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Author SHA1 Message Date
Wade Simmons 16538f5e44 use cipher.NewGCMWithCounterNonce
This assumes the following change has been made:

- https://github.com/golang/go/issues/73110
2026-09-15 12:16:55 -04:00
22 changed files with 133 additions and 735 deletions

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-14
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@@ -263,20 +263,6 @@ try {
}
Write-Host "OK: WSL peer -> windows lighthouse over v6"
# The NlMtu check above proves the value was written, not that windows honors it. A payload this size only
# crosses the tunnel as fragments cut at NlMtu on the way out of the adapter. Left at the adapter default it
# reaches nebula whole, overflows the udp.MTU (9001) write buffer and is dropped, so the ping never answers.
# Anything smaller would ride out as one oversized datagram and survive on IP fragmentation of the underlay.
$BigPayload = 9000
foreach ($target in @(@{ Family = 'v4'; Ip = $Ip2 }, @{ Family = 'v6'; Ip = $Ip6_2 })) {
Wait-Until -TimeoutSec 30 -What "$($target.Family) ping with a $BigPayload byte payload from windows lighthouse to WSL peer ($($target.Ip))" -Predicate {
if ($peerProc.HasExited) { throw "peer exited (code $($peerProc.ExitCode)) before the large $($target.Family) ping succeeded" }
$null = & ping.exe -n 1 -w 1000 -l $BigPayload $target.Ip
$LASTEXITCODE -eq 0
}
Write-Host "OK: windows lighthouse -> WSL peer, $BigPayload byte $($target.Family) payload"
}
Write-Host ''
Write-Host 'All smoke checks passed.'
}
-3
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@@ -242,14 +242,11 @@ test-cov-html:
go test -coverprofile=coverage.out
go tool cover -html=coverage.out
# The package builds only compile. The final line links an android binary so a linker-only failure
# cannot pass CI.
build-test-mobile:
GOARCH=amd64 GOOS=ios go build $(shell go list ./... | grep -v '/cmd/\|/examples/')
GOARCH=arm64 GOOS=ios go build $(shell go list ./... | grep -v '/cmd/\|/examples/')
GOARCH=amd64 GOOS=android go build $(shell go list ./... | grep -v '/cmd/\|/examples/')
GOARCH=arm64 GOOS=android go build $(shell go list ./... | grep -v '/cmd/\|/examples/')
GOARCH=arm64 GOOS=android go build -o /dev/null ${NEBULA_CMD_PATH}
bench:
go test -bench=.
-3
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@@ -457,9 +457,6 @@ firewall:
# Rules are comprised of a protocol, port, and one or more of host, group, or CIDR
# Logical evaluation is roughly: port AND proto AND (ca_sha OR ca_name) AND (host OR group OR groups OR cidr) AND (local cidr)
# - port: Takes `0` or `any` as any, a single number `80`, a range `200-901`, or `fragment` to match second and further fragments of fragmented packets (since there is no port available).
# For IPv6, Nebula can't tell which protocol a second or further fragment belongs to. Any rule that allows them (port `any` or `fragment`,
# and every icmp rule, since icmp ignores ports) allows them for every protocol, not just the rule's. The first fragment, which carries
# the ports, is always checked against its real protocol and port, so this never opens a port the rules don't allow.
# proto: `any`, `tcp`, `udp`, or `icmp`
# a port specification is ignored if proto is `icmp`
# host: `any` or a literal hostname, ie `test-host`
+1 -1
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@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ go 1.26.0
require (
dario.cat/mergo v1.0.2
filippo.io/bigmod v0.1.0
github.com/DefinedNet/netlink v1.3.2-dn.1
github.com/anmitsu/go-shlex v0.0.0-20200514113438-38f4b401e2be
github.com/armon/go-radix v1.0.0
github.com/flynn/noise v1.1.0
@@ -21,6 +20,7 @@ require (
github.com/skip2/go-qrcode v0.0.0-20200617195104-da1b6568686e
github.com/stefanberger/go-pkcs11uri v0.0.0-20230803200340-78284954bff6
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.12.1
github.com/vishvananda/netlink v1.3.1
go.uber.org/goleak v1.3.0
go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.5
golang.org/x/crypto v0.57.0
+4 -2
View File
@@ -3,8 +3,6 @@ dario.cat/mergo v1.0.2 h1:85+piFYR1tMbRrLcDwR18y4UKJ3aH1Tbzi24VRW1TK8=
dario.cat/mergo v1.0.2/go.mod h1:E/hbnu0NxMFBjpMIE34DRGLWqDy0g5FuKDhCb31ngxA=
filippo.io/bigmod v0.1.0 h1:UNzDk7y9ADKST+axd9skUpBQeW7fG2KrTZyOE4uGQy8=
filippo.io/bigmod v0.1.0/go.mod h1:OjOXDNlClLblvXdwgFFOQFJEocLhhtai8vGLy0JCZlI=
github.com/DefinedNet/netlink v1.3.2-dn.1 h1:Md2PsUE1Xuy1Zxs/Bm6356n1kt5bq2HspXlPJ6pEspg=
github.com/DefinedNet/netlink v1.3.2-dn.1/go.mod h1:o4YSn8Jw7zoDcYXDmV77TRd4eS5sSLuE+vu2zAN67C8=
github.com/alecthomas/template v0.0.0-20160405071501-a0175ee3bccc/go.mod h1:LOuyumcjzFXgccqObfd/Ljyb9UuFJ6TxHnclSeseNhc=
github.com/alecthomas/template v0.0.0-20190718012654-fb15b899a751/go.mod h1:LOuyumcjzFXgccqObfd/Ljyb9UuFJ6TxHnclSeseNhc=
github.com/alecthomas/units v0.0.0-20151022065526-2efee857e7cf/go.mod h1:ybxpYRFXyAe+OPACYpWeL0wqObRcbAqCMya13uyzqw0=
@@ -140,6 +138,8 @@ github.com/stretchr/testify v1.4.0/go.mod h1:j7eGeouHqKxXV5pUuKE4zz7dFj8WfuZ+81P
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.7.0/go.mod h1:6Fq8oRcR53rry900zMqJjRRixrwX3KX962/h/Wwjteg=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.12.1 h1:EuwCh5fleGS7H32xRwO3wRGT7DxrDhLAT6FF8MpWDWE=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.12.1/go.mod h1:MDEgiDPPsNp5cuIrHPPCyornHKgEVbtFUmoNlxoYthg=
github.com/vishvananda/netlink v1.3.1 h1:3AEMt62VKqz90r0tmNhog0r/PpWKmrEShJU0wJW6bV0=
github.com/vishvananda/netlink v1.3.1/go.mod h1:ARtKouGSTGchR8aMwmkzC0qiNPrrWO5JS/XMVl45+b4=
github.com/vishvananda/netns v0.0.5 h1:DfiHV+j8bA32MFM7bfEunvT8IAqQ/NzSJHtcmW5zdEY=
github.com/vishvananda/netns v0.0.5/go.mod h1:SpkAiCQRtJ6TvvxPnOSyH3BMl6unz3xZlaprSwhNNJM=
github.com/yuin/goldmark v1.1.27/go.mod h1:3hX8gzYuyVAZsxl0MRgGTJEmQBFcNTphYh9decYSb74=
@@ -195,6 +195,8 @@ golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20200930185726-fdedc70b468f/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7w
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20201119102817-f84b799fce68/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7wpKNCjG9DtNlClVuFLEZdDNbEs=
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20210124154548-22da62e12c0c/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7wpKNCjG9DtNlClVuFLEZdDNbEs=
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20210603081109-ebe580a85c40/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
golang.org/x/sys v0.2.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
golang.org/x/sys v0.10.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
golang.org/x/sys v0.48.0 h1:bbX/i/6MgT9BVLM9RT1thmxL04yeTAhbEz4SyadbXoo=
golang.org/x/sys v0.48.0/go.mod h1:hNLxWAXmnKAxqDtdwIYC4bM9oQPEecfsnNMuSxOs3og=
golang.org/x/term v0.0.0-20201126162022-7de9c90e9dd1/go.mod h1:bj7SfCRtBDWHUb9snDiAeCFNEtKQo2Wmx5Cou7ajbmo=
+58
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@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/netip"
"slices"
"sync"
@@ -17,6 +18,7 @@ import (
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/logging"
)
const defaultPromoteEvery = 1000 // Count of packets sent before we try moving a tunnel to a preferred underlay ip address
@@ -928,3 +930,59 @@ func (i *HostInfo) logger(l *slog.Logger) *slog.Logger {
return li
}
// Utility functions
func localAddrs(l *slog.Logger, allowList *LocalAllowList) []netip.Addr {
//FIXME: This function is pretty garbage
var finalAddrs []netip.Addr
ifaces, _ := net.Interfaces()
for _, i := range ifaces {
allow := allowList.AllowName(i.Name)
if l.Enabled(context.Background(), logging.LevelTrace) {
l.Log(context.Background(), logging.LevelTrace, "localAllowList.AllowName",
"interfaceName", i.Name,
"allow", allow,
)
}
if !allow {
continue
}
addrs, _ := i.Addrs()
for _, rawAddr := range addrs {
var addr netip.Addr
switch v := rawAddr.(type) {
case *net.IPNet:
//continue
addr, _ = netip.AddrFromSlice(v.IP)
case *net.IPAddr:
addr, _ = netip.AddrFromSlice(v.IP)
}
if !addr.IsValid() {
if l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
l.Debug("addr was invalid", "localAddr", rawAddr)
}
continue
}
addr = addr.Unmap()
if addr.IsLoopback() == false && addr.IsLinkLocalUnicast() == false {
isAllowed := allowList.Allow(addr)
if l.Enabled(context.Background(), logging.LevelTrace) {
l.Log(context.Background(), logging.LevelTrace, "localAllowList.Allow",
"localAddr", addr,
"allowed", isAllowed,
)
}
if !isAllowed {
continue
}
finalAddrs = append(finalAddrs, addr)
}
}
}
return finalAddrs
}
+13 -3
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@@ -45,7 +45,8 @@ func setTransportChecksum4(packet []byte) {
if ihl < ipv4.HeaderLen || end < ihl || end > len(packet) {
return
}
// do not attempt to set checksums for fragments
// The checksum covers the whole datagram, which a fragment (MF set or a
// non-zero offset) does not carry.
if binary.BigEndian.Uint16(packet[6:8])&0x3fff != 0 {
return
}
@@ -67,7 +68,10 @@ func setTransportChecksum6(packet []byte) {
return
}
// we must find the transport header in order to write a checksum
// The checksum covers the whole datagram, which a fragment does not carry.
// An unknown extension header hides where the transport header starts. A
// chain longer than the walk's budget ends it early, at an offset that was
// never checked against the packet.
proto, offset, _, anyFragment, err := IPv6FindUpperProtocol(packet[:end])
if err != nil || anyFragment || offset >= end {
return
@@ -105,7 +109,8 @@ func transportExtent(transport []byte, proto uint8) ([]byte, bool) {
// writeTransportChecksum stores the checksum of transport, taken over the
// pseudo-header sum csum, in the header's checksum field. A UDP checksum that
// computes to zero goes on the wire as 0xffff: zero means no checksum was
// computed (RFC 768), and over IPv6 the checksum is mandatory (RFC 8200 section 8.1).
// computed (RFC 768), and over IPv6 the checksum is mandatory (RFC 8200
// section 8.1).
func writeTransportChecksum(transport []byte, proto uint8, csum uint32) {
var at, minLen int
switch proto {
@@ -128,6 +133,11 @@ func writeTransportChecksum(transport []byte, proto uint8, csum uint32) {
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(transport[at:], sum)
}
// fold reduces a pseudo-header sum to the 16 bit seed Checksum takes. Carrying
// the high half back into the low half is what keeps the reduction lossless, so
// the seed sums exactly as the wider value would; 0xffff is its fixed point.
// Every term of that sum comes from a 16 bit field, so it stays far below the
// width at which the accumulator would wrap.
func fold(csum uint32) uint16 {
for csum > 0xffff {
csum = (csum >> 16) + (csum & 0xffff)
+20 -48
View File
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@ import (
// ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload is returned when the ipv6 extension header chain is truncated before a terminal
// upper layer protocol is reached.
var ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload = errors.New("could not find payload in ipv6 packet")
var ErrIPv6ExtensionHeaderAfterFragment = errors.New("extension header after fragment header in packet")
var ErrIPv6HopByHopHeadersMustBeFirst = errors.New("hop-by-hop header must be first extension header")
const (
// MaxIPv4RejectPacketSize is the largest IPv4 reject packet:
@@ -30,13 +28,6 @@ const (
MaxRejectPacketSize = maxIPv6RejectPacketSize
IPv6HeaderHopByHop = 0
IPv6HeaderRouting = 43
IPv6HeaderFragment = 44
IPv6NoNextHeader = 59
IPv6HeaderDestination = 60
IPv6HeaderAuthentication = 51
IPProtocolICMP = 1
IPProtocolICMPv6 = 58
IPProtocolTCP = 6
@@ -354,15 +345,14 @@ func ipv6CreateRejectTCPPacket(packet []byte, out []byte, offset int) []byte {
return out
}
// IPv6FindUpperProtocol walks the ipv6 extension header chain and returns the upper layer protocol, the offset it begins at, and whether the packet is a non-first fragment.
// Only the RFC 8200 and IANA extension headers below are walked.
// Everything else, including Mobility (135), HIP (139), Shim6 (140), experimental 253/254, and real upper layer protocols like SCTP or GRE, is terminal.
// For a non-first fragment the returned protocol is the fragmented protocol and offset points at the fragment header, there is no transport header to locate.
// Returns ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload if packet is smaller than an ipv6 header, or the chain is truncated, or if more than 8 extension headers are present.
// Returns ErrIPv6HopByHopHeadersMustBeFirst if a hop-by-hop header appears anywhere but directly after the ipv6 header (RFC 8200 section 4.1).
// Returns ErrIPv6ExtensionHeaderAfterFragment if any walked extension header, including a second fragment header, follows the fragment header of a
// first fragment. The upper layer header must then begin at byte 0 of the fragmentable part, beyond the reach of any non-first fragment,
// whose offset is at least 8, so overlapping fragments cannot rewrite the ports or protocol the firewall read from the first fragment.
// IPv6FindUpperProtocol walks the ipv6 extension header chain and returns the upper layer protocol, the
// offset it begins at, and whether the packet is a non-first fragment. Only the RFC 8200 and IANA extension
// headers below are walked. Everything else, including Mobility (135), HIP (139), Shim6 (140), experimental
// 253/254, and real upper layer protocols like SCTP or GRE, is terminal. Walking those as extension headers
// is a firewall bypass, so they fail closed. For a non-first fragment the returned protocol is the fragmented
// protocol and offset points at the fragment header, there is no transport header to locate. Returns
// ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload if packet is smaller than an ipv6 header or the chain is truncated before a
// terminal protocol is reached.
func IPv6FindUpperProtocol(packet []byte) (nextHeader uint8, offset int, isFragment bool, anyFragment bool, err error) {
const maxIPv6ExtHeaders = 8
if len(packet) < ipv6.HeaderLen {
@@ -373,60 +363,42 @@ func IPv6FindUpperProtocol(packet []byte) (nextHeader uint8, offset int, isFragm
for range maxIPv6ExtHeaders {
switch nextHeader {
case IPv6HeaderHopByHop, IPv6HeaderRouting, IPv6HeaderDestination:
if anyFragment {
return 0, 0, false, false, ErrIPv6ExtensionHeaderAfterFragment
}
case 0, 43, 60: // Hop-by-Hop, Routing, Destination
if len(packet) < offset+2 {
return 0, 0, false, false, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload
return nextHeader, offset, isFragment, anyFragment, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload
}
if nextHeader == IPv6HeaderHopByHop && offset != ipv6.HeaderLen {
//hop-by-hop must appear first, and only once, if it exists.
return 0, 0, false, false, ErrIPv6HopByHopHeadersMustBeFirst
}
nextHeader = packet[offset]
offset += (int(packet[offset+1]) + 1) << 3
case IPv6HeaderFragment:
if anyFragment {
return 0, 0, false, false, ErrIPv6ExtensionHeaderAfterFragment
}
case 44: // Fragment
if len(packet) < offset+8 {
return 0, 0, false, false, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload
return nextHeader, offset, isFragment, anyFragment, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload
}
anyFragment = true
// Non-first fragments carry no transport header, report the fragmented protocol and stop.
// Per RFC 8200 section 4.5 the receiver only uses the offset zero fragment's next header, so the value
// returned here can't be verified.
// Non-first fragments carry no transport header, report the fragmented protocol and stop
if packet[offset+2] != 0 || packet[offset+3]&0xf8 != 0 {
return packet[offset], offset, true, anyFragment, nil
}
nextHeader = packet[offset]
offset += 8
case IPv6HeaderAuthentication: // AH
if anyFragment {
return 0, 0, false, false, ErrIPv6ExtensionHeaderAfterFragment
}
case 51: // AH
if len(packet) < offset+2 {
return 0, 0, false, false, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload
return nextHeader, offset, isFragment, anyFragment, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload
}
nextHeader = packet[offset]
offset += (int(packet[offset+1]) + 2) << 2
default:
// A prior extension header can declare a length that advances offset past the packet. The terminal
// protocol's header isn't actually here, so treat the chain as truncated rather than classifying it.
if offset > len(packet) {
// A prior extension header can declare a length that advances offset past the packet, reject this.
return 0, 0, false, false, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload
return nextHeader, offset, isFragment, anyFragment, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload
}
return nextHeader, offset, isFragment, anyFragment, nil //success!
return nextHeader, offset, isFragment, anyFragment, nil
}
}
// Fail closed
return 0, 0, false, false, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload
return nextHeader, offset, isFragment, anyFragment, nil
}
func CreateICMPEchoResponse(packet, out []byte) []byte {
+12 -41
View File
@@ -522,32 +522,13 @@ func Test_IPv6FindUpperProtocol(t *testing.T) {
dst := net.ParseIP("fd00::2")
// 8 byte extension/transport stand-ins, first byte is the next header, second is the length field
extToTCP := []byte{6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} // len 0 -> 8 bytes, next = TCP
extToUDP := []byte{17, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} // len 0 -> 8 bytes, next = UDP
extToRouting := []byte{43, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} // len 0 -> 8 bytes, next = Routing
ahToUDP := []byte{17, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} // AH len 0 -> (0+2)<<2 = 8 bytes, next = UDP
firstFragToUDP := []byte{17, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1} // frag offset 0, M=1, next = UDP
nonFirstFrag := []byte{17, 0, 0, 9, 0, 0, 0, 1} // frag offset non-zero, next = UDP
transport := []byte{0, 80, 1, 187, 0, 0, 0, 0} // stand-in bytes, IPv6FindUpperProtocol never reads ports
extToHbH := []byte{0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} // len 0 -> 8 bytes, next = Hop-by-Hop
extToDst := []byte{60, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} // len 0 -> 8 bytes, next = Destination
extToFrag := []byte{44, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} // len 0 -> 8 bytes, next = Fragment
firstFragToDst := []byte{60, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1} // frag offset 0, M=1, next = Destination
firstFragToAH := []byte{51, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1} // frag offset 0, M=1, next = AH
firstFragToFrag := []byte{44, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1} // frag offset 0, M=1, next = Fragment
firstFragToESP := []byte{50, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1} // frag offset 0, M=1, next = ESP
atomicFragToDst := []byte{60, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1} // frag offset 0, M=0, next = Destination
nonFirstFragToDst := []byte{60, 0, 0, 9, 0, 0, 0, 1} // frag offset non-zero, next = Destination
// 8 walked headers spend the budget before the 9th slot's terminal is ever classified. This is the
// report 4040546 shape: without failing closed the walk hands back offset 104, and a caller reads ports
// from the attacker's bytes there. Destination is the header that may legally repeat.
var budgetChain []byte
for range 7 {
budgetChain = append(budgetChain, extToDst...)
}
budgetChain = append(budgetChain, extToTCP...)
budgetChain = append(budgetChain, transport...)
extToTCP := []byte{6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} // len 0 -> 8 bytes, next = TCP
extToUDP := []byte{17, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} // len 0 -> 8 bytes, next = UDP
extToRouting := []byte{43, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} // len 0 -> 8 bytes, next = Routing
ahToUDP := []byte{17, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} // AH len 0 -> (0+2)<<2 = 8 bytes, next = UDP
firstFragToUDP := []byte{17, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1} // frag offset 0, M=1, next = UDP
nonFirstFrag := []byte{17, 0, 0, 9, 0, 0, 0, 1} // frag offset non-zero, next = UDP
transport := []byte{0, 80, 1, 187, 0, 0, 0, 0} // stand-in bytes, IPv6FindUpperProtocol never reads ports
tests := []struct {
name string
@@ -567,20 +548,10 @@ func Test_IPv6FindUpperProtocol(t *testing.T) {
{"ah then udp", 51, append(ahToUDP, transport...), 17, ipv6.HeaderLen + 8, false, false, nil},
{"first fragment walks to transport", 44, append(firstFragToUDP, transport...), 17, ipv6.HeaderLen + 8, false, true, nil},
{"non-first fragment stops", 44, append(nonFirstFrag, transport...), 17, ipv6.HeaderLen, true, true, nil},
{"non-first fragment reports its claimed protocol", 44, append(nonFirstFragToDst, transport...), 60, ipv6.HeaderLen, true, true, nil},
{"routing then first fragment", 43, append(append(extToFrag, firstFragToUDP...), transport...), 17, ipv6.HeaderLen + 16, false, true, nil},
{"first fragment of a non-transport protocol is terminal", 44, append(firstFragToESP, transport...), 50, ipv6.HeaderLen + 8, false, true, nil},
{"destination after first fragment", 44, append(append(firstFragToDst, extToTCP...), transport...), 0, 0, false, false, ErrIPv6ExtensionHeaderAfterFragment},
{"ah after first fragment", 44, append(append(firstFragToAH, ahToUDP...), transport...), 0, 0, false, false, ErrIPv6ExtensionHeaderAfterFragment},
{"fragment after first fragment", 44, append(append(firstFragToFrag, nonFirstFrag...), transport...), 0, 0, false, false, ErrIPv6ExtensionHeaderAfterFragment},
{"destination after atomic fragment", 44, append(append(atomicFragToDst, extToTCP...), transport...), 0, 0, false, false, ErrIPv6ExtensionHeaderAfterFragment},
{"hop-by-hop after destination", 60, append(append(extToHbH, extToTCP...), transport...), 0, 0, false, false, ErrIPv6HopByHopHeadersMustBeFirst},
{"hop-by-hop twice", 0, append(append(extToHbH, extToTCP...), transport...), 0, 0, false, false, ErrIPv6HopByHopHeadersMustBeFirst},
{"unknown protocol is terminal", 132, transport, 132, ipv6.HeaderLen, false, false, nil}, // SCTP
{"truncated extension header", 0, nil, 0, 0, false, false, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload},
{"truncated extension header", 0, nil, 0, ipv6.HeaderLen, false, false, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload},
// Destination Options with a declared length (255+1)*8 = 2048 that runs past the 48 byte buffer, next = SCTP
{"extension length past buffer", 0, []byte{132, 255, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 0, 0, false, false, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload},
{"budget exhausted fails closed", 60, budgetChain, 0, 0, false, false, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload},
{"extension length past buffer", 60, []byte{132, 255, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 132, ipv6.HeaderLen + 2048, false, false, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
@@ -588,10 +559,10 @@ func Test_IPv6FindUpperProtocol(t *testing.T) {
packet := makeIPv6Packet(src, dst, tt.nextHeader, tt.payload)
proto, offset, isFragment, anyFragment, err := IPv6FindUpperProtocol(packet)
if tt.wantErr != nil {
require.ErrorIs(t, err, tt.wantErr)
} else {
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, tt.wantErr)
return
}
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, tt.wantProto, proto)
assert.Equal(t, tt.wantOffset, offset)
assert.Equal(t, tt.wantFragment, isFragment)
+1 -28
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ import (
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/logging"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/nicfinder"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
)
@@ -43,10 +42,6 @@ type LightHouse struct {
// addresses rather than whatever this machine's NICs happen to be. Set it before Start.
localAddrsFn func(*LocalAllowList) []netip.Addr
// lastLocalAddrsErr is the previous localAddrsFn failure. Enumeration runs on every update, so an
// unchanged failure is demoted to Debug rather than warning every lighthouse.interval forever.
lastLocalAddrsErr atomic.Pointer[string]
// Local cache of answers from light houses
// map of vpn addr to answers
addrMap map[netip.Addr]*RemoteList
@@ -120,9 +115,7 @@ func NewLightHouseFromConfig(ctx context.Context, l *slog.Logger, c *config.C, c
l: l,
}
h.localAddrsFn = func(al *LocalAllowList) []netip.Addr {
addrs, err := nicfinder.Find(ctx, h.l, al)
h.logLocalAddrsErr(err)
return addrs
return localAddrs(h.l, al)
}
lighthouses := make([]netip.Addr, 0)
@@ -923,26 +916,6 @@ func (lh *LightHouse) TriggerUpdate() {
}
}
// logLocalAddrsErr reports a localAddrs failure at Warn the first time it is seen and at Debug while
// it persists unchanged, so a permanent failure does not warn on every update forever.
func (lh *LightHouse) logLocalAddrsErr(err error) {
if err == nil {
lh.lastLocalAddrsErr.Store(nil)
return
}
msg := err.Error()
prev := lh.lastLocalAddrsErr.Swap(&msg)
if prev != nil && *prev == msg {
if lh.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
lh.l.Debug("Failed to collect local addresses to advertise", "error", err)
}
return
}
lh.l.Warn("Failed to collect local addresses to advertise", "error", err)
}
func (lh *LightHouse) SendUpdate() {
var v4 []*V4AddrPort
var v6 []*V6AddrPort
-31
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,7 @@
package nebula
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/netip"
"testing"
@@ -766,32 +764,3 @@ func TestLighthouse_DeletesWork(t *testing.T) {
out = lh.Query(testHost)
assert.Nil(t, out)
}
func TestLightHouse_logLocalAddrsErr(t *testing.T) {
out := &bytes.Buffer{}
lh := &LightHouse{l: test.NewLoggerWithOutput(out)}
// The first sighting of a failure warns.
lh.logLocalAddrsErr(errors.New("permission denied"))
assert.Contains(t, out.String(), "level=WARN")
assert.Contains(t, out.String(), "permission denied")
// Repeating unchanged does not warn again, which is what keeps a permanent failure from warning
// on every lighthouse.interval for the life of the process.
out.Reset()
lh.logLocalAddrsErr(errors.New("permission denied"))
assert.NotContains(t, out.String(), "level=WARN")
// A different failure is a new event and warns.
out.Reset()
lh.logLocalAddrsErr(errors.New("something else"))
assert.Contains(t, out.String(), "level=WARN")
assert.Contains(t, out.String(), "something else")
// Recovering resets, so the same failure returning later warns again.
out.Reset()
lh.logLocalAddrsErr(nil)
assert.Empty(t, out.String())
lh.logLocalAddrsErr(errors.New("something else"))
assert.Contains(t, out.String(), "level=WARN")
}
+2 -5
View File
@@ -32,12 +32,9 @@ const _ = noiseutil.RejectHeadroom - 4*maxRoutines
func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, deviceFactory overlay.DeviceFactory) (retcon *Control, reterr error) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
// The goroutines started below stop only when this context does, and only a caller holding the
// Control can arrange that. Cancel whenever we are not handing one back, which covers an error
// and a config test alike: a config test used to leave the lighthouse query worker, and a
// hostname resolver per dns named static host, running for the life of the process.
// Automatically cancel the context if Main returns an error, to signal all created goroutines to quit.
defer func() {
if retcon == nil {
if reterr != nil {
cancel()
}
}()
-74
View File
@@ -1,21 +1,12 @@
package nebula
import (
"fmt"
"net/netip"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
cert_test "github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"go.uber.org/goleak"
)
func TestParseCpuAffinity(t *testing.T) {
@@ -58,68 +49,3 @@ func TestParseCpuAffinity(t *testing.T) {
assert.Nil(t, parseCpuAffinity(newConfig([]any{1 << 20}), l, 1))
}
}
// TestMain_ConfigTestReleasesItsGoroutines pins the rule that Main only leaves goroutines running
// when it hands back a Control to stop them with.
//
// A config test gets no Control, so anything it started had nothing to stop it: the lighthouse
// query worker, and a hostname resolver per dns named static host, ran for the life of the
// process. That matters to every embedder that validates a config in process rather than by
// exec'ing, dnclient and the apple clients included, because they do it on each config load and
// the leak accumulates.
func TestMain_ConfigTestReleasesItsGoroutines(t *testing.T) {
defer goleak.VerifyNone(t, goleak.IgnoreCurrent())
l := test.NewLogger()
dir := t.TempDir()
before := time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)
after := time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
ca, _, caKey, caPEM := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, before, after, nil, nil, nil)
networks := []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")}
_, _, keyPEM, certPEM := cert_test.NewTestCert(
cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, ca, caKey, "config-test", before, after, networks, nil, nil)
caPath := filepath.Join(dir, "ca.pem")
certPath := filepath.Join(dir, "cert.pem")
keyPath := filepath.Join(dir, "key.pem")
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(caPath, caPEM, 0o600))
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(certPath, certPEM, 0o600))
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(keyPath, keyPEM, 0o600))
// A static host by address, not by name: the query worker is the goroutine under test and a
// hostname would drag a real dns lookup into a unit test.
configBody := fmt.Sprintf(`
pki:
ca: %s
cert: %s
key: %s
static_host_map:
"10.0.0.2": ["192.0.2.1:4242"]
lighthouse:
hosts:
- "10.0.0.2"
listen:
host: 127.0.0.1
port: 0
tun:
disabled: true
firewall:
outbound:
- port: any
proto: any
host: any
inbound:
- port: any
proto: any
host: any
`, caPath, certPath, keyPath)
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "config.yml"), []byte(configBody), 0o600))
c := config.NewC(l)
require.NoError(t, c.Load(dir))
ctrl, err := Main(c, true, "config-test", l, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Nil(t, ctrl, "a config test hands back nothing to stop, so it must stop itself")
}
-39
View File
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
//go:build !android
package nicfinder
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/netip"
)
func localAddrs(ctx context.Context, l *slog.Logger, filter Filter) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
ifaces, err := net.Interfaces()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to enumerate local interfaces: %w", err)
}
var out []netip.Addr
var errs []error
for _, i := range ifaces {
if !allowName(ctx, l, filter, i.Name) {
continue
}
addrs, err := i.Addrs()
if err != nil {
errs = append(errs, fmt.Errorf("failed to get addresses for %s: %w", i.Name, err))
continue
}
for _, rawAddr := range addrs {
if addr, ok := allowedAddr(ctx, l, filter, rawAddr); ok {
out = append(out, addr)
}
}
}
return out, errors.Join(errs...)
}
-104
View File
@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
//go:build android
package nicfinder
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net/netip"
"os"
"github.com/DefinedNet/netlink"
"github.com/DefinedNet/netlink/nl"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
// Android denies bind() on netlink route sockets and RTM_GETLINK, so net.Interfaces fails with EACCES.
// Enumerate with an RTM_GETADDR dump on an unbound socket instead.
// localInterfaces returns every interface that has an address, with its addresses. It lists
// addresses over a netlink socket that is never bound and names each index with SIOCGIFNAME, the
// same operations Bionic's getifaddrs uses for app UIDs, which the sandbox permits.
func localAddrs(ctx context.Context, l *slog.Logger, filter Filter) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
var errs []error
addrs, err := netlinkAddrList()
if err != nil {
if !errors.Is(err, netlink.ErrDumpInterrupted) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to enumerate local interfaces: %w", err)
}
// The address table kept changing under the dump and netlink gave up retrying. What it
// returned is still worth advertising.
errs = append(errs, fmt.Errorf("local addresses may be incomplete: %w", err))
}
// Any socket will do for SIOCGIFNAME.
sfd, err := unix.Socket(unix.AF_INET, unix.SOCK_DGRAM|unix.SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0)
if err != nil {
return nil, os.NewSyscallError("socket", err)
}
defer unix.Close(sfd)
var out []netip.Addr
nameAllowed := make(map[int]bool) // by interface index, once named
for _, a := range addrs {
allow, named := nameAllowed[a.LinkIndex]
if (named && !allow) || a.IPNet == nil {
continue
}
addr, ok := allowedAddr(ctx, l, filter, a.IPNet)
if !ok {
continue
}
if !named {
name, err := interfaceNameByIndex(sfd, a.LinkIndex)
// ENODEV means the interface went away after the dump. Any other failure is reported
// and the interface skipped, so the rest are still returned.
if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, unix.ENODEV) {
errs = append(errs, fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve name of interface %d: %w", a.LinkIndex, err))
}
allow = err == nil && allowName(ctx, l, filter, name)
nameAllowed[a.LinkIndex] = allow
}
if allow {
out = append(out, addr)
}
}
return out, errors.Join(errs...)
}
// netlinkAddrList is netlink.AddrList over a socket that is never bound. The kernel autobinds it
// on the first send, which the sandbox permits.
func netlinkAddrList() ([]netlink.Addr, error) {
fd, err := unix.Socket(unix.AF_NETLINK, unix.SOCK_RAW|unix.SOCK_CLOEXEC, unix.NETLINK_ROUTE)
if err != nil {
return nil, os.NewSyscallError("socket", err)
}
s, err := nl.NewNetlinkSocketFromFd(fd)
if err != nil {
unix.Close(fd)
return nil, err
}
h := netlink.NewHandleFromSockets(
map[int]*nl.SocketHandle{unix.NETLINK_ROUTE: {Socket: s}},
netlink.HandleOptions{RetryInterrupted: true},
)
defer h.Close()
if err := h.SetSocketTimeout(netlink.GetSocketTimeout()); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return h.AddrList(nil, netlink.FAMILY_ALL)
}
// interfaceNameByIndex resolves an interface index with SIOCGIFNAME.
func interfaceNameByIndex(fd int, index int) (string, error) {
var ifr unix.Ifreq
ifr.SetUint32(uint32(index)) // ifr_ifindex is in the ifr_ifru union
if err := unix.IoctlIfreq(fd, unix.SIOCGIFNAME, &ifr); err != nil {
return "", err
}
return ifr.Name(), nil
}
-59
View File
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
package nicfinder
import (
"context"
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/netip"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/logging"
)
// Filter decides which interfaces, by name, and which of their addresses Find returns.
type Filter interface {
AllowName(string) bool
Allow(netip.Addr) bool
}
// Find returns the addresses of this host's network interfaces that allowList accepts, with
// loopback and link-local addresses left out. When only some interfaces could be read it returns
// their addresses alongside an error for the rest. allowList must not be nil; it is called as
// given, so a nil pointer of a type whose methods accept a nil receiver is fine.
func Find(ctx context.Context, l *slog.Logger, allowList Filter) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
return localAddrs(ctx, l, allowList)
}
// allowName asks filter about an interface name and traces the answer.
func allowName(ctx context.Context, l *slog.Logger, filter Filter, name string) bool {
allow := filter.AllowName(name)
if l.Enabled(ctx, logging.LevelTrace) {
l.Log(ctx, logging.LevelTrace, "localAllowList.AllowName", "interfaceName", name, "allow", allow)
}
return allow
}
// allowedAddr converts one address a platform reports and says whether to advertise it: it must
// be a *net.IPNet or *net.IPAddr carrying an IP, not be loopback or link-local, and be accepted by
// filter, whose answer is traced. IPv4 comes back unmapped.
func allowedAddr(ctx context.Context, l *slog.Logger, filter Filter, rawAddr net.Addr) (netip.Addr, bool) {
var ip net.IP
switch v := rawAddr.(type) {
case *net.IPNet:
ip = v.IP
case *net.IPAddr:
ip = v.IP
}
addr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(ip)
if !ok {
return netip.Addr{}, false
}
addr = addr.Unmap()
if addr.IsLoopback() || addr.IsLinkLocalUnicast() {
return netip.Addr{}, false
}
isAllowed := filter.Allow(addr)
if l.Enabled(ctx, logging.LevelTrace) {
l.Log(ctx, logging.LevelTrace, "localAllowList.Allow", "localAddr", addr, "allowed", isAllowed)
}
return addr, isAllowed
}
-117
View File
@@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
package nicfinder
import (
"context"
"net"
"net/netip"
"regexp"
"testing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
)
type allowAll struct{}
func (allowAll) Allow(netip.Addr) bool { return true }
func (allowAll) AllowName(string) bool { return true }
type testAllowList struct {
bannedName *regexp.Regexp
bannedAddr netip.Addr
}
func (l *testAllowList) Allow(addr netip.Addr) bool {
return addr != l.bannedAddr
}
func (l *testAllowList) AllowName(n string) bool {
return !l.bannedName.MatchString(n)
}
func newTestAllowList(bannedName string) *testAllowList {
return &testAllowList{
bannedName: regexp.MustCompile(bannedName),
}
}
func TestAllowedAddr(t *testing.T) {
ctx, l := context.Background(), test.NewLogger()
allowed := func(filter Filter, addrs []net.Addr) []netip.Addr {
var out []netip.Addr
for _, rawAddr := range addrs {
if addr, ok := allowedAddr(ctx, l, filter, rawAddr); ok {
out = append(out, addr)
}
}
return out
}
addrs := []net.Addr{
&net.IPNet{IP: net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1"), Mask: net.CIDRMask(8, 32)},
&net.IPNet{IP: net.ParseIP("::1"), Mask: net.CIDRMask(128, 128)},
&net.IPNet{IP: net.ParseIP("10.0.0.5"), Mask: net.CIDRMask(24, 32)},
&net.IPNet{IP: net.ParseIP("169.254.10.10"), Mask: net.CIDRMask(16, 32)},
&net.IPNet{IP: net.ParseIP("fe80::1"), Mask: net.CIDRMask(64, 128)},
&net.IPAddr{IP: net.ParseIP("fd00::5")},
&net.IPNet{},
otherAddr{},
nil,
}
// Loopback, link local and anything without an IP are dropped, and IPv4 comes back unmapped
// even though net.ParseIP hands over a 16 byte slice.
assert.Equal(t, []netip.Addr{
netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.5"),
netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::5"),
}, allowed(allowAll{}, addrs))
// The filter sees the unmapped form and can drop a single address.
al := newTestAllowList("none")
al.bannedAddr = netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.5")
assert.Equal(t, []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::5")}, allowed(al, addrs))
}
// otherAddr is a net.Addr that is neither *net.IPNet nor *net.IPAddr. netlink.Addr is one such
// type: it satisfies net.Addr through an embedded *net.IPNet, and passing it directly once
// silently produced no addresses.
type otherAddr struct{}
func (otherAddr) Network() string { return "other" }
func (otherAddr) String() string { return "other" }
// hostFilter counts AllowName calls and can reject every name or every address.
type hostFilter struct {
rejectNames bool
rejectAddrs bool
asked map[string]int
}
func (f *hostFilter) Allow(netip.Addr) bool { return !f.rejectAddrs }
func (f *hostFilter) AllowName(name string) bool {
f.asked[name]++
return !f.rejectNames
}
// Runs this platform's localAddrs against the host and checks it honors the whole filter.
func TestLocalAddrsAppliesFilter(t *testing.T) {
ctx, l := context.Background(), test.NewLogger()
f := &hostFilter{asked: map[string]int{}}
all, err := localAddrs(ctx, l, f)
if len(f.asked) == 0 {
t.Skipf("no interfaces to enumerate here: %v", err)
}
for name, n := range f.asked {
assert.Equal(t, 1, n, "AllowName asked %d times for %s", n, name)
}
// Loopback and link-local never come back, whatever the filter says.
for _, addr := range all {
assert.False(t, addr.IsLoopback() || addr.IsLinkLocalUnicast(), "%s", addr)
}
none, _ := localAddrs(ctx, l, &hostFilter{rejectNames: true, asked: map[string]int{}})
assert.Empty(t, none, "addresses got past a filter that rejects every interface name")
none, _ = localAddrs(ctx, l, &hostFilter{rejectAddrs: true, asked: map[string]int{}})
assert.Empty(t, none, "addresses got past a filter that rejects every address")
}
+10 -73
View File
@@ -2,14 +2,13 @@ package noiseutil
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/aes"
"crypto/cipher"
"crypto/fips140"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"fmt"
"reflect"
"runtime"
"unsafe"
// unsafe needed for go:linkname
_ "crypto/tls"
@@ -18,16 +17,6 @@ import (
"github.com/flynn/noise"
)
// TODO: Use NewGCMWithCounterNonce or NewGCMForQUIC once available:
// - https://github.com/golang/go/issues/73110
// - https://github.com/golang/go/issues/79219
// Using tls.aeadAESGCMTLS13 gives us the TLS 1.3 GCM, which also verifies
// that the nonce is strictly increasing. This works for both boringcrypto
// and fips140.
//
//go:linkname aeadAESGCMTLS13 crypto/tls.aeadAESGCMTLS13
func aeadAESGCMTLS13(key, noncePrefix []byte) cipher.AEAD
type cipherFn struct {
fn func([32]byte) noise.Cipher
name string
@@ -43,8 +32,14 @@ var CipherAESGCMFIPS140 noise.CipherFunc = cipherFn{cipherAESGCMFIPS140, "AESGCM
var emptyNonce = []byte{0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
func cipherAESGCMFIPS140(k [32]byte) noise.Cipher {
gcm := aeadAESGCMTLS13(k[:], emptyNonce)
gcm = extractFIPSAEAD(gcm)
c, err := aes.NewCipher(k[:])
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
gcm, err := cipher.NewGCMWithCounterNonce(c)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
return &aeadGCMFIPS140Cipher{
AEAD: gcm,
}
@@ -52,57 +47,6 @@ func cipherAESGCMFIPS140(k [32]byte) noise.Cipher {
type aeadGCMFIPS140Cipher struct {
cipher.AEAD
ready bool
}
// Extract the internal FIPS GCM implementation from the tls wrapper. The TLS
// wrapper is not thread safe around Open, so instead of locking around it we
// can grab the internal implementation that is thread safe. This is the FIPS
// module implementation: `crypto/internal/fips140/aes/gcm.GCMWithXORCounterNonce`
//
// - https://github.com/golang/go/blob/go1.26.4/src/crypto/internal/fips140/aes/gcm/gcm_nonces.go#L212-L287
//
// The wrapper is struct `crypto/tls.xorNonceAEAD` , with field `aead`:
//
// - https://github.com/golang/go/blob/go1.26.4/src/crypto/tls/cipher_suites.go#L482-L487
//
// This can be cleaned up once these FIPS implementations are exposed directly:
//
// - https://github.com/golang/go/issues/73110
func extractFIPSAEAD(xorNonceAEAD cipher.AEAD) cipher.AEAD {
r := reflect.ValueOf(xorNonceAEAD)
v := r.Elem().FieldByName("aead")
if !v.IsValid() {
// The internal crypto/tls.xorNonceAEAD struct no longer has an `aead`
// field. This can only happen on a Go version this code was not built
// against; the package init() self-test guards against ever reaching
// this at runtime, so this is a defensive fail-fast.
panic(fmt.Sprintf("noiseutil: could not extract FIPS AEAD from %T on %s: no `aead` field (incompatible Go version)", xorNonceAEAD, runtime.Version()))
}
v2 := reflect.NewAt(v.Type(), unsafe.Pointer(v.UnsafeAddr())).Elem()
aead, ok := v2.Interface().(cipher.AEAD)
if !ok {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("noiseutil: extracted FIPS `aead` field is %s, not a cipher.AEAD, on %s (incompatible Go version)", v2.Type(), runtime.Version()))
}
return aead
}
func (c *aeadGCMFIPS140Cipher) init(nonce []byte) {
// GCMWithXORCounterNonce expects that the first call to Seal
// is with a counter of `0`, this is how it extracts the nonce mask.
// We can clean this up in the future when NewGCMWithCounterNonce or
// NewGCMForQUIC are available:
if !bytes.Equal(emptyNonce, nonce) {
c.AEAD.Seal([]byte{}, emptyNonce, []byte{}, []byte{})
}
c.ready = true
}
func (c *aeadGCMFIPS140Cipher) Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte {
if !c.ready {
c.init(nonce)
}
return c.AEAD.Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, additionalData)
}
func (c *aeadGCMFIPS140Cipher) Encrypt(out []byte, n uint64, ad, plaintext []byte) []byte {
@@ -133,15 +77,8 @@ func (c *aeadGCMFIPS140Cipher) DecryptDanger(out, ad, ciphertext []byte, n uint6
return c.Open(out, nb, ciphertext, ad)
}
func (c *aeadGCMFIPS140Cipher) Overhead() int {
if c == nil {
return 0
}
return c.AEAD.Overhead()
}
func aeadGCMFIPS140CipherNonce(n uint64) []byte {
// GCMWithXORCounterNonce uses a 4 byte static prefix and an 8 byte nonce
// GCMWithCounterNonce uses a 4 byte static prefix and an 8 byte nonce
var nonce [12]byte
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(nonce[4:], n)
return nonce[:]
+1 -1
View File
@@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ func parseV6(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.ParsedPacket) error {
// and cannot drift into misreading an unknown protocol (SCTP, GRE, etc.) as a forged transport.
proto, offset, isFragment, anyFragment, err := iputil.IPv6FindUpperProtocol(data)
if err != nil {
return err
return ErrIPv6PacketTooShort
}
fp.Protocol = proto
+7 -27
View File
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ func Test_newPacket_v6(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t, err)
err = newPacket(buffer.Bytes(), true, p)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, iputil.ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIPv6PacketTooShort)
// A v6 packet with a hop-by-hop extension
// ICMPv6 Payload (Echo Request)
@@ -151,12 +151,12 @@ func Test_newPacket_v6(t *testing.T) {
// A full IPv6 header and 1 byte in the first extension, but missing
// the length byte.
err = newPacket(buffer.Bytes()[:41], true, p)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, iputil.ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIPv6PacketTooShort)
// A full IPv6 header plus 1 full extension, but only 1 byte of the
// next layer, missing length byte
err = newPacket(buffer.Bytes()[:49], true, p)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, iputil.ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIPv6PacketTooShort)
err = nil
// A good ICMP packet
@@ -354,12 +354,12 @@ func Test_newPacket_v6(t *testing.T) {
// Ensure buffer bounds checking during processing, a truncated AH header can't reach the payload
err = newPacket(b[:41], true, p)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, iputil.ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIPv6PacketTooShort)
// Invalid AH header
b = buffer.Bytes()
err = newPacket(b, true, p)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, iputil.ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIPv6PacketTooShort)
}
func Test_newPacket_ipv6Fragment(t *testing.T) {
@@ -466,7 +466,7 @@ func Test_newPacket_ipv6Fragment(t *testing.T) {
// Too short of a fragment packet
err = newPacket(secondFrag[:len(secondFrag)-10], false, p)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, iputil.ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIPv6PacketTooShort)
}
func BenchmarkParseV6(b *testing.B) {
@@ -707,27 +707,7 @@ func Test_newPacket_v6ExtHeaderPastBuffer(t *testing.T) {
pkt[40] = byte(layers.IPProtocolSCTP) // Dest Options next header = SCTP
pkt[41] = 255 // declared length (255+1)*8 = 2048, past the 48 byte buffer
require.ErrorIs(t, newPacket(pkt, true, p), iputil.ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload)
}
// Test_newPacket_v6ExtHeaderAfterFragment rejects a first fragment whose transport header sits behind another extension
// header. The ports would then start 8 or more bytes into the fragmentable part, where a non-first fragment, filtered
// only as `port: fragment`, could overlap them on a receiver that splices overlapping fragments.
func Test_newPacket_v6ExtHeaderAfterFragment(t *testing.T) {
p := &firewall.ParsedPacket{}
pkt := make([]byte, 60)
pkt[0] = 0x60 // version 6
pkt[6] = byte(layers.IPProtocolIPv6Fragment) // NextHeader -> Fragment
pkt[7] = 64 // hop limit
pkt[40] = byte(layers.IPProtocolIPv6Destination) // Fragment NextHeader -> Destination Options
pkt[43] = 0x01 // offset 0, M=1: a first fragment
pkt[48] = byte(iputil.IPProtocolTCP) // Destination Options NextHeader -> TCP
pkt[49] = 0 // HdrExtLen 0 -> 8 bytes, TCP begins at 56
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[58:60], 443) // TCP dst port, reachable by a fragment at offset 8
require.ErrorIs(t, newPacket(pkt, true, p), iputil.ErrIPv6ExtensionHeaderAfterFragment)
require.ErrorIs(t, newPacket(pkt, false, p), iputil.ErrIPv6ExtensionHeaderAfterFragment)
require.ErrorIs(t, newPacket(pkt, true, p), ErrIPv6PacketTooShort)
}
// Test_newPacket_v6ExtHeaderConfusion is a regression test for parseV6 walking any unrecognized
+3 -61
View File
@@ -29,10 +29,7 @@ type tun struct {
Routes atomic.Pointer[[]Route]
routeTree atomic.Pointer[bart.Table[routing.Gateways]]
linkAddr *netroute.LinkAddr
// hostOwned means the fd arrived from the OS, which has already configured addressing, mtu
// and routes for it. NEPacketTunnelProvider on darwin does this.
hostOwned bool
l *slog.Logger
l *slog.Logger
}
type ifReq struct {
@@ -152,48 +149,8 @@ func (t *tun) deviceBytes() (o [16]byte) {
return
}
// newTunFromFd adopts a utun the host already created and configured, which is how a darwin
// network extension is handed its device. Everything about moving packets is shared with newTun,
// only the setup differs: the host owns addressing and routing here.
func newTunFromFd(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, deviceFd int, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix) (*tun, error) {
if err := unix.SetNonblock(deviceFd, true); err != nil {
// We own the fd from the moment it is handed to us
_ = unix.Close(deviceFd)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to set the tun fd to non-blocking mode: %w", err)
}
file := os.NewFile(uintptr(deviceFd), "/dev/tun")
t := &tun{
f: file,
Device: utunNameFromFd(deviceFd),
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
DefaultMTU: c.GetInt("tun.mtu", DefaultMTU),
hostOwned: true,
l: l,
}
if err := t.reload(c, true); err != nil {
_ = file.Close()
return nil, err
}
c.RegisterReloadCallback(func(c *config.C) {
if err := t.reload(c, false); err != nil {
util.LogWithContextIfNeeded("failed to reload tun device", err, t.l)
}
})
return t, nil
}
// utunNameFromFd asks the socket what interface it is, for logs. A blank name is not worth
// failing a tunnel over, so an error just leaves it empty.
func utunNameFromFd(fd int) string {
name, err := unix.GetsockoptString(fd, unix.AF_SYS_CONTROL, _UTUN_OPT_IFNAME)
if err != nil {
return ""
}
return name
func newTunFromFd(_ *config.C, _ *slog.Logger, _ int, _ []netip.Prefix) (*tun, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("newTunFromFd not supported in Darwin")
}
func (t *tun) Close() error {
@@ -204,12 +161,6 @@ func (t *tun) Close() error {
}
func (t *tun) Activate() error {
// The host handed us a configured device. Its addresses, mtu and routes come from the network
// settings it applied, and a sandboxed extension cannot change them anyway.
if t.hostOwned {
return nil
}
devName := t.deviceBytes()
s, err := unix.Socket(
@@ -423,11 +374,6 @@ func getLinkAddr(name string) (*netroute.LinkAddr, error) {
}
func (t *tun) addRoutes(logErrors bool) error {
// The route tree is still ours, the system routing table is not
if t.hostOwned {
return nil
}
routes := *t.Routes.Load()
for _, r := range routes {
@@ -457,10 +403,6 @@ func (t *tun) addRoutes(logErrors bool) error {
}
func (t *tun) removeRoutes(routes []Route) error {
if t.hostOwned {
return nil
}
for _, r := range routes {
if !r.Install {
continue
+1 -1
View File
@@ -15,12 +15,12 @@ import (
"time"
"unsafe"
"github.com/DefinedNet/netlink"
"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
"github.com/vishvananda/netlink"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)