOUSE_NIP
# Should fail because not allowed by host4 outbound firewall # Should fail because not allowed by host4 outbound firewall
! docker exec host4 ping -c1 192.168.100.2 -w5 || exit 1 ! docker exec host4 ping -c1 $HOST2_NIP -w5 || exit 1
! docker exec host4 ping -c1 192.168.100.3 -w5 || exit 1 ! docker exec host4 ping -c1 $HOST3_NIP -w5 || exit 1
set +x set +x
echo echo
@@ -109,27 +157,34 @@ echo " *** Testing ncat from host4"
echo echo
set -x set -x
# Should fail because not allowed by host4 outbound firewall # Should fail because not allowed by host4 outbound firewall
! docker exec host4 ncat -nzv -w5 192.168.100.2 2000 || exit 1 ! docker exec host4 ncat -nzv -w5 $HOST2_NIP 2000 || exit 1
! docker exec host4 ncat -nzv -w5 192.168.100.3 2000 || exit 1 ! docker exec host4 ncat -nzv -w5 $HOST3_NIP 2000 || exit 1
! docker exec host4 ncat -nzuv -w5 192.168.100.2 3000 | grep -q host2 || exit 1 ! docker exec host4 ncat -nzuv -w5 $HOST2_NIP 3000 | grep -q host2 || exit 1
! docker exec host4 ncat -nzuv -w5 192.168.100.3 3000 | grep -q host3 || exit 1 ! docker exec host4 ncat -nzuv -w5 $HOST3_NIP 3000 | grep -q host3 || exit 1
set +x set +x
echo echo
echo " *** Testing conntrack" echo " *** Testing conntrack"
echo echo
set -x set -x
# host2 can ping host3 now that host3 pinged it first
docker exec host2 ping -c1 192.168.100.3 # host4's outbound firewall only allows ICMP to the lighthouse, so host4
# host4 can ping host2 once conntrack established # cannot initiate UDP to host2. Once host2 initiates a flow to host4:4000,
docker exec host2 ping -c1 192.168.100.4 # conntrack must let host4's listener reply on that flow. If it doesn't,
docker exec host4 ping -c1 192.168.100.2 # the echo back from host4 never reaches host2.
docker exec host2 sh -c "(/usr/bin/echo host2; sleep 2) | ncat -nuv $HOST4_NIP 4000" | grep -q helloagainfromhost4
docker exec host4 sh -c 'kill 1' docker exec host4 sh -c 'kill 1'
docker exec host3 sh -c 'kill 1' docker exec host3 sh -c 'kill 1'
docker exec host2 sh -c 'kill 1' docker exec host2 sh -c 'kill 1'
docker exec lighthouse1 sh -c 'kill 1' docker exec lighthouse1 sh -c 'kill 1'
sleep 5
# Wait up to 30s for all backgrounded jobs to exit rather than relying on a
# fixed sleep.
for _ in $(seq 1 30); do
[ -z "$(jobs -r)" ] && break
sleep 1
done
if [ "$(jobs -r)" ] if [ "$(jobs -r)" ]
then then
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# -*- mode: ruby -*- # -*- mode: ruby -*-
# vi: set ft=ruby : # vi: set ft=ruby :
Vagrant.configure("2") do |config| Vagrant.configure("2") do |config|
config.vm.box = "ubuntu/jammy64" config.vm.box = "bento/ubuntu-24.04"
config.vm.synced_folder "../build", "/nebula" config.vm.synced_folder "../build", "/nebula"
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# -*- mode: ruby -*- # -*- mode: ruby -*-
# vi: set ft=ruby : # vi: set ft=ruby :
Vagrant.configure("2") do |config| Vagrant.configure("2") do |config|
config.vm.box = "generic/netbsd9" config.vm.box = "DefinedNet/netbsd10"
config.vm.synced_folder "../build", "/nebula", type: "rsync" config.vm.synced_folder "../build", "/nebula", type: "rsync"
end end
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# -*- mode: ruby -*- # -*- mode: ruby -*-
# vi: set ft=ruby : # vi: set ft=ruby :
Vagrant.configure("2") do |config| Vagrant.configure("2") do |config|
config.vm.box = "generic/openbsd7" config.vm.box = "DefinedNet/openbsd78"
config.vm.synced_folder "../build", "/nebula", type: "rsync" config.vm.synced_folder "../build", "/nebula", type: "rsync"
end end
+107 -84
View File
@@ -13,20 +13,28 @@ on:
- 'go.sum' - 'go.sum'
jobs: jobs:
test-linux: static:
name: Build all and test on ubuntu-linux name: Static checks
runs-on: ubuntu-latest runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps: steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 - uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6 - uses: actions/setup-go@v7
with: with:
go-version: '1.25' go-version: '1.27'
check-latest: true check-latest: true
- name: Build - name: Install goimports
run: make all run: go install golang.org/x/tools/cmd/goimports@latest
- name: gofmt
run: |
if [ "$(find . -iname '*.go' | grep -v '\.pb\.go$' | xargs goimports -l)" ]
then
find . -iname '*.go' | grep -v '\.pb\.go$' | xargs goimports -d
exit 1
fi
- name: Vet - name: Vet
run: make vet run: make vet
@@ -34,99 +42,114 @@ jobs:
- name: golangci-lint - name: golangci-lint
uses: golangci/golangci-lint-action@v9 uses: golangci/golangci-lint-action@v9
with: with:
version: v2.5 version: v2.12
- name: Test
run: make test
- name: End 2 end
run: make e2evv
- name: Build test mobile
run: make build-test-mobile
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v5
with:
name: e2e packet flow linux-latest
path: e2e/mermaid/linux-latest
if-no-files-found: warn
test-linux-boringcrypto:
name: Build and test on linux with boringcrypto
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
go-version: '1.25'
check-latest: true
- name: Build
run: make bin-boringcrypto
- name: Test
run: make test-boringcrypto
- name: End 2 end
run: make e2e GOEXPERIMENT=boringcrypto CGO_ENABLED=1 TEST_ENV="TEST_LOGS=1" TEST_FLAGS="-v -ldflags -checklinkname=0"
test-linux-pkcs11:
name: Build and test on linux with pkcs11
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
go-version: '1.25'
check-latest: true
- name: Build
run: make bin-pkcs11
- name: Test
run: make test-pkcs11
test: test:
name: Build and test on ${{ matrix.os }} name: Test ${{ matrix.name }}
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }} runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
strategy: strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix: matrix:
os: [windows-latest, macos-latest] include:
- name: linux
os: ubuntu-latest
build-cmd: go build ./cmd/nebula ./cmd/nebula-cert
test-cmd: make test
e2e-cmd: make e2evv
- name: linux-boringcrypto
os: ubuntu-latest
build-cmd: make boringcrypto
test-cmd: make boringcrypto test
e2e-cmd: make boringcrypto e2evv
- name: linux-fips140
os: ubuntu-latest
build-cmd: make fips140-all
test-cmd: make fips140-all GOALS=test
e2e-cmd: make fips140-all GOALS=e2evv
- name: linux-pkcs11
os: ubuntu-latest
build-cmd: make bin-pkcs11
test-cmd: make test-pkcs11
e2e-cmd: ''
- name: macos
os: macos-latest
build-cmd: go build ./cmd/nebula ./cmd/nebula-cert
test-cmd: make test
e2e-cmd: make e2evv
- name: windows
os: windows-latest
build-cmd: go build ./cmd/nebula ./cmd/nebula-cert
test-cmd: make test
e2e-cmd: make e2evv
steps: steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 - uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6 - uses: actions/setup-go@v7
with: with:
go-version: '1.25' go-version: '1.27'
check-latest: true check-latest: true
- name: Build nebula - name: Build
run: go build ./cmd/nebula run: ${{ matrix.build-cmd }}
- name: Build nebula-cert - name: Cross-build darwin-amd64
run: go build ./cmd/nebula-cert if: matrix.name == 'macos'
run: GOARCH=amd64 go build -o /tmp/nebula-amd64 ./cmd/nebula && GOARCH=amd64 go build -o /tmp/nebula-cert-amd64 ./cmd/nebula-cert
- name: Vet
run: make vet
- name: golangci-lint
uses: golangci/golangci-lint-action@v9
with:
version: v2.5
- name: Test - name: Test
run: make test run: ${{ matrix.test-cmd }}
- name: End 2 end - name: End 2 end
run: make e2evv if: matrix.e2e-cmd != ''
run: ${{ matrix.e2e-cmd }}
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v5 - uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
if: matrix.e2e-cmd != '' && always()
with: with:
name: e2e packet flow ${{ matrix.os }} name: e2e packet flow ${{ matrix.name }}
path: e2e/mermaid/${{ matrix.os }} path: e2e/mermaid/
if-no-files-found: warn if-no-files-found: warn
cross-build:
name: Cross-build ${{ matrix.name }}
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
include:
- {name: linux-arm, make-target: all-cross-linux-arm}
- {name: linux-mips, make-target: all-cross-linux-mips}
- {name: linux-other, make-target: all-cross-linux-other}
- {name: freebsd, make-target: all-freebsd}
- {name: openbsd, make-target: all-openbsd}
- {name: netbsd, make-target: all-netbsd}
- {name: windows, make-target: all-cross-windows}
- {name: mobile, make-target: build-test-mobile}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/setup-go@v7
with:
go-version: '1.27'
check-latest: true
- name: Build ${{ matrix.name }}
run: make -j"$(nproc)" ${{ matrix.make-target }}
finish:
name: CI status
if: always()
needs: [static, test, cross-build]
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Fail if any upstream job failed
if: contains(needs.*.result, 'failure') || contains(needs.*.result, 'cancelled')
run: |
echo "upstream results: ${{ toJSON(needs) }}"
exit 1
- name: All upstream jobs passed
run: echo "ok"
+14
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,21 @@ version: "2"
linters: linters:
default: none default: none
enable: enable:
- sloglint
- testifylint - testifylint
settings:
sloglint:
# Enforce key-value pair form for Info/Debug/Warn/Error/Log/With and
# the package-level slog equivalents. Use l.Log(ctx, level, ...) for
# custom levels instead of LogAttrs when you can.
#
# LogAttrs is also flagged by this rule because it takes ...slog.Attr;
# the few legitimate sites (where attrs is built up as a []slog.Attr)
# carry a //nolint:sloglint with rationale.
kv-only: true
# no-mixed-args is on by default: forbids mixing kv and attrs in one call.
# discard-handler is on by default (since Go 1.24): suggests
# slog.DiscardHandler over slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil).
exclusions: exclusions:
generated: lax generated: lax
presets: presets:
+262 -3
View File
@@ -7,12 +7,262 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
## [Unreleased] ## [Unreleased]
### Added
- Version 3 certificates and post-quantum hybrid handshakes (`ix_hybrid_mlkem1024`). A version 3 certificate is a
version 2 certificate extended with a post-quantum key and a deterministic post-quantum CA signature, and a node
holding one still presents the version 2 certificate it extends to peers that need it. Its post-quantum suite names
the algorithms, as its curve does the classical ones; the one suite today is `MLKEM1024_MLDSA87`, an ML-KEM-1024
key for hosts and ML-DSA-87 for CAs and their signatures, chosen with `nebula-cert -pq-suite`. `nebula-cert
pq-extend` upgrades existing CAs and hosts in place, and extending a certificate twice gives the same certificate.
See `docs/pq-handshake.md`.
### Changed ### Changed
- `default_local_cidr_any` now defaults to false, meaning that any firewall rule - A version 3 certificate has two fingerprints: its own, and that of the version 2 certificate it extends. Both
identify it in logs and to `pki.blocklist`. **To block a version 3 certificate, block its v2 fingerprint**: the
pool checks it for the v3 certificate and for its v2 form alike, so that one entry covers both forms. Blocking only
the v3 fingerprint leaves the v2 form usable in classical handshakes. `nebula-cert print` leads with both
fingerprints and says which one to block; in JSON they are `fingerprint` and `v2Fingerprint`.
- Firewall `ca_sha` rules match a version 3 peer by either fingerprint of its CA.
### Fixed
- `create-tunnel -address <ip:port>` panicked on a nil RemoteList and, over the ssh debug server, took nebula
down with it. A hostinfo returned by StartHandshake had no RemoteList until the handshake loop's first
pass attached one, and `create-tunnel -address` set the remote before that. The list is now attached when
the handshake starts, so a pending hostinfo never exists without one.
## [1.11.1] - 2026-08-21
See the [v1.11.1](https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/milestone/30?closed=1) milestone for a complete list of changes.
### Changed
- IPv6 packets whose next header is a protocol Nebula does not parse (SCTP, GRE, IP-in-IP, etc.) are now
classified as that protocol with no ports, closing a firewall bypass where a crafted payload could steer
the classifier into reading one as TCP/UDP and matching a TCP/UDP rule. These packets are now matched as
their true protocol, so only a `proto: any` rule allows them. If you carry one of these protocols over the
overlay, confirm a `proto: any` rule covers it before upgrading, it may have been passing only through this
bypass. (#1840)
- Drop the dependency on `github.com/cyberdelia/go-metrics-graphite`, which has been unmaintained for over ten
years, by inlining the small amount of code Nebula used. (#1832)
### Fixed
- The ICMPv6 type was read from the wrong byte when classifying IPv6 packets, so the echo identifier used
for conntrack was never picked up. (#1840)
- Enforce outbound message counter limits so a tunnel is rehandshaked before the counter can wrap, preventing
nonce reuse. This is unreachable in practice, but is enforced as a defense-in-depth measure. (#1841)
- Prevent `nebula-cert ca` from running out of memory on 32bit systems when generating encrypted private keys. (#1834)
- Tolerate `ErrDumpInterrupted` when listing tun addresses on Linux, so a transient interrupted netlink dump
no longer aborts startup. (#1835)
## [1.11.0] - 2026-07-23
See the [v1.11.0](https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/milestone/25?closed=1) milestone for a complete list of changes.
### Breaking
- Logging has switched from logrus to Go's structured `slog`. Log output changes: levels are upper case
(`level=INFO`), trace prints as `level=DEBUG-4`, timestamps are always RFC3339Nano and `logging.timestamp_format`
is ignored, and some messages were reworded. Review any log parsing before upgrading. This is also an API break
for embedders, as constructors now take a `*slog.Logger`. (#1672, #1734, #1621)
- `firewall.inbound_action` and `firewall.outbound_action` (used to set reject vs. drop policy) were each being
applied to the opposite direction, that is now corrected. This only affects how blocked packets are answered, not
which packets the firewall allows or denies. If you set either of these you are getting the behavior of the other
one today and likely want to swap them before upgrading. (#1798)
- On Windows, Nebula now installs WFP PERMIT filters for the nebula adapter and the listener port by default. WFP
sits below Windows Defender Firewall, so any WDF inbound rules you rely on for either will no longer apply. Set
`tun.windows_bypass_wdf` and `listen.windows_bypass_wdf` to false to leave WDF in charge. (#1710)
- On Windows, the nebula device is now set to the `private` network category instead of whatever Windows decided,
which is usually `Public`. This makes the host firewall less restrictive on the overlay. Set
`tun.network_category` to `unset` to keep the old behavior. (#1710)
- Reject packets for non-TCP now use ICMP code 13, communication administratively prohibited, instead of code 3,
port unreachable. Anything keying off the old code needs updating. (#1766, #1768)
- The SSH debug server's profiling commands are now confined to `sshd.sandbox_dir`, which defaults to
`$TMP/nebula-debug`. Relative paths resolve inside it and absolute paths outside it are rejected, so anything
scripting `start-cpu-profile`, `save-heap-profile`, or `save-mutex-profile` with a path elsewhere needs the
directory set. The directory is not created for you. (#1622)
### Added
- Sign the Windows release binaries. (#1718)
- Generate IPv6 reject packets, matching the existing IPv4 behavior. (#1766, #1767, #1768)
- Accept `-` in `nebula-cert` to read from stdin or write to stdout. (#1714)
- Search for both `config.yml` and `config.yaml` in service and command line modes. (#1717)
- Add version labels to the Docker/OCI images. (#1772)
- Rebind the listener and re-query lighthouses on macOS when the underlay network changes, so devices moving
between wifi and wired or between networks recover without waiting for dead tunnel detection. Controlled by
`listen.rebind_on_network_change` (default `true`, not reloadable). (#1816)
### Changed
- Reload the firewall when the unsafe networks in the certificate change. (#1719)
- Reconfigure, start, and stop the stats listener on a config reload instead of requiring a restart. (#1670)
- Update a static host's addresses when they change on reload. (#1713)
- Don't require a port on ICMP firewall rules. (#1609)
- Connection track ICMP traffic. (#1602)
- Return `NODATA` instead of `NXDOMAIN` from the DNS server for a name that exists but has no record of the
requested type, so clients that query `AAAA` first (busybox/Alpine) fall through to `A`. (#1668)
- Record the local host's details in the DNS server. (#1716)
- Install Windows unsafe routes as link routes. (#1709)
- Reduce relay handshake log spam, and only log a handshake send error at error level when the remote list
changes. (#1733, #1765, #1810)
- Start, stop, and reload subsystems (DNS, stats, conntrack, ssh, punchy) cleanly without leaking goroutines. (#1640, #1654, #1661, #1667, #1669, #1708, #1806, #1815)
- `Control` is now safe to stop and wait on from any lifecycle state, and a new `Control.Wait` blocks until nebula
has fully stopped and returns the first fatal reader error. Failed starts release the udp sockets and tun fd
instead of leaking them. (#1794)
- Trigger an immediate lighthouse update when reconnecting to or adding a lighthouse instead of waiting for the next update tick. (#1645)
- Bring the Darwin and OpenBSD tun implementations in line with the other BSDs. (#1703)
- Update to build against go v1.26. (#1818)
- Various dependency updates. (#1586, #1587, #1604, #1617, #1618, #1627, #1628, #1629, #1652, #1664, #1665, #1697, #1721, #1732, #1742, #1743, #1750, #1763, #1771, #1782, #1800, #1807)
### Fixed
- Fix a data race on a host's remote address that could send packets to the wrong address during a roam. (#1773)
- Fix tunnels that could permanently escape connection manager monitoring. (#1752)
- Fix a crash when reloading the SSH server's trusted keys. (#1787)
- Fix hostmap corruption when a host has multiple overlay addresses. Each address now gets its own list instead of
a single shared chain, which also fixes two latent bugs on the add and makePrimary paths. (#1788, #1790)
- Apply `remote_allow_list` IPv4 rules to 4-in-6 mapped addresses. (#1786)
- Don't panic in the DNS server on a short or empty query name. (#1635)
- Advance the replay window on relayed packets so a relay drops replayed frames instead of re-forwarding them. (#1751)
- Fix a race in relay state handling. (#1753)
- Lock replay window updates so concurrent readers can't corrupt it. (#1802)
- Reject malformed handshakes more reliably, including invalid ed25519 key lengths. (#1601, #1756)
- Properly handle `closetunnel` packets. (#1638)
- Fix an IPv6 extension-header length overflow that could make the firewall parse the wrong protocol and ports. (#1789)
- Fix relay re-establishment when a handshake arrives over a relay entry that a one-sided teardown left
`Disestablished`, which silently dropped every send until dead tunnel detection forced a re-handshake. (#1805)
- Don't build new relay state on a tunnel that was just discarded. (#1796)
- Don't delete the wrong pending hostinfo in the handshake manager. (#1811)
- Don't call the packet reader after a UDP error on Darwin. (#1755)
- Open the FreeBSD tun device non blocking. (#1666)
## [1.10.3] - 2026-02-06
### Security
- Fix an issue where blocklist bypass is possible when using curve P256 since the signature can have 2 valid representations.
Both fingerprint representations will be tested against the blocklist.
Any newly issued P256 based certificates will have their signature clamped to the low-s form.
Nebula will assert the low-s signature form when validating certificates in a future version. [GHSA-69x3-g4r3-p962](https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/security/advisories/GHSA-69x3-g4r3-p962)
### Changed
- Improve error reporting if nebula fails to start due to a tun device naming issue. (#1588)
## [1.10.2] - 2026-01-21
### Fixed
- Fix panic when using `use_system_route_table` that was introduced in v1.10.1. (#1580)
### Changed
- Fix some typos in comments. (#1582)
- Dependency updates. (#1581)
## [1.10.1] - 2026-01-16
See the [v1.10.1](https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/milestone/26?closed=1) milestone for a complete list of changes.
### Fixed
- Fix a bug where an unsafe route derived from the system route table could be lost on a config reload. (#1573)
- Fix the PEM banner for ECDSA P256 public keys. (#1552)
- Fix a regression on Windows from 1.9.x where nebula could fall back to a less performant UDP listener if
non-critical ioctls failed. (#1568)
- Fix a bug in handshake processing when a peer sends an unexpected public key. (#1566)
### Added
- Add a config option to control accepting `recv_error` packets which defaults to `always`. (#1569)
### Changed
- Various dependency updates. (#1541, #1549, #1550, #1557, #1558, #1560, #1561, #1570, #1571)
## [1.10.0] - 2025-12-04
See the [v1.10.0](https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/milestone/16?closed=1) milestone for a complete list of changes.
### Added
- Support for ipv6 and multiple ipv4/6 addresses in the overlay.
A new v2 ASN.1 based certificate format.
Certificates now have a unified interface for external implementations.
(#1212, #1216, #1345, #1359, #1381, #1419, #1464, #1466, #1451, #1476, #1467, #1481, #1399, #1488, #1492, #1495, #1468, #1521, #1535, #1538)
- Add the ability to mark packets on linux to better target nebula packets in iptables/nftables. (#1331)
- Add ECMP support for `unsafe_routes`. (#1332)
- PKCS11 support for P256 keys when built with `pkcs11` tag (#1153, #1482)
### Changed
- **NOTE**: `default_local_cidr_any` now defaults to false, meaning that any firewall rule
intended to target an `unsafe_routes` entry must explicitly declare it via the intended to target an `unsafe_routes` entry must explicitly declare it via the
`local_cidr` field. This is almost always the intended behavior. This flag is `local_cidr` field. This is almost always the intended behavior. This flag is
deprecated and will be removed in a future release. deprecated and will be removed in a future release. (#1373)
- Improve logging when a relay is in use on an inbound packet. (#1533)
- Avoid fatal errors if `rountines` is > 1 on systems that don't support more than 1 routine. (#1531)
- Log a warning if a firewall rule contains an `any` that negates a more restrictive filter. (#1513)
- Accept encrypted CA passphrase from an environment variable. (#1421)
- Allow handshaking with any trusted remote. (#1509)
- Log only the count of blocklisted certificate fingerprints instead of the entire list. (#1525)
- Don't fatal when the ssh server is unable to be configured successfully. (#1520)
- Update to build against go v1.25. (#1483)
- Allow projects using `nebula` as a library with userspace networking to configure the `logger` and build version. (#1239)
- Upgrade to `yaml.v3`. (#1148, #1371, #1438, #1478)
### Fixed
- Fix a potential bug with udp ipv4 only on darwin. (#1532)
- Improve lost packet statistics. (#1441, #1537)
- Honor `remote_allow_list` in hole punch response. (#1186)
- Fix a panic when `tun.use_system_route_table` is `true` and a route lacks a destination. (#1437)
- Fix an issue when `tun.use_system_route_table: true` could result in heavy CPU utilization when many thousands of routes
are present. (#1326)
- Fix tests for 32 bit machines. (#1394)
- Fix a possible 32bit integer underflow in config handling. (#1353)
- Fix moving a udp address from one vpn address to another in the `static_host_map`
which could cause rapid re-handshaking with an incorrect remote. (#1259)
- Improve smoke tests in environments where the docker network is not the default. (#1347)
## [1.9.7] - 2025-10-10
### Security
- Fix an issue where Nebula could incorrectly accept and process a packet from an erroneous source IP when the sender's
certificate is configured with unsafe_routes (cert v1/v2) or multiple IPs (cert v2). (#1494)
### Changed
- Disable sending `recv_error` messages when a packet is received outside the allowable counter window. (#1459)
- Improve error messages and remove some unnecessary fatal conditions in the Windows and generic udp listener. (#1453)
## [1.9.6] - 2025-7-15
### Added
- Support dropping inactive tunnels. This is disabled by default in this release but can be enabled with `tunnels.drop_inactive`. See example config for more details. (#1413)
### Fixed
- Fix Darwin freeze due to presence of some Network Extensions (#1426)
- Ensure the same relay tunnel is always used when multiple relay tunnels are present (#1422)
- Fix Windows freeze due to ICMP error handling (#1412)
- Fix relay migration panic (#1403)
## [1.9.5] - 2024-12-05
### Added
- Gracefully ignore v2 certificates. (#1282)
### Fixed
- Fix relays that refuse to re-establish after one of the remote tunnel pairs breaks. (#1277)
## [1.9.4] - 2024-09-09 ## [1.9.4] - 2024-09-09
@@ -671,7 +921,16 @@ created.)
- Initial public release. - Initial public release.
[Unreleased]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/compare/v1.9.4...HEAD [Unreleased]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/compare/v1.11.1...HEAD
[1.11.1]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.11.1
[1.11.0]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.11.0
[1.10.3]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.10.3
[1.10.2]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.10.2
[1.10.1]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.10.1
[1.10.0]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.10.0
[1.9.7]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.9.7
[1.9.6]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.9.6
[1.9.5]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.9.5
[1.9.4]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.9.4 [1.9.4]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.9.4
[1.9.3]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.9.3 [1.9.3]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.9.3
[1.9.2]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.9.2 [1.9.2]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.9.2
+1
View File
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
#ECCN:Open Source
+133 -20
View File
@@ -60,6 +60,29 @@ ALL = $(ALL_LINUX) \
windows-amd64 \ windows-amd64 \
windows-arm64 windows-arm64
# Cross-build shards used by .github/workflows/test.yml — same as ALL_*
# but with the arch that has a native CI runner removed, so the cross-build
# job is not duplicating coverage the native test jobs already give.
ALL_CROSS_LINUX = $(filter-out linux-amd64,$(ALL_LINUX))
# ALL_CROSS_LINUX further split into family sub-shards so each can run on
# its own CI runner in parallel. Union of the three must equal
# ALL_CROSS_LINUX; adding a new linux arch goes into the matching family.
ALL_CROSS_LINUX_ARM = linux-arm-5 linux-arm-6 linux-arm-7 linux-arm64
ALL_CROSS_LINUX_MIPS = linux-mips linux-mipsle linux-mips64 linux-mips64le linux-mips-softfloat
ALL_CROSS_LINUX_OTHER = linux-386 linux-ppc64le linux-riscv64 linux-loong64
# Based on section 2.2 of the Go Cryptographic Module CVMP Security Policy #5247
ALL_FIPS140 = linux-amd64-fips140 \
linux-arm64-fips140 \
windows-amd64-fips140 \
windows-arm64-fips140 \
darwin-arm64-fips140 \
freebsd-amd64-fips140 \
linux-arm-7-fips140 \
linux-mips64-fips140 \
linux-ppc64le-fips140
e2e: e2e:
$(TEST_ENV) go test -tags=e2e_testing -count=1 $(TEST_FLAGS) ./e2e $(TEST_ENV) go test -tags=e2e_testing -count=1 $(TEST_FLAGS) ./e2e
@@ -82,6 +105,35 @@ DOCKER_BIN = build/linux-amd64/nebula build/linux-amd64/nebula-cert
all: $(ALL:%=build/%/nebula) $(ALL:%=build/%/nebula-cert) all: $(ALL:%=build/%/nebula) $(ALL:%=build/%/nebula-cert)
all-linux: $(ALL_LINUX:%=build/%/nebula) $(ALL_LINUX:%=build/%/nebula-cert)
all-freebsd: $(ALL_FREEBSD:%=build/%/nebula) $(ALL_FREEBSD:%=build/%/nebula-cert)
all-openbsd: $(ALL_OPENBSD:%=build/%/nebula) $(ALL_OPENBSD:%=build/%/nebula-cert)
all-netbsd: $(ALL_NETBSD:%=build/%/nebula) $(ALL_NETBSD:%=build/%/nebula-cert)
all-darwin: build/darwin-amd64/nebula build/darwin-amd64/nebula-cert build/darwin-arm64/nebula build/darwin-arm64/nebula-cert
all-windows: build/windows-amd64/nebula.exe build/windows-amd64/nebula-cert.exe build/windows-arm64/nebula.exe build/windows-arm64/nebula-cert.exe
# CI cross-build shards. darwin-arm64 is covered by the native macos-latest
# job; windows-amd64 is covered by the native windows-latest job; both are
# omitted here to avoid building them a second time. darwin-amd64 stays in
# all-cross-darwin because intel mac is only a labeled/master-time native
# job, so PRs still need cross-build coverage for it.
all-cross-linux: $(ALL_CROSS_LINUX:%=build/%/nebula) $(ALL_CROSS_LINUX:%=build/%/nebula-cert)
all-cross-linux-arm: $(ALL_CROSS_LINUX_ARM:%=build/%/nebula) $(ALL_CROSS_LINUX_ARM:%=build/%/nebula-cert)
all-cross-linux-mips: $(ALL_CROSS_LINUX_MIPS:%=build/%/nebula) $(ALL_CROSS_LINUX_MIPS:%=build/%/nebula-cert)
all-cross-linux-other: $(ALL_CROSS_LINUX_OTHER:%=build/%/nebula) $(ALL_CROSS_LINUX_OTHER:%=build/%/nebula-cert)
all-cross-darwin: build/darwin-amd64/nebula build/darwin-amd64/nebula-cert
all-cross-windows: build/windows-arm64/nebula.exe build/windows-arm64/nebula-cert.exe
docker: docker/linux-$(shell go env GOARCH) docker: docker/linux-$(shell go env GOARCH)
release: $(ALL:%=build/nebula-%.tar.gz) release: $(ALL:%=build/nebula-%.tar.gz)
@@ -96,6 +148,8 @@ release-netbsd: $(ALL_NETBSD:%=build/nebula-%.tar.gz)
release-boringcrypto: build/nebula-linux-$(shell go env GOARCH)-boringcrypto.tar.gz release-boringcrypto: build/nebula-linux-$(shell go env GOARCH)-boringcrypto.tar.gz
release-fips140: $(ALL_FIPS140:%=build/nebula-%.tar.gz)
BUILD_ARGS += -trimpath BUILD_ARGS += -trimpath
bin-windows: build/windows-amd64/nebula.exe build/windows-amd64/nebula-cert.exe bin-windows: build/windows-amd64/nebula.exe build/windows-amd64/nebula-cert.exe
@@ -116,17 +170,24 @@ bin-freebsd-arm64: build/freebsd-arm64/nebula build/freebsd-arm64/nebula-cert
bin-boringcrypto: build/linux-$(shell go env GOARCH)-boringcrypto/nebula build/linux-$(shell go env GOARCH)-boringcrypto/nebula-cert bin-boringcrypto: build/linux-$(shell go env GOARCH)-boringcrypto/nebula build/linux-$(shell go env GOARCH)-boringcrypto/nebula-cert
mv $? . mv $? .
bin-fips140: build/linux-$(shell go env GOARCH)-fips140/nebula build/linux-$(shell go env GOARCH)-fips140/nebula-cert
mv $? .
bin-pkcs11: BUILD_ARGS += -tags pkcs11 bin-pkcs11: BUILD_ARGS += -tags pkcs11
bin-pkcs11: CGO_ENABLED = 1 bin-pkcs11: CGO_ENABLED = 1
bin-pkcs11: bin bin-pkcs11: bin
# Build with the pprof debug server (serves on :6060). See startPprofServer.
debug: BUILD_ARGS += -tags debug
debug: bin
bin: bin:
go build $(BUILD_ARGS) -ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" -o ./nebula${NEBULA_CMD_SUFFIX} ${NEBULA_CMD_PATH} $(GOENV) go build $(BUILD_ARGS) -ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" -o ./nebula${NEBULA_CMD_SUFFIX} ${NEBULA_CMD_PATH}
go build $(BUILD_ARGS) -ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" -o ./nebula-cert${NEBULA_CMD_SUFFIX} ./cmd/nebula-cert $(GOENV) go build $(BUILD_ARGS) -ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" -o ./nebula-cert${NEBULA_CMD_SUFFIX} ./cmd/nebula-cert
install: install:
go install $(BUILD_ARGS) -ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" ${NEBULA_CMD_PATH} $(GOENV) go install $(BUILD_ARGS) -ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" ${NEBULA_CMD_PATH}
go install $(BUILD_ARGS) -ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" ./cmd/nebula-cert $(GOENV) go install $(BUILD_ARGS) -ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" ./cmd/nebula-cert
build/linux-arm-%: GOENV += GOARM=$(word 3, $(subst -, ,$*)) build/linux-arm-%: GOENV += GOARM=$(word 3, $(subst -, ,$*))
build/linux-mips-%: GOENV += GOMIPS=$(word 3, $(subst -, ,$*)) build/linux-mips-%: GOENV += GOMIPS=$(word 3, $(subst -, ,$*))
@@ -137,8 +198,11 @@ build/linux-mips-softfloat/%: LDFLAGS += -s -w
# boringcrypto # boringcrypto
build/linux-amd64-boringcrypto/%: GOENV += GOEXPERIMENT=boringcrypto CGO_ENABLED=1 build/linux-amd64-boringcrypto/%: GOENV += GOEXPERIMENT=boringcrypto CGO_ENABLED=1
build/linux-arm64-boringcrypto/%: GOENV += GOEXPERIMENT=boringcrypto CGO_ENABLED=1 build/linux-arm64-boringcrypto/%: GOENV += GOEXPERIMENT=boringcrypto CGO_ENABLED=1
build/linux-amd64-boringcrypto/%: LDFLAGS += -checklinkname=0
build/linux-arm64-boringcrypto/%: LDFLAGS += -checklinkname=0 # fips140
FIPSVERSION = v1.0.0
$(foreach _rule, $(ALL_FIPS140), build/$(_rule)/%): GOENV += GOFIPS140=$(FIPSVERSION)
$(foreach _rule, $(ALL_FIPS140), build/$(_rule)/%): BUILD_ARGS += -tags fips140enforce
build/%/nebula: .FORCE build/%/nebula: .FORCE
GOOS=$(firstword $(subst -, , $*)) \ GOOS=$(firstword $(subst -, , $*)) \
@@ -169,10 +233,7 @@ vet:
go vet $(VET_FLAGS) -v ./... go vet $(VET_FLAGS) -v ./...
test: test:
go test -v ./... $(TEST_ENV) go test $(TEST_FLAGS) -v ./...
test-boringcrypto:
GOEXPERIMENT=boringcrypto CGO_ENABLED=1 go test -ldflags "-checklinkname=0" -v ./...
test-pkcs11: test-pkcs11:
CGO_ENABLED=1 go test -v -tags pkcs11 ./... CGO_ENABLED=1 go test -v -tags pkcs11 ./...
@@ -181,11 +242,14 @@ test-cov-html:
go test -coverprofile=coverage.out go test -coverprofile=coverage.out
go tool cover -html=coverage.out go tool cover -html=coverage.out
# The package builds only compile. The final line links an android binary so a linker-only failure
# cannot pass CI.
build-test-mobile: build-test-mobile:
GOARCH=amd64 GOOS=ios go build $(shell go list ./... | grep -v '/cmd/\|/examples/') GOARCH=amd64 GOOS=ios go build $(shell go list ./... | grep -v '/cmd/\|/examples/')
GOARCH=arm64 GOOS=ios go build $(shell go list ./... | grep -v '/cmd/\|/examples/') GOARCH=arm64 GOOS=ios go build $(shell go list ./... | grep -v '/cmd/\|/examples/')
GOARCH=amd64 GOOS=android go build $(shell go list ./... | grep -v '/cmd/\|/examples/') GOARCH=amd64 GOOS=android go build $(shell go list ./... | grep -v '/cmd/\|/examples/')
GOARCH=arm64 GOOS=android go build $(shell go list ./... | grep -v '/cmd/\|/examples/') GOARCH=arm64 GOOS=android go build $(shell go list ./... | grep -v '/cmd/\|/examples/')
GOARCH=arm64 GOOS=android go build -o /dev/null ${NEBULA_CMD_PATH}
bench: bench:
go test -bench=. go test -bench=.
@@ -215,26 +279,75 @@ ifeq ($(words $(MAKECMDGOALS)),1)
@$(MAKE) service ${.DEFAULT_GOAL} --no-print-directory @$(MAKE) service ${.DEFAULT_GOAL} --no-print-directory
endif endif
# Useful to chain together, like:
# - make fips140 e2evv
# - make fips140 smoke-docker
# Use `release-fips140` to build release binaries
fips140:
@echo > $(NULL_FILE)
ifeq ($(strip $(GOFIPS140)),)
$(eval GOFIPS140 = $(FIPSVERSION))
endif
$(eval GOENV += GOFIPS140=$(GOFIPS140))
$(eval BUILD_ARGS += -tags fips140enforce)
$(eval TEST_ENV += $(GOENV))
$(eval CURVE = P256)
ifeq ($(words $(MAKECMDGOALS)),1)
@$(MAKE) fips140 GOFIPS140=$(GOFIPS140) ${.DEFAULT_GOAL} --no-print-directory
endif
# To test the future pending module, use like `make fips140-latest test`
ALL_GOFIPS140 = v1.0.0 v1.26.0 latest
define FIPS140_rule
fips140-$(1): GOFIPS140 = $(1)
fips140-$(1): fips140
endef
$(foreach _rule, $(ALL_GOFIPS140), $(eval $(call FIPS140_rule,$(_rule))))
# Iterate and run the goals for all fips versions, like `make fips140-all GOALS=test`
fips140-all:
@$(foreach _v,$(ALL_GOFIPS140),$(MAKE) fips140-$(_v) $(GOALS) &&) true
# Useful to chain together, like:
# - make boringcrypto e2evv
# - make boringcrypto smoke-docker
# Use `release-boringcrypto` or `bin-boringcrypto` to build release binaries
boringcrypto:
@echo > $(NULL_FILE)
$(eval GOENV += GOEXPERIMENT=boringcrypto CGO_ENABLED=1)
$(eval TEST_ENV += $(GOENV))
$(eval CURVE = P256)
ifeq ($(words $(MAKECMDGOALS)),1)
@$(MAKE) boringcrypto ${.DEFAULT_GOAL} --no-print-directory
endif
bin-docker: bin build/linux-amd64/nebula build/linux-amd64/nebula-cert bin-docker: bin build/linux-amd64/nebula build/linux-amd64/nebula-cert
smoke-docker: BUILD_ARGS += -race
smoke-docker: GOENV += CGO_ENABLED=1
smoke-docker: bin-docker smoke-docker: bin-docker
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && ./build.sh # This is so we can limit `fips140` smoke test to just P256 curve.
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && ./smoke.sh if [ "$(CURVE)" != "P256" ]; then cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && $(GOENV) ./build.sh; fi
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && NAME="smoke-p256" CURVE="P256" ./build.sh if [ "$(CURVE)" != "P256" ]; then cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && $(GOENV) ./smoke.sh; fi
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && NAME="smoke-p256" ./smoke.sh cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && $(GOENV) NAME="smoke-p256" CURVE="P256" ./build.sh
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && $(GOENV) NAME="smoke-p256" ./smoke.sh
smoke-relay-docker: BUILD_ARGS += -race
smoke-relay-docker: GOENV += CGO_ENABLED=1
smoke-relay-docker: bin-docker smoke-relay-docker: bin-docker
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && ./build-relay.sh cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && $(GOENV) ./build-relay.sh
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && ./smoke-relay.sh cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && $(GOENV) ./smoke-relay.sh
smoke-docker-race: BUILD_ARGS = -race smoke-docker-ipv6: export SMOKE_OVERLAY_IPV6 = 1
smoke-docker-race: CGO_ENABLED = 1 smoke-docker-ipv6: smoke-docker
smoke-docker-race: smoke-docker
smoke-self: bin
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && ./smoke-self.sh
smoke-vagrant/%: bin-docker build/%/nebula smoke-vagrant/%: bin-docker build/%/nebula
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && ./build.sh $* cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && ./build.sh $*
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && ./smoke-vagrant.sh $* cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && ./smoke-vagrant.sh $*
.FORCE: .FORCE:
.PHONY: bench bench-cpu bench-cpu-long bin build-test-mobile e2e e2ev e2evv e2evvv e2evvvv proto release service smoke-docker smoke-docker-race test test-cov-html smoke-vagrant/% .PHONY: all all-linux all-freebsd all-openbsd all-netbsd all-darwin all-windows all-cross-linux all-cross-linux-arm all-cross-linux-mips all-cross-linux-other all-cross-darwin all-cross-windows bench bench-cpu bench-cpu-long bin bin-windows bin-windows-arm64 bin-darwin bin-freebsd bin-freebsd-arm64 bin-boringcrypto bin-fips140 bin-pkcs11 bin-docker boringcrypto build-test-mobile debug docker e2e e2ev e2evv e2evvv e2evvvv e2e-bench fips140 fips140-all $(ALL_GOFIPS140:%=fips140-%) install proto release release-linux release-freebsd release-openbsd release-netbsd release-boringcrypto release-fips140 service smoke-docker smoke-relay-docker smoke-docker-ipv6 smoke-self test test-pkcs11 test-cov-html vet smoke-vagrant/%
.DEFAULT_GOAL := bin .DEFAULT_GOAL := bin
+15 -3
View File
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ Check the [releases](https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/latest) page for
docker pull nebulaoss/nebula docker pull nebulaoss/nebula
``` ```
#### Mobile #### Mobile ([source code](https://github.com/DefinedNet/mobile_nebula))
- [iOS](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/mobile-nebula/id1509587936?itsct=apps_box&amp;itscg=30200) - [iOS](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/mobile-nebula/id1509587936?itsct=apps_box&amp;itscg=30200)
- [Android](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.defined.mobile_nebula&pcampaignid=pcampaignidMKT-Other-global-all-co-prtnr-py-PartBadge-Mar2515-1) - [Android](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.defined.mobile_nebula&pcampaignid=pcampaignidMKT-Other-global-all-co-prtnr-py-PartBadge-Mar2515-1)
@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@ Nebula was created to provide a mechanism for groups of hosts to communicate sec
## Getting started (quickly) ## Getting started (quickly)
**Don't want to manage your own PKI and lighthouses?** [Managed Nebula](https://www.defined.net/) from Defined Networking handles all of this for you.
To set up a Nebula network, you'll need: To set up a Nebula network, you'll need:
#### 1. The [Nebula binaries](https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases) or [Distribution Packages](https://github.com/slackhq/nebula#distribution-packages) for your specific platform. Specifically you'll need `nebula-cert` and the specific nebula binary for each platform you use. #### 1. The [Nebula binaries](https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases) or [Distribution Packages](https://github.com/slackhq/nebula#distribution-packages) for your specific platform. Specifically you'll need `nebula-cert` and the specific nebula binary for each platform you use.
@@ -143,17 +145,27 @@ To build nebula for a specific platform (ex, Windows):
See the [Makefile](Makefile) for more details on build targets See the [Makefile](Makefile) for more details on build targets
## Curve P256 and BoringCrypto ## Curve P256 and FIPS 140-3 mode
The default curve used for cryptographic handshakes and signatures is Curve25519. This is the recommended setting for most users. If your deployment has certain compliance requirements, you have the option of creating your CA using `nebula-cert ca -curve P256` to use NIST Curve P256. The CA will then sign certificates using ECDSA P256, and any hosts using these certificates will use P256 for ECDH handshakes. The default curve used for cryptographic handshakes and signatures is Curve25519. This is the recommended setting for most users. If your deployment has certain compliance requirements, you have the option of creating your CA using `nebula-cert ca -curve P256` to use NIST Curve P256. The CA will then sign certificates using ECDSA P256, and any hosts using these certificates will use P256 for ECDH handshakes.
In addition, Nebula can be built using the [BoringCrypto GOEXPERIMENT](https://github.com/golang/go/blob/go1.20/src/crypto/internal/boring/README.md) by running either of the following make targets: Nebula can be built to support the [FIPS 140-3](https://go.dev/doc/security/fips140) mode of Go by running either of the following make targets. (This sets GOFIPS140=v1.0.0, which must be done at compile time so that the correct AES-GCM can be used for FIPS 140-3 enforcement mode).
```sh
make fips140
make fips140 test
make release-fips140
```
Nebula can also be built using the [BoringCrypto GOEXPERIMENT](https://github.com/golang/go/blob/go1.20/src/crypto/internal/boring/README.md) by running either of the following make targets.
```sh ```sh
make bin-boringcrypto make bin-boringcrypto
make release-boringcrypto make release-boringcrypto
``` ```
NOTE: boringcrypto support is deprecated and will be removed in the next release. Users should migrate to the native FIPS 140-3 mode described above.
This is not the recommended default deployment, but may be useful based on your compliance requirements. This is not the recommended default deployment, but may be useful based on your compliance requirements.
## Credits ## Credits
+186 -44
View File
@@ -1,23 +1,43 @@
package nebula package nebula
import ( import (
"context"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"math"
mathbits "math/bits"
"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics" "github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
) )
const bitsPerWord = 64
// Bits is a sliding-window anti-replay tracker. The window is stored as a
// circular bitmap packed into uint64 words (8x denser than a []bool), so a
// length-N window costs N/8 bytes. length must be a power of two.
type Bits struct { type Bits struct {
length uint64 length uint64
lengthMask uint64
current uint64 current uint64
bits []bool bits []uint64
lostCounter metrics.Counter lostCounter metrics.Counter
dupeCounter metrics.Counter dupeCounter metrics.Counter
outOfWindowCounter metrics.Counter outOfWindowCounter metrics.Counter
} }
func NewBits(bits uint64) *Bits { func NewBits(length uint64) *Bits {
if length == 0 || length&(length-1) != 0 {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("Bits length must be a power of two, got %d", length))
}
nWords := length / bitsPerWord
if nWords == 0 {
nWords = 1
}
b := &Bits{ b := &Bits{
length: bits, length: length,
bits: make([]bool, bits, bits), lengthMask: length - 1,
bits: make([]uint64, nWords),
current: 0, current: 0,
lostCounter: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("network.packets.lost", nil), lostCounter: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("network.packets.lost", nil),
dupeCounter: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("network.packets.duplicate", nil), dupeCounter: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("network.packets.duplicate", nil),
@@ -25,88 +45,210 @@ func NewBits(bits uint64) *Bits {
} }
// There is no counter value 0, mark it to avoid counting a lost packet later. // There is no counter value 0, mark it to avoid counting a lost packet later.
b.bits[0] = true b.bits[0] = 1
b.current = 0
return b return b
} }
func (b *Bits) Check(l *logrus.Logger, i uint64) bool { func (b *Bits) get(i uint64) bool {
pos := i & b.lengthMask
//bit-shifting by 6 because i is a bit index, not a u64 index, and we need to find the u64 without bit in it
return b.bits[pos>>6]&(uint64(1)<<(pos&63)) != 0
}
func (b *Bits) set(i uint64) {
pos := i & b.lengthMask
b.bits[pos>>6] |= uint64(1) << (pos & 63)
}
// clearRange clears `count` bits starting at circular position `startPos`
// (already masked to [0, length)) and returns how many of them were set
// before the clear. count must be in [1, length].
func (b *Bits) clearRange(startPos, count uint64) uint64 {
wasSet := uint64(0)
if count >= b.length {
for _, w := range b.bits {
wasSet += uint64(mathbits.OnesCount64(w))
}
clear(b.bits)
return wasSet
}
pos := startPos
remaining := count
// handle the potential partial word before pos becomes u64 aligned
word := pos >> 6
bit := pos & 63
take := min(min(uint64(64)-bit, remaining), b.length-pos)
var mask uint64
if take == 64 {
mask = math.MaxUint64
} else {
mask = ((uint64(1) << take) - 1) << bit
}
wasSet += uint64(mathbits.OnesCount64(b.bits[word] & mask))
b.bits[word] &^= mask
remaining -= take
pos = (pos + take) & b.lengthMask
// Clear whole words, keeping track of the number of set bits
for remaining >= 64 {
word = pos >> 6
wasSet += uint64(mathbits.OnesCount64(b.bits[word]))
b.bits[word] = 0
remaining -= 64
pos = (pos + 64) & b.lengthMask
}
// Clear the remaining partial word
if remaining > 0 {
word = pos >> 6
mask = (uint64(1) << remaining) - 1
wasSet += uint64(mathbits.OnesCount64(b.bits[word] & mask))
b.bits[word] &^= mask
}
return wasSet
}
func (b *Bits) strictlyWithinWindow(i uint64) bool {
// Handle the case where the window hasn't slid yet. This avoids u64 underflow.
inWarmup := b.current < b.length
if i < b.length && inWarmup {
return true
}
// Next, if the packet is in-window, see if we've seen it before
if i > b.current-b.length {
return true
}
return false //not within window!
}
// Check returns true if i is within (or way out in front of) the window, and not a replay
func (b *Bits) Check(l *slog.Logger, i uint64) bool {
// If i is the next number, return true. // If i is the next number, return true.
if i > b.current { if i > b.current {
return true return true
} }
// If i is within the window, check if it's been set already. if b.strictlyWithinWindow(i) {
if i > b.current-b.length || i < b.length && b.current < b.length { return !b.get(i)
return !b.bits[i%b.length]
} }
// Not within the window // Not within the window
if l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel { if l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
l.Debugf("rejected a packet (top) %d %d\n", b.current, i) l.Debug("rejected a packet (top)", "current", b.current, "incoming", i)
} }
return false return false
} }
func (b *Bits) Update(l *logrus.Logger, i uint64) bool { // Update has three branches:
// If i is the next number, return true and update current. // - i == b.current+1: fast path; advance the cursor by one and lose-count
// the slot we just stomped (only past warmup; see the i > b.length guard
// below).
// - i > b.current+1: jump path; clear all slots between current and i
// (or up to a full window's worth, whichever is smaller) via clearRange,
// then mark i. Two arms here: a warmup arm that handles the very first
// window before the cursor has slid, and a steady-state arm that treats
// every cleared empty slot as a lost packet.
// - i <= b.current: in-window check for duplicates; out-of-window otherwise.
//
// NewBits seeds bits[0]=1 so counter 0 looks "received" — Update never
// clears that marker during warmup (clearRange skips position 0 when
// startPos=1), and once b.current >= b.length the marker is no longer
// consulted. The marker prevents a fictitious "lost" hit on the first real
// counter.
func (b *Bits) Update(l *slog.Logger, i uint64) bool {
// Fast path: i is the next expected counter. Split out so the function
// stays small and avoids paying for the slow paths' slog argument-build
// stack frame on every call. The bit read/test/write is inlined to
// touch the backing word once.
if i == b.current+1 { if i == b.current+1 {
// Check if the oldest bit was lost since we are shifting the window by 1 and occupying it with this counter pos := i & b.lengthMask
// The very first window can only be tracked as lost once we are on the 2nd window or greater word := pos >> 6
if b.bits[i%b.length] == false && i > b.length { mask := uint64(1) << (pos & 63)
w := b.bits[word]
if i > b.length && w&mask == 0 {
b.lostCounter.Inc(1) b.lostCounter.Inc(1)
} }
b.bits[i%b.length] = true b.bits[word] = w | mask
b.current = i b.current = i
return true return true
} }
return b.updateSlow(l, i)
}
// updateSlow handles jumps, in-window backfill, dupes, and out-of-window.
func (b *Bits) updateSlow(l *slog.Logger, i uint64) bool {
// If i is a jump, adjust the window, record lost, update current, and return true // If i is a jump, adjust the window, record lost, update current, and return true
if i > b.current { if i > b.current {
lost := int64(0) end := min(i, b.current+b.length)
// Zero out the bits between the current and the new counter value, limited by the window size, count := end - b.current
// since the window is shifting startPos := (b.current + 1) & b.lengthMask
for n := b.current + 1; n <= min(i, b.current+b.length); n++ {
if b.bits[n%b.length] == false && n > b.length { var lost int64
lost++ if b.current >= b.length {
// Steady state: every cleared slot is past warmup, so any unset
// bit we evict is a lost packet from the previous cycle.
wasSet := b.clearRange(startPos, count)
lost = int64(count) - int64(wasSet)
} else {
// Warmup (the very first window). Some cleared slots represent
// packets <= length where eviction is not "lost" in the usual
// sense. This branch is taken at most once per connection so we
// don't bother optimizing it.
for n := b.current + 1; n <= end; n++ {
if !b.get(n) && n > b.length {
lost++
}
} }
b.bits[n%b.length] = false b.clearRange(startPos, count)
} }
// Only record any skipped packets as a result of the window moving further than the window length // Anything past the new window can never be backfilled, so it's lost.
// Any loss within the new window will be accounted for in future calls if i > b.current+b.length {
lost += max(0, int64(i-b.current-b.length)) lost += int64(i - b.current - b.length)
}
b.lostCounter.Inc(lost) b.lostCounter.Inc(lost)
b.bits[i%b.length] = true b.set(i)
b.current = i b.current = i
return true return true
} }
// If i is within the current window but below the current counter, // If i is within the current window but below the current counter, check to see if it's a duplicate
// Check to see if it's a duplicate if b.strictlyWithinWindow(i) {
if i > b.current-b.length || i < b.length && b.current < b.length { pos := i & b.lengthMask
if b.current == i || b.bits[i%b.length] == true { word := pos >> 6
if l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel { mask := uint64(1) << (pos & 63)
l.WithField("receiveWindow", m{"accepted": false, "currentCounter": b.current, "incomingCounter": i, "reason": "duplicate"}). w := b.bits[word]
Debug("Receive window") if b.current == i || w&mask != 0 {
if l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
l.Debug("Receive window",
"accepted", false,
"currentCounter", b.current,
"incomingCounter", i,
"reason", "duplicate",
)
} }
b.dupeCounter.Inc(1) b.dupeCounter.Inc(1)
return false return false
} }
b.bits[i%b.length] = true b.bits[word] = w | mask
return true return true
} }
// In all other cases, fail and don't change current. // In all other cases, fail and don't change current.
b.outOfWindowCounter.Inc(1) b.outOfWindowCounter.Inc(1)
if l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel { if l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
l.WithField("accepted", false). l.Debug("Receive window",
WithField("currentCounter", b.current). "accepted", false,
WithField("incomingCounter", i). "currentCounter", b.current,
WithField("reason", "nonsense"). "incomingCounter", i,
Debug("Receive window") "reason", "nonsense",
)
} }
return false return false
} }
+277 -130
View File
@@ -7,61 +7,79 @@ import (
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
) )
// snapshot returns the bitmap as a []bool of length b.length, for readable
// test assertions against the now-packed []uint64 storage.
func (b *Bits) snapshot() []bool {
out := make([]bool, b.length)
for i := uint64(0); i < b.length; i++ {
out[i] = b.get(i)
}
return out
}
func TestBitsRequiresPowerOfTwo(t *testing.T) {
assert.Panics(t, func() { NewBits(10) })
assert.Panics(t, func() { NewBits(0) })
assert.NotPanics(t, func() { NewBits(1) })
assert.NotPanics(t, func() { NewBits(16) })
assert.NotPanics(t, func() { NewBits(1024) })
assert.NotPanics(t, func() { NewBits(16384) })
}
func TestBits(t *testing.T) { func TestBits(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger() l := test.NewLogger()
b := NewBits(10) b := NewBits(16)
assert.EqualValues(t, 16, b.length)
// make sure it is the right size
assert.Len(t, b.bits, 10)
// This is initialized to zero - receive one. This should work. // This is initialized to zero - receive one. This should work.
assert.True(t, b.Check(l, 1)) assert.True(t, b.Check(l, 1))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 1)) assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 1))
assert.EqualValues(t, 1, b.current) assert.EqualValues(t, 1, b.current)
g := []bool{true, true, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false} g := []bool{true, true, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false}
assert.Equal(t, g, b.bits) assert.Equal(t, g, b.snapshot())
// Receive two // Receive two
assert.True(t, b.Check(l, 2)) assert.True(t, b.Check(l, 2))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 2)) assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 2))
assert.EqualValues(t, 2, b.current) assert.EqualValues(t, 2, b.current)
g = []bool{true, true, true, false, false, false, false, false, false, false} g = []bool{true, true, true, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false}
assert.Equal(t, g, b.bits) assert.Equal(t, g, b.snapshot())
// Receive two again - it will fail // Receive two again - it will fail
assert.False(t, b.Check(l, 2)) assert.False(t, b.Check(l, 2))
assert.False(t, b.Update(l, 2)) assert.False(t, b.Update(l, 2))
assert.EqualValues(t, 2, b.current) assert.EqualValues(t, 2, b.current)
// Jump ahead to 15, which should clear everything and set the 6th element // Jump ahead to 25, which clears the window and sets slot 25%16 = 9.
assert.True(t, b.Check(l, 15)) assert.True(t, b.Check(l, 25))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 15)) assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 25))
assert.EqualValues(t, 15, b.current) assert.EqualValues(t, 25, b.current)
g = []bool{false, false, false, false, false, true, false, false, false, false} g = []bool{false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, true, false, false, false, false, false, false}
assert.Equal(t, g, b.bits) assert.Equal(t, g, b.snapshot())
// Mark 14, which is allowed because it is in the window // Mark 24, which is in window (current 25, length 16, window covers [10,25]).
assert.True(t, b.Check(l, 14)) assert.True(t, b.Check(l, 24))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 14)) assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 24))
assert.EqualValues(t, 15, b.current) assert.EqualValues(t, 25, b.current)
g = []bool{false, false, false, false, true, true, false, false, false, false} g = []bool{false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, true, true, false, false, false, false, false, false}
assert.Equal(t, g, b.bits) assert.Equal(t, g, b.snapshot())
// Mark 5, which is not allowed because it is not in the window // Mark 5, not allowed because 5 <= current-length (25-16=9).
assert.False(t, b.Check(l, 5)) assert.False(t, b.Check(l, 5))
assert.False(t, b.Update(l, 5)) assert.False(t, b.Update(l, 5))
assert.EqualValues(t, 15, b.current) assert.EqualValues(t, 25, b.current)
g = []bool{false, false, false, false, true, true, false, false, false, false} g = []bool{false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, true, true, false, false, false, false, false, false}
assert.Equal(t, g, b.bits) assert.Equal(t, g, b.snapshot())
// make sure we handle wrapping around once to the current position // Make sure we handle wrapping around once to the same slot. With
b = NewBits(10) // length=16, packets 1 and 17 share slot 1.
b = NewBits(16)
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 1)) assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 1))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 11)) assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 17))
assert.Equal(t, []bool{false, true, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false}, b.bits) assert.Equal(t, []bool{false, true, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false}, b.snapshot())
// Walk through a few windows in order // Walk through a few windows in order
b = NewBits(10) b = NewBits(16)
for i := uint64(1); i <= 100; i++ { for i := uint64(1); i <= 100; i++ {
assert.True(t, b.Check(l, i), "Error while checking %v", i) assert.True(t, b.Check(l, i), "Error while checking %v", i)
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, i), "Error while updating %v", i) assert.True(t, b.Update(l, i), "Error while updating %v", i)
@@ -72,24 +90,31 @@ func TestBits(t *testing.T) {
func TestBitsLargeJumps(t *testing.T) { func TestBitsLargeJumps(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger() l := test.NewLogger()
b := NewBits(10)
// length=16. Update(55) from current=0:
// warmup, per-bit loop sees no n>16 with unset bits (slot 0 was set by
// NewBits and gets re-evaluated when n=16; n=16 is not strictly > 16),
// so the loop contributes 0. The jump exceeds the window so we record
// 55 - 0 - 16 = 39 packets fell out the back.
b := NewBits(16)
b.lostCounter.Clear() b.lostCounter.Clear()
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 55))
assert.Equal(t, int64(39), b.lostCounter.Count())
b = NewBits(10) // Update(100): clears 16 slots starting at slot 56%16=8. Only slot 7 (for
b.lostCounter.Clear() // packet 55) was set, so 16 - 1 = 15 evicted slots had unset bits.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 55)) // We saw packet 55 and can still track 45,46,47,48,49,50,51,52,53,54 // Plus 100 - 55 - 16 = 29 packets fell past the window. Total 44.
assert.Equal(t, int64(45), b.lostCounter.Count()) assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 100))
assert.Equal(t, int64(39+44), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 100)) // We saw packet 55 and 100 and can still track 90,91,92,93,94,95,96,97,98,99 // Update(200): same shape: 16 - 1 = 15 evicted unset, plus 200 - 100 - 16 = 84 past window. Total 99.
assert.Equal(t, int64(89), b.lostCounter.Count()) assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 200))
assert.Equal(t, int64(39+44+99), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 200)) // We saw packet 55, 100, and 200 and can still track 190,191,192,193,194,195,196,197,198,199
assert.Equal(t, int64(188), b.lostCounter.Count())
} }
func TestBitsDupeCounter(t *testing.T) { func TestBitsDupeCounter(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger() l := test.NewLogger()
b := NewBits(10) b := NewBits(16)
b.lostCounter.Clear() b.lostCounter.Clear()
b.dupeCounter.Clear() b.dupeCounter.Clear()
b.outOfWindowCounter.Clear() b.outOfWindowCounter.Clear()
@@ -114,120 +139,117 @@ func TestBitsDupeCounter(t *testing.T) {
func TestBitsOutOfWindowCounter(t *testing.T) { func TestBitsOutOfWindowCounter(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger() l := test.NewLogger()
b := NewBits(10) b := NewBits(16)
b.lostCounter.Clear() b.lostCounter.Clear()
b.dupeCounter.Clear() b.dupeCounter.Clear()
b.outOfWindowCounter.Clear() b.outOfWindowCounter.Clear()
// Jump to 20 (warmup branch + 4 past-window packets).
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 20)) assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 20))
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.outOfWindowCounter.Count()) assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.outOfWindowCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 21)) // 9 single-step advances, each evicts a slot whose bit was cleared during
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 22)) // the jump above and whose value was never seen, so each contributes 1
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 23)) // to lostCounter.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 24)) for n := uint64(21); n <= 29; n++ {
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 25)) assert.True(t, b.Update(l, n))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 26)) }
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 27))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 28))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 29))
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.outOfWindowCounter.Count()) assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.outOfWindowCounter.Count())
// 0 is below current-length (29-16=13) so it falls outside the window.
assert.False(t, b.Update(l, 0)) assert.False(t, b.Update(l, 0))
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.outOfWindowCounter.Count()) assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.outOfWindowCounter.Count())
assert.Equal(t, int64(19), b.lostCounter.Count()) // packet 0 wasn't lost // 4 from the Update(20) jump + 9 from 21..29.
assert.Equal(t, int64(13), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.dupeCounter.Count()) assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.dupeCounter.Count())
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.outOfWindowCounter.Count()) assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.outOfWindowCounter.Count())
} }
func TestBitsLostCounter(t *testing.T) { func TestBitsLostCounter(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger() l := test.NewLogger()
b := NewBits(10) b := NewBits(16)
b.lostCounter.Clear() b.lostCounter.Clear()
b.dupeCounter.Clear() b.dupeCounter.Clear()
b.outOfWindowCounter.Clear() b.outOfWindowCounter.Clear()
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 20)) // Walk 20..29 like the original, just with a bigger window. Same
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 21)) // reasoning as TestBitsOutOfWindowCounter: 4 past-window from Update(20),
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 22)) // then 9 more from the unit advances.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 23)) for n := uint64(20); n <= 29; n++ {
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 24)) assert.True(t, b.Update(l, n))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 25)) }
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 26)) assert.Equal(t, int64(13), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 27))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 28))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 29))
assert.Equal(t, int64(19), b.lostCounter.Count()) // packet 0 wasn't lost
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.dupeCounter.Count()) assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.dupeCounter.Count())
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.outOfWindowCounter.Count()) assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.outOfWindowCounter.Count())
b = NewBits(10) b = NewBits(16)
b.lostCounter.Clear() b.lostCounter.Clear()
b.dupeCounter.Clear() b.dupeCounter.Clear()
b.outOfWindowCounter.Clear() b.outOfWindowCounter.Clear()
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 9)) // Update(15) clears the warmup window (no lost), sets slot 15.
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.lostCounter.Count())
// 10 will set 0 index, 0 was already set, no lost packets
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 10))
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.lostCounter.Count())
// 11 will set 1 index, 1 was missed, we should see 1 packet lost
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 11))
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Now let's fill in the window, should end up with 8 lost packets
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 12))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 13))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 14))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 15)) assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 15))
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Update(16): slot 0 was already set (NewBits seeded it), and 16 is not
// strictly > length, so nothing is recorded as lost.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 16)) assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 16))
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Update(17): we jumped straight from 0 to 15, so slot 1 was cleared
// (and never re-set). 17 > 16 is past warmup, so packet 1 is recorded lost.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 17)) assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 17))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 18)) assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 19))
assert.Equal(t, int64(8), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Jump ahead by a window size // Fill in 18..30 in single steps. Each i evicts slot i%16. Slots 2..14
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 29)) // were all cleared during Update(15), and we never re-set any of them,
assert.Equal(t, int64(8), b.lostCounter.Count()) // so each i in 18..30 is a fresh lost packet — 13 more.
// Now lets walk ahead normally through the window, the missed packets should fill in for n := uint64(18); n <= 30; n++ {
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 30)) assert.True(t, b.Update(l, n))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 31)) }
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 32)) assert.Equal(t, int64(14), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 33))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 34))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 35))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 36))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 37))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 38))
// 39 packets tracked, 22 seen, 17 lost
assert.Equal(t, int64(17), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Jump ahead by 2 windows, should have recording 1 full window missing // Jump ahead by exactly one window size.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 58)) assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 46))
assert.Equal(t, int64(27), b.lostCounter.Count()) // end = min(46, 30+16) = 46, count = 16, all slots cleared. Before the
// Now lets walk ahead normally through the window, the missed packets should fill in from this window // jump every slot 0..15 had been set (Update(15), (16), (17), 18..30),
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 59)) // so wasSet=16 and 46 == current+length means no past-window slack:
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 60)) // lost contribution = 0.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 61)) assert.Equal(t, int64(14), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 62))
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 63)) // Walk 47..55. The Update(46) jump cleared every slot, so only slot 14
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 64)) // (for packet 46) is set when we start. Each subsequent unit step lands
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 65)) // on a slot that was cleared and is past warmup, so it counts as lost.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 66)) // 9 more = 23.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 67)) for n := uint64(47); n <= 55; n++ {
// 68 packets tracked, 32 seen, 36 missed assert.True(t, b.Update(l, n))
assert.Equal(t, int64(36), b.lostCounter.Count()) }
assert.Equal(t, int64(23), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Jump ahead by two windows: clears the window plus past-window loss.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 87))
// current=55, length=16. end = min(87, 71) = 71. count=16, all slots
// cleared. Slots set before the clear are slots 14,15,0..7 (10 total).
// Lost from clear = 16 - 10 = 6. Past window: 87 - 55 - 16 = 16. +22.
assert.Equal(t, int64(45), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.dupeCounter.Count()) assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.dupeCounter.Count())
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.outOfWindowCounter.Count()) assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.outOfWindowCounter.Count())
} }
func TestBitsLostCounterIssue1(t *testing.T) { func TestBitsLostCounterIssue1(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger() l := test.NewLogger()
b := NewBits(10) b := NewBits(16)
b.lostCounter.Clear() b.lostCounter.Clear()
b.dupeCounter.Clear() b.dupeCounter.Clear()
b.outOfWindowCounter.Clear() b.outOfWindowCounter.Clear()
// Receive 4, backfill 1, then 9, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 (skip 8), 10, 11, 14.
// Then jump to 25 — slot 25%16=9 is being evicted, but it had been set
// (we received packet 9), so no spurious lost increment. The original
// regression was about double-counting a missing packet when its slot
// got cleared on a jump. With the jump path now using clearRange's
// word-level wasSet count, the same semantics hold.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 4)) assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 4))
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.lostCounter.Count()) assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 1)) assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 1))
@@ -244,7 +266,7 @@ func TestBitsLostCounterIssue1(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.lostCounter.Count()) assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 7)) assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 7))
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.lostCounter.Count()) assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.lostCounter.Count())
// assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 8)) // Skip packet 8.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 10)) assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 10))
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.lostCounter.Count()) assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 11)) assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 11))
@@ -252,9 +274,23 @@ func TestBitsLostCounterIssue1(t *testing.T) {
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 14)) assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 14))
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.lostCounter.Count()) assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Issue seems to be here, we reset missing packet 8 to false here and don't increment the lost counter
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 19)) // Jump to 25. With length=16, slot 25%16=9 corresponds to packet 9
// (which we DID receive), so its bit is set and no lost++ from that
// eviction. The trace below shows the only loss is packet 8.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 25))
// current was 14, i=25. end=min(25,30)=25. count=11. startPos=15.
// steady? current=14<16, so warmup branch: per-bit n=15..25, count those
// with !get(n) AND n>16. n=17..25 are >16. Among slots 17%16=1..25%16=9
// did we set slots 1..9 (packets 1..9)? Yes for all but slot 8 (packet 8
// was skipped). n=24 maps to slot 8 which is FALSE → lost++. All other
// n in 17..25 map to slots that are set. n=16 is not strictly > 16. So
// lost = 1.
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count()) assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count())
// Fill in 12, 13, 15, 16. Each is below current=25 (in-window). 16 must
// recheck slot 0 — it was set by NewBits and then cleared by the
// Update(25) jump, so 16 backfills cleanly.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 12)) assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 12))
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count()) assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 13)) assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 13))
@@ -263,29 +299,140 @@ func TestBitsLostCounterIssue1(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count()) assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 16)) assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 16))
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count()) assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 17))
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 18))
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 20))
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 21))
// We missed packet 8 above // We missed packet 8 above and that loss is still recorded once, never
// double-counted, never zeroed.
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count()) assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.dupeCounter.Count()) assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.dupeCounter.Count())
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.outOfWindowCounter.Count()) assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.outOfWindowCounter.Count())
} }
func BenchmarkBits(b *testing.B) { // TestBitsWarmupOvershoot exercises the jump path's warmup arm with an
z := NewBits(10) // overshoot past one full window. NewBits leaves current=0 with only slot 0
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ { // "set" by the marker. Jumping straight to length+k must (a) clear every
for i := range z.bits { // slot the jump straddles, (b) count only past-window slack (not the
z.bits[i] = true // in-window slots, which never had a "lost" tenant during warmup), and
} // (c) leave the cursor at the new counter so subsequent unit advances
for i := range z.bits { // count from steady state. The marker bit at slot 0 is irrelevant once
z.bits[i] = false // current >= length.
} func TestBitsWarmupOvershoot(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
b := NewBits(16)
b.lostCounter.Clear()
// Jump from current=0 to i=20 (length=16, overshoot=4).
// Warmup arm: counts slots in [1..16] where bit unset and n>length.
// Only n=16 was unset and >length: but slot 16%16=0 is the marker,
// so b.get(16) reads bits[0]=1 and skips. Result: 0 lost from the loop.
// Past-window: i - current - length = 20 - 0 - 16 = 4 lost.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 20))
assert.Equal(t, int64(4), b.lostCounter.Count())
assert.Equal(t, uint64(20), b.current)
// Steady state now (current=20 >= length=16). Unit advance to 21
// stomps slot 21%16=5, which was cleared by the jump and not reset,
// so this is +1 lost.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 21))
assert.Equal(t, int64(5), b.lostCounter.Count())
}
// TestBitsCheckAcrossWarmupBoundary pins the underflow trick in Check's
// in-window clause. While in warmup, b.current-b.length underflows uint64
// to a huge value so the first OR-clause is always false; the second
// clause (i < length && current < length) carries the in-window check.
// Once current >= length the regimes flip cleanly.
func TestBitsCheckAcrossWarmupBoundary(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
b := NewBits(16)
// Warmup: current=0. Check(0) must read the marker (set) and return false.
assert.False(t, b.Check(l, 0), "marker slot should look already-received")
// Warmup: any 0 < i < length is in-window and unset → accepted.
for i := uint64(1); i < 16; i++ {
assert.True(t, b.Check(l, i), "warmup in-window i=%d should be accepted", i)
}
// Warmup: i >= length but > current is "next number" so accepted.
assert.True(t, b.Check(l, 16))
assert.True(t, b.Check(l, 1_000_000))
// Cross into steady state.
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 100))
// Now current=100, length=16. In-window range is [85..100].
// 84 is just outside: the underflow clause activates; 84 > 100-16=84 is false.
// And the warmup clause is false (current >= length). So out of window.
assert.False(t, b.Check(l, 84))
// 85 sits at the boundary. 85 > 84 is true → in window, unset → accept.
assert.True(t, b.Check(l, 85))
// 100 is current itself; not strictly greater, in-window, but already set.
assert.False(t, b.Check(l, 100))
// Way out: clearly out of window.
assert.False(t, b.Check(l, 50))
}
// TestBitsMarkerInvariant verifies the seeded bits[0]=1 marker behaves
// correctly across warmup and beyond. Update should never clear the marker
// during warmup (clearRange skips position 0 when startPos=1), and once
// current >= length the marker is no longer consulted by Check/Update on
// the live path — but it must still report counter 0 as a duplicate while
// we are in warmup.
func TestBitsMarkerInvariant(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
b := NewBits(8)
// Counter 0 is the seeded marker; Check sees it as already received.
assert.False(t, b.Check(l, 0))
// Update(0) at current=0 hits the duplicate branch.
b.dupeCounter.Clear()
assert.False(t, b.Update(l, 0))
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), b.dupeCounter.Count())
// Walk forward through warmup; the marker must remain set.
for n := uint64(1); n <= 7; n++ {
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, n))
}
// Position 0 (the marker) should still read as set because we never
// cleared it; Update(0) still looks like a duplicate.
assert.False(t, b.Check(l, 0))
// Cross into steady state with a unit advance to 8: pos=0, evicts the
// marker bit. The lost-counter guard (i > b.length) is false (8 == 8),
// so this advance does NOT charge a lost packet — exactly what the
// marker is there to prevent.
b.lostCounter.Clear()
assert.True(t, b.Update(l, 8))
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), b.lostCounter.Count())
// The slot at pos 0 is now occupied by counter 8.
assert.False(t, b.Check(l, 8))
}
// BenchmarkBitsUpdateInOrder is the steady-state hot path: each call is
// i == current+1.
func BenchmarkBitsUpdateInOrder(b *testing.B) {
l := test.NewLogger()
z := NewBits(16384)
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
z.Update(l, uint64(n)+1)
}
}
// BenchmarkBitsUpdateReorder simulates light reorder within the window:
// every other packet arrives one slot behind its predecessor (forces the
// in-window backfill branch).
func BenchmarkBitsUpdateReorder(b *testing.B) {
l := test.NewLogger()
z := NewBits(16384)
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
base := uint64(n) * 2
z.Update(l, base+2)
z.Update(l, base+1)
}
}
// BenchmarkBitsUpdateLargeJumps stresses the clearRange word-level path.
func BenchmarkBitsUpdateLargeJumps(b *testing.B) {
l := test.NewLogger()
z := NewBits(16384)
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
z.Update(l, uint64(n+1)*1000)
} }
} }
-1
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
//go:build boringcrypto //go:build boringcrypto
// +build boringcrypto
package nebula package nebula
+113 -10
View File
@@ -1,17 +1,25 @@
package cert package cert
import ( import (
"bufio"
"bytes"
"encoding/pem"
"errors" "errors"
"fmt" "fmt"
"io"
"net/netip" "net/netip"
"slices" "slices"
"strings"
"time" "time"
) )
type CAPool struct { type CAPool struct {
CAs map[string]*CachedCertificate CAs map[string]*CachedCertificate
certBlocklist map[string]struct{} certBlocklist map[string]struct{}
// v3CAs indexes the version 3 CAs in CAs by the fingerprint of their v2 form, which is what the certificates
// they issue name as issuer. A version 3 CA only verifies version 3 certificates: version 2 certificates find
// their issuer in CAs, where only the v2 form of the CA, if listed itself, answers to that fingerprint.
v3CAs map[string]*CachedCertificate
} }
// NewCAPool creates an empty CAPool // NewCAPool creates an empty CAPool
@@ -19,6 +27,7 @@ func NewCAPool() *CAPool {
ca := CAPool{ ca := CAPool{
CAs: make(map[string]*CachedCertificate), CAs: make(map[string]*CachedCertificate),
certBlocklist: make(map[string]struct{}), certBlocklist: make(map[string]struct{}),
v3CAs: make(map[string]*CachedCertificate),
} }
return &ca return &ca
@@ -29,22 +38,46 @@ func NewCAPool() *CAPool {
// If the pool contains any expired certificates, an ErrExpired will be // If the pool contains any expired certificates, an ErrExpired will be
// returned along with the pool. The caller must handle any such errors. // returned along with the pool. The caller must handle any such errors.
func NewCAPoolFromPEM(caPEMs []byte) (*CAPool, error) { func NewCAPoolFromPEM(caPEMs []byte) (*CAPool, error) {
return NewCAPoolFromPEMReader(bytes.NewReader(caPEMs))
}
// NewCAPoolFromPEMReader will create a new CA pool from the provided reader.
// The reader must contain a PEM-encoded set of nebula certificates.
func NewCAPoolFromPEMReader(r io.Reader) (*CAPool, error) {
pool := NewCAPool() pool := NewCAPool()
var err error
var expired bool var expired bool
for {
caPEMs, err = pool.AddCAFromPEM(caPEMs) scanner := bufio.NewScanner(r)
if errors.Is(err, ErrExpired) { scanner.Split(SplitPEM)
expired = true
err = nil for scanner.Scan() {
pemBytes := scanner.Bytes()
block, rest := pem.Decode(pemBytes)
if len(bytes.TrimSpace(rest)) > 0 {
return nil, ErrInvalidPEMBlock
} }
if block == nil {
return nil, ErrInvalidPEMBlock
}
c, err := unmarshalCertificateBlock(block)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return nil, err return nil, err
} }
if len(caPEMs) == 0 || strings.TrimSpace(string(caPEMs)) == "" {
break err = pool.AddCA(c)
if errors.Is(err, ErrExpired) {
expired = true
continue
} else if err != nil {
return nil, err
} }
} }
if err := scanner.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, ErrInvalidPEMBlock
}
if expired { if expired {
return pool, ErrExpired return pool, ErrExpired
@@ -95,6 +128,17 @@ func (ncp *CAPool) AddCA(c Certificate) error {
cc.InvertedGroups[g] = struct{}{} cc.InvertedGroups[g] = struct{}{}
} }
if v2 := V2Form(c); v2 != nil {
v2Sum, err := v2.Fingerprint()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("could not calculate fingerprint for provided CA; error: %w; %s", err, c.Name())
}
if other, ok := ncp.v3CAs[v2Sum]; ok && other.Fingerprint != sum {
return fmt.Errorf("%s: two version 3 CAs extend the same version 2 CA %s", c.Name(), v2Sum)
}
ncp.v3CAs[v2Sum] = cc
}
ncp.CAs[sum] = cc ncp.CAs[sum] = cc
if c.Expired(time.Now()) { if c.Expired(time.Now()) {
@@ -141,10 +185,46 @@ func (ncp *CAPool) VerifyCertificate(now time.Time, c Certificate) (*CachedCerti
return nil, err return nil, err
} }
// Pre nebula v1.10.3 could generate signatures in either high or low s form and validation
// of signatures allowed for either. Nebula v1.10.3 and beyond clamps signature generation to low-s form
// but validation still allows for either. Since a change in the signature bytes affects the fingerprint, we
// need to test both forms until such a time comes that we enforce low-s form on signature validation.
fp2, err := CalculateAlternateFingerprint(c)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not calculate alternate fingerprint to verify: %w", err)
}
if fp2 != "" && ncp.IsBlocklisted(fp2) {
return nil, ErrBlockListed
}
// Blocking the v2 form of a version 3 certificate blocks the certificate too.
var v2Fps []string
if v2 := V2Form(c); v2 != nil {
v2Fp, err := v2.Fingerprint()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not calculate v2 fingerprint to verify: %w", err)
}
v2Fp2, err := CalculateAlternateFingerprint(v2)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not calculate alternate v2 fingerprint to verify: %w", err)
}
v2Fps = append(v2Fps, v2Fp)
if v2Fp2 != "" {
v2Fps = append(v2Fps, v2Fp2)
}
for _, f := range v2Fps {
if ncp.IsBlocklisted(f) {
return nil, ErrBlockListed
}
}
}
cc := CachedCertificate{ cc := CachedCertificate{
Certificate: c, Certificate: c,
InvertedGroups: make(map[string]struct{}), InvertedGroups: make(map[string]struct{}),
Fingerprint: fp, Fingerprint: fp,
fingerprint2: fp2,
v2Fingerprints: v2Fps,
signerFingerprint: signer.Fingerprint, signerFingerprint: signer.Fingerprint,
} }
@@ -158,6 +238,16 @@ func (ncp *CAPool) VerifyCertificate(now time.Time, c Certificate) (*CachedCerti
// VerifyCachedCertificate is the same as VerifyCertificate other than it operates on a pre-verified structure and // VerifyCachedCertificate is the same as VerifyCertificate other than it operates on a pre-verified structure and
// is a cheaper operation to perform as a result. // is a cheaper operation to perform as a result.
func (ncp *CAPool) VerifyCachedCertificate(now time.Time, c *CachedCertificate) error { func (ncp *CAPool) VerifyCachedCertificate(now time.Time, c *CachedCertificate) error {
// Check any available alternate fingerprint forms for this certificate, re P256 high-s/low-s
if c.fingerprint2 != "" && ncp.IsBlocklisted(c.fingerprint2) {
return ErrBlockListed
}
for _, f := range c.v2Fingerprints {
if ncp.IsBlocklisted(f) {
return ErrBlockListed
}
}
_, err := ncp.verify(c.Certificate, now, c.Fingerprint, c.signerFingerprint) _, err := ncp.verify(c.Certificate, now, c.Fingerprint, c.signerFingerprint)
return err return err
} }
@@ -172,6 +262,14 @@ func (ncp *CAPool) verify(c Certificate, now time.Time, certFp string, signerFp
return nil, err return nil, err
} }
if signer.Certificate.Curve() != c.Curve() {
return nil, ErrCurveMismatch
}
if PQSuiteOf(signer.Certificate) != PQSuiteOf(c) {
return nil, ErrPQSuiteMismatch
}
if signer.Certificate.Expired(now) { if signer.Certificate.Expired(now) {
return nil, ErrRootExpired return nil, ErrRootExpired
} }
@@ -208,7 +306,12 @@ func (ncp *CAPool) GetCAForCert(c Certificate) (*CachedCertificate, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no issuer in certificate") return nil, fmt.Errorf("no issuer in certificate")
} }
signer, ok := ncp.CAs[issuer] cas := ncp.CAs
if c.Version() == Version3 {
cas = ncp.v3CAs
}
signer, ok := cas[issuer]
if ok { if ok {
return signer, nil return signer, nil
} }
+128 -4
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,14 @@
package cert package cert
import ( import (
"bytes"
"io"
"net/netip" "net/netip"
"strings"
"testing" "testing"
"time" "time"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert/p256"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require" "github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
) )
@@ -111,6 +115,60 @@ k+coOv04r+zh33ISyhbsafnYduN17p2eD7CmHvHuerguXD9f32gcxo/KsFCKEjMe
assert.Len(t, ppppp.CAs, 1) assert.Len(t, ppppp.CAs, 1)
} }
// oneByteReader wraps a reader to return at most 1 byte per Read call,
// exercising the streaming accumulation logic in NewCAPoolFromPEMReader.
type oneByteReader struct {
r io.Reader
}
func (o *oneByteReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
if len(p) == 0 {
return 0, nil
}
return o.r.Read(p[:1])
}
func TestNewCAPoolFromPEMReader_EmptyReader(t *testing.T) {
pool, err := NewCAPoolFromPEMReader(bytes.NewReader(nil))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, pool.CAs)
pool, err = NewCAPoolFromPEMReader(strings.NewReader(" \n\t\n "))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, pool.CAs)
}
func TestNewCAPoolFromPEMReader_OneByteReads(t *testing.T) {
ca1, _, _, pem1 := NewTestCaCert(Version2, Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(time.Hour), nil, nil, nil)
ca2, _, _, pem2 := NewTestCaCert(Version2, Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(time.Hour), nil, nil, nil)
bundle := append(pem1, pem2...)
pool, err := NewCAPoolFromPEMReader(&oneByteReader{r: bytes.NewReader(bundle)})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Len(t, pool.CAs, 2)
fp1, err := ca1.Fingerprint()
require.NoError(t, err)
fp2, err := ca2.Fingerprint()
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, pool.CAs, fp1)
assert.Contains(t, pool.CAs, fp2)
}
func TestNewCAPoolFromPEMReader_TruncatedPEM(t *testing.T) {
_, err := NewCAPoolFromPEMReader(strings.NewReader("-----BEGIN NEBULA CERTIFICATE-----\npartialdata"))
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInvalidPEMBlock)
}
func TestNewCAPoolFromPEMReader_TrailingGarbage(t *testing.T) {
_, _, _, pem1 := NewTestCaCert(Version2, Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(time.Hour), nil, nil, nil)
bundle := append(pem1, []byte("some trailing garbage")...)
_, err := NewCAPoolFromPEMReader(bytes.NewReader(bundle))
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInvalidPEMBlock)
}
func TestCertificateV1_Verify(t *testing.T) { func TestCertificateV1_Verify(t *testing.T) {
ca, _, caKey, _ := NewTestCaCert(Version1, Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, nil) ca, _, caKey, _ := NewTestCaCert(Version1, Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, nil)
c, _, _, _ := NewTestCert(Version1, Curve_CURVE25519, ca, caKey, "test cert", time.Now(), time.Now().Add(5*time.Minute), nil, nil, nil) c, _, _, _ := NewTestCert(Version1, Curve_CURVE25519, ca, caKey, "test cert", time.Now(), time.Now().Add(5*time.Minute), nil, nil, nil)
@@ -170,6 +228,15 @@ func TestCertificateV1_VerifyP256(t *testing.T) {
_, err = caPool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), c) _, err = caPool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), c)
require.EqualError(t, err, "certificate is in the block list") require.EqualError(t, err, "certificate is in the block list")
// Create a copy of the cert and swap to the alternate form for the signature
nc := c.Copy()
b, err := p256.Swap(c.Signature())
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, nc.(*certificateV1).setSignature(b))
_, err = caPool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), nc)
require.EqualError(t, err, "certificate is in the block list")
caPool.ResetCertBlocklist() caPool.ResetCertBlocklist()
_, err = caPool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), c) _, err = caPool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), c)
require.NoError(t, err) require.NoError(t, err)
@@ -187,7 +254,7 @@ func TestCertificateV1_VerifyP256(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t, err) require.NoError(t, err)
caPool = NewCAPool() caPool = NewCAPool()
b, err := caPool.AddCAFromPEM(caPem) b, err = caPool.AddCAFromPEM(caPem)
require.NoError(t, err) require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, b) assert.Empty(t, b)
@@ -196,7 +263,17 @@ func TestCertificateV1_VerifyP256(t *testing.T) {
}) })
c, _, _, _ = NewTestCert(Version1, Curve_P256, ca, caKey, "test", time.Now(), time.Now().Add(5*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{"test1"}) c, _, _, _ = NewTestCert(Version1, Curve_P256, ca, caKey, "test", time.Now(), time.Now().Add(5*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{"test1"})
_, err = caPool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), c) cc, err := caPool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), c)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Reset the blocklist and block the alternate form fingerprint
caPool.ResetCertBlocklist()
caPool.BlocklistFingerprint(cc.fingerprint2)
err = caPool.VerifyCachedCertificate(time.Now(), cc)
require.EqualError(t, err, "certificate is in the block list")
caPool.ResetCertBlocklist()
err = caPool.VerifyCachedCertificate(time.Now(), cc)
require.NoError(t, err) require.NoError(t, err)
} }
@@ -394,6 +471,15 @@ func TestCertificateV2_VerifyP256(t *testing.T) {
_, err = caPool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), c) _, err = caPool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), c)
require.EqualError(t, err, "certificate is in the block list") require.EqualError(t, err, "certificate is in the block list")
// Create a copy of the cert and swap to the alternate form for the signature
nc := c.Copy()
b, err := p256.Swap(c.Signature())
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, nc.(*certificateV2).setSignature(b))
_, err = caPool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), nc)
require.EqualError(t, err, "certificate is in the block list")
caPool.ResetCertBlocklist() caPool.ResetCertBlocklist()
_, err = caPool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), c) _, err = caPool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), c)
require.NoError(t, err) require.NoError(t, err)
@@ -411,7 +497,7 @@ func TestCertificateV2_VerifyP256(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t, err) require.NoError(t, err)
caPool = NewCAPool() caPool = NewCAPool()
b, err := caPool.AddCAFromPEM(caPem) b, err = caPool.AddCAFromPEM(caPem)
require.NoError(t, err) require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, b) assert.Empty(t, b)
@@ -420,7 +506,17 @@ func TestCertificateV2_VerifyP256(t *testing.T) {
}) })
c, _, _, _ = NewTestCert(Version2, Curve_P256, ca, caKey, "test", time.Now(), time.Now().Add(5*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{"test1"}) c, _, _, _ = NewTestCert(Version2, Curve_P256, ca, caKey, "test", time.Now(), time.Now().Add(5*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{"test1"})
_, err = caPool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), c) cc, err := caPool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), c)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Reset the blocklist and block the alternate form fingerprint
caPool.ResetCertBlocklist()
caPool.BlocklistFingerprint(cc.fingerprint2)
err = caPool.VerifyCachedCertificate(time.Now(), cc)
require.EqualError(t, err, "certificate is in the block list")
caPool.ResetCertBlocklist()
err = caPool.VerifyCachedCertificate(time.Now(), cc)
require.NoError(t, err) require.NoError(t, err)
} }
@@ -558,3 +654,31 @@ func TestCertificateV2_Verify_Subnets(t *testing.T) {
_, err = caPool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), c) _, err = caPool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), c)
require.NoError(t, err) require.NoError(t, err)
} }
func TestCertificateV2_CurveMismatch(t *testing.T) {
caIp1 := mustParsePrefixUnmapped("10.0.0.0/16")
caIp2 := mustParsePrefixUnmapped("192.168.0.0/24")
ca, _, caKey, _ := NewTestCaCert(Version2, Curve_P256, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), []netip.Prefix{caIp1, caIp2}, nil, []string{"test"})
caPem, err := ca.MarshalPEM()
require.NoError(t, err)
caPool := NewCAPool()
b, err := caPool.AddCAFromPEM(caPem)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, b)
// ip is outside the network
cIp1 := mustParsePrefixUnmapped("10.0.0.1/24")
c, _, _, _ := NewTestCert(Version2, Curve_P256, ca, caKey, "test", time.Now(), time.Now().Add(5*time.Minute), []netip.Prefix{cIp1}, nil, []string{"test"})
fp, _ := c.Fingerprint()
_, err = caPool.verify(c, time.Now(), fp, c.Issuer())
require.NoError(t, err)
//
c2 := c.(*certificateV2)
c2.curve = Curve_CURVE25519
fp, _ = c.Fingerprint()
_, err = caPool.verify(c, time.Now(), fp, c.Issuer())
require.Error(t, err)
}
+47
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ import (
"fmt" "fmt"
"net/netip" "net/netip"
"time" "time"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert/p256"
) )
type Version uint8 type Version uint8
@@ -12,12 +14,14 @@ const (
VersionPre1 Version = 0 VersionPre1 Version = 0
Version1 Version = 1 Version1 Version = 1
Version2 Version = 2 Version2 Version = 2
Version3 Version = 3
) )
type Certificate interface { type Certificate interface {
// Version defines the underlying certificate structure and wire protocol version // Version defines the underlying certificate structure and wire protocol version
// Version1 certificates are ipv4 only and uses protobuf serialization // Version1 certificates are ipv4 only and uses protobuf serialization
// Version2 certificates are ipv4 or ipv6 and uses asn.1 serialization // Version2 certificates are ipv4 or ipv6 and uses asn.1 serialization
// Version3 certificates extend a Version2 certificate with post-quantum keys and signatures
Version() Version Version() Version
// Name is the human-readable name that identifies this certificate. // Name is the human-readable name that identifies this certificate.
@@ -110,6 +114,12 @@ type CachedCertificate struct {
InvertedGroups map[string]struct{} InvertedGroups map[string]struct{}
Fingerprint string Fingerprint string
signerFingerprint string signerFingerprint string
// A place to store a 2nd fingerprint if the certificate could have one, such as with P256
fingerprint2 string
// The fingerprints of a version 3 certificate's v2 form, which the blocklist also applies to
v2Fingerprints []string
} }
func (cc *CachedCertificate) String() string { func (cc *CachedCertificate) String() string {
@@ -119,6 +129,7 @@ func (cc *CachedCertificate) String() string {
// Recombine will attempt to unmarshal a certificate received in a handshake. // Recombine will attempt to unmarshal a certificate received in a handshake.
// Handshakes save space by placing the peers public key in a different part of the packet, we have to // Handshakes save space by placing the peers public key in a different part of the packet, we have to
// reassemble the actual certificate structure with that in mind. // reassemble the actual certificate structure with that in mind.
// Implementations MUST assert the public key is not in the raw certificate bytes if the passed in public key is not empty.
func Recombine(v Version, rawCertBytes, publicKey []byte, curve Curve) (Certificate, error) { func Recombine(v Version, rawCertBytes, publicKey []byte, curve Curve) (Certificate, error) {
if publicKey == nil { if publicKey == nil {
return nil, ErrNoPeerStaticKey return nil, ErrNoPeerStaticKey
@@ -137,6 +148,8 @@ func Recombine(v Version, rawCertBytes, publicKey []byte, curve Curve) (Certific
c, err = unmarshalCertificateV1(rawCertBytes, publicKey) c, err = unmarshalCertificateV1(rawCertBytes, publicKey)
case Version2: case Version2:
c, err = unmarshalCertificateV2(rawCertBytes, publicKey, curve) c, err = unmarshalCertificateV2(rawCertBytes, publicKey, curve)
case Version3:
c, err = unmarshalCertificateV3(rawCertBytes, publicKey, curve)
default: default:
return nil, ErrUnknownVersion return nil, ErrUnknownVersion
} }
@@ -151,3 +164,37 @@ func Recombine(v Version, rawCertBytes, publicKey []byte, curve Curve) (Certific
return c, nil return c, nil
} }
// CalculateAlternateFingerprint calculates a 2nd fingerprint representation for P256 certificates
// CAPool blocklist testing through `VerifyCertificate` and `VerifyCachedCertificate` automatically performs this step.
func CalculateAlternateFingerprint(c Certificate) (string, error) {
if c.Curve() != Curve_P256 {
return "", nil
}
// The post-quantum signature of a version 3 certificate covers its classical signature, so it has no second form.
// The pool checks the fingerprints of its v2 form separately.
if c.Version() == Version3 {
return "", nil
}
nc := c.Copy()
b, err := p256.Swap(nc.Signature())
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
switch v := nc.(type) {
case *certificateV1:
err = v.setSignature(b)
case *certificateV2:
err = v.setSignature(b)
default:
return "", ErrUnknownVersion
}
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return nc.Fingerprint()
}
+14 -4
View File
@@ -112,6 +112,9 @@ func (c *certificateV1) CheckSignature(key []byte) bool {
} }
switch c.details.curve { switch c.details.curve {
case Curve_CURVE25519: case Curve_CURVE25519:
if len(key) != ed25519.PublicKeySize {
return false //avoids a panic internal to ed25519
}
return ed25519.Verify(key, b, c.signature) return ed25519.Verify(key, b, c.signature)
case Curve_P256: case Curve_P256:
pubKey, err := ecdsa.ParseUncompressedPublicKey(elliptic.P256(), key) pubKey, err := ecdsa.ParseUncompressedPublicKey(elliptic.P256(), key)
@@ -426,7 +429,7 @@ func unmarshalCertificateV1(b []byte, publicKey []byte) (*certificateV1, error)
unsafeNetworks: make([]netip.Prefix, len(rc.Details.Subnets)/2), unsafeNetworks: make([]netip.Prefix, len(rc.Details.Subnets)/2),
notBefore: time.Unix(rc.Details.NotBefore, 0), notBefore: time.Unix(rc.Details.NotBefore, 0),
notAfter: time.Unix(rc.Details.NotAfter, 0), notAfter: time.Unix(rc.Details.NotAfter, 0),
publicKey: make([]byte, len(rc.Details.PublicKey)), publicKey: nil,
isCA: rc.Details.IsCA, isCA: rc.Details.IsCA,
curve: rc.Details.Curve, curve: rc.Details.Curve,
}, },
@@ -437,12 +440,19 @@ func unmarshalCertificateV1(b []byte, publicKey []byte) (*certificateV1, error)
copy(nc.details.groups, rc.Details.Groups) copy(nc.details.groups, rc.Details.Groups)
nc.details.issuer = hex.EncodeToString(rc.Details.Issuer) nc.details.issuer = hex.EncodeToString(rc.Details.Issuer)
// If a public key is passed in as an argument, the certificate pubkey must be empty
// and the passed-in pubkey copied into the cert.
if len(publicKey) > 0 { if len(publicKey) > 0 {
nc.details.publicKey = publicKey if len(rc.Details.PublicKey) != 0 {
return nil, ErrCertPubkeyPresent
}
nc.details.publicKey = make([]byte, len(publicKey))
copy(nc.details.publicKey, publicKey)
} else {
nc.details.publicKey = make([]byte, len(rc.Details.PublicKey))
copy(nc.details.publicKey, rc.Details.PublicKey)
} }
copy(nc.details.publicKey, rc.Details.PublicKey)
var ip netip.Addr var ip netip.Addr
for i, rawIp := range rc.Details.Ips { for i, rawIp := range rc.Details.Ips {
if i%2 == 0 { if i%2 == 0 {
+63 -1
View File
@@ -62,6 +62,62 @@ func TestCertificateV1_Marshal(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, nc.Groups(), nc2.Groups()) assert.Equal(t, nc.Groups(), nc2.Groups())
} }
func TestCertificateV1_Unmarshal(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
before := time.Now().Add(time.Second * -60).Round(time.Second)
after := time.Now().Add(time.Second * 60).Round(time.Second)
pubKey := []byte("1234567890abcedfghij1234567890ab")
invalidPubkey := []byte("00000000000000000000000000000000")
nc := certificateV1{
details: detailsV1{
name: "testing",
networks: []netip.Prefix{
mustParsePrefixUnmapped("10.1.1.1/24"),
mustParsePrefixUnmapped("10.1.1.2/16"),
},
unsafeNetworks: []netip.Prefix{
mustParsePrefixUnmapped("9.1.1.2/24"),
mustParsePrefixUnmapped("9.1.1.3/16"),
},
groups: []string{"test-group1", "test-group2", "test-group3"},
notBefore: before,
notAfter: after,
publicKey: pubKey,
isCA: false,
issuer: "1234567890abcedfghij1234567890ab",
},
signature: []byte("1234567890abcedfghij1234567890ab"),
}
// This certificate has a pubkey included
certWithPubkey, err := nc.Marshal()
require.NoError(t, err)
// This certificate is missing the pubkey section
certWithoutPubkey, err := nc.MarshalForHandshakes()
require.NoError(t, err)
// Cert has no pubkey and no pubkey passed in must fail to validate
isNil, err := unmarshalCertificateV1(certWithoutPubkey, nil)
require.Error(t, err)
// Cert has different pubkey than one passed in must fail
isNil, err = unmarshalCertificateV1(certWithPubkey, invalidPubkey)
require.Nil(t, isNil)
require.Error(t, err)
// Cert has pubkey and no pubkey argument works ok
_, err = unmarshalCertificateV1(certWithPubkey, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Cert has no pubkey and valid, correctly signed pubkey passed in
nc2, err := unmarshalCertificateV1(certWithoutPubkey, pubKey)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, pubKey, nc2.PublicKey())
}
func TestCertificateV1_PublicKeyPem(t *testing.T) { func TestCertificateV1_PublicKeyPem(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
before := time.Now().Add(time.Second * -60).Round(time.Second) before := time.Now().Add(time.Second * -60).Round(time.Second)
@@ -99,13 +155,19 @@ func TestCertificateV1_PublicKeyPem(t *testing.T) {
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA= AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
-----END NEBULA P256 PUBLIC KEY----- -----END NEBULA P256 PUBLIC KEY-----
`)
pubP256KeyPemCA := []byte(`-----BEGIN NEBULA ECDSA P256 PUBLIC KEY-----
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
-----END NEBULA ECDSA P256 PUBLIC KEY-----
`) `)
pubP256Key, _, _, err := UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(pubP256KeyPem) pubP256Key, _, _, err := UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(pubP256KeyPem)
require.NoError(t, err) require.NoError(t, err)
nc.details.curve = Curve_P256 nc.details.curve = Curve_P256
nc.details.publicKey = pubP256Key nc.details.publicKey = pubP256Key
assert.Equal(t, Curve_P256, nc.Curve()) assert.Equal(t, Curve_P256, nc.Curve())
assert.Equal(t, string(nc.MarshalPublicKeyPEM()), string(pubP256KeyPem)) assert.Equal(t, string(nc.MarshalPublicKeyPEM()), string(pubP256KeyPemCA))
assert.True(t, nc.IsCA()) assert.True(t, nc.IsCA())
nc.details.isCA = false nc.details.isCA = false
+10 -1
View File
@@ -151,6 +151,9 @@ func (c *certificateV2) CheckSignature(key []byte) bool {
switch c.curve { switch c.curve {
case Curve_CURVE25519: case Curve_CURVE25519:
if len(key) != ed25519.PublicKeySize {
return false //avoids a panic internal to ed25519
}
return ed25519.Verify(key, b, c.signature) return ed25519.Verify(key, b, c.signature)
case Curve_P256: case Curve_P256:
pubKey, err := ecdsa.ParseUncompressedPublicKey(elliptic.P256(), key) pubKey, err := ecdsa.ParseUncompressedPublicKey(elliptic.P256(), key)
@@ -592,7 +595,13 @@ func unmarshalCertificateV2(b []byte, publicKey []byte, curve Curve) (*certifica
// Maybe grab the public key // Maybe grab the public key
var rawPublicKey cryptobyte.String var rawPublicKey cryptobyte.String
if len(publicKey) > 0 { if len(publicKey) > 0 {
rawPublicKey = publicKey // If a public key is passed in, then the handshake certificate must
// not have a public key present
if input.PeekASN1Tag(TagCertPublicKey) {
return nil, ErrCertPubkeyPresent
}
rawPublicKey = make(cryptobyte.String, len(publicKey))
copy(rawPublicKey, publicKey)
} else if !input.ReadOptionalASN1(&rawPublicKey, nil, TagCertPublicKey) { } else if !input.ReadOptionalASN1(&rawPublicKey, nil, TagCertPublicKey) {
return nil, ErrBadFormat return nil, ErrBadFormat
} }
+60 -1
View File
@@ -76,6 +76,58 @@ func TestCertificateV2_Marshal(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, nc.Groups(), nc2.Groups()) assert.Equal(t, nc.Groups(), nc2.Groups())
} }
func TestCertificateV2_Unmarshal(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
before := time.Now().Add(time.Second * -60).Round(time.Second)
after := time.Now().Add(time.Second * 60).Round(time.Second)
pubKey := []byte("1234567890abcedfghij1234567890ab")
nc := certificateV2{
details: detailsV2{
name: "testing",
networks: []netip.Prefix{
mustParsePrefixUnmapped("10.1.1.2/16"),
mustParsePrefixUnmapped("10.1.1.1/24"),
},
unsafeNetworks: []netip.Prefix{
mustParsePrefixUnmapped("9.1.1.3/16"),
mustParsePrefixUnmapped("9.1.1.2/24"),
},
groups: []string{"test-group1", "test-group2", "test-group3"},
notBefore: before,
notAfter: after,
isCA: false,
issuer: "1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef",
},
signature: []byte("1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef"),
publicKey: pubKey,
}
db, err := nc.details.Marshal()
require.NoError(t, err)
nc.rawDetails = db
certWithPubkey, err := nc.Marshal()
require.NoError(t, err)
//t.Log("Cert size:", len(b))
certWithoutPubkey, err := nc.MarshalForHandshakes()
require.NoError(t, err)
// Cert must not have a pubkey if one is passed in as an argument
_, err = unmarshalCertificateV2(certWithPubkey, pubKey, Curve_CURVE25519)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrCertPubkeyPresent)
// Certs must have pubkeys
_, err = unmarshalCertificateV2(certWithoutPubkey, nil, Curve_CURVE25519)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrBadFormat)
// Ensure proper unmarshal if a pubkey is passed in
nc2, err := unmarshalCertificateV2(certWithoutPubkey, pubKey, Curve_CURVE25519)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, nc.PublicKey(), nc2.PublicKey())
}
func TestCertificateV2_PublicKeyPem(t *testing.T) { func TestCertificateV2_PublicKeyPem(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
before := time.Now().Add(time.Second * -60).Round(time.Second) before := time.Now().Add(time.Second * -60).Round(time.Second)
@@ -114,12 +166,19 @@ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA= AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
-----END NEBULA P256 PUBLIC KEY----- -----END NEBULA P256 PUBLIC KEY-----
`) `)
pubP256KeyPemCA := []byte(`-----BEGIN NEBULA ECDSA P256 PUBLIC KEY-----
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
-----END NEBULA ECDSA P256 PUBLIC KEY-----
`)
pubP256Key, _, _, err := UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(pubP256KeyPem) pubP256Key, _, _, err := UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(pubP256KeyPem)
require.NoError(t, err) require.NoError(t, err)
nc.curve = Curve_P256 nc.curve = Curve_P256
nc.publicKey = pubP256Key nc.publicKey = pubP256Key
assert.Equal(t, Curve_P256, nc.Curve()) assert.Equal(t, Curve_P256, nc.Curve())
assert.Equal(t, string(nc.MarshalPublicKeyPEM()), string(pubP256KeyPem)) assert.Equal(t, string(nc.MarshalPublicKeyPEM()), string(pubP256KeyPemCA))
assert.True(t, nc.IsCA()) assert.True(t, nc.IsCA())
nc.details.isCA = false nc.details.isCA = false
+516
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,516 @@
package cert
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/mldsa"
"crypto/mlkem"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"encoding/pem"
"fmt"
"net/netip"
"time"
"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1"
)
// A version 3 certificate is a version 2 certificate extended with post-quantum keys. Its first fields are exactly
// the fields of the v2 certificate it extends, so a v3 holder can always marshal that v2 form, byte for byte, and use
// it with peers that only speak v2. The v2 form keeps its own classical CA signature and fingerprint.
//
// The certificate's PQSuite says which post-quantum algorithms it uses, the way its curve does for the classical
// ones. Hosts carry a public key for the suite's KEM and CAs one for its signature algorithm. The issuing CA, which
// has the same suite, signs every field with that signature algorithm, including the suite and the classical
// signature, so neither can be swapped out. Signatures are deterministic, so a certificate extended twice is the same
// certificate.
//
// Wherever a v3 certificate deals in keys they are composite: the classical key followed by the post-quantum one.
// PublicKey returns classical || post-quantum, and VerifyPrivateKey and signing take the private keys the same way.
const (
TagCertPQSuite = 4 | classContextSpecific
TagCertPQPublicKey = 5 | classContextSpecific
TagCertPQSignature = 6 | classContextSpecific
)
// Sizes of the keys and signatures of PQSuite_MLKEM1024_MLDSA87.
const (
// MLKEM1024PublicKeySize is the size of an ML-KEM-1024 encapsulation key.
MLKEM1024PublicKeySize = mlkem.EncapsulationKeySize1024
// MLKEM1024PrivateKeySize is the size of an ML-KEM-1024 decapsulation key seed.
MLKEM1024PrivateKeySize = mlkem.SeedSize
// MLDSA87PublicKeySize is the size of an ML-DSA-87 public key.
MLDSA87PublicKeySize = mldsa.MLDSA87PublicKeySize
// MLDSA87PrivateKeySize is the size of an ML-DSA-87 private key seed.
MLDSA87PrivateKeySize = mldsa.PrivateKeySize
// MLDSA87SignatureSize is the size of an ML-DSA-87 signature.
MLDSA87SignatureSize = mldsa.MLDSA87SignatureSize
// pqSignatureContext is the ML-DSA context string for certificate signatures.
pqSignatureContext = "nebula certificate v3"
)
type certificateV3 struct {
// v2 is the version 2 certificate this one extends. Its public key is the classical key.
v2 certificateV2
// pqSuite names the post-quantum algorithms, and so the kind of pqPublicKey and pqSignature.
pqSuite PQSuite
// pqPublicKey is the suite's KEM public key of a host, or its signature algorithm's public key of a CA.
pqPublicKey []byte
// pqSignature is the issuing CA's post-quantum signature over every other field.
pqSignature []byte
}
// V2Form returns the version 2 certificate a version 3 certificate extends, or nil for any other version. It is
// what a v3 holder presents to peers that do not speak v3.
func V2Form(c Certificate) Certificate {
if c3, ok := c.(*certificateV3); ok {
return &c3.v2
}
return nil
}
func (c *certificateV3) Version() Version {
return Version3
}
func (c *certificateV3) Curve() Curve {
return c.v2.curve
}
func (c *certificateV3) Groups() []string {
return c.v2.details.groups
}
func (c *certificateV3) IsCA() bool {
return c.v2.details.isCA
}
func (c *certificateV3) Issuer() string {
return c.v2.details.issuer
}
func (c *certificateV3) Name() string {
return c.v2.details.name
}
func (c *certificateV3) Networks() []netip.Prefix {
return c.v2.details.networks
}
func (c *certificateV3) NotAfter() time.Time {
return c.v2.details.notAfter
}
func (c *certificateV3) NotBefore() time.Time {
return c.v2.details.notBefore
}
// PublicKey returns the composite public key, classical || post-quantum.
func (c *certificateV3) PublicKey() []byte {
k := make([]byte, 0, len(c.v2.publicKey)+len(c.pqPublicKey))
k = append(k, c.v2.publicKey...)
return append(k, c.pqPublicKey...)
}
func (c *certificateV3) MarshalPublicKeyPEM() []byte {
return marshalCertPublicKeyToPEM(c)
}
// Signature returns the classical signature. The post-quantum signature covers it.
func (c *certificateV3) Signature() []byte {
return c.v2.signature
}
func (c *certificateV3) UnsafeNetworks() []netip.Prefix {
return c.v2.details.unsafeNetworks
}
// Fingerprint is the sha256 of the whole certificate. It differs from the fingerprint of the v2 form.
func (c *certificateV3) Fingerprint() (string, error) {
b, err := c.Marshal()
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
sum := sha256.Sum256(b)
return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]), nil
}
// CheckSignature checks both signatures against the composite public key of the signing CA. Like the classical
// signature with the curve, the post-quantum signature is checked with the algorithm of this certificate's suite,
// which the signing CA has to share.
func (c *certificateV3) CheckSignature(key []byte) bool {
p := pqSuites[c.pqSuite]
if p == nil {
return false
}
classical, pq, err := c.pqSuite.SplitPublicKey(true, key)
if err != nil {
return false
}
if !c.v2.CheckSignature(classical) {
return false
}
b, err := c.marshalForPQSigning()
if err != nil {
return false
}
return p.dsa.verify(pq, b, c.pqSignature)
}
func (c *certificateV3) Expired(t time.Time) bool {
return c.v2.Expired(t)
}
// VerifyPrivateKey checks a composite private key, classical || post-quantum seed, against the composite public key.
func (c *certificateV3) VerifyPrivateKey(curve Curve, key []byte) error {
classical, seed, err := c.pqSuite.SplitPrivateKey(c.IsCA(), key)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := c.v2.VerifyPrivateKey(curve, classical); err != nil {
return err
}
pub, err := c.pqSuite.publicKey(c.IsCA(), seed)
if err != nil {
return ErrInvalidPrivateKey
}
if !bytes.Equal(pub, c.pqPublicKey) {
return ErrPublicPrivateKeyMismatch
}
return nil
}
func (c *certificateV3) String() string {
mb, err := c.marshalJSON()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Sprintf("<error marshalling certificate: %v>", err)
}
b, err := json.MarshalIndent(mb, "", "\t")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Sprintf("<error marshalling certificate: %v>", err)
}
return string(b)
}
// MarshalForHandshakes leaves out both public keys, the handshake carries them as the composite static key. It keeps
// the suite, which says how to split that key.
func (c *certificateV3) MarshalForHandshakes() ([]byte, error) {
return c.marshal(false, false)
}
func (c *certificateV3) Marshal() ([]byte, error) {
return c.marshal(true, false)
}
// marshalForPQSigning returns the bytes the post-quantum signature covers: every field but that signature, with the
// curve always present. The suite is always present anyway.
func (c *certificateV3) marshalForPQSigning() ([]byte, error) {
return c.marshal(true, true)
}
func (c *certificateV3) marshal(withPublicKeys, forSigning bool) ([]byte, error) {
if c.v2.rawDetails == nil {
return nil, ErrEmptyRawDetails
}
var b cryptobyte.Builder
b.AddASN1(asn1.SEQUENCE, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddBytes(c.v2.rawDetails)
if withPublicKeys {
if forSigning || c.v2.curve != Curve_CURVE25519 {
b.AddASN1(TagCertCurve, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddBytes([]byte{byte(c.v2.curve)})
})
}
b.AddASN1(TagCertPublicKey, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddBytes(c.v2.publicKey)
})
}
b.AddASN1(TagCertSignature, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddBytes(c.v2.signature)
})
b.AddASN1(TagCertPQSuite, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddUint8(uint8(c.pqSuite))
})
if withPublicKeys {
b.AddASN1(TagCertPQPublicKey, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddBytes(c.pqPublicKey)
})
}
if !forSigning {
b.AddASN1(TagCertPQSignature, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddBytes(c.pqSignature)
})
}
})
return b.Bytes()
}
func (c *certificateV3) MarshalPEM() ([]byte, error) {
b, err := c.Marshal()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: CertificateV3Banner, Bytes: b}), nil
}
func (c *certificateV3) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
b, err := c.marshalJSON()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return json.Marshal(b)
}
func (c *certificateV3) marshalJSON() (m, error) {
mb, err := c.v2.marshalJSON()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
fp, err := c.Fingerprint()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
mb["v2Fingerprint"] = mb["fingerprint"]
mb["fingerprint"] = fp
mb["version"] = Version3
mb["pqSuite"] = c.pqSuite.String()
mb["pqPublicKey"] = fmt.Sprintf("%x", c.pqPublicKey)
mb["pqSignature"] = fmt.Sprintf("%x", c.pqSignature)
return mb, nil
}
func (c *certificateV3) Copy() Certificate {
nc := &certificateV3{
v2: *c.v2.Copy().(*certificateV2),
pqSuite: c.pqSuite,
pqPublicKey: make([]byte, len(c.pqPublicKey)),
pqSignature: make([]byte, len(c.pqSignature)),
}
copy(nc.pqPublicKey, c.pqPublicKey)
copy(nc.pqSignature, c.pqSignature)
return nc
}
func (c *certificateV3) validate() error {
if err := c.v2.validate(); err != nil {
return err
}
if !c.pqSuite.Valid() {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrUnknownPQSuite, c.pqSuite)
}
if !c.pqSuite.checkPublicKey(c.IsCA(), c.pqPublicKey) {
return ErrInvalidPublicKey
}
if len(c.pqSignature) != c.pqSuite.signatureSize() {
return ErrBadFormat
}
return nil
}
// unmarshalCertificateV3 parses a v3 certificate. publicKey is the composite public key when the certificate came
// from a handshake, which then must not carry either public key itself.
func unmarshalCertificateV3(b []byte, publicKey []byte, curve Curve) (*certificateV3, error) {
l := len(b)
if l == 0 || l > MaxCertificateSize {
return nil, ErrBadFormat
}
input := cryptobyte.String(b)
var body cryptobyte.String
if !input.ReadASN1(&body, asn1.SEQUENCE) || body.Empty() || !input.Empty() {
return nil, ErrBadFormat
}
var rawDetails cryptobyte.String
if !body.ReadASN1Element(&rawDetails, TagCertDetails) || rawDetails.Empty() {
return nil, ErrBadFormat
}
var rawCurve byte
if !readOptionalASN1Byte(&body, &rawCurve, TagCertCurve, byte(curve)) {
return nil, ErrBadFormat
}
curve = Curve(rawCurve)
fromHandshake := len(publicKey) > 0
var classical, pq cryptobyte.String
if fromHandshake {
if body.PeekASN1Tag(TagCertPublicKey) {
return nil, ErrCertPubkeyPresent
}
} else if !body.ReadASN1(&classical, TagCertPublicKey) || classical.Empty() {
return nil, ErrBadFormat
}
var signature cryptobyte.String
if !body.ReadASN1(&signature, TagCertSignature) || signature.Empty() {
return nil, ErrBadFormat
}
var rawSuite cryptobyte.String
if !body.ReadASN1(&rawSuite, TagCertPQSuite) || len(rawSuite) != 1 {
return nil, ErrBadFormat
}
suite := PQSuite(rawSuite[0])
if !suite.Valid() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrUnknownPQSuite, suite)
}
if fromHandshake {
if body.PeekASN1Tag(TagCertPQPublicKey) {
return nil, ErrCertPubkeyPresent
}
} else if !body.ReadASN1(&pq, TagCertPQPublicKey) || pq.Empty() {
return nil, ErrBadFormat
}
var pqSignature cryptobyte.String
if !body.ReadASN1(&pqSignature, TagCertPQSignature) || pqSignature.Empty() {
return nil, ErrBadFormat
}
if !body.Empty() {
return nil, ErrBadFormat
}
details, err := unmarshalDetails(rawDetails)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if fromHandshake {
k, p, err := suite.SplitPublicKey(details.isCA, publicKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
classical = bytes.Clone(k)
pq = bytes.Clone(p)
}
c := &certificateV3{
v2: certificateV2{
details: details,
rawDetails: rawDetails,
curve: curve,
publicKey: classical,
signature: signature,
},
pqSuite: suite,
pqPublicKey: pq,
pqSignature: pqSignature,
}
if err := c.validate(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return c, nil
}
// ExtendToV3 builds the version 3 certificate in suite that extends the version 2 certificate c with pqPublicKey, the
// composite public key's post-quantum half. pqSign produces the suite's post-quantum signature, see SignPQ.
//
// A CA certificate signs its own extension: signer must be nil and pqSign must use the private key for pqPublicKey.
// A host certificate is extended by its issuing CA: signer is the v3 form of that CA, which must be in the same suite.
// In both cases c's classical signature, and so its fingerprint, are left unchanged, so certificates in use can be
// extended in place.
func ExtendToV3(c Certificate, suite PQSuite, pqPublicKey []byte, signer Certificate, pqSign SignerLambda) (Certificate, error) {
c2, ok := c.(*certificateV2)
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("only version 2 certificates can be extended to version 3, got version %d", c.Version())
}
if !suite.Valid() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrUnknownPQSuite, suite)
}
var signingKey []byte
if c2.IsCA() {
if signer != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("a CA certificate must extend itself, signer must be nil")
}
if !c2.CheckSignature(c2.publicKey) {
return nil, ErrNotSelfSigned
}
signingKey = append(bytes.Clone(c2.publicKey), pqPublicKey...)
} else {
if signer == nil || signer.Version() != Version3 || !signer.IsCA() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("a host certificate must be extended by a version 3 CA")
}
if PQSuiteOf(signer) != suite {
return nil, ErrPQSuiteMismatch
}
signerV2 := V2Form(signer)
issuer, err := signerV2.Fingerprint()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if c2.Issuer() != issuer {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("certificate was not issued by the signing CA")
}
if !c2.CheckSignature(signerV2.PublicKey()) {
return nil, ErrSignatureMismatch
}
signingKey = signer.PublicKey()
}
c3 := &certificateV3{
v2: *c2.Copy().(*certificateV2),
pqSuite: suite,
pqPublicKey: bytes.Clone(pqPublicKey),
}
if len(c3.pqPublicKey) != suite.PublicKeySize(c3.IsCA()) {
return nil, ErrInvalidPublicKey
}
b, err := c3.marshalForPQSigning()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
sig, err := pqSign(b)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
c3.pqSignature = sig
if err := c3.validate(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Catch a pqSign that used the wrong key before the certificate goes anywhere.
if !c3.CheckSignature(signingKey) {
return nil, ErrSignatureMismatch
}
return c3, nil
}
// SignPQ returns a SignerLambda that signs certificates with the private key seed of suite's signature algorithm.
// Signatures are deterministic, so signing the same certificate twice gives the same bytes and the same fingerprint,
// and extending a certificate is idempotent.
func SignPQ(suite PQSuite, seed []byte) (SignerLambda, error) {
p := pqSuites[suite]
if p == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrUnknownPQSuite, suite)
}
if len(seed) != p.dsa.privateKeySize {
return nil, ErrInvalidPrivateKey
}
return p.dsa.signer(seed)
}
+493
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,493 @@
package cert
import (
"crypto/mldsa"
"crypto/mlkem"
"net/netip"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert/p256"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1"
)
var testCurves = []Curve{Curve_CURVE25519, Curve_P256}
func newTestV3(t *testing.T, curve Curve) (ca Certificate, caKey []byte, host Certificate, hostKey []byte) {
t.Helper()
ca, _, caKey, _ = NewTestCaCert(Version3, curve, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, []string{"g"})
host, _, hostKeyPEM, _ := NewTestCert(Version3, curve, ca, caKey, "host", time.Time{}, time.Time{}, []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.1.0.1/16")}, nil, []string{"g"})
hostKey, _, _, err := UnmarshalPrivateKeyFromPEM(hostKeyPEM)
require.NoError(t, err)
return ca, caKey, host, hostKey
}
func TestCertificateV3_Sign(t *testing.T) {
for _, curve := range testCurves {
t.Run(curve.String(), func(t *testing.T) {
ca, caKey, host, hostKey := newTestV3(t, curve)
assert.Equal(t, Version3, ca.Version())
assert.Equal(t, Version3, host.Version())
assert.True(t, ca.CheckSignature(ca.PublicKey()))
assert.True(t, host.CheckSignature(ca.PublicKey()))
require.NoError(t, ca.VerifyPrivateKey(curve, caKey))
require.NoError(t, host.VerifyPrivateKey(curve, hostKey))
// The classical half of the key alone is not the key.
require.Error(t, host.VerifyPrivateKey(curve, hostKey[:len(hostKey)-MLKEM1024PrivateKeySize]))
// The issuer is the v2 form of the CA, which old peers know it by.
caV2Fp, err := V2Form(ca).Fingerprint()
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, caV2Fp, host.Issuer())
// A v2 CA can not sign a v3 certificate, nor a v3 CA a v2 one.
_, err = (&TBSCertificate{Version: Version3, Curve: curve, PQSuite: DefaultPQSuite, Name: "x", Networks: host.Networks(), NotBefore: host.NotBefore(), NotAfter: host.NotAfter(), PublicKey: host.PublicKey()}).Sign(V2Form(ca), curve, caKey)
require.Error(t, err)
})
}
}
// The v2 form must be exactly the certificate the CA's v2 form would have signed, so peers that only speak v2
// accept it. Ed25519 signatures are deterministic, so the bytes can be compared outright.
func TestCertificateV3_V2FormIsExact(t *testing.T) {
ca, caKey, host, _ := newTestV3(t, Curve_CURVE25519)
classicalCAKey := caKey[:len(caKey)-MLDSA87PrivateKeySize]
classicalPub := V2Form(host).PublicKey()
tbs := &TBSCertificate{
Version: Version2,
Curve: Curve_CURVE25519,
Name: host.Name(),
Networks: host.Networks(),
Groups: host.Groups(),
NotBefore: host.NotBefore(),
NotAfter: host.NotAfter(),
PublicKey: classicalPub,
}
v2, err := tbs.Sign(V2Form(ca), Curve_CURVE25519, classicalCAKey)
require.NoError(t, err)
want, err := v2.Marshal()
require.NoError(t, err)
got, err := V2Form(host).Marshal()
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, want, got)
wantHS, err := v2.MarshalForHandshakes()
require.NoError(t, err)
gotHS, err := V2Form(host).MarshalForHandshakes()
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, wantHS, gotHS)
assert.Nil(t, V2Form(v2))
}
func TestCertificateV3_MarshalRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
for _, curve := range testCurves {
t.Run(curve.String(), func(t *testing.T) {
ca, _, host, _ := newTestV3(t, curve)
for _, c := range []Certificate{ca, host} {
b, err := c.Marshal()
require.NoError(t, err)
c2, err := unmarshalCertificateV3(b, nil, Curve_CURVE25519)
require.NoError(t, err)
assertCertsEqual(t, c, c2)
p, err := c.MarshalPEM()
require.NoError(t, err)
c3, rest, err := UnmarshalCertificateFromPEM(p)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, rest)
assertCertsEqual(t, c, c3)
// Handshakes carry the composite public key in the noise static, not in the certificate.
hs, err := c.MarshalForHandshakes()
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Less(t, len(hs), len(b)-len(c.PublicKey()))
c4, err := Recombine(Version3, hs, c.PublicKey(), curve)
require.NoError(t, err)
assertCertsEqual(t, c, c4)
_, err = Recombine(Version3, b, c.PublicKey(), curve)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrCertPubkeyPresent)
}
})
}
}
func assertCertsEqual(t *testing.T, want, got Certificate) {
t.Helper()
wb, err := want.Marshal()
require.NoError(t, err)
gb, err := got.Marshal()
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, wb, gb)
wf, err := want.Fingerprint()
require.NoError(t, err)
gf, err := got.Fingerprint()
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, wf, gf)
assert.Equal(t, want.PublicKey(), got.PublicKey())
}
// rebuildV3 re-encodes a v3 certificate's envelope after edit has had a go at its fields.
func rebuildV3(t *testing.T, c Certificate, edit func(fields map[asn1.Tag][]byte, order *[]asn1.Tag)) []byte {
t.Helper()
b, err := c.Marshal()
require.NoError(t, err)
in := cryptobyte.String(b)
var body cryptobyte.String
require.True(t, in.ReadASN1(&body, asn1.SEQUENCE))
fields := map[asn1.Tag][]byte{}
var order []asn1.Tag
for !body.Empty() {
var el cryptobyte.String
var tag asn1.Tag
require.True(t, body.ReadAnyASN1Element(&el, &tag))
fields[tag] = el
order = append(order, tag)
}
edit(fields, &order)
var out cryptobyte.Builder
out.AddASN1(asn1.SEQUENCE, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
for _, tag := range order {
b.AddBytes(fields[tag])
}
})
return out.BytesOrPanic()
}
func TestCertificateV3_StrictParse(t *testing.T) {
_, _, host, _ := newTestV3(t, Curve_CURVE25519)
good, err := host.Marshal()
require.NoError(t, err)
_, err = unmarshalCertificateV3(append(good, 0), nil, Curve_CURVE25519)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrBadFormat, "trailing bytes after the envelope")
trailing := rebuildV3(t, host, func(fields map[asn1.Tag][]byte, order *[]asn1.Tag) {
fields[7|classContextSpecific] = []byte{7 | classContextSpecific, 1, 0}
*order = append(*order, 7|classContextSpecific)
})
_, err = unmarshalCertificateV3(trailing, nil, Curve_CURVE25519)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrBadFormat, "unknown field after the pq signature")
for _, tag := range []asn1.Tag{TagCertPQSuite, TagCertPQPublicKey, TagCertPQSignature} {
missing := rebuildV3(t, host, func(fields map[asn1.Tag][]byte, order *[]asn1.Tag) {
*order = removeTag(*order, tag)
})
_, err = unmarshalCertificateV3(missing, nil, Curve_CURVE25519)
require.Error(t, err, "missing %x", tag)
}
// A v2 certificate is not a v3 one.
v2, err := V2Form(host).Marshal()
require.NoError(t, err)
_, err = unmarshalCertificateV3(v2, nil, Curve_CURVE25519)
require.Error(t, err)
// A wrong sized post-quantum key fails validation.
short := rebuildV3(t, host, func(fields map[asn1.Tag][]byte, order *[]asn1.Tag) {
var b cryptobyte.Builder
b.AddASN1(TagCertPQPublicKey, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { b.AddBytes(make([]byte, MLKEM1024PublicKeySize-1)) })
fields[TagCertPQPublicKey] = b.BytesOrPanic()
})
_, err = unmarshalCertificateV3(short, nil, Curve_CURVE25519)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrInvalidPublicKey)
// The suite is one known value, PQSuiteUnknown included in what is not.
for _, suite := range [][]byte{{byte(PQSuiteUnknown)}, {200}, {}, {1, 1}} {
bad := rebuildV3(t, host, func(fields map[asn1.Tag][]byte, order *[]asn1.Tag) {
var b cryptobyte.Builder
b.AddASN1(TagCertPQSuite, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { b.AddBytes(suite) })
fields[TagCertPQSuite] = b.BytesOrPanic()
})
_, err = unmarshalCertificateV3(bad, nil, Curve_CURVE25519)
require.Error(t, err, "suite %x", suite)
}
}
func removeTag(order []asn1.Tag, tag asn1.Tag) []asn1.Tag {
var out []asn1.Tag
for _, t := range order {
if t != tag {
out = append(out, t)
}
}
return out
}
func TestCertificateV3_Tamper(t *testing.T) {
for _, curve := range testCurves {
t.Run(curve.String(), func(t *testing.T) {
ca, _, host, _ := newTestV3(t, curve)
// Swapping the post-quantum key breaks only the post-quantum signature, which must still catch it.
dk, err := mlkem.GenerateKey1024()
require.NoError(t, err)
swapped := host.Copy().(*certificateV3)
swapped.pqPublicKey = dk.EncapsulationKey().Bytes()
assert.True(t, V2Form(swapped).CheckSignature(V2Form(ca).PublicKey()))
assert.False(t, swapped.CheckSignature(ca.PublicKey()))
// The post-quantum signature covers the classical one.
resigned := host.Copy().(*certificateV3)
if curve == Curve_P256 {
sig, err := p256.Swap(resigned.v2.signature)
require.NoError(t, err)
resigned.v2.signature = sig
assert.True(t, V2Form(resigned).CheckSignature(V2Form(ca).PublicKey()))
} else {
resigned.v2.signature[0] ^= 1
}
assert.False(t, resigned.CheckSignature(ca.PublicKey()))
// Another CA's post-quantum key does not verify.
other, _, _, _ := NewTestCaCert(Version3, curve, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil)
k := append(V2Form(ca).PublicKey(), other.PublicKey()[len(V2Form(other).PublicKey()):]...)
assert.False(t, host.CheckSignature(k))
})
}
}
func TestCAPool_V3(t *testing.T) {
for _, curve := range testCurves {
t.Run(curve.String(), func(t *testing.T) {
ca, _, host, _ := newTestV3(t, curve)
now := time.Now()
// A v3 CA verifies v3 certificates, and only those.
pool := NewCAPool()
require.NoError(t, pool.AddCA(ca))
cc, err := pool.VerifyCertificate(now, host)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, pool.VerifyCachedCertificate(now, cc))
_, err = pool.VerifyCertificate(now, V2Form(host))
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrCaNotFound)
// Listing the v2 form of the CA as well accepts the v2 form of the certificate.
require.NoError(t, pool.AddCA(V2Form(ca)))
_, err = pool.VerifyCertificate(now, V2Form(host))
require.NoError(t, err)
_, err = pool.VerifyCertificate(now, host)
require.NoError(t, err)
// The v2 form of the CA alone does not verify a v3 certificate.
v2Pool := NewCAPool()
require.NoError(t, v2Pool.AddCA(V2Form(ca)))
_, err = v2Pool.VerifyCertificate(now, host)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrCaNotFound)
// A second v3 extension of the same v2 CA is ambiguous.
sk, err := mldsa.GenerateKey(mldsa.MLDSA87())
require.NoError(t, err)
signPQ, err := SignPQ(DefaultPQSuite, sk.Bytes())
require.NoError(t, err)
again, err := ExtendToV3(V2Form(ca), DefaultPQSuite, sk.PublicKey().Bytes(), nil, signPQ)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.ErrorContains(t, pool.AddCA(again), "two version 3 CAs extend the same version 2 CA")
})
}
}
func TestCAPool_V3Blocklist(t *testing.T) {
for _, curve := range testCurves {
t.Run(curve.String(), func(t *testing.T) {
ca, _, host, _ := newTestV3(t, curve)
now := time.Now()
pool := NewCAPool()
require.NoError(t, pool.AddCA(ca))
require.NoError(t, pool.AddCA(V2Form(ca)))
cc, err := pool.VerifyCertificate(now, host)
require.NoError(t, err)
fp, err := host.Fingerprint()
require.NoError(t, err)
v2Fp, err := V2Form(host).Fingerprint()
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotEqual(t, fp, v2Fp)
// Blocking the v3 fingerprint leaves the v2 form alone, which is why operators list both.
pool.BlocklistFingerprint(fp)
_, err = pool.VerifyCertificate(now, host)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrBlockListed)
require.ErrorIs(t, pool.VerifyCachedCertificate(now, cc), ErrBlockListed)
_, err = pool.VerifyCertificate(now, V2Form(host))
require.NoError(t, err)
// Blocking the v2 fingerprint blocks both.
pool.ResetCertBlocklist()
pool.BlocklistFingerprint(v2Fp)
_, err = pool.VerifyCertificate(now, host)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrBlockListed)
require.ErrorIs(t, pool.VerifyCachedCertificate(now, cc), ErrBlockListed)
_, err = pool.VerifyCertificate(now, V2Form(host))
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrBlockListed)
if curve == Curve_P256 {
// So does the other form of a P256 v2 signature.
alt, err := CalculateAlternateFingerprint(V2Form(host))
require.NoError(t, err)
pool.ResetCertBlocklist()
pool.BlocklistFingerprint(alt)
_, err = pool.VerifyCertificate(now, host)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrBlockListed)
}
})
}
}
// Certificates already in use extend in place: their v2 forms, and fingerprints, do not change.
func TestExtendToV3(t *testing.T) {
for _, curve := range testCurves {
t.Run(curve.String(), func(t *testing.T) {
ca2, _, caKey2, _ := NewTestCaCert(Version2, curve, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil)
host2, _, _, _ := NewTestCert(Version2, curve, ca2, caKey2, "host", time.Time{}, time.Time{}, []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.1.0.1/16")}, nil, nil)
sk, err := mldsa.GenerateKey(mldsa.MLDSA87())
require.NoError(t, err)
signPQ, err := SignPQ(DefaultPQSuite, sk.Bytes())
require.NoError(t, err)
ca3, err := ExtendToV3(ca2, DefaultPQSuite, sk.PublicKey().Bytes(), nil, signPQ)
require.NoError(t, err)
assertCertsEqual(t, ca2, V2Form(ca3))
require.NoError(t, ca3.VerifyPrivateKey(curve, append(caKey2, sk.Bytes()...)))
dk, err := mlkem.GenerateKey1024()
require.NoError(t, err)
host3, err := ExtendToV3(host2, DefaultPQSuite, dk.EncapsulationKey().Bytes(), ca3, signPQ)
require.NoError(t, err)
assertCertsEqual(t, host2, V2Form(host3))
pool := NewCAPool()
require.NoError(t, pool.AddCA(ca3))
_, err = pool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), host3)
require.NoError(t, err)
// A host must be extended by its own issuer, and with that issuer's key.
other2, _, _, _ := NewTestCaCert(Version2, curve, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil)
other3, err := ExtendToV3(other2, DefaultPQSuite, sk.PublicKey().Bytes(), nil, signPQ)
require.NoError(t, err)
_, err = ExtendToV3(host2, DefaultPQSuite, dk.EncapsulationKey().Bytes(), other3, signPQ)
require.Error(t, err)
wrong, err := mldsa.GenerateKey(mldsa.MLDSA87())
require.NoError(t, err)
wrongSign, err := SignPQ(DefaultPQSuite, wrong.Bytes())
require.NoError(t, err)
_, err = ExtendToV3(host2, DefaultPQSuite, dk.EncapsulationKey().Bytes(), ca3, wrongSign)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrSignatureMismatch)
// A CA extends itself, and needs its own post-quantum key to.
_, err = ExtendToV3(ca2, DefaultPQSuite, sk.PublicKey().Bytes(), nil, wrongSign)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrSignatureMismatch)
_, err = ExtendToV3(ca2, DefaultPQSuite, sk.PublicKey().Bytes(), ca3, signPQ)
require.Error(t, err)
// Only v2 certificates extend.
_, err = ExtendToV3(host3, DefaultPQSuite, dk.EncapsulationKey().Bytes(), ca3, signPQ)
require.Error(t, err)
})
}
}
// ML-DSA-87 signing is deterministic, so extending a certificate twice gives the same bytes and the same fingerprint:
// pq-extend is idempotent, and a CA extended again is not a second v3 CA to the pool.
func TestExtendToV3_Deterministic(t *testing.T) {
for _, curve := range testCurves {
t.Run(curve.String(), func(t *testing.T) {
ca2, _, caKey2, _ := NewTestCaCert(Version2, curve, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil)
host2, _, _, _ := NewTestCert(Version2, curve, ca2, caKey2, "host", time.Time{}, time.Time{}, []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.1.0.1/16")}, nil, nil)
sk, err := mldsa.GenerateKey(mldsa.MLDSA87())
require.NoError(t, err)
signPQ, err := SignPQ(DefaultPQSuite, sk.Bytes())
require.NoError(t, err)
dk, err := mlkem.GenerateKey1024()
require.NoError(t, err)
extend := func(c Certificate, pq []byte, signer Certificate) ([]byte, string, Certificate) {
c3, err := ExtendToV3(c, DefaultPQSuite, pq, signer, signPQ)
require.NoError(t, err)
b, err := c3.Marshal()
require.NoError(t, err)
fp, err := c3.Fingerprint()
require.NoError(t, err)
return b, fp, c3
}
caBytesA, caFpA, caA := extend(ca2, sk.PublicKey().Bytes(), nil)
caBytesB, caFpB, caB := extend(ca2, sk.PublicKey().Bytes(), nil)
assert.Equal(t, caBytesA, caBytesB)
assert.Equal(t, caFpA, caFpB)
hostBytesA, hostFpA, _ := extend(host2, dk.EncapsulationKey().Bytes(), caA)
hostBytesB, hostFpB, _ := extend(host2, dk.EncapsulationKey().Bytes(), caB)
assert.Equal(t, hostBytesA, hostBytesB)
assert.Equal(t, hostFpA, hostFpB)
pool := NewCAPool()
require.NoError(t, pool.AddCA(caA))
require.NoError(t, pool.AddCA(caB))
})
}
}
func TestCertificateV3_KeyPEM(t *testing.T) {
for _, curve := range testCurves {
t.Run(curve.String(), func(t *testing.T) {
ca, caKey, host, hostKey := newTestV3(t, curve)
pub, rest, gotCurve, err := UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(host.MarshalPublicKeyPEM())
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, rest)
assert.Equal(t, curve, gotCurve)
assert.Equal(t, host.PublicKey(), pub)
pub, _, gotCurve, err = UnmarshalSigningPublicKeyFromPEM(ca.MarshalPublicKeyPEM())
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, curve, gotCurve)
assert.Equal(t, ca.PublicKey(), pub)
key, _, gotCurve, err := UnmarshalPrivateKeyFromPEM(MarshalPQPrivateKeyToPEM(curve, DefaultPQSuite, hostKey))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, curve, gotCurve)
assert.Equal(t, hostKey, key)
key, _, gotCurve, err = UnmarshalSigningPrivateKeyFromPEM(MarshalPQSigningPrivateKeyToPEM(curve, DefaultPQSuite, caKey))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, curve, gotCurve)
assert.Equal(t, caKey, key)
kdf := NewArgon2Parameters(64*1024, 4, 1)
enc, err := EncryptAndMarshalPQSigningPrivateKey(curve, DefaultPQSuite, caKey, []byte("pw"), kdf)
require.NoError(t, err)
_, _, _, err = UnmarshalSigningPrivateKeyFromPEM(enc)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrPrivateKeyEncrypted)
gotCurve, key, _, err = DecryptAndUnmarshalSigningPrivateKey([]byte("pw"), enc)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, curve, gotCurve)
assert.Equal(t, caKey, key)
// The banners name both halves.
assert.Contains(t, string(MarshalPQPrivateKeyToPEM(curve, DefaultPQSuite, hostKey)), " MLKEM1024 PRIVATE KEY-----")
assert.Contains(t, string(MarshalPQSigningPrivateKeyToPEM(curve, DefaultPQSuite, caKey)), " MLDSA87 PRIVATE KEY-----")
assert.Contains(t, string(enc), " MLDSA87 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----")
// A key of the wrong size, or for an unknown suite, has no banner.
assert.Nil(t, MarshalPQPrivateKeyToPEM(curve, DefaultPQSuite, hostKey[1:]))
assert.Nil(t, MarshalPQPrivateKeyToPEM(curve, PQSuiteUnknown, hostKey))
assert.Nil(t, MarshalPQSigningPrivateKeyToPEM(curve, DefaultPQSuite, caKey[1:]))
_, err = EncryptAndMarshalPQSigningPrivateKey(curve, DefaultPQSuite, caKey[1:], []byte("pw"), kdf)
require.Error(t, err)
})
}
}
+43 -11
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
"fmt" "fmt"
"io" "io"
"math" "math"
"strings"
"golang.org/x/crypto/argon2" "golang.org/x/crypto/argon2"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/proto" "google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"
@@ -158,6 +159,33 @@ func splitNonceCiphertext(blob []byte, nonceSize int) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
// EncryptAndMarshalSigningPrivateKey is a simple helper to encrypt and PEM encode a private key // EncryptAndMarshalSigningPrivateKey is a simple helper to encrypt and PEM encode a private key
func EncryptAndMarshalSigningPrivateKey(curve Curve, b []byte, passphrase []byte, kdfParams *Argon2Parameters) ([]byte, error) { func EncryptAndMarshalSigningPrivateKey(curve Curve, b []byte, passphrase []byte, kdfParams *Argon2Parameters) ([]byte, error) {
switch curve {
case Curve_CURVE25519:
return encryptAndMarshalSigningPrivateKey(EncryptedEd25519PrivateKeyBanner, b, passphrase, kdfParams)
case Curve_P256:
return encryptAndMarshalSigningPrivateKey(EncryptedECDSAP256PrivateKeyBanner, b, passphrase, kdfParams)
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid curve: %v", curve)
}
}
// EncryptAndMarshalPQSigningPrivateKey encrypts and PEM encodes a composite CA private key of suite, the classical
// signing key followed by the seed of the suite's signature algorithm.
func EncryptAndMarshalPQSigningPrivateKey(curve Curve, suite PQSuite, b []byte, passphrase []byte, kdfParams *Argon2Parameters) ([]byte, error) {
p := pqSuites[suite]
if p == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrUnknownPQSuite, suite)
}
if curve != Curve_CURVE25519 && curve != Curve_P256 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid curve: %v", curve)
}
if len(b) != pqKeySize(pqSigningPrivateKey, curve, p) {
return nil, ErrInvalidPrivateKey
}
return encryptAndMarshalSigningPrivateKey(pqBannerName(pqEncryptedSigningPrivateKey, curve, p), b, passphrase, kdfParams)
}
func encryptAndMarshalSigningPrivateKey(banner string, b []byte, passphrase []byte, kdfParams *Argon2Parameters) ([]byte, error) {
ciphertext, err := aes256Encrypt(passphrase, kdfParams, b) ciphertext, err := aes256Encrypt(passphrase, kdfParams, b)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return nil, err return nil, err
@@ -180,14 +208,7 @@ func EncryptAndMarshalSigningPrivateKey(curve Curve, b []byte, passphrase []byte
return nil, err return nil, err
} }
switch curve { return pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: banner, Bytes: b}), nil
case Curve_CURVE25519:
return pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: EncryptedEd25519PrivateKeyBanner, Bytes: b}), nil
case Curve_P256:
return pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: EncryptedECDSAP256PrivateKeyBanner, Bytes: b}), nil
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid curve: %v", curve)
}
} }
// UnmarshalNebulaEncryptedData will unmarshal a protobuf byte representation of a nebula cert into its // UnmarshalNebulaEncryptedData will unmarshal a protobuf byte representation of a nebula cert into its
@@ -260,10 +281,14 @@ func DecryptAndUnmarshalSigningPrivateKey(passphrase, b []byte) (Curve, []byte,
return curve, nil, r, fmt.Errorf("input did not contain a valid PEM encoded block") return curve, nil, r, fmt.Errorf("input did not contain a valid PEM encoded block")
} }
switch k.Type { pq, pqKey := pqKeyBanners[k.Type]
case EncryptedEd25519PrivateKeyBanner: pqKey = pqKey && pq.kind == pqEncryptedSigningPrivateKey
switch {
case pqKey:
curve = pq.curve
case k.Type == EncryptedEd25519PrivateKeyBanner:
curve = Curve_CURVE25519 curve = Curve_CURVE25519
case EncryptedECDSAP256PrivateKeyBanner: case k.Type == EncryptedECDSAP256PrivateKeyBanner:
curve = Curve_P256 curve = Curve_P256
default: default:
return curve, nil, r, fmt.Errorf("bytes did not contain a proper nebula encrypted Ed25519/ECDSA private key banner") return curve, nil, r, fmt.Errorf("bytes did not contain a proper nebula encrypted Ed25519/ECDSA private key banner")
@@ -285,6 +310,13 @@ func DecryptAndUnmarshalSigningPrivateKey(passphrase, b []byte) (Curve, []byte,
return curve, nil, r, fmt.Errorf("unsupported encryption algorithm: %s", ned.EncryptionMetadata.EncryptionAlgorithm) return curve, nil, r, fmt.Errorf("unsupported encryption algorithm: %s", ned.EncryptionMetadata.EncryptionAlgorithm)
} }
if pqKey {
if len(bytes) != pq.size {
return curve, nil, r, fmt.Errorf("key was not %d bytes, is invalid %s", pq.size, strings.ToLower(strings.TrimPrefix(k.Type, "NEBULA ")))
}
return curve, bytes, r, nil
}
switch curve { switch curve {
case Curve_CURVE25519: case Curve_CURVE25519:
if len(bytes) != ed25519.PrivateKeySize { if len(bytes) != ed25519.PrivateKeySize {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ qrlJ69wer3ZUHFXA
assert.Nil(t, k) assert.Nil(t, k)
assert.Equal(t, rest, invalidPem) assert.Equal(t, rest, invalidPem)
// Fail due to ivalid PEM format, because // Fail due to invalid PEM format, because
// it's missing the requisite pre-encapsulation boundary. // it's missing the requisite pre-encapsulation boundary.
curve, k, rest, err = DecryptAndUnmarshalSigningPrivateKey(passphrase, rest) curve, k, rest, err = DecryptAndUnmarshalSigningPrivateKey(passphrase, rest)
require.EqualError(t, err, "input did not contain a valid PEM encoded block") require.EqualError(t, err, "input did not contain a valid PEM encoded block")
+4
View File
@@ -21,6 +21,10 @@ var (
ErrPrivateKeyEncrypted = errors.New("private key must be decrypted") ErrPrivateKeyEncrypted = errors.New("private key must be decrypted")
ErrCaNotFound = errors.New("could not find ca for the certificate") ErrCaNotFound = errors.New("could not find ca for the certificate")
ErrUnknownVersion = errors.New("certificate version unrecognized") ErrUnknownVersion = errors.New("certificate version unrecognized")
ErrCertPubkeyPresent = errors.New("certificate has unexpected pubkey present")
ErrCurveMismatch = errors.New("certificate curve does not match CA")
ErrPQSuiteMismatch = errors.New("certificate post-quantum suite does not match CA")
ErrUnknownPQSuite = errors.New("unknown post-quantum suite")
ErrInvalidPEMBlock = errors.New("input did not contain a valid PEM encoded block") ErrInvalidPEMBlock = errors.New("input did not contain a valid PEM encoded block")
ErrInvalidPEMCertificateBanner = errors.New("bytes did not contain a proper certificate banner") ErrInvalidPEMCertificateBanner = errors.New("bytes did not contain a proper certificate banner")
+43 -4
View File
@@ -13,6 +13,12 @@ import (
"golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519" "golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519"
) )
// testCertNow is the reference "now" used to derive default before/after times
// in NewTestCaCert and NewTestCert. Holding it fixed for the lifetime of the
// test binary keeps CA and leaf defaults aligned at the same second, so a leaf
// signed with default times can never expire after its CA on a rounding race.
var testCertNow = time.Now().Round(time.Second)
// NewTestCaCert will create a new ca certificate // NewTestCaCert will create a new ca certificate
func NewTestCaCert(version Version, curve Curve, before, after time.Time, networks, unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix, groups []string) (Certificate, []byte, []byte, []byte) { func NewTestCaCert(version Version, curve Curve, before, after time.Time, networks, unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix, groups []string) (Certificate, []byte, []byte, []byte) {
var err error var err error
@@ -33,11 +39,15 @@ func NewTestCaCert(version Version, curve Curve, before, after time.Time, networ
// There is no default to allow the underlying lib to respond with an error // There is no default to allow the underlying lib to respond with an error
} }
if version == Version3 {
pub, priv = appendPQSigningKey(pub, priv)
}
if before.IsZero() { if before.IsZero() {
before = time.Now().Add(time.Second * -60).Round(time.Second) before = testCertNow.Add(time.Second * -60)
} }
if after.IsZero() { if after.IsZero() {
after = time.Now().Add(time.Second * 60).Round(time.Second) after = testCertNow.Add(time.Second * 60)
} }
t := &TBSCertificate{ t := &TBSCertificate{
@@ -52,6 +62,9 @@ func NewTestCaCert(version Version, curve Curve, before, after time.Time, networ
Groups: groups, Groups: groups,
IsCA: true, IsCA: true,
} }
if version == Version3 {
t.PQSuite = DefaultPQSuite
}
c, err := t.Sign(nil, curve, priv) c, err := t.Sign(nil, curve, priv)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
@@ -70,11 +83,11 @@ func NewTestCaCert(version Version, curve Curve, before, after time.Time, networ
// Expiry times are defaulted if you do not pass them in // Expiry times are defaulted if you do not pass them in
func NewTestCert(v Version, curve Curve, ca Certificate, key []byte, name string, before, after time.Time, networks, unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix, groups []string) (Certificate, []byte, []byte, []byte) { func NewTestCert(v Version, curve Curve, ca Certificate, key []byte, name string, before, after time.Time, networks, unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix, groups []string) (Certificate, []byte, []byte, []byte) {
if before.IsZero() { if before.IsZero() {
before = time.Now().Add(time.Second * -60).Round(time.Second) before = testCertNow.Add(time.Second * -60)
} }
if after.IsZero() { if after.IsZero() {
after = time.Now().Add(time.Second * 60).Round(time.Second) after = testCertNow.Add(time.Second * 60)
} }
if len(networks) == 0 { if len(networks) == 0 {
@@ -91,6 +104,10 @@ func NewTestCert(v Version, curve Curve, ca Certificate, key []byte, name string
panic("unknown curve") panic("unknown curve")
} }
if v == Version3 {
pub, priv = appendPQKey(ca, pub, priv)
}
nc := &TBSCertificate{ nc := &TBSCertificate{
Version: v, Version: v,
Curve: curve, Curve: curve,
@@ -102,6 +119,7 @@ func NewTestCert(v Version, curve Curve, ca Certificate, key []byte, name string
NotAfter: time.Unix(after.Unix(), 0), NotAfter: time.Unix(after.Unix(), 0),
PublicKey: pub, PublicKey: pub,
IsCA: false, IsCA: false,
PQSuite: PQSuiteOf(ca),
} }
c, err := nc.Sign(ca, ca.Curve(), key) c, err := nc.Sign(ca, ca.Curve(), key)
@@ -114,9 +132,30 @@ func NewTestCert(v Version, curve Curve, ca Certificate, key []byte, name string
panic(err) panic(err)
} }
if v == Version3 {
return c, pub, MarshalPQPrivateKeyToPEM(curve, PQSuiteOf(ca), priv), pem
}
return c, pub, MarshalPrivateKeyToPEM(curve, priv), pem return c, pub, MarshalPrivateKeyToPEM(curve, priv), pem
} }
// appendPQSigningKey makes a classical CA keypair into a version 3 composite one with a fresh key of the default suite.
func appendPQSigningKey(pub, priv []byte) ([]byte, []byte) {
pqPub, pqPriv, err := DefaultPQSuite.GenerateKey(true)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
return append(pub, pqPub...), append(priv, pqPriv...)
}
// appendPQKey makes a classical host keypair into a version 3 composite one with a fresh key of the CA's suite.
func appendPQKey(ca Certificate, pub, priv []byte) ([]byte, []byte) {
pqPub, pqPriv, err := PQSuiteOf(ca).GenerateKey(false)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
return append(pub, pqPub...), append(priv, pqPriv...)
}
func X25519Keypair() ([]byte, []byte) { func X25519Keypair() ([]byte, []byte) {
privkey := make([]byte, 32) privkey := make([]byte, 32)
if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, privkey); err != nil { if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, privkey); err != nil {
+127
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
package p256
import (
"crypto/elliptic"
"errors"
"math/big"
"filippo.io/bigmod"
"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1"
)
var halfN = new(big.Int).Rsh(elliptic.P256().Params().N, 1)
var nMod *bigmod.Modulus
func init() {
n, err := bigmod.NewModulus(elliptic.P256().Params().N.Bytes())
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
nMod = n
}
func IsNormalized(sig []byte) (bool, error) {
r, s, err := parseSignature(sig)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
return checkLowS(r, s), nil
}
func checkLowS(_, s []byte) bool {
bigS := new(big.Int).SetBytes(s)
// Check if S <= (N/2), because we want to include the midpoint in the set of low-s
return bigS.Cmp(halfN) <= 0
}
func swap(r, s []byte) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
var err error
bigS, err := bigmod.NewNat().SetBytes(s, nMod)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
sNormalized := nMod.Nat().Sub(bigS, nMod)
result := sNormalized.Bytes(nMod)
for len(result) > 1 && result[0] == 0 {
result = result[1:]
}
return r, result, nil
}
func Normalize(sig []byte) ([]byte, error) {
r, s, err := parseSignature(sig)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if checkLowS(r, s) {
return sig, nil
}
newR, newS, err := swap(r, s)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return encodeSignature(newR, newS)
}
// Swap will change sig between its current form to the opposite high or low form.
func Swap(sig []byte) ([]byte, error) {
r, s, err := parseSignature(sig)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
newR, newS, err := swap(r, s)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return encodeSignature(newR, newS)
}
// parseSignature taken exactly from crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa.go
func parseSignature(sig []byte) (r, s []byte, err error) {
var inner cryptobyte.String
input := cryptobyte.String(sig)
if !input.ReadASN1(&inner, asn1.SEQUENCE) ||
!input.Empty() ||
!inner.ReadASN1Integer(&r) ||
!inner.ReadASN1Integer(&s) ||
!inner.Empty() {
return nil, nil, errors.New("invalid ASN.1")
}
return r, s, nil
}
func encodeSignature(r, s []byte) ([]byte, error) {
var b cryptobyte.Builder
b.AddASN1(asn1.SEQUENCE, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
addASN1IntBytes(b, r)
addASN1IntBytes(b, s)
})
return b.Bytes()
}
// addASN1IntBytes encodes in ASN.1 a positive integer represented as
// a big-endian byte slice with zero or more leading zeroes.
func addASN1IntBytes(b *cryptobyte.Builder, bytes []byte) {
for len(bytes) > 0 && bytes[0] == 0 {
bytes = bytes[1:]
}
if len(bytes) == 0 {
b.SetError(errors.New("invalid integer"))
return
}
b.AddASN1(asn1.INTEGER, func(c *cryptobyte.Builder) {
if bytes[0]&0x80 != 0 {
c.AddUint8(0)
}
c.AddBytes(bytes)
})
}
+28
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
package p256
import (
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rand"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestFlipping(t *testing.T) {
priv, err1 := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
require.NoError(t, err1)
out, err := ecdsa.SignASN1(rand.Reader, priv, []byte("big chungus"))
require.NoError(t, err)
r, s, err := parseSignature(out)
require.NoError(t, err)
r, s1, err := swap(r, s)
require.NoError(t, err)
r, s2, err := swap(r, s1)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, s, s2)
require.NotEqual(t, s, s1)
}
+267 -16
View File
@@ -1,15 +1,72 @@
package cert package cert
import ( import (
"bytes"
"encoding/pem" "encoding/pem"
"errors"
"fmt" "fmt"
"slices"
"strings"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519" "golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519"
) )
var ErrTruncatedPEMBlock = errors.New("truncated PEM block")
// SplitPEM is a split function for bufio.Scanner that returns each PEM block.
func SplitPEM(data []byte, atEOF bool) (advance int, token []byte, err error) {
// Look for the start of a PEM block
start := bytes.Index(data, []byte("-----BEGIN "))
if start == -1 {
if atEOF && len(bytes.TrimSpace(data)) > 0 {
// Non-whitespace content with no PEM block
return 0, nil, ErrTruncatedPEMBlock
}
if atEOF {
return len(data), nil, nil
}
// Request more data
return 0, nil, nil
}
// Look for the end marker
endMarkerStart := bytes.Index(data[start:], []byte("-----END "))
if endMarkerStart == -1 {
if atEOF {
// Incomplete PEM block at EOF
return 0, nil, ErrTruncatedPEMBlock
}
// Need more data to find the end
return 0, nil, nil
}
// Find the actual end of the END line (after the newline)
endMarkerStart += start
endLineEnd := bytes.IndexByte(data[endMarkerStart:], '\n')
var end int
if endLineEnd == -1 {
if atEOF {
// END marker without newline at EOF - take it anyway
end = len(data)
} else {
// Need more data
return 0, nil, nil
}
} else {
end = endMarkerStart + endLineEnd + 1
}
// Extract the PEM block
pemBlock := data[start:end]
// Return the valid PEM block
return end, pemBlock, nil
}
const ( //cert banners const ( //cert banners
CertificateBanner = "NEBULA CERTIFICATE" CertificateBanner = "NEBULA CERTIFICATE"
CertificateV2Banner = "NEBULA CERTIFICATE V2" CertificateV2Banner = "NEBULA CERTIFICATE V2"
CertificateV3Banner = "NEBULA CERTIFICATE V3"
) )
const ( //key-agreement-key banners const ( //key-agreement-key banners
@@ -19,6 +76,109 @@ const ( //key-agreement-key banners
P256PublicKeyBanner = "NEBULA P256 PUBLIC KEY" P256PublicKeyBanner = "NEBULA P256 PUBLIC KEY"
) )
// Version 3 keys are composite: the classical key followed by the post-quantum key of the certificate's PQSuite, a
// KEM seed or public key for hosts and a signature algorithm's seed or public key for CAs. Their banners name both
// halves, "NEBULA X25519 MLKEM1024 PRIVATE KEY" or "NEBULA ED25519 MLDSA87 PUBLIC KEY" for example, because the
// post-quantum algorithm can not be told from the key's size: ML-KEM and ML-DSA seeds are the same size at every
// strength. The banners name algorithms, not suites, so suites sharing an algorithm share its banners too.
// Classical key sizes, the composite keys of version 3 add the post-quantum key to these.
const (
x25519KeySize = 32
p256PublicKeySize = 65 // uncompressed
p256PrivateKeySize = 32
ed25519PublicKeySize = 32
ed25519PrivateKeySize = 64
ecdsaP256PublicKeySize = 65 // uncompressed
)
// ClassicalPrivateKey returns the classical half of a host private key: all of a classical key, or the classical half
// of a composite one, whatever its suite.
func ClassicalPrivateKey(key []byte) []byte {
// X25519 and P256 private keys are the same size.
if len(key) > x25519KeySize {
return key[:x25519KeySize]
}
return key
}
// pqKeyKind is what a composite key banner holds.
type pqKeyKind int
const (
pqPrivateKey pqKeyKind = iota
pqPublicKey
pqSigningPrivateKey
pqSigningPublicKey
pqEncryptedSigningPrivateKey
)
// pqKeyBanner is what a composite key banner says about the key under it.
type pqKeyBanner struct {
kind pqKeyKind
curve Curve
size int // of the whole composite key; for an encrypted key, once decrypted
}
var pqKeyKinds = []pqKeyKind{pqPrivateKey, pqPublicKey, pqSigningPrivateKey, pqSigningPublicKey, pqEncryptedSigningPrivateKey}
// pqKeyBanners maps every composite key banner of every suite to what it holds, see registerPQSuite.
var pqKeyBanners = map[string]pqKeyBanner{}
// pqBannerName returns the banner for a composite key.
func pqBannerName(kind pqKeyKind, curve Curve, suite *pqSuite) string {
classical := map[Curve]string{Curve_CURVE25519: "X25519", Curve_P256: "P256"}[curve]
alg := suite.kem.name
if kind != pqPrivateKey && kind != pqPublicKey {
classical = map[Curve]string{Curve_CURVE25519: "ED25519", Curve_P256: "ECDSA P256"}[curve]
alg = suite.dsa.name
}
return "NEBULA " + classical + " " + alg + " " + map[pqKeyKind]string{
pqPrivateKey: "PRIVATE KEY",
pqPublicKey: "PUBLIC KEY",
pqSigningPrivateKey: "PRIVATE KEY",
pqSigningPublicKey: "PUBLIC KEY",
pqEncryptedSigningPrivateKey: "ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY",
}[kind]
}
// pqKeySize returns the size of a composite key.
func pqKeySize(kind pqKeyKind, curve Curve, suite *pqSuite) int {
p256 := curve == Curve_P256
switch kind {
case pqPrivateKey:
return x25519KeySize + suite.kem.privateKeySize // a P256 private key is the same size
case pqPublicKey:
return map[bool]int{false: x25519KeySize, true: p256PublicKeySize}[p256] + suite.kem.publicKeySize
case pqSigningPublicKey:
return map[bool]int{false: ed25519PublicKeySize, true: ecdsaP256PublicKeySize}[p256] + suite.dsa.publicKeySize
default:
return map[bool]int{false: ed25519PrivateKeySize, true: p256PrivateKeySize}[p256] + suite.dsa.privateKeySize
}
}
// marshalPQKeyToPEM PEM encodes a composite key of suite, nil for an unknown curve or suite or a key of the wrong size.
func marshalPQKeyToPEM(kind pqKeyKind, curve Curve, suite PQSuite, b []byte) []byte {
p := pqSuites[suite]
if p == nil || (curve != Curve_CURVE25519 && curve != Curve_P256) || len(b) != pqKeySize(kind, curve, p) {
return nil
}
return pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: pqBannerName(kind, curve, p), Bytes: b})
}
// unmarshalPQKeyBlock checks a PEM block that may hold a composite key of one of kinds. ok is false when the banner
// is not a composite key banner of those kinds at all.
func unmarshalPQKeyBlock(k *pem.Block, kinds ...pqKeyKind) (curve Curve, ok bool, err error) {
b, found := pqKeyBanners[k.Type]
if !found || !slices.Contains(kinds, b.kind) {
return 0, false, nil
}
if b.kind != pqEncryptedSigningPrivateKey && len(k.Bytes) != b.size {
return b.curve, true, fmt.Errorf("key was not %d bytes, is invalid %s", b.size, strings.ToLower(strings.TrimPrefix(k.Type, "NEBULA ")))
}
return b.curve, true, nil
}
/* including "ECDSA" in the P256 banners is a clue that these keys should be used only for signing */ /* including "ECDSA" in the P256 banners is a clue that these keys should be used only for signing */
const ( //signing key banners const ( //signing key banners
EncryptedECDSAP256PrivateKeyBanner = "NEBULA ECDSA P256 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY" EncryptedECDSAP256PrivateKeyBanner = "NEBULA ECDSA P256 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY"
@@ -37,19 +197,7 @@ func UnmarshalCertificateFromPEM(b []byte) (Certificate, []byte, error) {
return nil, r, ErrInvalidPEMBlock return nil, r, ErrInvalidPEMBlock
} }
var c Certificate c, err := unmarshalCertificateBlock(p)
var err error
switch p.Type {
// Implementations must validate the resulting certificate contains valid information
case CertificateBanner:
c, err = unmarshalCertificateV1(p.Bytes, nil)
case CertificateV2Banner:
c, err = unmarshalCertificateV2(p.Bytes, nil, Curve_CURVE25519)
default:
return nil, r, ErrInvalidPEMCertificateBanner
}
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return nil, r, err return nil, r, err
} }
@@ -58,7 +206,29 @@ func UnmarshalCertificateFromPEM(b []byte) (Certificate, []byte, error) {
} }
// unmarshalCertificateBlock decodes a single PEM block into a certificate.
// It expects a Nebula certificate banner and returns ErrInvalidPEMCertificateBanner otherwise.
func unmarshalCertificateBlock(block *pem.Block) (Certificate, error) {
switch block.Type {
// Implementations must validate the resulting certificate contains valid information
case CertificateBanner:
return unmarshalCertificateV1(block.Bytes, nil)
case CertificateV2Banner:
return unmarshalCertificateV2(block.Bytes, nil, Curve_CURVE25519)
case CertificateV3Banner:
return unmarshalCertificateV3(block.Bytes, nil, Curve_CURVE25519)
default:
return nil, ErrInvalidPEMCertificateBanner
}
}
func marshalCertPublicKeyToPEM(c Certificate) []byte { func marshalCertPublicKeyToPEM(c Certificate) []byte {
if suite := PQSuiteOf(c); suite != PQSuiteUnknown {
if c.IsCA() {
return MarshalPQSigningPublicKeyToPEM(c.Curve(), suite, c.PublicKey())
}
return MarshalPQPublicKeyToPEM(c.Curve(), suite, c.PublicKey())
}
if c.IsCA() { if c.IsCA() {
return MarshalSigningPublicKeyToPEM(c.Curve(), c.PublicKey()) return MarshalSigningPublicKeyToPEM(c.Curve(), c.PublicKey())
} else { } else {
@@ -79,6 +249,12 @@ func MarshalPublicKeyToPEM(curve Curve, b []byte) []byte {
} }
} }
// MarshalPQPublicKeyToPEM returns a PEM representation of a composite host public key of suite, the classical ECDH
// key followed by the suite's KEM public key, or nil if b is not one.
func MarshalPQPublicKeyToPEM(curve Curve, suite PQSuite, b []byte) []byte {
return marshalPQKeyToPEM(pqPublicKey, curve, suite, b)
}
// MarshalSigningPublicKeyToPEM returns a PEM representation of a public key used for signing. // MarshalSigningPublicKeyToPEM returns a PEM representation of a public key used for signing.
// if your public key came from a certificate, prefer Certificate.PublicKeyPEM() if possible, to avoid mistakes! // if your public key came from a certificate, prefer Certificate.PublicKeyPEM() if possible, to avoid mistakes!
func MarshalSigningPublicKeyToPEM(curve Curve, b []byte) []byte { func MarshalSigningPublicKeyToPEM(curve Curve, b []byte) []byte {
@@ -86,24 +262,39 @@ func MarshalSigningPublicKeyToPEM(curve Curve, b []byte) []byte {
case Curve_CURVE25519: case Curve_CURVE25519:
return pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: Ed25519PublicKeyBanner, Bytes: b}) return pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: Ed25519PublicKeyBanner, Bytes: b})
case Curve_P256: case Curve_P256:
return pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: P256PublicKeyBanner, Bytes: b}) return pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: ECDSAP256PublicKeyBanner, Bytes: b})
default: default:
return nil return nil
} }
} }
// MarshalPQSigningPublicKeyToPEM returns a PEM representation of a composite CA public key of suite, the classical
// signing key followed by the public key of the suite's signature algorithm, or nil if b is not one.
func MarshalPQSigningPublicKeyToPEM(curve Curve, suite PQSuite, b []byte) []byte {
return marshalPQKeyToPEM(pqSigningPublicKey, curve, suite, b)
}
// UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM will try to unmarshal the first pem block in a byte array, returning any non
// consumed data or an error on failure. Only key-agreement (ECDH) public key banners are accepted.
// Use UnmarshalSigningPublicKeyFromPEM for Ed25519/ECDSA banners.
func UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(b []byte) ([]byte, []byte, Curve, error) { func UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(b []byte) ([]byte, []byte, Curve, error) {
k, r := pem.Decode(b) k, r := pem.Decode(b)
if k == nil { if k == nil {
return nil, r, 0, fmt.Errorf("input did not contain a valid PEM encoded block") return nil, r, 0, fmt.Errorf("input did not contain a valid PEM encoded block")
} }
if curve, ok, err := unmarshalPQKeyBlock(k, pqPublicKey); ok {
if err != nil {
return nil, r, 0, err
}
return k.Bytes, r, curve, nil
}
var expectedLen int var expectedLen int
var curve Curve var curve Curve
switch k.Type { switch k.Type {
case X25519PublicKeyBanner, Ed25519PublicKeyBanner: case X25519PublicKeyBanner:
expectedLen = 32 expectedLen = 32
curve = Curve_CURVE25519 curve = Curve_CURVE25519
case P256PublicKeyBanner, ECDSAP256PublicKeyBanner: case P256PublicKeyBanner:
// Uncompressed // Uncompressed
expectedLen = 65 expectedLen = 65
curve = Curve_P256 curve = Curve_P256
@@ -116,6 +307,39 @@ func UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(b []byte) ([]byte, []byte, Curve, error) {
return k.Bytes, r, curve, nil return k.Bytes, r, curve, nil
} }
// UnmarshalSigningPublicKeyFromPEM will try to unmarshal the first pem block in a byte array, returning any non
// consumed data or an error on failure. Only Ed25519/ECDSA public key banners are accepted.
// Use UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM for X25519/P256 (ECDH) banners.
func UnmarshalSigningPublicKeyFromPEM(b []byte) ([]byte, []byte, Curve, error) {
k, r := pem.Decode(b)
if k == nil {
return nil, r, 0, fmt.Errorf("input did not contain a valid PEM encoded block")
}
if curve, ok, err := unmarshalPQKeyBlock(k, pqSigningPublicKey); ok {
if err != nil {
return nil, r, 0, err
}
return k.Bytes, r, curve, nil
}
var expectedLen int
var curve Curve
switch k.Type {
case Ed25519PublicKeyBanner:
expectedLen = 32
curve = Curve_CURVE25519
case ECDSAP256PublicKeyBanner:
// Uncompressed
expectedLen = 65
curve = Curve_P256
default:
return nil, r, 0, fmt.Errorf("bytes did not contain a proper Ed25519/ECDSA public key banner")
}
if len(k.Bytes) != expectedLen {
return nil, r, 0, fmt.Errorf("key was not %d bytes, is invalid %s public key", expectedLen, curve)
}
return k.Bytes, r, curve, nil
}
func MarshalPrivateKeyToPEM(curve Curve, b []byte) []byte { func MarshalPrivateKeyToPEM(curve Curve, b []byte) []byte {
switch curve { switch curve {
case Curve_CURVE25519: case Curve_CURVE25519:
@@ -127,6 +351,18 @@ func MarshalPrivateKeyToPEM(curve Curve, b []byte) []byte {
} }
} }
// MarshalPQPrivateKeyToPEM returns a PEM representation of a composite host private key of suite, the classical ECDH
// key followed by the seed of the suite's KEM, or nil if b is not one.
func MarshalPQPrivateKeyToPEM(curve Curve, suite PQSuite, b []byte) []byte {
return marshalPQKeyToPEM(pqPrivateKey, curve, suite, b)
}
// MarshalPQSigningPrivateKeyToPEM returns a PEM representation of a composite CA private key of suite, the classical
// signing key followed by the seed of the suite's signature algorithm, or nil if b is not one.
func MarshalPQSigningPrivateKeyToPEM(curve Curve, suite PQSuite, b []byte) []byte {
return marshalPQKeyToPEM(pqSigningPrivateKey, curve, suite, b)
}
func MarshalSigningPrivateKeyToPEM(curve Curve, b []byte) []byte { func MarshalSigningPrivateKeyToPEM(curve Curve, b []byte) []byte {
switch curve { switch curve {
case Curve_CURVE25519: case Curve_CURVE25519:
@@ -145,6 +381,12 @@ func UnmarshalPrivateKeyFromPEM(b []byte) ([]byte, []byte, Curve, error) {
if k == nil { if k == nil {
return nil, r, 0, fmt.Errorf("input did not contain a valid PEM encoded block") return nil, r, 0, fmt.Errorf("input did not contain a valid PEM encoded block")
} }
if curve, ok, err := unmarshalPQKeyBlock(k, pqPrivateKey); ok {
if err != nil {
return nil, r, 0, err
}
return k.Bytes, r, curve, nil
}
var expectedLen int var expectedLen int
var curve Curve var curve Curve
switch k.Type { switch k.Type {
@@ -168,6 +410,15 @@ func UnmarshalSigningPrivateKeyFromPEM(b []byte) ([]byte, []byte, Curve, error)
if k == nil { if k == nil {
return nil, r, 0, fmt.Errorf("input did not contain a valid PEM encoded block") return nil, r, 0, fmt.Errorf("input did not contain a valid PEM encoded block")
} }
if curve, ok, err := unmarshalPQKeyBlock(k, pqSigningPrivateKey, pqEncryptedSigningPrivateKey); ok {
switch {
case err != nil:
return nil, r, 0, err
case pqKeyBanners[k.Type].kind == pqEncryptedSigningPrivateKey:
return nil, nil, curve, ErrPrivateKeyEncrypted
}
return k.Bytes, r, curve, nil
}
var curve Curve var curve Curve
switch k.Type { switch k.Type {
case EncryptedEd25519PrivateKeyBanner: case EncryptedEd25519PrivateKeyBanner:
+168 -72
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,88 @@
package cert package cert
import ( import (
"bufio"
"strings"
"testing" "testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require" "github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
) )
func scanAll(t *testing.T, input string) ([]string, error) {
t.Helper()
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(strings.NewReader(input))
scanner.Split(SplitPEM)
var blocks []string
for scanner.Scan() {
blocks = append(blocks, scanner.Text())
}
return blocks, scanner.Err()
}
func TestSplitPEM_Single(t *testing.T) {
input := "-----BEGIN TEST-----\ndata\n-----END TEST-----\n"
blocks, err := scanAll(t, input)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, blocks, 1)
require.Equal(t, input, blocks[0])
}
func TestSplitPEM_Multiple(t *testing.T) {
block1 := "-----BEGIN TEST-----\naaa\n-----END TEST-----\n"
block2 := "-----BEGIN TEST-----\nbbb\n-----END TEST-----\n"
blocks, err := scanAll(t, block1+block2)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, blocks, 2)
require.Equal(t, block1, blocks[0])
require.Equal(t, block2, blocks[1])
}
func TestSplitPEM_CommentsAndWhitespaceBetweenBlocks(t *testing.T) {
input := "# comment\n\n-----BEGIN TEST-----\naaa\n-----END TEST-----\n\n# another comment\n\n-----BEGIN TEST-----\nbbb\n-----END TEST-----\n"
blocks, err := scanAll(t, input)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, blocks, 2)
}
func TestSplitPEM_Empty(t *testing.T) {
blocks, err := scanAll(t, "")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Empty(t, blocks)
}
func TestSplitPEM_WhitespaceOnly(t *testing.T) {
blocks, err := scanAll(t, " \n\t\n ")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Empty(t, blocks)
}
func TestSplitPEM_TrailingGarbage(t *testing.T) {
input := "-----BEGIN TEST-----\ndata\n-----END TEST-----\ngarbage"
blocks, err := scanAll(t, input)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrTruncatedPEMBlock)
require.Len(t, blocks, 1)
}
func TestSplitPEM_TruncatedBlock(t *testing.T) {
input := "-----BEGIN TEST-----\npartial data with no end"
_, err := scanAll(t, input)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrTruncatedPEMBlock)
}
func TestSplitPEM_NoEndNewline(t *testing.T) {
input := "-----BEGIN TEST-----\ndata\n-----END TEST-----"
blocks, err := scanAll(t, input)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, blocks, 1)
require.Equal(t, input, blocks[0])
}
func TestSplitPEM_GarbageOnly(t *testing.T) {
_, err := scanAll(t, "this is not PEM data")
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrTruncatedPEMBlock)
}
func TestUnmarshalCertificateFromPEM(t *testing.T) { func TestUnmarshalCertificateFromPEM(t *testing.T) {
goodCert := []byte(` goodCert := []byte(`
# A good cert # A good cert
@@ -44,7 +120,7 @@ bzBEr00kERQxxTzTsH8cpYEgRoipvmExvg8WP8NdAJEYJosB
assert.Equal(t, rest, invalidPem) assert.Equal(t, rest, invalidPem)
require.EqualError(t, err, "bytes did not contain a proper certificate banner") require.EqualError(t, err, "bytes did not contain a proper certificate banner")
// Fail due to ivalid PEM format, because // Fail due to invalid PEM format, because
// it's missing the requisite pre-encapsulation boundary. // it's missing the requisite pre-encapsulation boundary.
cert, rest, err = UnmarshalCertificateFromPEM(rest) cert, rest, err = UnmarshalCertificateFromPEM(rest)
assert.Nil(t, cert) assert.Nil(t, cert)
@@ -106,7 +182,7 @@ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
assert.Equal(t, rest, invalidPem) assert.Equal(t, rest, invalidPem)
require.EqualError(t, err, "bytes did not contain a proper Ed25519/ECDSA private key banner") require.EqualError(t, err, "bytes did not contain a proper Ed25519/ECDSA private key banner")
// Fail due to ivalid PEM format, because // Fail due to invalid PEM format, because
// it's missing the requisite pre-encapsulation boundary. // it's missing the requisite pre-encapsulation boundary.
k, rest, curve, err = UnmarshalSigningPrivateKeyFromPEM(rest) k, rest, curve, err = UnmarshalSigningPrivateKeyFromPEM(rest)
assert.Nil(t, k) assert.Nil(t, k)
@@ -168,7 +244,7 @@ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
assert.Equal(t, rest, invalidPem) assert.Equal(t, rest, invalidPem)
require.EqualError(t, err, "bytes did not contain a proper private key banner") require.EqualError(t, err, "bytes did not contain a proper private key banner")
// Fail due to ivalid PEM format, because // Fail due to invalid PEM format, because
// it's missing the requisite pre-encapsulation boundary. // it's missing the requisite pre-encapsulation boundary.
k, rest, curve, err = UnmarshalPrivateKeyFromPEM(rest) k, rest, curve, err = UnmarshalPrivateKeyFromPEM(rest)
assert.Nil(t, k) assert.Nil(t, k)
@@ -179,60 +255,6 @@ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
func TestUnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(t *testing.T) { func TestUnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
pubKey := []byte(`# A good key pubKey := []byte(`# A good key
-----BEGIN NEBULA ED25519 PUBLIC KEY-----
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
-----END NEBULA ED25519 PUBLIC KEY-----
`)
shortKey := []byte(`# A short key
-----BEGIN NEBULA ED25519 PUBLIC KEY-----
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==
-----END NEBULA ED25519 PUBLIC KEY-----
`)
invalidBanner := []byte(`# Invalid banner
-----BEGIN NOT A NEBULA PUBLIC KEY-----
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
-----END NOT A NEBULA PUBLIC KEY-----
`)
invalidPem := []byte(`# Not a valid PEM format
-BEGIN NEBULA ED25519 PUBLIC KEY-----
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
-END NEBULA ED25519 PUBLIC KEY-----`)
keyBundle := appendByteSlices(pubKey, shortKey, invalidBanner, invalidPem)
// Success test case
k, rest, curve, err := UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(keyBundle)
assert.Len(t, k, 32)
assert.Equal(t, Curve_CURVE25519, curve)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, rest, appendByteSlices(shortKey, invalidBanner, invalidPem))
// Fail due to short key
k, rest, curve, err = UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(rest)
assert.Nil(t, k)
assert.Equal(t, Curve_CURVE25519, curve)
assert.Equal(t, rest, appendByteSlices(invalidBanner, invalidPem))
require.EqualError(t, err, "key was not 32 bytes, is invalid CURVE25519 public key")
// Fail due to invalid banner
k, rest, curve, err = UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(rest)
assert.Nil(t, k)
assert.Equal(t, Curve_CURVE25519, curve)
require.EqualError(t, err, "bytes did not contain a proper public key banner")
assert.Equal(t, rest, invalidPem)
// Fail due to ivalid PEM format, because
// it's missing the requisite pre-encapsulation boundary.
k, rest, curve, err = UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(rest)
assert.Nil(t, k)
assert.Equal(t, Curve_CURVE25519, curve)
assert.Equal(t, rest, invalidPem)
require.EqualError(t, err, "input did not contain a valid PEM encoded block")
}
func TestUnmarshalX25519PublicKey(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
pubKey := []byte(`# A good key
-----BEGIN NEBULA X25519 PUBLIC KEY----- -----BEGIN NEBULA X25519 PUBLIC KEY-----
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA= AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
-----END NEBULA X25519 PUBLIC KEY----- -----END NEBULA X25519 PUBLIC KEY-----
@@ -243,7 +265,7 @@ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA= AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
-----END NEBULA P256 PUBLIC KEY----- -----END NEBULA P256 PUBLIC KEY-----
`) `)
oldPubP256Key := []byte(`# A good key signingKey := []byte(`# A signing key has the wrong scope for this function
-----BEGIN NEBULA ECDSA P256 PUBLIC KEY----- -----BEGIN NEBULA ECDSA P256 PUBLIC KEY-----
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA= AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
@@ -264,44 +286,118 @@ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA= AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
-END NEBULA X25519 PUBLIC KEY-----`) -END NEBULA X25519 PUBLIC KEY-----`)
keyBundle := appendByteSlices(pubKey, pubP256Key, oldPubP256Key, shortKey, invalidBanner, invalidPem) keyBundle := appendByteSlices(pubKey, pubP256Key, signingKey, shortKey, invalidBanner, invalidPem)
// Success test case // X25519 key
k, rest, curve, err := UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(keyBundle) k, rest, curve, err := UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(keyBundle)
assert.Len(t, k, 32) assert.Len(t, k, 32)
require.NoError(t, err) require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, rest, appendByteSlices(pubP256Key, oldPubP256Key, shortKey, invalidBanner, invalidPem)) assert.Equal(t, rest, appendByteSlices(pubP256Key, signingKey, shortKey, invalidBanner, invalidPem))
assert.Equal(t, Curve_CURVE25519, curve) assert.Equal(t, Curve_CURVE25519, curve)
// Success test case // P256 key
k, rest, curve, err = UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(rest) k, rest, curve, err = UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(rest)
assert.Len(t, k, 65) assert.Len(t, k, 65)
require.NoError(t, err) require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, rest, appendByteSlices(oldPubP256Key, shortKey, invalidBanner, invalidPem)) assert.Equal(t, rest, appendByteSlices(signingKey, shortKey, invalidBanner, invalidPem))
assert.Equal(t, Curve_P256, curve) assert.Equal(t, Curve_P256, curve)
// Success test case // Reject a signing public key (Ed25519/ECDSA banner)
k, rest, curve, err = UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(rest) k, rest, _, err = UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(rest)
assert.Len(t, k, 65) assert.Nil(t, k)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, rest, appendByteSlices(shortKey, invalidBanner, invalidPem)) assert.Equal(t, rest, appendByteSlices(shortKey, invalidBanner, invalidPem))
assert.Equal(t, Curve_P256, curve) require.EqualError(t, err, "bytes did not contain a proper public key banner")
// Fail due to short key // Fail due to short key
k, rest, curve, err = UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(rest) k, rest, _, err = UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(rest)
assert.Nil(t, k) assert.Nil(t, k)
assert.Equal(t, rest, appendByteSlices(invalidBanner, invalidPem)) assert.Equal(t, rest, appendByteSlices(invalidBanner, invalidPem))
require.EqualError(t, err, "key was not 32 bytes, is invalid CURVE25519 public key") require.EqualError(t, err, "key was not 32 bytes, is invalid CURVE25519 public key")
// Fail due to invalid banner // Fail due to invalid banner
k, rest, curve, err = UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(rest) k, rest, _, err = UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(rest)
assert.Nil(t, k) assert.Nil(t, k)
require.EqualError(t, err, "bytes did not contain a proper public key banner") require.EqualError(t, err, "bytes did not contain a proper public key banner")
assert.Equal(t, rest, invalidPem) assert.Equal(t, rest, invalidPem)
// Fail due to ivalid PEM format, because // Fail due to invalid PEM format, because
// it's missing the requisite pre-encapsulation boundary. // it's missing the requisite pre-encapsulation boundary.
k, rest, curve, err = UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(rest) k, rest, _, err = UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(rest)
assert.Nil(t, k)
assert.Equal(t, rest, invalidPem)
require.EqualError(t, err, "input did not contain a valid PEM encoded block")
}
func TestUnmarshalSigningPublicKeyFromPEM(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
pubKey := []byte(`# A good key
-----BEGIN NEBULA ED25519 PUBLIC KEY-----
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
-----END NEBULA ED25519 PUBLIC KEY-----
`)
pubP256Key := []byte(`# A good key
-----BEGIN NEBULA ECDSA P256 PUBLIC KEY-----
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
-----END NEBULA ECDSA P256 PUBLIC KEY-----
`)
ecdhKey := []byte(`# A key-agreement key has the wrong scope for this function
-----BEGIN NEBULA X25519 PUBLIC KEY-----
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
-----END NEBULA X25519 PUBLIC KEY-----
`)
shortKey := []byte(`# A short key
-----BEGIN NEBULA ED25519 PUBLIC KEY-----
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==
-----END NEBULA ED25519 PUBLIC KEY-----
`)
invalidBanner := []byte(`# Invalid banner
-----BEGIN NOT A NEBULA PUBLIC KEY-----
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
-----END NOT A NEBULA PUBLIC KEY-----
`)
invalidPem := []byte(`# Not a valid PEM format
-BEGIN NEBULA ED25519 PUBLIC KEY-----
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
-END NEBULA ED25519 PUBLIC KEY-----`)
keyBundle := appendByteSlices(pubKey, pubP256Key, ecdhKey, shortKey, invalidBanner, invalidPem)
// Ed25519 key
k, rest, curve, err := UnmarshalSigningPublicKeyFromPEM(keyBundle)
assert.Len(t, k, 32)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, rest, appendByteSlices(pubP256Key, ecdhKey, shortKey, invalidBanner, invalidPem))
assert.Equal(t, Curve_CURVE25519, curve)
// ECDSA P256 key
k, rest, curve, err = UnmarshalSigningPublicKeyFromPEM(rest)
assert.Len(t, k, 65)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, rest, appendByteSlices(ecdhKey, shortKey, invalidBanner, invalidPem))
assert.Equal(t, Curve_P256, curve)
// Reject a key-agreement public key (X25519/P256 banner)
k, rest, _, err = UnmarshalSigningPublicKeyFromPEM(rest)
assert.Nil(t, k)
assert.Equal(t, rest, appendByteSlices(shortKey, invalidBanner, invalidPem))
require.EqualError(t, err, "bytes did not contain a proper Ed25519/ECDSA public key banner")
// Fail due to short key
k, rest, _, err = UnmarshalSigningPublicKeyFromPEM(rest)
assert.Nil(t, k)
assert.Equal(t, rest, appendByteSlices(invalidBanner, invalidPem))
require.EqualError(t, err, "key was not 32 bytes, is invalid CURVE25519 public key")
// Fail due to invalid banner
k, rest, _, err = UnmarshalSigningPublicKeyFromPEM(rest)
assert.Nil(t, k)
require.EqualError(t, err, "bytes did not contain a proper Ed25519/ECDSA public key banner")
assert.Equal(t, rest, invalidPem)
// Fail due to invalid PEM format, because
// it's missing the requisite pre-encapsulation boundary.
k, rest, _, err = UnmarshalSigningPublicKeyFromPEM(rest)
assert.Nil(t, k) assert.Nil(t, k)
assert.Equal(t, rest, invalidPem) assert.Equal(t, rest, invalidPem)
require.EqualError(t, err, "input did not contain a valid PEM encoded block") require.EqualError(t, err, "input did not contain a valid PEM encoded block")
+282
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,282 @@
package cert
import (
"crypto/mldsa"
"crypto/mlkem"
"fmt"
"slices"
"strings"
)
// PQSuite names the post-quantum algorithms of a version 3 certificate, the way Curve names its classical ones: the
// key encapsulation mechanism of a host's key, and the signature algorithm of a CA's key and of the certificates it
// signs. A CA and every certificate it signs share a suite. Every version 3 certificate names its suite.
type PQSuite uint8
const (
// PQSuiteUnknown is never valid in a certificate.
PQSuiteUnknown PQSuite = 0
// PQSuite_MLKEM1024_MLDSA87 gives hosts ML-KEM-1024 keys and CAs ML-DSA-87 keys and signatures.
PQSuite_MLKEM1024_MLDSA87 PQSuite = 1
)
// DefaultPQSuite is the suite tools use when none is asked for.
const DefaultPQSuite = PQSuite_MLKEM1024_MLDSA87
// pqKEM is the key encapsulation mechanism of a suite, what host keys use. Private keys are seeds.
type pqKEM struct {
name string // as it appears in key banners
publicKeySize int
privateKeySize int
generate func() (pub, priv []byte, err error)
publicKey func(priv []byte) ([]byte, error)
checkPublicKey func(pub []byte) bool
}
// pqDSA is the signature algorithm of a suite, what CA keys and certificate signatures use. Private keys are seeds.
type pqDSA struct {
name string // as it appears in key banners
publicKeySize int
privateKeySize int
signatureSize int
generate func() (pub, priv []byte, err error)
publicKey func(priv []byte) ([]byte, error)
checkPublicKey func(pub []byte) bool
signer func(priv []byte) (SignerLambda, error) // must sign deterministically
verify func(pub, msg, sig []byte) bool
}
type pqSuite struct {
kem pqKEM
dsa pqDSA
}
// pqSuites holds every known suite, see registerPQSuite.
var pqSuites = map[PQSuite]*pqSuite{}
func init() {
registerPQSuite(PQSuite_MLKEM1024_MLDSA87, &pqSuite{kem: mlkem1024, dsa: mldsa87})
}
// registerPQSuite makes a suite known, along with the banners of its composite keys.
func registerPQSuite(id PQSuite, s *pqSuite) {
pqSuites[id] = s
for _, curve := range []Curve{Curve_CURVE25519, Curve_P256} {
for _, kind := range pqKeyKinds {
pqKeyBanners[pqBannerName(kind, curve, s)] = pqKeyBanner{kind: kind, curve: curve, size: pqKeySize(kind, curve, s)}
}
}
}
var mlkem1024 = pqKEM{
name: "MLKEM1024",
publicKeySize: mlkem.EncapsulationKeySize1024,
privateKeySize: mlkem.SeedSize,
generate: func() ([]byte, []byte, error) {
dk, err := mlkem.GenerateKey1024()
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
return dk.EncapsulationKey().Bytes(), dk.Bytes(), nil
},
publicKey: func(priv []byte) ([]byte, error) {
dk, err := mlkem.NewDecapsulationKey1024(priv)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return dk.EncapsulationKey().Bytes(), nil
},
checkPublicKey: func(pub []byte) bool {
return len(pub) == mlkem.EncapsulationKeySize1024 && mlkemModulusOK(pub[:len(pub)-32])
},
}
// mlkemModulusOK is the modulus check of FIPS 203 section 7.2, the one crypto/mlkem runs on an encapsulation key: t,
// the key less its trailing 32 byte seed, packs 12 bit coefficients that must all be below q. crypto/mlkem would also
// expand the seed into the ~10KB matrix of an encapsulation key, which a certificate check has no use for.
func mlkemModulusOK(t []byte) bool {
const q = 3329
for i := 0; i+3 <= len(t); i += 3 {
d1 := uint16(t[i]) | uint16(t[i+1]&0x0f)<<8
d2 := uint16(t[i+1]>>4) | uint16(t[i+2])<<4
if d1 >= q || d2 >= q {
return false
}
}
return true
}
var mldsa87 = pqDSA{
name: "MLDSA87",
publicKeySize: mldsa.MLDSA87PublicKeySize,
privateKeySize: mldsa.PrivateKeySize,
signatureSize: mldsa.MLDSA87SignatureSize,
generate: func() ([]byte, []byte, error) {
sk, err := mldsa.GenerateKey(mldsa.MLDSA87())
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
return sk.PublicKey().Bytes(), sk.Bytes(), nil
},
publicKey: func(priv []byte) ([]byte, error) {
sk, err := mldsa.NewPrivateKey(mldsa.MLDSA87(), priv)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return sk.PublicKey().Bytes(), nil
},
checkPublicKey: func(pub []byte) bool {
_, err := mldsa.NewPublicKey(mldsa.MLDSA87(), pub)
return err == nil
},
// Deterministic signing (FIPS 204 section 3.4): the hedged variant guards signers an attacker can fault
// physically, which a CA key in a file is not, and the Ed25519 signature beside it is deterministic too.
signer: func(priv []byte) (SignerLambda, error) {
sk, err := mldsa.NewPrivateKey(mldsa.MLDSA87(), priv)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return func(b []byte) ([]byte, error) {
return sk.SignDeterministic(b, &mldsa.Options{Context: pqSignatureContext})
}, nil
},
verify: func(pub, msg, sig []byte) bool {
pk, err := mldsa.NewPublicKey(mldsa.MLDSA87(), pub)
if err != nil {
return false
}
return mldsa.Verify(pk, msg, sig, &mldsa.Options{Context: pqSignatureContext}) == nil
},
}
// PQSuites returns every known suite.
func PQSuites() []PQSuite {
s := make([]PQSuite, 0, len(pqSuites))
for k := range pqSuites {
s = append(s, k)
}
slices.Sort(s)
return s
}
// ParsePQSuite returns the suite named by s, as String names it, ignoring case.
func ParsePQSuite(s string) (PQSuite, error) {
for _, k := range PQSuites() {
if strings.EqualFold(s, k.String()) {
return k, nil
}
}
return PQSuiteUnknown, fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", ErrUnknownPQSuite, s)
}
// PQSuiteOf returns the suite of a version 3 certificate, or PQSuiteUnknown for any other version.
func PQSuiteOf(c Certificate) PQSuite {
if c3, ok := c.(*certificateV3); ok {
return c3.pqSuite
}
return PQSuiteUnknown
}
func (s PQSuite) String() string {
if p := pqSuites[s]; p != nil {
return p.kem.name + "_" + p.dsa.name
}
return fmt.Sprintf("PQSuite(%d)", uint8(s))
}
// Valid reports whether s is a known suite.
func (s PQSuite) Valid() bool {
return pqSuites[s] != nil
}
// PublicKeySize returns the size of the post-quantum half of a composite public key, a CA's or a host's.
func (s PQSuite) PublicKeySize(isCA bool) int {
p := pqSuites[s]
switch {
case p == nil:
return 0
case isCA:
return p.dsa.publicKeySize
default:
return p.kem.publicKeySize
}
}
// PrivateKeySize returns the size of the post-quantum half of a composite private key, a CA's or a host's.
func (s PQSuite) PrivateKeySize(isCA bool) int {
p := pqSuites[s]
switch {
case p == nil:
return 0
case isCA:
return p.dsa.privateKeySize
default:
return p.kem.privateKeySize
}
}
// GenerateKey makes a post-quantum keypair, a CA's signing key or a host's KEM key, to append to a classical one.
func (s PQSuite) GenerateKey(isCA bool) (pub, priv []byte, err error) {
p := pqSuites[s]
switch {
case p == nil:
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrUnknownPQSuite, s)
case isCA:
return p.dsa.generate()
default:
return p.kem.generate()
}
}
// publicKey derives the post-quantum public key from the post-quantum half of a private key.
func (s PQSuite) publicKey(isCA bool, priv []byte) ([]byte, error) {
p := pqSuites[s]
switch {
case p == nil:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrUnknownPQSuite, s)
case isCA:
return p.dsa.publicKey(priv)
default:
return p.kem.publicKey(priv)
}
}
// checkPublicKey reports whether pub is a well formed post-quantum public key, a CA's or a host's.
func (s PQSuite) checkPublicKey(isCA bool, pub []byte) bool {
p := pqSuites[s]
switch {
case p == nil, len(pub) != s.PublicKeySize(isCA):
return false
case isCA:
return p.dsa.checkPublicKey(pub)
default:
return p.kem.checkPublicKey(pub)
}
}
// signatureSize returns the size of the post-quantum signature of a certificate in this suite.
func (s PQSuite) signatureSize() int {
if p := pqSuites[s]; p != nil {
return p.dsa.signatureSize
}
return 0
}
// SplitPublicKey splits a composite public key into its classical and post-quantum halves.
func (s PQSuite) SplitPublicKey(isCA bool, key []byte) (classical, pq []byte, err error) {
n := s.PublicKeySize(isCA)
if n == 0 || len(key) <= n {
return nil, nil, ErrInvalidPublicKey
}
return key[:len(key)-n], key[len(key)-n:], nil
}
// SplitPrivateKey splits a composite private key into its classical and post-quantum halves.
func (s PQSuite) SplitPrivateKey(isCA bool, key []byte) (classical, pq []byte, err error) {
n := s.PrivateKeySize(isCA)
if n == 0 || len(key) <= n {
return nil, nil, ErrInvalidPrivateKey
}
return key[:len(key)-n], key[len(key)-n:], nil
}
+211
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
package cert
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/mlkem"
"crypto/rand"
"net/netip"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// testPQSuite stands in for a second suite. It reuses ML-KEM-1024 and ML-DSA-87 under other names, so it is
// interchangeable with the default suite in everything but its identity, which is what has to keep them apart.
const testPQSuite PQSuite = 200
func registerTestPQSuite(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
kem, dsa := mlkem1024, mldsa87
kem.name, dsa.name = "TESTKEM", "TESTDSA"
registerPQSuite(testPQSuite, &pqSuite{kem: kem, dsa: dsa})
t.Cleanup(func() {
delete(pqSuites, testPQSuite)
for k := range pqKeyBanners {
if strings.Contains(k, "TESTKEM") || strings.Contains(k, "TESTDSA") {
delete(pqKeyBanners, k)
}
}
})
}
// newTestV3InSuite issues a v3 CA and host certificate in suite.
func newTestV3InSuite(t *testing.T, curve Curve, suite PQSuite) (ca Certificate, caKey []byte, host Certificate, hostKey []byte) {
t.Helper()
ca2, _, caKey2, _ := NewTestCaCert(Version2, curve, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil)
pqPub, pqPriv, err := suite.GenerateKey(true)
require.NoError(t, err)
signPQ, err := SignPQ(suite, pqPriv)
require.NoError(t, err)
ca, err = ExtendToV3(ca2, suite, pqPub, nil, signPQ)
require.NoError(t, err)
caKey = append(caKey2, pqPriv...)
var pub, priv []byte
if curve == Curve_P256 {
pub, priv = P256Keypair()
} else {
pub, priv = X25519Keypair()
}
hostPQPub, hostPQPriv, err := suite.GenerateKey(false)
require.NoError(t, err)
tbs := &TBSCertificate{
Version: Version3,
Curve: curve,
PQSuite: suite,
Name: "host",
Networks: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.1.0.1/16")},
NotBefore: ca.NotBefore(),
NotAfter: ca.NotAfter(),
PublicKey: append(pub, hostPQPub...),
}
host, err = tbs.Sign(ca, curve, caKey)
require.NoError(t, err)
return ca, caKey, host, append(priv, hostPQPriv...)
}
func TestPQSuite_Names(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, "MLKEM1024_MLDSA87", PQSuite_MLKEM1024_MLDSA87.String())
assert.Equal(t, []PQSuite{PQSuite_MLKEM1024_MLDSA87}, PQSuites())
assert.False(t, PQSuiteUnknown.Valid())
s, err := ParsePQSuite("mlkem1024_mldsa87")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, PQSuite_MLKEM1024_MLDSA87, s)
_, err = ParsePQSuite("mlkem768_mldsa65")
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrUnknownPQSuite)
_, _, host, _ := newTestV3(t, Curve_CURVE25519)
assert.Equal(t, DefaultPQSuite, PQSuiteOf(host))
assert.Equal(t, PQSuiteUnknown, PQSuiteOf(V2Form(host)))
}
// A second suite works end to end, and is never confused with the first, even with keys of the same sizes.
func TestPQSuite_Second(t *testing.T) {
registerTestPQSuite(t)
for _, curve := range testCurves {
t.Run(curve.String(), func(t *testing.T) {
ca, caKey, host, hostKey := newTestV3InSuite(t, curve, testPQSuite)
assert.Equal(t, testPQSuite, PQSuiteOf(ca))
assert.Equal(t, testPQSuite, PQSuiteOf(host))
require.NoError(t, ca.VerifyPrivateKey(curve, caKey))
require.NoError(t, host.VerifyPrivateKey(curve, hostKey))
pool := NewCAPool()
require.NoError(t, pool.AddCA(ca))
_, err := pool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), host)
require.NoError(t, err)
// The suite travels in the certificate, handshakes included.
hs, err := host.MarshalForHandshakes()
require.NoError(t, err)
c, err := Recombine(Version3, hs, host.PublicKey(), curve)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, testPQSuite, PQSuiteOf(c))
assertCertsEqual(t, host, c)
// Keys get their algorithms' banners.
b := MarshalPQPrivateKeyToPEM(curve, testPQSuite, hostKey)
assert.Contains(t, string(b), " TESTKEM PRIVATE KEY-----")
key, _, _, err := UnmarshalPrivateKeyFromPEM(b)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, hostKey, key)
assert.Contains(t, string(host.MarshalPublicKeyPEM()), " TESTKEM PUBLIC KEY-----")
assert.Contains(t, string(ca.MarshalPublicKeyPEM()), " TESTDSA PUBLIC KEY-----")
// The suite is signed: relabelling a certificate breaks it, though the keys fit either suite.
_, _, other, _ := newTestV3(t, curve)
relabelled := other.Copy().(*certificateV3)
relabelled.pqSuite = testPQSuite
assert.False(t, relabelled.CheckSignature(ca.PublicKey()))
})
}
}
// A CA and the certificates it signs share a suite, like they share a curve.
func TestPQSuite_Mismatch(t *testing.T) {
registerTestPQSuite(t)
for _, curve := range testCurves {
t.Run(curve.String(), func(t *testing.T) {
ca, caKey, host, _ := newTestV3(t, curve)
// Signing refuses a certificate in another suite than its CA.
tbs := &TBSCertificate{
Version: Version3, Curve: curve, PQSuite: testPQSuite, Name: "x",
Networks: host.Networks(), NotBefore: host.NotBefore(), NotAfter: host.NotAfter(), PublicKey: host.PublicKey(),
}
_, err := tbs.Sign(ca, curve, caKey)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrPQSuiteMismatch)
// Extending refuses it too.
v2CA := V2Form(ca)
v2Host := V2Form(host)
_, pqHost, err := DefaultPQSuite.SplitPublicKey(false, host.PublicKey())
require.NoError(t, err)
signPQ, err := SignPQ(DefaultPQSuite, caKey[len(caKey)-DefaultPQSuite.PrivateKeySize(true):])
require.NoError(t, err)
_, err = ExtendToV3(v2Host, testPQSuite, pqHost, ca, signPQ)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrPQSuiteMismatch)
// The pool rejects a certificate whose CA, found by issuer, is in another suite: here the same v2 CA
// extended once per suite, with only the default suite's extension trusted.
pqPub, pqPriv, err := testPQSuite.GenerateKey(true)
require.NoError(t, err)
signOther, err := SignPQ(testPQSuite, pqPriv)
require.NoError(t, err)
otherCA, err := ExtendToV3(v2CA, testPQSuite, pqPub, nil, signOther)
require.NoError(t, err)
otherHost, err := ExtendToV3(v2Host, testPQSuite, pqHost, otherCA, signOther)
require.NoError(t, err)
pool := NewCAPool()
require.NoError(t, pool.AddCA(ca))
_, err = pool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), otherHost)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrPQSuiteMismatch)
})
}
}
func TestMLKEMModulusOK(t *testing.T) {
stdlib := func(pub []byte) bool {
_, err := mlkem.NewEncapsulationKey1024(pub)
return err == nil
}
setCoeff := func(pub []byte, i int, v uint16) {
b := pub[i/2*3:]
if i%2 == 0 {
b[0] = byte(v)
b[1] = b[1]&0xf0 | byte(v>>8)
} else {
b[1] = b[1]&0x0f | byte(v<<4)
b[2] = byte(v >> 4)
}
}
for range 8 {
dk, err := mlkem.GenerateKey1024()
require.NoError(t, err)
pub := dk.EncapsulationKey().Bytes()
require.True(t, mlkem1024.checkPublicKey(pub))
for _, i := range []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 511, 512, 1022, 1023} {
for _, v := range []uint16{0, 3328, 3329, 4095} {
p := bytes.Clone(pub)
setCoeff(p, i, v)
assert.Equal(t, stdlib(p), mlkem1024.checkPublicKey(p), "coefficient %d = %d", i, v)
assert.Equal(t, v < 3329, mlkem1024.checkPublicKey(p), "coefficient %d = %d", i, v)
}
}
}
pub := make([]byte, mlkem.EncapsulationKeySize1024)
for range 64 {
_, _ = rand.Read(pub)
assert.Equal(t, stdlib(pub), mlkem1024.checkPublicKey(pub))
}
assert.False(t, mlkem1024.checkPublicKey(pub[:len(pub)-1]))
}
+84 -8
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ import (
"fmt" "fmt"
"net/netip" "net/netip"
"time" "time"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert/p256"
) )
// TBSCertificate represents a certificate intended to be signed. // TBSCertificate represents a certificate intended to be signed.
@@ -24,6 +26,7 @@ type TBSCertificate struct {
NotAfter time.Time NotAfter time.Time
PublicKey []byte PublicKey []byte
Curve Curve Curve Curve
PQSuite PQSuite // version 3 only, the suite of the certificate and of its signing CA
issuer string issuer string
} }
@@ -45,31 +48,95 @@ type SignerLambda func(certBytes []byte) ([]byte, error)
// details do not violate constraints of the signing certificate. // details do not violate constraints of the signing certificate.
// If the TBSCertificate is a CA then signer must be nil. // If the TBSCertificate is a CA then signer must be nil.
func (t *TBSCertificate) Sign(signer Certificate, curve Curve, key []byte) (Certificate, error) { func (t *TBSCertificate) Sign(signer Certificate, curve Curve, key []byte) (Certificate, error) {
switch t.Curve { if t.Version == Version3 {
// The signing key is a composite CA key, classical || the seed of the suite's signature algorithm.
classicalKey, pqKey, err := t.PQSuite.SplitPrivateKey(true, key)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
classical, err := classicalSigner(t.Curve, classicalKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
pq, err := SignPQ(t.PQSuite, pqKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return t.SignHybridWith(signer, curve, classical, pq)
}
sp, err := classicalSigner(t.Curve, key)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return t.SignWith(signer, curve, sp)
}
// classicalSigner returns a SignerLambda for a classical signing private key.
func classicalSigner(curve Curve, key []byte) (SignerLambda, error) {
switch curve {
case Curve_CURVE25519: case Curve_CURVE25519:
if len(key) != ed25519.PrivateKeySize {
return nil, ErrInvalidPrivateKey
}
pk := ed25519.PrivateKey(key) pk := ed25519.PrivateKey(key)
sp := func(certBytes []byte) ([]byte, error) { return func(certBytes []byte) ([]byte, error) {
sig := ed25519.Sign(pk, certBytes) sig := ed25519.Sign(pk, certBytes)
return sig, nil return sig, nil
} }, nil
return t.SignWith(signer, curve, sp)
case Curve_P256: case Curve_P256:
pk, err := ecdsa.ParseRawPrivateKey(elliptic.P256(), key) pk, err := ecdsa.ParseRawPrivateKey(elliptic.P256(), key)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return nil, err return nil, err
} }
sp := func(certBytes []byte) ([]byte, error) { return func(certBytes []byte) ([]byte, error) {
// We need to hash first for ECDSA // We need to hash first for ECDSA
// - https://pkg.go.dev/crypto/ecdsa#SignASN1 // - https://pkg.go.dev/crypto/ecdsa#SignASN1
hashed := sha256.Sum256(certBytes) hashed := sha256.Sum256(certBytes)
return ecdsa.SignASN1(rand.Reader, pk, hashed[:]) return ecdsa.SignASN1(rand.Reader, pk, hashed[:])
} }, nil
return t.SignWith(signer, curve, sp)
default: default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid curve: %s", t.Curve) return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid curve: %s", curve)
} }
} }
// SignHybridWith signs a version 3 certificate, using sp for the classical signature and pqSp for the post-quantum
// signature of t.PQSuite. t.PublicKey is the composite public key. signer must be a version 3 CA in the same suite,
// or nil for a self signed CA. The v2 form is signed exactly as SignWith would sign it, and so is the v2 form of
// signer.
func (t *TBSCertificate) SignHybridWith(signer Certificate, curve Curve, sp, pqSp SignerLambda) (Certificate, error) {
if t.Version != Version3 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("SignHybridWith only signs version 3 certificates")
}
if !t.PQSuite.Valid() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrUnknownPQSuite, t.PQSuite)
}
classical, pq, err := t.PQSuite.SplitPublicKey(t.IsCA, t.PublicKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var signerV2 Certificate
if signer != nil {
if signer.Version() != Version3 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("a version 3 certificate must be signed by a version 3 CA")
}
if PQSuiteOf(signer) != t.PQSuite {
return nil, ErrPQSuiteMismatch
}
signerV2 = V2Form(signer)
}
t2 := *t
t2.Version = Version2
t2.PublicKey = classical
c2, err := t2.SignWith(signerV2, curve, sp)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return ExtendToV3(c2, t.PQSuite, pq, signer, pqSp)
}
// SignWith does the same thing as sign, but uses the function in `sp` to calculate the signature. // SignWith does the same thing as sign, but uses the function in `sp` to calculate the signature.
// You should only use SignWith if you do not have direct access to your private key. // You should only use SignWith if you do not have direct access to your private key.
func (t *TBSCertificate) SignWith(signer Certificate, curve Curve, sp SignerLambda) (Certificate, error) { func (t *TBSCertificate) SignWith(signer Certificate, curve Curve, sp SignerLambda) (Certificate, error) {
@@ -112,6 +179,8 @@ func (t *TBSCertificate) SignWith(signer Certificate, curve Curve, sp SignerLamb
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return nil, err return nil, err
} }
case Version3:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("version 3 certificates carry two signatures, use SignHybridWith")
default: default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unknown cert version %d", t.Version) return nil, fmt.Errorf("unknown cert version %d", t.Version)
} }
@@ -126,6 +195,13 @@ func (t *TBSCertificate) SignWith(signer Certificate, curve Curve, sp SignerLamb
return nil, err return nil, err
} }
if curve == Curve_P256 {
sig, err = p256.Normalize(sig)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
err = c.setSignature(sig) err = c.setSignature(sig)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return nil, err return nil, err
+46
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
"testing" "testing"
"time" "time"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert/p256"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require" "github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
) )
@@ -89,3 +90,48 @@ func TestCertificateV1_SignP256(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t, err) require.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotNil(t, uc) assert.NotNil(t, uc)
} }
func TestCertificate_SignP256_AlwaysNormalized(t *testing.T) {
before := time.Now().Add(time.Second * -60).Round(time.Second)
after := time.Now().Add(time.Second * 60).Round(time.Second)
pubKey := []byte("01234567890abcedfghij1234567890ab1234567890abcedfghij1234567890ab")
tbs := TBSCertificate{
Version: Version1,
Name: "testing",
Networks: []netip.Prefix{
mustParsePrefixUnmapped("10.1.1.1/24"),
mustParsePrefixUnmapped("10.1.1.2/16"),
},
UnsafeNetworks: []netip.Prefix{
mustParsePrefixUnmapped("9.1.1.2/24"),
mustParsePrefixUnmapped("9.1.1.3/16"),
},
Groups: []string{"test-group1", "test-group2", "test-group3"},
NotBefore: before,
NotAfter: after,
PublicKey: pubKey,
IsCA: true,
Curve: Curve_P256,
}
priv, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
require.NoError(t, err)
pub := elliptic.Marshal(elliptic.P256(), priv.PublicKey.X, priv.PublicKey.Y)
rawPriv := priv.D.FillBytes(make([]byte, 32))
for i := range 1000 {
if i&1 == 1 {
tbs.Version = Version1
} else {
tbs.Version = Version2
}
c, err := tbs.Sign(nil, Curve_P256, rawPriv)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotNil(t, c)
assert.True(t, c.CheckSignature(pub))
normie, err := p256.IsNormalized(c.Signature())
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, normie)
}
}
+96 -4
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,12 @@ import (
"golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519" "golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519"
) )
// testCertNow is the reference "now" used to derive default before/after times
// in NewTestCaCert and NewTestCert. Holding it fixed for the lifetime of the
// test binary keeps CA and leaf defaults aligned at the same second, so a leaf
// signed with default times can never expire after its CA on a rounding race.
var testCertNow = time.Now().Round(time.Second)
// NewTestCaCert will create a new ca certificate // NewTestCaCert will create a new ca certificate
func NewTestCaCert(version cert.Version, curve cert.Curve, before, after time.Time, networks, unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix, groups []string) (cert.Certificate, []byte, []byte, []byte) { func NewTestCaCert(version cert.Version, curve cert.Curve, before, after time.Time, networks, unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix, groups []string) (cert.Certificate, []byte, []byte, []byte) {
var err error var err error
@@ -34,11 +40,15 @@ func NewTestCaCert(version cert.Version, curve cert.Curve, before, after time.Ti
// There is no default to allow the underlying lib to respond with an error // There is no default to allow the underlying lib to respond with an error
} }
if version == cert.Version3 {
pub, priv = appendPQSigningKey(pub, priv)
}
if before.IsZero() { if before.IsZero() {
before = time.Now().Add(time.Second * -60).Round(time.Second) before = testCertNow.Add(time.Second * -60)
} }
if after.IsZero() { if after.IsZero() {
after = time.Now().Add(time.Second * 60).Round(time.Second) after = testCertNow.Add(time.Second * 60)
} }
t := &cert.TBSCertificate{ t := &cert.TBSCertificate{
@@ -53,6 +63,9 @@ func NewTestCaCert(version cert.Version, curve cert.Curve, before, after time.Ti
Groups: groups, Groups: groups,
IsCA: true, IsCA: true,
} }
if version == cert.Version3 {
t.PQSuite = cert.DefaultPQSuite
}
c, err := t.Sign(nil, curve, priv) c, err := t.Sign(nil, curve, priv)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
@@ -71,11 +84,11 @@ func NewTestCaCert(version cert.Version, curve cert.Curve, before, after time.Ti
// Expiry times are defaulted if you do not pass them in // Expiry times are defaulted if you do not pass them in
func NewTestCert(v cert.Version, curve cert.Curve, ca cert.Certificate, key []byte, name string, before, after time.Time, networks, unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix, groups []string) (cert.Certificate, []byte, []byte, []byte) { func NewTestCert(v cert.Version, curve cert.Curve, ca cert.Certificate, key []byte, name string, before, after time.Time, networks, unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix, groups []string) (cert.Certificate, []byte, []byte, []byte) {
if before.IsZero() { if before.IsZero() {
before = time.Now().Add(time.Second * -60).Round(time.Second) before = testCertNow.Add(time.Second * -60)
} }
if after.IsZero() { if after.IsZero() {
after = time.Now().Add(time.Second * 60).Round(time.Second) after = testCertNow.Add(time.Second * 60)
} }
var pub, priv []byte var pub, priv []byte
@@ -88,6 +101,10 @@ func NewTestCert(v cert.Version, curve cert.Curve, ca cert.Certificate, key []by
panic("unknown curve") panic("unknown curve")
} }
if v == cert.Version3 {
pub, priv = appendPQKey(ca, pub, priv)
}
nc := &cert.TBSCertificate{ nc := &cert.TBSCertificate{
Version: v, Version: v,
Curve: curve, Curve: curve,
@@ -99,6 +116,7 @@ func NewTestCert(v cert.Version, curve cert.Curve, ca cert.Certificate, key []by
NotAfter: time.Unix(after.Unix(), 0), NotAfter: time.Unix(after.Unix(), 0),
PublicKey: pub, PublicKey: pub,
IsCA: false, IsCA: false,
PQSuite: cert.PQSuiteOf(ca),
} }
c, err := nc.Sign(ca, ca.Curve(), key) c, err := nc.Sign(ca, ca.Curve(), key)
@@ -111,6 +129,9 @@ func NewTestCert(v cert.Version, curve cert.Curve, ca cert.Certificate, key []by
panic(err) panic(err)
} }
if v == cert.Version3 {
return c, pub, cert.MarshalPQPrivateKeyToPEM(curve, cert.PQSuiteOf(ca), priv), pem
}
return c, pub, cert.MarshalPrivateKeyToPEM(curve, priv), pem return c, pub, cert.MarshalPrivateKeyToPEM(curve, priv), pem
} }
@@ -126,6 +147,7 @@ func NewTestCertDifferentVersion(c cert.Certificate, v cert.Version, ca cert.Cer
NotAfter: time.Unix(c.NotAfter().Unix(), 0), NotAfter: time.Unix(c.NotAfter().Unix(), 0),
PublicKey: c.PublicKey(), PublicKey: c.PublicKey(),
IsCA: false, IsCA: false,
PQSuite: cert.PQSuiteOf(ca),
} }
c, err := nc.Sign(ca, ca.Curve(), key) c, err := nc.Sign(ca, ca.Curve(), key)
@@ -141,6 +163,24 @@ func NewTestCertDifferentVersion(c cert.Certificate, v cert.Version, ca cert.Cer
return c, pem return c, pem
} }
// appendPQSigningKey makes a classical CA keypair into a version 3 composite one with a fresh key of the default suite.
func appendPQSigningKey(pub, priv []byte) ([]byte, []byte) {
pqPub, pqPriv, err := cert.DefaultPQSuite.GenerateKey(true)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
return append(pub, pqPub...), append(priv, pqPriv...)
}
// appendPQKey makes a classical host keypair into a version 3 composite one with a fresh key of the CA's suite.
func appendPQKey(ca cert.Certificate, pub, priv []byte) ([]byte, []byte) {
pqPub, pqPriv, err := cert.PQSuiteOf(ca).GenerateKey(false)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
return append(pub, pqPub...), append(priv, pqPriv...)
}
func X25519Keypair() ([]byte, []byte) { func X25519Keypair() ([]byte, []byte) {
privkey := make([]byte, 32) privkey := make([]byte, 32)
if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, privkey); err != nil { if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, privkey); err != nil {
@@ -163,3 +203,55 @@ func P256Keypair() ([]byte, []byte) {
pubkey := privkey.PublicKey() pubkey := privkey.PublicKey()
return pubkey.Bytes(), privkey.Bytes() return pubkey.Bytes(), privkey.Bytes()
} }
// DummyCert is a minimal cert.Certificate implementation for testing error paths.
type DummyCert struct {
Version_ cert.Version
Curve_ cert.Curve
Groups_ []string
IsCA_ bool
Issuer_ string
Name_ string
Networks_ []netip.Prefix
NotAfter_ time.Time
NotBefore_ time.Time
PublicKey_ []byte
Signature_ []byte
UnsafeNetworks_ []netip.Prefix
}
func (d *DummyCert) Version() cert.Version { return d.Version_ }
func (d *DummyCert) Curve() cert.Curve { return d.Curve_ }
func (d *DummyCert) Groups() []string { return d.Groups_ }
func (d *DummyCert) IsCA() bool { return d.IsCA_ }
func (d *DummyCert) Issuer() string { return d.Issuer_ }
func (d *DummyCert) Name() string { return d.Name_ }
func (d *DummyCert) Networks() []netip.Prefix { return d.Networks_ }
func (d *DummyCert) NotAfter() time.Time { return d.NotAfter_ }
func (d *DummyCert) NotBefore() time.Time { return d.NotBefore_ }
func (d *DummyCert) PublicKey() []byte { return d.PublicKey_ }
func (d *DummyCert) Signature() []byte { return d.Signature_ }
func (d *DummyCert) UnsafeNetworks() []netip.Prefix { return d.UnsafeNetworks_ }
func (d *DummyCert) Fingerprint() (string, error) { return "", nil }
func (d *DummyCert) CheckSignature(key []byte) bool { return false }
func (d *DummyCert) MarshalForHandshakes() ([]byte, error) { return nil, nil }
func (d *DummyCert) MarshalPEM() ([]byte, error) { return nil, nil }
func (d *DummyCert) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) { return nil, nil }
func (d *DummyCert) Marshal() ([]byte, error) { return nil, nil }
func (d *DummyCert) String() string { return "dummy" }
func (d *DummyCert) Copy() cert.Certificate { return d }
func (d *DummyCert) VerifyPrivateKey(c cert.Curve, k []byte) error { return nil }
func (d *DummyCert) Expired(time.Time) bool { return false }
func (d *DummyCert) MarshalPublicKeyPEM() []byte { return nil }
func (d *DummyCert) PublicKeyPEM() []byte { return nil }
// NewTestCAPool creates a CAPool from the given CA certificates, panicking on error.
func NewTestCAPool(cas ...cert.Certificate) *cert.CAPool {
pool := cert.NewCAPool()
for _, ca := range cas {
if err := pool.AddCA(ca); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
}
return pool
}
+98 -22
View File
@@ -3,11 +3,14 @@ package main
import ( import (
"crypto/ecdsa" "crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic" "crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/fips140"
"crypto/rand" "crypto/rand"
"errors"
"flag" "flag"
"fmt" "fmt"
"io" "io"
"math" "math"
"math/bits"
"net/netip" "net/netip"
"os" "os"
"strings" "strings"
@@ -34,6 +37,7 @@ type caFlags struct {
argonParallelism *uint argonParallelism *uint
encryption *bool encryption *bool
version *uint version *uint
pqSuite *string
curve *string curve *string
p11url *string p11url *string
@@ -43,11 +47,33 @@ type caFlags struct {
subnets *string subnets *string
} }
func defaultCurve() string {
if fips140.Enforced() {
return "P256"
}
return "25519"
}
func newCaFlags() *caFlags { func newCaFlags() *caFlags {
// prevent running out of memory on 32-bit systems by defaulting to
// RFC9106's recommendation for memory-constrained environments
var (
defaultArgonMemory uint
defaultArgonIterations uint
)
if bits.UintSize == 32 {
defaultArgonMemory = 64 * 1024
defaultArgonIterations = 3
} else {
defaultArgonMemory = 2 * 1024 * 1024
defaultArgonIterations = 1
}
cf := caFlags{set: flag.NewFlagSet("ca", flag.ContinueOnError)} cf := caFlags{set: flag.NewFlagSet("ca", flag.ContinueOnError)}
cf.set.Usage = func() {} cf.set.Usage = func() {}
cf.name = cf.set.String("name", "", "Required: name of the certificate authority") cf.name = cf.set.String("name", "", "Required: name of the certificate authority")
cf.version = cf.set.Uint("version", uint(cert.Version2), "Optional: version of the certificate format to use") cf.version = cf.set.Uint("version", uint(cert.Version2), "Optional: version of the certificate format to use. Version 3 adds a post-quantum key, for post-quantum certificates")
cf.pqSuite = pqSuiteFlag(cf.set, "Optional: post-quantum suite of a version 3 CA, which the certificates it signs share")
cf.duration = cf.set.Duration("duration", time.Duration(time.Hour*8760), "Optional: amount of time the certificate should be valid for. Valid time units are seconds: \"s\", minutes: \"m\", hours: \"h\"") cf.duration = cf.set.Duration("duration", time.Duration(time.Hour*8760), "Optional: amount of time the certificate should be valid for. Valid time units are seconds: \"s\", minutes: \"m\", hours: \"h\"")
cf.outKeyPath = cf.set.String("out-key", "ca.key", "Optional: path to write the private key to") cf.outKeyPath = cf.set.String("out-key", "ca.key", "Optional: path to write the private key to")
cf.outCertPath = cf.set.String("out-crt", "ca.crt", "Optional: path to write the certificate to") cf.outCertPath = cf.set.String("out-crt", "ca.crt", "Optional: path to write the certificate to")
@@ -55,11 +81,11 @@ func newCaFlags() *caFlags {
cf.groups = cf.set.String("groups", "", "Optional: comma separated list of groups. This will limit which groups subordinate certs can use") cf.groups = cf.set.String("groups", "", "Optional: comma separated list of groups. This will limit which groups subordinate certs can use")
cf.networks = cf.set.String("networks", "", "Optional: comma separated list of ip address and network in CIDR notation. This will limit which ip addresses and networks subordinate certs can use in networks") cf.networks = cf.set.String("networks", "", "Optional: comma separated list of ip address and network in CIDR notation. This will limit which ip addresses and networks subordinate certs can use in networks")
cf.unsafeNetworks = cf.set.String("unsafe-networks", "", "Optional: comma separated list of ip address and network in CIDR notation. This will limit which ip addresses and networks subordinate certs can use in unsafe networks") cf.unsafeNetworks = cf.set.String("unsafe-networks", "", "Optional: comma separated list of ip address and network in CIDR notation. This will limit which ip addresses and networks subordinate certs can use in unsafe networks")
cf.argonMemory = cf.set.Uint("argon-memory", 2*1024*1024, "Optional: Argon2 memory parameter (in KiB) used for encrypted private key passphrase") cf.argonMemory = cf.set.Uint("argon-memory", defaultArgonMemory, "Optional: Argon2 memory parameter (in KiB) used for encrypted private key passphrase")
cf.argonParallelism = cf.set.Uint("argon-parallelism", 4, "Optional: Argon2 parallelism parameter used for encrypted private key passphrase") cf.argonParallelism = cf.set.Uint("argon-parallelism", 4, "Optional: Argon2 parallelism parameter used for encrypted private key passphrase")
cf.argonIterations = cf.set.Uint("argon-iterations", 1, "Optional: Argon2 iterations parameter used for encrypted private key passphrase") cf.argonIterations = cf.set.Uint("argon-iterations", defaultArgonIterations, "Optional: Argon2 iterations parameter used for encrypted private key passphrase")
cf.encryption = cf.set.Bool("encrypt", false, "Optional: prompt for passphrase and write out-key in an encrypted format") cf.encryption = cf.set.Bool("encrypt", false, "Optional: prompt for passphrase and write out-key in an encrypted format")
cf.curve = cf.set.String("curve", "25519", "EdDSA/ECDSA Curve (25519, P256)") cf.curve = cf.set.String("curve", defaultCurve(), "EdDSA/ECDSA Curve (25519, P256)")
cf.p11url = p11Flag(cf.set) cf.p11url = p11Flag(cf.set)
cf.ips = cf.set.String("ips", "", "Deprecated, see -networks") cf.ips = cf.set.String("ips", "", "Deprecated, see -networks")
@@ -97,6 +123,19 @@ func ca(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader) error
if err = mustFlagString("out-key", cf.outKeyPath); err != nil { if err = mustFlagString("out-key", cf.outKeyPath); err != nil {
return err return err
} }
} else {
// out-key is meaningless under PKCS#11 because the private key never
// leaves the HSM; reject it so we never silently accept or claim a
// stdout slot for it.
outKeySet := false
cf.set.Visit(func(f *flag.Flag) {
if f.Name == "out-key" {
outKeySet = true
}
})
if outKeySet {
return newHelpErrorf("cannot set -out-key with -pkcs11")
}
} }
if err := mustFlagString("out-crt", cf.outCertPath); err != nil { if err := mustFlagString("out-crt", cf.outCertPath); err != nil {
return err return err
@@ -114,7 +153,7 @@ func ca(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader) error
var groups []string var groups []string
if *cf.groups != "" { if *cf.groups != "" {
for _, rg := range strings.Split(*cf.groups, ",") { for rg := range strings.SplitSeq(*cf.groups, ",") {
g := strings.TrimSpace(rg) g := strings.TrimSpace(rg)
if g != "" { if g != "" {
groups = append(groups, g) groups = append(groups, g)
@@ -123,8 +162,15 @@ func ca(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader) error
} }
version := cert.Version(*cf.version) version := cert.Version(*cf.version)
if version != cert.Version1 && version != cert.Version2 { if version != cert.Version1 && version != cert.Version2 && version != cert.Version3 {
return newHelpErrorf("-version must be either %v or %v", cert.Version1, cert.Version2) return newHelpErrorf("-version must be %v, %v or %v", cert.Version1, cert.Version2, cert.Version3)
}
if version == cert.Version3 && isP11 {
return newHelpErrorf("-version 3 can not be used with -pkcs11, the post-quantum key has to be in out-key")
}
suite, err := parsePQSuiteFlag(cf.set, *cf.pqSuite, version == cert.Version3, "is only for -version 3")
if err != nil {
return err
} }
var networks []netip.Prefix var networks []netip.Prefix
@@ -134,7 +180,7 @@ func ca(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader) error
} }
if *cf.networks != "" { if *cf.networks != "" {
for _, rs := range strings.Split(*cf.networks, ",") { for rs := range strings.SplitSeq(*cf.networks, ",") {
rs := strings.Trim(rs, " ") rs := strings.Trim(rs, " ")
if rs != "" { if rs != "" {
n, err := netip.ParsePrefix(rs) n, err := netip.ParsePrefix(rs)
@@ -156,7 +202,7 @@ func ca(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader) error
} }
if *cf.unsafeNetworks != "" { if *cf.unsafeNetworks != "" {
for _, rs := range strings.Split(*cf.unsafeNetworks, ",") { for rs := range strings.SplitSeq(*cf.unsafeNetworks, ",") {
rs := strings.Trim(rs, " ") rs := strings.Trim(rs, " ")
if rs != "" { if rs != "" {
n, err := netip.ParsePrefix(rs) n, err := netip.ParsePrefix(rs)
@@ -171,12 +217,21 @@ func ca(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader) error
} }
} }
var claims ioClaims
if err := reserveOutputs(&claims,
"out-key", *cf.outKeyPath,
"out-crt", *cf.outCertPath,
"out-qr", *cf.outQRPath,
); err != nil {
return err
}
var passphrase []byte var passphrase []byte
if !isP11 && *cf.encryption { if !isP11 && *cf.encryption {
passphrase = []byte(os.Getenv("NEBULA_CA_PASSPHRASE")) passphrase = []byte(os.Getenv("NEBULA_CA_PASSPHRASE"))
if len(passphrase) == 0 { if len(passphrase) == 0 {
for i := 0; i < 5; i++ { for range 5 {
out.Write([]byte("Enter passphrase: ")) errOut.Write([]byte("Enter passphrase: "))
passphrase, err = pr.ReadPassword() passphrase, err = pr.ReadPassword()
if err == ErrNoTerminal { if err == ErrNoTerminal {
@@ -222,6 +277,9 @@ func ca(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader) error
} else { } else {
switch *cf.curve { switch *cf.curve {
case "25519", "X25519", "Curve25519", "CURVE25519": case "25519", "X25519", "Curve25519", "CURVE25519":
if fips140.Enforced() {
return errors.New("use of Curve25519 is not allowed in FIPS 140-only mode")
}
curve = cert.Curve_CURVE25519 curve = cert.Curve_CURVE25519
pub, rawPriv, err = ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) pub, rawPriv, err = ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
@@ -246,6 +304,13 @@ func ca(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader) error
default: default:
return fmt.Errorf("invalid curve: %s", *cf.curve) return fmt.Errorf("invalid curve: %s", *cf.curve)
} }
if version == cert.Version3 {
pub, rawPriv, err = appendPQSigningKey(suite, pub, rawPriv)
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
} }
t := &cert.TBSCertificate{ t := &cert.TBSCertificate{
@@ -260,15 +325,20 @@ func ca(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader) error
IsCA: true, IsCA: true,
Curve: curve, Curve: curve,
} }
if version == cert.Version3 {
t.PQSuite = suite
}
if !isP11 { if !isP11 && !isStdio(*cf.outKeyPath) {
if _, err := os.Stat(*cf.outKeyPath); err == nil { if _, err := os.Stat(*cf.outKeyPath); err == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("refusing to overwrite existing CA key: %s", *cf.outKeyPath) return fmt.Errorf("refusing to overwrite existing CA key: %s", *cf.outKeyPath)
} }
} }
if _, err := os.Stat(*cf.outCertPath); err == nil { if !isStdio(*cf.outCertPath) {
return fmt.Errorf("refusing to overwrite existing CA cert: %s", *cf.outCertPath) if _, err := os.Stat(*cf.outCertPath); err == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("refusing to overwrite existing CA cert: %s", *cf.outCertPath)
}
} }
var c cert.Certificate var c cert.Certificate
@@ -285,16 +355,21 @@ func ca(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader) error
return fmt.Errorf("error while signing: %s", err) return fmt.Errorf("error while signing: %s", err)
} }
if *cf.encryption { switch {
case *cf.encryption && version == cert.Version3:
b, err = cert.EncryptAndMarshalPQSigningPrivateKey(curve, suite, rawPriv, passphrase, kdfParams)
case *cf.encryption:
b, err = cert.EncryptAndMarshalSigningPrivateKey(curve, rawPriv, passphrase, kdfParams) b, err = cert.EncryptAndMarshalSigningPrivateKey(curve, rawPriv, passphrase, kdfParams)
if err != nil { case version == cert.Version3:
return fmt.Errorf("error while encrypting out-key: %s", err) b = cert.MarshalPQSigningPrivateKeyToPEM(curve, suite, rawPriv)
} default:
} else {
b = cert.MarshalSigningPrivateKeyToPEM(curve, rawPriv) b = cert.MarshalSigningPrivateKeyToPEM(curve, rawPriv)
} }
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error while encrypting out-key: %s", err)
}
err = os.WriteFile(*cf.outKeyPath, b, 0600) err = writeOutput(*cf.outKeyPath, b, 0600, out)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error while writing out-key: %s", err) return fmt.Errorf("error while writing out-key: %s", err)
} }
@@ -305,7 +380,7 @@ func ca(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader) error
return fmt.Errorf("error while marshalling certificate: %s", err) return fmt.Errorf("error while marshalling certificate: %s", err)
} }
err = os.WriteFile(*cf.outCertPath, b, 0600) err = writeOutput(*cf.outCertPath, b, 0600, out)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error while writing out-crt: %s", err) return fmt.Errorf("error while writing out-crt: %s", err)
} }
@@ -316,7 +391,7 @@ func ca(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader) error
return fmt.Errorf("error while generating qr code: %s", err) return fmt.Errorf("error while generating qr code: %s", err)
} }
err = os.WriteFile(*cf.outQRPath, b, 0600) err = writeOutput(*cf.outQRPath, b, 0600, out)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error while writing out-qr: %s", err) return fmt.Errorf("error while writing out-qr: %s", err)
} }
@@ -332,6 +407,7 @@ func caSummary() string {
func caHelp(out io.Writer) { func caHelp(out io.Writer) {
cf := newCaFlags() cf := newCaFlags()
out.Write([]byte("Usage of " + os.Args[0] + " " + caSummary() + "\n")) out.Write([]byte("Usage of " + os.Args[0] + " " + caSummary() + "\n"))
out.Write([]byte(stdioHelpText))
cf.set.SetOutput(out) cf.set.SetOutput(out)
cf.set.PrintDefaults() cf.set.PrintDefaults()
} }
+101 -15
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
//go:build !windows //go:build !windows
// +build !windows
package main package main
@@ -7,7 +6,9 @@ import (
"bytes" "bytes"
"encoding/pem" "encoding/pem"
"errors" "errors"
"math/bits"
"os" "os"
"strconv"
"strings" "strings"
"testing" "testing"
"time" "time"
@@ -22,15 +23,28 @@ func Test_caSummary(t *testing.T) {
} }
func Test_caHelp(t *testing.T) { func Test_caHelp(t *testing.T) {
var (
defaultArgonMemory string
defaultArgonIterations string
)
if bits.UintSize == 32 {
defaultArgonMemory = strconv.Itoa(64 * 1024)
defaultArgonIterations = strconv.Itoa(3)
} else {
defaultArgonMemory = strconv.Itoa(2 * 1024 * 1024)
defaultArgonIterations = strconv.Itoa(1)
}
ob := &bytes.Buffer{} ob := &bytes.Buffer{}
caHelp(ob) caHelp(ob)
assert.Equal( assert.Equal(
t, t,
"Usage of "+os.Args[0]+" ca <flags>: create a self signed certificate authority\n"+ "Usage of "+os.Args[0]+" ca <flags>: create a self signed certificate authority\n"+
" Pass \"-\" to any path flag to read from stdin or write to stdout.\n"+
" -argon-iterations uint\n"+ " -argon-iterations uint\n"+
" \tOptional: Argon2 iterations parameter used for encrypted private key passphrase (default 1)\n"+ " \tOptional: Argon2 iterations parameter used for encrypted private key passphrase (default "+defaultArgonIterations+")\n"+
" -argon-memory uint\n"+ " -argon-memory uint\n"+
" \tOptional: Argon2 memory parameter (in KiB) used for encrypted private key passphrase (default 2097152)\n"+ " \tOptional: Argon2 memory parameter (in KiB) used for encrypted private key passphrase (default "+defaultArgonMemory+")\n"+
" -argon-parallelism uint\n"+ " -argon-parallelism uint\n"+
" \tOptional: Argon2 parallelism parameter used for encrypted private key passphrase (default 4)\n"+ " \tOptional: Argon2 parallelism parameter used for encrypted private key passphrase (default 4)\n"+
" -curve string\n"+ " -curve string\n"+
@@ -54,12 +68,14 @@ func Test_caHelp(t *testing.T) {
" -out-qr string\n"+ " -out-qr string\n"+
" \tOptional: output a qr code image (png) of the certificate\n"+ " \tOptional: output a qr code image (png) of the certificate\n"+
optionalPkcs11String(" -pkcs11 string\n \tOptional: PKCS#11 URI to an existing private key\n")+ optionalPkcs11String(" -pkcs11 string\n \tOptional: PKCS#11 URI to an existing private key\n")+
" -pq-suite string\n"+
" \tOptional: post-quantum suite of a version 3 CA, which the certificates it signs share (MLKEM1024_MLDSA87) (default \"MLKEM1024_MLDSA87\")\n"+
" -subnets string\n"+ " -subnets string\n"+
" \tDeprecated, see -unsafe-networks\n"+ " \tDeprecated, see -unsafe-networks\n"+
" -unsafe-networks string\n"+ " -unsafe-networks string\n"+
" \tOptional: comma separated list of ip address and network in CIDR notation. This will limit which ip addresses and networks subordinate certs can use in unsafe networks\n"+ " \tOptional: comma separated list of ip address and network in CIDR notation. This will limit which ip addresses and networks subordinate certs can use in unsafe networks\n"+
" -version uint\n"+ " -version uint\n"+
" \tOptional: version of the certificate format to use (default 2)\n", " \tOptional: version of the certificate format to use. Version 3 adds a post-quantum key, for post-quantum certificates (default 2)\n",
ob.String(), ob.String(),
) )
} }
@@ -84,7 +100,7 @@ func Test_ca(t *testing.T) {
err: nil, err: nil,
} }
pwPromptOb := "Enter passphrase: " pwPromptEB := "Enter passphrase: "
// required args // required args
assertHelpError(t, ca( assertHelpError(t, ca(
@@ -168,8 +184,8 @@ func Test_ca(t *testing.T) {
eb.Reset() eb.Reset()
args = []string{"-version", "1", "-encrypt", "-name", "test", "-duration", "100m", "-groups", "1,2,3,4,5", "-out-crt", crtF.Name(), "-out-key", keyF.Name()} args = []string{"-version", "1", "-encrypt", "-name", "test", "-duration", "100m", "-groups", "1,2,3,4,5", "-out-crt", crtF.Name(), "-out-key", keyF.Name()}
require.NoError(t, ca(args, ob, eb, testpw)) require.NoError(t, ca(args, ob, eb, testpw))
assert.Equal(t, pwPromptOb, ob.String()) assert.Empty(t, ob.String())
assert.Empty(t, eb.String()) assert.Equal(t, pwPromptEB, eb.String())
// test encrypted key with passphrase environment variable // test encrypted key with passphrase environment variable
os.Remove(keyF.Name()) os.Remove(keyF.Name())
@@ -187,10 +203,16 @@ func Test_ca(t *testing.T) {
k, _ := pem.Decode(rb) k, _ := pem.Decode(rb)
ned, err := cert.UnmarshalNebulaEncryptedData(k.Bytes) ned, err := cert.UnmarshalNebulaEncryptedData(k.Bytes)
require.NoError(t, err) require.NoError(t, err)
// we won't know salt in advance, so just check start of string
assert.Equal(t, uint32(2*1024*1024), ned.EncryptionMetadata.Argon2Parameters.Memory) if bits.UintSize == 32 {
assert.Equal(t, uint32(64*1024), ned.EncryptionMetadata.Argon2Parameters.Memory)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(3), ned.EncryptionMetadata.Argon2Parameters.Iterations)
} else {
assert.Equal(t, uint32(2*1024*1024), ned.EncryptionMetadata.Argon2Parameters.Memory)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(1), ned.EncryptionMetadata.Argon2Parameters.Iterations)
}
assert.Equal(t, uint8(4), ned.EncryptionMetadata.Argon2Parameters.Parallelism) assert.Equal(t, uint8(4), ned.EncryptionMetadata.Argon2Parameters.Parallelism)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(1), ned.EncryptionMetadata.Argon2Parameters.Iterations)
// verify the key is valid and decrypt-able // verify the key is valid and decrypt-able
var curve cert.Curve var curve cert.Curve
@@ -200,15 +222,15 @@ func Test_ca(t *testing.T) {
assert.Empty(t, b) assert.Empty(t, b)
assert.Len(t, lKey, 64) assert.Len(t, lKey, 64)
// test when reading passsword results in an error // test when reading password results in an error
os.Remove(keyF.Name()) os.Remove(keyF.Name())
os.Remove(crtF.Name()) os.Remove(crtF.Name())
ob.Reset() ob.Reset()
eb.Reset() eb.Reset()
args = []string{"-version", "1", "-encrypt", "-name", "test", "-duration", "100m", "-groups", "1,2,3,4,5", "-out-crt", crtF.Name(), "-out-key", keyF.Name()} args = []string{"-version", "1", "-encrypt", "-name", "test", "-duration", "100m", "-groups", "1,2,3,4,5", "-out-crt", crtF.Name(), "-out-key", keyF.Name()}
require.Error(t, ca(args, ob, eb, errpw)) require.Error(t, ca(args, ob, eb, errpw))
assert.Equal(t, pwPromptOb, ob.String()) assert.Empty(t, ob.String())
assert.Empty(t, eb.String()) assert.Equal(t, pwPromptEB, eb.String())
// test when user fails to enter a password // test when user fails to enter a password
os.Remove(keyF.Name()) os.Remove(keyF.Name())
@@ -217,8 +239,8 @@ func Test_ca(t *testing.T) {
eb.Reset() eb.Reset()
args = []string{"-version", "1", "-encrypt", "-name", "test", "-duration", "100m", "-groups", "1,2,3,4,5", "-out-crt", crtF.Name(), "-out-key", keyF.Name()} args = []string{"-version", "1", "-encrypt", "-name", "test", "-duration", "100m", "-groups", "1,2,3,4,5", "-out-crt", crtF.Name(), "-out-key", keyF.Name()}
require.EqualError(t, ca(args, ob, eb, nopw), "no passphrase specified, remove -encrypt flag to write out-key in plaintext") require.EqualError(t, ca(args, ob, eb, nopw), "no passphrase specified, remove -encrypt flag to write out-key in plaintext")
assert.Equal(t, strings.Repeat(pwPromptOb, 5), ob.String()) // prompts 5 times before giving up assert.Empty(t, ob.String())
assert.Empty(t, eb.String()) assert.Equal(t, strings.Repeat(pwPromptEB, 5), eb.String()) // prompts 5 times before giving up
// create valid cert/key for overwrite tests // create valid cert/key for overwrite tests
os.Remove(keyF.Name()) os.Remove(keyF.Name())
@@ -247,3 +269,67 @@ func Test_ca(t *testing.T) {
os.Remove(keyF.Name()) os.Remove(keyF.Name())
} }
func Test_ca_stdio(t *testing.T) {
nopw := &StubPasswordReader{}
keyF, err := os.CreateTemp("", "ca.key")
require.NoError(t, err)
os.Remove(keyF.Name())
defer os.Remove(keyF.Name())
crtF, err := os.CreateTemp("", "ca.crt")
require.NoError(t, err)
os.Remove(crtF.Name())
defer os.Remove(crtF.Name())
// out-crt on stdout, out-key on disk
ob := &bytes.Buffer{}
eb := &bytes.Buffer{}
require.NoError(t, ca([]string{"-name", "test-ca", "-duration", "1h", "-out-crt", "-", "-out-key", keyF.Name()}, ob, eb, nopw))
assert.Empty(t, eb.String())
c, _, err := cert.UnmarshalCertificateFromPEM(ob.Bytes())
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, c.IsCA())
assert.Equal(t, "test-ca", c.Name())
// out-key on stdout, out-crt on disk
os.Remove(keyF.Name())
ob.Reset()
eb.Reset()
require.NoError(t, ca([]string{"-name", "test-ca", "-duration", "1h", "-out-crt", crtF.Name(), "-out-key", "-"}, ob, eb, nopw))
assert.Empty(t, eb.String())
_, _, curve, err := cert.UnmarshalSigningPrivateKeyFromPEM(ob.Bytes())
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, curve)
// dual stdout is rejected up front
os.Remove(crtF.Name())
ob.Reset()
eb.Reset()
require.EqualError(t,
ca([]string{"-name", "test-ca", "-duration", "1h", "-out-crt", "-", "-out-key", "-"}, ob, eb, nopw),
`-out-key and -out-crt both set to "-", only one output may write to stdout`)
assert.Empty(t, ob.String())
// an output conflict combined with -encrypt must error BEFORE prompting
// for a passphrase; pr would record any read attempt
tracker := &trackingPasswordReader{}
ob.Reset()
eb.Reset()
require.EqualError(t,
ca([]string{"-name", "test-ca", "-duration", "1h", "-encrypt", "-out-crt", "-", "-out-key", "-"}, ob, eb, tracker),
`-out-key and -out-crt both set to "-", only one output may write to stdout`)
assert.Empty(t, ob.String())
assert.Empty(t, eb.String())
assert.Zero(t, tracker.calls, "passphrase prompt should not have been called")
}
type trackingPasswordReader struct {
calls int
}
func (pr *trackingPasswordReader) ReadPassword() ([]byte, error) {
pr.calls++
return []byte(""), nil
}
+5
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
//go:build fips140enforce
//go:debug fips140=only
package main
+76 -4
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
package main package main
import ( import (
"crypto/fips140"
"errors"
"flag" "flag"
"fmt" "fmt"
"io" "io"
@@ -15,7 +17,10 @@ type keygenFlags struct {
set *flag.FlagSet set *flag.FlagSet
outKeyPath *string outKeyPath *string
outPubPath *string outPubPath *string
inKeyPath *string
curve *string curve *string
version *uint
pqSuite *string
p11url *string p11url *string
} }
@@ -24,7 +29,10 @@ func newKeygenFlags() *keygenFlags {
cf.set.Usage = func() {} cf.set.Usage = func() {}
cf.outPubPath = cf.set.String("out-pub", "", "Required: path to write the public key to") cf.outPubPath = cf.set.String("out-pub", "", "Required: path to write the public key to")
cf.outKeyPath = cf.set.String("out-key", "", "Required: path to write the private key to") cf.outKeyPath = cf.set.String("out-key", "", "Required: path to write the private key to")
cf.curve = cf.set.String("curve", "25519", "ECDH Curve (25519, P256)") cf.curve = cf.set.String("curve", defaultCurve(), "ECDH Curve (25519, P256)")
cf.version = cf.set.Uint("version", 0, "Optional: 3 adds a post-quantum key, for version 3 certificates")
cf.inKeyPath = cf.set.String("in-key", "", "Optional: path to an existing private key to add a post-quantum key to, keeping the existing key. Implies -version 3")
cf.pqSuite = pqSuiteFlag(cf.set, "Optional: post-quantum suite of a version 3 key, which must be the suite of the CA that signs it")
cf.p11url = p11Flag(cf.set) cf.p11url = p11Flag(cf.set)
return &cf return &cf
} }
@@ -42,14 +50,52 @@ func keygen(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer) error {
if err = mustFlagString("out-key", cf.outKeyPath); err != nil { if err = mustFlagString("out-key", cf.outKeyPath); err != nil {
return err return err
} }
} else if *cf.outKeyPath != "" {
return newHelpErrorf("cannot set -out-key with -pkcs11")
} }
if err = mustFlagString("out-pub", cf.outPubPath); err != nil { if err = mustFlagString("out-pub", cf.outPubPath); err != nil {
return err return err
} }
version := cert.Version(*cf.version)
if *cf.inKeyPath != "" {
version = cert.Version3
}
if version != 0 && version != cert.Version3 {
return newHelpErrorf("-version must be %v, or left out for keys that work with any other version", cert.Version3)
}
if version == cert.Version3 && isP11 {
return newHelpErrorf("-version 3 can not be used with -pkcs11, the post-quantum key has to be in out-key")
}
suite, err := parsePQSuiteFlag(cf.set, *cf.pqSuite, version == cert.Version3, "is only for -version 3")
if err != nil {
return err
}
var claims ioClaims
if err := reserveInputs(&claims, "in-key", *cf.inKeyPath); err != nil {
return err
}
var pub, rawPriv []byte var pub, rawPriv []byte
var curve cert.Curve var curve cert.Curve
if isP11 { if *cf.inKeyPath != "" {
raw, err := readInput("in-key", *cf.inKeyPath, &claims)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error while reading in-key: %s", err)
}
rawPriv, _, curve, err = cert.UnmarshalPrivateKeyFromPEM(raw)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error while parsing in-key: %s", err)
}
pub, err = publicKeyFor(curve, rawPriv)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error while parsing in-key: %s", err)
}
if fips140.Enforced() && curve == cert.Curve_CURVE25519 {
return errors.New("use of Curve25519 is not allowed in FIPS 140-only mode")
}
} else if isP11 {
switch *cf.curve { switch *cf.curve {
case "P256": case "P256":
curve = cert.Curve_P256 curve = cert.Curve_P256
@@ -59,6 +105,9 @@ func keygen(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer) error {
} else { } else {
switch *cf.curve { switch *cf.curve {
case "25519", "X25519", "Curve25519", "CURVE25519": case "25519", "X25519", "Curve25519", "CURVE25519":
if fips140.Enforced() {
return errors.New("use of Curve25519 is not allowed in FIPS 140-only mode")
}
pub, rawPriv = x25519Keypair() pub, rawPriv = x25519Keypair()
curve = cert.Curve_CURVE25519 curve = cert.Curve_CURVE25519
case "P256": case "P256":
@@ -69,6 +118,20 @@ func keygen(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer) error {
} }
} }
if version == cert.Version3 {
pub, rawPriv, err = appendPQKey(suite, pub, rawPriv)
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
if err := reserveOutputs(&claims,
"out-key", *cf.outKeyPath,
"out-pub", *cf.outPubPath,
); err != nil {
return err
}
if isP11 { if isP11 {
p11Client, err := pkclient.FromUrl(*cf.p11url) p11Client, err := pkclient.FromUrl(*cf.p11url)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
@@ -82,12 +145,20 @@ func keygen(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer) error {
return fmt.Errorf("error while getting public key: %w", err) return fmt.Errorf("error while getting public key: %w", err)
} }
} else { } else {
err = os.WriteFile(*cf.outKeyPath, cert.MarshalPrivateKeyToPEM(curve, rawPriv), 0600) b := cert.MarshalPrivateKeyToPEM(curve, rawPriv)
if version == cert.Version3 {
b = cert.MarshalPQPrivateKeyToPEM(curve, suite, rawPriv)
}
err = writeOutput(*cf.outKeyPath, b, 0600, out)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error while writing out-key: %s", err) return fmt.Errorf("error while writing out-key: %s", err)
} }
} }
err = os.WriteFile(*cf.outPubPath, cert.MarshalPublicKeyToPEM(curve, pub), 0600) b := cert.MarshalPublicKeyToPEM(curve, pub)
if version == cert.Version3 {
b = cert.MarshalPQPublicKeyToPEM(curve, suite, pub)
}
err = writeOutput(*cf.outPubPath, b, 0600, out)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error while writing out-pub: %s", err) return fmt.Errorf("error while writing out-pub: %s", err)
} }
@@ -102,6 +173,7 @@ func keygenSummary() string {
func keygenHelp(out io.Writer) { func keygenHelp(out io.Writer) {
cf := newKeygenFlags() cf := newKeygenFlags()
_, _ = out.Write([]byte("Usage of " + os.Args[0] + " " + keygenSummary() + "\n")) _, _ = out.Write([]byte("Usage of " + os.Args[0] + " " + keygenSummary() + "\n"))
_, _ = out.Write([]byte(stdioHelpText))
cf.set.SetOutput(out) cf.set.SetOutput(out)
cf.set.PrintDefaults() cf.set.PrintDefaults()
} }
+48 -1
View File
@@ -20,13 +20,20 @@ func Test_keygenHelp(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal( assert.Equal(
t, t,
"Usage of "+os.Args[0]+" keygen <flags>: create a public/private key pair. the public key can be passed to `nebula-cert sign`\n"+ "Usage of "+os.Args[0]+" keygen <flags>: create a public/private key pair. the public key can be passed to `nebula-cert sign`\n"+
" Pass \"-\" to any path flag to read from stdin or write to stdout.\n"+
" -curve string\n"+ " -curve string\n"+
" \tECDH Curve (25519, P256) (default \"25519\")\n"+ " \tECDH Curve (25519, P256) (default \"25519\")\n"+
" -in-key string\n"+
" \tOptional: path to an existing private key to add a post-quantum key to, keeping the existing key. Implies -version 3\n"+
" -out-key string\n"+ " -out-key string\n"+
" \tRequired: path to write the private key to\n"+ " \tRequired: path to write the private key to\n"+
" -out-pub string\n"+ " -out-pub string\n"+
" \tRequired: path to write the public key to\n"+ " \tRequired: path to write the public key to\n"+
optionalPkcs11String(" -pkcs11 string\n \tOptional: PKCS#11 URI to an existing private key\n"), optionalPkcs11String(" -pkcs11 string\n \tOptional: PKCS#11 URI to an existing private key\n")+
" -pq-suite string\n"+
" \tOptional: post-quantum suite of a version 3 key, which must be the suite of the CA that signs it (MLKEM1024_MLDSA87) (default \"MLKEM1024_MLDSA87\")\n"+
" -version uint\n"+
" \tOptional: 3 adds a post-quantum key, for version 3 certificates\n",
ob.String(), ob.String(),
) )
} }
@@ -93,3 +100,43 @@ func Test_keygen(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t, err) require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Len(t, lPub, 32) assert.Len(t, lPub, 32)
} }
func Test_keygen_stdio(t *testing.T) {
keyF, err := os.CreateTemp("", "test.key")
require.NoError(t, err)
os.Remove(keyF.Name())
defer os.Remove(keyF.Name())
pubF, err := os.CreateTemp("", "test.pub")
require.NoError(t, err)
os.Remove(pubF.Name())
defer os.Remove(pubF.Name())
// out-pub on stdout, out-key on disk
ob := &bytes.Buffer{}
eb := &bytes.Buffer{}
require.NoError(t, keygen([]string{"-out-pub", "-", "-out-key", keyF.Name()}, ob, eb))
assert.Empty(t, eb.String())
lPub, _, curve, err := cert.UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(ob.Bytes())
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, curve)
assert.Len(t, lPub, 32)
// out-key on stdout, out-pub on disk
os.Remove(keyF.Name())
ob.Reset()
eb.Reset()
require.NoError(t, keygen([]string{"-out-pub", pubF.Name(), "-out-key", "-"}, ob, eb))
assert.Empty(t, eb.String())
lKey, _, curve, err := cert.UnmarshalPrivateKeyFromPEM(ob.Bytes())
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, curve)
assert.Len(t, lKey, 32)
// both on stdout is a conflict caught up front
ob.Reset()
eb.Reset()
require.EqualError(t, keygen([]string{"-out-pub", "-", "-out-key", "-"}, ob, eb),
`-out-key and -out-pub both set to "-", only one output may write to stdout`)
assert.Empty(t, ob.String())
}
+5
View File
@@ -89,6 +89,8 @@ func main() {
err = printCert(args[1:], os.Stdout, os.Stderr) err = printCert(args[1:], os.Stdout, os.Stderr)
case "verify": case "verify":
err = verify(args[1:], os.Stdout, os.Stderr) err = verify(args[1:], os.Stdout, os.Stderr)
case "pq-extend":
err = pqExtend(args[1:], os.Stdout, os.Stderr, StdinPasswordReader{})
default: default:
err = fmt.Errorf("unknown mode: %s", args[0]) err = fmt.Errorf("unknown mode: %s", args[0])
} }
@@ -122,6 +124,8 @@ func handleError(mode string, e error, out io.Writer) int {
printHelp(out) printHelp(out)
case "verify": case "verify":
verifyHelp(out) verifyHelp(out)
case "pq-extend":
pqExtendHelp(out)
} }
} }
@@ -145,6 +149,7 @@ func help(err string, out io.Writer) {
fmt.Fprintln(out, " "+signSummary()) fmt.Fprintln(out, " "+signSummary())
fmt.Fprintln(out, " "+printSummary()) fmt.Fprintln(out, " "+printSummary())
fmt.Fprintln(out, " "+verifySummary()) fmt.Fprintln(out, " "+verifySummary())
fmt.Fprintln(out, " "+pqExtendSummary())
fmt.Fprintln(out, "") fmt.Fprintln(out, "")
fmt.Fprintf(out, " To see usage for a given mode, use %s <mode> -h\n", os.Args[0]) fmt.Fprintf(out, " To see usage for a given mode, use %s <mode> -h\n", os.Args[0])
} }
+1
View File
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ func Test_help(t *testing.T) {
" " + signSummary() + "\n" + " " + signSummary() + "\n" +
" " + printSummary() + "\n" + " " + printSummary() + "\n" +
" " + verifySummary() + "\n" + " " + verifySummary() + "\n" +
" " + pqExtendSummary() + "\n" +
"\n" + "\n" +
" To see usage for a given mode, use " + os.Args[0] + " <mode> -h\n" " To see usage for a given mode, use " + os.Args[0] + " <mode> -h\n"
+3 -1
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,9 @@ func (pr StdinPasswordReader) ReadPassword() ([]byte, error) {
} }
password, err := term.ReadPassword(int(os.Stdin.Fd())) password, err := term.ReadPassword(int(os.Stdin.Fd()))
fmt.Println() // Terminal echo is off while reading, so the user's Enter key does not
// produce a visible newline. Emit one on stderr to match the prompt.
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr)
return password, err return password, err
} }
+311
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
package main
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/ecdh"
"encoding/pem"
"flag"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"strings"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
)
// pqSuiteFlag adds -pq-suite to a flag set.
func pqSuiteFlag(set *flag.FlagSet, usage string) *string {
var names []string
for _, s := range cert.PQSuites() {
names = append(names, s.String())
}
return set.String("pq-suite", cert.DefaultPQSuite.String(), usage+" ("+strings.Join(names, ", ")+")")
}
// parsePQSuiteFlag returns the suite -pq-suite names. Setting it is an error unless allowed, when the suite has no use
// or comes from elsewhere.
func parsePQSuiteFlag(set *flag.FlagSet, value string, allowed bool, why string) (cert.PQSuite, error) {
given := false
set.Visit(func(f *flag.Flag) {
if f.Name == "pq-suite" {
given = true
}
})
if given && !allowed {
return cert.PQSuiteUnknown, newHelpErrorf("-pq-suite %s", why)
}
s, err := cert.ParsePQSuite(value)
if err != nil {
return cert.PQSuiteUnknown, newHelpErrorf("-pq-suite: %s", err)
}
return s, nil
}
// appendPQSigningKey makes a classical CA keypair into a version 3 composite one with a fresh key of suite.
func appendPQSigningKey(suite cert.PQSuite, pub, priv []byte) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
pqPub, pqPriv, err := suite.GenerateKey(true)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("error while generating %v CA key: %s", suite, err)
}
return append(pub, pqPub...), append(priv, pqPriv...), nil
}
// appendPQKey makes a classical host keypair into a version 3 composite one with a fresh key of suite.
func appendPQKey(suite cert.PQSuite, pub, priv []byte) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
pqPub, pqPriv, err := suite.GenerateKey(false)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("error while generating %v key: %s", suite, err)
}
return append(pub, pqPub...), append(priv, pqPriv...), nil
}
// publicKeyFor returns the public key of a classical host private key.
func publicKeyFor(curve cert.Curve, priv []byte) ([]byte, error) {
var c ecdh.Curve
switch curve {
case cert.Curve_CURVE25519:
c = ecdh.X25519()
case cert.Curve_P256:
c = ecdh.P256()
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid curve: %s", curve)
}
k, err := c.NewPrivateKey(priv)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("not a classical %s private key, it may already have a post-quantum key", curve)
}
return k.PublicKey().Bytes(), nil
}
type pqExtendFlags struct {
set *flag.FlagSet
caKeyPath *string
caCertPath *string
inCertPath *string
inPubPath *string
outCertPath *string
outKeyPath *string
pqSuite *string
}
func newPQExtendFlags() *pqExtendFlags {
pf := pqExtendFlags{set: flag.NewFlagSet("pq-extend", flag.ContinueOnError)}
pf.set.Usage = func() {}
pf.inCertPath = pf.set.String("in-crt", "", "Required: path to the version 2 certificate to extend, a CA or a host")
pf.outCertPath = pf.set.String("out-crt", "", "Required: path to write the version 3 certificate to")
pf.caKeyPath = pf.set.String("ca-key", "ca.key", "Optional: path to the CA key. For a CA in-crt, its own version 2 key. For a host in-crt, the version 3 key of the CA that issued it")
pf.caCertPath = pf.set.String("ca-crt", "", "Required for a host in-crt: path to the version 3 form of the CA that issued it")
pf.inPubPath = pf.set.String("in-pub", "", "Required for a host in-crt: path to the host's public key from keygen -in-key")
pf.outKeyPath = pf.set.String("out-key", "", "Required for a CA in-crt: path to write the CA's version 3 key to, encrypted again if ca-key was")
pf.pqSuite = pqSuiteFlag(pf.set, "Optional, for a CA in-crt: post-quantum suite of the version 3 CA. A host takes its CA's suite")
return &pf
}
// pqExtend turns a version 2 certificate into a version 3 one in place: the v2 form, and so its fingerprint and
// existing trust in it, stays exactly as it was.
func pqExtend(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader) error {
pf := newPQExtendFlags()
if err := pf.set.Parse(args); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := mustFlagString("in-crt", pf.inCertPath); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := mustFlagString("out-crt", pf.outCertPath); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := mustFlagString("ca-key", pf.caKeyPath); err != nil {
return err
}
var claims ioClaims
if err := reserveInputs(&claims,
"in-crt", *pf.inCertPath,
"ca-key", *pf.caKeyPath,
"ca-crt", *pf.caCertPath,
"in-pub", *pf.inPubPath,
); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := reserveOutputs(&claims,
"out-crt", *pf.outCertPath,
"out-key", *pf.outKeyPath,
); err != nil {
return err
}
rawCert, err := readInput("in-crt", *pf.inCertPath, &claims)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error while reading in-crt: %s", err)
}
c, _, err := cert.UnmarshalCertificateFromPEM(rawCert)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error while parsing in-crt: %s", err)
}
if c.Version() != cert.Version2 {
return fmt.Errorf("only version 2 certificates extend to version 3, in-crt is version %d", c.Version())
}
for _, p := range []string{*pf.outCertPath, *pf.outKeyPath} {
if p != "" && !isStdio(p) {
if _, err := os.Stat(p); err == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("refusing to overwrite existing file: %s", p)
}
}
}
rawCAKey, err := readInput("ca-key", *pf.caKeyPath, &claims)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error while reading ca-key: %s", err)
}
curve, caKey, passphrase, err := readSigningKey(rawCAKey, errOut, pr)
if err != nil {
return err
}
suite, err := parsePQSuiteFlag(pf.set, *pf.pqSuite, c.IsCA(), "is for CA certificates, a host takes its CA's suite")
if err != nil {
return err
}
var c3 cert.Certificate
if c.IsCA() {
c3, err = extendCA(pf, c, suite, curve, caKey, rawCAKey, passphrase, out)
} else {
c3, err = extendHost(pf, c, curve, caKey, &claims)
}
if err != nil {
return err
}
b, err := c3.MarshalPEM()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error while marshalling certificate: %s", err)
}
if err := writeOutput(*pf.outCertPath, b, 0600, out); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error while writing out-crt: %s", err)
}
return nil
}
// extendCA gives a v2 CA a post-quantum key of suite and writes out the composite key.
func extendCA(pf *pqExtendFlags, ca cert.Certificate, suite cert.PQSuite, curve cert.Curve, key, rawKey, passphrase []byte, out io.Writer) (cert.Certificate, error) {
if *pf.caCertPath != "" || *pf.inPubPath != "" {
return nil, newHelpErrorf("-ca-crt and -in-pub are for host certificates, a CA extends itself")
}
if err := mustFlagString("out-key", pf.outKeyPath); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := ca.VerifyPrivateKey(curve, key); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("refusing to extend, the CA certificate does not match ca-key")
}
pub, priv, err := appendPQSigningKey(suite, nil, append([]byte(nil), key...))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
signPQ, err := cert.SignPQ(suite, priv[len(key):])
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
c3, err := cert.ExtendToV3(ca, suite, pub, nil, signPQ)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error while extending: %s", err)
}
var b []byte
if passphrase != nil {
// Encrypt it the way ca-key was, with a fresh salt.
block, _ := pem.Decode(rawKey)
if block == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error while parsing ca-key: input did not contain a valid PEM encoded block")
}
ned, err := cert.UnmarshalNebulaEncryptedData(block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error while parsing encrypted ca-key: %s", err)
}
a := ned.EncryptionMetadata.Argon2Parameters
kdf := cert.NewArgon2Parameters(a.Memory, a.Parallelism, a.Iterations)
b, err = cert.EncryptAndMarshalPQSigningPrivateKey(curve, suite, priv, passphrase, kdf)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error while encrypting out-key: %s", err)
}
} else {
b = cert.MarshalPQSigningPrivateKeyToPEM(curve, suite, priv)
}
if err := writeOutput(*pf.outKeyPath, b, 0600, out); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error while writing out-key: %s", err)
}
return c3, nil
}
// extendHost adds a host's post-quantum key to its certificate, signed by the v3 form of its CA, in the CA's suite.
func extendHost(pf *pqExtendFlags, c cert.Certificate, curve cert.Curve, caKey []byte, claims *ioClaims) (cert.Certificate, error) {
if *pf.outKeyPath != "" {
return nil, newHelpErrorf("-out-key is for CA certificates, a host's key comes from keygen -in-key")
}
if err := mustFlagString("ca-crt", pf.caCertPath); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := mustFlagString("in-pub", pf.inPubPath); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
rawCA, err := readInput("ca-crt", *pf.caCertPath, claims)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error while reading ca-crt: %s", err)
}
ca, _, err := cert.UnmarshalCertificateFromPEM(rawCA)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error while parsing ca-crt: %s", err)
}
if ca.Version() != cert.Version3 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ca-crt must be a version 3 CA, extend the CA first")
}
if err := ca.VerifyPrivateKey(curve, caKey); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("refusing to extend, ca-crt does not match ca-key")
}
rawPub, err := readInput("in-pub", *pf.inPubPath, claims)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error while reading in-pub: %s", err)
}
pub, _, pubCurve, err := cert.UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(rawPub)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error while parsing in-pub: %s", err)
}
suite := cert.PQSuiteOf(ca)
classical, pq, err := suite.SplitPublicKey(false, pub)
if pubCurve != c.Curve() || err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("in-pub must be the host's key from keygen -in-key -pq-suite %v", suite)
}
if !bytes.Equal(classical, c.PublicKey()) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("in-pub does not extend the key in in-crt")
}
_, pqCAKey, err := suite.SplitPrivateKey(true, caKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
signPQ, err := cert.SignPQ(suite, pqCAKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
c3, err := cert.ExtendToV3(c, suite, pq, ca, signPQ)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error while extending: %s", err)
}
return c3, nil
}
func pqExtendSummary() string {
return "pq-extend <flags>: extend a version 2 CA or host certificate to version 3 in place, keeping its v2 form and fingerprint"
}
func pqExtendHelp(out io.Writer) {
pf := newPQExtendFlags()
out.Write([]byte("Usage of " + os.Args[0] + " " + pqExtendSummary() + "\n"))
out.Write([]byte(stdioHelpText))
pf.set.SetOutput(out)
pf.set.PrintDefaults()
}
+220
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
package main
import (
"bytes"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func readCert(t *testing.T, path string) cert.Certificate {
t.Helper()
b, err := os.ReadFile(path)
require.NoError(t, err)
c, _, err := cert.UnmarshalCertificateFromPEM(b)
require.NoError(t, err)
return c
}
func readSigningKeyFile(t *testing.T, path string) (cert.Curve, []byte) {
t.Helper()
b, err := os.ReadFile(path)
require.NoError(t, err)
k, _, curve, err := cert.UnmarshalSigningPrivateKeyFromPEM(b)
require.NoError(t, err)
return curve, k
}
func readKeyFile(t *testing.T, path string) (cert.Curve, []byte) {
t.Helper()
b, err := os.ReadFile(path)
require.NoError(t, err)
k, _, curve, err := cert.UnmarshalPrivateKeyFromPEM(b)
require.NoError(t, err)
return curve, k
}
func verifiedBy(t *testing.T, c cert.Certificate, cas ...cert.Certificate) error {
t.Helper()
pool := cert.NewCAPool()
for _, ca := range cas {
require.NoError(t, pool.AddCA(ca))
}
_, err := pool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), c)
return err
}
func TestPQ_CAAndSign(t *testing.T) {
for _, curve := range []string{"25519", "P256"} {
t.Run(curve, func(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
ob, eb := &bytes.Buffer{}, &bytes.Buffer{}
nopw := &StubPasswordReader{}
p := func(n string) string { return filepath.Join(dir, n) }
require.NoError(t, ca([]string{"-version", "3", "-curve", curve, "-name", "pq ca", "-out-crt", p("ca.crt"), "-out-key", p("ca.key")}, ob, eb, nopw))
caCrt := readCert(t, p("ca.crt"))
assert.Equal(t, cert.Version3, caCrt.Version())
caCurve, caKey := readSigningKeyFile(t, p("ca.key"))
require.NoError(t, caCrt.VerifyPrivateKey(caCurve, caKey))
// A v3 CA signs v3 by default.
require.NoError(t, signCert([]string{"-ca-crt", p("ca.crt"), "-ca-key", p("ca.key"), "-name", "host", "-networks", "10.1.0.1/16", "-out-crt", p("host.crt"), "-out-key", p("host.key")}, ob, eb, nopw))
host := readCert(t, p("host.crt"))
assert.Equal(t, cert.Version3, host.Version())
hostCurve, hostKey := readKeyFile(t, p("host.key"))
require.NoError(t, host.VerifyPrivateKey(hostCurve, hostKey))
require.NoError(t, verifiedBy(t, host, caCrt))
// And v2 as its v2 form.
require.NoError(t, signCert([]string{"-version", "2", "-ca-crt", p("ca.crt"), "-ca-key", p("ca.key"), "-name", "old", "-networks", "10.1.0.2/16", "-out-crt", p("old.crt"), "-out-key", p("old.key")}, ob, eb, nopw))
old := readCert(t, p("old.crt"))
assert.Equal(t, cert.Version2, old.Version())
require.NoError(t, verifiedBy(t, old, cert.V2Form(caCrt)))
// keygen -version 3 makes keys for v3 certificates, and only those.
require.NoError(t, keygen([]string{"-version", "3", "-curve", curve, "-out-key", p("k3.key"), "-out-pub", p("k3.pub")}, ob, eb))
require.NoError(t, signCert([]string{"-ca-crt", p("ca.crt"), "-ca-key", p("ca.key"), "-name", "k3", "-networks", "10.1.0.3/16", "-in-pub", p("k3.pub"), "-out-crt", p("k3.crt")}, ob, eb, nopw))
_, k3 := readKeyFile(t, p("k3.key"))
require.NoError(t, readCert(t, p("k3.crt")).VerifyPrivateKey(hostCurve, k3))
require.ErrorContains(t, signCert([]string{"-version", "2", "-ca-crt", p("ca.crt"), "-ca-key", p("ca.key"), "-name", "x", "-networks", "10.1.0.4/16", "-in-pub", p("k3.pub"), "-out-crt", p("x.crt")}, ob, eb, nopw), "only version 3 certificates carry")
})
}
}
func TestPQ_SignErrors(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
ob, eb := &bytes.Buffer{}, &bytes.Buffer{}
nopw := &StubPasswordReader{}
p := func(n string) string { return filepath.Join(dir, n) }
require.NoError(t, ca([]string{"-name", "v2 ca", "-out-crt", p("ca.crt"), "-out-key", p("ca.key")}, ob, eb, nopw))
require.ErrorContains(t, signCert([]string{"-version", "3", "-ca-crt", p("ca.crt"), "-ca-key", p("ca.key"), "-name", "h", "-networks", "10.1.0.1/16", "-out-crt", p("h.crt"), "-out-key", p("h.key")}, ob, eb, nopw), "must be signed by a version 3 CA")
require.NoError(t, keygen([]string{"-out-key", p("k.key"), "-out-pub", p("k.pub")}, ob, eb))
require.NoError(t, ca([]string{"-version", "3", "-name", "v3 ca", "-out-crt", p("ca3.crt"), "-out-key", p("ca3.key")}, ob, eb, nopw))
require.ErrorContains(t, signCert([]string{"-ca-crt", p("ca3.crt"), "-ca-key", p("ca3.key"), "-name", "h", "-networks", "10.1.0.1/16", "-in-pub", p("k.pub"), "-out-crt", p("h3.crt")}, ob, eb, nopw), "need an in-pub from keygen -version 3")
// keygen -in-key refuses a key that already has a post-quantum key.
require.NoError(t, keygen([]string{"-version", "3", "-out-key", p("k3.key"), "-out-pub", p("k3.pub")}, ob, eb))
require.ErrorContains(t, keygen([]string{"-in-key", p("k3.key"), "-out-key", p("k33.key"), "-out-pub", p("k33.pub")}, ob, eb), "already have a post-quantum key")
}
func TestPQ_SuiteFlag(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
ob, eb := &bytes.Buffer{}, &bytes.Buffer{}
nopw := &StubPasswordReader{}
p := func(n string) string { return filepath.Join(dir, n) }
// The suite can be named, case aside, and the certificates a CA signs share its suite.
require.NoError(t, ca([]string{"-version", "3", "-pq-suite", "mlkem1024_mldsa87", "-name", "ca", "-out-crt", p("ca.crt"), "-out-key", p("ca.key")}, ob, eb, nopw))
assert.Equal(t, cert.PQSuite_MLKEM1024_MLDSA87, cert.PQSuiteOf(readCert(t, p("ca.crt"))))
require.NoError(t, keygen([]string{"-version", "3", "-pq-suite", "MLKEM1024_MLDSA87", "-out-key", p("k.key"), "-out-pub", p("k.pub")}, ob, eb))
require.NoError(t, signCert([]string{"-ca-crt", p("ca.crt"), "-ca-key", p("ca.key"), "-name", "h", "-networks", "10.1.0.1/16", "-in-pub", p("k.pub"), "-out-crt", p("h.crt")}, ob, eb, nopw))
assert.Equal(t, cert.PQSuite_MLKEM1024_MLDSA87, cert.PQSuiteOf(readCert(t, p("h.crt"))))
// Printing shows it.
ob.Reset()
require.NoError(t, printCert([]string{"-json", "-path", p("h.crt")}, ob, eb))
assert.Contains(t, ob.String(), `"pqSuite":"MLKEM1024_MLDSA87"`)
// Unknown suites, and suites where there is no post-quantum key, are refused.
require.ErrorContains(t, ca([]string{"-version", "3", "-pq-suite", "mlkem768_mldsa65", "-name", "x", "-out-crt", p("x.crt"), "-out-key", p("x.key")}, ob, eb, nopw), "unknown post-quantum suite")
require.ErrorContains(t, ca([]string{"-pq-suite", "MLKEM1024_MLDSA87", "-name", "x", "-out-crt", p("x.crt"), "-out-key", p("x.key")}, ob, eb, nopw), "only for -version 3")
require.ErrorContains(t, keygen([]string{"-pq-suite", "MLKEM1024_MLDSA87", "-out-key", p("x.key"), "-out-pub", p("x.pub")}, ob, eb), "only for -version 3")
// A host takes its CA's suite when extended.
require.NoError(t, ca([]string{"-name", "ca2", "-out-crt", p("ca2.crt"), "-out-key", p("ca2.key")}, ob, eb, nopw))
require.NoError(t, signCert([]string{"-ca-crt", p("ca2.crt"), "-ca-key", p("ca2.key"), "-name", "h2", "-networks", "10.1.0.2/16", "-out-crt", p("h2.crt"), "-out-key", p("h2.key")}, ob, eb, nopw))
require.NoError(t, pqExtend([]string{"-in-crt", p("ca2.crt"), "-ca-key", p("ca2.key"), "-pq-suite", "MLKEM1024_MLDSA87", "-out-crt", p("ca23.crt"), "-out-key", p("ca23.key")}, ob, eb, nopw))
require.NoError(t, keygen([]string{"-in-key", p("h2.key"), "-out-key", p("h23.key"), "-out-pub", p("h23.pub")}, ob, eb))
require.ErrorContains(t, pqExtend([]string{"-in-crt", p("h2.crt"), "-in-pub", p("h23.pub"), "-ca-crt", p("ca23.crt"), "-ca-key", p("ca23.key"), "-pq-suite", "MLKEM1024_MLDSA87", "-out-crt", p("h23.crt")}, ob, eb, nopw), "a host takes its CA's suite")
}
// TestPQ_Extend upgrades a v2 CA and a host in place, the way a running network migrates.
func TestPQ_Extend(t *testing.T) {
for _, encrypt := range []bool{false, true} {
name := "plain"
if encrypt {
name = "encrypted"
}
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
ob, eb := &bytes.Buffer{}, &bytes.Buffer{}
pw := &StubPasswordReader{}
if encrypt {
t.Setenv("NEBULA_CA_PASSPHRASE", "hunter2")
}
p := func(n string) string { return filepath.Join(dir, n) }
caArgs := []string{"-name", "ca", "-out-crt", p("ca.crt"), "-out-key", p("ca.key"), "-argon-memory", "1024"}
if encrypt {
caArgs = append(caArgs, "-encrypt")
}
require.NoError(t, ca(caArgs, ob, eb, pw))
require.NoError(t, signCert([]string{"-ca-crt", p("ca.crt"), "-ca-key", p("ca.key"), "-name", "host", "-networks", "10.1.0.1/16", "-out-crt", p("host.crt"), "-out-key", p("host.key")}, ob, eb, pw))
ca2 := readCert(t, p("ca.crt"))
host2 := readCert(t, p("host.crt"))
// The CA extends itself.
require.NoError(t, pqExtend([]string{"-in-crt", p("ca.crt"), "-ca-key", p("ca.key"), "-out-crt", p("ca3.crt"), "-out-key", p("ca3.key")}, ob, eb, pw))
ca3 := readCert(t, p("ca3.crt"))
assert.Equal(t, cert.Version3, ca3.Version())
assertSameCert(t, ca2, cert.V2Form(ca3))
raw, err := os.ReadFile(p("ca3.key"))
require.NoError(t, err)
curve, ca3Key, _, err := readSigningKey(raw, eb, pw)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, ca3.VerifyPrivateKey(curve, ca3Key))
if encrypt {
_, _, _, err = cert.UnmarshalSigningPrivateKeyFromPEM(raw)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, cert.ErrPrivateKeyEncrypted, "an encrypted ca-key stays encrypted")
}
// The host gets a post-quantum key on top of the one it has, and the CA signs it.
require.NoError(t, keygen([]string{"-in-key", p("host.key"), "-out-key", p("host3.key"), "-out-pub", p("host3.pub")}, ob, eb))
require.NoError(t, pqExtend([]string{"-in-crt", p("host.crt"), "-in-pub", p("host3.pub"), "-ca-crt", p("ca3.crt"), "-ca-key", p("ca3.key"), "-out-crt", p("host3.crt")}, ob, eb, pw))
host3 := readCert(t, p("host3.crt"))
assert.Equal(t, cert.Version3, host3.Version())
assertSameCert(t, host2, cert.V2Form(host3))
hostCurve, host3Key := readKeyFile(t, p("host3.key"))
require.NoError(t, host3.VerifyPrivateKey(hostCurve, host3Key))
require.NoError(t, verifiedBy(t, host3, ca3))
require.NoError(t, verifiedBy(t, host2, ca2), "existing trust is untouched")
// print leads a version 3 certificate with both fingerprints and says which one blocks both forms.
ob.Reset()
require.NoError(t, printCert([]string{"-path", p("host3.crt")}, ob, eb))
fp3, err := host3.Fingerprint()
require.NoError(t, err)
fp2, err := host2.Fingerprint()
require.NoError(t, err)
printed := ob.String()
lead := "Fingerprint: " + fp3 + "\nv2 fingerprint: " + fp2 + " (block this one in pki.blocklist, it covers both forms)\n"
require.Greater(t, len(printed), len(lead))
assert.Equal(t, lead, printed[:len(lead)])
// Someone else's key does not extend this host.
require.NoError(t, keygen([]string{"-version", "3", "-out-key", p("other.key"), "-out-pub", p("other.pub")}, ob, eb))
require.ErrorContains(t, pqExtend([]string{"-in-crt", p("host.crt"), "-in-pub", p("other.pub"), "-ca-crt", p("ca3.crt"), "-ca-key", p("ca3.key"), "-out-crt", p("bad.crt")}, ob, eb, pw), "does not extend the key")
// Nor does the v2 CA key, or a v3 certificate.
require.ErrorContains(t, pqExtend([]string{"-in-crt", p("host.crt"), "-in-pub", p("host3.pub"), "-ca-crt", p("ca3.crt"), "-ca-key", p("ca.key"), "-out-crt", p("bad.crt")}, ob, eb, pw), "does not match ca-key")
require.ErrorContains(t, pqExtend([]string{"-in-crt", p("host3.crt"), "-in-pub", p("host3.pub"), "-ca-crt", p("ca3.crt"), "-ca-key", p("ca3.key"), "-out-crt", p("bad.crt")}, ob, eb, pw), "only version 2 certificates")
})
}
}
func assertSameCert(t *testing.T, want, got cert.Certificate) {
t.Helper()
wb, err := want.Marshal()
require.NoError(t, err)
gb, err := got.Marshal()
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, wb, gb)
}
+36 -8
View File
@@ -40,11 +40,23 @@ func printCert(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer) error {
return err return err
} }
rawCert, err := os.ReadFile(*pf.path) var claims ioClaims
if err := reserveInputs(&claims, "path", *pf.path); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := reserveOutputs(&claims, "out-qr", *pf.outQRPath); err != nil {
return err
}
rawCert, err := readInput("path", *pf.path, &claims)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("unable to read cert; %s", err) return fmt.Errorf("unable to read cert; %s", err)
} }
// When the QR is going to stdout, suppress the human-readable text/json
// output so the binary stream is not contaminated.
qrToStdout := isStdio(*pf.outQRPath)
var c cert.Certificate var c cert.Certificate
var qrBytes []byte var qrBytes []byte
part := 0 part := 0
@@ -57,11 +69,26 @@ func printCert(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer) error {
return fmt.Errorf("error while unmarshaling cert: %s", err) return fmt.Errorf("error while unmarshaling cert: %s", err)
} }
if *pf.json { if !qrToStdout {
jsonCerts = append(jsonCerts, c) if *pf.json {
} else { jsonCerts = append(jsonCerts, c)
_, _ = out.Write([]byte(c.String())) } else {
_, _ = out.Write([]byte("\n")) // A version 3 certificate has two fingerprints, and only the v2 one blocks both of its forms.
// Lead with them so the right one is the obvious one to copy.
if v2 := cert.V2Form(c); v2 != nil {
fp, err := c.Fingerprint()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error while computing fingerprint: %s", err)
}
v2fp, err := v2.Fingerprint()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error while computing v2 fingerprint: %s", err)
}
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(out, "Fingerprint: %s\nv2 fingerprint: %s (block this one in pki.blocklist, it covers both forms)\n", fp, v2fp)
}
_, _ = out.Write([]byte(c.String()))
_, _ = out.Write([]byte("\n"))
}
} }
if *pf.outQRPath != "" { if *pf.outQRPath != "" {
@@ -79,7 +106,7 @@ func printCert(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer) error {
part++ part++
} }
if *pf.json { if *pf.json && !qrToStdout {
b, _ := json.Marshal(jsonCerts) b, _ := json.Marshal(jsonCerts)
_, _ = out.Write(b) _, _ = out.Write(b)
_, _ = out.Write([]byte("\n")) _, _ = out.Write([]byte("\n"))
@@ -91,7 +118,7 @@ func printCert(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer) error {
return fmt.Errorf("error while generating qr code: %s", err) return fmt.Errorf("error while generating qr code: %s", err)
} }
err = os.WriteFile(*pf.outQRPath, b, 0600) err = writeOutput(*pf.outQRPath, b, 0600, out)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error while writing out-qr: %s", err) return fmt.Errorf("error while writing out-qr: %s", err)
} }
@@ -107,6 +134,7 @@ func printSummary() string {
func printHelp(out io.Writer) { func printHelp(out io.Writer) {
pf := newPrintFlags() pf := newPrintFlags()
out.Write([]byte("Usage of " + os.Args[0] + " " + printSummary() + "\n")) out.Write([]byte("Usage of " + os.Args[0] + " " + printSummary() + "\n"))
out.Write([]byte(stdioHelpText))
pf.set.SetOutput(out) pf.set.SetOutput(out)
pf.set.PrintDefaults() pf.set.PrintDefaults()
} }
+39
View File
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ func Test_printHelp(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal( assert.Equal(
t, t,
"Usage of "+os.Args[0]+" print <flags>: prints details about a certificate\n"+ "Usage of "+os.Args[0]+" print <flags>: prints details about a certificate\n"+
" Pass \"-\" to any path flag to read from stdin or write to stdout.\n"+
" -json\n"+ " -json\n"+
" \tOptional: outputs certificates in json format\n"+ " \tOptional: outputs certificates in json format\n"+
" -out-qr string\n"+ " -out-qr string\n"+
@@ -178,6 +179,44 @@ func Test_printCert(t *testing.T) {
ob.String(), ob.String(),
) )
assert.Empty(t, eb.String()) assert.Empty(t, eb.String())
// read cert from stdin
ob.Reset()
eb.Reset()
withStdin(t, bytes.NewReader(p))
err = printCert([]string{"-json", "-path", "-"}, ob, eb)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(
t,
`[{"details":{"curve":"CURVE25519","groups":["hi"],"isCa":false,"issuer":"`+c.Issuer()+`","name":"test","networks":["10.0.0.123/8"],"notAfter":"0001-01-01T00:00:00Z","notBefore":"0001-01-01T00:00:00Z","publicKey":"`+pk+`","unsafeNetworks":[]},"fingerprint":"`+fp+`","signature":"`+sig+`","version":1}]
`,
ob.String(),
)
assert.Empty(t, eb.String())
// -out-qr - sends only the PNG to stdout, suppressing the cert dump
ob.Reset()
eb.Reset()
withStdin(t, bytes.NewReader(p))
err = printCert([]string{"-path", "-", "-out-qr", "-"}, ob, eb)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, eb.String())
stdout := ob.Bytes()
require.NotEmpty(t, stdout)
// PNG magic, no PEM/JSON noise prepended
assert.Equal(t, []byte{0x89, 'P', 'N', 'G', 0x0d, 0x0a, 0x1a, 0x0a}, stdout[:8])
assert.NotContains(t, string(stdout), "NebulaCertificate")
assert.NotContains(t, string(stdout), `"details"`)
// json + out-qr - still suppresses json
ob.Reset()
eb.Reset()
withStdin(t, bytes.NewReader(p))
err = printCert([]string{"-json", "-path", "-", "-out-qr", "-"}, ob, eb)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, eb.String())
assert.Equal(t, []byte{0x89, 'P', 'N', 'G'}, ob.Bytes()[:4])
assert.NotContains(t, ob.String(), `"details"`)
} }
// NewTestCaCert will generate a CA cert // NewTestCaCert will generate a CA cert
+153 -56
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package main
import ( import (
"crypto/ecdh" "crypto/ecdh"
"crypto/fips140"
"crypto/rand" "crypto/rand"
"errors" "errors"
"flag" "flag"
@@ -43,7 +44,7 @@ type signFlags struct {
func newSignFlags() *signFlags { func newSignFlags() *signFlags {
sf := signFlags{set: flag.NewFlagSet("sign", flag.ContinueOnError)} sf := signFlags{set: flag.NewFlagSet("sign", flag.ContinueOnError)}
sf.set.Usage = func() {} sf.set.Usage = func() {}
sf.version = sf.set.Uint("version", 0, "Optional: version of the certificate format to use. The default is to match the version of the signing CA") sf.version = sf.set.Uint("version", 0, "Optional: version of the certificate format to use. The default is to match the version of the signing CA. A version 3 CA also signs version 2 certificates, as its v2 form")
sf.caKeyPath = sf.set.String("ca-key", "ca.key", "Optional: path to the signing CA key") sf.caKeyPath = sf.set.String("ca-key", "ca.key", "Optional: path to the signing CA key")
sf.caCertPath = sf.set.String("ca-crt", "ca.crt", "Optional: path to the signing CA cert") sf.caCertPath = sf.set.String("ca-crt", "ca.crt", "Optional: path to the signing CA cert")
sf.name = sf.set.String("name", "", "Required: name of the cert, usually a hostname") sf.name = sf.set.String("name", "", "Required: name of the cert, usually a hostname")
@@ -85,6 +86,9 @@ func signCert(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader)
if !isP11 && *sf.inPubPath != "" && *sf.outKeyPath != "" { if !isP11 && *sf.inPubPath != "" && *sf.outKeyPath != "" {
return newHelpErrorf("cannot set both -in-pub and -out-key") return newHelpErrorf("cannot set both -in-pub and -out-key")
} }
if isP11 && *sf.outKeyPath != "" {
return newHelpErrorf("cannot set -out-key with -pkcs11")
}
var v4Networks []netip.Prefix var v4Networks []netip.Prefix
var v6Networks []netip.Prefix var v6Networks []netip.Prefix
@@ -98,8 +102,31 @@ func signCert(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader)
} }
version := cert.Version(*sf.version) version := cert.Version(*sf.version)
if version != 0 && version != cert.Version1 && version != cert.Version2 { if version != 0 && version != cert.Version1 && version != cert.Version2 && version != cert.Version3 {
return newHelpErrorf("-version must be either %v or %v", cert.Version1, cert.Version2) return newHelpErrorf("-version must be %v, %v or %v", cert.Version1, cert.Version2, cert.Version3)
}
if *sf.outKeyPath == "" {
*sf.outKeyPath = *sf.name + ".key"
}
if *sf.outCertPath == "" {
*sf.outCertPath = *sf.name + ".crt"
}
var claims ioClaims
if err := reserveInputs(&claims,
"ca-key", *sf.caKeyPath,
"ca-crt", *sf.caCertPath,
"in-pub", *sf.inPubPath,
); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := reserveOutputs(&claims,
"out-key", *sf.outKeyPath,
"out-crt", *sf.outCertPath,
"out-qr", *sf.outQRPath,
); err != nil {
return err
} }
var curve cert.Curve var curve cert.Curve
@@ -107,47 +134,18 @@ func signCert(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader)
if !isP11 { if !isP11 {
var rawCAKey []byte var rawCAKey []byte
rawCAKey, err := os.ReadFile(*sf.caKeyPath) rawCAKey, err = readInput("ca-key", *sf.caKeyPath, &claims)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error while reading ca-key: %s", err) return fmt.Errorf("error while reading ca-key: %s", err)
} }
// naively attempt to decode the private key as though it is not encrypted curve, caKey, _, err = readSigningKey(rawCAKey, errOut, pr)
caKey, _, curve, err = cert.UnmarshalSigningPrivateKeyFromPEM(rawCAKey) if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, cert.ErrPrivateKeyEncrypted) { return err
var passphrase []byte
passphrase = []byte(os.Getenv("NEBULA_CA_PASSPHRASE"))
if len(passphrase) == 0 {
// ask for a passphrase until we get one
for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
out.Write([]byte("Enter passphrase: "))
passphrase, err = pr.ReadPassword()
if errors.Is(err, ErrNoTerminal) {
return fmt.Errorf("ca-key is encrypted and must be decrypted interactively")
} else if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error reading password: %s", err)
}
if len(passphrase) > 0 {
break
}
}
if len(passphrase) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("cannot open encrypted ca-key without passphrase")
}
}
curve, caKey, _, err = cert.DecryptAndUnmarshalSigningPrivateKey(passphrase, rawCAKey)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error while parsing encrypted ca-key: %s", err)
}
} else if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error while parsing ca-key: %s", err)
} }
} }
rawCACert, err := os.ReadFile(*sf.caCertPath) rawCACert, err := readInput("ca-crt", *sf.caCertPath, &claims)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error while reading ca-crt: %s", err) return fmt.Errorf("error while reading ca-crt: %s", err)
} }
@@ -171,13 +169,30 @@ func signCert(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader)
version = caCert.Version() version = caCert.Version()
} }
// A version 3 certificate is in the suite of its CA.
suite := cert.PQSuiteOf(caCert)
switch {
case version == cert.Version3 && caCert.Version() != cert.Version3:
return newHelpErrorf("version 3 certificates must be signed by a version 3 CA")
case version == cert.Version3 && isP11:
return newHelpErrorf("version 3 certificates can not be signed with -pkcs11, the post-quantum key has to be in ca-key")
case version != cert.Version3 && caCert.Version() == cert.Version3:
// A v3 CA signs anything older as its v2 form, with the classical half of its key.
caCert = cert.V2Form(caCert)
if caKey != nil {
if caKey, _, err = suite.SplitPrivateKey(true, caKey); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error while parsing ca-key: %s", err)
}
}
}
// if no duration is given, expire one second before the root expires // if no duration is given, expire one second before the root expires
if *sf.duration <= 0 { if *sf.duration <= 0 {
*sf.duration = time.Until(caCert.NotAfter()) - time.Second*1 *sf.duration = time.Until(caCert.NotAfter()) - time.Second*1
} }
if *sf.networks != "" { if *sf.networks != "" {
for _, rs := range strings.Split(*sf.networks, ",") { for rs := range strings.SplitSeq(*sf.networks, ",") {
rs := strings.Trim(rs, " ") rs := strings.Trim(rs, " ")
if rs != "" { if rs != "" {
n, err := netip.ParsePrefix(rs) n, err := netip.ParsePrefix(rs)
@@ -202,7 +217,7 @@ func signCert(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader)
} }
if *sf.unsafeNetworks != "" { if *sf.unsafeNetworks != "" {
for _, rs := range strings.Split(*sf.unsafeNetworks, ",") { for rs := range strings.SplitSeq(*sf.unsafeNetworks, ",") {
rs := strings.Trim(rs, " ") rs := strings.Trim(rs, " ")
if rs != "" { if rs != "" {
n, err := netip.ParsePrefix(rs) n, err := netip.ParsePrefix(rs)
@@ -221,7 +236,7 @@ func signCert(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader)
var groups []string var groups []string
if *sf.groups != "" { if *sf.groups != "" {
for _, rg := range strings.Split(*sf.groups, ",") { for rg := range strings.SplitSeq(*sf.groups, ",") {
g := strings.TrimSpace(rg) g := strings.TrimSpace(rg)
if g != "" { if g != "" {
groups = append(groups, g) groups = append(groups, g)
@@ -243,9 +258,13 @@ func signCert(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader)
}(p11Client) }(p11Client)
} }
if fips140.Enforced() && curve == cert.Curve_CURVE25519 {
return errors.New("use of Curve25519 is not allowed in FIPS 140-only mode")
}
if *sf.inPubPath != "" { if *sf.inPubPath != "" {
var pubCurve cert.Curve var pubCurve cert.Curve
rawPub, err := os.ReadFile(*sf.inPubPath) rawPub, err := readInput("in-pub", *sf.inPubPath, &claims)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error while reading in-pub: %s", err) return fmt.Errorf("error while reading in-pub: %s", err)
} }
@@ -257,6 +276,16 @@ func signCert(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader)
if pubCurve != curve { if pubCurve != curve {
return fmt.Errorf("curve of in-pub does not match ca") return fmt.Errorf("curve of in-pub does not match ca")
} }
// Composite keys are longer than any classical one, an uncompressed P256 key being the longest.
if isPQ := len(pub) > 65; isPQ != (version == cert.Version3) {
if isPQ {
return fmt.Errorf("in-pub has a post-quantum key, which only version 3 certificates carry")
}
return fmt.Errorf("version 3 certificates need an in-pub from keygen -version 3")
}
if _, _, err := suite.SplitPublicKey(false, pub); version == cert.Version3 && err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("in-pub is not a key for the CA's post-quantum suite, %v", suite)
}
} else if isP11 { } else if isP11 {
pub, err = p11Client.GetPubKey() pub, err = p11Client.GetPubKey()
if err != nil { if err != nil {
@@ -264,18 +293,18 @@ func signCert(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader)
} }
} else { } else {
pub, rawPriv = newKeypair(curve) pub, rawPriv = newKeypair(curve)
if version == cert.Version3 {
pub, rawPriv, err = appendPQKey(suite, pub, rawPriv)
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
} }
if *sf.outKeyPath == "" { if !isStdio(*sf.outCertPath) {
*sf.outKeyPath = *sf.name + ".key" if _, err := os.Stat(*sf.outCertPath); err == nil {
} return fmt.Errorf("refusing to overwrite existing cert: %s", *sf.outCertPath)
}
if *sf.outCertPath == "" {
*sf.outCertPath = *sf.name + ".crt"
}
if _, err := os.Stat(*sf.outCertPath); err == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("refusing to overwrite existing cert: %s", *sf.outCertPath)
} }
var crts []cert.Certificate var crts []cert.Certificate
@@ -354,17 +383,45 @@ func signCert(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader)
} }
crts = append(crts, nc) crts = append(crts, nc)
case cert.Version3:
t := &cert.TBSCertificate{
Version: cert.Version3,
Name: *sf.name,
Networks: append(v4Networks, v6Networks...),
Groups: groups,
UnsafeNetworks: append(v4UnsafeNetworks, v6UnsafeNetworks...),
NotBefore: notBefore,
NotAfter: notAfter,
PublicKey: pub,
IsCA: false,
Curve: curve,
PQSuite: suite,
}
nc, err := t.Sign(caCert, curve, caKey)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error while signing: %w", err)
}
crts = append(crts, nc)
default: default:
// this should be unreachable // this should be unreachable
return fmt.Errorf("invalid version: %d", version) return fmt.Errorf("invalid version: %d", version)
} }
if !isP11 && *sf.inPubPath == "" { if !isP11 && *sf.inPubPath == "" {
if _, err := os.Stat(*sf.outKeyPath); err == nil { if !isStdio(*sf.outKeyPath) {
return fmt.Errorf("refusing to overwrite existing key: %s", *sf.outKeyPath) if _, err := os.Stat(*sf.outKeyPath); err == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("refusing to overwrite existing key: %s", *sf.outKeyPath)
}
} }
err = os.WriteFile(*sf.outKeyPath, cert.MarshalPrivateKeyToPEM(curve, rawPriv), 0600) b := cert.MarshalPrivateKeyToPEM(curve, rawPriv)
if version == cert.Version3 {
b = cert.MarshalPQPrivateKeyToPEM(curve, suite, rawPriv)
}
err = writeOutput(*sf.outKeyPath, b, 0600, out)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error while writing out-key: %s", err) return fmt.Errorf("error while writing out-key: %s", err)
} }
@@ -379,7 +436,7 @@ func signCert(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader)
b = append(b, sb...) b = append(b, sb...)
} }
err = os.WriteFile(*sf.outCertPath, b, 0600) err = writeOutput(*sf.outCertPath, b, 0600, out)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error while writing out-crt: %s", err) return fmt.Errorf("error while writing out-crt: %s", err)
} }
@@ -390,7 +447,7 @@ func signCert(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader)
return fmt.Errorf("error while generating qr code: %s", err) return fmt.Errorf("error while generating qr code: %s", err)
} }
err = os.WriteFile(*sf.outQRPath, b, 0600) err = writeOutput(*sf.outQRPath, b, 0600, out)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error while writing out-qr: %s", err) return fmt.Errorf("error while writing out-qr: %s", err)
} }
@@ -440,6 +497,46 @@ func signSummary() string {
func signHelp(out io.Writer) { func signHelp(out io.Writer) {
sf := newSignFlags() sf := newSignFlags()
out.Write([]byte("Usage of " + os.Args[0] + " " + signSummary() + "\n")) out.Write([]byte("Usage of " + os.Args[0] + " " + signSummary() + "\n"))
out.Write([]byte(stdioHelpText))
sf.set.SetOutput(out) sf.set.SetOutput(out)
sf.set.PrintDefaults() sf.set.PrintDefaults()
} }
// readSigningKey decodes a CA key, asking for its passphrase if it is encrypted.
// The passphrase is returned too, nil for a key that was not encrypted.
func readSigningKey(rawCAKey []byte, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader) (cert.Curve, []byte, []byte, error) {
// naively attempt to decode the private key as though it is not encrypted
caKey, _, curve, err := cert.UnmarshalSigningPrivateKeyFromPEM(rawCAKey)
if errors.Is(err, cert.ErrPrivateKeyEncrypted) {
var passphrase []byte
passphrase = []byte(os.Getenv("NEBULA_CA_PASSPHRASE"))
if len(passphrase) == 0 {
// ask for a passphrase until we get one
for range 5 {
errOut.Write([]byte("Enter passphrase: "))
passphrase, err = pr.ReadPassword()
if errors.Is(err, ErrNoTerminal) {
return 0, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ca-key is encrypted and must be decrypted interactively")
} else if err != nil {
return 0, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("error reading password: %s", err)
}
if len(passphrase) > 0 {
break
}
}
if len(passphrase) == 0 {
return 0, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot open encrypted ca-key without passphrase")
}
}
curve, caKey, _, err = cert.DecryptAndUnmarshalSigningPrivateKey(passphrase, rawCAKey)
if err != nil {
return 0, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("error while parsing encrypted ca-key: %s", err)
}
return curve, caKey, passphrase, nil
} else if err != nil {
return 0, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("error while parsing ca-key: %s", err)
}
return curve, caKey, nil, nil
}
+112 -9
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
//go:build !windows //go:build !windows
// +build !windows
package main package main
@@ -27,6 +26,7 @@ func Test_signHelp(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal( assert.Equal(
t, t,
"Usage of "+os.Args[0]+" sign <flags>: create and sign a certificate\n"+ "Usage of "+os.Args[0]+" sign <flags>: create and sign a certificate\n"+
" Pass \"-\" to any path flag to read from stdin or write to stdout.\n"+
" -ca-crt string\n"+ " -ca-crt string\n"+
" \tOptional: path to the signing CA cert (default \"ca.crt\")\n"+ " \tOptional: path to the signing CA cert (default \"ca.crt\")\n"+
" -ca-key string\n"+ " -ca-key string\n"+
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ func Test_signHelp(t *testing.T) {
" -unsafe-networks string\n"+ " -unsafe-networks string\n"+
" \tOptional: comma separated list of ip address and network in CIDR notation. Unsafe networks this cert can route for\n"+ " \tOptional: comma separated list of ip address and network in CIDR notation. Unsafe networks this cert can route for\n"+
" -version uint\n"+ " -version uint\n"+
" \tOptional: version of the certificate format to use. The default is to match the version of the signing CA\n", " \tOptional: version of the certificate format to use. The default is to match the version of the signing CA. A version 3 CA also signs version 2 certificates, as its v2 form\n",
ob.String(), ob.String(),
) )
} }
@@ -376,15 +376,18 @@ func Test_signCert(t *testing.T) {
// test with the proper password // test with the proper password
args = []string{"-version", "1", "-ca-crt", caCrtF.Name(), "-ca-key", caKeyF.Name(), "-name", "test", "-ip", "1.1.1.1/24", "-out-crt", crtF.Name(), "-out-key", keyF.Name(), "-duration", "100m", "-subnets", "10.1.1.1/32, , 10.2.2.2/32 , , ,, 10.5.5.5/32", "-groups", "1,, 2 , ,,,3,4,5"} args = []string{"-version", "1", "-ca-crt", caCrtF.Name(), "-ca-key", caKeyF.Name(), "-name", "test", "-ip", "1.1.1.1/24", "-out-crt", crtF.Name(), "-out-key", keyF.Name(), "-duration", "100m", "-subnets", "10.1.1.1/32, , 10.2.2.2/32 , , ,, 10.5.5.5/32", "-groups", "1,, 2 , ,,,3,4,5"}
require.NoError(t, signCert(args, ob, eb, testpw)) require.NoError(t, signCert(args, ob, eb, testpw))
assert.Equal(t, "Enter passphrase: ", ob.String()) assert.Empty(t, ob.String())
assert.Empty(t, eb.String()) assert.Equal(t, "Enter passphrase: ", eb.String())
// test with the proper password in the environment // test with the proper password in the environment
os.Remove(crtF.Name()) os.Remove(crtF.Name())
os.Remove(keyF.Name()) os.Remove(keyF.Name())
args = []string{"-version", "1", "-ca-crt", caCrtF.Name(), "-ca-key", caKeyF.Name(), "-name", "test", "-ip", "1.1.1.1/24", "-out-crt", crtF.Name(), "-out-key", keyF.Name(), "-duration", "100m", "-subnets", "10.1.1.1/32, , 10.2.2.2/32 , , ,, 10.5.5.5/32", "-groups", "1,, 2 , ,,,3,4,5"} args = []string{"-version", "1", "-ca-crt", caCrtF.Name(), "-ca-key", caKeyF.Name(), "-name", "test", "-ip", "1.1.1.1/24", "-out-crt", crtF.Name(), "-out-key", keyF.Name(), "-duration", "100m", "-subnets", "10.1.1.1/32, , 10.2.2.2/32 , , ,, 10.5.5.5/32", "-groups", "1,, 2 , ,,,3,4,5"}
os.Setenv("NEBULA_CA_PASSPHRASE", string(passphrase)) os.Setenv("NEBULA_CA_PASSPHRASE", string(passphrase))
ob.Reset()
eb.Reset()
require.NoError(t, signCert(args, ob, eb, testpw)) require.NoError(t, signCert(args, ob, eb, testpw))
assert.Empty(t, ob.String())
assert.Empty(t, eb.String()) assert.Empty(t, eb.String())
os.Setenv("NEBULA_CA_PASSPHRASE", "") os.Setenv("NEBULA_CA_PASSPHRASE", "")
@@ -395,8 +398,8 @@ func Test_signCert(t *testing.T) {
testpw.password = []byte("invalid password") testpw.password = []byte("invalid password")
args = []string{"-version", "1", "-ca-crt", caCrtF.Name(), "-ca-key", caKeyF.Name(), "-name", "test", "-ip", "1.1.1.1/24", "-out-crt", crtF.Name(), "-out-key", keyF.Name(), "-duration", "100m", "-subnets", "10.1.1.1/32, , 10.2.2.2/32 , , ,, 10.5.5.5/32", "-groups", "1,, 2 , ,,,3,4,5"} args = []string{"-version", "1", "-ca-crt", caCrtF.Name(), "-ca-key", caKeyF.Name(), "-name", "test", "-ip", "1.1.1.1/24", "-out-crt", crtF.Name(), "-out-key", keyF.Name(), "-duration", "100m", "-subnets", "10.1.1.1/32, , 10.2.2.2/32 , , ,, 10.5.5.5/32", "-groups", "1,, 2 , ,,,3,4,5"}
require.Error(t, signCert(args, ob, eb, testpw)) require.Error(t, signCert(args, ob, eb, testpw))
assert.Equal(t, "Enter passphrase: ", ob.String()) assert.Empty(t, ob.String())
assert.Empty(t, eb.String()) assert.Equal(t, "Enter passphrase: ", eb.String())
// test with the wrong password in environment // test with the wrong password in environment
ob.Reset() ob.Reset()
@@ -416,8 +419,8 @@ func Test_signCert(t *testing.T) {
args = []string{"-version", "1", "-ca-crt", caCrtF.Name(), "-ca-key", caKeyF.Name(), "-name", "test", "-ip", "1.1.1.1/24", "-out-crt", crtF.Name(), "-out-key", keyF.Name(), "-duration", "100m", "-subnets", "10.1.1.1/32, , 10.2.2.2/32 , , ,, 10.5.5.5/32", "-groups", "1,, 2 , ,,,3,4,5"} args = []string{"-version", "1", "-ca-crt", caCrtF.Name(), "-ca-key", caKeyF.Name(), "-name", "test", "-ip", "1.1.1.1/24", "-out-crt", crtF.Name(), "-out-key", keyF.Name(), "-duration", "100m", "-subnets", "10.1.1.1/32, , 10.2.2.2/32 , , ,, 10.5.5.5/32", "-groups", "1,, 2 , ,,,3,4,5"}
require.Error(t, signCert(args, ob, eb, nopw)) require.Error(t, signCert(args, ob, eb, nopw))
// normally the user hitting enter on the prompt would add newlines between these // normally the user hitting enter on the prompt would add newlines between these
assert.Equal(t, "Enter passphrase: Enter passphrase: Enter passphrase: Enter passphrase: Enter passphrase: ", ob.String()) assert.Empty(t, ob.String())
assert.Empty(t, eb.String()) assert.Equal(t, "Enter passphrase: Enter passphrase: Enter passphrase: Enter passphrase: Enter passphrase: ", eb.String())
// test an error condition // test an error condition
ob.Reset() ob.Reset()
@@ -425,6 +428,106 @@ func Test_signCert(t *testing.T) {
args = []string{"-version", "1", "-ca-crt", caCrtF.Name(), "-ca-key", caKeyF.Name(), "-name", "test", "-ip", "1.1.1.1/24", "-out-crt", crtF.Name(), "-out-key", keyF.Name(), "-duration", "100m", "-subnets", "10.1.1.1/32, , 10.2.2.2/32 , , ,, 10.5.5.5/32", "-groups", "1,, 2 , ,,,3,4,5"} args = []string{"-version", "1", "-ca-crt", caCrtF.Name(), "-ca-key", caKeyF.Name(), "-name", "test", "-ip", "1.1.1.1/24", "-out-crt", crtF.Name(), "-out-key", keyF.Name(), "-duration", "100m", "-subnets", "10.1.1.1/32, , 10.2.2.2/32 , , ,, 10.5.5.5/32", "-groups", "1,, 2 , ,,,3,4,5"}
require.Error(t, signCert(args, ob, eb, errpw)) require.Error(t, signCert(args, ob, eb, errpw))
assert.Equal(t, "Enter passphrase: ", ob.String()) assert.Empty(t, ob.String())
assert.Equal(t, "Enter passphrase: ", eb.String())
}
func Test_signCert_stdio(t *testing.T) {
nopw := &StubPasswordReader{
password: []byte(""),
err: nil,
}
caPub, caPriv, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
rawCAKey := cert.MarshalSigningPrivateKeyToPEM(cert.Curve_CURVE25519, caPriv)
ca, _ := NewTestCaCert("ca", caPub, caPriv, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(time.Minute*200), nil, nil, nil)
rawCACrt, _ := ca.MarshalPEM()
caCrtF, err := os.CreateTemp("", "sign-cert.crt")
require.NoError(t, err)
defer os.Remove(caCrtF.Name())
caCrtF.Write(rawCACrt)
caKeyF, err := os.CreateTemp("", "sign-cert.key")
require.NoError(t, err)
defer os.Remove(caKeyF.Name())
caKeyF.Write(rawCAKey)
keyF, err := os.CreateTemp("", "sign.key")
require.NoError(t, err)
os.Remove(keyF.Name())
defer os.Remove(keyF.Name())
// ca-key on stdin, cert to stdout
withStdin(t, bytes.NewReader(rawCAKey))
ob := &bytes.Buffer{}
eb := &bytes.Buffer{}
args := []string{"-version", "1", "-ca-crt", caCrtF.Name(), "-ca-key", "-", "-name", "stdin-test", "-ip", "1.1.1.1/24", "-out-crt", "-", "-out-key", keyF.Name(), "-duration", "100m"}
require.NoError(t, signCert(args, ob, eb, nopw))
assert.Empty(t, eb.String()) assert.Empty(t, eb.String())
lCrt, _, err := cert.UnmarshalCertificateFromPEM(ob.Bytes())
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "stdin-test", lCrt.Name())
assert.True(t, lCrt.CheckSignature(caPub))
// two flags reading from stdin should error before any read attempt;
// otherwise an interactive shell would hang on io.ReadAll
stdinIn := bytes.NewReader(rawCAKey)
withStdin(t, stdinIn)
ob.Reset()
eb.Reset()
args = []string{"-version", "1", "-ca-crt", "-", "-ca-key", "-", "-name", "stdin-test", "-ip", "1.1.1.1/24", "-out-crt", "nope", "-out-key", "nope", "-duration", "100m"}
require.EqualError(t, signCert(args, ob, eb, nopw),
`-ca-key and -ca-crt both set to "-", only one input may read from stdin`)
assert.Equal(t, len(rawCAKey), stdinIn.Len(), "stdin should be untouched when conflict is caught up front")
// two flags writing to stdout should error before any output is written
// AND before stdin is consumed
stdinR := bytes.NewReader(rawCAKey)
withStdin(t, stdinR)
ob.Reset()
eb.Reset()
args = []string{"-version", "1", "-ca-crt", caCrtF.Name(), "-ca-key", "-", "-name", "stdin-test", "-ip", "1.1.1.1/24", "-out-crt", "-", "-out-key", "-", "-duration", "100m"}
require.EqualError(t, signCert(args, ob, eb, nopw),
`-out-key and -out-crt both set to "-", only one output may write to stdout`)
assert.Empty(t, ob.String())
// stdin should be untouched because the conflict was caught up front
assert.Equal(t, len(rawCAKey), stdinR.Len())
// out-key on stdout, cert on disk
keyF2, err := os.CreateTemp("", "sign.key")
require.NoError(t, err)
os.Remove(keyF2.Name())
defer os.Remove(keyF2.Name())
crtF, err := os.CreateTemp("", "sign.crt")
require.NoError(t, err)
os.Remove(crtF.Name())
defer os.Remove(crtF.Name())
ob.Reset()
eb.Reset()
args = []string{"-version", "1", "-ca-crt", caCrtF.Name(), "-ca-key", caKeyF.Name(), "-name", "stdin-test", "-ip", "1.1.1.1/24", "-out-crt", crtF.Name(), "-out-key", "-", "-duration", "100m"}
require.NoError(t, signCert(args, ob, eb, nopw))
assert.Empty(t, eb.String())
_, _, curve, err := cert.UnmarshalPrivateKeyFromPEM(ob.Bytes())
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, curve)
// in-pub on stdin (caller already has a keypair, only the cert is generated)
inPub, _ := x25519Keypair()
rawInPub := cert.MarshalPublicKeyToPEM(cert.Curve_CURVE25519, inPub)
withStdin(t, bytes.NewReader(rawInPub))
os.Remove(crtF.Name())
ob.Reset()
eb.Reset()
args = []string{"-version", "1", "-ca-crt", caCrtF.Name(), "-ca-key", caKeyF.Name(), "-name", "in-pub-test", "-ip", "1.1.1.1/24", "-in-pub", "-", "-out-crt", "-", "-duration", "100m"}
require.NoError(t, signCert(args, ob, eb, nopw))
assert.Empty(t, eb.String())
stdinCrt, _, err := cert.UnmarshalCertificateFromPEM(ob.Bytes())
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "in-pub-test", stdinCrt.Name())
assert.Equal(t, inPub, stdinCrt.PublicKey())
} }
+117
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
package main
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
)
// stdioPath is the special path value that selects stdin (for inputs) or
// stdout (for outputs) instead of a file on disk.
const stdioPath = "-"
// stdioHelpText is rendered just under the Usage line of each subcommand
// help so the - convention is documented once instead of on every flag.
const stdioHelpText = " Pass \"-\" to any path flag to read from stdin or write to stdout.\n"
// stdinReader is the source used when an input flag is set to "-".
// It is a package level var so tests can swap in a deterministic reader.
// Tests that mutate stdinReader cannot run with t.Parallel().
var stdinReader io.Reader = os.Stdin
// ioClaims tracks which flags have claimed stdin and stdout during a single
// command invocation so we can refuse a second flag asking for the same
// stream.
type ioClaims struct {
in string
out string
}
func (c *ioClaims) claimIn(flagName string) error {
if c.in != "" && c.in != flagName {
return fmt.Errorf("-%s and -%s both set to %q, only one input may read from stdin", c.in, flagName, stdioPath)
}
c.in = flagName
return nil
}
func (c *ioClaims) claimOut(flagName string) error {
if c.out != "" && c.out != flagName {
return fmt.Errorf("-%s and -%s both set to %q, only one output may write to stdout", c.out, flagName, stdioPath)
}
c.out = flagName
return nil
}
// reserveInputs walks alternating (flagName, path) pairs and claims stdin
// for any path equal to stdioPath. It must be called before any input is
// read so a conflict can be reported immediately instead of blocking on
// io.ReadAll while waiting for input that will never arrive.
func reserveInputs(claims *ioClaims, pairs ...string) error {
return reserveStdio(claims, "reserveInputs", (*ioClaims).claimIn, pairs)
}
// reserveOutputs walks alternating (flagName, path) pairs and claims stdout
// for any path equal to stdioPath. It must be called before any output is
// written so a conflict cannot leave one stream half written before the
// second flag fails.
func reserveOutputs(claims *ioClaims, pairs ...string) error {
return reserveStdio(claims, "reserveOutputs", (*ioClaims).claimOut, pairs)
}
func reserveStdio(claims *ioClaims, who string, claim func(*ioClaims, string) error, pairs []string) error {
if len(pairs)%2 != 0 {
panic(who + " requires alternating name, path pairs")
}
for i := 0; i < len(pairs); i += 2 {
name, path := pairs[i], pairs[i+1]
if path != stdioPath {
continue
}
if err := claim(claims, name); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// readInput returns the bytes referenced by path, reading from stdin when
// path is stdioPath.
func readInput(flagName, path string, claims *ioClaims) ([]byte, error) {
if path == stdioPath {
if err := claims.claimIn(flagName); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return io.ReadAll(stdinReader)
}
return os.ReadFile(path)
}
// openInput returns a reader for path. When path is stdioPath the returned
// reader wraps stdin and Close is a no-op.
func openInput(flagName, path string, claims *ioClaims) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
if path == stdioPath {
if err := claims.claimIn(flagName); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return io.NopCloser(stdinReader), nil
}
return os.Open(path)
}
// writeOutput writes data to path, or to stdout when path is stdioPath. perm
// is only used for file output. The caller must have already claimed stdout
// via reserveOutputs before invoking with stdioPath.
func writeOutput(path string, data []byte, perm os.FileMode, stdout io.Writer) error {
if path == stdioPath {
_, err := stdout.Write(data)
return err
}
return os.WriteFile(path, data, perm)
}
// isStdio reports whether path is the stdio sentinel and so should skip
// existence checks like "refuse to overwrite".
func isStdio(path string) bool {
return path == stdioPath
}
+167
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
package main
import (
"bytes"
"io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// withStdin temporarily replaces stdinReader for the duration of t.
func withStdin(t *testing.T, r io.Reader) {
t.Helper()
prev := stdinReader
stdinReader = r
t.Cleanup(func() { stdinReader = prev })
}
func Test_readInput_stdin(t *testing.T) {
withStdin(t, bytes.NewBufferString("hello"))
var claims ioClaims
got, err := readInput("path", "-", &claims)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, []byte("hello"), got)
assert.Equal(t, "path", claims.in)
}
func Test_readInput_file(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
p := filepath.Join(dir, "f")
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(p, []byte("file"), 0600))
var claims ioClaims
got, err := readInput("path", p, &claims)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, []byte("file"), got)
assert.Empty(t, claims.in)
}
func Test_readInput_doubleStdinErrors(t *testing.T) {
withStdin(t, bytes.NewBufferString("hello"))
var claims ioClaims
_, err := readInput("ca-key", "-", &claims)
require.NoError(t, err)
_, err = readInput("ca-crt", "-", &claims)
require.EqualError(t, err, `-ca-key and -ca-crt both set to "-", only one input may read from stdin`)
}
func Test_openInput_stdin(t *testing.T) {
withStdin(t, bytes.NewBufferString("hi"))
var claims ioClaims
r, err := openInput("ca", "-", &claims)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer r.Close()
b, err := io.ReadAll(r)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, []byte("hi"), b)
}
func Test_openInput_doubleStdinErrors(t *testing.T) {
withStdin(t, bytes.NewBufferString("hi"))
var claims ioClaims
r, err := openInput("ca", "-", &claims)
require.NoError(t, err)
r.Close()
_, err = openInput("crt", "-", &claims)
require.EqualError(t, err, `-ca and -crt both set to "-", only one input may read from stdin`)
}
func Test_writeOutput_stdout(t *testing.T) {
out := &bytes.Buffer{}
err := writeOutput("-", []byte("payload"), 0600, out)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "payload", out.String())
}
func Test_writeOutput_file(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
p := filepath.Join(dir, "f")
out := &bytes.Buffer{}
err := writeOutput(p, []byte("payload"), 0600, out)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, out.String())
got, err := os.ReadFile(p)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, []byte("payload"), got)
}
func Test_reserveOutputs_noConflict(t *testing.T) {
var claims ioClaims
require.NoError(t, reserveOutputs(&claims,
"out-key", "/tmp/key",
"out-crt", "-",
"out-qr", "",
))
assert.Equal(t, "out-crt", claims.out)
}
func Test_reserveOutputs_conflict(t *testing.T) {
var claims ioClaims
err := reserveOutputs(&claims,
"out-key", "-",
"out-crt", "-",
)
require.EqualError(t, err, `-out-key and -out-crt both set to "-", only one output may write to stdout`)
}
func Test_reserveOutputs_panicsOnOddPairs(t *testing.T) {
defer func() {
r := recover()
require.NotNil(t, r)
}()
var claims ioClaims
_ = reserveOutputs(&claims, "out-key")
}
func Test_reserveInputs_noConflict(t *testing.T) {
var claims ioClaims
require.NoError(t, reserveInputs(&claims,
"ca-key", "/tmp/ca.key",
"ca-crt", "-",
"in-pub", "",
))
assert.Equal(t, "ca-crt", claims.in)
}
func Test_reserveInputs_conflict(t *testing.T) {
var claims ioClaims
err := reserveInputs(&claims,
"ca-key", "-",
"ca-crt", "-",
)
require.EqualError(t, err, `-ca-key and -ca-crt both set to "-", only one input may read from stdin`)
}
func Test_claimIn_idempotent(t *testing.T) {
// pre-claim then a lazy re-claim of the same flag should be a no-op
var claims ioClaims
require.NoError(t, claims.claimIn("ca-key"))
require.NoError(t, claims.claimIn("ca-key"))
assert.Equal(t, "ca-key", claims.in)
}
func Test_claimOut_idempotent(t *testing.T) {
var claims ioClaims
require.NoError(t, claims.claimOut("out-crt"))
require.NoError(t, claims.claimOut("out-crt"))
assert.Equal(t, "out-crt", claims.out)
}
func Test_isStdio(t *testing.T) {
assert.True(t, isStdio("-"))
assert.False(t, isStdio(""))
assert.False(t, isStdio("./-"))
assert.False(t, isStdio("foo"))
}
+15 -13
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
"fmt" "fmt"
"io" "io"
"os" "os"
"strings"
"time" "time"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert" "github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
@@ -40,24 +39,26 @@ func verify(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer) error {
return err return err
} }
rawCACert, err := os.ReadFile(*vf.caPath) var claims ioClaims
if err := reserveInputs(&claims,
"ca", *vf.caPath,
"crt", *vf.certPath,
); err != nil {
return err
}
caReader, err := openInput("ca", *vf.caPath, &claims)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error while reading ca: %w", err) return fmt.Errorf("error while reading ca: %w", err)
} }
defer caReader.Close()
caPool := cert.NewCAPool() caPool, err := cert.NewCAPoolFromPEMReader(caReader)
for { if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, cert.ErrExpired) {
rawCACert, err = caPool.AddCAFromPEM(rawCACert) return fmt.Errorf("error while adding ca cert to pool: %w", err)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error while adding ca cert to pool: %w", err)
}
if rawCACert == nil || len(rawCACert) == 0 || strings.TrimSpace(string(rawCACert)) == "" {
break
}
} }
rawCert, err := os.ReadFile(*vf.certPath) rawCert, err := readInput("crt", *vf.certPath, &claims)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("unable to read crt: %w", err) return fmt.Errorf("unable to read crt: %w", err)
} }
@@ -92,6 +93,7 @@ func verifySummary() string {
func verifyHelp(out io.Writer) { func verifyHelp(out io.Writer) {
vf := newVerifyFlags() vf := newVerifyFlags()
_, _ = out.Write([]byte("Usage of " + os.Args[0] + " " + verifySummary() + "\n")) _, _ = out.Write([]byte("Usage of " + os.Args[0] + " " + verifySummary() + "\n"))
_, _ = out.Write([]byte(stdioHelpText))
vf.set.SetOutput(out) vf.set.SetOutput(out)
vf.set.PrintDefaults() vf.set.PrintDefaults()
} }
+45 -1
View File
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ func Test_verifyHelp(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal( assert.Equal(
t, t,
"Usage of "+os.Args[0]+" verify <flags>: verifies a certificate isn't expired and was signed by a trusted authority.\n"+ "Usage of "+os.Args[0]+" verify <flags>: verifies a certificate isn't expired and was signed by a trusted authority.\n"+
" Pass \"-\" to any path flag to read from stdin or write to stdout.\n"+
" -ca string\n"+ " -ca string\n"+
" \tRequired: path to a file containing one or more ca certificates\n"+ " \tRequired: path to a file containing one or more ca certificates\n"+
" -crt string\n"+ " -crt string\n"+
@@ -64,7 +65,7 @@ func Test_verify(t *testing.T) {
err = verify([]string{"-ca", caFile.Name(), "-crt", "does_not_exist"}, ob, eb) err = verify([]string{"-ca", caFile.Name(), "-crt", "does_not_exist"}, ob, eb)
assert.Empty(t, ob.String()) assert.Empty(t, ob.String())
assert.Empty(t, eb.String()) assert.Empty(t, eb.String())
require.EqualError(t, err, "error while adding ca cert to pool: input did not contain a valid PEM encoded block") require.ErrorIs(t, err, cert.ErrInvalidPEMBlock)
// make a ca for later // make a ca for later
caPub, caPriv, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) caPub, caPriv, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
@@ -122,3 +123,46 @@ func Test_verify(t *testing.T) {
assert.Empty(t, eb.String()) assert.Empty(t, eb.String())
require.NoError(t, err) require.NoError(t, err)
} }
func Test_verify_stdio(t *testing.T) {
ob := &bytes.Buffer{}
eb := &bytes.Buffer{}
caPub, caPriv, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
ca, _ := NewTestCaCert("test-ca", caPub, caPriv, time.Now().Add(time.Hour*-1), time.Now().Add(time.Hour*2), nil, nil, nil)
caPEM, _ := ca.MarshalPEM()
crt, _ := NewTestCert(ca, caPriv, "test-cert", time.Now().Add(time.Hour*-1), time.Now().Add(time.Hour), nil, nil, nil)
crtPEM, _ := crt.MarshalPEM()
caFile, err := os.CreateTemp("", "verify-ca")
require.NoError(t, err)
defer os.Remove(caFile.Name())
caFile.Write(caPEM)
// crt on stdin, ca on disk
withStdin(t, bytes.NewReader(crtPEM))
require.NoError(t, verify([]string{"-ca", caFile.Name(), "-crt", "-"}, ob, eb))
assert.Empty(t, ob.String())
assert.Empty(t, eb.String())
// ca on stdin, crt on disk
certFile, err := os.CreateTemp("", "verify-cert")
require.NoError(t, err)
defer os.Remove(certFile.Name())
certFile.Write(crtPEM)
withStdin(t, bytes.NewReader(caPEM))
ob.Reset()
eb.Reset()
require.NoError(t, verify([]string{"-ca", "-", "-crt", certFile.Name()}, ob, eb))
assert.Empty(t, ob.String())
assert.Empty(t, eb.String())
// both flags on stdin should error
withStdin(t, bytes.NewReader(caPEM))
ob.Reset()
eb.Reset()
require.EqualError(t, verify([]string{"-ca", "-", "-crt", "-"}, ob, eb),
`-ca and -crt both set to "-", only one input may read from stdin`)
}
+5
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
//go:build fips140enforce
//go:debug fips140=only
package main
+10 -4
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,16 @@
//go:build !windows //go:build !windows
// +build !windows
package main package main
import "github.com/sirupsen/logrus" import (
"log/slog"
"os"
func HookLogger(l *logrus.Logger) { "github.com/slackhq/nebula/logging"
// Do nothing, let the logs flow to stdout/stderr )
// newPlatformLogger returns a *slog.Logger that writes to stdout. Non-Windows
// platforms have no special sink to integrate with.
func newPlatformLogger() *slog.Logger {
return logging.NewLogger(os.Stdout)
} }
+71 -39
View File
@@ -1,54 +1,86 @@
package main package main
import ( import (
"fmt" "context"
"io/ioutil" "log/slog"
"os" "strings"
"sync"
"github.com/kardianos/service" "github.com/slackhq/nebula/logging"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
) )
// HookLogger routes the logrus logs through the service logger so that they end up in the Windows Event Viewer // newPlatformLogger returns a *slog.Logger that routes every log record
// logrus output will be discarded // through the Windows service logger so records end up in the Windows
func HookLogger(l *logrus.Logger) { // Event Log. All the heavy lifting (level management, format swap,
l.AddHook(newLogHook(logger)) // timestamp toggle, WithAttrs/WithGroup) comes from logging.NewHandler;
l.SetOutput(ioutil.Discard) // this file only contributes:
//
// - an io.Writer that forwards each formatted line to the service
// logger at the current record's Event Log severity, and
// - a thin severityTag that embeds *logging.Handler and overrides
// only Handle / WithAttrs / WithGroup, so Event Viewer's severity
// column and severity-based filters keep working the way they did
// before the slog migration.
//
// Format (text vs json) is carried by the embedded *logging.Handler, so
// logging.format: json in config still produces JSON lines in Event
// Viewer, same as the pre-slog logrus setup.
func newPlatformLogger() *slog.Logger {
w := &eventLogWriter{}
return slog.New(&severityTag{Handler: logging.NewHandler(w), w: w})
} }
type logHook struct { // eventLogWriter forwards slog-formatted lines to the Windows service
sl service.Logger // logger at the severity most recently stashed by severityTag.Handle.
// The mutex serializes the stash + inner.Handle + Write cycle per record
// across all concurrent goroutines; slog's builtin text/json handlers
// each hold their own mutex around Write, but that only protects the
// Write call itself, not our stash-then-handle sequence.
type eventLogWriter struct {
mu sync.Mutex
level slog.Level
} }
func newLogHook(sl service.Logger) *logHook { func (w *eventLogWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
return &logHook{sl: sl} line := strings.TrimRight(string(p), "\n")
} switch {
case w.level >= slog.LevelError:
func (h *logHook) Fire(entry *logrus.Entry) error { return len(p), logger.Error(line)
line, err := entry.String() case w.level >= slog.LevelWarn:
if err != nil { return len(p), logger.Warning(line)
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Unable to read entry, %v", err)
return err
}
switch entry.Level {
case logrus.PanicLevel:
return h.sl.Error(line)
case logrus.FatalLevel:
return h.sl.Error(line)
case logrus.ErrorLevel:
return h.sl.Error(line)
case logrus.WarnLevel:
return h.sl.Warning(line)
case logrus.InfoLevel:
return h.sl.Info(line)
case logrus.DebugLevel:
return h.sl.Info(line)
default: default:
return nil return len(p), logger.Info(line)
} }
} }
func (h *logHook) Levels() []logrus.Level { // severityTag embeds *logging.Handler to pick up everything it does for
return logrus.AllLevels // free (Enabled, SetLevel, GetLevel, SetFormat, GetFormat,
// SetDisableTimestamp) and overrides only Handle / WithAttrs / WithGroup
// so each record's slog.Level is stashed on the writer before formatting
// and so derived handlers stay wrapped as severityTag rather than
// downgrading to bare *logging.Handler.
type severityTag struct {
*logging.Handler
w *eventLogWriter
}
func (s *severityTag) Handle(ctx context.Context, r slog.Record) error {
s.w.mu.Lock()
defer s.w.mu.Unlock()
s.w.level = r.Level
return s.Handler.Handle(ctx, r)
}
func (s *severityTag) WithAttrs(attrs []slog.Attr) slog.Handler {
if len(attrs) == 0 {
return s
}
return &severityTag{Handler: s.Handler.WithAttrs(attrs).(*logging.Handler), w: s.w}
}
func (s *severityTag) WithGroup(name string) slog.Handler {
if name == "" {
return s
}
return &severityTag{Handler: s.Handler.WithGroup(name).(*logging.Handler), w: s.w}
} }
+42 -11
View File
@@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ import (
"runtime/debug" "runtime/debug"
"strings" "strings"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula" "github.com/slackhq/nebula"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config" "github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/logging"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util" "github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
) )
@@ -50,20 +50,30 @@ func main() {
os.Exit(0) os.Exit(0)
} }
l := logging.NewLogger(os.Stdout)
if *serviceFlag != "" { if *serviceFlag != "" {
doService(configPath, configTest, Build, serviceFlag) if *configTest {
os.Exit(1) fmt.Println("-test is not supported with -service, run the config test without -service")
os.Exit(1)
}
if err := doService(configPath, Build, serviceFlag); err != nil {
l.Error("Service command failed", "error", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
return
} }
if *configPath == "" { if *configPath == "" {
fmt.Println("-config flag must be set") p, err := config.DefaultPath()
flag.Usage() if err != nil {
os.Exit(1) fmt.Println(err)
os.Exit(1)
}
*configPath = p
} }
l := logrus.New()
l.Out = os.Stdout
c := config.NewC(l) c := config.NewC(l)
err := c.Load(*configPath) err := c.Load(*configPath)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
@@ -71,6 +81,16 @@ func main() {
os.Exit(1) os.Exit(1)
} }
if err := logging.ApplyConfig(l, c); err != nil {
fmt.Printf("failed to apply logging config: %s", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
c.RegisterReloadCallback(func(c *config.C) {
if err := logging.ApplyConfig(l, c); err != nil {
l.Error("Failed to reconfigure logger on reload", "error", err)
}
})
ctrl, err := nebula.Main(c, *configTest, Build, l, nil) ctrl, err := nebula.Main(c, *configTest, Build, l, nil)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
util.LogWithContextIfNeeded("Failed to start", err, l) util.LogWithContextIfNeeded("Failed to start", err, l)
@@ -78,8 +98,19 @@ func main() {
} }
if !*configTest { if !*configTest {
ctrl.Start() if err := ctrl.Start(); err != nil {
ctrl.ShutdownBlock() util.LogWithContextIfNeeded("Error while running", err, l)
os.Exit(1)
}
go ctrl.ShutdownBlock()
if err := ctrl.Wait(); err != nil {
l.Error("Nebula stopped due to fatal error", "error", err)
os.Exit(2)
}
l.Info("Goodbye")
} }
os.Exit(0) os.Exit(0)
+45 -33
View File
@@ -4,19 +4,17 @@ import (
"fmt" "fmt"
"log" "log"
"os" "os"
"path/filepath"
"github.com/kardianos/service" "github.com/kardianos/service"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula" "github.com/slackhq/nebula"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config" "github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/logging"
) )
var logger service.Logger var logger service.Logger
type program struct { type program struct {
configPath *string configPath *string
configTest *bool
build string build string
control *nebula.Control control *nebula.Control
} }
@@ -25,8 +23,7 @@ func (p *program) Start(s service.Service) error {
// Start should not block. // Start should not block.
logger.Info("Nebula service starting.") logger.Info("Nebula service starting.")
l := logrus.New() l := newPlatformLogger()
HookLogger(l)
c := config.NewC(l) c := config.NewC(l)
err := c.Load(*p.configPath) err := c.Load(*p.configPath)
@@ -34,39 +31,56 @@ func (p *program) Start(s service.Service) error {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to load config: %s", err) return fmt.Errorf("failed to load config: %s", err)
} }
p.control, err = nebula.Main(c, *p.configTest, Build, l, nil) if err := logging.ApplyConfig(l, c); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to apply logging config: %s", err)
}
c.RegisterReloadCallback(func(c *config.C) {
if err := logging.ApplyConfig(l, c); err != nil {
l.Error("Failed to reconfigure logger on reload", "error", err)
}
})
p.control, err = nebula.Main(c, false, Build, l, nil)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return err return err
} }
p.control.Start() if err := p.control.Start(); err != nil {
return err
}
// Nebula can stop itself on a fatal packet reader error, make sure to log it if it happens.
go func() {
if err := p.control.Wait(); err != nil {
logger.Error(fmt.Sprintf("Nebula stopped due to fatal error: %v", err))
os.Exit(2)
}
}()
return nil return nil
} }
func (p *program) Stop(s service.Service) error { func (p *program) Stop(s service.Service) error {
logger.Info("Nebula service stopping.") logger.Info("Nebula service stopping.")
if p.control == nil {
return nil
}
p.control.Stop() p.control.Stop()
// block until nebula has fully drained before reporting stopped.
// error logging is handled by Start.
_ = p.control.Wait()
return nil return nil
} }
func fileExists(filename string) bool { func doService(configPath *string, build string, serviceFlag *string) error {
_, err := os.Stat(filename)
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
return false
}
return true
}
func doService(configPath *string, configTest *bool, build string, serviceFlag *string) {
if *configPath == "" { if *configPath == "" {
ex, err := os.Executable() p, err := config.DefaultPath()
if err != nil { if err != nil {
panic(err) return err
}
*configPath = filepath.Dir(ex) + "/config.yaml"
if !fileExists(*configPath) {
*configPath = filepath.Dir(ex) + "/config.yml"
} }
*configPath = p
} }
svcConfig := &service.Config{ svcConfig := &service.Config{
@@ -78,23 +92,22 @@ func doService(configPath *string, configTest *bool, build string, serviceFlag *
prg := &program{ prg := &program{
configPath: configPath, configPath: configPath,
configTest: configTest,
build: build, build: build,
} }
// Here are what the different loggers are doing: // Here are what the different loggers are doing:
// - `log` is the standard go log utility, meant to be used while the process is still attached to stdout/stderr // - `log` is the standard go log utility, meant to be used while the process is still attached to stdout/stderr
// - `logger` is the service log utility that may be attached to a special place depending on OS (Windows will have it attached to the event log) // - `logger` is the service log utility that may be attached to a special place depending on OS (Windows will have it attached to the event log)
// - above, in `Run` we create a `logrus.Logger` which is what nebula expects to use // - in program.Start we build a *slog.Logger via newPlatformLogger; on non-Windows that is a stdout-backed slog logger, on Windows it routes records through the service logger
s, err := service.New(prg, svcConfig) s, err := service.New(prg, svcConfig)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
log.Fatal(err) return err
} }
errs := make(chan error, 5) errs := make(chan error, 5)
logger, err = s.Logger(errs) logger, err = s.Logger(errs)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
log.Fatal(err) return err
} }
go func() { go func() {
@@ -109,18 +122,17 @@ func doService(configPath *string, configTest *bool, build string, serviceFlag *
switch *serviceFlag { switch *serviceFlag {
case "run": case "run":
err = s.Run() if err := s.Run(); err != nil {
if err != nil { // Route any errors to the system logger and report the failure
// Route any errors to the system logger
logger.Error(err) logger.Error(err)
return err
} }
default: default:
err := service.Control(s, *serviceFlag) if err := service.Control(s, *serviceFlag); err != nil {
if err != nil {
log.Printf("Valid actions: %q\n", service.ControlAction) log.Printf("Valid actions: %q\n", service.ControlAction)
log.Fatal(err) return err
} }
return
} }
return nil
} }
+96
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
//go:build linux && !android && !e2e_testing
package main
import (
"fmt"
"net/netip"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
cert_test "github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// TestControlStopClosesOnTimer reproduces the dnclient lifecycle: nebula runs as
// a library, and on a config update dnclient calls Stop() in-process to tear the
// old instance down before starting a new one. This boots a real nebula (real
// blocking UDP sockets, tun disabled), lets it run, then Stop()s it on a timer
// and asserts it actually closes. If the reader goroutines parked in recvmmsg
// don't wake on Close(), Wait() blocks forever and this fails with a goroutine
// dump instead of relying on a process signal to unstick them.
func TestControlStopClosesOnTimer(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
dir := t.TempDir()
before := time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)
after := time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
ca, _, caKey, caPEM := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, before, after, nil, nil, nil)
networks := []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")}
_, _, keyPEM, certPEM := cert_test.NewTestCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, ca, caKey, "close-on-timer", before, after, networks, nil, nil)
caPath := filepath.Join(dir, "ca.pem")
certPath := filepath.Join(dir, "cert.pem")
keyPath := filepath.Join(dir, "key.pem")
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(caPath, caPEM, 0o600))
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(certPath, certPEM, 0o600))
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(keyPath, keyPEM, 0o600))
// tun disabled so no device/root is needed; routines: 2 so we exercise the
// multi-socket (SO_REUSEPORT) teardown, which is where dnclient runs.
configBody := fmt.Sprintf(`
pki:
ca: %s
cert: %s
key: %s
listen:
host: 127.0.0.1
port: 0
tun:
disabled: true
firewall:
outbound:
- port: any
proto: any
host: any
inbound:
- port: any
proto: any
host: any
routines: 2
`, caPath, certPath, keyPath)
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "config.yml"), []byte(configBody), 0o600))
c := config.NewC(l)
require.NoError(t, c.Load(dir))
ctrl, err := nebula.Main(c, false, "close-on-timer", l, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, ctrl.Start())
// Run like a live nebula, then close on a timer, exactly as dnclient does.
<-time.NewTimer(5 * time.Second).C
stopped := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
ctrl.Stop() // closes the udp sockets (shutdown(2)) and the tun
ctrl.Wait() // blocks until every reader goroutine has returned
close(stopped)
}()
select {
case <-stopped:
t.Log("nebula closed cleanly on timer")
case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
buf := make([]byte, 1<<20)
n := runtime.Stack(buf, true)
t.Fatalf("nebula did NOT close within 10s of Stop(): a blocking reader never woke\n%s", buf[:n])
}
}
+5
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
//go:build fips140enforce
//go:debug fips140=only
package main
+31 -8
View File
@@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ import (
"runtime/debug" "runtime/debug"
"strings" "strings"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula" "github.com/slackhq/nebula"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config" "github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/logging"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util" "github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
) )
@@ -50,13 +50,15 @@ func main() {
} }
if *configPath == "" { if *configPath == "" {
fmt.Println("-config flag must be set") p, err := config.DefaultPath()
flag.Usage() if err != nil {
os.Exit(1) fmt.Println(err)
os.Exit(1)
}
*configPath = p
} }
l := logrus.New() l := logging.NewLogger(os.Stdout)
l.Out = os.Stdout
c := config.NewC(l) c := config.NewC(l)
err := c.Load(*configPath) err := c.Load(*configPath)
@@ -65,6 +67,16 @@ func main() {
os.Exit(1) os.Exit(1)
} }
if err := logging.ApplyConfig(l, c); err != nil {
fmt.Printf("failed to apply logging config: %s", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
c.RegisterReloadCallback(func(c *config.C) {
if err := logging.ApplyConfig(l, c); err != nil {
l.Error("Failed to reconfigure logger on reload", "error", err)
}
})
ctrl, err := nebula.Main(c, *configTest, Build, l, nil) ctrl, err := nebula.Main(c, *configTest, Build, l, nil)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
util.LogWithContextIfNeeded("Failed to start", err, l) util.LogWithContextIfNeeded("Failed to start", err, l)
@@ -72,9 +84,20 @@ func main() {
} }
if !*configTest { if !*configTest {
ctrl.Start() if err := ctrl.Start(); err != nil {
util.LogWithContextIfNeeded("Error while running", err, l)
os.Exit(1)
}
go ctrl.ShutdownBlock()
notifyReady(l) notifyReady(l)
ctrl.ShutdownBlock()
if err := ctrl.Wait(); err != nil {
l.Error("Nebula stopped due to fatal error", "error", err)
os.Exit(2)
}
l.Info("Goodbye")
} }
os.Exit(0) os.Exit(0)
+7 -8
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,10 @@
package main package main
import ( import (
"log/slog"
"net" "net"
"os" "os"
"time" "time"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
) )
// SdNotifyReady tells systemd the service is ready and dependent services can now be started // SdNotifyReady tells systemd the service is ready and dependent services can now be started
@@ -13,30 +12,30 @@ import (
// https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.service.html // https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.service.html
const SdNotifyReady = "READY=1" const SdNotifyReady = "READY=1"
func notifyReady(l *logrus.Logger) { func notifyReady(l *slog.Logger) {
sockName := os.Getenv("NOTIFY_SOCKET") sockName := os.Getenv("NOTIFY_SOCKET")
if sockName == "" { if sockName == "" {
l.Debugln("NOTIFY_SOCKET systemd env var not set, not sending ready signal") l.Debug("NOTIFY_SOCKET systemd env var not set, not sending ready signal")
return return
} }
conn, err := net.DialTimeout("unixgram", sockName, time.Second) conn, err := net.DialTimeout("unixgram", sockName, time.Second)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
l.WithError(err).Error("failed to connect to systemd notification socket") l.Error("failed to connect to systemd notification socket", "error", err)
return return
} }
defer conn.Close() defer conn.Close()
err = conn.SetWriteDeadline(time.Now().Add(time.Second)) err = conn.SetWriteDeadline(time.Now().Add(time.Second))
if err != nil { if err != nil {
l.WithError(err).Error("failed to set the write deadline for the systemd notification socket") l.Error("failed to set the write deadline for the systemd notification socket", "error", err)
return return
} }
if _, err = conn.Write([]byte(SdNotifyReady)); err != nil { if _, err = conn.Write([]byte(SdNotifyReady)); err != nil {
l.WithError(err).Error("failed to signal the systemd notification socket") l.Error("failed to signal the systemd notification socket", "error", err)
return return
} }
l.Debugln("notified systemd the service is ready") l.Debug("notified systemd the service is ready")
} }
+2 -3
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,9 @@
//go:build !linux //go:build !linux
// +build !linux
package main package main
import "github.com/sirupsen/logrus" import "log/slog"
func notifyReady(_ *logrus.Logger) { func notifyReady(_ *slog.Logger) {
// No init service to notify // No init service to notify
} }
+21 -15
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ import (
"context" "context"
"errors" "errors"
"fmt" "fmt"
"log/slog"
"maps"
"math" "math"
"os" "os"
"os/signal" "os/signal"
@@ -16,7 +18,6 @@ import (
"time" "time"
"dario.cat/mergo" "dario.cat/mergo"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"go.yaml.in/yaml/v3" "go.yaml.in/yaml/v3"
) )
@@ -26,11 +27,11 @@ type C struct {
Settings map[string]any Settings map[string]any
oldSettings map[string]any oldSettings map[string]any
callbacks []func(*C) callbacks []func(*C)
l *logrus.Logger l *slog.Logger
reloadLock sync.Mutex reloadLock sync.Mutex
} }
func NewC(l *logrus.Logger) *C { func NewC(l *slog.Logger) *C {
return &C{ return &C{
Settings: make(map[string]any), Settings: make(map[string]any),
l: l, l: l,
@@ -107,12 +108,18 @@ func (c *C) HasChanged(k string) bool {
newVals, err := yaml.Marshal(nv) newVals, err := yaml.Marshal(nv)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
c.l.WithField("config_path", k).WithError(err).Error("Error while marshaling new config") c.l.Error("Error while marshaling new config",
"config_path", k,
"error", err,
)
} }
oldVals, err := yaml.Marshal(ov) oldVals, err := yaml.Marshal(ov)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
c.l.WithField("config_path", k).WithError(err).Error("Error while marshaling old config") c.l.Error("Error while marshaling old config",
"config_path", k,
"error", err,
)
} }
return string(newVals) != string(oldVals) return string(newVals) != string(oldVals)
@@ -148,13 +155,14 @@ func (c *C) ReloadConfig() {
defer c.reloadLock.Unlock() defer c.reloadLock.Unlock()
c.oldSettings = make(map[string]any) c.oldSettings = make(map[string]any)
for k, v := range c.Settings { maps.Copy(c.oldSettings, c.Settings)
c.oldSettings[k] = v
}
err := c.Load(c.path) err := c.Load(c.path)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
c.l.WithField("config_path", c.path).WithError(err).Error("Error occurred while reloading config") c.l.Error("Error occurred while reloading config",
"config_path", c.path,
"error", err,
)
return return
} }
@@ -168,9 +176,7 @@ func (c *C) ReloadConfigString(raw string) error {
defer c.reloadLock.Unlock() defer c.reloadLock.Unlock()
c.oldSettings = make(map[string]any) c.oldSettings = make(map[string]any)
for k, v := range c.Settings { maps.Copy(c.oldSettings, c.Settings)
c.oldSettings[k] = v
}
err := c.LoadString(raw) err := c.LoadString(raw)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
@@ -207,7 +213,7 @@ func (c *C) GetStringSlice(k string, d []string) []string {
} }
v := make([]string, len(rv)) v := make([]string, len(rv))
for i := 0; i < len(v); i++ { for i := range v {
v[i] = fmt.Sprintf("%v", rv[i]) v[i] = fmt.Sprintf("%v", rv[i])
} }
@@ -301,8 +307,8 @@ func (c *C) IsSet(k string) bool {
} }
func (c *C) get(k string, v any) any { func (c *C) get(k string, v any) any {
parts := strings.Split(k, ".") parts := strings.SplitSeq(k, ".")
for _, p := range parts { for p := range parts {
m, ok := v.(map[string]any) m, ok := v.(map[string]any)
if !ok { if !ok {
return nil return nil
+29
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
package config
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
)
// DefaultPath returns a path to a config file alongside the running executable, preferring config.yaml over config.yml.
// If neither file exists an error is returned that names both paths checked.
func DefaultPath() (string, error) {
ex, err := os.Executable()
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return defaultPathInDir(filepath.Dir(ex))
}
func defaultPathInDir(dir string) (string, error) {
yamlPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.yaml")
if _, err := os.Stat(yamlPath); err == nil {
return yamlPath, nil
}
ymlPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.yml")
if _, err := os.Stat(ymlPath); err == nil {
return ymlPath, nil
}
return "", fmt.Errorf("no default config found at %s or %s", yamlPath, ymlPath)
}
+67
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
package config
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestDefaultPathInDir(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("prefers config.yaml when both exist", func(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
want := filepath.Join(dir, "config.yaml")
other := filepath.Join(dir, "config.yml")
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(want, []byte("a: 1"), 0644))
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(other, []byte("a: 2"), 0644))
got, err := defaultPathInDir(dir)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, want, got)
})
t.Run("returns config.yaml when only it exists", func(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
want := filepath.Join(dir, "config.yaml")
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(want, []byte("a: 1"), 0644))
got, err := defaultPathInDir(dir)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, want, got)
})
t.Run("falls back to config.yml when only it exists", func(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
want := filepath.Join(dir, "config.yml")
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(want, []byte("a: 1"), 0644))
got, err := defaultPathInDir(dir)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, want, got)
})
t.Run("errors when neither exists and names both paths", func(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
got, err := defaultPathInDir(dir)
assert.Empty(t, got)
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), filepath.Join(dir, "config.yaml"))
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), filepath.Join(dir, "config.yml"))
})
}
func TestDefaultPath(t *testing.T) {
got, err := DefaultPath()
if err != nil {
ex, exErr := os.Executable()
require.NoError(t, exErr)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), filepath.Dir(ex))
return
}
ex, err := os.Executable()
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, filepath.Dir(ex), filepath.Dir(got))
assert.Contains(t, []string{"config.yaml", "config.yml"}, filepath.Base(got))
}
+114 -120
View File
@@ -5,13 +5,12 @@ import (
"context" "context"
"encoding/binary" "encoding/binary"
"fmt" "fmt"
"log/slog"
"net/netip" "net/netip"
"sync" "sync"
"sync/atomic" "sync/atomic"
"time" "time"
"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert" "github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config" "github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header" "github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
@@ -45,19 +44,16 @@ type connectionManager struct {
inactivityTimeout atomic.Int64 inactivityTimeout atomic.Int64
dropInactive atomic.Bool dropInactive atomic.Bool
metricsTxPunchy metrics.Counter l *slog.Logger
l *logrus.Logger
} }
func newConnectionManagerFromConfig(l *logrus.Logger, c *config.C, hm *HostMap, p *Punchy) *connectionManager { func newConnectionManagerFromConfig(l *slog.Logger, c *config.C, hm *HostMap, p *Punchy) *connectionManager {
cm := &connectionManager{ cm := &connectionManager{
hostMap: hm, hostMap: hm,
l: l, l: l,
punchy: p, punchy: p,
relayUsed: make(map[uint32]struct{}), relayUsed: make(map[uint32]struct{}),
relayUsedLock: &sync.RWMutex{}, relayUsedLock: &sync.RWMutex{},
metricsTxPunchy: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("messages.tx.punchy", nil),
} }
cm.reload(c, true) cm.reload(c, true)
@@ -85,9 +81,10 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) reload(c *config.C, initial bool) {
old := cm.getInactivityTimeout() old := cm.getInactivityTimeout()
cm.inactivityTimeout.Store((int64)(c.GetDuration("tunnels.inactivity_timeout", 10*time.Minute))) cm.inactivityTimeout.Store((int64)(c.GetDuration("tunnels.inactivity_timeout", 10*time.Minute)))
if !initial { if !initial {
cm.l.WithField("oldDuration", old). cm.l.Info("Inactivity timeout has changed",
WithField("newDuration", cm.getInactivityTimeout()). "oldDuration", old,
Info("Inactivity timeout has changed") "newDuration", cm.getInactivityTimeout(),
)
} }
} }
@@ -95,9 +92,10 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) reload(c *config.C, initial bool) {
old := cm.dropInactive.Load() old := cm.dropInactive.Load()
cm.dropInactive.Store(c.GetBool("tunnels.drop_inactive", false)) cm.dropInactive.Store(c.GetBool("tunnels.drop_inactive", false))
if !initial { if !initial {
cm.l.WithField("oldBool", old). cm.l.Info("Drop inactive setting has changed",
WithField("newBool", cm.dropInactive.Load()). "oldBool", old,
Info("Drop inactive setting has changed") "newBool", cm.dropInactive.Load(),
)
} }
} }
} }
@@ -107,11 +105,18 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) getInactivityTimeout() time.Duration {
} }
func (cm *connectionManager) In(h *HostInfo) { func (cm *connectionManager) In(h *HostInfo) {
h.in.Store(true) h.markIn()
} }
func (cm *connectionManager) Out(h *HostInfo) { // OutNoRebind records outbound traffic without consuming the rebind epoch, for relayed sends: the direct path
h.out.Store(true) // to the relay consumes the edge, the via send must not.
func (cm *connectionManager) OutNoRebind(h *HostInfo) {
h.markOutOnly()
}
// Out records outbound traffic and reports whether we rebound since this tunnel last sent
func (cm *connectionManager) Out(h *HostInfo) bool {
return h.markOut(cm.intf.rebindEpoch.Load())
} }
func (cm *connectionManager) RelayUsed(localIndex uint32) { func (cm *connectionManager) RelayUsed(localIndex uint32) {
@@ -130,22 +135,13 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) RelayUsed(localIndex uint32) {
// getAndResetTrafficCheck returns if there was any inbound or outbound traffic within the last tick and // getAndResetTrafficCheck returns if there was any inbound or outbound traffic within the last tick and
// resets the state for this local index // resets the state for this local index
func (cm *connectionManager) getAndResetTrafficCheck(h *HostInfo, now time.Time) (bool, bool) { func (cm *connectionManager) getAndResetTrafficCheck(h *HostInfo, now time.Time) (bool, bool) {
in := h.in.Swap(false) in, out := h.takeTraffic()
out := h.out.Swap(false)
if in || out { if in || out {
h.lastUsed = now h.lastUsed = now
} }
return in, out return in, out
} }
// AddTrafficWatch must be called for every new HostInfo.
// We will continue to monitor the HostInfo until the tunnel is dropped.
func (cm *connectionManager) AddTrafficWatch(h *HostInfo) {
if h.out.Swap(true) == false {
cm.trafficTimer.Add(h.localIndexId, cm.checkInterval)
}
}
func (cm *connectionManager) Start(ctx context.Context) { func (cm *connectionManager) Start(ctx context.Context) {
clockSource := time.NewTicker(cm.trafficTimer.t.tickDuration) clockSource := time.NewTicker(cm.trafficTimer.t.tickDuration)
defer clockSource.Stop() defer clockSource.Stop()
@@ -178,10 +174,8 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) doTrafficCheck(localIndex uint32, p, nb, out []byte
switch decision { switch decision {
case deleteTunnel: case deleteTunnel:
if cm.hostMap.DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo) { // Local delete only, clearing the lighthouse cache if this was the last hostinfo for the vpn addr
// Only clearing the lighthouse cache if this is the last hostinfo for this vpn ip in the hostmap cm.intf.closeTunnel(hostinfo)
cm.intf.lightHouse.DeleteVpnAddrs(hostinfo.vpnAddrs)
}
case closeTunnel: case closeTunnel:
cm.intf.sendCloseTunnel(hostinfo) cm.intf.sendCloseTunnel(hostinfo)
@@ -256,7 +250,7 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) migrateRelayUsed(oldhostinfo, newhostinfo *HostInfo
var err error var err error
index, err = AddRelay(cm.l, newhostinfo, cm.hostMap, r.PeerAddr, nil, r.Type, Requested) index, err = AddRelay(cm.l, newhostinfo, cm.hostMap, r.PeerAddr, nil, r.Type, Requested)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
cm.l.WithError(err).Error("failed to migrate relay to new hostinfo") cm.l.Error("failed to migrate relay to new hostinfo", "error", err)
continue continue
} }
switch r.Type { switch r.Type {
@@ -278,7 +272,7 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) migrateRelayUsed(oldhostinfo, newhostinfo *HostInfo
InitiatorRelayIndex: index, InitiatorRelayIndex: index,
} }
switch newhostinfo.GetCert().Certificate.Version() { switch protocolVersion(newhostinfo.GetCert().Certificate.Version()) {
case cert.Version1: case cert.Version1:
if !relayFrom.Is4() { if !relayFrom.Is4() {
cm.l.Error("can not migrate v1 relay with a v6 network because the relay is not running a current nebula version") cm.l.Error("can not migrate v1 relay with a v6 network because the relay is not running a current nebula version")
@@ -304,16 +298,16 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) migrateRelayUsed(oldhostinfo, newhostinfo *HostInfo
msg, err := req.Marshal() msg, err := req.Marshal()
if err != nil { if err != nil {
cm.l.WithError(err).Error("failed to marshal Control message to migrate relay") cm.l.Error("failed to marshal Control message to migrate relay", "error", err)
} else { } else {
cm.intf.SendMessageToHostInfo(header.Control, 0, newhostinfo, msg, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu)) cm.intf.SendMessageToHostInfo(header.Control, 0, newhostinfo, msg, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
cm.l.WithFields(logrus.Fields{ cm.l.Info("send CreateRelayRequest",
"relayFrom": req.RelayFromAddr, "relayFrom", relayFrom,
"relayTo": req.RelayToAddr, "relayTo", relayTo,
"initiatorRelayIndex": req.InitiatorRelayIndex, "initiatorRelayIndex", req.InitiatorRelayIndex,
"responderRelayIndex": req.ResponderRelayIndex, "responderRelayIndex", req.ResponderRelayIndex,
"vpnAddrs": newhostinfo.vpnAddrs}). "vpnAddrs", newhostinfo.vpnAddrs,
Info("send CreateRelayRequest") )
} }
} }
} }
@@ -325,7 +319,7 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) makeTrafficDecision(localIndex uint32, now time.Tim
hostinfo := cm.hostMap.Indexes[localIndex] hostinfo := cm.hostMap.Indexes[localIndex]
if hostinfo == nil { if hostinfo == nil {
cm.l.WithField("localIndex", localIndex).Debugln("Not found in hostmap") cm.l.Debug("Not found in hostmap", "localIndex", localIndex)
return doNothing, nil, nil return doNothing, nil, nil
} }
@@ -333,6 +327,12 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) makeTrafficDecision(localIndex uint32, now time.Tim
return closeTunnel, hostinfo, nil return closeTunnel, hostinfo, nil
} }
if hostinfo.ConnectionState != nil && hostinfo.ConnectionState.messageCounter.Load() >= RejectAfterMessages {
// Send path can't encrypt a CloseTunnel notify, so just delete locally; the peer recovers via recv_error.
hostinfo.logger(cm.l).Error("Dropping tunnel, message counter is exhausted")
return deleteTunnel, hostinfo, nil
}
primary := cm.hostMap.Hosts[hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0]] primary := cm.hostMap.Hosts[hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0]]
mainHostInfo := true mainHostInfo := true
if primary != nil && primary != hostinfo { if primary != nil && primary != hostinfo {
@@ -345,12 +345,12 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) makeTrafficDecision(localIndex uint32, now time.Tim
// A hostinfo is determined alive if there is incoming traffic // A hostinfo is determined alive if there is incoming traffic
if inTraffic { if inTraffic {
decision := doNothing decision := doNothing
if cm.l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel { if cm.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(cm.l). hostinfo.logger(cm.l).Debug("Tunnel status",
WithField("tunnelCheck", m{"state": "alive", "method": "passive"}). "tunnelCheck", m{"state": "alive", "method": "passive"},
Debug("Tunnel status") )
} }
hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Store(false) hostinfo.setPendingDeletion(false)
if mainHostInfo { if mainHostInfo {
decision = tryRehandshake decision = tryRehandshake
@@ -367,17 +367,17 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) makeTrafficDecision(localIndex uint32, now time.Tim
if !outTraffic { if !outTraffic {
// Send a punch packet to keep the NAT state alive // Send a punch packet to keep the NAT state alive
cm.sendPunch(hostinfo) cm.punchy.SendPunch(hostinfo)
} }
return decision, hostinfo, primary return decision, hostinfo, primary
} }
if hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load() { if hostinfo.isPendingDeletion() {
// We have already sent a test packet and nothing was returned, this hostinfo is dead // We have already sent a test packet and nothing was returned, this hostinfo is dead
hostinfo.logger(cm.l). hostinfo.logger(cm.l).Info("Tunnel status",
WithField("tunnelCheck", m{"state": "dead", "method": "active"}). "tunnelCheck", m{"state": "dead", "method": "active"},
Info("Tunnel status") )
return deleteTunnel, hostinfo, nil return deleteTunnel, hostinfo, nil
} }
@@ -388,44 +388,43 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) makeTrafficDecision(localIndex uint32, now time.Tim
inactiveFor, isInactive := cm.isInactive(hostinfo, now) inactiveFor, isInactive := cm.isInactive(hostinfo, now)
if isInactive { if isInactive {
// Tunnel is inactive, tear it down // Tunnel is inactive, tear it down
hostinfo.logger(cm.l). hostinfo.logger(cm.l).Info("Dropping tunnel due to inactivity",
WithField("inactiveDuration", inactiveFor). "inactiveDuration", inactiveFor,
WithField("primary", mainHostInfo). "primary", mainHostInfo,
Info("Dropping tunnel due to inactivity") )
return closeTunnel, hostinfo, primary return closeTunnel, hostinfo, primary
} }
// If we aren't sending or receiving traffic then its an unused tunnel and we don't to test the tunnel. // If we aren't sending or receiving traffic then its an unused tunnel and we don't to test the tunnel.
// Just maintain NAT state if configured to do so. // Just maintain NAT state if configured to do so.
cm.sendPunch(hostinfo) cm.punchy.SendPunch(hostinfo)
cm.trafficTimer.Add(hostinfo.localIndexId, cm.checkInterval) cm.trafficTimer.Add(hostinfo.localIndexId, cm.checkInterval)
return doNothing, nil, nil return doNothing, nil, nil
} }
if cm.punchy.GetTargetEverything() { // We aren't receiving traffic but we are sending it. The outbound
// This is similar to the old punchy behavior with a slight optimization. // traffic itself refreshes the primary remote's NAT state; this
// We aren't receiving traffic but we are sending it, punch on all known // fans out to non-primary remotes, but only if target_all_remotes
// ips in case we need to re-prime NAT state // is configured.
cm.sendPunch(hostinfo) cm.punchy.SendPunchToAll(hostinfo)
}
if cm.l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel { if cm.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(cm.l). hostinfo.logger(cm.l).Debug("Tunnel status",
WithField("tunnelCheck", m{"state": "testing", "method": "active"}). "tunnelCheck", m{"state": "testing", "method": "active"},
Debug("Tunnel status") )
} }
// Send a test packet to trigger an authenticated tunnel test, this should suss out any lingering tunnel issues // Send a test packet to trigger an authenticated tunnel test, this should suss out any lingering tunnel issues
decision = sendTestPacket decision = sendTestPacket
} else { } else {
if cm.l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel { if cm.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(cm.l).Debugf("Hostinfo sadness") hostinfo.logger(cm.l).Debug("Hostinfo sadness")
} }
} }
hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Store(true) hostinfo.setPendingDeletion(true)
cm.trafficTimer.Add(hostinfo.localIndexId, cm.pendingDeletionInterval) cm.trafficTimer.Add(hostinfo.localIndexId, cm.pendingDeletionInterval)
return decision, hostinfo, nil return decision, hostinfo, nil
} }
@@ -459,6 +458,11 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) shouldSwapPrimary(current *HostInfo) bool {
return false return false
} }
if current.ConnectionState.messageCounter.Load() >= RehandshakeAfterMessages {
// This tunnel is being rolled for counter exhaustion, never swap back onto its spent key.
return false
}
crt := cm.intf.pki.getCertState().getCertificate(current.ConnectionState.myCert.Version()) crt := cm.intf.pki.getCertState().getCertificate(current.ConnectionState.myCert.Version())
if crt == nil { if crt == nil {
//my cert was reloaded away. We should definitely swap from this tunnel //my cert was reloaded away. We should definitely swap from this tunnel
@@ -493,14 +497,16 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) isInvalidCertificate(now time.Time, hostinfo *HostI
return false //cert is still valid! yay! return false //cert is still valid! yay!
} else if err == cert.ErrBlockListed { //avoiding errors.Is for speed } else if err == cert.ErrBlockListed { //avoiding errors.Is for speed
// Block listed certificates should always be disconnected // Block listed certificates should always be disconnected
hostinfo.logger(cm.l).WithError(err). hostinfo.logger(cm.l).Info("Remote certificate is blocked, tearing down the tunnel",
WithField("fingerprint", remoteCert.Fingerprint). "error", err,
Info("Remote certificate is blocked, tearing down the tunnel") "fingerprint", remoteCert.Fingerprint,
)
return true return true
} else if cm.intf.disconnectInvalid.Load() { } else if cm.intf.disconnectInvalid.Load() {
hostinfo.logger(cm.l).WithError(err). hostinfo.logger(cm.l).Info("Remote certificate is no longer valid, tearing down the tunnel",
WithField("fingerprint", remoteCert.Fingerprint). "error", err,
Info("Remote certificate is no longer valid, tearing down the tunnel") "fingerprint", remoteCert.Fingerprint,
)
return true return true
} else { } else {
//if we reach here, the cert is no longer valid, but we're configured to keep tunnels from now-invalid certs open //if we reach here, the cert is no longer valid, but we're configured to keep tunnels from now-invalid certs open
@@ -508,41 +514,17 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) isInvalidCertificate(now time.Time, hostinfo *HostI
} }
} }
func (cm *connectionManager) sendPunch(hostinfo *HostInfo) {
if !cm.punchy.GetPunch() {
// Punching is disabled
return
}
if cm.intf.lightHouse.IsAnyLighthouseAddr(hostinfo.vpnAddrs) {
// Do not punch to lighthouses, we assume our lighthouse update interval is good enough.
// In the event the update interval is not sufficient to maintain NAT state then a publicly available lighthouse
// would lose the ability to notify us and punchy.respond would become unreliable.
return
}
if cm.punchy.GetTargetEverything() {
hostinfo.remotes.ForEach(cm.hostMap.GetPreferredRanges(), func(addr netip.AddrPort, preferred bool) {
cm.metricsTxPunchy.Inc(1)
cm.intf.outside.WriteTo([]byte{1}, addr)
})
} else if hostinfo.remote.IsValid() {
cm.metricsTxPunchy.Inc(1)
cm.intf.outside.WriteTo([]byte{1}, hostinfo.remote)
}
}
func (cm *connectionManager) tryRehandshake(hostinfo *HostInfo) { func (cm *connectionManager) tryRehandshake(hostinfo *HostInfo) {
cs := cm.intf.pki.getCertState() cs := cm.intf.pki.getCertState()
curCrt := hostinfo.ConnectionState.myCert curCrt := hostinfo.ConnectionState.myCert
curCrtVersion := curCrt.Version() curCrtVersion := curCrt.Version()
myCrt := cs.getCertificate(curCrtVersion) myCrt := cs.getCertificate(curCrtVersion)
if myCrt == nil { if myCrt == nil {
cm.l.WithField("vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs). cm.l.Info("Re-handshaking with remote",
WithField("version", curCrtVersion). "vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
WithField("reason", "local certificate removed"). "version", curCrtVersion,
Info("Re-handshaking with remote") "reason", "local certificate removed",
)
cm.intf.handshakeManager.StartHandshake(hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0], nil) cm.intf.handshakeManager.StartHandshake(hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0], nil)
return return
} }
@@ -550,11 +532,12 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) tryRehandshake(hostinfo *HostInfo) {
if peerCrt != nil && curCrtVersion < peerCrt.Certificate.Version() { if peerCrt != nil && curCrtVersion < peerCrt.Certificate.Version() {
// if our certificate version is less than theirs, and we have a matching version available, rehandshake? // if our certificate version is less than theirs, and we have a matching version available, rehandshake?
if cs.getCertificate(peerCrt.Certificate.Version()) != nil { if cs.getCertificate(peerCrt.Certificate.Version()) != nil {
cm.l.WithField("vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs). cm.l.Info("Re-handshaking with remote",
WithField("version", curCrtVersion). "vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
WithField("peerVersion", peerCrt.Certificate.Version()). "version", curCrtVersion,
WithField("reason", "local certificate version lower than peer, attempting to correct"). "peerVersion", peerCrt.Certificate.Version(),
Info("Re-handshaking with remote") "reason", "local certificate version lower than peer, attempting to correct",
)
cm.intf.handshakeManager.StartHandshake(hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0], func(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) { cm.intf.handshakeManager.StartHandshake(hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0], func(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) {
hh.initiatingVersionOverride = peerCrt.Certificate.Version() hh.initiatingVersionOverride = peerCrt.Certificate.Version()
}) })
@@ -562,17 +545,28 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) tryRehandshake(hostinfo *HostInfo) {
} }
} }
if !bytes.Equal(curCrt.Signature(), myCrt.Signature()) { if !bytes.Equal(curCrt.Signature(), myCrt.Signature()) {
cm.l.WithField("vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs). cm.l.Info("Re-handshaking with remote",
WithField("reason", "local certificate is not current"). "vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
Info("Re-handshaking with remote") "reason", "local certificate is not current",
)
cm.intf.handshakeManager.StartHandshake(hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0], nil) cm.intf.handshakeManager.StartHandshake(hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0], nil)
return return
} }
if curCrtVersion < cs.initiatingVersion { if curCrtVersion < cs.initiatingVersion {
cm.l.WithField("vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs). cm.l.Info("Re-handshaking with remote",
WithField("reason", "current cert version < pki.initiatingVersion"). "vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
Info("Re-handshaking with remote") "reason", "current cert version < pki.initiatingVersion",
)
cm.intf.handshakeManager.StartHandshake(hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0], nil)
return
}
if hostinfo.ConnectionState.messageCounter.Load() >= RehandshakeAfterMessages {
cm.l.Info("Re-handshaking with remote",
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"reason", "message counter rehandshake threshold reached",
)
cm.intf.handshakeManager.StartHandshake(hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0], nil) cm.intf.handshakeManager.StartHandshake(hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0], nil)
return return
+136 -63
View File
@@ -7,9 +7,10 @@ import (
"testing" "testing"
"time" "time"
"github.com/flynn/noise" "github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert" "github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config" "github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/overlaytest"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test" "github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp" "github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
@@ -21,10 +22,13 @@ func newTestLighthouse() *LightHouse {
l: test.NewLogger(), l: test.NewLogger(),
addrMap: map[netip.Addr]*RemoteList{}, addrMap: map[netip.Addr]*RemoteList{},
queryChan: make(chan netip.Addr, 10), queryChan: make(chan netip.Addr, 10),
// Nothing drains queryChan here, so an 11th query is dropped.
queryDropped: metrics.NilCounter{},
} }
lighthouses := []netip.Addr{} lighthouses := []netip.Addr{}
staticList := map[netip.Addr]struct{}{} staticList := map[netip.Addr]struct{}{}
lh.localAddrsFn = func(*LocalAllowList) []netip.Addr { return nil }
lh.lighthouses.Store(&lighthouses) lh.lighthouses.Store(&lighthouses)
lh.staticList.Store(&staticList) lh.staticList.Store(&staticList)
@@ -46,13 +50,13 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest(t *testing.T) {
initiatingVersion: cert.Version1, initiatingVersion: cert.Version1,
privateKey: []byte{}, privateKey: []byte{},
v1Cert: &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1}, v1Cert: &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1},
v1HandshakeBytes: []byte{}, v1Credential: nil,
} }
lh := newTestLighthouse() lh := newTestLighthouse()
ifce := &Interface{ ifce := &Interface{
hostMap: hostMap, hostMap: hostMap,
inside: &test.NoopTun{}, inside: &overlaytest.NoopTun{},
outside: &udp.NoopConn{}, outside: &udp.NoopConn{},
firewall: &Firewall{}, firewall: &Firewall{},
lightHouse: lh, lightHouse: lh,
@@ -63,9 +67,9 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest(t *testing.T) {
ifce.pki.cs.Store(cs) ifce.pki.cs.Store(cs)
// Create manager // Create manager
conf := config.NewC(l) conf := config.NewC(test.NewLogger())
punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(l, conf) punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf, nil)
nc := newConnectionManagerFromConfig(l, conf, hostMap, punchy) nc := newConnectionManagerFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf, hostMap, punchy)
nc.intf = ifce nc.intf = ifce
p := []byte("") p := []byte("")
nb := make([]byte, 12, 12) nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
@@ -79,32 +83,31 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest(t *testing.T) {
} }
hostinfo.ConnectionState = &ConnectionState{ hostinfo.ConnectionState = &ConnectionState{
myCert: &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1}, myCert: &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1},
H: &noise.HandshakeState{},
} }
nc.hostMap.unlockedAddHostInfo(hostinfo, ifce) nc.hostMap.unlockedAddHostInfo(hostinfo, ifce)
// We saw traffic out to vpnIp // We saw traffic out to vpnIp
nc.Out(hostinfo) nc.Out(hostinfo)
nc.In(hostinfo) nc.In(hostinfo)
assert.False(t, hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load()) assert.False(t, hostinfo.isPendingDeletion())
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Hosts, hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0]) assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Hosts, hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0])
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Indexes, hostinfo.localIndexId) assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Indexes, hostinfo.localIndexId)
assert.True(t, hostinfo.out.Load()) assert.True(t, hostinfo.sentSinceCheck())
assert.True(t, hostinfo.in.Load()) assert.True(t, (hostinfo.state.Load()&stateIn != 0))
// Do a traffic check tick, should not be pending deletion but should not have any in/out packets recorded // Do a traffic check tick, should not be pending deletion but should not have any in/out packets recorded
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, nb, out, time.Now()) nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, nb, out, time.Now())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load()) assert.False(t, hostinfo.isPendingDeletion())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.out.Load()) assert.False(t, hostinfo.sentSinceCheck())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.in.Load()) assert.False(t, (hostinfo.state.Load()&stateIn != 0))
// Do another traffic check tick, this host should be pending deletion now // Do another traffic check tick, this host should be pending deletion now
nc.Out(hostinfo) nc.Out(hostinfo)
assert.True(t, hostinfo.out.Load()) assert.True(t, hostinfo.sentSinceCheck())
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, nb, out, time.Now()) nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, nb, out, time.Now())
assert.True(t, hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load()) assert.True(t, hostinfo.isPendingDeletion())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.out.Load()) assert.False(t, hostinfo.sentSinceCheck())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.in.Load()) assert.False(t, (hostinfo.state.Load()&stateIn != 0))
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Indexes, hostinfo.localIndexId) assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Indexes, hostinfo.localIndexId)
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Hosts, hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0]) assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Hosts, hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0])
@@ -129,13 +132,13 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest2(t *testing.T) {
initiatingVersion: cert.Version1, initiatingVersion: cert.Version1,
privateKey: []byte{}, privateKey: []byte{},
v1Cert: &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1}, v1Cert: &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1},
v1HandshakeBytes: []byte{}, v1Credential: nil,
} }
lh := newTestLighthouse() lh := newTestLighthouse()
ifce := &Interface{ ifce := &Interface{
hostMap: hostMap, hostMap: hostMap,
inside: &test.NoopTun{}, inside: &overlaytest.NoopTun{},
outside: &udp.NoopConn{}, outside: &udp.NoopConn{},
firewall: &Firewall{}, firewall: &Firewall{},
lightHouse: lh, lightHouse: lh,
@@ -146,9 +149,9 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest2(t *testing.T) {
ifce.pki.cs.Store(cs) ifce.pki.cs.Store(cs)
// Create manager // Create manager
conf := config.NewC(l) conf := config.NewC(test.NewLogger())
punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(l, conf) punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf, nil)
nc := newConnectionManagerFromConfig(l, conf, hostMap, punchy) nc := newConnectionManagerFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf, hostMap, punchy)
nc.intf = ifce nc.intf = ifce
p := []byte("") p := []byte("")
nb := make([]byte, 12, 12) nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
@@ -162,44 +165,116 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest2(t *testing.T) {
} }
hostinfo.ConnectionState = &ConnectionState{ hostinfo.ConnectionState = &ConnectionState{
myCert: &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1}, myCert: &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1},
H: &noise.HandshakeState{},
} }
nc.hostMap.unlockedAddHostInfo(hostinfo, ifce) nc.hostMap.unlockedAddHostInfo(hostinfo, ifce)
// We saw traffic out to vpnIp // We saw traffic out to vpnIp
nc.Out(hostinfo) nc.Out(hostinfo)
nc.In(hostinfo) nc.In(hostinfo)
assert.True(t, hostinfo.in.Load()) assert.True(t, (hostinfo.state.Load()&stateIn != 0))
assert.True(t, hostinfo.out.Load()) assert.True(t, hostinfo.sentSinceCheck())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load()) assert.False(t, hostinfo.isPendingDeletion())
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Hosts, hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0]) assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Hosts, hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0])
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Indexes, hostinfo.localIndexId) assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Indexes, hostinfo.localIndexId)
// Do a traffic check tick, should not be pending deletion but should not have any in/out packets recorded // Do a traffic check tick, should not be pending deletion but should not have any in/out packets recorded
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, nb, out, time.Now()) nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, nb, out, time.Now())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load()) assert.False(t, hostinfo.isPendingDeletion())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.out.Load()) assert.False(t, hostinfo.sentSinceCheck())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.in.Load()) assert.False(t, (hostinfo.state.Load()&stateIn != 0))
// Do another traffic check tick, this host should be pending deletion now // Do another traffic check tick, this host should be pending deletion now
nc.Out(hostinfo) nc.Out(hostinfo)
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, nb, out, time.Now()) nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, nb, out, time.Now())
assert.True(t, hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load()) assert.True(t, hostinfo.isPendingDeletion())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.out.Load()) assert.False(t, hostinfo.sentSinceCheck())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.in.Load()) assert.False(t, (hostinfo.state.Load()&stateIn != 0))
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Indexes, hostinfo.localIndexId) assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Indexes, hostinfo.localIndexId)
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Hosts, hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0]) assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Hosts, hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0])
// We saw traffic, should no longer be pending deletion // We saw traffic, should no longer be pending deletion
nc.In(hostinfo) nc.In(hostinfo)
nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, nb, out, time.Now()) nc.doTrafficCheck(hostinfo.localIndexId, p, nb, out, time.Now())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load()) assert.False(t, hostinfo.isPendingDeletion())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.out.Load()) assert.False(t, hostinfo.sentSinceCheck())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.in.Load()) assert.False(t, (hostinfo.state.Load()&stateIn != 0))
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Indexes, hostinfo.localIndexId) assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Indexes, hostinfo.localIndexId)
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Hosts, hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0]) assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Hosts, hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0])
} }
func Test_NewConnectionManager_CounterLimits(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
localrange := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.1.1.1/24")
vpnIp := netip.MustParseAddr("172.1.1.2")
preferredRanges := []netip.Prefix{localrange}
// Very incomplete mock objects
hostMap := newHostMap(l)
hostMap.preferredRanges.Store(&preferredRanges)
cs := &CertState{
initiatingVersion: cert.Version1,
privateKey: []byte{},
v1Cert: &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1},
v1Credential: nil,
}
lh := newTestLighthouse()
ifce := &Interface{
hostMap: hostMap,
inside: &overlaytest.NoopTun{},
outside: &udp.NoopConn{},
firewall: &Firewall{},
lightHouse: lh,
pki: &PKI{},
myVpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("172.1.1.1")}, // sorts below vpnIp so shouldSwapPrimary can proceed
handshakeManager: NewHandshakeManager(l, hostMap, lh, &udp.NoopConn{}, defaultHandshakeConfig),
l: l,
}
ifce.pki.cs.Store(cs)
conf := config.NewC(test.NewLogger())
punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf, nil)
nc := newConnectionManagerFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf, hostMap, punchy)
nc.intf = ifce
hostinfo := &HostInfo{
vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{vpnIp},
localIndexId: 1099,
remoteIndexId: 9901,
}
hostinfo.ConnectionState = &ConnectionState{
myCert: &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1},
}
nc.hostMap.unlockedAddHostInfo(hostinfo, ifce)
// Below the rehandshake threshold, no handshake is started
hostinfo.ConnectionState.messageCounter.Store(RehandshakeAfterMessages - 1)
nc.tryRehandshake(hostinfo)
assert.Nil(t, ifce.handshakeManager.QueryVpnAddr(vpnIp))
// A tunnel on its current cert would normally swap to primary
assert.True(t, nc.shouldSwapPrimary(hostinfo))
// At the rehandshake threshold, a new handshake is started
hostinfo.ConnectionState.messageCounter.Store(RehandshakeAfterMessages)
nc.tryRehandshake(hostinfo)
assert.NotNil(t, ifce.handshakeManager.QueryVpnAddr(vpnIp))
// An exhausted tunnel being rolled must never swap back to primary onto its spent key
assert.False(t, nc.shouldSwapPrimary(hostinfo))
// Still below the reject limit, the tunnel stays up
nc.In(hostinfo)
decision, _, _ := nc.makeTrafficDecision(hostinfo.localIndexId, time.Now())
assert.Equal(t, tryRehandshake, decision)
// At the reject limit, the tunnel is deleted locally without a doomed CloseTunnel notify
hostinfo.ConnectionState.messageCounter.Store(RejectAfterMessages)
decision, _, _ = nc.makeTrafficDecision(hostinfo.localIndexId, time.Now())
assert.Equal(t, deleteTunnel, decision)
}
func Test_NewConnectionManager_DisconnectInactive(t *testing.T) { func Test_NewConnectionManager_DisconnectInactive(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger() l := test.NewLogger()
localrange := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.1.1.1/24") localrange := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.1.1.1/24")
@@ -214,13 +289,13 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManager_DisconnectInactive(t *testing.T) {
initiatingVersion: cert.Version1, initiatingVersion: cert.Version1,
privateKey: []byte{}, privateKey: []byte{},
v1Cert: &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1}, v1Cert: &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1},
v1HandshakeBytes: []byte{}, v1Credential: nil,
} }
lh := newTestLighthouse() lh := newTestLighthouse()
ifce := &Interface{ ifce := &Interface{
hostMap: hostMap, hostMap: hostMap,
inside: &test.NoopTun{}, inside: &overlaytest.NoopTun{},
outside: &udp.NoopConn{}, outside: &udp.NoopConn{},
firewall: &Firewall{}, firewall: &Firewall{},
lightHouse: lh, lightHouse: lh,
@@ -231,12 +306,12 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManager_DisconnectInactive(t *testing.T) {
ifce.pki.cs.Store(cs) ifce.pki.cs.Store(cs)
// Create manager // Create manager
conf := config.NewC(l) conf := config.NewC(test.NewLogger())
conf.Settings["tunnels"] = map[string]any{ conf.Settings["tunnels"] = map[string]any{
"drop_inactive": true, "drop_inactive": true,
} }
punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(l, conf) punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf, nil)
nc := newConnectionManagerFromConfig(l, conf, hostMap, punchy) nc := newConnectionManagerFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf, hostMap, punchy)
assert.True(t, nc.dropInactive.Load()) assert.True(t, nc.dropInactive.Load())
nc.intf = ifce nc.intf = ifce
@@ -248,38 +323,37 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManager_DisconnectInactive(t *testing.T) {
} }
hostinfo.ConnectionState = &ConnectionState{ hostinfo.ConnectionState = &ConnectionState{
myCert: &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1}, myCert: &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1},
H: &noise.HandshakeState{},
} }
nc.hostMap.unlockedAddHostInfo(hostinfo, ifce) nc.hostMap.unlockedAddHostInfo(hostinfo, ifce)
// Do a traffic check tick, in and out should be cleared but should not be pending deletion // Do a traffic check tick, in and out should be cleared but should not be pending deletion
nc.Out(hostinfo) nc.Out(hostinfo)
nc.In(hostinfo) nc.In(hostinfo)
assert.True(t, hostinfo.out.Load()) assert.True(t, hostinfo.sentSinceCheck())
assert.True(t, hostinfo.in.Load()) assert.True(t, (hostinfo.state.Load()&stateIn != 0))
now := time.Now() now := time.Now()
decision, _, _ := nc.makeTrafficDecision(hostinfo.localIndexId, now) decision, _, _ := nc.makeTrafficDecision(hostinfo.localIndexId, now)
assert.Equal(t, tryRehandshake, decision) assert.Equal(t, tryRehandshake, decision)
assert.Equal(t, now, hostinfo.lastUsed) assert.Equal(t, now, hostinfo.lastUsed)
assert.False(t, hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load()) assert.False(t, hostinfo.isPendingDeletion())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.out.Load()) assert.False(t, hostinfo.sentSinceCheck())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.in.Load()) assert.False(t, (hostinfo.state.Load()&stateIn != 0))
decision, _, _ = nc.makeTrafficDecision(hostinfo.localIndexId, now.Add(time.Second*5)) decision, _, _ = nc.makeTrafficDecision(hostinfo.localIndexId, now.Add(time.Second*5))
assert.Equal(t, doNothing, decision) assert.Equal(t, doNothing, decision)
assert.Equal(t, now, hostinfo.lastUsed) assert.Equal(t, now, hostinfo.lastUsed)
assert.False(t, hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load()) assert.False(t, hostinfo.isPendingDeletion())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.out.Load()) assert.False(t, hostinfo.sentSinceCheck())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.in.Load()) assert.False(t, (hostinfo.state.Load()&stateIn != 0))
// Do another traffic check tick, should still not be pending deletion // Do another traffic check tick, should still not be pending deletion
decision, _, _ = nc.makeTrafficDecision(hostinfo.localIndexId, now.Add(time.Second*10)) decision, _, _ = nc.makeTrafficDecision(hostinfo.localIndexId, now.Add(time.Second*10))
assert.Equal(t, doNothing, decision) assert.Equal(t, doNothing, decision)
assert.Equal(t, now, hostinfo.lastUsed) assert.Equal(t, now, hostinfo.lastUsed)
assert.False(t, hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load()) assert.False(t, hostinfo.isPendingDeletion())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.out.Load()) assert.False(t, hostinfo.sentSinceCheck())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.in.Load()) assert.False(t, (hostinfo.state.Load()&stateIn != 0))
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Indexes, hostinfo.localIndexId) assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Indexes, hostinfo.localIndexId)
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Hosts, hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0]) assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Hosts, hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0])
@@ -287,9 +361,9 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManager_DisconnectInactive(t *testing.T) {
decision, _, _ = nc.makeTrafficDecision(hostinfo.localIndexId, now.Add(time.Minute*10)) decision, _, _ = nc.makeTrafficDecision(hostinfo.localIndexId, now.Add(time.Minute*10))
assert.Equal(t, closeTunnel, decision) assert.Equal(t, closeTunnel, decision)
assert.Equal(t, now, hostinfo.lastUsed) assert.Equal(t, now, hostinfo.lastUsed)
assert.False(t, hostinfo.pendingDeletion.Load()) assert.False(t, hostinfo.isPendingDeletion())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.out.Load()) assert.False(t, hostinfo.sentSinceCheck())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.in.Load()) assert.False(t, (hostinfo.state.Load()&stateIn != 0))
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Indexes, hostinfo.localIndexId) assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Indexes, hostinfo.localIndexId)
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Hosts, hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0]) assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Hosts, hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0])
} }
@@ -339,15 +413,15 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest_DisconnectInvalid(t *testing.T) {
cachedPeerCert, err := ncp.VerifyCertificate(now.Add(time.Second), peerCert) cachedPeerCert, err := ncp.VerifyCertificate(now.Add(time.Second), peerCert)
cs := &CertState{ cs := &CertState{
privateKey: []byte{}, privateKey: []byte{},
v1Cert: &dummyCert{}, v1Cert: &dummyCert{},
v1HandshakeBytes: []byte{}, v1Credential: nil,
} }
lh := newTestLighthouse() lh := newTestLighthouse()
ifce := &Interface{ ifce := &Interface{
hostMap: hostMap, hostMap: hostMap,
inside: &test.NoopTun{}, inside: &overlaytest.NoopTun{},
outside: &udp.NoopConn{}, outside: &udp.NoopConn{},
firewall: &Firewall{}, firewall: &Firewall{},
lightHouse: lh, lightHouse: lh,
@@ -360,9 +434,9 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest_DisconnectInvalid(t *testing.T) {
ifce.disconnectInvalid.Store(true) ifce.disconnectInvalid.Store(true)
// Create manager // Create manager
conf := config.NewC(l) conf := config.NewC(test.NewLogger())
punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(l, conf) punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf, nil)
nc := newConnectionManagerFromConfig(l, conf, hostMap, punchy) nc := newConnectionManagerFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf, hostMap, punchy)
nc.intf = ifce nc.intf = ifce
ifce.connectionManager = nc ifce.connectionManager = nc
@@ -371,7 +445,6 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest_DisconnectInvalid(t *testing.T) {
ConnectionState: &ConnectionState{ ConnectionState: &ConnectionState{
myCert: &dummyCert{}, myCert: &dummyCert{},
peerCert: cachedPeerCert, peerCert: cachedPeerCert,
H: &noise.HandshakeState{},
}, },
} }
nc.hostMap.unlockedAddHostInfo(hostinfo, ifce) nc.hostMap.unlockedAddHostInfo(hostinfo, ifce)
+115 -50
View File
@@ -1,80 +1,76 @@
package nebula package nebula
import ( import (
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/json" "encoding/json"
"fmt" "fmt"
"log/slog"
"sync" "sync"
"sync/atomic" "sync/atomic"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert" "github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/noiseutil" "github.com/slackhq/nebula/noiseutil"
) )
const ReplayWindow = 1024 const (
ReplayWindow = 8192
// RehandshakeAfterMessages rolls keys inside the AES-GCM data-volume margin (~2^-36 advantage at 64KB frames).
RehandshakeAfterMessages = uint64(1) << 34
// RejectAfterMessages is the nonce ceiling enforced by noiseutil; a tunnel here is deleted locally, not notified.
RejectAfterMessages = noiseutil.RejectAfterMessages
)
// RehandshakeAfterMessages must stay below RejectAfterMessages so tunnels roll before the hard send stop.
const _ = RejectAfterMessages - RehandshakeAfterMessages
// sessionEpoch hands out a receiver-local ordinal to every ConnectionState at creation. The RX
// staging sort (overlay/batch) orders packets by (epoch, message counter). A re-handshake never
// rekeys an existing tunnel; it brings up a new hostinfo and ConnectionState with a counter space
// starting near zero, while the old tunnel keeps decrypting until torn down. During that cutover
// one flush batch can hold packets from both tunnels, and the epoch keeps the old tunnel's
// packets sorted first.
var sessionEpoch atomic.Uint64
type ConnectionState struct { type ConnectionState struct {
eKey *NebulaCipherState eKey noiseutil.CipherState
dKey *NebulaCipherState dKey noiseutil.CipherState
H *noise.HandshakeState
myCert cert.Certificate myCert cert.Certificate
peerCert *cert.CachedCertificate peerCert *cert.CachedCertificate
initiator bool initiator bool
messageCounter atomic.Uint64 messageCounter atomic.Uint64
window *Bits window *Bits
decryptLock sync.Mutex
writeLock sync.Mutex writeLock sync.Mutex
// epoch is this session's sessionEpoch ordinal. Immutable after creation.
epoch uint64
} }
func NewConnectionState(l *logrus.Logger, cs *CertState, crt cert.Certificate, initiator bool, pattern noise.HandshakePattern) (*ConnectionState, error) { // newConnectionStateFromResult builds a fully-populated ConnectionState from a
var dhFunc noise.DHFunc // completed handshake.Result. It seeds messageCounter and the replay window so
switch crt.Curve() { // that the post-handshake message indices already used on the wire don't count
case cert.Curve_CURVE25519: // as missed traffic in the data plane.
dhFunc = noise.DH25519 func newConnectionStateFromResult(r *handshake.Result) (*ConnectionState, error) {
case cert.Curve_P256: // Refuse a MessageIndex too big for the replay window: it can only be a bug, and would spin the seed loop below.
if cs.pkcs11Backed { if r.MessageIndex >= ReplayWindow {
dhFunc = noiseutil.DHP256PKCS11 return nil, fmt.Errorf("handshake message index %d exceeds replay window", r.MessageIndex)
} else {
dhFunc = noiseutil.DHP256
}
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid curve: %s", crt.Curve())
} }
var ncs noise.CipherSuite
if cs.cipher == "chachapoly" {
ncs = noise.NewCipherSuite(dhFunc, noise.CipherChaChaPoly, noise.HashSHA256)
} else {
ncs = noise.NewCipherSuite(dhFunc, noiseutil.CipherAESGCM, noise.HashSHA256)
}
static := noise.DHKey{Private: cs.privateKey, Public: crt.PublicKey()}
hs, err := noise.NewHandshakeState(noise.Config{
CipherSuite: ncs,
Random: rand.Reader,
Pattern: pattern,
Initiator: initiator,
StaticKeypair: static,
//NOTE: These should come from CertState (pki.go) when we finally implement it
PresharedKey: []byte{},
PresharedKeyPlacement: 0,
})
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("NewConnectionState: %s", err)
}
// The queue and ready params prevent a counter race that would happen when
// sending stored packets and simultaneously accepting new traffic.
ci := &ConnectionState{ ci := &ConnectionState{
H: hs, myCert: r.MyCert,
initiator: initiator, initiator: r.Initiator,
peerCert: r.RemoteCert,
eKey: noiseutil.NewCipherState(r.EKey, r.Cipher),
dKey: noiseutil.NewCipherState(r.DKey, r.Cipher),
window: NewBits(ReplayWindow), window: NewBits(ReplayWindow),
myCert: crt, epoch: sessionEpoch.Add(1),
}
ci.messageCounter.Add(r.MessageIndex)
for i := uint64(1); i <= r.MessageIndex; i++ {
ci.window.Update(nil, i)
} }
// always start the counter from 2, as packet 1 and packet 2 are handshake packets.
ci.messageCounter.Add(2)
return ci, nil return ci, nil
} }
@@ -86,6 +82,75 @@ func (cs *ConnectionState) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
}) })
} }
// NextMessageCounter reserves the next 1-based counter; RejectAfterMessages is the first we refuse, pinned to not wrap.
func (cs *ConnectionState) NextMessageCounter() (uint64, bool) {
c := cs.messageCounter.Add(1)
if c >= RejectAfterMessages {
cs.messageCounter.Store(RejectAfterMessages)
return c, false
}
return c, true
}
// heardFromPeer reports whether anything from the peer has decrypted under these
// keys, beyond the handshake messages the replay window was seeded with.
func (cs *ConnectionState) heardFromPeer(handshakeMessages uint64) bool {
cs.decryptLock.Lock()
defer cs.decryptLock.Unlock()
return cs.window.current > handshakeMessages
}
func (cs *ConnectionState) Curve() cert.Curve { func (cs *ConnectionState) Curve() cert.Curve {
return cs.myCert.Curve() return cs.myCert.Curve()
} }
func (cs *ConnectionState) Decrypt(l *slog.Logger, messageCounter uint64, packet []byte, nb []byte) ([]byte, error) {
cs.decryptLock.Lock()
result := cs.window.Check(l, messageCounter)
cs.decryptLock.Unlock()
if !result {
return nil, ErrAlreadySeen
}
out, err := cs.dKey.DecryptDanger(packet[header.Len:header.Len], packet[:header.Len], packet[header.Len:], messageCounter, nb)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
cs.decryptLock.Lock()
result = cs.window.Update(l, messageCounter)
cs.decryptLock.Unlock()
if !result {
return nil, ErrAlreadySeen
}
return out, nil
}
func (cs *ConnectionState) VerifyRelay(l *slog.Logger, messageCounter uint64, packet []byte, nb []byte) error {
cs.decryptLock.Lock()
result := cs.window.Check(l, messageCounter)
cs.decryptLock.Unlock()
if !result {
return ErrAlreadySeen
}
// The entire body is sent as AD, not encrypted.
// The packet consists of a 16-byte parsed Nebula header, Associated Data-protected payload, and a trailing 16-byte AEAD signature value.
// The packet is guaranteed to be at least 16 bytes at this point, b/c it got past the h.Parse() call above. If it's
// otherwise malformed (meaning, there is no trailing 16 byte AEAD value), then this will result in at worst a 0-length slice
// which will gracefully fail in the DecryptDanger call.
signedPayload := packet[:len(packet)-cs.dKey.Overhead()]
signatureValue := packet[len(packet)-cs.dKey.Overhead():]
_, err := cs.dKey.DecryptDanger(nil, signedPayload, signatureValue, messageCounter, nb)
if err != nil {
return err
}
cs.decryptLock.Lock()
result = cs.window.Update(l, messageCounter)
cs.decryptLock.Unlock()
if !result {
return ErrAlreadySeen
}
return nil
}
+311
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
package nebula
import (
"net/netip"
"strconv"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/DefinedNet/noise"
"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
ct "github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// runTestHandshake runs a complete IX handshake between two freshly-built
// peers and returns the initiator and responder Results. Used to produce
// real cipher states for tests that need to exercise post-handshake glue.
func runTestHandshake(t *testing.T) (initR, respR *handshake.Result) {
t.Helper()
ca, _, caKey, _ := ct.NewTestCaCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil,
)
caPool := ct.NewTestCAPool(ca)
makeCreds := func(name string, networks []netip.Prefix) handshake.GetCredentialFunc {
c, _, rawKey, _ := ct.NewTestCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, ca, caKey,
name, ca.NotBefore(), ca.NotAfter(), networks, nil, nil,
)
priv, _, _, err := cert.UnmarshalPrivateKeyFromPEM(rawKey)
require.NoError(t, err)
hsBytes, err := c.MarshalForHandshakes()
require.NoError(t, err)
ncs := noise.NewCipherSuite(noise.DH25519, noise.CipherChaChaPoly, noise.HashSHA256)
cred := handshake.NewCredential(c, hsBytes, priv, ncs)
return func(v cert.Version) *handshake.Credential {
if v == cert.Version2 {
return cred
}
return nil
}
}
verifier := func(c cert.Certificate) (*cert.CachedCertificate, error) {
return caPool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), c)
}
initCreds := makeCreds("initiator", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")})
respCreds := makeCreds("responder", []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.2/24")})
initM, err := handshake.NewMachine(
cert.Version2, initCreds, verifier,
func() (uint32, error) { return 1000, nil },
true, header.HandshakeIXPSK0,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
respM, err := handshake.NewMachine(
cert.Version2, respCreds, verifier,
func() (uint32, error) { return 2000, nil },
false, header.HandshakeIXPSK0,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
msg1, err := initM.Initiate(nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
resp, respR, err := respM.ProcessPacket(nil, msg1)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, respR)
_, initR, err = initM.ProcessPacket(nil, resp)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, initR)
return initR, respR
}
func TestConnectionState_NextMessageCounter(t *testing.T) {
cs := &ConnectionState{}
cs.messageCounter.Store(RejectAfterMessages - 2)
c, ok := cs.NextMessageCounter()
assert.True(t, ok)
assert.Equal(t, RejectAfterMessages-1, c)
// Hitting the limit refuses and pins the counter there
c, ok = cs.NextMessageCounter()
assert.False(t, ok)
assert.Equal(t, RejectAfterMessages, c)
assert.Equal(t, RejectAfterMessages, cs.messageCounter.Load())
// Continued send attempts stay refused and the counter never wraps
for range 10 {
_, ok = cs.NextMessageCounter()
assert.False(t, ok)
}
assert.Equal(t, RejectAfterMessages, cs.messageCounter.Load())
}
// TestSendNoMetricsDropsExhausted drives the send path to the exhausted drop; metric and out flag prove it.
func TestSendNoMetricsDropsExhausted(t *testing.T) {
initR, _ := runTestHandshake(t)
ci, err := newConnectionStateFromResult(initR)
require.NoError(t, err)
ci.messageCounter.Store(RejectAfterMessages - 1)
f := &Interface{l: test.NewLogger(), messageMetrics: &MessageMetrics{txExhausted: metrics.NewCounter()}}
hostinfo := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.1")}, ConnectionState: ci}
f.sendNoMetrics(header.Message, 0, ci, hostinfo, netip.AddrPort{}, []byte{}, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu), 0)
// The crossing send is refused: it records an exhaustion drop and never reaches connectionManager.Out.
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), f.messageMetrics.txExhausted.Count())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.sentSinceCheck())
}
// TestSendNoMetricsCloseTunnelKeepsRebindEpoch pins that a closing tunnel does not consume a rebind, a later
// packet on a re-established tunnel still needs that edge to trigger the far-side punch.
func TestSendNoMetricsCloseTunnelKeepsRebindEpoch(t *testing.T) {
initR, _ := runTestHandshake(t)
ci, err := newConnectionStateFromResult(initR)
require.NoError(t, err)
f := &Interface{
l: test.NewLogger(),
messageMetrics: &MessageMetrics{txExhausted: metrics.NewCounter()},
writers: []udp.Conn{udp.NoopConn{}},
connectionManager: &connectionManager{},
}
hostinfo := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.1")}, ConnectionState: ci}
// Tunnel is on epoch 0, then we rebind.
hostinfo.markOut(0)
f.rebindEpoch.Add(1)
remote := netip.MustParseAddrPort("10.0.0.2:4242")
f.sendNoMetrics(header.CloseTunnel, 0, ci, hostinfo, remote, []byte{}, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu), 0)
// markOut at the new epoch still reports the move, so the edge was preserved.
assert.True(t, hostinfo.markOut(1), "a CloseTunnel send must not consume the rebind epoch")
}
// capturingConn is a udp.Conn that records every WriteTo.
type capturingConn struct {
udp.NoopConn
writes [][]byte
addrs []netip.AddrPort
}
func (c *capturingConn) WriteTo(b []byte, addr netip.AddrPort) error {
c.writes = append(c.writes, append([]byte(nil), b...))
c.addrs = append(c.addrs, addr)
return nil
}
// TestSendNoMetricsViaRelay sends through a relay from the mtu sized buffer the cached packet flush uses. Payloads up
// to overlay.MaxMTU go out intact, anything bigger is dropped rather than outgrowing the buffer, which once panicked.
func TestSendNoMetricsViaRelay(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
n int
sent bool
}{
{0, true},
{1300, true},
{overlay.MaxMTU, true},
{overlay.MaxMTU + 1, false}, // too big for the relay's tag
{mtu - 47, false}, // too big for the inner tag, this panicked
{9000, false}, // a full packet at tun.mtu 9000
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(strconv.Itoa(tt.n), func(t *testing.T) {
// One tunnel to the target, carried end to end, and one to the relay that wraps it
targetInit, targetResp := runTestHandshake(t)
relayInit, relayResp := runTestHandshake(t)
ci, err := newConnectionStateFromResult(targetInit)
require.NoError(t, err)
relayCI, err := newConnectionStateFromResult(relayInit)
require.NoError(t, err)
targetAddr := netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.2")
relayAddr := netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.3")
relayRemote := netip.MustParseAddrPort("192.0.2.1:4242")
relay := &Relay{Type: TerminalType, State: Established, LocalIndex: 5, RemoteIndex: 6, PeerAddr: targetAddr}
relayHI := &HostInfo{
vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{relayAddr},
ConnectionState: relayCI,
relayState: RelayState{
relayForByAddr: map[netip.Addr]*Relay{targetAddr: relay},
relayForByIdx: map[uint32]*Relay{relay.LocalIndex: relay},
},
}
relayHI.remote.Store(&relayRemote)
// No remote of its own, so the send has to go via the relay
hostinfo := &HostInfo{
vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{targetAddr},
ConnectionState: ci,
remoteIndexId: 7,
relayState: RelayState{
relays: []netip.Addr{relayAddr},
relayForByAddr: map[netip.Addr]*Relay{},
relayForByIdx: map[uint32]*Relay{},
},
}
l := test.NewLogger()
hm := newHostMap(l)
hm.Hosts[relayAddr] = relayHI
conn := &capturingConn{}
f := &Interface{
l: l,
hostMap: hm,
messageMetrics: &MessageMetrics{txExhausted: metrics.NewCounter()},
writers: []udp.Conn{conn},
}
f.connectionManager = &connectionManager{intf: f, relayUsed: map[uint32]struct{}{}, relayUsedLock: &sync.RWMutex{}}
payload := make([]byte, tt.n)
for i := range payload {
payload[i] = byte(i)
}
counter := ci.messageCounter.Load()
f.sendNoMetrics(header.Message, 0, ci, hostinfo, netip.AddrPort{}, payload, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu), 0)
if !tt.sent {
assert.Empty(t, conn.writes)
assert.Equal(t, counter, ci.messageCounter.Load(), "a dropped packet must not spend a counter")
return
}
require.Len(t, conn.writes, 1)
assert.Equal(t, relayRemote, conn.addrs[0])
pkt := conn.writes[0]
// The relay authenticates the whole packet under its own header
outer := &header.H{}
require.NoError(t, outer.Parse(pkt))
assert.Equal(t, header.MessageRelay, outer.Subtype)
assert.Equal(t, relay.RemoteIndex, outer.RemoteIndex)
relayPeer, err := newConnectionStateFromResult(relayResp)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, relayPeer.VerifyRelay(l, outer.MessageCounter, pkt, make([]byte, 12)))
// Inside it, the target decrypts the end to end packet back to the payload
inner := pkt[header.Len : len(pkt)-relayPeer.dKey.Overhead()]
h := &header.H{}
require.NoError(t, h.Parse(inner))
assert.Equal(t, header.Message, h.Type)
assert.Equal(t, hostinfo.remoteIndexId, h.RemoteIndex)
targetPeer, err := newConnectionStateFromResult(targetResp)
require.NoError(t, err)
got, err := targetPeer.Decrypt(l, h.MessageCounter, inner, make([]byte, 12))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, payload, got)
})
}
}
func TestNewConnectionStateFromResult(t *testing.T) {
initR, respR := runTestHandshake(t)
t.Run("initiator", func(t *testing.T) {
ci, err := newConnectionStateFromResult(initR)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, ci.initiator)
assert.Equal(t, initR.MyCert, ci.myCert)
assert.Equal(t, initR.RemoteCert, ci.peerCert)
assert.NotNil(t, ci.eKey)
assert.NotNil(t, ci.dKey)
// IX has 2 handshake messages; the next data-plane send is counter=3.
assert.Equal(t, uint64(2), ci.messageCounter.Load(),
"messageCounter must equal Result.MessageIndex so the next send is N+1")
// Both handshake counters must be marked seen so they don't appear lost.
// Check returns false if an index has already been recorded.
assert.False(t, ci.window.Check(nil, 1), "counter 1 must already be seen")
assert.False(t, ci.window.Check(nil, 2), "counter 2 must already be seen")
// Counter 3 is the next data-plane message and must NOT be pre-marked.
assert.True(t, ci.window.Check(nil, 3), "counter 3 must not be pre-seeded")
})
t.Run("message index too large is refused", func(t *testing.T) {
bad := *initR
bad.MessageIndex = ReplayWindow
ci, err := newConnectionStateFromResult(&bad)
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Nil(t, ci)
})
t.Run("responder", func(t *testing.T) {
ci, err := newConnectionStateFromResult(respR)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, ci.initiator)
assert.Equal(t, respR.MyCert, ci.myCert)
assert.Equal(t, respR.RemoteCert, ci.peerCert)
assert.NotNil(t, ci.eKey)
assert.NotNil(t, ci.dKey)
assert.Equal(t, uint64(2), ci.messageCounter.Load())
})
}
+122 -20
View File
@@ -2,17 +2,33 @@ package nebula
import ( import (
"context" "context"
"errors"
"log/slog"
"net/netip" "net/netip"
"os" "os"
"os/signal" "os/signal"
"sync"
"syscall" "syscall"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert" "github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header" "github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay" "github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay"
) )
type RunState int
const (
StateUnknown RunState = iota
StateReady
StateStarted
StateStopping
StateStopped
)
var ErrAlreadyStarted = errors.New("nebula is already started")
var ErrAlreadyStopped = errors.New("nebula cannot be restarted")
var ErrUnknownState = errors.New("nebula state is invalid")
// Every interaction here needs to take extra care to copy memory and not return or use arguments "as is" when touching // Every interaction here needs to take extra care to copy memory and not return or use arguments "as is" when touching
// core. This means copying IP objects, slices, de-referencing pointers and taking the actual value, etc // core. This means copying IP objects, slices, de-referencing pointers and taking the actual value, etc
@@ -26,14 +42,18 @@ type controlHostLister interface {
} }
type Control struct { type Control struct {
stateLock sync.Mutex
state RunState
f *Interface f *Interface
l *logrus.Logger l *slog.Logger
ctx context.Context ctx context.Context
cancel context.CancelFunc cancel context.CancelFunc
sshStart func() sshStart func()
statsStart func() statsStart func()
dnsStart func() dnsStart func()
lighthouseStart func() lighthouseStart func()
networkChangeStart func(rebind func())
connectionManagerStart func(context.Context) connectionManagerStart func(context.Context)
} }
@@ -49,10 +69,31 @@ type ControlHostInfo struct {
CurrentRelaysThroughMe []netip.Addr `json:"currentRelaysThroughMe"` CurrentRelaysThroughMe []netip.Addr `json:"currentRelaysThroughMe"`
} }
// Start actually runs nebula, this is a nonblocking call. To block use Control.ShutdownBlock() // Start actually runs nebula, this is a nonblocking call.
func (c *Control) Start() { // Use Wait to block until nebula has fully stopped and to learn whether a fatal reader error caused the shutdown.
func (c *Control) Start() error {
c.stateLock.Lock()
defer c.stateLock.Unlock()
switch c.state {
case StateReady:
//yay!
case StateStopped, StateStopping:
return ErrAlreadyStopped
case StateStarted:
return ErrAlreadyStarted
default:
return ErrUnknownState
}
// Activate the interface // Activate the interface
c.f.activate() err := c.f.activate()
if err != nil {
// Cancel before Close so a caller returning from Wait always observes a dead Context
c.cancel()
_ = c.f.Close()
c.state = StateStopped
return err
}
// Call all the delayed funcs that waited patiently for the interface to be created. // Call all the delayed funcs that waited patiently for the interface to be created.
if c.sshStart != nil { if c.sshStart != nil {
@@ -64,6 +105,9 @@ func (c *Control) Start() {
if c.dnsStart != nil { if c.dnsStart != nil {
go c.dnsStart() go c.dnsStart()
} }
if c.networkChangeStart != nil {
go c.networkChangeStart(c.RebindUDPServer)
}
if c.connectionManagerStart != nil { if c.connectionManagerStart != nil {
go c.connectionManagerStart(c.ctx) go c.connectionManagerStart(c.ctx)
} }
@@ -71,25 +115,70 @@ func (c *Control) Start() {
c.lighthouseStart() c.lighthouseStart()
} }
c.f.triggerShutdown = func() { go c.Stop() }
// Start reading packets. // Start reading packets.
c.f.run() c.f.run()
c.state = StateStarted
return nil
}
func (c *Control) State() RunState {
c.stateLock.Lock()
defer c.stateLock.Unlock()
return c.state
} }
func (c *Control) Context() context.Context { func (c *Control) Context() context.Context {
return c.ctx return c.ctx
} }
// Stop signals nebula to shutdown and close all tunnels, returns after the shutdown is complete // Stop tears nebula down, closing all tunnels and releasing everything it holds.
// Use Wait to block until the shutdown has completed.
// A Control that has been stopped cannot be started again, Start will return ErrAlreadyStopped.
func (c *Control) Stop() { func (c *Control) Stop() {
// Stop the handshakeManager (and other services), to prevent new tunnels from c.stateLock.Lock()
// being created while we're shutting them all down. switch c.state {
c.cancel() case StateStarted:
// Fall through to the full teardown below
c.CloseAllTunnels(false) case StateReady:
if err := c.f.Close(); err != nil { // Never started
c.l.WithError(err).Error("Close interface failed") c.cancel()
c.state = StateStopped
if err := c.f.Close(); err != nil {
c.l.Error("Close interface failed", "error", err)
}
c.stateLock.Unlock()
return
default:
c.stateLock.Unlock()
// We are stopping or stopped already
return
} }
c.l.Info("Goodbye")
c.state = StateStopping
c.stateLock.Unlock()
// Closing tunnels can be slow with a large hostmap, don't hold the lock for it
c.cancel()
c.CloseAllTunnels(false)
c.stateLock.Lock()
c.state = StateStopped
if err := c.f.Close(); err != nil {
c.l.Error("Close interface failed", "error", err)
}
c.stateLock.Unlock()
}
// Wait blocks until nebula has fully stopped, either via Stop or an internal fatal error,
// and returns the first fatal packet reader error if there was one.
// It is safe to call from multiple goroutines and at any point in the lifecycle,
// but a Wait on a Control that is never started and never stopped will block forever.
func (c *Control) Wait() error {
return c.f.wait()
} }
// ShutdownBlock will listen for and block on term and interrupt signals, calling Control.Stop() once signalled // ShutdownBlock will listen for and block on term and interrupt signals, calling Control.Stop() once signalled
@@ -100,19 +189,30 @@ func (c *Control) ShutdownBlock() {
rawSig := <-sigChan rawSig := <-sigChan
sig := rawSig.String() sig := rawSig.String()
c.l.WithField("signal", sig).Info("Caught signal, shutting down") c.l.Info("Caught signal, shutting down", "signal", sig)
c.Stop() c.Stop()
} }
// RebindUDPServer asks the UDP listener to rebind it's listener. Mainly used on mobile clients when interfaces change // RebindUDPServer asks the UDP listener to rebind it's listener. Mainly used on mobile clients when interfaces change.
func (c *Control) RebindUDPServer() { func (c *Control) RebindUDPServer() {
_ = c.f.outside.Rebind() c.stateLock.Lock()
defer c.stateLock.Unlock()
if c.state != StateStarted {
return
}
// A failure here means we are likely still pinned to the interface we came up on, so the rest of this is
// unlikely to help. Say so instead of silently carrying on as if we rebound.
if err := c.f.outside.Rebind(); err != nil {
c.l.Error("Failed to rebind udp socket", "error", err)
}
// Trigger a lighthouse update, useful for mobile clients that should have an update interval of 0 // Trigger a lighthouse update, useful for mobile clients that should have an update interval of 0
c.f.lightHouse.SendUpdate() c.f.lightHouse.SendUpdate()
// Let the main interface know that we rebound so that underlying tunnels know to trigger punches from their remotes // Let the main interface know that we rebound so that underlying tunnels know to trigger punches from their remotes
c.f.rebindCount++ c.f.rebindEpoch.Add(1)
} }
// ListHostmapHosts returns details about the actual or pending (handshaking) hostmap by vpn ip // ListHostmapHosts returns details about the actual or pending (handshaking) hostmap by vpn ip
@@ -237,8 +337,10 @@ func (c *Control) CloseAllTunnels(excludeLighthouses bool) (closed int) {
c.f.send(header.CloseTunnel, 0, h.ConnectionState, h, []byte{}, make([]byte, 12, 12), make([]byte, mtu)) c.f.send(header.CloseTunnel, 0, h.ConnectionState, h, []byte{}, make([]byte, 12, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
c.f.closeTunnel(h) c.f.closeTunnel(h)
c.l.WithField("vpnAddrs", h.vpnAddrs).WithField("udpAddr", h.remote). c.l.Debug("Sending close tunnel message",
Debug("Sending close tunnel message") "vpnAddrs", h.vpnAddrs,
"udpAddr", h.GetRemote(),
)
closed++ closed++
} }
@@ -282,7 +384,7 @@ func copyHostInfo(h *HostInfo, preferredRanges []netip.Prefix) ControlHostInfo {
RemoteAddrs: h.remotes.CopyAddrs(preferredRanges), RemoteAddrs: h.remotes.CopyAddrs(preferredRanges),
CurrentRelaysToMe: h.relayState.CopyRelayIps(), CurrentRelaysToMe: h.relayState.CopyRelayIps(),
CurrentRelaysThroughMe: h.relayState.CopyRelayForIps(), CurrentRelaysThroughMe: h.relayState.CopyRelayForIps(),
CurrentRemote: h.remote, CurrentRemote: h.GetRemote(),
} }
for i, a := range h.vpnAddrs { for i, a := range h.vpnAddrs {
+309
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,309 @@
package nebula
import (
"context"
"errors"
"io"
"net/netip"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/batch"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
type fakeDevice struct {
closeOnce sync.Once
closedCh chan struct{}
closed bool
}
func newFakeDevice() *fakeDevice {
return &fakeDevice{closedCh: make(chan struct{})}
}
// Read blocks until Close like a real tun with no traffic, then reports EOF
// the same way a closed device does
func (d *fakeDevice) Read() ([]tio.Packet, error) {
<-d.closedCh
return nil, io.EOF
}
func (d *fakeDevice) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return len(p), nil }
func (d *fakeDevice) Close() error {
d.closeOnce.Do(func() {
d.closed = true
close(d.closedCh)
})
return nil
}
func (d *fakeDevice) Activate() error { return nil }
func (d *fakeDevice) Networks() []netip.Prefix { return nil }
func (d *fakeDevice) Name() string { return "fake" }
func (d *fakeDevice) RoutesFor(netip.Addr) routing.Gateways { return nil }
func (d *fakeDevice) Queues(int) ([]tio.Queue, error) { return []tio.Queue{d}, nil }
// newReadyControl hand-builds the minimum Control that Main would have
// produced right before Start, including the construction token NewInterface
// takes so waiters block until Close releases the resources
func newReadyControl(t *testing.T) (*Control, *fakeDevice, *fakeConn) {
l := test.NewLogger()
dev := newFakeDevice()
conn := &fakeConn{}
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
myVpnNet := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.128.0.1/16")
nt := new(bart.Lite)
nt.Insert(myVpnNet)
cs := &CertState{
myVpnNetworks: []netip.Prefix{myVpnNet},
myVpnNetworksTable: nt,
}
lh, err := NewLightHouseFromConfig(ctx, l, config.NewC(l), cs, nil, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
f := &Interface{
ctx: ctx,
inside: dev,
outside: conn,
writers: []udp.Conn{conn},
batchers: make([]*batch.MultiCoalescer, 1),
routines: 1,
hostMap: newHostMap(l),
lightHouse: lh,
l: l,
}
f.wg.Add(1)
return &Control{
state: StateReady,
f: f,
l: l,
ctx: ctx,
cancel: cancel,
}, dev, conn
}
func TestControl_StopBeforeStart(t *testing.T) {
c, dev, conn := newReadyControl(t)
// A Stop on a never started control must release everything Main acquired
c.Stop()
assert.Equal(t, StateStopped, c.State())
assert.True(t, dev.closed, "the tun device should have been closed")
assert.True(t, conn.closed, "the udp socket should have been closed")
require.ErrorIs(t, c.ctx.Err(), context.Canceled, "the service context should have been cancelled")
// Wait must return promptly now that the resources are released
require.NoError(t, c.Wait())
// A stopped control can never be started
err := c.Start()
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAlreadyStopped)
// A second Stop is a harmless no-op
c.Stop()
assert.Equal(t, StateStopped, c.State())
require.NoError(t, c.Wait())
}
func TestControl_WaitBlocksUntilStop(t *testing.T) {
c, _, _ := newReadyControl(t)
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() { done <- c.Wait() }()
select {
case <-done:
t.Fatal("Wait returned before Stop")
case <-time.After(50 * time.Millisecond):
}
c.Stop()
select {
case err := <-done:
require.NoError(t, err)
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("Wait did not return after Stop")
}
}
type fakeConn struct {
closed bool
rebinds int
}
func (c *fakeConn) Rebind() error { c.rebinds++; return nil }
func (c *fakeConn) LocalAddr() (netip.AddrPort, error) { return netip.AddrPort{}, nil }
func (c *fakeConn) ListenOut(_ udp.EncReader, _ func()) error { return nil }
func (c *fakeConn) WriteTo(_ []byte, _ netip.AddrPort) error { return nil }
func (c *fakeConn) WriteBatch(bufs [][]byte, _ []netip.AddrPort) (int, error) {
return len(bufs), nil
}
func (c *fakeConn) ReloadConfig(_ *config.C) {}
func (c *fakeConn) SupportsMultipleReaders() bool { return true }
func (c *fakeConn) Close() error { c.closed = true; return nil }
type multiqueueDevice struct {
*fakeDevice
}
// Queues claims multiqueue support but fails to open the second queue,
// exercising the activation error path.
func (d *multiqueueDevice) Queues(n int) ([]tio.Queue, error) {
if n > 1 {
return nil, errors.New("second queue failed to open")
}
return d.fakeDevice.Queues(n)
}
func TestControl_StartMultiqueueFailureReleases(t *testing.T) {
dev := &multiqueueDevice{fakeDevice: newFakeDevice()}
conn := &fakeConn{}
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
f := &Interface{
ctx: ctx,
inside: dev,
outside: conn,
writers: []udp.Conn{conn},
batchers: make([]*batch.MultiCoalescer, 2),
routines: 2,
l: test.NewLogger(),
}
f.wg.Add(1)
c := &Control{
state: StateReady,
f: f,
l: test.NewLogger(),
ctx: ctx,
cancel: cancel,
}
// The second reader fails to open, everything must be released
err := c.Start()
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, StateStopped, c.State())
assert.True(t, dev.closed, "the tun device should have been closed")
assert.True(t, conn.closed, "the udp socket should have been closed")
require.ErrorIs(t, c.ctx.Err(), context.Canceled)
// And Wait must not hang on the construction token
require.NoError(t, c.Wait())
}
func TestInterface_CloseIsIdempotent(t *testing.T) {
dev := newFakeDevice()
f := &Interface{
inside: dev,
l: test.NewLogger(),
}
f.wg.Add(1)
require.NoError(t, f.Close())
assert.True(t, dev.closed)
// A second Close must not double release the wg token or the device
require.NoError(t, f.Close())
require.NoError(t, f.wait())
}
func TestControl_FatalErrorReportsThroughWait(t *testing.T) {
c, dev, conn := newReadyControl(t)
// Mirror what Start wires up, without needing real packet readers
c.f.triggerShutdown = c.Stop
c.state = StateStarted
boom := errors.New("boom")
c.f.onFatal(boom)
require.ErrorIs(t, c.Wait(), boom)
assert.Equal(t, StateStopped, c.State())
assert.True(t, dev.closed)
assert.True(t, conn.closed)
// A second fatal error must not fire the shutdown again or replace the first
c.f.onFatal(errors.New("later"))
require.ErrorIs(t, c.Wait(), boom)
// Wait stays factual, a Stop after the death does not mask the error
c.Stop()
require.ErrorIs(t, c.Wait(), boom)
}
func TestControl_ConcurrentStopAndStart(t *testing.T) {
c, _, _ := newReadyControl(t)
var wg sync.WaitGroup
for range 2 {
wg.Go(func() { c.Stop() })
}
wg.Go(func() { _ = c.Start() })
wg.Go(func() {
_ = c.Wait()
// A returned Wait must always observe the final state, no matter how
// the race resolved
assert.Equal(t, StateStopped, c.State())
})
wg.Wait()
// However the race resolves, the control must end fully stopped with no
// panic and Wait must observe the final state
require.NoError(t, c.Wait())
assert.Equal(t, StateStopped, c.State())
err := c.Start()
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAlreadyStopped)
}
func TestControl_StartStopLifecycle(t *testing.T) {
c, dev, conn := newReadyControl(t)
err := c.Start()
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, StateStarted, c.State())
err = c.Start()
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAlreadyStarted)
// Stop must unpark the reader blocked in the device and release everything
c.Stop()
assert.Equal(t, StateStopped, c.State())
assert.True(t, dev.closed, "the tun device should have been closed")
assert.True(t, conn.closed, "the udp socket should have been closed")
require.ErrorIs(t, c.ctx.Err(), context.Canceled)
// The reader drained off a closed device, that is not a fatal error
require.NoError(t, c.Wait())
err = c.Start()
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAlreadyStopped)
}
func TestControl_RebindIsGatedByState(t *testing.T) {
c, _, conn := newReadyControl(t)
// A rebind before Start reaches nothing, the interface is not up
c.RebindUDPServer()
assert.Equal(t, 0, conn.rebinds, "rebind before start must be a no-op")
err := c.Start()
require.NoError(t, err)
c.RebindUDPServer()
assert.Equal(t, 1, conn.rebinds, "rebind while started must reach the conn")
// A rebind racing a completed stop must not touch the closed conn
c.Stop()
require.NoError(t, c.Wait())
c.RebindUDPServer()
assert.Equal(t, 1, conn.rebinds, "rebind after stop must be a no-op")
}
+163 -8
View File
@@ -1,15 +1,17 @@
package nebula package nebula
import ( import (
"bytes"
"log/slog"
"net" "net"
"net/netip" "net/netip"
"reflect" "reflect"
"testing" "testing"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert" "github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test" "github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
) )
func TestControl_GetHostInfoByVpnIp(t *testing.T) { func TestControl_GetHostInfoByVpnIp(t *testing.T) {
@@ -43,8 +45,7 @@ func TestControl_GetHostInfoByVpnIp(t *testing.T) {
assert.True(t, ok) assert.True(t, ok)
crt := &dummyCert{} crt := &dummyCert{}
hm.unlockedAddHostInfo(&HostInfo{ hi := &HostInfo{
remote: remote1,
remotes: remotes, remotes: remotes,
ConnectionState: &ConnectionState{ ConnectionState: &ConnectionState{
peerCert: &cert.CachedCertificate{Certificate: crt}, peerCert: &cert.CachedCertificate{Certificate: crt},
@@ -57,13 +58,14 @@ func TestControl_GetHostInfoByVpnIp(t *testing.T) {
relayForByAddr: map[netip.Addr]*Relay{}, relayForByAddr: map[netip.Addr]*Relay{},
relayForByIdx: map[uint32]*Relay{}, relayForByIdx: map[uint32]*Relay{},
}, },
}, &Interface{}) }
hi.remote.Store(&remote1)
hm.unlockedAddHostInfo(hi, &Interface{})
vpnIp2, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(ipNet2.IP) vpnIp2, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(ipNet2.IP)
assert.True(t, ok) assert.True(t, ok)
hm.unlockedAddHostInfo(&HostInfo{ hi2 := &HostInfo{
remote: remote1,
remotes: remotes, remotes: remotes,
ConnectionState: &ConnectionState{ ConnectionState: &ConnectionState{
peerCert: nil, peerCert: nil,
@@ -76,13 +78,16 @@ func TestControl_GetHostInfoByVpnIp(t *testing.T) {
relayForByAddr: map[netip.Addr]*Relay{}, relayForByAddr: map[netip.Addr]*Relay{},
relayForByIdx: map[uint32]*Relay{}, relayForByIdx: map[uint32]*Relay{},
}, },
}, &Interface{}) }
hi2.remote.Store(&remote1)
hm.unlockedAddHostInfo(hi2, &Interface{})
c := Control{ c := Control{
state: StateReady,
f: &Interface{ f: &Interface{
hostMap: hm, hostMap: hm,
}, },
l: logrus.New(), l: test.NewLogger(),
} }
thi := c.GetHostInfoByVpnAddr(vpnIp, false) thi := c.GetHostInfoByVpnAddr(vpnIp, false)
@@ -119,3 +124,153 @@ func assertFields(t *testing.T, expected []string, actualStruct any) {
assert.Equal(t, expected, fields) assert.Equal(t, expected, fields)
} }
// alwaysAllowV4/V6 are check funcs that accept every entry (including nil pointers),
// letting us inject a nil *V4AddrPort/*V6AddrPort into a RemoteList's reported cache
// the same way a malformed proto message off the wire could.
func alwaysAllowV4(netip.Addr, *V4AddrPort) bool { return true }
func alwaysAllowV6(netip.Addr, *V6AddrPort) bool { return true }
// TestGetRelays_SkipsNilRelayAddrs proves GetRelays tolerates nil entries in the
// RelayVpnAddrs proto slice (which protoAddrToNetAddr would nil-deref on) and still
// returns the valid relays, including the legacy OldRelayVpnAddrs.
func TestGetRelays_SkipsNilRelayAddrs(t *testing.T) {
good := netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.9")
d := &NebulaMetaDetails{
OldRelayVpnAddrs: []uint32{0x0a000001}, // 10.0.0.1
RelayVpnAddrs: []*Addr{
nil,
netAddrToProtoAddr(good),
nil,
},
}
var relays []netip.Addr
require.NotPanics(t, func() { relays = d.GetRelays() })
assert.Equal(t, []netip.Addr{
netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.1"),
good,
}, relays)
}
// TestGetRelays_AllNil ensures an all-nil RelayVpnAddrs slice yields no relays and no panic.
func TestGetRelays_AllNil(t *testing.T) {
d := &NebulaMetaDetails{RelayVpnAddrs: []*Addr{nil, nil}}
var relays []netip.Addr
require.NotPanics(t, func() { relays = d.GetRelays() })
assert.Empty(t, relays)
}
// TestRemoteList_CopyCache_SkipsNilReported proves CopyCache skips nil reported
// pointers (v4 and v6) instead of nil-dereferencing them in protoV*AddrPortToNetAddrPort.
func TestRemoteList_CopyCache_SkipsNilReported(t *testing.T) {
owner := netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.1")
rl := NewRemoteList([]netip.Addr{owner}, nil)
rl.unlockedSetV4(owner, owner, []*V4AddrPort{
nil,
newIp4AndPortFromString("1.2.3.4:5"),
nil,
}, alwaysAllowV4)
rl.unlockedSetV6(owner, owner, []*V6AddrPort{
nil,
newIp6AndPortFromString("[1::1]:6"),
nil,
}, alwaysAllowV6)
var cm *CacheMap
require.NotPanics(t, func() { cm = rl.CopyCache() })
c := (*cm)[owner.String()]
require.NotNil(t, c)
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []netip.AddrPort{
netip.MustParseAddrPort("1.2.3.4:5"),
netip.MustParseAddrPort("[1::1]:6"),
}, c.Reported)
}
// TestRemoteList_Rebuild_SkipsNilReported drives unlockedCollect (via Rebuild) with
// nil reported entries and confirms only the valid addresses survive, with no panic.
func TestRemoteList_Rebuild_SkipsNilReported(t *testing.T) {
owner := netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.1")
rl := NewRemoteList([]netip.Addr{owner}, nil)
rl.unlockedSetV4(owner, owner, []*V4AddrPort{
nil,
newIp4AndPortFromString("1.2.3.4:5"),
}, alwaysAllowV4)
rl.unlockedSetV6(owner, owner, []*V6AddrPort{
newIp6AndPortFromString("[1::1]:6"),
nil,
}, alwaysAllowV6)
require.NotPanics(t, func() { rl.Rebuild([]netip.Prefix{}) })
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []netip.AddrPort{
netip.MustParseAddrPort("1.2.3.4:5"),
netip.MustParseAddrPort("[1::1]:6"),
}, rl.addrs)
}
// newRelayControl marshals a NebulaControl the way it arrives on the wire so we can feed
// it through HandleControlMsg's unmarshal + validate path.
func newRelayControl(t *testing.T, typ NebulaControl_MessageType, from, to *Addr) []byte {
t.Helper()
msg := &NebulaControl{
Type: typ,
RelayFromAddr: from,
RelayToAddr: to,
}
b, err := msg.Marshal()
require.NoError(t, err)
return b
}
// TestRelayManager_HandleControlMsg_NilRelayAddrs verifies the validation block added to
// HandleControlMsg: CreateRelay{Request,Response} carrying a nil RelayFromAddr or
// RelayToAddr are dropped with a debug log rather than nil-dereferencing downstream.
func TestRelayManager_HandleControlMsg_NilRelayAddrs(t *testing.T) {
good := netAddrToProtoAddr(netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.9"))
cases := []struct {
name string
typ NebulaControl_MessageType
from *Addr
to *Addr
wantLog string // debug substring expected, "" == expect no drop log
}{
{"request nil from", NebulaControl_CreateRelayRequest, nil, good, "nil RelayFromAddr"},
{"request nil to", NebulaControl_CreateRelayRequest, good, nil, "nil RelayToAddr"},
{"request both nil", NebulaControl_CreateRelayRequest, nil, nil, "nil RelayFromAddr"},
{"response nil from", NebulaControl_CreateRelayResponse, nil, good, "nil RelayFromAddr"},
{"response nil to", NebulaControl_CreateRelayResponse, good, nil, "nil RelayToAddr"},
// A non-relay control type is not subject to the relay-addr validation and must
// pass through it untouched (the final switch simply no-ops on it).
{"unrelated type nil addrs", NebulaControl_None, nil, nil, ""},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
var buf bytes.Buffer
l := test.NewLoggerWithOutputAndLevel(&buf, slog.LevelDebug)
rm := &relayManager{l: l, hostmap: newHostMap(l)}
rm.useRelays.Store(true)
f := &Interface{l: l}
h := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.2")}, localIndexId: 1}
d := newRelayControl(t, tc.typ, tc.from, tc.to)
require.NotPanics(t, func() { rm.HandleControlMsg(h, d, f) })
if tc.wantLog == "" {
assert.NotContains(t, buf.String(), "nil Relay")
} else {
assert.Contains(t, buf.String(), tc.wantLog)
}
})
}
}
+43 -62
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,10 @@
//go:build e2e_testing //go:build e2e_testing
// +build e2e_testing
package nebula package nebula
import ( import (
"net/netip" "net/netip"
"github.com/google/gopacket"
"github.com/google/gopacket/layers"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header" "github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay" "github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp" "github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
@@ -23,7 +20,9 @@ func (c *Control) WaitForType(msgType header.MessageType, subType header.Message
panic(err) panic(err)
} }
pipeTo.InjectUDPPacket(p) pipeTo.InjectUDPPacket(p)
if h.Type == msgType && h.Subtype == subType { match := h.Type == msgType && h.Subtype == subType
p.Release()
if match {
return return
} }
} }
@@ -39,7 +38,9 @@ func (c *Control) WaitForTypeByIndex(toIndex uint32, msgType header.MessageType,
panic(err) panic(err)
} }
pipeTo.InjectUDPPacket(p) pipeTo.InjectUDPPacket(p)
if h.RemoteIndex == toIndex && h.Type == msgType && h.Subtype == subType { match := h.RemoteIndex == toIndex && h.Type == msgType && h.Subtype == subType
p.Release()
if match {
return return
} }
} }
@@ -91,65 +92,15 @@ func (c *Control) GetTunTxChan() <-chan []byte {
return c.f.inside.(*overlay.TestTun).TxPackets return c.f.inside.(*overlay.TestTun).TxPackets
} }
// InjectUDPPacket will inject a packet into the udp side of nebula // InjectUDPPacket injects a packet into the udp side. We copy internally so the caller keeps ownership of p.
// The copy comes from the freelist so steady-state alloc is zero.
func (c *Control) InjectUDPPacket(p *udp.Packet) { func (c *Control) InjectUDPPacket(p *udp.Packet) {
c.f.outside.(*udp.TesterConn).Send(p) c.f.outside.(*udp.TesterConn).Send(p.Copy())
} }
// InjectTunUDPPacket puts a udp packet on the tun interface. Using UDP here because it's a simpler protocol // InjectTunPacket pushes an IP packet onto the tun interface.
func (c *Control) InjectTunUDPPacket(toAddr netip.Addr, toPort uint16, fromAddr netip.Addr, fromPort uint16, data []byte) { func (c *Control) InjectTunPacket(packet []byte) {
serialize := make([]gopacket.SerializableLayer, 0) c.f.inside.(*overlay.TestTun).Send(packet)
var netLayer gopacket.NetworkLayer
if toAddr.Is6() {
if !fromAddr.Is6() {
panic("Cant send ipv6 to ipv4")
}
ip := &layers.IPv6{
Version: 6,
NextHeader: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
SrcIP: fromAddr.Unmap().AsSlice(),
DstIP: toAddr.Unmap().AsSlice(),
}
serialize = append(serialize, ip)
netLayer = ip
} else {
if !fromAddr.Is4() {
panic("Cant send ipv4 to ipv6")
}
ip := &layers.IPv4{
Version: 4,
TTL: 64,
Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
SrcIP: fromAddr.Unmap().AsSlice(),
DstIP: toAddr.Unmap().AsSlice(),
}
serialize = append(serialize, ip)
netLayer = ip
}
udp := layers.UDP{
SrcPort: layers.UDPPort(fromPort),
DstPort: layers.UDPPort(toPort),
}
err := udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(netLayer)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
buffer := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
opt := gopacket.SerializeOptions{
ComputeChecksums: true,
FixLengths: true,
}
serialize = append(serialize, &udp, gopacket.Payload(data))
err = gopacket.SerializeLayers(buffer, opt, serialize...)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
c.f.inside.(*overlay.TestTun).Send(buffer.Bytes())
} }
func (c *Control) GetVpnAddrs() []netip.Addr { func (c *Control) GetVpnAddrs() []netip.Addr {
@@ -157,7 +108,29 @@ func (c *Control) GetVpnAddrs() []netip.Addr {
} }
func (c *Control) GetUDPAddr() netip.AddrPort { func (c *Control) GetUDPAddr() netip.AddrPort {
return c.f.outside.(*udp.TesterConn).Addr return c.f.outside.(*udp.TesterConn).GetAddr()
}
// SetUDPAddr moves this node to a new underlay address, standing in for a laptop waking up on a different
// network. Register the new address with the router as well or nothing will route back.
func (c *Control) SetUDPAddr(addr netip.AddrPort) {
c.f.outside.(*udp.TesterConn).SetAddr(addr)
}
// SetLocalAddrsFn replaces underlay address discovery so a test can advertise its simulated address instead of
// whatever this machine's NICs happen to be. Call it before Start, SendUpdate reads it from the update worker.
func (c *Control) SetLocalAddrsFn(fn func(*LocalAllowList) []netip.Addr) {
c.f.lightHouse.localAddrsFn = fn
}
// GetRebindEpochFor returns the rebind epoch a tunnel last sent under, so a test can tell whether a send
// consumed the epoch edge without having to infer it from lighthouse traffic.
func (c *Control) GetRebindEpochFor(vpnAddr netip.Addr) (uint32, bool) {
h := c.f.hostMap.QueryVpnAddr(vpnAddr)
if h == nil {
return 0, false
}
return h.state.Load() >> stateEpochShift, true
} }
func (c *Control) KillPendingTunnel(vpnIp netip.Addr) bool { func (c *Control) KillPendingTunnel(vpnIp netip.Addr) bool {
@@ -174,6 +147,14 @@ func (c *Control) GetHostmap() *HostMap {
return c.f.hostMap return c.f.hostMap
} }
// GetHostmapIndexCount returns the number of entries in the main hostmap Indexes table, holding
// the hostmap read lock so tests can poll it while connection manager churns tunnels.
func (c *Control) GetHostmapIndexCount() int {
c.f.hostMap.RLock()
defer c.f.hostMap.RUnlock()
return len(c.f.hostMap.Indexes)
}
func (c *Control) GetF() *Interface { func (c *Control) GetF() *Interface {
return c.f return c.f
} }
+187
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
// Package cpupick chooses which CPUs the tun reader threads pin to when the
// operator has not chosen for us (tun.cpu_affinity). The stock spread —
// allowed[i] for routine i — has two failure modes this package exists to fix:
//
// - every co-located nebula starts its spread at allowed[0], so N instances
// on one box stack their readers onto the same cores, and allowed[0] is
// usually CPU 0, the core housekeeping and default IRQ affinity already
// favor;
// - on heterogeneous CPUs (ARM big.LITTLE, Intel P/E hybrids, AMD compact
// cores) low IDs are not necessarily fast cores, and pinning an encrypt
// thread to an efficiency core caps that queue's throughput.
//
// Default instead returns a preference-ordered pin list: the allowed set
// filtered to performance cores (when the platform distinguishes them and
// enough remain for every routine), confined to a single NUMA node and spread
// across distinct physical cores when the topology permits, CPU 0's physical
// core demoted to last resort, and the order rotated by a stable per-instance
// key so co-located instances spread instead of stacking.
package cpupick
import (
"log/slog"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
)
// topology is the slice of machine layout arrange consults: the NUMA node
// and the physical core behind each candidate CPU, plus which core CPU 0
// lives on (zeroCore, -1 when unknown — tracked separately because CPU 0's
// SMT sibling deserves demotion even when CPU 0 itself isn't a candidate).
// Probed from sysfs on Linux; flatTopology stands in when the platform can't
// say, which turns every topology rule into a no-op rather than a wrong
// answer.
type topology struct {
nodeOf map[int]int
coreOf map[int]int
zeroCore int
}
// flatTopology places every CPU on node 0 and on a physical core of its own.
func flatTopology(cpus []int) topology {
t := topology{
nodeOf: make(map[int]int, len(cpus)),
coreOf: make(map[int]int, len(cpus)),
zeroCore: -1,
}
for i, c := range cpus {
t.nodeOf[c] = 0
t.coreOf[c] = i
if c == 0 {
t.zeroCore = i
}
}
return t
}
// Default computes the pin order for `routines` tun readers. key is any
// stable per-instance value; the bound UDP port is ideal — distinct across
// co-located instances, stable across restarts so benchmark runs stay
// comparable. Returns nil when there is nothing useful to say (no affinity
// support on this platform, lookup failure); callers keep their existing
// fallback spread.
func Default(routines int, key uint64, l *slog.Logger) []int {
allowed, err := util.AllowedCPUs()
if err != nil || len(allowed) == 0 {
return nil
}
perf, signal := perfCPUs(allowed)
cands := pickCandidates(allowed, perf, routines)
if len(cands) == 0 {
return nil
}
if len(perf) < routines {
signal = ""
}
cpus := arrange(cands, readTopology(cands), routines, splitmix64(key))
if l != nil {
l.Info("chose default pin CPUs for tun readers",
"cpus", cpus[:min(routines, len(cpus))],
"perfSignal", signal)
}
return cpus
}
// pickCandidates applies the enough-for-everyone guard: a perf filter that
// leaves fewer candidates than routines is discarded — giving every reader
// its own (possibly slow) core beats stacking two readers on a fast one.
func pickCandidates(allowed, perf []int, routines int) []int {
if len(perf) < routines {
return allowed
}
return perf
}
// arrange turns the candidate set into the final pin order:
//
// 1. NUMA: when at least one node holds enough candidates for every
// routine, confine to one such node, chosen by the instance hash. The
// readers share hostmap and cipher state, so splitting one instance
// across nodes taxes every packet — and co-located instances that hash
// to different nodes stop competing entirely. When no node is big
// enough, span nodes rather than stack readers.
// 2. Rotate the preferred candidates by the hash so instances spread.
// 3. SMT: emit one thread per physical core before any of their siblings —
// two encrypt threads on one core split its execution units. Siblings
// still follow for the routines > cores case.
// 4. CPU 0's whole physical core goes last: housekeeping and default IRQ
// noise on CPU 0 bleeds into its SMT sibling too. Within that tail the
// sibling precedes CPU 0 itself, which only catches the bleed-through.
//
// The rotation happens before the SMT pass so each instance's one-per-core
// walk also starts at a different core, and CPU 0's core is excluded from
// the rotation so no hash value can put it back at the front.
func arrange(cands []int, topo topology, routines int, h uint64) []int {
byNode := map[int][]int{}
var nodes []int
for _, c := range cands {
n := topo.nodeOf[c]
if _, ok := byNode[n]; !ok {
nodes = append(nodes, n)
}
byNode[n] = append(byNode[n], c)
}
var eligible []int
for _, n := range nodes {
if len(byNode[n]) >= routines {
eligible = append(eligible, n)
}
}
if len(eligible) > 0 {
cands = byNode[eligible[int(h%uint64(len(eligible)))]]
}
// Split off CPU 0's core: its siblings tail the list, CPU 0 tails them.
preferred := make([]int, 0, len(cands))
var zeroTail []int
hasZero := false
for _, c := range cands {
switch {
case c == 0:
hasZero = true
case topo.zeroCore >= 0 && topo.coreOf[c] == topo.zeroCore:
zeroTail = append(zeroTail, c)
default:
preferred = append(preferred, c)
}
}
if hasZero {
zeroTail = append(zeroTail, 0)
}
if len(preferred) == 0 {
return zeroTail // CPU 0's core is all we have
}
// The node pick consumed the low hash bits; rotate by the high ones so
// the two choices stay independent.
off := int((h >> 32) % uint64(len(preferred)))
rot := make([]int, 0, len(preferred))
rot = append(rot, preferred[off:]...)
rot = append(rot, preferred[:off]...)
seenCore := make(map[int]bool, len(rot))
out := make([]int, 0, len(cands))
var siblings []int
for _, c := range rot {
g := topo.coreOf[c]
if seenCore[g] {
siblings = append(siblings, c)
continue
}
seenCore[g] = true
out = append(out, c)
}
out = append(out, siblings...)
out = append(out, zeroTail...)
return out
}
// splitmix64 decorrelates instance keys before the selection modulos: ports
// on one box often share spacing (4242/4243, or round steps like +1000) that
// raw key%len arithmetic would fold onto the same offset.
func splitmix64(x uint64) uint64 {
x += 0x9e3779b97f4a7c15
x = (x ^ (x >> 30)) * 0xbf58476d1ce4e5b9
x = (x ^ (x >> 27)) * 0x94d049bb133111eb
return x ^ (x >> 31)
}
+171
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
package cpupick
import (
"slices"
"testing"
)
// pairTopo builds a topology where consecutive candidate pairs are SMT
// siblings: (cpus[0],cpus[1]) share a core, (cpus[2],cpus[3]) the next, ...
// All CPUs land on node 0.
func pairTopo(cpus []int) topology {
t := topology{
nodeOf: make(map[int]int, len(cpus)),
coreOf: make(map[int]int, len(cpus)),
zeroCore: -1,
}
for i, c := range cpus {
t.nodeOf[c] = 0
t.coreOf[c] = i / 2
if c == 0 {
t.zeroCore = i / 2
}
}
return t
}
func TestArrangeDemotesZeroForEveryKey(t *testing.T) {
candidates := []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}
for key := range uint64(64) {
got := arrange(candidates, flatTopology(candidates), 4, splitmix64(key))
if len(got) != len(candidates) {
t.Fatalf("key %d: len=%d want %d", key, len(got), len(candidates))
}
if got[0] == 0 {
t.Errorf("key %d: CPU 0 at the front: %v", key, got)
}
if got[len(got)-1] != 0 {
t.Errorf("key %d: CPU 0 not demoted to last: %v", key, got)
}
sorted := slices.Clone(got)
slices.Sort(sorted)
if !slices.Equal(sorted, candidates) {
t.Errorf("key %d: not a permutation: %v", key, got)
}
}
}
func TestArrangeDemotesZeroSiblings(t *testing.T) {
// Pairs (0,1),(2,3),(4,5),(6,7): CPU 0's core — 0 and its sibling 1 —
// must tail the list, sibling ahead of 0 itself.
candidates := []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}
for key := range uint64(64) {
got := arrange(candidates, pairTopo(candidates), 2, splitmix64(key))
n := len(got)
if got[n-1] != 0 || got[n-2] != 1 {
t.Fatalf("key %d: tail = %v, want [... 1 0]", key, got)
}
}
}
func TestArrangeZeroSiblingWithoutZero(t *testing.T) {
// CPU 0 excluded (cpuset) but its sibling 1 remains: the sibling still
// tails the list when the topology knows which core CPU 0 lives on.
candidates := []int{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
topo := pairTopo([]int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5})
got := arrange(candidates, topo, 2, splitmix64(7))
if got[len(got)-1] != 1 {
t.Errorf("CPU 0's sibling not demoted: %v", got)
}
}
func TestArrangeRotatesByKey(t *testing.T) {
candidates := []int{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}
seen := map[int]bool{}
for key := range uint64(64) {
seen[arrange(candidates, flatTopology(candidates), 4, splitmix64(key))[0]] = true
}
// 64 hashed keys over 8 slots must hit more than one starting CPU, or
// co-located instances would all stack again.
if len(seen) < 2 {
t.Errorf("rotation never varied across keys: %v", seen)
}
}
func TestArrangeStableForSameKey(t *testing.T) {
candidates := []int{0, 2, 4, 6}
topo := flatTopology(candidates)
a := arrange(candidates, topo, 2, splitmix64(4242))
b := arrange(candidates, topo, 2, splitmix64(4242))
if !slices.Equal(a, b) {
t.Errorf("same key ordered differently: %v vs %v", a, b)
}
}
func TestArrangeZeroOnly(t *testing.T) {
if got := arrange([]int{0}, flatTopology([]int{0}), 1, splitmix64(7)); !slices.Equal(got, []int{0}) {
t.Errorf("sole CPU 0 must survive: %v", got)
}
}
func TestArrangeSMTSiblingsLast(t *testing.T) {
// Pairs (1,2),(3,4),(5,6),(7,8): the first four picks must cover four
// distinct physical cores before any sibling repeats.
candidates := []int{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}
topo := pairTopo(candidates)
for key := range uint64(16) {
got := arrange(candidates, topo, 4, splitmix64(key))
seen := map[int]bool{}
for _, c := range got[:4] {
g := topo.coreOf[c]
if seen[g] {
t.Fatalf("key %d: sibling before all cores covered: %v", key, got)
}
seen[g] = true
}
}
}
func TestArrangeNUMAConfinesToOneNode(t *testing.T) {
// Two nodes of four; both fit routines=3, so the result must sit
// entirely inside one of them, and the hash must pick both across keys.
candidates := []int{1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 13}
topo := flatTopology(candidates)
for _, c := range []int{10, 11, 12, 13} {
topo.nodeOf[c] = 1
}
nodesSeen := map[int]bool{}
for key := range uint64(32) {
got := arrange(candidates, topo, 3, splitmix64(key))
if len(got) != 4 {
t.Fatalf("key %d: not confined to one node: %v", key, got)
}
n := topo.nodeOf[got[0]]
for _, c := range got {
if topo.nodeOf[c] != n {
t.Fatalf("key %d: spans nodes: %v", key, got)
}
}
nodesSeen[n] = true
}
if len(nodesSeen) != 2 {
t.Errorf("hash never spread instances across nodes: %v", nodesSeen)
}
}
func TestArrangeNUMASpansWhenNoNodeFits(t *testing.T) {
candidates := []int{1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 13}
topo := flatTopology(candidates)
for _, c := range []int{10, 11, 12, 13} {
topo.nodeOf[c] = 1
}
got := arrange(candidates, topo, 6, splitmix64(1))
if len(got) != len(candidates) {
t.Errorf("undersized nodes must span, got %v", got)
}
}
func TestPickCandidates(t *testing.T) {
allowed := []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}
perf := []int{4, 5}
// Enough perf cores for every routine: only they are used.
if got := pickCandidates(allowed, perf, 2); !slices.Equal(got, perf) {
t.Errorf("perf filter not applied: %v", got)
}
// Perf filter too small for the routine count: discarded, everyone
// gets their own core from the full allowed set.
if got := pickCandidates(allowed, perf, 4); !slices.Equal(got, allowed) {
t.Errorf("undersized perf filter not discarded: %v", got)
}
}
+154
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
//go:build linux
package cpupick
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strconv"
"strings"
)
// capacityKeepPct is the cpu_capacity admission threshold, relative to the
// fastest allowed core. LITTLE cores are normalized to ~250-400 of the big
// core's 1024 while mid cores sit at ~75%+, so half of max separates little
// from the rest without splitting prime from mid on three-tier parts.
const capacityKeepPct = 50
// freqKeepPct is the cpuinfo_max_freq admission threshold. Favored-core
// turbo skew is 2-4% and ARM mid-vs-prime ~12%, while E-cores, LITTLE
// cores, and AMD compact cores all sit >= 20% below their siblings' max.
const freqKeepPct = 85
// perfCPUs partitions allowed into the subset that are "performance" cores,
// consulting (in order of authority):
//
// 1. cpu_capacity — arch_topology's normalized per-CPU capacity, exposed on
// arm/arm64/riscv; the scheduler's own view of big vs LITTLE.
// 2. /sys/devices/cpu_core/cpus — the Intel hybrid P-core PMU mask, present
// only on P/E parts (x86 has no cpu_capacity) and naming P cores outright.
// 3. cpuinfo_max_freq — the cross-vendor fallback; catches AMD compact
// cores, which neither of the above covers.
//
// Returns allowed unchanged (signal "") when nothing distinguishes the
// cores: homogeneous parts, VMs without cpufreq, sysfs unavailable.
func perfCPUs(allowed []int) ([]int, string) {
return perfCPUsFrom("/sys/devices/system/cpu", "/sys/devices/cpu_core/cpus", allowed)
}
func perfCPUsFrom(cpuDir, intelCoreMask string, allowed []int) ([]int, string) {
if cpus, ok := byPerCPUValue(cpuDir, "cpu_capacity", allowed, capacityKeepPct); ok {
return cpus, "cpu_capacity"
}
if cpus, ok := byIntelCoreMask(intelCoreMask, allowed); ok {
return cpus, "intel_core_pmu"
}
if cpus, ok := byPerCPUValue(cpuDir, "cpufreq/cpuinfo_max_freq", allowed, freqKeepPct); ok {
return cpus, "max_freq"
}
return allowed, ""
}
// byPerCPUValue keeps the allowed CPUs whose per-CPU sysfs value is at least
// keepPct percent of the maximum across allowed. Inconclusive (ok=false)
// when any CPU is missing the file or when every value is equal.
func byPerCPUValue(cpuDir, file string, allowed []int, keepPct int) ([]int, bool) {
vals := make([]int, len(allowed))
minV, maxV := 0, 0
for i, cpu := range allowed {
v, err := readIntFile(filepath.Join(cpuDir, fmt.Sprintf("cpu%d", cpu), file))
if err != nil {
return nil, false
}
vals[i] = v
if i == 0 || v < minV {
minV = v
}
if v > maxV {
maxV = v
}
}
if minV == maxV {
return nil, false // homogeneous by this signal; try the next one
}
keep := make([]int, 0, len(allowed))
for i, cpu := range allowed {
if vals[i]*100 >= maxV*keepPct {
keep = append(keep, cpu)
}
}
return keep, true
}
// byIntelCoreMask keeps the allowed CPUs named by the hybrid P-core PMU
// mask. Inconclusive when the file is absent (non-hybrid x86, other arches)
// or no allowed CPU is in the mask (the process was deliberately confined
// to E-cores; nothing useful to prefer within that).
func byIntelCoreMask(maskPath string, allowed []int) ([]int, bool) {
b, err := os.ReadFile(maskPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, false
}
set, err := parseCPUList(strings.TrimSpace(string(b)))
if err != nil || len(set) == 0 {
return nil, false
}
pcore := make(map[int]bool, len(set))
for _, c := range set {
pcore[c] = true
}
keep := make([]int, 0, len(allowed))
for _, cpu := range allowed {
if pcore[cpu] {
keep = append(keep, cpu)
}
}
if len(keep) == 0 {
return nil, false
}
return keep, true
}
// parseCPUList decodes the kernel's cpulist format ("0-7,16-23", "3") into
// individual CPU IDs. Empty input yields an empty list.
func parseCPUList(s string) ([]int, error) {
if s == "" {
return nil, nil
}
var out []int
for part := range strings.SplitSeq(s, ",") {
part = strings.TrimSpace(part)
if part == "" {
continue
}
lo, hi, isRange := strings.Cut(part, "-")
a, err := strconv.Atoi(lo)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("bad cpulist entry %q: %w", part, err)
}
if !isRange {
out = append(out, a)
continue
}
b, err := strconv.Atoi(hi)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("bad cpulist entry %q: %w", part, err)
}
if b < a || b-a > 8192 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("bad cpulist range %q", part)
}
for v := a; v <= b; v++ {
out = append(out, v)
}
}
return out, nil
}
func readIntFile(path string) (int, error) {
b, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
return strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(string(b)))
}
+163
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
//go:build linux
package cpupick
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"slices"
"testing"
)
// fakeSysfs builds a cpuDir tree with the given per-CPU file values.
// A nil map for a file means "file absent on every CPU".
func fakeSysfs(t *testing.T, capacity, maxFreq map[int]int) string {
t.Helper()
dir := t.TempDir()
write := func(cpu int, rel string, v int) {
p := filepath.Join(dir, fmt.Sprintf("cpu%d", cpu), rel)
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(p), 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(p, fmt.Appendf(nil, "%d\n", v), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
for cpu, v := range capacity {
write(cpu, "cpu_capacity", v)
}
for cpu, v := range maxFreq {
write(cpu, "cpufreq/cpuinfo_max_freq", v)
}
return dir
}
func writeCoreMask(t *testing.T, mask string) string {
t.Helper()
p := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "cpus")
if err := os.WriteFile(p, []byte(mask+"\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return p
}
func TestPerfCPUsBigLittleCapacity(t *testing.T) {
// 4 big (1024) + 4 LITTLE (~290): capacity is authoritative on ARM.
dir := fakeSysfs(t, map[int]int{
0: 1024, 1: 1024, 2: 1024, 3: 1024,
4: 290, 5: 290, 6: 290, 7: 290,
}, nil)
got, signal := perfCPUsFrom(dir, filepath.Join(dir, "nope"), []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7})
if signal != "cpu_capacity" {
t.Fatalf("signal = %q", signal)
}
if !slices.Equal(got, []int{0, 1, 2, 3}) {
t.Errorf("got %v", got)
}
}
func TestPerfCPUsThreeTierKeepsMid(t *testing.T) {
// prime (1024) + mid (~780) + little (~280): 50% keeps prime+mid.
dir := fakeSysfs(t, map[int]int{
0: 280, 1: 280, 2: 280, 3: 280,
4: 780, 5: 780, 6: 780,
7: 1024,
}, nil)
got, _ := perfCPUsFrom(dir, filepath.Join(dir, "nope"), []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7})
if !slices.Equal(got, []int{4, 5, 6, 7}) {
t.Errorf("got %v", got)
}
}
func TestPerfCPUsIntelHybridMask(t *testing.T) {
// No cpu_capacity on x86; the P-core PMU mask decides.
dir := fakeSysfs(t, nil, nil)
mask := writeCoreMask(t, "0-7")
got, signal := perfCPUsFrom(dir, mask, []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11})
if signal != "intel_core_pmu" {
t.Fatalf("signal = %q", signal)
}
if !slices.Equal(got, []int{0, 1, 2, 3}) {
t.Errorf("got %v", got)
}
}
func TestPerfCPUsIntelMaskDisjointFallsThrough(t *testing.T) {
// Confined to E-cores only: the mask can't help, and equal freqs below
// mean nothing else distinguishes them either -> allowed unchanged.
dir := fakeSysfs(t, nil, map[int]int{8: 4300000, 9: 4300000})
mask := writeCoreMask(t, "0-7")
got, signal := perfCPUsFrom(dir, mask, []int{8, 9})
if signal != "" || !slices.Equal(got, []int{8, 9}) {
t.Errorf("got %v signal %q", got, signal)
}
}
func TestPerfCPUsMaxFreqCompactCores(t *testing.T) {
// AMD-style compact cores: no capacity, no Intel mask; 3.3 vs 5.7 GHz.
dir := fakeSysfs(t, nil, map[int]int{
0: 5700000, 1: 5700000, 2: 3300000, 3: 3300000,
})
got, signal := perfCPUsFrom(dir, filepath.Join(dir, "nope"), []int{0, 1, 2, 3})
if signal != "max_freq" {
t.Fatalf("signal = %q", signal)
}
if !slices.Equal(got, []int{0, 1}) {
t.Errorf("got %v", got)
}
}
func TestPerfCPUsFavoredCoreSkewKept(t *testing.T) {
// Turbo Boost Max favored cores run a few percent hot; they must not
// shrink the candidate set to one or two cores.
dir := fakeSysfs(t, nil, map[int]int{
0: 5800000, 1: 5700000, 2: 5700000, 3: 5600000,
})
got, _ := perfCPUsFrom(dir, filepath.Join(dir, "nope"), []int{0, 1, 2, 3})
if !slices.Equal(got, []int{0, 1, 2, 3}) {
t.Errorf("favored-core skew filtered CPUs: %v", got)
}
}
func TestPerfCPUsHomogeneousInconclusive(t *testing.T) {
dir := fakeSysfs(t, nil, map[int]int{0: 3000000, 1: 3000000})
got, signal := perfCPUsFrom(dir, filepath.Join(dir, "nope"), []int{0, 1})
if signal != "" || !slices.Equal(got, []int{0, 1}) {
t.Errorf("got %v signal %q", got, signal)
}
}
func TestPerfCPUsNoSysfs(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
got, signal := perfCPUsFrom(dir, filepath.Join(dir, "nope"), []int{0, 1, 2})
if signal != "" || !slices.Equal(got, []int{0, 1, 2}) {
t.Errorf("got %v signal %q", got, signal)
}
}
func TestParseCPUList(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
in string
want []int
wantErr bool
}{
{"0-3", []int{0, 1, 2, 3}, false},
{"0-1,16-17", []int{0, 1, 16, 17}, false},
{"5", []int{5}, false},
{"", nil, false},
{"3-1", nil, true},
{"a-b", nil, true},
{"1,x", nil, true},
}
for _, c := range cases {
got, err := parseCPUList(c.in)
if (err != nil) != c.wantErr {
t.Errorf("%q: err=%v wantErr=%v", c.in, err, c.wantErr)
continue
}
if !c.wantErr && !slices.Equal(got, c.want) {
t.Errorf("%q: got %v want %v", c.in, got, c.want)
}
}
}
+10
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
//go:build !linux
package cpupick
// perfCPUs is Linux-only sysfs walking; elsewhere report "no distinction".
// Default already returns nil off-Linux (util.AllowedCPUs has no answer
// there), so this exists to keep the package compiling everywhere.
func perfCPUs(allowed []int) ([]int, string) {
return allowed, ""
}
+118
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
//go:build linux
package cpupick
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strconv"
"strings"
)
// readTopology probes the NUMA node and physical-core layout of cpus from
// sysfs. Anything sysfs won't say degrades toward flatTopology: an unknown
// node becomes node 0, an unknown core becomes a core of its own — either
// way the corresponding arrange rule becomes a no-op instead of a wrong
// answer.
func readTopology(cpus []int) topology {
return readTopologyFrom("/sys/devices/system/node", "/sys/devices/system/cpu", cpus)
}
func readTopologyFrom(nodeDir, cpuDir string, cpus []int) topology {
coreOf, zeroCore := coreGroups(cpuDir, cpus)
return topology{
nodeOf: numaNodes(nodeDir, cpus),
coreOf: coreOf,
zeroCore: zeroCore,
}
}
// numaNodes maps each cpu to its NUMA node via
// /sys/devices/system/node/nodeN/cpulist. CPUs no node claims (or no node
// dirs at all: VMs, non-NUMA kernels) land on node 0.
func numaNodes(nodeDir string, cpus []int) map[int]int {
out := make(map[int]int, len(cpus))
for _, c := range cpus {
out[c] = 0
}
entries, err := os.ReadDir(nodeDir)
if err != nil {
return out
}
want := make(map[int]bool, len(cpus))
for _, c := range cpus {
want[c] = true
}
for _, e := range entries {
id, ok := strings.CutPrefix(e.Name(), "node")
if !ok {
continue
}
n, err := strconv.Atoi(id)
if err != nil {
continue // has_cpu, possible, ... share the prefix
}
b, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(nodeDir, e.Name(), "cpulist"))
if err != nil {
continue
}
list, err := parseCPUList(strings.TrimSpace(string(b)))
if err != nil {
continue
}
for _, c := range list {
if want[c] {
out[c] = n
}
}
}
return out
}
// coreGroups maps each cpu to a dense physical-core id derived from its
// (physical_package_id, core_id) pair — core_id alone repeats across
// sockets. CPUs whose topology files are unreadable get a core of their own.
// The second return is the group id of the core CPU 0 lives on, or -1 when
// that can't be determined; CPU 0's own files are consulted even when 0 is
// not a candidate, so its SMT siblings are recognized under cpusets that
// exclude CPU 0 itself.
func coreGroups(cpuDir string, cpus []int) (map[int]int, int) {
type pkgCore struct{ pkg, core int }
pairOf := func(cpu int) (pkgCore, bool) {
topoDir := filepath.Join(cpuDir, fmt.Sprintf("cpu%d", cpu), "topology")
pkg, err1 := readIntFile(filepath.Join(topoDir, "physical_package_id"))
core, err2 := readIntFile(filepath.Join(topoDir, "core_id"))
if err1 != nil || err2 != nil {
return pkgCore{}, false
}
return pkgCore{pkg, core}, true
}
ids := map[pkgCore]int{}
out := make(map[int]int, len(cpus))
next := 0
for _, cpu := range cpus {
k, ok := pairOf(cpu)
if !ok {
out[cpu] = next
next++
continue
}
id, ok := ids[k]
if !ok {
id = next
next++
ids[k] = id
}
out[cpu] = id
}
zeroCore := -1
if k, ok := pairOf(0); ok {
if id, ok := ids[k]; ok {
zeroCore = id
}
}
return out, zeroCore
}
+111
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
//go:build linux
package cpupick
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
)
// fakeTopoSysfs builds nodeDir/cpuDir trees. nodes maps node id -> cpulist
// string; cores maps cpu -> (package, core) pair.
func fakeTopoSysfs(t *testing.T, nodes map[int]string, cores map[int][2]int) (string, string) {
t.Helper()
base := t.TempDir()
nodeDir := filepath.Join(base, "node")
cpuDir := filepath.Join(base, "cpu")
for n, list := range nodes {
d := filepath.Join(nodeDir, fmt.Sprintf("node%d", n))
if err := os.MkdirAll(d, 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(d, "cpulist"), []byte(list+"\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
for cpu, pc := range cores {
d := filepath.Join(cpuDir, fmt.Sprintf("cpu%d", cpu), "topology")
if err := os.MkdirAll(d, 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(d, "physical_package_id"), fmt.Appendf(nil, "%d\n", pc[0]), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(d, "core_id"), fmt.Appendf(nil, "%d\n", pc[1]), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
return nodeDir, cpuDir
}
func TestReadTopology(t *testing.T) {
// Two nodes; SMT pairs (0,4),(1,5) on node 0 and (2,6),(3,7) on node 1.
// core_id repeats across packages on purpose: the pair must disambiguate.
nodeDir, cpuDir := fakeTopoSysfs(t,
map[int]string{0: "0-1,4-5", 1: "2-3,6-7"},
map[int][2]int{
0: {0, 0}, 4: {0, 0}, 1: {0, 1}, 5: {0, 1},
2: {1, 0}, 6: {1, 0}, 3: {1, 1}, 7: {1, 1},
})
cpus := []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}
topo := readTopologyFrom(nodeDir, cpuDir, cpus)
for _, c := range []int{0, 1, 4, 5} {
if topo.nodeOf[c] != 0 {
t.Errorf("cpu %d on node %d, want 0", c, topo.nodeOf[c])
}
}
for _, c := range []int{2, 3, 6, 7} {
if topo.nodeOf[c] != 1 {
t.Errorf("cpu %d on node %d, want 1", c, topo.nodeOf[c])
}
}
pairs := [][2]int{{0, 4}, {1, 5}, {2, 6}, {3, 7}}
for _, p := range pairs {
if topo.coreOf[p[0]] != topo.coreOf[p[1]] {
t.Errorf("siblings %v not grouped: %d vs %d", p, topo.coreOf[p[0]], topo.coreOf[p[1]])
}
}
if topo.coreOf[0] == topo.coreOf[2] {
t.Error("cross-package cores with equal core_id must not merge")
}
if topo.zeroCore != topo.coreOf[0] {
t.Errorf("zeroCore = %d, want %d", topo.zeroCore, topo.coreOf[0])
}
}
func TestReadTopologyZeroCoreWithoutZeroCandidate(t *testing.T) {
// CPU 0 is not a candidate (cpuset excludes it) but its sibling 4 is:
// zeroCore must still identify their shared core.
nodeDir, cpuDir := fakeTopoSysfs(t,
map[int]string{0: "0-7"},
map[int][2]int{0: {0, 0}, 4: {0, 0}, 1: {0, 1}, 5: {0, 1}})
topo := readTopologyFrom(nodeDir, cpuDir, []int{1, 4, 5})
if topo.zeroCore < 0 || topo.coreOf[4] != topo.zeroCore {
t.Errorf("zeroCore = %d, coreOf[4] = %d; sibling of CPU 0 not identified", topo.zeroCore, topo.coreOf[4])
}
if topo.coreOf[1] == topo.zeroCore {
t.Error("cpu 1 wrongly grouped with CPU 0's core")
}
}
func TestReadTopologyMissingSysfs(t *testing.T) {
base := t.TempDir()
cpus := []int{0, 1, 2}
topo := readTopologyFrom(filepath.Join(base, "nope"), filepath.Join(base, "also-nope"), cpus)
seen := map[int]bool{}
for _, c := range cpus {
if topo.nodeOf[c] != 0 {
t.Errorf("cpu %d node = %d, want 0", c, topo.nodeOf[c])
}
if seen[topo.coreOf[c]] {
t.Errorf("cpu %d shares a fallback core group", c)
}
seen[topo.coreOf[c]] = true
}
if topo.zeroCore != -1 {
t.Errorf("zeroCore = %d, want -1 when unknown", topo.zeroCore)
}
}
+10
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
//go:build !linux
package cpupick
// readTopology has no sysfs to consult off Linux; the flat stand-in makes
// arrange's NUMA and SMT rules no-ops. Default is already nil off Linux
// (util.AllowedCPUs has no answer there) — this keeps the package compiling.
func readTopology(cpus []int) topology {
return flatTopology(cpus)
}
+9 -15
View File
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ function nebula.dissector(tvbuf, pktinfo, root)
tree:add(pf_version, tvbuf:range(0,1)) tree:add(pf_version, tvbuf:range(0,1))
local type = tree:add(pf_type, tvbuf:range(0,1)) local type = tree:add(pf_type, tvbuf:range(0,1))
local nebula_type = bit32.band(tvbuf:range(0,1):uint(), 0x0F) local nebula_type = bit.band(tvbuf:range(0,1):uint(), 0x0F)
if nebula_type == 0 then if nebula_type == 0 then
local stage = tvbuf(8,8):uint64() local stage = tvbuf(8,8):uint64()
tree:add(pf_subtype_handshake, tvbuf:range(1,1)) tree:add(pf_subtype_handshake, tvbuf:range(1,1))
@@ -84,30 +84,24 @@ end
function nebula.prefs_changed() function nebula.prefs_changed()
if default_settings.all_ports == nebula.prefs.all_ports and default_settings.port == nebula.prefs.port then if default_settings.all_ports == nebula.prefs.all_ports and default_settings.port == nebula.prefs.port then
-- Nothing changed, bail
return return
end end
-- Remove our old dissector -- Remove all existing registrations
DissectorTable.get("udp.port"):remove_all(nebula) DissectorTable.get("udp.port"):remove_all(nebula)
if nebula.prefs.all_ports and default_settings.all_ports ~= nebula.prefs.all_ports then if nebula.prefs.all_ports then
default_settings.all_port = nebula.prefs.all_ports -- Register on every port for hole punch capture
for i=0, 65535 do for i=0, 65535 do
DissectorTable.get("udp.port"):add(i, nebula) DissectorTable.get("udp.port"):add(i, nebula)
end end
else
-- no need to establish again on specific ports -- Register on the configured port only
return DissectorTable.get("udp.port"):add(nebula.prefs.port, nebula)
end end
default_settings.all_ports = nebula.prefs.all_ports
if default_settings.all_ports ~= nebula.prefs.all_ports then default_settings.port = nebula.prefs.port
-- Add our new port dissector
default_settings.port = nebula.prefs.port
DissectorTable.get("udp.port"):add(default_settings.port, nebula)
end
end end
DissectorTable.get("udp.port"):add(default_settings.port, nebula) DissectorTable.get("udp.port"):add(default_settings.port, nebula)
+322 -74
View File
@@ -1,68 +1,277 @@
package nebula package nebula
import ( import (
"context"
"fmt" "fmt"
"log/slog"
"net" "net"
"net/netip" "net/netip"
"strconv" "strconv"
"strings" "strings"
"sync" "sync"
"sync/atomic"
"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
"github.com/miekg/dns" "github.com/miekg/dns"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config" "github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
) )
// This whole thing should be rewritten to use context type dnsServer struct {
var dnsR *dnsRecords
var dnsServer *dns.Server
var dnsAddr string
type dnsRecords struct {
sync.RWMutex sync.RWMutex
l *logrus.Logger l *slog.Logger
dnsMap4 map[string]netip.Addr ctx context.Context
dnsMap6 map[string]netip.Addr dnsMap4 map[string]netip.Addr
hostMap *HostMap dnsMap6 map[string]netip.Addr
myVpnAddrsTable *bart.Lite hostMap *HostMap
pki *PKI
// selfHost is the cached FQDN we last seeded for ourselves
selfHost string
mux *dns.ServeMux
// enabled mirrors `lighthouse.serve_dns && lighthouse.am_lighthouse`.
// Start, Add, and reload consult it so callers don't need to know the
// gating rules. When it toggles off via reload, accumulated records are
// cleared so a later re-enable starts with a fresh map populated from
// new handshakes.
enabled atomic.Bool
serverMu sync.Mutex
server *dns.Server
// started is closed once `server` has finished binding (or after
// ListenAndServe returns on a bind failure). Stop waits on it before
// calling Shutdown to avoid the miekg/dns "server not started" race
// where a Shutdown that arrives before bind completes is silently
// ignored, leaving the listener running forever.
started chan struct{}
addr string
} }
func newDnsRecords(l *logrus.Logger, cs *CertState, hostMap *HostMap) *dnsRecords { // newDnsServerFromConfig builds a dnsServer, applies the initial config, and
return &dnsRecords{ // registers a reload callback. The reload callback is registered before the
l: l, // initial config is applied, so a SIGHUP can later enable, fix, or disable
dnsMap4: make(map[string]netip.Addr), // DNS even if the initial application failed.
dnsMap6: make(map[string]netip.Addr), //
hostMap: hostMap, // The dnsServer internally gates on `lighthouse.serve_dns &&
myVpnAddrsTable: cs.myVpnAddrsTable, // lighthouse.am_lighthouse`. Start and Add are safe to call unconditionally,
// they no-op when DNS isn't enabled. Each Start invocation owns a ctx-cancel
// watcher that tears the listener down on nebula shutdown. The returned
// pointer is always non-nil, even on error.
func newDnsServerFromConfig(ctx context.Context, l *slog.Logger, pki *PKI, hostMap *HostMap, c *config.C) (*dnsServer, error) {
ds := &dnsServer{
l: l,
ctx: ctx,
dnsMap4: make(map[string]netip.Addr),
dnsMap6: make(map[string]netip.Addr),
hostMap: hostMap,
pki: pki,
}
ds.mux = dns.NewServeMux()
ds.mux.HandleFunc(".", ds.handleDnsRequest)
c.RegisterReloadCallback(func(c *config.C) {
if err := ds.reload(c, false); err != nil {
ds.l.Error("Failed to reload DNS responder from config", "error", err)
}
})
if err := ds.reload(c, true); err != nil {
return ds, err
}
ds.seedSelf()
return ds, nil
}
// reload applies the latest config and reconciles the running state with it:
// - enabled toggled on -> spawn a runner
// - enabled toggled off -> stop the runner
// - listen address changed (while running) -> restart on the new address
// - everything else -> no-op
//
// On the initial call it only records configuration; Control.Start is what
// launches the first runner via dnsStart.
func (d *dnsServer) reload(c *config.C, initial bool) error {
wantsDns := c.GetBool("lighthouse.serve_dns", false)
amLighthouse := c.GetBool("lighthouse.am_lighthouse", false)
enabled := wantsDns && amLighthouse
newAddr := getDnsServerAddr(c)
d.serverMu.Lock()
running := d.server != nil
sameAddr := d.addr == newAddr
d.addr = newAddr
d.enabled.Store(enabled)
d.serverMu.Unlock()
if initial {
if wantsDns && !amLighthouse {
d.l.Warn("DNS server refusing to run because this host is not a lighthouse.")
}
return nil
}
if !enabled {
if running {
d.Stop()
}
// Drop any records that accumulated while enabled; a later re-enable
// will repopulate from fresh handshakes and a fresh seedSelf.
d.clearRecords()
return nil
}
if !running {
// Was disabled (or never started); bring it up now.
go d.Start()
} else if !sameAddr {
// Stop clears the slot before shutting down, otherwise the Start below can find the dying server and refuse
d.Stop()
go d.Start()
}
// Refresh the self entry every enabled reload so cert renewals that change our name or VPN addresses are picked up.
d.seedSelf()
return nil
}
// shutdownServer waits for the server to finish binding (so Shutdown actually
// stops it rather than no-oping) and then shuts it down.
func (d *dnsServer) shutdownServer(srv *dns.Server, started chan struct{}, reason string) {
if srv == nil {
return
}
if started != nil {
<-started
}
if err := srv.Shutdown(); err != nil {
d.l.Warn("Failed to shut down the DNS responder", "reason", reason, "error", err)
} }
} }
func (d *dnsRecords) Query(q uint16, data string) netip.Addr { // Start binds and serves the DNS responder. Blocks until Stop is called or
// the listener errors. Safe to call when DNS is disabled (returns
// immediately). This is what Control.dnsStart points at.
//
// Must be invoked after the tun device is active so that lighthouse.dns.host
// may bind to a nebula IP.
func (d *dnsServer) Start() {
if !d.enabled.Load() {
return
}
started := make(chan struct{})
d.serverMu.Lock()
// Re-check enabled under the lock, a disable that raced our check above snapshots the slot under it too.
// Two reloads in quick succession can both spawn a Start, the loser would orphan the live listener past Stop
if d.ctx.Err() != nil || d.server != nil || !d.enabled.Load() {
d.serverMu.Unlock()
return
}
addr := d.addr
server := &dns.Server{
Addr: addr,
Net: "udp",
Handler: d.mux,
NotifyStartedFunc: func() { close(started) },
}
d.server = server
d.started = started
d.serverMu.Unlock()
// Per-invocation ctx watcher. Exits when Start does, so we don't leak a
// watcher per reload-driven restart.
done := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
select {
case <-d.ctx.Done():
d.shutdownServer(server, started, "shutdown")
case <-done:
}
}()
d.l.Info("Starting DNS responder", "dnsListener", addr)
err := server.ListenAndServe()
close(done)
// If the listener never bound (bind error) NotifyStartedFunc never fires,
// so close started here to release any Stop caller waiting on it.
select {
case <-started:
default:
close(started)
}
// Release our slot, unless a reload already replaced us, so a dead listener can't block a future Start
d.serverMu.Lock()
if d.server == server {
d.server = nil
d.started = nil
}
d.serverMu.Unlock()
if err != nil {
d.l.Warn("Failed to run the DNS responder", "error", err)
}
}
// Stop shuts down the active server, if any. Idempotent.
func (d *dnsServer) Stop() {
d.serverMu.Lock()
srv := d.server
started := d.started
d.server = nil
d.started = nil
d.serverMu.Unlock()
d.shutdownServer(srv, started, "stop")
}
// Query returns the address for the given name and query type. The second
// return value reports whether the name is known at all (in either A or AAAA),
// which lets callers distinguish NODATA from NXDOMAIN.
func (d *dnsServer) Query(q uint16, data string) (netip.Addr, bool) {
data = strings.ToLower(data) data = strings.ToLower(data)
d.RLock() d.RLock()
defer d.RUnlock() defer d.RUnlock()
addr4, haveV4 := d.dnsMap4[data]
addr6, haveV6 := d.dnsMap6[data]
nameExists := haveV4 || haveV6
switch q { switch q {
case dns.TypeA: case dns.TypeA:
if r, ok := d.dnsMap4[data]; ok { if haveV4 {
return r return addr4, nameExists
} }
case dns.TypeAAAA: case dns.TypeAAAA:
if r, ok := d.dnsMap6[data]; ok { if haveV6 {
return r return addr6, nameExists
} }
} }
return netip.Addr{} return netip.Addr{}, nameExists
} }
func (d *dnsRecords) QueryCert(data string) string { func (d *dnsServer) QueryCert(data string) string {
if len(data) < 2 {
return ""
}
ip, err := netip.ParseAddr(data[:len(data)-1]) ip, err := netip.ParseAddr(data[:len(data)-1])
if err != nil { if err != nil {
return "" return ""
} }
// The hostmap only ever contains peers we have handshaked with, so it never carries an entry for ourselves.
// Answer self lookups straight from the local cert state.
if cs := d.certState(); cs != nil && cs.myVpnAddrsTable != nil && cs.myVpnAddrsTable.Contains(ip) {
c := cs.GetDefaultCertificate()
if c == nil {
return ""
}
b, err := c.MarshalJSON()
if err != nil {
return ""
}
return string(b)
}
hostinfo := d.hostMap.QueryVpnAddr(ip) hostinfo := d.hostMap.QueryVpnAddr(ip)
if hostinfo == nil { if hostinfo == nil {
return "" return ""
@@ -80,8 +289,67 @@ func (d *dnsRecords) QueryCert(data string) string {
return string(b) return string(b)
} }
// clearRecords drops all DNS records, including the self entry.
func (d *dnsServer) clearRecords() {
d.Lock()
defer d.Unlock()
clear(d.dnsMap4)
clear(d.dnsMap6)
d.selfHost = ""
}
// seedSelf inserts (or refreshes) a record for our own cert name pointing at our VPN addresses,
// so a single-lighthouse network can resolve the lighthouse's own hostname without the two-process workaround.
func (d *dnsServer) seedSelf() {
if !d.enabled.Load() {
return
}
cs := d.certState()
if cs == nil {
return
}
c := cs.GetDefaultCertificate()
if c == nil {
return
}
newHost := strings.ToLower(c.Name()) + "."
d.Lock()
defer d.Unlock()
if d.selfHost != "" && d.selfHost != newHost {
delete(d.dnsMap4, d.selfHost)
delete(d.dnsMap6, d.selfHost)
}
d.selfHost = newHost
delete(d.dnsMap4, newHost)
delete(d.dnsMap6, newHost)
haveV4, haveV6 := false, false
for _, addr := range cs.myVpnAddrs {
if addr.Is4() && !haveV4 {
d.dnsMap4[newHost] = addr
haveV4 = true
} else if addr.Is6() && !haveV6 {
d.dnsMap6[newHost] = addr
haveV6 = true
}
if haveV4 && haveV6 {
break
}
}
}
func (d *dnsServer) certState() *CertState {
if d.pki == nil {
return nil
}
return d.pki.getCertState()
}
// Add adds the first IPv4 and IPv6 address that appears in `addresses` as the record for `host` // Add adds the first IPv4 and IPv6 address that appears in `addresses` as the record for `host`
func (d *dnsRecords) Add(host string, addresses []netip.Addr) { func (d *dnsServer) Add(host string, addresses []netip.Addr) {
if !d.enabled.Load() {
return
}
host = strings.ToLower(host) host = strings.ToLower(host)
d.Lock() d.Lock()
defer d.Unlock() defer d.Unlock()
@@ -101,7 +369,7 @@ func (d *dnsRecords) Add(host string, addresses []netip.Addr) {
} }
} }
func (d *dnsRecords) isSelfNebulaOrLocalhost(addr string) bool { func (d *dnsServer) isSelfNebulaOrLocalhost(addr string) bool {
a, _, _ := net.SplitHostPort(addr) a, _, _ := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
b, err := netip.ParseAddr(a) b, err := netip.ParseAddr(a)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
@@ -112,17 +380,32 @@ func (d *dnsRecords) isSelfNebulaOrLocalhost(addr string) bool {
return true return true
} }
cs := d.certState()
if cs == nil || cs.myVpnAddrsTable == nil {
return false
}
//if we found it in this table, it's good //if we found it in this table, it's good
return d.myVpnAddrsTable.Contains(b) return cs.myVpnAddrsTable.Contains(b)
} }
func (d *dnsRecords) parseQuery(m *dns.Msg, w dns.ResponseWriter) { func (d *dnsServer) parseQuery(m *dns.Msg, w dns.ResponseWriter) {
debugEnabled := d.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug)
// Per RFC 2308 §2.2, a name that exists but has no record of the requested
// type must be answered with NOERROR and an empty answer section (NODATA),
// not NXDOMAIN (RFC 2308 §2.1), which is reserved for names that do not
// exist at all.
anyNameExists := false
for _, q := range m.Question { for _, q := range m.Question {
switch q.Qtype { switch q.Qtype {
case dns.TypeA, dns.TypeAAAA: case dns.TypeA, dns.TypeAAAA:
qType := dns.TypeToString[q.Qtype] qType := dns.TypeToString[q.Qtype]
d.l.Debugf("Query for %s %s", qType, q.Name) if debugEnabled {
ip := d.Query(q.Qtype, q.Name) d.l.Debug("DNS query", "type", qType, "name", q.Name)
}
ip, nameExists := d.Query(q.Qtype, q.Name)
if nameExists {
anyNameExists = true
}
if ip.IsValid() { if ip.IsValid() {
rr, err := dns.NewRR(fmt.Sprintf("%s %s %s", q.Name, qType, ip)) rr, err := dns.NewRR(fmt.Sprintf("%s %s %s", q.Name, qType, ip))
if err == nil { if err == nil {
@@ -134,7 +417,9 @@ func (d *dnsRecords) parseQuery(m *dns.Msg, w dns.ResponseWriter) {
if !d.isSelfNebulaOrLocalhost(w.RemoteAddr().String()) { if !d.isSelfNebulaOrLocalhost(w.RemoteAddr().String()) {
return return
} }
d.l.Debugf("Query for TXT %s", q.Name) if debugEnabled {
d.l.Debug("DNS query", "type", "TXT", "name", q.Name)
}
ip := d.QueryCert(q.Name) ip := d.QueryCert(q.Name)
if ip != "" { if ip != "" {
rr, err := dns.NewRR(fmt.Sprintf("%s TXT %s", q.Name, ip)) rr, err := dns.NewRR(fmt.Sprintf("%s TXT %s", q.Name, ip))
@@ -145,12 +430,12 @@ func (d *dnsRecords) parseQuery(m *dns.Msg, w dns.ResponseWriter) {
} }
} }
if len(m.Answer) == 0 { if len(m.Answer) == 0 && !anyNameExists {
m.Rcode = dns.RcodeNameError m.Rcode = dns.RcodeNameError
} }
} }
func (d *dnsRecords) handleDnsRequest(w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg) { func (d *dnsServer) handleDnsRequest(w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg) {
m := new(dns.Msg) m := new(dns.Msg)
m.SetReply(r) m.SetReply(r)
m.Compress = false m.Compress = false
@@ -163,21 +448,6 @@ func (d *dnsRecords) handleDnsRequest(w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg) {
w.WriteMsg(m) w.WriteMsg(m)
} }
func dnsMain(l *logrus.Logger, cs *CertState, hostMap *HostMap, c *config.C) func() {
dnsR = newDnsRecords(l, cs, hostMap)
// attach request handler func
dns.HandleFunc(".", dnsR.handleDnsRequest)
c.RegisterReloadCallback(func(c *config.C) {
reloadDns(l, c)
})
return func() {
startDns(l, c)
}
}
func getDnsServerAddr(c *config.C) string { func getDnsServerAddr(c *config.C) string {
dnsHost := strings.TrimSpace(c.GetString("lighthouse.dns.host", "")) dnsHost := strings.TrimSpace(c.GetString("lighthouse.dns.host", ""))
// Old guidance was to provide the literal `[::]` in `lighthouse.dns.host` but that won't resolve. // Old guidance was to provide the literal `[::]` in `lighthouse.dns.host` but that won't resolve.
@@ -186,25 +456,3 @@ func getDnsServerAddr(c *config.C) string {
} }
return net.JoinHostPort(dnsHost, strconv.Itoa(c.GetInt("lighthouse.dns.port", 53))) return net.JoinHostPort(dnsHost, strconv.Itoa(c.GetInt("lighthouse.dns.port", 53)))
} }
func startDns(l *logrus.Logger, c *config.C) {
dnsAddr = getDnsServerAddr(c)
dnsServer = &dns.Server{Addr: dnsAddr, Net: "udp"}
l.WithField("dnsListener", dnsAddr).Info("Starting DNS responder")
err := dnsServer.ListenAndServe()
defer dnsServer.Shutdown()
if err != nil {
l.Errorf("Failed to start server: %s\n ", err.Error())
}
}
func reloadDns(l *logrus.Logger, c *config.C) {
if dnsAddr == getDnsServerAddr(c) {
l.Debug("No DNS server config change detected")
return
}
l.Debug("Restarting DNS server")
dnsServer.Shutdown()
go startDns(l, c)
}
+561 -3
View File
@@ -1,19 +1,46 @@
package nebula package nebula
import ( import (
"context"
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/netip" "net/netip"
"strconv"
"testing" "testing"
"time"
"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
"github.com/miekg/dns" "github.com/miekg/dns"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus" "github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config" "github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
) )
type stubDNSWriter struct{}
func (stubDNSWriter) LocalAddr() net.Addr { return &net.UDPAddr{} }
func (stubDNSWriter) RemoteAddr() net.Addr {
return &net.UDPAddr{IP: net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1"), Port: 5353}
}
func (stubDNSWriter) Write([]byte) (int, error) { return 0, nil }
func (stubDNSWriter) WriteMsg(*dns.Msg) error { return nil }
func (stubDNSWriter) Close() error { return nil }
func (stubDNSWriter) TsigStatus() error { return nil }
func (stubDNSWriter) TsigTimersOnly(bool) {}
func (stubDNSWriter) Hijack() {}
func TestParsequery(t *testing.T) { func TestParsequery(t *testing.T) {
l := logrus.New() l := slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)
hostMap := &HostMap{} hostMap := &HostMap{}
ds := newDnsRecords(l, &CertState{}, hostMap) ds := &dnsServer{
l: l,
dnsMap4: make(map[string]netip.Addr),
dnsMap6: make(map[string]netip.Addr),
hostMap: hostMap,
}
ds.enabled.Store(true)
addrs := []netip.Addr{ addrs := []netip.Addr{
netip.MustParseAddr("1.2.3.4"), netip.MustParseAddr("1.2.3.4"),
netip.MustParseAddr("1.2.3.5"), netip.MustParseAddr("1.2.3.5"),
@@ -21,18 +48,56 @@ func TestParsequery(t *testing.T) {
netip.MustParseAddr("fd01::25"), netip.MustParseAddr("fd01::25"),
} }
ds.Add("test.com.com", addrs) ds.Add("test.com.com", addrs)
ds.Add("v4only.com.com", []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("1.2.3.6")})
ds.Add("v6only.com.com", []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("fd01::26")})
m := &dns.Msg{} m := &dns.Msg{}
m.SetQuestion("test.com.com", dns.TypeA) m.SetQuestion("test.com.com", dns.TypeA)
ds.parseQuery(m, nil) ds.parseQuery(m, nil)
assert.NotNil(t, m.Answer) assert.NotNil(t, m.Answer)
assert.Equal(t, "1.2.3.4", m.Answer[0].(*dns.A).A.String()) assert.Equal(t, "1.2.3.4", m.Answer[0].(*dns.A).A.String())
assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, m.Rcode)
m = &dns.Msg{} m = &dns.Msg{}
m.SetQuestion("test.com.com", dns.TypeAAAA) m.SetQuestion("test.com.com", dns.TypeAAAA)
ds.parseQuery(m, nil) ds.parseQuery(m, nil)
assert.NotNil(t, m.Answer) assert.NotNil(t, m.Answer)
assert.Equal(t, "fd01::24", m.Answer[0].(*dns.AAAA).AAAA.String()) assert.Equal(t, "fd01::24", m.Answer[0].(*dns.AAAA).AAAA.String())
assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, m.Rcode)
// A known name with no record of the requested type should return NODATA
// (NOERROR with empty answer), not NXDOMAIN.
m = &dns.Msg{}
m.SetQuestion("v4only.com.com", dns.TypeAAAA)
ds.parseQuery(m, nil)
assert.Empty(t, m.Answer)
assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, m.Rcode)
m = &dns.Msg{}
m.SetQuestion("v6only.com.com", dns.TypeA)
ds.parseQuery(m, nil)
assert.Empty(t, m.Answer)
assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, m.Rcode)
// An unknown name should still return NXDOMAIN.
m = &dns.Msg{}
m.SetQuestion("unknown.com.com", dns.TypeA)
ds.parseQuery(m, nil)
assert.Empty(t, m.Answer)
assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeNameError, m.Rcode)
// short lookups should not fail
m = &dns.Msg{}
m.Question = []dns.Question{{Name: "", Qtype: dns.TypeTXT, Qclass: dns.ClassINET}}
ds.parseQuery(m, stubDNSWriter{})
assert.Empty(t, m.Answer)
assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeNameError, m.Rcode)
m = &dns.Msg{}
m.Question = []dns.Question{{Name: ".", Qtype: dns.TypeTXT, Qclass: dns.ClassINET}}
ds.parseQuery(m, stubDNSWriter{})
assert.Empty(t, m.Answer)
assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeNameError, m.Rcode)
} }
func Test_getDnsServerAddr(t *testing.T) { func Test_getDnsServerAddr(t *testing.T) {
@@ -71,3 +136,496 @@ func Test_getDnsServerAddr(t *testing.T) {
} }
assert.Equal(t, "[::]:1", getDnsServerAddr(c)) assert.Equal(t, "[::]:1", getDnsServerAddr(c))
} }
func newTestDnsServer(t *testing.T) (*dnsServer, *config.C) {
t.Helper()
sl := slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)
ds := &dnsServer{
l: sl,
ctx: context.Background(),
dnsMap4: make(map[string]netip.Addr),
dnsMap6: make(map[string]netip.Addr),
hostMap: &HostMap{},
}
ds.mux = dns.NewServeMux()
ds.mux.HandleFunc(".", ds.handleDnsRequest)
return ds, config.NewC(nil)
}
func setDnsConfig(c *config.C, host string, port string, amLighthouse, serveDns bool) {
c.Settings["lighthouse"] = map[string]any{
"am_lighthouse": amLighthouse,
"serve_dns": serveDns,
"dns": map[string]any{
"host": host,
"port": port,
},
}
}
func TestDnsServer_reload_initial_disabled(t *testing.T) {
ds, c := newTestDnsServer(t)
setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", "0", true, false)
require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, true))
assert.False(t, ds.enabled.Load())
assert.Equal(t, "127.0.0.1:0", ds.addr)
assert.Nil(t, ds.server)
}
func TestDnsServer_reload_initial_enabled(t *testing.T) {
ds, c := newTestDnsServer(t)
setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", "0", true, true)
require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, true))
assert.True(t, ds.enabled.Load())
assert.Equal(t, "127.0.0.1:0", ds.addr)
// initial never starts a runner; that's Control.Start's job
assert.Nil(t, ds.server)
}
func TestDnsServer_reload_initial_serveDnsWithoutLighthouse(t *testing.T) {
ds, c := newTestDnsServer(t)
setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", "0", false, true)
require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, true))
// Wants DNS but isn't a lighthouse: gated off, no runner.
assert.False(t, ds.enabled.Load())
}
func TestDnsServer_reload_sameAddr_noOp(t *testing.T) {
port := freeUDPPort(t)
ds, c := newTestDnsServer(t)
setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", port, true, true)
require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, true))
go ds.Start()
waitForBind(t, ds)
ds.serverMu.Lock()
before := ds.server
ds.serverMu.Unlock()
require.NotNil(t, before)
// Same address, so the running listener must be left alone rather than rebuilt under live queries
require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, false))
assert.True(t, ds.enabled.Load())
ds.serverMu.Lock()
after := ds.server
ds.serverMu.Unlock()
assert.Same(t, before, after, "a same-address reload must not restart the listener")
ds.Stop()
}
// The branch the old sameAddr test was accidentally hitting: enabled with nothing running means reload starts it.
func TestDnsServer_reload_whenNotRunning_starts(t *testing.T) {
port := freeUDPPort(t)
ds, c := newTestDnsServer(t)
setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", port, true, true)
// initial only records config, it never starts anything
require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, true))
ds.serverMu.Lock()
assert.Nil(t, ds.server, "the initial reload must not start a listener")
ds.serverMu.Unlock()
require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, false))
waitForBind(t, ds)
ds.serverMu.Lock()
assert.NotNil(t, ds.server, "a reload with nothing running should bring DNS up")
ds.serverMu.Unlock()
ds.Stop()
}
func TestDnsServer_StartStop_lifecycle(t *testing.T) {
// Bind to a real (random) UDP port so we exercise the actual
// ListenAndServe + Shutdown plumbing including the started-chan race fix.
port := freeUDPPort(t)
ds, c := newTestDnsServer(t)
setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", port, true, true)
require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, true))
done := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
ds.Start()
close(done)
}()
waitFor(t, func() bool {
ds.serverMu.Lock()
started := ds.started
ds.serverMu.Unlock()
if started == nil {
return false
}
select {
case <-started:
return true
default:
return false
}
})
ds.Stop()
select {
case <-done:
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("Start did not return after Stop")
}
}
func TestDnsServer_Stop_beforeBind_doesNotHang(t *testing.T) {
// Stop called immediately after Start should not deadlock even if bind
// hasn't completed yet. This exercises the started-chan close-on-bind-fail
// path: by binding to an obviously bad port (privileged) we get a fast
// bind error before NotifyStartedFunc fires.
ds, c := newTestDnsServer(t)
// Use a port that should fail to bind (negative would be invalid, use a
// host that won't resolve to ensure listenUDP fails quickly).
setDnsConfig(c, "256.256.256.256", "53", true, true)
require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, true))
done := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
ds.Start()
close(done)
}()
// Give Start a moment to attempt the bind and fail.
select {
case <-done:
// Bind failed and Start returned; Stop should be a no-op.
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("Start did not return after a bad bind")
}
stopped := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
ds.Stop()
close(stopped)
}()
select {
case <-stopped:
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("Stop hung after a failed bind")
}
}
// newTestPKI builds a minimal *PKI with a single v1 cert whose name and
// VPN addresses are caller-provided, suitable for exercising seedSelf and
// QueryCert self handling.
func newTestPKI(t *testing.T, name string, addrs []netip.Addr) *PKI {
t.Helper()
networks := make([]netip.Prefix, 0, len(addrs))
for _, a := range addrs {
bits := 32
if a.Is6() {
bits = 128
}
networks = append(networks, netip.PrefixFrom(a, bits))
}
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, nil, nil, nil)
c, _, _, _ := cert_test.NewTestCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, ca, caKey, name, time.Time{}, time.Time{}, networks, nil, nil)
addrsTable := new(bart.Lite)
for _, a := range addrs {
addrsTable.Insert(netip.PrefixFrom(a, a.BitLen()))
}
cs := &CertState{
v2Cert: c,
initiatingVersion: cert.Version2,
myVpnAddrs: addrs,
myVpnAddrsTable: addrsTable,
}
pki := &PKI{}
pki.cs.Store(cs)
return pki
}
func TestDnsServer_seedSelf_addsOwnRecord(t *testing.T) {
ds, c := newTestDnsServer(t)
myV4 := netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.1")
myV6 := netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::1")
ds.pki = newTestPKI(t, "lighthouse", []netip.Addr{myV4, myV6})
setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", "0", true, true)
require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, true))
ds.seedSelf()
got4, exists := ds.Query(dns.TypeA, "lighthouse.")
assert.True(t, exists)
assert.Equal(t, myV4, got4)
got6, exists := ds.Query(dns.TypeAAAA, "lighthouse.")
assert.True(t, exists)
assert.Equal(t, myV6, got6)
}
func TestDnsServer_seedSelf_disabled_noOp(t *testing.T) {
ds, c := newTestDnsServer(t)
ds.pki = newTestPKI(t, "lighthouse", []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.1")})
setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", "0", true, false)
require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, true))
ds.seedSelf()
_, exists := ds.Query(dns.TypeA, "lighthouse.")
assert.False(t, exists)
}
func TestDnsServer_clearRecords_dropsSelfHost(t *testing.T) {
ds, c := newTestDnsServer(t)
ds.pki = newTestPKI(t, "lighthouse", []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.1")})
setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", "0", true, true)
require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, true))
ds.seedSelf()
require.NotEmpty(t, ds.selfHost)
ds.clearRecords()
assert.Empty(t, ds.selfHost)
_, exists := ds.Query(dns.TypeA, "lighthouse.")
assert.False(t, exists)
}
func TestDnsServer_QueryCert_returnsOwnCert(t *testing.T) {
ds, _ := newTestDnsServer(t)
myV4 := netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.1")
ds.pki = newTestPKI(t, "lighthouse", []netip.Addr{myV4})
got := ds.QueryCert(myV4.String() + ".")
assert.NotEmpty(t, got, "TXT lookup of our own VPN address should return our cert")
other := netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.99")
assert.Empty(t, ds.QueryCert(other.String()+"."), "unknown peer IP should return nothing")
}
func TestDnsServer_reload_disable_stopsRunningServer(t *testing.T) {
port := freeUDPPort(t)
ds, c := newTestDnsServer(t)
setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", port, true, true)
require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, true))
startReturned := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
ds.Start()
close(startReturned)
}()
waitForBind(t, ds)
// Toggle serve_dns off; reload should shut the running server down.
setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", port, true, false)
require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, false))
select {
case <-startReturned:
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("Start did not return after reload disabled DNS")
}
assert.False(t, ds.enabled.Load())
}
func freeUDPPort(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
conn, err := net.ListenPacket("udp", "127.0.0.1:0")
require.NoError(t, err)
port := conn.LocalAddr().(*net.UDPAddr).Port
require.NoError(t, conn.Close())
return strconv.Itoa(port)
}
func waitForBind(t *testing.T, ds *dnsServer) {
t.Helper()
waitFor(t, func() bool {
ds.serverMu.Lock()
started := ds.started
ds.serverMu.Unlock()
if started == nil {
return false
}
select {
case <-started:
return true
default:
return false
}
})
}
func waitFor(t *testing.T, cond func() bool) {
t.Helper()
deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
if cond() {
return
}
time.Sleep(5 * time.Millisecond)
}
t.Fatal("timed out waiting for condition")
}
// Two reloads in quick succession, or a HUP before Control.Start, can race two Starts at the same listener.
func TestDnsServer_Start_isIdempotent(t *testing.T) {
port := freeUDPPort(t)
ds, c := newTestDnsServer(t)
setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", port, true, true)
require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, true))
go ds.Start()
waitForBind(t, ds)
ds.serverMu.Lock()
first := ds.server
ds.serverMu.Unlock()
require.NotNil(t, first)
// If the second Start replaces the tracked server, Stop kills the wrong one and the port leaks
done := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
ds.Start()
close(done)
}()
select {
case <-done:
case <-time.After(time.Second * 5):
t.Fatal("second Start never returned")
}
ds.serverMu.Lock()
second := ds.server
ds.serverMu.Unlock()
assert.Same(t, first, second, "a second Start must not replace the running server")
// The real proof, after Stop the port must actually be free
ds.Stop()
waitFor(t, func() bool {
pc, err := net.ListenPacket("udp", "127.0.0.1:"+port)
if err != nil {
return false
}
_ = pc.Close()
return true
})
}
// An address change must actually end up listening on the new port. Start's guard refuses when a server is already
// installed, so reload has to clear the slot before shutting the old one down.
func TestDnsServer_reload_addrChange_restarts(t *testing.T) {
first := freeUDPPort(t)
second := freeUDPPort(t)
ds, c := newTestDnsServer(t)
setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", first, true, true)
require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, true))
go ds.Start()
waitForBind(t, ds)
// Cycle a few times, the failure this guards against depends on which goroutine wins serverMu
for i := range 8 {
want := second
if i%2 == 1 {
want = first
}
setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", want, true, true)
require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, false))
waitForBind(t, ds)
ds.serverMu.Lock()
srv := ds.server
ds.serverMu.Unlock()
require.NotNil(t, srv, "reload left DNS down instead of restarting it")
require.Equal(t, "127.0.0.1:"+want, srv.Addr, "reload should be serving the new address")
}
// Land back on second so the port assertions below are meaningful
setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", second, true, true)
require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, false))
waitForBind(t, ds)
// The old port must be released and the new one actually held
waitFor(t, func() bool {
pc, err := net.ListenPacket("udp", "127.0.0.1:"+first)
if err != nil {
return false
}
_ = pc.Close()
return true
})
_, err := net.ListenPacket("udp", "127.0.0.1:"+second)
require.Error(t, err, "the new address should be bound by the DNS responder")
ds.Stop()
}
// A listener that dies on its own must release the slot, or a later same-addr reload sees it as running and no-ops.
func TestDnsServer_Start_bindFailure_releasesSlot(t *testing.T) {
port := freeUDPPort(t)
blocker, err := net.ListenPacket("udp", "127.0.0.1:"+port)
require.NoError(t, err)
ds, c := newTestDnsServer(t)
setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", port, true, true)
require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, true))
ds.Start() // returns once the bind fails
ds.serverMu.Lock()
assert.Nil(t, ds.server, "a listener that failed to bind must not stay parked in the slot")
ds.serverMu.Unlock()
// With the slot released, a reload can retry once the port frees up
require.NoError(t, blocker.Close())
require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, false))
waitForBind(t, ds)
ds.serverMu.Lock()
assert.NotNil(t, ds.server, "a same-addr reload should retry after a failed bind")
ds.serverMu.Unlock()
ds.Stop()
}
// A disable that lands while Start is between its unlocked check and the guard must not leave a listener behind.
func TestDnsServer_Start_refusesWhenDisabledUnderLock(t *testing.T) {
port := freeUDPPort(t)
ds, c := newTestDnsServer(t)
setDnsConfig(c, "127.0.0.1", port, true, true)
require.NoError(t, ds.reload(c, true))
require.True(t, ds.enabled.Load())
// Holding serverMu parks Start on the lock, the only way to land the disable in that window on purpose
ds.serverMu.Lock()
done := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
ds.Start()
close(done)
}()
select {
case <-done:
ds.serverMu.Unlock()
t.Fatal("Start returned early, the test never exercised the window")
case <-time.After(time.Millisecond * 100):
}
// The disable reload's critical section. It sees nothing running, so it never calls Stop.
ds.enabled.Store(false)
ds.serverMu.Unlock()
select {
case <-done:
case <-time.After(time.Second * 5):
t.Fatal("Start never returned")
}
ds.serverMu.Lock()
assert.Nil(t, ds.server, "Start must not install a listener a disable already cancelled")
ds.serverMu.Unlock()
pc, err := net.ListenPacket("udp", "127.0.0.1:"+port)
require.NoError(t, err, "an orphaned listener is still holding the port")
_ = pc.Close()
}
+10
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@@ -1,6 +1,16 @@
FROM gcr.io/distroless/static:latest FROM gcr.io/distroless/static:latest
ARG TARGETOS TARGETARCH ARG TARGETOS TARGETARCH
ARG VERSION=dev
ARG REVISION=unknown
LABEL org.opencontainers.image.title="nebula" \
org.opencontainers.image.description="A scalable overlay networking tool with a focus on performance, simplicity and security" \
org.opencontainers.image.vendor="Nebula OSS" \
org.opencontainers.image.source="https://github.com/slackhq/nebula" \
org.opencontainers.image.version="${VERSION}" \
org.opencontainers.image.revision="${REVISION}"
COPY build/$TARGETOS-$TARGETARCH/nebula /nebula COPY build/$TARGETOS-$TARGETARCH/nebula /nebula
COPY build/$TARGETOS-$TARGETARCH/nebula-cert /nebula-cert COPY build/$TARGETOS-$TARGETARCH/nebula-cert /nebula-cert
+131
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
# Post-quantum handshake transport compared with QUIC
Status: analysis, 2026-10-14. Compares the fragment transport in
[pq-handshake.md](pq-handshake.md) with how QUIC makes its handshake reliable. TLS is out of
scope; only the transport mechanics are compared.
## Summary
QUIC's handshake reliability is closed-loop: the receiver acknowledges, and the sender
repairs exactly what is missing. Ours is open-loop: repair symbols are sent up front, and a
timer sends fresh symbols. At handshake sizes (K <= 15) a QUIC-style acknowledgement
shrinks to a 16-bit bitmap, and with an MDS code to a single count. So the real comparison
is forward error correction versus acknowledgements, not QUIC versus us.
FEC is the right core. One piece of feedback is worth adding, initiator to responder and for
msg2 only (see [Worth taking from QUIC](#worth-taking-from-quic)).
## What QUIC does
- **Messages as a stream.** Handshake bytes travel as `CRYPTO` frames (offset and length)
and are reassembled in order. Initial and Handshake packets each have their own packet
number space.
- **Immediate acknowledgements.** Receivers must acknowledge Initial and Handshake packets
without delay. ACK frames list ranges of received packet numbers.
- **Loss detection** (RFC 9002). A packet is lost once 3 later packets are acknowledged, or
after 9/8 of the round-trip time. Lost bytes are resent in new packets.
- **Probe timeout (PTO).** If a whole flight vanishes, a probe timer fires. Before any RTT
sample it starts at about 1 s (333 ms initial RTT plus 4x its variance) and doubles each
time. Both endpoints run it.
- **Amplification limit and anti-deadlock.** The server may send at most 3x what it
received until the client's address is validated. The client must keep probing so a
server stuck at that limit cannot deadlock.
- **Retry.** A stateless round trip to validate the address. `NEW_TOKEN` lets later
connections skip it.
- **Congestion control from the first packet.** The initial window is 10 packets of 1200
bytes.
## Side by side
| | QUIC | pq-handshake |
|---|---|---|
| Receiver feedback | ACK ranges, sent immediately | None; the next handshake message is the only acknowledgement |
| Partial loss | +1 to 2 RTT (ACK, detect, resend) | 0 RTT while at most m symbols are lost |
| Total loss | PTO: about 1 s, then doubling | Next PQ tick: 300 ms, then 1 s (alternating), or 100/300/600 ms (sticky) |
| Spurious retransmit | Wasted bytes | Still useful: fresh repair indexes add to what the receiver holds |
| Reassembly | Every byte offset, in order | Any K of up to 256 symbols |
| Who retransmits | Both sides on their own timers | Initiator on a timer; the responder resends msg2 only when a repeat msg1 arrives (rate limited) |
| State from the first packet | Server buffers and acknowledges partial flights | Capped pre-authentication table that never acknowledges |
| Address validation | Retry, 1 RTT | Cookie under load, 1 RTT |
From the [simulation results](pq-handshake.md#simulation-results): phase 2 at 5% random
loss with no FEC completes on the first attempt 39.8% of the time. Under
acknowledgement-based recovery roughly 60% of handshakes would pay at least one extra round
trip. With FEC, 0.4% wait for a retry. Spending bandwidth to save round trips is the stated
design preference, and open-loop recovery delivers it.
## Where the designs already agree
- **1200-byte floor and the 3x amplification budget**, both taken directly from QUIC.
- **Cookie and Retry.** Both cost one round trip and both can be forged by an on-path
attacker. QUIC's Retry integrity tag uses a fixed, published key.
- **On-path injection.** QUIC's Initial keys are derived from the client's connection ID,
which an observer can read, so QUIC accepts the same handshake-blocking injection
weakness documented for our symbols in
[Injected symbols](pq-handshake.md#injected-symbols).
- **Phase 2 msg3 confirmation.** Resending msg3 until any authenticated packet arrives,
with a `Test` from the responder on completion, is QUIC's handshake confirmation and
`HANDSHAKE_DONE`.
## Worth taking from QUIC
### 1. A msg2 progress probe from the initiator
This is the main gap. Today, recovering a partially lost msg2 means the initiator resends a
full msg1 attempt; the responder decodes it, matches it in the answered-msg1 cache, and
resends msg2. In phase 2 that is about 12 fragments (~13 KB) uploaded just to act as an
acknowledgement, and recovery waits for the 300 ms or 1 s tick.
- The initiator already knows the responder's index: msg2 fragments carry it as `FragID`
(`sendFragmentedResponse` passes `hostinfo.localIndexId`).
- A one-packet probe, "msg2: have n of K", sent to that index would recover in about one
round trip. The responder finds it the way phase 2 plans to find msg3.
- Timing comes for free: msg1 send to first msg2 fragment is an RTT sample. Probe at
roughly RTT/8 plus the repair delay after the first msg2 fragment if decoding has not
completed.
- Forging a probe needs the 32-bit responder index, so only an on-path attacker can, and
the existing 3x budget bounds the reply.
- If no msg2 fragment arrived at all, the initiator keeps today's msg1 resend. That is the
same tail-loss case QUIC's PTO covers.
The reverse direction, the responder reporting progress on msg1, should not be added. It
needs per-entry timers on the pre-authentication path, which is exactly the state QUIC
servers carry and the reason QUIC needs Retry.
### 2. Buffer early data in phase 2
QUIC stacks hold a few packets they cannot decrypt yet. The phase 2 plan drops data that
reaches the responder before msg3 decodes. Because repair fragments trail by
`handshakes.pq.repair_delay` (10 ms), losing one msg3 data fragment drops about 10 ms of
the initiator's first data while the repair is in flight. A small queue on the pending
responder entry, replayed once msg3 verifies, avoids this.
### 3. Burst size across remotes
QUIC handshakes on a single path. `handleOutbound` sends the same `now` and `later` sets to
every known remote and to relays (`StartRelays`).
- Phase 1 is fine.
- In phase 2, four remotes means about 48 packets (~54 KB) leaving one uplink at once,
every PQ tick, about 4x QUIC's initial window.
- The Gilbert-Elliott simulation treats each path independently, so it does not capture
this self-inflicted burst on a constrained uplink such as cellular.
- Options: send the full FEC set only to the most likely remote and a reduced set to the
others, or interleave packets across remotes.
## Not worth taking
- **Packet numbers, ACK ranges, an RTT estimator, loss thresholds, congestion control.**
QUIC pays for this machinery because it also serves a data transport. Nebula carries
packets and leaves reliability to the overlay's own transports. Building it only for
handshakes of at most 15 fragments buys nothing a symbol count cannot.
- **Offset-based reassembly.** It gives up the any-K-of-256 property and makes spurious
retransmits wasteful again.
- **An RTT-adaptive retry timer.** Low value. The fixed 100 ms linear schedule already fires
sooner than QUIC's 1 s first PTO, and a spurious resend costs bandwidth, not correctness.
## Conclusion
Keep FEC as the core and add the msg2 progress probe. That gets QUIC's roughly one round
trip tail recovery without pre-authentication state, and cuts phase 2's retry cost on the
uplink by about 10x. Items 2 and 3 are phase 2 concerns; item 1 also helps phase 1.
+563
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# Post-quantum handshakes
Status: draft. Decisions below were made on 2026-10-13 and 2026-10-14; open items are listed at
the end. Post-quantum handshakes ship hybrid only, on version 3 certificates (decided
2026-10-14); see [Implementation](#implementation-certificates-and-the-hybrid-handshake).
## Goals
1. **Confidentiality against harvest-now-decrypt-later.** Traffic recorded today must stay
secret after a cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists. This needs a
post-quantum key exchange now.
2. **Post-quantum authentication.** Needs certificates whose CA signature and host keys are
post-quantum, so certificates have to be reissued or extended. Post-quantum key exchange
ships only together with it: there is no post-quantum handshake on version 2 certificates.
3. **Never rely on IP fragmentation.** ML-KEM and ML-DSA do not fit in one packet, so the
handshake must carry messages larger than the path MTU itself.
Non-goals: identity hiding beyond what IX offers today, and signatures at handshake time.
The only signature in the system stays the CA signature inside the certificate.
## Primitives and sizes
| Primitive | Size |
|---|---|
| ML-KEM-1024 encapsulation key | 1568 B |
| ML-KEM-1024 ciphertext | 1568 B |
| ML-DSA-87 public key / signature | 2592 B / 4627 B |
| Today's IX msg1 / msg2 (v2 cert, 151 B) | 252 B / 287 B |
`crypto/mlkem` is available in Go 1.26; `crypto/mldsa` arrives in Go 1.27, which `go.mod`
requires.
## An ephemeral-KEM handshake, built and dropped
The first design was `ix_psk2_mlkem1024`: classical IX on version 2 certificates with an ephemeral
ML-KEM-1024 exchange mixed in through the `psk2` slot, so recorded traffic was protected without
reissuing certificates. It was built, field tested and then dropped on 2026-10-14, before any
release. Post-quantum handshakes ship hybrid only, for three reasons:
- It left authentication classical, which a deployment wanting quantum safety needs anyway, and
a second post-quantum handshake would be twice the code to review and keep.
- It completes in two messages, so the responder could not tell which of two crossing attempts
the initiator kept (see [Crossing attempts](#three-messages-in-the-manager)); on real hosts 5 of
100 first pings failed at 50 ms round trip for that reason.
- Its `psk` token came last in msg2, so the responder's static key travelled under classical keys
only.
Subtype 2 and payload field 9 (its encapsulation key) stay reserved. The code is on the
`pq-handshake` branch for reference.
## Hybrid IX with certificate v3
Decided on 2026-10-14 and implemented on the `pq-identity` branch (see
[Implementation](#implementation-certificates-and-the-hybrid-handshake)).
### Certificate v3
A version 3 certificate is a version 2 certificate extended with post-quantum keys. It is its own
format, with its own PEM banner (`NEBULA CERTIFICATE V3`) and a strict parser, but its first
fields are exactly the fields of a v2 certificate:
```
CertificateV3 ::= SEQUENCE {
details [0] Details, -- v2 details, unchanged
curve [1] Curve DEFAULT curve25519,
publicKey [2] OCTET STRING, -- classical: X25519 / P256 for hosts, Ed25519 / ECDSA P256 for CAs
signature [3] OCTET STRING, -- classical CA signature over details || curve || publicKey, as in v2
pqSuite [4] OCTET STRING, -- one byte, the PQSuite; always present
pqPublicKey [5] OCTET STRING, -- the suite's KEM public key for hosts, its signature public key for CAs
pqSignature [6] OCTET STRING -- the suite's signature by the issuing CA, context "nebula certificate v3",
-- over the DER of fields 0 to 5, curve always present
}
```
- **The suite.** `pqSuite` names the post-quantum algorithms the way `curve` names the classical
ones: the KEM of host keys, and the signature algorithm of CA keys and of the certificates a CA
signs. A CA and every certificate it signs share a suite, as they share a curve; the CA pool
rejects a mismatch, and the post-quantum signature covers the suite, so a certificate can not be
relabelled. The field is always present, in handshakes too, with no default, and 0 is never
valid. There is one suite today, `MLKEM1024_MLDSA87` (1): ML-KEM-1024 hosts, ML-DSA-87 CAs. A
new suite is an entry in the cert package's suite table plus, for a new KEM, a hybrid subtype; no
new certificate version. Changing a CA's suite means a new CA, or a new v3 extension of its v2
form that replaces the old one, since one v2 CA has one v3 extension.
- **The v2 form.** Fields 0 to 3 are a byte exact v2 certificate, signed by the v2 form of the CA.
A v3 holder presents it in classical handshakes, so peers that only speak v2 accept
it as they always have, and old parsers never see v3 bytes. A node therefore needs one
certificate, not a v2 and v3 pair.
- **Signatures.** Both must verify. The ML-DSA-87 signature covers the classical signature too, so
neither signature can be swapped out (which also makes P256 low/high-s alternates moot for v3).
If ML-DSA fell classically and someone swapped `pqPublicKey`, the hybrid handshake still needs
the classical static key, which only the classical signature covers. The ML-DSA-87 signature is
deterministic (FIPS 204 section 3.4), so extending the same v2 certificate with the same key twice
gives the same v3 certificate and fingerprint: `pq-extend` is idempotent. The hedged variant
guards signers an attacker can fault physically, which a CA key in a file is not, and the Ed25519
signature beside it is deterministic too.
- **Issuer and fingerprints.** The details are v2-shaped, so the issuer is the fingerprint of the
CA's v2 form. A v3 certificate's own fingerprint is the SHA-256 of its whole encoding and differs
from its v2 form's. Both identify it. To block a v3 certificate, block its v2 fingerprint: the
pool checks it for the v3 certificate and for its v2 form alike, so one entry covers both forms,
while blocking only the v3 fingerprint leaves the v2 form usable in classical handshakes.
`nebula-cert print` leads with both fingerprints and says which one to block. Firewall `ca_sha`
rules match a v3 peer by either fingerprint of its CA.
- **CA pool.** A v3 CA verifies only v3 certificates. To accept v2 certificates as well the pool
must also list the CA's v2 form. Dropping the v2 form is how a node requires post-quantum
authentication; there is no separate setting. Two different v3 extensions of one v2 CA are
rejected as ambiguous.
- **Keys are composite**, classical followed by post-quantum, wherever a v3 certificate deals in
them: `PublicKey()` returns `classical || pq`, and private keys are `classical || seed` (64 byte
ML-KEM seed for hosts, 32 byte ML-DSA seed for CAs), in one PEM block in `pki.key` with banners
such as `NEBULA X25519 MLKEM1024 PRIVATE KEY` and `NEBULA ED25519 MLDSA87 PRIVATE KEY`. The
banner names the post-quantum algorithm, not the suite, because a seed's size does not tell the
algorithm's strength.
- **Both curves.** Curve25519 and P256; the post-quantum half does not depend on the curve.
- **In-place upgrade.** `nebula-cert pq-extend` turns an existing v2 CA into a v3 CA whose v2 form
is the old CA certificate, byte for byte, and extends existing host certificates the same way.
Fingerprints, blocklists and trust in the v2 forms carry over unchanged. Hosts get their ML-KEM
key with `nebula-cert keygen -in-key`, which keeps the classical key.
| Certificate | Full | In a handshake | v2 form |
|---|---|---|---|
| CA, Curve25519 | 7365 B | n/a | 134 B |
| Host, Curve25519 | 6378 B | 4772 B | 171 B |
`crypto/mldsa` is new in Go 1.27, so `go.mod` moves to Go 1.27.
### Handshake
A new subtype, `ix_hybrid_mlkem1024` (3), runs `HandshakeHybridIX` from
[github.com/DefinedNet/noise](https://github.com/DefinedNet/noise) (its `PQ_RESEARCH.md` gives the
design rationale and security argument), with ML-KEM-1024 supplied by nebula:
```
-> e, s
<- ekem, skem, e, ee, se, s, es
-> skem
```
- `e` and `s` carry composite keys, X25519 (or P256) followed by ML-KEM-1024. DH tokens use the
classical halves, `ekem` and `skem` encapsulate to the ML-KEM halves, and every secret goes into
the one chaining key.
- **The responder's `e` is classical only.** It follows the responder's `ekem`, which already
completed the ephemeral KEM exchange, so it carries only the X25519 (or P256) key that `ee` and
`se` need. A second ephemeral KEM exchange would add nothing: one `ekem` is lost only if the
initiator's ephemeral private key or the responder's encapsulation randomness is, and a reverse
one would be lost in the same cases. PQNoise's pqIX has no responder `e` at all. The static ML-KEM key is the post-quantum half of the certificate's public
key, so it travels in `s` and the handshake form of the certificate leaves out both keys.
- **KEM tokens first.** msg2 starts with `ekem, skem`, so the responder's static key and
certificate are encrypted under keys that already include both KEM secrets: the responder's
identity is protected against harvest-now-decrypt-later, as TLS 1.3 with `X25519MLKEM768`
protects the server certificate. (OpenSSH offers no comparison: its hybrid key exchange sends the
host key in the clear.) The initiator's certificate travels in msg1 in the clear, as in IX today.
- **Authentication.** The responder authenticates the initiator when msg3 decrypts (it depends on
msg2's `skem` to the initiator's static key); the initiator authenticates the responder when the
first packet under the new keys decrypts (it depends on msg3's `skem`). Neither side needs a
signature. Knowing only a peer's classical private key gets an impersonator nowhere: as an
initiator it cannot read msg2, as a responder it cannot read msg3.
- **The two static ML-KEM keys see different ciphertexts.** msg2's `skem` ciphertext is encrypted
under a key derived from the `ekem` secret, which whoever sent msg2 chose, so anyone who can
address a pending initiator's index can have the initiator decapsulate a ciphertext of their
choosing with its static key. That is the IND-CCA setting ML-KEM is designed for, and
`crypto/mlkem` is constant time. The responder decrypts msg3's `skem` ciphertext under the keys of
a completed msg2 before decapsulating, so it only ever decapsulates ciphertexts the genuine
initiator sealed.
- v3 certificates go with this subtype and nothing else: a v3 certificate on any other subtype, or
a v2 one on this one, is a protocol error.
- **One subtype per KEM.** A hybrid subtype names its KEM, and a v3 holder initiates the subtype of
its suite's KEM. Peers need the same KEM, not the same suite: suites that differ only in their
signature algorithm share a subtype, and each certificate carries its own suite. A responder
whose suite uses another KEM drops msg1, so the pair behaves as if the responder did not speak
PQ: classical fallback, or no tunnel under `require`. A suite's KEM must have a subtype for the
pki to load a certificate in it.
| Message | Size (Curve25519) | Data fragments (k) |
|---|---|---|
| msg1 | 8009 B | 7 |
| msg2 | 9628 B | 9 |
| msg3 | 1616 B | 2 |
**Dependency.** DefinedNet/noise is a private repository today. `go.mod` points at a local clone
with a `replace` directive; the module has to be published (or the hybrid patterns upstreamed to
flynn/noise) before this can merge.
### Three messages in the manager
- **Responder.** After msg2 the responder keeps the handshake pending under its local index, the
multi-message responder the manager lacked before. A repeated msg1 maps to it through the
answered-msg1 cache and gets msg2 resent with fresh symbols. msg3's fragments name
the responder's index, so they reach the pending entry and never the pre-authentication table;
its reassembly is capped at 4 KiB. Until msg3 verifies, data for that index is dropped quietly:
a RecvError would tear down the initiator's new tunnel. On completing, the responder sends an
empty `Test`/`TestReply` under the new keys so the initiator hears back without traffic. A
pending responder expires after the handshake timeout.
- **Initiator.** Writing msg3 yields the transport keys, so the tunnel goes live at once, readable
only by the real responder; msg3 goes out before any packets cached during the handshake. Until
anything from the responder decrypts on the new tunnel, msg3 is resent with fresh symbols on a
linear backoff, and if nothing has decrypted by the handshake timeout the tunnel is closed.
Losing msg3 costs the data sent right behind it, which the overlay retransmits.
- **Lost confirmation.** A msg3 fragment for a v3 tunnel the responder already completed means the
initiator is still waiting, so the responder confirms again, at most once per retry interval and
only to the tunnel's own remote, never to the fragment's source.
- **Crossing attempts.** The initiator alternates, and its first classical attempt follows the
hybrid msg1 anywhere from right away to three retry intervals later (the retry timer lands two
slots ahead on the timer wheel, which moves on whole ticks), so at real round-trip times it
often goes out before msg2 is back. Answered, it would complete at once on the responder while
the hybrid handshake waits for msg3. So for four retry intervals after answering a peer's new
hybrid msg1, the responder leaves that peer's classical msg1s unanswered: the crossing one
arrives within the window whatever the round trip, because both take the same path. The
window is short so an initiator whose hybrid attempt fails on its own side (one that does not
yet trust our v3 CA, during a rollout) still gets a classical answer to a later attempt; a
block lasting as long as the hybrid state would refuse it until its handshake timed out, and
its next handshake would start with a hybrid msg1 again. A classical msg1 that still crosses,
past the window on a very slow path, is answered, but msg3 settles it: the initiator only
sends msg3 after committing to hybrid, so the responder takes the hybrid tunnel even though
the classical one is newer, rather than rejecting it as too old.
- **A failed attempt.** A post-quantum attempt can fail fatally where the classical one would not,
for example a v3 certificate from a CA the initiator trusts only in its v2 form. The failed
attempt is dropped and the handshake continues classical. With `require` the handshake ends.
### Rollout with v3
- `handshakes.pq` only does anything on a node with a v3 certificate. Without one, `initiate`,
`accept` and `sticky` log a warning and are ignored, and `require` is refused at startup and
on reload, since such a node could reach no one.
- A responder without a v3 certificate, or whose suite uses another KEM, drops hybrid msg1s
before reassembly, and the initiator falls back to classical.
- `handshakes.pq.require` means hybrid only, in both directions, so every peer needs a v3
certificate.
- Post-quantum authentication is required through the CA pool, by not listing the CA's v2 form.
A sticky or `require` initiator resists active downgrade of the key exchange; only the CA pool
resists downgrade of authentication, since a quantum attacker could forge a v2 form.
- `sticky` stays off by default for v3 holders too (decided 2026-10-14): a peer re-issued back to a
v2-only certificate would otherwise be unreachable until this process restarts. Deployments that
want downgrade resistance turn on `sticky` or `require`, or drop the CA's v2 form from the pool.
## Fragment transport
### Requirements
- No IP fragmentation: every datagram's UDP payload is at most 1232 bytes **after** relay
wrapping (16 B header + 16 B tag), the IPv6 minimum MTU budget also used by DNS Flag Day
2020 and Solana's Turbine.
- Every fragment of a handshake uses the same 5-tuple.
- Bounded pre-authentication state, bounded amplification, selective loss recovery,
tolerance of reordering and duplication, and a strictly validated, fuzzable parser.
### Wire format
Every packet of a fragmented handshake subtype is:
```
Nebula header (16) Version | Type=Handshake | Subtype | Reserved=0 | RemoteIndex | Counter
Fragment header (8) FragID u32 | MsgLen u16 | Index u8 | Flags u8
Cookie (16) only when Flags has 0x01
Symbol SymbolSize bytes
```
- `Counter` is the Noise message number (1, 2, 3). `RemoteIndex` is 0 for msg1, as today.
- `FragID` is the sender's local index (random, non-zero).
- `MsgLen` is the length of the whole message. Both ends derive the layout from it:
`K = ceil(MsgLen / 1160)`, `SymbolSize = ceil(MsgLen / K)`. Every symbol has the same
size. Room for a cookie is always reserved, so a packet is at most
16 + 8 + 16 + 1160 = 1200 bytes with or without one.
- `Index < K` is a data symbol (a slice of the message, the last one zero padded);
`Index >= K` is a repair symbol.
- `Flags` bit 0x01 means a cookie follows the fragment header. Other bits must be zero.
A cookie reply, sent by a responder under load, is a bare 32 byte packet:
```
Nebula header (16) Version | Type=Handshake | Subtype | Reserved=0 | RemoteIndex=FragID | Counter=0
Cookie (16)
```
It names the initiator's FragID, so the initiator finds its attempt the same way it finds
msg2.
### Forward error correction
Messages are protected with a systematic Reed-Solomon code over GF(2^8), implemented in
`handshake/fec`:
- The repair rows form a Cauchy matrix, `coefficient(row, col) = 1 / (row XOR col)` with
`row >= K > col`, so every square submatrix is invertible and **any K distinct symbols
reconstruct the message**. Naive identity-over-Vandermonde constructions are not MDS
(the PAR1 flaw and the 1997 Plank tutorial erratum).
- A repair row depends only on its index, so repair symbols are generated on demand and
their indexes never need to be agreed in advance. Up to 256 symbols exist per message.
- Known-answer vectors in `fec_test.go` pin the encoding and were cross-checked against an
independent implementation; changing them is a wire format change.
- Cost for a 9.8 KB message (k=9): about 13 µs for three repair symbols, about 19 µs to
decode with three data symbols missing.
**The sender chooses m**, the number of repair symbols per attempt. The receiver only needs
any K symbols, so this is policy and can change without a protocol change. The starting
rule is `m = max(2, ceil(K/3))`.
**Retries send fresh symbols.** Attempt 0 sends indexes `0 .. K+m-1`; each retry sends
the next `K+m` unused indexes. The receiver merges all distinct symbols across attempts,
so no received fragment is wasted. Indexes are a deterministic function of the message,
so retransmits stay idempotent: the responder caches msg2 itself and regenerates any
symbol.
**Repair symbols trail the data.** Data symbols go out back to back; repair symbols follow
after a short delay, so a queue tail-drop at the end of the data run does not also take the
repair. In simulation this lifts small messages substantially (k=2 at 10% loss, burst 8:
91.4% to 98.2% first-attempt success). Pacing every fragment was also evaluated; it gains
about 5 more points for k=7..9 on bursty paths, which is not worth the extra machinery,
and the retry with fresh symbols covers the remainder.
### Receiver rules
Implemented in `handshake/fragment` (`Sender`, `Assembly`, and the capped `Table`).
- Fragments are stored individually as they arrive and charged against a memory cap.
Nothing is allocated from a claimed size alone (FragmentSmack, game-engine "fragment
bombs").
- `MsgLen` must be identical for every fragment of a `FragID`; a mismatch drops the whole
entry. msg1 is capped at `MsgLen <= 16384` (K <= 15).
- The decoder keeps at most K distinct symbols, so an entry never exceeds about MsgLen bytes
however many repair symbols arrive.
- When K symbols are present the message is decoded and handed to the handshake `Machine`
as a synthetic `[header | message]`. The Machine never sees fragments.
- A completed message the responder answered is remembered without its symbols, outside the
memory and per-source caps, for the idle timeout: which symbol indexes it has seen, and its
hash. Fragments still trailing the attempt that completed it are counted and dropped. Once as
many new symbols as it has data symbols arrive, which only a retry offers, it is reported as a
repeat and the cached response is resent. Without this, the repair fragments trailing a msg1
whose data fragments already completed it open an entry that for K above the repair count can
never complete, and back to back handshakes from one source run into its quota (seen on real
hosts: the fifth hybrid handshake within 3 s fell back to classical). A message that decoded
but was not answered is forgotten, and the next attempt rebuilds it.
- If Noise rejects a decoded message, the entry is discarded and the next attempt
supplies fresh symbols. (Possible refinement: keep a few spare symbols so an injected
bad symbol can be identified by re-encoding instead of waiting for a retry.)
- Pre-authentication msg1 entries live in a table keyed by (source address or relay index,
FragID) with a total memory cap, per-source quotas (/32 for IPv4, /64 for IPv6), a
sliding TTL of about 2 s refreshed by progress, and random eviction under pressure.
msg2 and msg3 reassembly attaches to the existing pending handshake found by RemoteIndex.
The initiator keeps two msg2 slots keyed by the responder's FragID, each capped at 16 KiB.
When a stale lighthouse address for the peer belongs to another host now, both hosts answer
the same msg1, and their interleaved bursts would wipe each other out of a single slot that
emptied on every FragID change; with a slot each, whichever completes first is processed, and
a wrong host's answer takes the usual block-and-retry path. The responder's msg3 slot needs no
such care: it checks FragID against the initiator's index it learned from msg2.
### Retransmission and amplification
- Only timers cause transmission, with one reactive exception: the responder resends its
cached msg2 when a copy of msg1 completes again. An initiator sends msg1 to every address
it knows and through its relays, the responder reassembles each path separately, and each
path's first completion is answered on that path at once. A path that only works one way,
say a responder answering from the wrong interface, is then covered by the others in the
same attempt, and the initiator keeps the union of the msg2 symbols that reach it. After
that a path is answered again at most once per retry interval, and only once K symbols not
seen before on it arrive: duplicates do nothing, and there are 256 symbols per message, so
a resend costs the initiator K packets on that path and the answer is held to the 3x
budget below. That is TFTP's Sorcerer's Apprentice bound, per path rather than per
handshake.
A path is only an address and port, so a recently answered msg1 replayed from spoofed
sources draws one cached msg2 to each, at about 1.2-1.4x the bytes sent and never over 3x,
for as long as the answered msg1 is remembered (the handshake timeout). Accepted
(2026-10-15): classical IX already resends its stored msg2 to any source that replays msg1,
with no clock at all, and a per-handshake clock is what broke a path that only works one way.
- Duplicate msg1 detection compares the decoded message to the cached one **before**
running Noise or certificate verification.
- Before an address is validated, a responder sends at most 3x the bytes it received from
it (QUIC's rule). Normal handshakes sit near 1.1-1.2x.
- The initiator retransmits msg3 until any authenticated packet arrives from
the responder; the responder sends a small confirmation on completion and drops tunnel
traffic until msg3 verifies.
### Denial of service
The responder can no longer complete statelessly on msg1, since msg1 arrives in pieces.
Defenses are the capped table above plus a **cookie under load**, in the style of
WireGuard's mac2, QUIC Retry and the SCTP state cookie:
- Once the msg1 table is at least half full (by bytes or by entries), every msg1 fragment
must carry a valid cookie. One without is answered with a cookie reply and leaves no
state. Fragments that already belong to an entry need one too, so an attacker cannot
hold old entries open.
- A cookie is `HMAC-SHA256(secret, source address and port, relay channel, FragID)`
truncated to 16 bytes. The secret rotates every 2 minutes and the previous one is still
accepted, so a cookie is good for 2 to 4 minutes.
- Replies are never larger than the packet that prompted them (no amplification) and are
rate limited as a whole (a burst of 256, then 1000 per second), so spoofed floods cannot
turn the responder into a reflector.
- The initiator attaches the cookie to its PQ attempt, so every later packet carries it,
and immediately resends fresh symbols to the address the reply came from, at most once
per retry interval. Under load a PQ handshake costs one extra round trip, which in
practice still beats the classical attempt on the next retry tick.
- An attacker on the path can forge a cookie reply; the bogus cookie is simply rejected
and answered with a real one.
A CA-keyed pre-filter MAC was considered and rejected: networks commonly trust many CAs.
#### Pending hybrid responders
A hybrid responder that answered msg1 keeps a pending entry, keyed by its local index, until
msg3 arrives or the handshake timeout (5.5 s by default) passes. msg1 is cleartext and nothing
covers `e` or `Time`, so from one captured v3 msg1 an attacker can mint distinct valid msg1s
with a fresh `e` and a bumped `Time`. Each misses the answered-msg1 cache, costs the responder
the whole msg1 (two signature verifications, two encapsulations, four DH operations, the
certificate checks) and a pending entry, and the fragment table stays near empty because a
complete burst arrives together, so cookies are never demanded and spoofed sources work.
Pending entries are not bounded per peer or in total. Accepted as is (2026-10-14): the per-msg1
work is the same class as classical IX's pre-authentication cost, the expiry bounds the state in
time and the fragment table bounds bytes in flight. If it needs tightening, cap pending
responders per certificate fingerprint and in total, and count them toward the cookie
threshold.
#### Injected symbols
The decoder keeps the first K distinct symbols it sees, so one forged symbol in those K
spoils that attempt's decode; Noise rejects the result and the next attempt brings fresh
symbols. Forging one needs the attempt's FragID or index, which are random 32 bit values,
and for msg1 the initiator's exact address and port too, so in practice only an attacker
who sees the traffic can do it. An attacker who can also drop packets gains nothing new.
One who can only inject, and races a forged symbol into every attempt, can stop a PQ
handshake where it could not stop a classical one, since classical msg2s are tried one
packet at a time. Keeping spare symbols to find a consistent subset only raises the number
of forgeries needed per attempt, and authenticating symbols is impossible for msg1, which
travels before any key exists. So the decoder deliberately does neither. A non-sticky
initiator still gets a classical tunnel from its next attempt; a sticky one, by design,
does not downgrade.
## Rollout
- Separate settings for initiating and accepting PQ handshakes, both off by default:
`handshakes.pq.initiate`, `handshakes.pq.accept`. `handshakes.pq.repair_delay` (default
10ms) sets how long repair fragments trail the data fragments.
- `handshakes.pq.require` makes every handshake PQ: it implies `initiate` and `accept`,
never offers a classical attempt, and drops classical msg1s. It needs a v3 certificate.
- Old nodes silently drop unknown subtypes, so discovery is speculative: an initiator with
`initiate` enabled alternates PQ and classical attempts on successive timer retries,
keeping both pending, and the first to complete wins. A path nothing has been sent over
yet gets the PQ attempt first: an early resend triggered by a lighthouse reply is PQ, and
a relay that comes up pushes the PQ attempt through at once, counting as the PQ turn.
Without that, relays set up during the first attempt handed every relayed handshake to
the classical retry (seen on real hosts: 11 of 11). Once a msg2 fragment or cookie reply
arrives for the PQ attempt the peer evidently speaks PQ, and classical stops getting
turns.
- All `handshakes.pq` settings reload without a restart. Handshakes in flight carry on;
the new settings apply to the next attempt and the next packet.
- `handshakes.pq.sticky` (default off): once a peer has completed a PQ handshake, never fall
back to classical for it again during this process lifetime. This resists active
downgrade after first contact.
- No lighthouse capability advertisement.
## Simulation results
Gilbert-Elliott channel (bad state drops everything), losses expressed as average rate and
mean burst length in packets. First-attempt success for the whole handshake with
`m = max(2, ceil(K/3))` and repair delayed 16 packet slots, compared with no FEC:
| Handshake | Loss | Burst 1 | Burst 2 | Burst 4 | Burst 8 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| two messages (2, 2) no FEC | 5% | 81.4% | 85.6% | 87.9% | 89.0% |
| two messages (2, 2) FEC | 5% | 99.9% | 99.4% | 99.3% | 98.6% |
| two messages (2, 2) FEC | 10% | 99.3% | 97.5% | 97.4% | 96.3% |
| hybrid (7, 9, 2) no FEC | 5% | 39.8% | 57.5% | 70.4% | 77.7% |
| hybrid (7, 9, 2) FEC | 5% | 99.6% | 94.2% | 90.4% | 88.8% |
| hybrid (7, 9, 2) FEC | 10% | 95.9% | 84.6% | 79.0% | 77.3% |
With fresh repair symbols, the hybrid handshake completes within two attempts at least 99.1% of the time
in every scenario above, and within three at least 99.99%.
## Prior art
- **WireGuard / Rosenpass**: fit every message in one packet; cookies and biscuits for
statelessness. Not possible at our sizes.
- **IKEv2**: RFC 7383 fragments only after keys exist, with each fragment authenticated;
RFC 9242/9370 move PQ key exchange into intermediate exchanges for that reason.
- **QUIC / DTLS 1.3**: offset-based reassembly with ACKs; QUIC's 3x amplification limit and
1200-byte floor.
- **Solana Turbine**: Reed-Solomon over 1232-byte UDP packets through untrusted relays;
moved to Merkle-authenticated shreds after unauthenticated repair symbols enabled
poisoning.
- **kcp-go, UDPspeeder, CM256**: RS FEC over UDP; parity must scale up for small groups.
- **gQUIC FEC (removed)**: FEC does not pay for bulk transfer under bursty loss; it does
for short, latency-critical transfers such as handshakes.
- **TFTP, NFS duplicate request cache, memcached UDP, IP reassembly bugs**: retransmit
storms, ID-wrap misassembly, reflection amplification, and allocation from claimed sizes.
## Implementation: fragment transport and manager
- `handshake/fec`, `handshake/fragment`: the code and the fragment transport.
- `handshake_manager_pq.go` and the manager:
- **Initiator.** Attempts alternate PQ and classical, starting with PQ (sticky peers get
only PQ). The PQ attempt has its own local index registered alongside the classical
one; whichever response completes first wins, and the other index is released
(`settleIndex`). A timed out or deleted pending handshake releases both.
- **Responder.** msg1 fragments go into the capped pre-authentication table. A decoded
msg1 is looked up by hash among recently answered ones before any Noise, KEM or
certificate work: the trailing repair fragments of an attempt rebuild a msg1 its data
fragments already completed, and a retrying initiator offers fresh symbols for the
same msg1. A repeat goes straight to the cached-response resend, which offers fresh
msg2 symbols on the path the repeat came by and is held to the 3x amplification
budget.
- **Relays** carry fragments unchanged; repair fragments trail via a timer.
- The pre-authentication table is capped at 4 MiB, 1024 entries, 4 per source (IPv4 /32,
IPv6 /64, or relay channel), 16 KiB messages and a 3 s idle timeout. Cookies are
demanded from half full.
- Tests: codec and fragment tests and fuzzers, manager unit tests
for the response budget, table tests for the per-path repeat clock, and e2e tests for a clean handshake, loss of
data fragments in both directions, fallback to a peer that does not accept PQ, a lost
msg2 recovered by fresh symbols, sticky mode under an attacker dropping PQ packets,
relays, a direct msg2 lost on every attempt and answered through a relay instead, index
cleanup on completion, fallback and timeout, and a responder flooded from
spoofed sources demanding and accepting a cookie. Unit tests cover cookie binding and
rotation, the never-amplify rule, the initiator's rate limited resend, and reload. ML-KEM also
passes under `GOEXPERIMENT=boringcrypto` and `GODEBUG=fips140=on`.
## Implementation: certificates and the hybrid handshake
- `cert`: `cert_v3.go` (format, `V2Form`, `ExtendToV3`, `SignPQ`), `pq_suite.go` (`PQSuite` and
the suite table), `SignHybridWith` and the composite `Sign` path, the CA pool's v3 index, suite
check and v2-form blocklisting, and the composite key PEM banners, generated per suite.
- `handshake`: the `ix_hybrid_mlkem1024` subtype on `noise.HandshakeHybridIX`, `KEMMLKEM1024`,
`HybridSubtype` mapping a suite to the subtype of its KEM,
composite credentials, cipher states ordered by role for three message patterns, and
`Machine.PeerCert` for a responder that has to act before completion.
- `pki.go` loads a v3 certificate with its composite key and derives the v2 form; messages after
the handshake treat v3 tunnels as v2 (`protocolVersion`).
- `handshake_manager_hybrid.go`: pending responders, confirmation and reconfirmation, the
initiator's msg3 resends and teardown, and the crossing window; `outside.go` keeps quiet about
pending responder indexes.
- `nebula-cert`: `ca`, `keygen` and `sign` take `-version 3`, `keygen -in-key` extends an existing
host key, `sign -version 2` with a v3 CA signs as its v2 form, and `pq-extend` upgrades v2
certificates in place, keeping an encrypted CA key encrypted. `ca`, `keygen` and `pq-extend` of a
CA take `-pq-suite`; `sign` and `pq-extend` of a host take the CA's suite.
- Tests: certificate format, strictness, tampering, pool and blocklist rules and in-place
extension on both curves; Machine-level hybrid handshakes including corrupted msg3 and
impersonation with only the classical key; e2e tests for a clean hybrid handshake, a lost
confirmation, a never confirmed handshake (no RecvErrors, teardown, expiry), a v2-only peer, an
initiator that trusts only the v2 form, `require` both ways, and relays; pki loading; firewall
`ca_sha`; and the `nebula-cert` flows.
## Open items
- Publish DefinedNet/noise and drop the `replace` in `go.mod`, once Nate says the fork is ready to
ship. The classical-only responder `e` is on the local clone's `drop-responder-ekem-key` branch
(b4a892b), not yet in DefinedNet/noise.
- DefinedNet/noise `ReadMessage` returns `ErrShortMessage` without rolling back the symmetric
state ([DefinedNet/noise#2](https://github.com/DefinedNet/noise/issues/2), inherited from
flynn/noise). A message that fails a length check after a key-mixing token leaves `ck` and `h`
advanced, so the genuine message can never be read: one spoofed short packet to a pending
initiator's index, which msg1 carries in the clear in every IX variant, kills that attempt until
it times out, and the Machine reports it as recoverable. Blocks publishing the module; the fix is
a deferred rollback that also restores `k`, `n` and `hasK`. Smaller pre-publish items are in
[DefinedNet/noise#3](https://github.com/DefinedNet/noise/issues/3).
Field tested on real hosts on 2026-10-14 (`pq-lab/2026-10-14-hybrid/`, untracked): LAN median 3.2 ms
against 1.4 ms classical, +2.0 ms at 50 ms round trip, no fallbacks with `require` under loss.
The cryptographic review of 2026-10-14 found no break in the composition or the certificate
chain. Its outcomes are folded in above: deterministic ML-DSA signing, the fingerprint guidance,
the `skem` oracle note, the psk2 note (moot now that handshake is dropped), the pending-responder
exposure and the `sticky` default.
Accepted as is: a tunnel that came up classical between two v3 holders (say, the hybrid attempt
was dropped) stays classical until it rehandshakes for another reason. `require`, `sticky` and a
CA pool without v2 forms cover deployments that need more. PKCS#11 keys do not support v3.
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