Compare commits

..
178 changed files with 2330 additions and 18521 deletions
+2 -9
View File
@@ -43,15 +43,8 @@ runs:
with:
role-to-assume: ${{ inputs.role }}
aws-region: ${{ inputs.region }}
# An STS secret key with special characters does not survive the
# pwsh -> make -> MSYS sh -> aws.exe chain, and SigV4 then signs with a
# key that no longer matches, so the first S3 upload fails with
# SignatureDoesNotMatch. Retries the assume until it comes back clean.
# Same fix as DefinedNet/dnclient#867.
special-characters-workaround: true
# Overridden by the workaround above and kept for whenever that goes:
# the default 12 rides out IAM trust-policy propagation, and once the
# role is stable a real misconfiguration should fail fast.
# Default is 12 retries to ride out IAM trust-policy propagation; once
# the role is stable we want a real misconfiguration to fail fast.
retry-max-attempts: 5
- name: Sign .exe files
+11 -82
View File
@@ -73,11 +73,8 @@ jobs:
build-darwin:
name: Build Universal Darwin
env:
HAS_SIGNING_CREDS: ${{ secrets.APPLE_SIGNING_ROLE_ARN != '' }}
HAS_SIGNING_CREDS: ${{ secrets.AC_USERNAME != '' }}
runs-on: macos-latest
permissions:
id-token: write
contents: read
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
@@ -86,68 +83,17 @@ jobs:
go-version: '1.26'
check-latest: true
# GitHub holds ARNs, not credentials, and ARNs outlive a rotation
- name: Configure AWS credentials
if: env.HAS_SIGNING_CREDS == 'true'
uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v6
with:
role-to-assume: ${{ secrets.APPLE_SIGNING_ROLE_ARN }}
aws-region: us-east-2
# parse-json-secrets unpacks into SIGNING_* and ASC_*, masked on the way in
- name: Fetch signing credentials
if: env.HAS_SIGNING_CREDS == 'true'
uses: aws-actions/aws-secretsmanager-get-secrets@v3
with:
parse-json-secrets: true
secret-ids: |
SIGNING,${{ secrets.APPLE_SIGNING_DEVELOPER_ID_ARN }}
ASC,${{ secrets.APPLE_NOTARY_KEY_ARN }}
- name: Import certificates
if: env.HAS_SIGNING_CREDS == 'true'
uses: Apple-Actions/import-codesign-certs@v7
with:
p12-file-base64: ${{ env.SIGNING_P12_BASE64 }}
p12-password: ${{ env.SIGNING_PASSWORD }}
# The action imports but does not check the chain validates, which is how a p12
# missing its intermediate reaches a failing codesign
- name: Check the identity is usable
if: env.HAS_SIGNING_CREDS == 'true'
run: |
: "${SIGNING_IDENTITY_SHA1:?empty, so the secret has no identity_sha1}"
identities=$(security find-identity -v -p codesigning signing_temp.keychain)
case "$identities" in
*"$SIGNING_IDENTITY_SHA1"*) ;;
*) printf '%s\n' "$identities" >&2; exit 1 ;;
esac
# notarytool wants the key as a file
- name: Write the App Store Connect key
if: env.HAS_SIGNING_CREDS == 'true'
run: |
mkdir -p ~/private_keys
chmod 700 ~/private_keys
key_path="$HOME/private_keys/AuthKey_${ASC_KEY_ID}.p8"
(umask 077; printf '%s\n' "$ASC_PRIVATE_KEY" > "$key_path")
echo "ASC_P8=$key_path" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
- name: Drop the credentials from the environment
if: env.HAS_SIGNING_CREDS == 'true'
run: |
# The action's own inventory, so a new field in a secret is covered
python3 -c '
import json, os
raw = os.environ.get("SECRETS_LIST_CLEAN_UP")
if raw is None and os.environ.get("SIGNING_P12_BASE64"):
raise SystemExit("SECRETS_LIST_CLEAN_UP is gone, fetched secrets are not being scrubbed")
keep = {"SIGNING_IDENTITY_SHA1", "ASC_KEY_ID", "ASC_ISSUER_ID"}
names = [n for n in json.loads(raw or "[]") if n not in keep]
print("\n".join(f"{n}=" for n in dict.fromkeys(names)))
' >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
p12-file-base64: ${{ secrets.APPLE_DEVELOPER_CERTIFICATE_P12_BASE64 }}
p12-password: ${{ secrets.APPLE_DEVELOPER_CERTIFICATE_PASSWORD }}
- name: Build, sign, and notarize
env:
AC_USERNAME: ${{ secrets.AC_USERNAME }}
AC_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.AC_PASSWORD }}
run: |
rm -rf release
mkdir release
@@ -156,34 +102,17 @@ jobs:
lipo -create -output ./release/nebula ./build/darwin-amd64/nebula ./build/darwin-arm64/nebula
lipo -create -output ./release/nebula-cert ./build/darwin-amd64/nebula-cert ./build/darwin-arm64/nebula-cert
# Unset in a fork, which has no credentials to sign with
if [ -n "$SIGNING_IDENTITY_SHA1" ]; then
codesign -s "$SIGNING_IDENTITY_SHA1" -f -v --timestamp --options=runtime -i "net.defined.nebula" ./release/nebula
codesign -s "$SIGNING_IDENTITY_SHA1" -f -v --timestamp --options=runtime -i "net.defined.nebula-cert" ./release/nebula-cert
if [ -n "$AC_USERNAME" ]; then
codesign -s "10BC1FDDEB6CE753550156C0669109FAC49E4D1E" -f -v --timestamp --options=runtime -i "net.defined.nebula" ./release/nebula
codesign -s "10BC1FDDEB6CE753550156C0669109FAC49E4D1E" -f -v --timestamp --options=runtime -i "net.defined.nebula-cert" ./release/nebula-cert
fi
zip -j release/nebula-darwin.zip release/nebula-cert release/nebula
if [ -n "$ASC_P8" ]; then
xcrun notarytool submit ./release/nebula-darwin.zip --key "$ASC_P8" --key-id "$ASC_KEY_ID" --issuer "$ASC_ISSUER_ID" --wait
if [ -n "$AC_USERNAME" ]; then
xcrun notarytool submit ./release/nebula-darwin.zip --team-id "576H3XS7FP" --apple-id "$AC_USERNAME" --password "$AC_PASSWORD" --wait
fi
- name: Drop the signing key
if: always() && env.HAS_SIGNING_CREDS == 'true'
run: |
# Locked, not deleted: import-codesign-certs deletes it in its own post
# step and fails the job if it is already gone. Locked is unusable.
security lock-keychain signing_temp.keychain || true
rm -f "$ASC_P8"
# Nothing later in this job needs AWS
python3 -c '
import json, os
names = json.loads(os.environ.get("SECRETS_LIST_CLEAN_UP") or "[]")
names += ["ASC_P8", "SIGNING_IDENTITY_SHA1", "ASC_KEY_ID", "ASC_ISSUER_ID",
"AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID", "AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY", "AWS_SESSION_TOKEN"]
print("\n".join(f"{n}=" for n in dict.fromkeys(names)))
' >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
- name: Upload artifacts
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
with:
+31 -32
View File
@@ -20,45 +20,44 @@ jobs:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/setup-go@v7
with:
go-version: '1.26'
check-latest: true
- name: Smoke Docker
run: make smoke-docker
- name: Smoke Docker IPv6 overlay
run: make smoke-docker-ipv6
- name: Smoke Relay Docker
run: make smoke-relay-docker
- name: Smoke Docker boringcrypto
run: make boringcrypto smoke-docker
- name: Smoke Docker fips140
run: make fips140-all GOALS=smoke-docker
timeout-minutes: 10
smoke-self:
name: Run self traffic smoke test on macOS
runs-on: macos-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/setup-go@v7
with:
go-version: '1.26'
check-latest: true
- name: build
run: make bin
run: make bin-docker CGO_ENABLED=1 BUILD_ARGS=-race
- name: run smoke-self
- name: setup docker image
working-directory: ./.github/workflows/smoke
run: ./smoke-self.sh
run: ./build.sh
- name: run smoke
working-directory: ./.github/workflows/smoke
run: ./smoke.sh
- name: setup docker image ipv6
working-directory: ./.github/workflows/smoke
run: SMOKE_OVERLAY_IPV6=1 ./build.sh
- name: run smoke ipv6
working-directory: ./.github/workflows/smoke
run: SMOKE_OVERLAY_IPV6=1 ./smoke.sh
- name: setup relay docker image
working-directory: ./.github/workflows/smoke
run: ./build-relay.sh
- name: run smoke relay
working-directory: ./.github/workflows/smoke
run: ./smoke-relay.sh
- name: setup docker image for P256
working-directory: ./.github/workflows/smoke
run: NAME="smoke-p256" CURVE=P256 ./build.sh
- name: run smoke-p256
working-directory: ./.github/workflows/smoke
run: NAME="smoke-p256" ./smoke.sh
timeout-minutes: 10
-130
View File
@@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
# A host must be able to reach its own overlay address. Where the kernel sends
# that traffic through the tun rather than over loopback, nebula sees it and
# hands it straight back (immediatelyForwardToSelf), and whether the kernel
# accepts what comes back is only answerable against a real kernel. Runs one
# nebula on this machine as root and aims every probe at its own address.
set -e -x
set -o pipefail
V4=192.0.2.1
V6=2001:db8::1
case "$(uname -s)" in
Darwin) TUN_DEV=utun ;;
*) TUN_DEV=tun0 ;;
esac
ROOT="$(cd ../../.. && pwd)"
rm -rf build/self
mkdir -p build/self
cd build/self
cleanup() {
echo
echo " *** cleanup"
echo
set +e
if [ -n "$NEBULA_PID" ]
then
sudo kill "$NEBULA_PID"
fi
{ kill $(jobs -p); wait; } 2>/dev/null
sed 's/^/ [self] /' nebula.log
}
trap cleanup EXIT
# perl is on every platform this runs on; timeout(1) is not.
alarm() {
perl -e 'alarm shift; exec @ARGV' "$@"
}
RESULTS=""
FAILED=""
probe() {
local name="$1"
shift
if "$@"
then
RESULTS="$RESULTS $name=ok"
else
RESULTS="$RESULTS $name=FAIL"
FAILED="$FAILED $name"
fi
}
# Send one datagram, then wait for the listener to have written it out.
udp_probe() {
echo self | alarm 5 nc -u -w1 "$1" 3000 || true
set +x
for _ in $(seq 1 20)
do
if grep -q self "$2"
then
set -x
return 0
fi
sleep 0.25
done
set -x
return 1
}
"$ROOT/nebula-cert" ca -name "Smoke Test"
"$ROOT/nebula-cert" sign -name self -networks "$V4/24,$V6/64"
HOST=self AM_LIGHTHOUSE=true TUN_DEV="$TUN_DEV" ../../genconfig.sh >self.yml
"$ROOT/nebula" -config self.yml -test
sudo -v
sudo "$ROOT/nebula" -config self.yml >nebula.log 2>&1 &
NEBULA_PID=$!
for _ in $(seq 1 40)
do
ifconfig | grep "inet6 $V6 " >/dev/null && break
sleep 0.25
done
ifconfig | grep "inet $V4 "
ifconfig | grep "inet6 $V6 "
nc -l "$V4" 2000 >/dev/null &
nc -l "$V6" 2000 >/dev/null &
nc -u -l "$V4" 3000 >udp4.txt &
nc -u -l "$V6" 3000 >udp6.txt &
sleep 1
set +x
echo
echo " *** Testing self traffic from $V4"
echo
set -x
probe icmp4 alarm 5 ping -c1 "$V4"
probe tcp4 alarm 5 nc -z "$V4" 2000
probe udp4 udp_probe "$V4" udp4.txt
set +x
echo
echo " *** Testing self traffic from $V6"
echo
set -x
probe icmp6 alarm 5 ping6 -c1 "$V6"
probe tcp6 alarm 5 nc -z "$V6" 2000
probe udp6 udp_probe "$V6" udp6.txt
set +x
echo
echo " *** self traffic:$RESULTS"
echo
if [ -n "$FAILED" ]
then
echo "self traffic failed:$FAILED" >&2
exit 1
fi
+5 -34
View File
@@ -51,19 +51,15 @@ wsl -d $Distro -- bash -c "rm -rf $WslDir && mkdir -p $WslDir" | Out-Null
$DevName = 'nebula-smoke'
$Ip1 = '192.168.241.1'
$Ip2 = '192.168.241.2'
# Dual stack on purpose: a v4-only overlay never exercises the v6 side of tun.mtu.
$Ip6_1 = 'fd42:4242:241::1'
$Ip6_2 = 'fd42:4242:241::2'
$Mtu = 1300
$Port = 4242
& $NebulaCert ca -name 'smoke-ca' -out-crt "$WorkDir\ca.crt" -out-key "$WorkDir\ca.key"
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "nebula-cert ca failed (exit $LASTEXITCODE)" }
& $NebulaCert sign -name 'lighthouse' -networks "$Ip1/24,$Ip6_1/64" -ca-crt "$WorkDir\ca.crt" -ca-key "$WorkDir\ca.key" -out-crt "$WorkDir\lighthouse.crt" -out-key "$WorkDir\lighthouse.key"
& $NebulaCert sign -name 'lighthouse' -networks "$Ip1/24" -ca-crt "$WorkDir\ca.crt" -ca-key "$WorkDir\ca.key" -out-crt "$WorkDir\lighthouse.crt" -out-key "$WorkDir\lighthouse.key"
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "nebula-cert sign lighthouse failed (exit $LASTEXITCODE)" }
& $NebulaCert sign -name 'peer' -networks "$Ip2/24,$Ip6_2/64" -ca-crt "$WorkDir\ca.crt" -ca-key "$WorkDir\ca.key" -out-crt "$WorkDir\peer.crt" -out-key "$WorkDir\peer.key"
& $NebulaCert sign -name 'peer' -networks "$Ip2/24" -ca-crt "$WorkDir\ca.crt" -ca-key "$WorkDir\ca.key" -out-crt "$WorkDir\peer.crt" -out-key "$WorkDir\peer.key"
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "nebula-cert sign peer failed (exit $LASTEXITCODE)" }
# Windows lighthouse config.
@@ -86,7 +82,7 @@ tun:
drop_local_broadcast: false
drop_multicast: false
tx_queue: 500
mtu: $Mtu
mtu: 1300
network_category: private
logging:
level: info
@@ -130,7 +126,7 @@ tun:
drop_local_broadcast: false
drop_multicast: false
tx_queue: 500
mtu: $Mtu
mtu: 1300
logging:
level: info
format: text
@@ -173,7 +169,7 @@ Write-Host '=== WSL diagnostic ==='
wsl --version 2>&1 | Out-Host
wsl --list --verbose 2>&1 | Out-Host
wsl -d $Distro -u root -- uname -a | Out-Host
wsl -d $Distro -u root -- bash -c "modprobe tun 2>&1 || true; mkdir -p /dev/net; [ -c /dev/net/tun ] || mknod /dev/net/tun c 10 200; chmod 600 /dev/net/tun; { echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/disable_ipv6; echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/default/disable_ipv6; } 2>/dev/null || true; ls -l /dev/net/tun"
wsl -d $Distro -u root -- bash -c "modprobe tun 2>&1 || true; mkdir -p /dev/net; [ -c /dev/net/tun ] || mknod /dev/net/tun c 10 200; chmod 600 /dev/net/tun; ls -l /dev/net/tun"
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "failed to prepare /dev/net/tun in WSL (TUN support missing?)" }
# Deliberately no New-NetFirewallRule calls here -- nebula's windows_bypass_wdf
@@ -218,16 +214,6 @@ try {
}
Write-Host "OK: $DevName NetworkCategory=Private"
# v6 silently kept the adapter default of 65535 while v4 was correct.
foreach ($family in @('IPv4', 'IPv6')) {
Wait-Until -TimeoutSec 30 -What "$DevName $family NlMtu=$Mtu" -Predicate {
if ($lhProc.HasExited) { throw "lighthouse exited (code $($lhProc.ExitCode)) before $family mtu was set" }
$rows = @(Get-NetIPInterface -InterfaceAlias $DevName -AddressFamily $family -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
$rows.Count -gt 0 -and -not ($rows | Where-Object { $_.NlMtu -ne $Mtu })
}
Write-Host "OK: $DevName $family NlMtu=$Mtu"
}
Wait-Until -TimeoutSec 30 -What "WSL nebula1 with $Ip2" -Predicate {
if ($peerProc.HasExited) { throw "peer exited (code $($peerProc.ExitCode)) before tun was ready" }
$r = wsl -d $Distro -u root -- bash -c "ip -o addr show nebula1 2>/dev/null | grep -q 'inet $Ip2' && echo yes"
@@ -235,13 +221,6 @@ try {
}
Write-Host "OK: WSL nebula1 has $Ip2"
Wait-Until -TimeoutSec 30 -What "WSL nebula1 with $Ip6_2" -Predicate {
if ($peerProc.HasExited) { throw "peer exited (code $($peerProc.ExitCode)) before the v6 address was up" }
$r = wsl -d $Distro -u root -- bash -c "ip -o addr show nebula1 2>/dev/null | grep -q 'inet6 $Ip6_2' && echo yes"
("$r").Trim() -eq 'yes'
}
Write-Host "OK: WSL nebula1 has $Ip6_2"
Wait-Until -TimeoutSec 30 -What "ping from WSL peer to windows lighthouse ($Ip1)" -Predicate {
if ($peerProc.HasExited) { throw "peer exited (code $($peerProc.ExitCode)) before ping succeeded" }
$r = wsl -d $Distro -u root -- bash -c "ping -c1 -W1 $Ip1 >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo OK"
@@ -255,14 +234,6 @@ try {
}
Write-Host "OK: windows lighthouse -> WSL peer"
# Otherwise the v6 networks only prove the interface exists, not that it forwards.
Wait-Until -TimeoutSec 30 -What "v6 ping from WSL peer to windows lighthouse ($Ip6_1)" -Predicate {
if ($peerProc.HasExited) { throw "peer exited (code $($peerProc.ExitCode)) before the v6 ping succeeded" }
$r = wsl -d $Distro -u root -- bash -c "ping -6 -c1 -W1 $Ip6_1 >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo OK"
("$r").Trim() -eq 'OK'
}
Write-Host "OK: WSL peer -> windows lighthouse over v6"
Write-Host ''
Write-Host 'All smoke checks passed.'
}
+3 -8
View File
@@ -58,14 +58,9 @@ jobs:
e2e-cmd: make e2evv
- name: linux-boringcrypto
os: ubuntu-latest
build-cmd: make boringcrypto
test-cmd: make boringcrypto test
e2e-cmd: make boringcrypto e2evv
- name: linux-fips140
os: ubuntu-latest
build-cmd: make fips140-all
test-cmd: make fips140-all GOALS=test
e2e-cmd: make fips140-all GOALS=e2evv
build-cmd: make bin-boringcrypto
test-cmd: make test-boringcrypto
e2e-cmd: make e2e GOEXPERIMENT=boringcrypto CGO_ENABLED=1 TEST_ENV="TEST_LOGS=1" TEST_FLAGS="-v -ldflags -checklinkname=0"
- name: linux-pkcs11
os: ubuntu-latest
build-cmd: make bin-pkcs11
+1 -50
View File
@@ -7,53 +7,6 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
## [Unreleased]
### Added
- New `nebula ctl <command>` subcommand, which runs any of the debug and administrative commands the sshd
block exposes without requiring an ssh server, a host key, or authorized keys. Nebula serves them over a
local unix socket, configured by the new `ctl` block and enabled by default at `/run/nebula/ctl.sock` on
Linux and `/var/run/nebula/ctl.sock` elsewhere. The socket lives in a `0700` directory so filesystem
permissions are the access control; failing to create it is logged and never prevents nebula from
starting. Packagers running nebula under systemd will want `RuntimeDirectory=nebula` in the unit so the
directory exists with the right ownership. Not supported on Windows yet, and never enabled on iOS or
Android. Reloadable.
### Changed
- The ssh console now reports a real exit status for `ssh <host> <command>` rather than always reporting
success, so commands run that way are scriptable.
- The debug and administrative commands moved out of `ssh.go` into `commands.go` and are no longer tied to
ssh: both the ssh console and `nebula ctl` dispatch against one shared registry, so a command added in
one place is available over both. Embedders of the `sshd` package are affected: `sshd.NewSSHServer` now
takes a `*diag.Registry`, `sshd.SSHServer.RegisterCommand` is gone in favor of registering on that
registry directly, and the command types now live in the `diag` package rather than being re-exported
from `sshd`.
## [1.11.1] - 2026-08-21
See the [v1.11.1](https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/milestone/30?closed=1) milestone for a complete list of changes.
### Changed
- IPv6 packets whose next header is a protocol Nebula does not parse (SCTP, GRE, IP-in-IP, etc.) are now
classified as that protocol with no ports, closing a firewall bypass where a crafted payload could steer
the classifier into reading one as TCP/UDP and matching a TCP/UDP rule. These packets are now matched as
their true protocol, so only a `proto: any` rule allows them. If you carry one of these protocols over the
overlay, confirm a `proto: any` rule covers it before upgrading, it may have been passing only through this
bypass. (#1840)
- Drop the dependency on `github.com/cyberdelia/go-metrics-graphite`, which has been unmaintained for over ten
years, by inlining the small amount of code Nebula used. (#1832)
### Fixed
- The ICMPv6 type was read from the wrong byte when classifying IPv6 packets, so the echo identifier used
for conntrack was never picked up. (#1840)
- Enforce outbound message counter limits so a tunnel is rehandshaked before the counter can wrap, preventing
nonce reuse. This is unreachable in practice, but is enforced as a defense-in-depth measure. (#1841)
- Prevent `nebula-cert ca` from running out of memory on 32bit systems when generating encrypted private keys. (#1834)
- Tolerate `ErrDumpInterrupted` when listing tun addresses on Linux, so a transient interrupted netlink dump
no longer aborts startup. (#1835)
## [1.11.0] - 2026-07-23
See the [v1.11.0](https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/milestone/25?closed=1) milestone for a complete list of changes.
@@ -917,9 +870,7 @@ created.)
- Initial public release.
[Unreleased]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/compare/v1.11.1...HEAD
[1.11.1]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.11.1
[1.11.0]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.11.0
[Unreleased]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/compare/v1.10.3...HEAD
[1.10.3]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.10.3
[1.10.2]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.10.2
[1.10.1]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.10.1
+20 -86
View File
@@ -72,17 +72,6 @@ ALL_CROSS_LINUX_ARM = linux-arm-5 linux-arm-6 linux-arm-7 linux-arm64
ALL_CROSS_LINUX_MIPS = linux-mips linux-mipsle linux-mips64 linux-mips64le linux-mips-softfloat
ALL_CROSS_LINUX_OTHER = linux-386 linux-ppc64le linux-riscv64 linux-loong64
# Based on section 2.2 of the Go Cryptographic Module CVMP Security Policy #5247
ALL_FIPS140 = linux-amd64-fips140 \
linux-arm64-fips140 \
windows-amd64-fips140 \
windows-arm64-fips140 \
darwin-arm64-fips140 \
freebsd-amd64-fips140 \
linux-arm-7-fips140 \
linux-mips64-fips140 \
linux-ppc64le-fips140
e2e:
$(TEST_ENV) go test -tags=e2e_testing -count=1 $(TEST_FLAGS) ./e2e
@@ -148,8 +137,6 @@ release-netbsd: $(ALL_NETBSD:%=build/nebula-%.tar.gz)
release-boringcrypto: build/nebula-linux-$(shell go env GOARCH)-boringcrypto.tar.gz
release-fips140: $(ALL_FIPS140:%=build/nebula-%.tar.gz)
BUILD_ARGS += -trimpath
bin-windows: build/windows-amd64/nebula.exe build/windows-amd64/nebula-cert.exe
@@ -170,24 +157,17 @@ bin-freebsd-arm64: build/freebsd-arm64/nebula build/freebsd-arm64/nebula-cert
bin-boringcrypto: build/linux-$(shell go env GOARCH)-boringcrypto/nebula build/linux-$(shell go env GOARCH)-boringcrypto/nebula-cert
mv $? .
bin-fips140: build/linux-$(shell go env GOARCH)-fips140/nebula build/linux-$(shell go env GOARCH)-fips140/nebula-cert
mv $? .
bin-pkcs11: BUILD_ARGS += -tags pkcs11
bin-pkcs11: CGO_ENABLED = 1
bin-pkcs11: bin
# Build with the pprof debug server (serves on :6060). See startPprofServer.
debug: BUILD_ARGS += -tags debug
debug: bin
bin:
$(GOENV) go build $(BUILD_ARGS) -ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" -o ./nebula${NEBULA_CMD_SUFFIX} ${NEBULA_CMD_PATH}
$(GOENV) go build $(BUILD_ARGS) -ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" -o ./nebula-cert${NEBULA_CMD_SUFFIX} ./cmd/nebula-cert
go build $(BUILD_ARGS) -ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" -o ./nebula${NEBULA_CMD_SUFFIX} ${NEBULA_CMD_PATH}
go build $(BUILD_ARGS) -ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" -o ./nebula-cert${NEBULA_CMD_SUFFIX} ./cmd/nebula-cert
install:
$(GOENV) go install $(BUILD_ARGS) -ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" ${NEBULA_CMD_PATH}
$(GOENV) go install $(BUILD_ARGS) -ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" ./cmd/nebula-cert
go install $(BUILD_ARGS) -ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" ${NEBULA_CMD_PATH}
go install $(BUILD_ARGS) -ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" ./cmd/nebula-cert
build/linux-arm-%: GOENV += GOARM=$(word 3, $(subst -, ,$*))
build/linux-mips-%: GOENV += GOMIPS=$(word 3, $(subst -, ,$*))
@@ -198,11 +178,8 @@ build/linux-mips-softfloat/%: LDFLAGS += -s -w
# boringcrypto
build/linux-amd64-boringcrypto/%: GOENV += GOEXPERIMENT=boringcrypto CGO_ENABLED=1
build/linux-arm64-boringcrypto/%: GOENV += GOEXPERIMENT=boringcrypto CGO_ENABLED=1
# fips140
FIPSVERSION = v1.0.0
$(foreach _rule, $(ALL_FIPS140), build/$(_rule)/%): GOENV += GOFIPS140=$(FIPSVERSION)
$(foreach _rule, $(ALL_FIPS140), build/$(_rule)/%): BUILD_ARGS += -tags fips140enforce
build/linux-amd64-boringcrypto/%: LDFLAGS += -checklinkname=0
build/linux-arm64-boringcrypto/%: LDFLAGS += -checklinkname=0
build/%/nebula: .FORCE
GOOS=$(firstword $(subst -, , $*)) \
@@ -233,7 +210,10 @@ vet:
go vet $(VET_FLAGS) -v ./...
test:
$(TEST_ENV) go test $(TEST_FLAGS) -v ./...
go test -v ./...
test-boringcrypto:
GOEXPERIMENT=boringcrypto CGO_ENABLED=1 go test -ldflags "-checklinkname=0" -v ./...
test-pkcs11:
CGO_ENABLED=1 go test -v -tags pkcs11 ./...
@@ -276,75 +256,29 @@ ifeq ($(words $(MAKECMDGOALS)),1)
@$(MAKE) service ${.DEFAULT_GOAL} --no-print-directory
endif
# Useful to chain together, like:
# - make fips140 e2evv
# - make fips140 smoke-docker
# Use `release-fips140` to build release binaries
fips140:
@echo > $(NULL_FILE)
ifeq ($(strip $(GOFIPS140)),)
$(eval GOFIPS140 = $(FIPSVERSION))
endif
$(eval GOENV += GOFIPS140=$(GOFIPS140))
$(eval BUILD_ARGS += -tags fips140enforce)
$(eval TEST_ENV += $(GOENV))
$(eval CURVE = P256)
ifeq ($(words $(MAKECMDGOALS)),1)
@$(MAKE) fips140 GOFIPS140=$(GOFIPS140) ${.DEFAULT_GOAL} --no-print-directory
endif
# To test the future pending module, use like `make fips140-latest test`
ALL_GOFIPS140 = v1.0.0 v1.26.0 latest
define FIPS140_rule
fips140-$(1): GOFIPS140 = $(1)
fips140-$(1): fips140
endef
$(foreach _rule, $(ALL_GOFIPS140), $(eval $(call FIPS140_rule,$(_rule))))
# Iterate and run the goals for all fips versions, like `make fips140-all GOALS=test`
fips140-all:
@$(foreach _v,$(ALL_GOFIPS140),$(MAKE) fips140-$(_v) $(GOALS) &&) true
# Useful to chain together, like:
# - make boringcrypto e2evv
# - make boringcrypto smoke-docker
# Use `release-boringcrypto` or `bin-boringcrypto` to build release binaries
boringcrypto:
@echo > $(NULL_FILE)
$(eval GOENV += GOEXPERIMENT=boringcrypto CGO_ENABLED=1)
$(eval TEST_ENV += $(GOENV))
$(eval CURVE = P256)
ifeq ($(words $(MAKECMDGOALS)),1)
@$(MAKE) boringcrypto ${.DEFAULT_GOAL} --no-print-directory
endif
bin-docker: bin build/linux-amd64/nebula build/linux-amd64/nebula-cert
smoke-docker: BUILD_ARGS += -race
smoke-docker: GOENV += CGO_ENABLED=1
smoke-docker: bin-docker
# This is so we can limit `fips140` smoke test to just P256 curve.
if [ "$(CURVE)" != "P256" ]; then cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && $(GOENV) ./build.sh; fi
if [ "$(CURVE)" != "P256" ]; then cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && $(GOENV) ./smoke.sh; fi
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && $(GOENV) NAME="smoke-p256" CURVE="P256" ./build.sh
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && $(GOENV) NAME="smoke-p256" ./smoke.sh
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && ./build.sh
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && ./smoke.sh
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && NAME="smoke-p256" CURVE="P256" ./build.sh
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && NAME="smoke-p256" ./smoke.sh
smoke-relay-docker: BUILD_ARGS += -race
smoke-relay-docker: GOENV += CGO_ENABLED=1
smoke-relay-docker: bin-docker
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && $(GOENV) ./build-relay.sh
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && $(GOENV) ./smoke-relay.sh
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && ./build-relay.sh
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && ./smoke-relay.sh
smoke-docker-ipv6: export SMOKE_OVERLAY_IPV6 = 1
smoke-docker-ipv6: smoke-docker
smoke-self: bin
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && ./smoke-self.sh
smoke-docker-race: BUILD_ARGS = -race
smoke-docker-race: CGO_ENABLED = 1
smoke-docker-race: smoke-docker
smoke-vagrant/%: bin-docker build/%/nebula
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && ./build.sh $*
cd .github/workflows/smoke/ && ./smoke-vagrant.sh $*
.FORCE:
.PHONY: all all-linux all-freebsd all-openbsd all-netbsd all-darwin all-windows all-cross-linux all-cross-linux-arm all-cross-linux-mips all-cross-linux-other all-cross-darwin all-cross-windows bench bench-cpu bench-cpu-long bin bin-windows bin-windows-arm64 bin-darwin bin-freebsd bin-freebsd-arm64 bin-boringcrypto bin-fips140 bin-pkcs11 bin-docker boringcrypto build-test-mobile debug docker e2e e2ev e2evv e2evvv e2evvvv e2e-bench fips140 fips140-all $(ALL_GOFIPS140:%=fips140-%) install proto release release-linux release-freebsd release-openbsd release-netbsd release-boringcrypto release-fips140 service smoke-docker smoke-relay-docker smoke-docker-ipv6 smoke-self test test-pkcs11 test-cov-html vet smoke-vagrant/%
.PHONY: all all-linux all-freebsd all-openbsd all-netbsd all-darwin all-windows all-cross-linux all-cross-linux-arm all-cross-linux-mips all-cross-linux-other all-cross-darwin all-cross-windows bench bench-cpu bench-cpu-long bin build-test-mobile e2e e2ev e2evv e2evvv e2evvvv proto release service smoke-docker smoke-docker-race test test-cov-html smoke-vagrant/%
.DEFAULT_GOAL := bin
+2 -12
View File
@@ -145,27 +145,17 @@ To build nebula for a specific platform (ex, Windows):
See the [Makefile](Makefile) for more details on build targets
## Curve P256 and FIPS 140-3 mode
## Curve P256 and BoringCrypto
The default curve used for cryptographic handshakes and signatures is Curve25519. This is the recommended setting for most users. If your deployment has certain compliance requirements, you have the option of creating your CA using `nebula-cert ca -curve P256` to use NIST Curve P256. The CA will then sign certificates using ECDSA P256, and any hosts using these certificates will use P256 for ECDH handshakes.
Nebula can be built to support the [FIPS 140-3](https://go.dev/doc/security/fips140) mode of Go by running either of the following make targets. (This sets GOFIPS140=v1.0.0, which must be done at compile time so that the correct AES-GCM can be used for FIPS 140-3 enforcement mode).
```sh
make fips140
make fips140 test
make release-fips140
```
Nebula can also be built using the [BoringCrypto GOEXPERIMENT](https://github.com/golang/go/blob/go1.20/src/crypto/internal/boring/README.md) by running either of the following make targets.
In addition, Nebula can be built using the [BoringCrypto GOEXPERIMENT](https://github.com/golang/go/blob/go1.20/src/crypto/internal/boring/README.md) by running either of the following make targets:
```sh
make bin-boringcrypto
make release-boringcrypto
```
NOTE: boringcrypto support is deprecated and will be removed in the next release. Users should migrate to the native FIPS 140-3 mode described above.
This is not the recommended default deployment, but may be useful based on your compliance requirements.
## Credits
+3 -30
View File
@@ -3,14 +3,11 @@ package main
import (
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/fips140"
"crypto/rand"
"errors"
"flag"
"fmt"
"io"
"math"
"math/bits"
"net/netip"
"os"
"strings"
@@ -46,28 +43,7 @@ type caFlags struct {
subnets *string
}
func defaultCurve() string {
if fips140.Enforced() {
return "P256"
}
return "25519"
}
func newCaFlags() *caFlags {
// prevent running out of memory on 32-bit systems by defaulting to
// RFC9106's recommendation for memory-constrained environments
var (
defaultArgonMemory uint
defaultArgonIterations uint
)
if bits.UintSize == 32 {
defaultArgonMemory = 64 * 1024
defaultArgonIterations = 3
} else {
defaultArgonMemory = 2 * 1024 * 1024
defaultArgonIterations = 1
}
cf := caFlags{set: flag.NewFlagSet("ca", flag.ContinueOnError)}
cf.set.Usage = func() {}
cf.name = cf.set.String("name", "", "Required: name of the certificate authority")
@@ -79,11 +55,11 @@ func newCaFlags() *caFlags {
cf.groups = cf.set.String("groups", "", "Optional: comma separated list of groups. This will limit which groups subordinate certs can use")
cf.networks = cf.set.String("networks", "", "Optional: comma separated list of ip address and network in CIDR notation. This will limit which ip addresses and networks subordinate certs can use in networks")
cf.unsafeNetworks = cf.set.String("unsafe-networks", "", "Optional: comma separated list of ip address and network in CIDR notation. This will limit which ip addresses and networks subordinate certs can use in unsafe networks")
cf.argonMemory = cf.set.Uint("argon-memory", defaultArgonMemory, "Optional: Argon2 memory parameter (in KiB) used for encrypted private key passphrase")
cf.argonMemory = cf.set.Uint("argon-memory", 2*1024*1024, "Optional: Argon2 memory parameter (in KiB) used for encrypted private key passphrase")
cf.argonParallelism = cf.set.Uint("argon-parallelism", 4, "Optional: Argon2 parallelism parameter used for encrypted private key passphrase")
cf.argonIterations = cf.set.Uint("argon-iterations", defaultArgonIterations, "Optional: Argon2 iterations parameter used for encrypted private key passphrase")
cf.argonIterations = cf.set.Uint("argon-iterations", 1, "Optional: Argon2 iterations parameter used for encrypted private key passphrase")
cf.encryption = cf.set.Bool("encrypt", false, "Optional: prompt for passphrase and write out-key in an encrypted format")
cf.curve = cf.set.String("curve", defaultCurve(), "EdDSA/ECDSA Curve (25519, P256)")
cf.curve = cf.set.String("curve", "25519", "EdDSA/ECDSA Curve (25519, P256)")
cf.p11url = p11Flag(cf.set)
cf.ips = cf.set.String("ips", "", "Deprecated, see -networks")
@@ -268,9 +244,6 @@ func ca(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader) error
} else {
switch *cf.curve {
case "25519", "X25519", "Curve25519", "CURVE25519":
if fips140.Enforced() {
return errors.New("use of Curve25519 is not allowed in FIPS 140-only mode")
}
curve = cert.Curve_CURVE25519
pub, rawPriv, err = ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
+5 -25
View File
@@ -7,9 +7,7 @@ import (
"bytes"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"math/bits"
"os"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -24,18 +22,6 @@ func Test_caSummary(t *testing.T) {
}
func Test_caHelp(t *testing.T) {
var (
defaultArgonMemory string
defaultArgonIterations string
)
if bits.UintSize == 32 {
defaultArgonMemory = strconv.Itoa(64 * 1024)
defaultArgonIterations = strconv.Itoa(3)
} else {
defaultArgonMemory = strconv.Itoa(2 * 1024 * 1024)
defaultArgonIterations = strconv.Itoa(1)
}
ob := &bytes.Buffer{}
caHelp(ob)
assert.Equal(
@@ -43,9 +29,9 @@ func Test_caHelp(t *testing.T) {
"Usage of "+os.Args[0]+" ca <flags>: create a self signed certificate authority\n"+
" Pass \"-\" to any path flag to read from stdin or write to stdout.\n"+
" -argon-iterations uint\n"+
" \tOptional: Argon2 iterations parameter used for encrypted private key passphrase (default "+defaultArgonIterations+")\n"+
" \tOptional: Argon2 iterations parameter used for encrypted private key passphrase (default 1)\n"+
" -argon-memory uint\n"+
" \tOptional: Argon2 memory parameter (in KiB) used for encrypted private key passphrase (default "+defaultArgonMemory+")\n"+
" \tOptional: Argon2 memory parameter (in KiB) used for encrypted private key passphrase (default 2097152)\n"+
" -argon-parallelism uint\n"+
" \tOptional: Argon2 parallelism parameter used for encrypted private key passphrase (default 4)\n"+
" -curve string\n"+
@@ -202,16 +188,10 @@ func Test_ca(t *testing.T) {
k, _ := pem.Decode(rb)
ned, err := cert.UnmarshalNebulaEncryptedData(k.Bytes)
require.NoError(t, err)
if bits.UintSize == 32 {
assert.Equal(t, uint32(64*1024), ned.EncryptionMetadata.Argon2Parameters.Memory)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(3), ned.EncryptionMetadata.Argon2Parameters.Iterations)
} else {
assert.Equal(t, uint32(2*1024*1024), ned.EncryptionMetadata.Argon2Parameters.Memory)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(1), ned.EncryptionMetadata.Argon2Parameters.Iterations)
}
// we won't know salt in advance, so just check start of string
assert.Equal(t, uint32(2*1024*1024), ned.EncryptionMetadata.Argon2Parameters.Memory)
assert.Equal(t, uint8(4), ned.EncryptionMetadata.Argon2Parameters.Parallelism)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(1), ned.EncryptionMetadata.Argon2Parameters.Iterations)
// verify the key is valid and decrypt-able
var curve cert.Curve
-5
View File
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
//go:build fips140enforce
//go:debug fips140=only
package main
+1 -6
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
package main
import (
"crypto/fips140"
"errors"
"flag"
"fmt"
"io"
@@ -26,7 +24,7 @@ func newKeygenFlags() *keygenFlags {
cf.set.Usage = func() {}
cf.outPubPath = cf.set.String("out-pub", "", "Required: path to write the public key to")
cf.outKeyPath = cf.set.String("out-key", "", "Required: path to write the private key to")
cf.curve = cf.set.String("curve", defaultCurve(), "ECDH Curve (25519, P256)")
cf.curve = cf.set.String("curve", "25519", "ECDH Curve (25519, P256)")
cf.p11url = p11Flag(cf.set)
return &cf
}
@@ -63,9 +61,6 @@ func keygen(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer) error {
} else {
switch *cf.curve {
case "25519", "X25519", "Curve25519", "CURVE25519":
if fips140.Enforced() {
return errors.New("use of Curve25519 is not allowed in FIPS 140-only mode")
}
pub, rawPriv = x25519Keypair()
curve = cert.Curve_CURVE25519
case "P256":
-5
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package main
import (
"crypto/ecdh"
"crypto/fips140"
"crypto/rand"
"errors"
"flag"
@@ -269,10 +268,6 @@ func signCert(args []string, out io.Writer, errOut io.Writer, pr PasswordReader)
}(p11Client)
}
if fips140.Enforced() && curve == cert.Curve_CURVE25519 {
return errors.New("use of Curve25519 is not allowed in FIPS 140-only mode")
}
if *sf.inPubPath != "" {
var pubCurve cert.Curve
rawPub, err := readInput("in-pub", *sf.inPubPath, &claims)
-5
View File
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
//go:build fips140enforce
//go:debug fips140=only
package main
-131
View File
@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
package main
import (
"errors"
"flag"
"fmt"
"io/fs"
"log/slog"
"os"
"syscall"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/diag"
)
// ctlMain implements `nebula ctl <command> [args...]`, which runs a debug command against the
// nebula already running on this host. Everything after the command name is forwarded to that
// nebula verbatim and parsed there by the same flag sets the ssh console uses, so this side
// deliberately understands as little as possible about it.
//
// Returns the process exit status.
func ctlMain(argv []string) int {
fl := flag.NewFlagSet("nebula ctl", flag.ContinueOnError)
fl.Usage = func() {
out := fl.Output()
fmt.Fprintf(out, "Usage: nebula ctl [-config path] [-socket path] <command> [arguments]\n\n")
fmt.Fprintf(out, "Runs a debug command against the running nebula on this host, over its local\n")
fmt.Fprintf(out, "control socket. Run `nebula ctl` with no command for the list of commands.\n\n")
fl.PrintDefaults()
}
socket := fl.String("socket", "", "Path to the control socket. Overrides ctl.socket from the config")
configPath := fl.String("config", "", "Path to the nebula config, read only to find ctl.socket")
// The flag package stops at the first non-flag argument, which is exactly the behaviour
// wanted here: `nebula ctl -socket /x list-hostmap -json` consumes -socket, stops at
// list-hostmap, and leaves the rest untouched for the daemon to parse.
if err := fl.Parse(argv); err != nil {
// -h is a request, not a failure.
if errors.Is(err, flag.ErrHelp) {
return diag.StatusOK
}
return diag.StatusUsage
}
path := *socket
if path == "" {
path = ctlSocketPath(*configPath)
}
if path == "" {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "nebula ctl: no control socket path is known for this platform, set ctl.socket in the config")
return diag.StatusError
}
client, err := diag.Dial(path)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, ctlDialError(path, err))
return diag.StatusError
}
defer client.Close()
args := fl.Args()
status, err := client.Run(args, os.Stdout)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, diag.ErrTruncated) {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "nebula ctl: nebula closed the connection before %s finished\n", ctlCommandName(args))
return diag.StatusError
}
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "nebula ctl: %s\n", err)
if status == diag.StatusOK {
return diag.StatusError
}
}
return status
}
// ctlSocketPath finds the socket to talk to. The platform default is the primary mechanism;
// reading the config is the refinement for someone who moved the socket. It is best effort by
// design, because config.DefaultPath resolves next to the nebula binary and a packaged install
// keeps its config somewhere else entirely, so a config we cannot find is the normal case
// rather than a failure.
func ctlSocketPath(configPath string) string {
if configPath == "" {
p, err := config.DefaultPath()
if err != nil {
return diag.DefaultSocketPath()
}
configPath = p
}
c := config.NewC(slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler))
if err := c.Load(configPath); err != nil {
return diag.DefaultSocketPath()
}
return c.GetString("ctl.socket", diag.DefaultSocketPath())
}
// ctlDialError turns a connect failure into something an operator can act on. These messages
// are the entire user experience when things are not working, so they name the path and say
// what to check.
func ctlDialError(path string, err error) string {
switch {
case errors.Is(err, diag.ErrNotSupported):
return "nebula ctl is not supported on this platform yet"
case errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist):
return fmt.Sprintf("nebula ctl: no control socket at %s. Is nebula running? Is ctl.enabled set to false, or ctl.socket set to another path?", path)
case errors.Is(err, syscall.ECONNREFUSED):
return fmt.Sprintf("nebula ctl: found a stale socket at %s, nebula is not listening on it", path)
case errors.Is(err, fs.ErrPermission):
return fmt.Sprintf("nebula ctl: permission denied opening %s. nebula ctl must run as the user nebula runs as, usually root", path)
default:
return fmt.Sprintf("nebula ctl: %s", err)
}
}
// ctlCommandName names the command for an error message, for the case where there isn't one.
func ctlCommandName(args []string) string {
if len(args) == 0 {
return "the command"
}
return args[0]
}
-70
View File
@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
package main
import (
"errors"
"io/fs"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"syscall"
"testing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/diag"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// The daemon parses the command's own flags, so this side must consume its own and forward
// everything from the command name onwards untouched.
func TestCtlSocketPath(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("a config naming a socket is used", func(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "config.yml")
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, []byte("ctl:\n socket: /run/somewhere/ctl.sock\n"), 0600))
assert.Equal(t, "/run/somewhere/ctl.sock", ctlSocketPath(path))
})
t.Run("a config without a ctl block falls back to the platform default", func(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "config.yml")
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, []byte("pki:\n ca: /dev/null\n"), 0600))
assert.Equal(t, diag.DefaultSocketPath(), ctlSocketPath(path))
})
// A packaged install keeps its config somewhere config.DefaultPath will never look, so a
// config we cannot read is the ordinary case and must not be fatal.
t.Run("an unreadable config falls back to the platform default", func(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, diag.DefaultSocketPath(), ctlSocketPath(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "nope.yml")))
})
}
func TestCtlDialError(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
err error
wants string
}{
{"missing socket names the path and what to check", fs.ErrNotExist, "no control socket at /x/ctl.sock. Is nebula running?"},
{"a stale socket is called stale", syscall.ECONNREFUSED, "found a stale socket at /x/ctl.sock"},
{"permission denied suggests the right user", fs.ErrPermission, "must run as the user nebula runs as"},
{"an unsupported platform says so", diag.ErrNotSupported, "not supported on this platform"},
{"anything else is reported verbatim", errors.New("something else"), "something else"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
assert.Contains(t, ctlDialError("/x/ctl.sock", tt.err), tt.wants)
})
}
t.Run("a wrapped syscall error is still recognised", func(t *testing.T) {
err := &os.SyscallError{Syscall: "connect", Err: syscall.ECONNREFUSED}
assert.Contains(t, ctlDialError("/x/ctl.sock", err), "stale socket")
})
}
func TestCtlCommandName(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, "print-cert", ctlCommandName([]string{"print-cert", "-json"}))
assert.Equal(t, "the command", ctlCommandName(nil))
}
-5
View File
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
//go:build fips140enforce
//go:debug fips140=only
package main
-15
View File
@@ -32,26 +32,11 @@ func init() {
}
func main() {
// Subcommands are dispatched before flag.Parse, because flag.Parse stops at the first
// non-flag argument and everything after `ctl` has to reach the running nebula's own flag
// parser untouched. Nothing here looks at -json or a vpn address.
if len(os.Args) > 1 && os.Args[1] == "ctl" {
os.Exit(ctlMain(os.Args[2:]))
}
configPath := flag.String("config", "", "Path to either a file or directory to load configuration from")
configTest := flag.Bool("test", false, "Test the config and print the end result. Non zero exit indicates a faulty config")
printVersion := flag.Bool("version", false, "Print version")
printUsage := flag.Bool("help", false, "Print command line usage")
flag.Usage = func() {
out := flag.CommandLine.Output()
fmt.Fprintf(out, "Usage of %s:\n", os.Args[0])
flag.PrintDefaults()
fmt.Fprintf(out, "\nCommands:\n")
fmt.Fprintf(out, " ctl [command]\n\tRun a debug command against the running nebula on this host.\n\tRun `nebula ctl` on its own for the list of commands.\n")
}
flag.Parse()
if *printVersion {
-922
View File
@@ -1,922 +0,0 @@
package nebula
// The commands nebula exposes for debugging and administration. They are transport neutral:
// the ssh console in ssh.go and the `nebula ctl` socket in ctl.go both dispatch against the
// registry attachCommands fills in, and a command cannot tell which one invoked it. Adding a
// command here makes it available over both.
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"flag"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"maps"
"net/netip"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"runtime/pprof"
"sort"
"strconv"
"strings"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/diag"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/logging"
)
type listHostMapFlags struct {
Json bool
Pretty bool
ByIndex bool
}
type printCertFlags struct {
Json bool
Pretty bool
Raw bool
}
type printTunnelFlags struct {
Pretty bool
}
type changeRemoteFlags struct {
Address string
}
type closeTunnelFlags struct {
LocalOnly bool
}
type createTunnelFlags struct {
Address string
}
type deviceInfoFlags struct {
Json bool
Pretty bool
}
func attachCommands(l *slog.Logger, c *config.C, reg *diag.Registry, f *Interface) {
// sandboxDir defaults to a dir in temp. The intention is that end user will
// create this dir as needed. Overriding this config value to "" allows
// writing to anywhere in the system.
defaultDir := filepath.Join(os.TempDir(), "nebula-debug")
// The key is spelled for both transports now: the profile writers are reachable over
// `nebula ctl` as well, but sshd.sandbox_dir keeps working for anyone already setting it.
sandboxDir := c.GetString("ctl.sandbox_dir", c.GetString("sshd.sandbox_dir", defaultDir))
reg.RegisterCommand(&diag.Command{
Name: "list-hostmap",
ShortDescription: "List all known previously connected hosts",
Flags: func() (*flag.FlagSet, any) {
fl := flag.NewFlagSet("", flag.ContinueOnError)
s := listHostMapFlags{}
fl.BoolVar(&s.Json, "json", false, "outputs as json with more information")
fl.BoolVar(&s.Pretty, "pretty", false, "pretty prints json, assumes -json")
fl.BoolVar(&s.ByIndex, "by-index", false, "gets all hosts in the hostmap from the index table")
return fl, &s
},
Callback: func(fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
return cmdListHostMap(f.hostMap, fs, w)
},
})
reg.RegisterCommand(&diag.Command{
Name: "list-pending-hostmap",
ShortDescription: "List all handshaking hosts",
Flags: func() (*flag.FlagSet, any) {
fl := flag.NewFlagSet("", flag.ContinueOnError)
s := listHostMapFlags{}
fl.BoolVar(&s.Json, "json", false, "outputs as json with more information")
fl.BoolVar(&s.Pretty, "pretty", false, "pretty prints json, assumes -json")
fl.BoolVar(&s.ByIndex, "by-index", false, "gets all hosts in the hostmap from the index table")
return fl, &s
},
Callback: func(fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
return cmdListHostMap(f.handshakeManager, fs, w)
},
})
reg.RegisterCommand(&diag.Command{
Name: "list-lighthouse-addrmap",
ShortDescription: "List all lighthouse map entries",
Flags: func() (*flag.FlagSet, any) {
fl := flag.NewFlagSet("", flag.ContinueOnError)
s := listHostMapFlags{}
fl.BoolVar(&s.Json, "json", false, "outputs as json with more information")
fl.BoolVar(&s.Pretty, "pretty", false, "pretty prints json, assumes -json")
return fl, &s
},
Callback: func(fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
return cmdListLighthouseMap(f.lightHouse, fs, w)
},
})
reg.RegisterCommand(&diag.Command{
Name: "reload",
ShortDescription: "Reloads configuration from disk, same as sending HUP to the process",
Callback: func(fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
return cmdReload(c, w)
},
})
reg.RegisterCommand(&diag.Command{
Name: "start-cpu-profile",
ShortDescription: "Starts a cpu profile and write output to the provided file, ex: `cpu-profile.pb.gz`",
Callback: func(fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
return cmdStartCpuProfile(sandboxDir, fs, a, w)
},
})
reg.RegisterCommand(&diag.Command{
Name: "stop-cpu-profile",
ShortDescription: "Stops a cpu profile and writes output to the previously provided file",
Callback: func(fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
pprof.StopCPUProfile()
return w.WriteLine("If a CPU profile was running it is now stopped")
},
})
reg.RegisterCommand(&diag.Command{
Name: "save-heap-profile",
ShortDescription: "Saves a heap profile to the provided path, ex: `heap-profile.pb.gz`",
Callback: func(fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
return cmdGetHeapProfile(sandboxDir, fs, a, w)
},
})
reg.RegisterCommand(&diag.Command{
Name: "mutex-profile-fraction",
ShortDescription: "Gets or sets runtime.SetMutexProfileFraction",
Callback: cmdMutexProfileFraction,
})
reg.RegisterCommand(&diag.Command{
Name: "save-mutex-profile",
ShortDescription: "Saves a mutex profile to the provided path, ex: `mutex-profile.pb.gz`",
Callback: func(fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
return cmdGetMutexProfile(sandboxDir, fs, a, w)
},
})
reg.RegisterCommand(&diag.Command{
Name: "log-level",
ShortDescription: "Gets or sets the current log level",
Callback: func(fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
return cmdLogLevel(l, fs, a, w)
},
})
reg.RegisterCommand(&diag.Command{
Name: "log-format",
ShortDescription: "Gets or sets the current log format",
Callback: func(fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
return cmdLogFormat(l, fs, a, w)
},
})
reg.RegisterCommand(&diag.Command{
Name: "version",
ShortDescription: "Prints the currently running version of nebula",
Callback: func(fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
return cmdVersion(f, fs, a, w)
},
})
reg.RegisterCommand(&diag.Command{
Name: "device-info",
ShortDescription: "Prints information about the network device.",
Flags: func() (*flag.FlagSet, any) {
fl := flag.NewFlagSet("", flag.ContinueOnError)
s := deviceInfoFlags{}
fl.BoolVar(&s.Json, "json", false, "outputs as json with more information")
fl.BoolVar(&s.Pretty, "pretty", false, "pretty prints json, assumes -json")
return fl, &s
},
Callback: func(fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
return cmdDeviceInfo(f, fs, w)
},
})
reg.RegisterCommand(&diag.Command{
Name: "print-cert",
ShortDescription: "Prints the current certificate being used or the certificate for the provided vpn addr",
Flags: func() (*flag.FlagSet, any) {
fl := flag.NewFlagSet("", flag.ContinueOnError)
s := printCertFlags{}
fl.BoolVar(&s.Json, "json", false, "outputs as json")
fl.BoolVar(&s.Pretty, "pretty", false, "pretty prints json, assumes -json")
fl.BoolVar(&s.Raw, "raw", false, "raw prints the PEM encoded certificate, not compatible with -json or -pretty")
return fl, &s
},
Callback: func(fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
return cmdPrintCert(f, fs, a, w)
},
})
reg.RegisterCommand(&diag.Command{
Name: "print-tunnel",
ShortDescription: "Prints json details about a tunnel for the provided vpn addr",
Flags: func() (*flag.FlagSet, any) {
fl := flag.NewFlagSet("", flag.ContinueOnError)
s := printTunnelFlags{}
fl.BoolVar(&s.Pretty, "pretty", false, "pretty prints json")
return fl, &s
},
Callback: func(fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
return cmdPrintTunnel(f, fs, a, w)
},
})
reg.RegisterCommand(&diag.Command{
Name: "print-relays",
ShortDescription: "Prints json details about all relay info",
Flags: func() (*flag.FlagSet, any) {
fl := flag.NewFlagSet("", flag.ContinueOnError)
s := printTunnelFlags{}
fl.BoolVar(&s.Pretty, "pretty", false, "pretty prints json")
return fl, &s
},
Callback: func(fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
return cmdPrintRelays(f, fs, a, w)
},
})
reg.RegisterCommand(&diag.Command{
Name: "change-remote",
ShortDescription: "Changes the remote address used in the tunnel for the provided vpn addr",
Flags: func() (*flag.FlagSet, any) {
fl := flag.NewFlagSet("", flag.ContinueOnError)
s := changeRemoteFlags{}
fl.StringVar(&s.Address, "address", "", "The new remote address, ip:port")
return fl, &s
},
Callback: func(fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
return cmdChangeRemote(f, fs, a, w)
},
})
reg.RegisterCommand(&diag.Command{
Name: "close-tunnel",
ShortDescription: "Closes a tunnel for the provided vpn addr",
Flags: func() (*flag.FlagSet, any) {
fl := flag.NewFlagSet("", flag.ContinueOnError)
s := closeTunnelFlags{}
fl.BoolVar(&s.LocalOnly, "local-only", false, "Disables notifying the remote that the tunnel is shutting down")
return fl, &s
},
Callback: func(fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
return cmdCloseTunnel(f, fs, a, w)
},
})
reg.RegisterCommand(&diag.Command{
Name: "create-tunnel",
ShortDescription: "Creates a tunnel for the provided vpn address",
Help: "The lighthouses will be queried for real addresses but you can provide one as well.",
Flags: func() (*flag.FlagSet, any) {
fl := flag.NewFlagSet("", flag.ContinueOnError)
s := createTunnelFlags{}
fl.StringVar(&s.Address, "address", "", "Optionally provide a real remote address, ip:port ")
return fl, &s
},
Callback: func(fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
return cmdCreateTunnel(f, fs, a, w)
},
})
reg.RegisterCommand(&diag.Command{
Name: "query-lighthouse",
ShortDescription: "Query the lighthouses for the provided vpn address",
Help: "This command is asynchronous. Only currently known udp addresses will be printed.",
Callback: func(fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
return cmdQueryLighthouse(f, fs, a, w)
},
})
}
func cmdListHostMap(hl controlHostLister, a any, w diag.StringWriter) error {
fs, ok := a.(*listHostMapFlags)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("internal error: expected flags to be listHostMapFlags but was %+v", a)
}
var hm []ControlHostInfo
if fs.ByIndex {
hm = listHostMapIndexes(hl)
} else {
hm = listHostMapHosts(hl)
}
sort.Slice(hm, func(i, j int) bool {
return hm[i].VpnAddrs[0].Compare(hm[j].VpnAddrs[0]) < 0
})
if fs.Json || fs.Pretty {
js := json.NewEncoder(w.GetWriter())
if fs.Pretty {
js.SetIndent("", " ")
}
err := js.Encode(hm)
if err != nil {
return nil
}
} else {
for _, v := range hm {
err := w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("%s: %s", v.VpnAddrs, v.RemoteAddrs))
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
}
return nil
}
func cmdListLighthouseMap(lightHouse *LightHouse, a any, w diag.StringWriter) error {
fs, ok := a.(*listHostMapFlags)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("internal error: expected flags to be listHostMapFlags but was %+v", a)
}
type lighthouseInfo struct {
VpnAddr string `json:"vpnAddr"`
Addrs *CacheMap `json:"addrs"`
}
lightHouse.RLock()
addrMap := make([]lighthouseInfo, len(lightHouse.addrMap))
x := 0
for k, v := range lightHouse.addrMap {
addrMap[x] = lighthouseInfo{
VpnAddr: k.String(),
Addrs: v.CopyCache(),
}
x++
}
lightHouse.RUnlock()
sort.Slice(addrMap, func(i, j int) bool {
return strings.Compare(addrMap[i].VpnAddr, addrMap[j].VpnAddr) < 0
})
if fs.Json || fs.Pretty {
js := json.NewEncoder(w.GetWriter())
if fs.Pretty {
js.SetIndent("", " ")
}
err := js.Encode(addrMap)
if err != nil {
return nil
}
} else {
for _, v := range addrMap {
b, err := json.Marshal(v.Addrs)
if err != nil {
return err
}
err = w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("%s: %s", v.VpnAddr, string(b)))
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
}
return nil
}
// sanitizeFilePath validates that the given file path is within the sandbox directory.
// If sandboxDir is empty, the path is returned as-is for backwards compatibility.
func sanitizeFilePath(sandboxDir, filePath string) (string, error) {
if sandboxDir == "" {
return filePath, nil
}
// Clean and resolve the path relative to the sandbox directory
if !filepath.IsAbs(filePath) {
filePath = filepath.Join(sandboxDir, filePath)
}
cleaned := filepath.Clean(filePath)
// Ensure the resolved path is within the sandbox directory
cleanedSandbox := filepath.Clean(sandboxDir)
if cleaned == cleanedSandbox {
return "", fmt.Errorf("path %q resolves to the sandbox directory itself %q", filePath, sandboxDir)
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(cleaned, cleanedSandbox+string(filepath.Separator)) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("path %q is outside the sandbox directory %q", filePath, sandboxDir)
}
return cleaned, nil
}
func cmdStartCpuProfile(sandboxDir string, fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
if len(a) == 0 {
err := w.WriteLine("No path to write profile provided")
return err
}
filePath, err := sanitizeFilePath(sandboxDir, a[0])
if err != nil {
return w.WriteLine(err.Error())
}
file, err := os.Create(filePath)
if err != nil {
err = w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Unable to create profile file: %s", err))
return err
}
err = pprof.StartCPUProfile(file)
if err != nil {
err = w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Unable to start cpu profile: %s", err))
return err
}
err = w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Started cpu profile, issue stop-cpu-profile to write the output to %s", a))
return err
}
func cmdVersion(ifce *Interface, fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("%s", ifce.version))
}
func cmdQueryLighthouse(ifce *Interface, fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
if len(a) == 0 {
return w.WriteLine("No vpn address was provided")
}
vpnAddr, err := netip.ParseAddr(a[0])
if err != nil {
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("The provided vpn address could not be parsed: %s", a[0]))
}
if !vpnAddr.IsValid() {
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("The provided vpn address could not be parsed: %s", a[0]))
}
var cm *CacheMap
rl := ifce.lightHouse.Query(vpnAddr)
if rl != nil {
cm = rl.CopyCache()
}
return json.NewEncoder(w.GetWriter()).Encode(cm)
}
func cmdCloseTunnel(ifce *Interface, fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
flags, ok := fs.(*closeTunnelFlags)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("internal error: expected flags to be closeTunnelFlags but was %+v", fs)
}
if len(a) == 0 {
return w.WriteLine("No vpn address was provided")
}
vpnAddr, err := netip.ParseAddr(a[0])
if err != nil {
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("The provided vpn address could not be parsed: %s", a[0]))
}
if !vpnAddr.IsValid() {
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("The provided vpn address could not be parsed: %s", a[0]))
}
hostInfo := ifce.hostMap.QueryVpnAddr(vpnAddr)
if hostInfo == nil {
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Could not find tunnel for vpn address: %v", a[0]))
}
if !flags.LocalOnly {
ifce.send(
header.CloseTunnel,
0,
hostInfo.ConnectionState,
hostInfo,
[]byte{},
make([]byte, 12, 12),
make([]byte, mtu),
)
}
ifce.closeTunnel(hostInfo)
return w.WriteLine("Closed")
}
func cmdCreateTunnel(ifce *Interface, fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
flags, ok := fs.(*createTunnelFlags)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("internal error: expected flags to be createTunnelFlags but was %+v", fs)
}
if len(a) == 0 {
return w.WriteLine("No vpn address was provided")
}
vpnAddr, err := netip.ParseAddr(a[0])
if err != nil {
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("The provided vpn address could not be parsed: %s", a[0]))
}
if !vpnAddr.IsValid() {
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("The provided vpn address could not be parsed: %s", a[0]))
}
hostInfo := ifce.hostMap.QueryVpnAddr(vpnAddr)
if hostInfo != nil {
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Tunnel already exists"))
}
hostInfo = ifce.handshakeManager.QueryVpnAddr(vpnAddr)
if hostInfo != nil {
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Tunnel already handshaking"))
}
var addr netip.AddrPort
if flags.Address != "" {
addr, err = netip.ParseAddrPort(flags.Address)
if err != nil {
return w.WriteLine("Address could not be parsed")
}
}
hostInfo = ifce.handshakeManager.StartHandshake(vpnAddr, nil)
if addr.IsValid() {
hostInfo.SetRemote(addr)
}
return w.WriteLine("Created")
}
func cmdChangeRemote(ifce *Interface, fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
flags, ok := fs.(*changeRemoteFlags)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("internal error: expected flags to be changeRemoteFlags but was %+v", fs)
}
if len(a) == 0 {
return w.WriteLine("No vpn address was provided")
}
if flags.Address == "" {
return w.WriteLine("No address was provided")
}
addr, err := netip.ParseAddrPort(flags.Address)
if err != nil {
return w.WriteLine("Address could not be parsed")
}
vpnAddr, err := netip.ParseAddr(a[0])
if err != nil {
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("The provided vpn address could not be parsed: %s", a[0]))
}
if !vpnAddr.IsValid() {
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("The provided vpn address could not be parsed: %s", a[0]))
}
hostInfo := ifce.hostMap.QueryVpnAddr(vpnAddr)
if hostInfo == nil {
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Could not find tunnel for vpn address: %v", a[0]))
}
hostInfo.SetRemote(addr)
return w.WriteLine("Changed")
}
func cmdGetHeapProfile(sandboxDir string, fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
if len(a) == 0 {
return w.WriteLine("No path to write profile provided")
}
filePath, err := sanitizeFilePath(sandboxDir, a[0])
if err != nil {
return w.WriteLine(err.Error())
}
file, err := os.Create(filePath)
if err != nil {
err = w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Unable to create profile file: %s", err))
return err
}
err = pprof.WriteHeapProfile(file)
if err != nil {
err = w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Unable to write profile: %s", err))
return err
}
err = w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Mem profile created at %s", a))
return err
}
func cmdMutexProfileFraction(fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
if len(a) == 0 {
rate := runtime.SetMutexProfileFraction(-1)
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Current value: %d", rate))
}
newRate, err := strconv.Atoi(a[0])
if err != nil {
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Invalid argument: %s", a[0]))
}
oldRate := runtime.SetMutexProfileFraction(newRate)
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("New value: %d. Old value: %d", newRate, oldRate))
}
func cmdGetMutexProfile(sandboxDir string, fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
if len(a) == 0 {
return w.WriteLine("No path to write profile provided")
}
filePath, err := sanitizeFilePath(sandboxDir, a[0])
if err != nil {
return w.WriteLine(err.Error())
}
file, err := os.Create(filePath)
if err != nil {
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Unable to create profile file: %s", err))
}
defer file.Close()
mutexProfile := pprof.Lookup("mutex")
if mutexProfile == nil {
return w.WriteLine("Unable to get pprof.Lookup(\"mutex\")")
}
err = mutexProfile.WriteTo(file, 0)
if err != nil {
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Unable to write profile: %s", err))
}
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Mutex profile created at %s", a))
}
func cmdLogLevel(l *slog.Logger, fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
ctrl, ok := l.Handler().(interface {
GetLevel() slog.Level
SetLevel(slog.Level)
})
if !ok {
return w.WriteLine("Log level is not reconfigurable on this logger")
}
if len(a) == 0 {
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Log level is: %s", logging.LevelName(ctrl.GetLevel())))
}
level, err := logging.ParseLevel(strings.ToLower(a[0]))
if err != nil {
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Unknown log level %s. Possible log levels: trace, debug, info, warn, error", a))
}
ctrl.SetLevel(level)
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Log level is: %s", logging.LevelName(ctrl.GetLevel())))
}
func cmdLogFormat(l *slog.Logger, fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
ctrl, ok := l.Handler().(interface {
GetFormat() string
SetFormat(string) error
})
if !ok {
return w.WriteLine("Log format is not reconfigurable on this logger")
}
if len(a) == 0 {
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Log format is: %s", ctrl.GetFormat()))
}
if err := ctrl.SetFormat(strings.ToLower(a[0])); err != nil {
return err
}
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Log format is: %s", ctrl.GetFormat()))
}
func cmdPrintCert(ifce *Interface, fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
args, ok := fs.(*printCertFlags)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("internal error: expected flags to be printCertFlags but was %+v", fs)
}
cert := ifce.pki.getCertState().GetDefaultCertificate()
if len(a) > 0 {
vpnAddr, err := netip.ParseAddr(a[0])
if err != nil {
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("The provided vpn addr could not be parsed: %s", a[0]))
}
if !vpnAddr.IsValid() {
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("The provided vpn addr could not be parsed: %s", a[0]))
}
hostInfo := ifce.hostMap.QueryVpnAddr(vpnAddr)
if hostInfo == nil {
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Could not find tunnel for vpn addr: %v", a[0]))
}
cert = hostInfo.GetCert().Certificate
}
if args.Json || args.Pretty {
b, err := cert.MarshalJSON()
if err != nil {
return nil
}
if args.Pretty {
buf := new(bytes.Buffer)
err := json.Indent(buf, b, "", " ")
b = buf.Bytes()
if err != nil {
return nil
}
}
return w.WriteBytes(b)
}
if args.Raw {
b, err := cert.MarshalPEM()
if err != nil {
return nil
}
return w.WriteBytes(b)
}
return w.WriteLine(cert.String())
}
func cmdPrintRelays(ifce *Interface, fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
args, ok := fs.(*printTunnelFlags)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("internal error: expected flags to be printTunnelFlags but was %+v", fs)
}
relays := map[uint32]*HostInfo{}
ifce.hostMap.Lock()
maps.Copy(relays, ifce.hostMap.Relays)
ifce.hostMap.Unlock()
type RelayFor struct {
Error error
Type string
State string
PeerAddr netip.Addr
LocalIndex uint32
RemoteIndex uint32
RelayedThrough []netip.Addr
}
type RelayOutput struct {
NebulaAddr netip.Addr
RelayForAddrs []RelayFor
}
type CmdOutput struct {
Relays []*RelayOutput
}
co := CmdOutput{}
enc := json.NewEncoder(w.GetWriter())
if args.Pretty {
enc.SetIndent("", " ")
}
for k, v := range relays {
ro := RelayOutput{NebulaAddr: v.vpnAddrs[0]}
co.Relays = append(co.Relays, &ro)
relayHI := ifce.hostMap.QueryVpnAddr(v.vpnAddrs[0])
if relayHI == nil {
ro.RelayForAddrs = append(ro.RelayForAddrs, RelayFor{Error: errors.New("could not find hostinfo")})
continue
}
for _, vpnAddr := range relayHI.relayState.CopyRelayForIps() {
rf := RelayFor{Error: nil}
r, ok := relayHI.relayState.GetRelayForByAddr(vpnAddr)
if ok {
t := ""
switch r.Type {
case ForwardingType:
t = "forwarding"
case TerminalType:
t = "terminal"
default:
t = "unknown"
}
s := ""
switch r.State {
case Requested:
s = "requested"
case Established:
s = "established"
default:
s = "unknown"
}
rf.LocalIndex = r.LocalIndex
rf.RemoteIndex = r.RemoteIndex
rf.PeerAddr = r.PeerAddr
rf.Type = t
rf.State = s
if rf.LocalIndex != k {
rf.Error = fmt.Errorf("hostmap LocalIndex '%v' does not match RelayState LocalIndex", k)
}
}
relayedHI := ifce.hostMap.QueryVpnAddr(vpnAddr)
if relayedHI != nil {
rf.RelayedThrough = append(rf.RelayedThrough, relayedHI.relayState.CopyRelayIps()...)
}
ro.RelayForAddrs = append(ro.RelayForAddrs, rf)
}
}
err := enc.Encode(co)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func cmdPrintTunnel(ifce *Interface, fs any, a []string, w diag.StringWriter) error {
args, ok := fs.(*printTunnelFlags)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("internal error: expected flags to be printTunnelFlags but was %+v", fs)
}
if len(a) == 0 {
return w.WriteLine("No vpn address was provided")
}
vpnAddr, err := netip.ParseAddr(a[0])
if err != nil {
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("The provided vpn addr could not be parsed: %s", a[0]))
}
if !vpnAddr.IsValid() {
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("The provided vpn addr could not be parsed: %s", a[0]))
}
hostInfo := ifce.hostMap.QueryVpnAddr(vpnAddr)
if hostInfo == nil {
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Could not find tunnel for vpn addr: %v", a[0]))
}
enc := json.NewEncoder(w.GetWriter())
if args.Pretty {
enc.SetIndent("", " ")
}
return enc.Encode(copyHostInfo(hostInfo, ifce.hostMap.GetPreferredRanges()))
}
func cmdDeviceInfo(ifce *Interface, fs any, w diag.StringWriter) error {
data := struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Cidr []netip.Prefix `json:"cidr"`
}{
Name: ifce.inside.Name(),
Cidr: make([]netip.Prefix, len(ifce.inside.Networks())),
}
copy(data.Cidr, ifce.inside.Networks())
flags, ok := fs.(*deviceInfoFlags)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("internal error: expected flags to be deviceInfoFlags but was %+v", fs)
}
if flags.Json || flags.Pretty {
js := json.NewEncoder(w.GetWriter())
if flags.Pretty {
js.SetIndent("", " ")
}
return js.Encode(data)
} else {
return w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("name=%v cidr=%v", data.Name, data.Cidr))
}
}
func cmdReload(c *config.C, w diag.StringWriter) error {
err := w.WriteLine("Reloading config")
c.ReloadConfig()
return err
}
-69
View File
@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
package nebula
import (
"bytes"
"log/slog"
"testing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/diag"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// attachedCommands is every command nebula exposes. The ssh console and `nebula ctl` dispatch
// against this one set, so this list is the contract for both transports.
var attachedCommands = []string{
"change-remote",
"close-tunnel",
"create-tunnel",
"device-info",
"list-hostmap",
"list-lighthouse-addrmap",
"list-pending-hostmap",
"log-format",
"log-level",
"mutex-profile-fraction",
"print-cert",
"print-relays",
"print-tunnel",
"query-lighthouse",
"reload",
"save-heap-profile",
"save-mutex-profile",
"start-cpu-profile",
"stop-cpu-profile",
"version",
}
func TestAttachCommands(t *testing.T) {
l := slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)
reg := diag.NewRegistry()
// The callbacks capture these but do not touch them until a command runs, and this test
// only registers and asks for help.
attachCommands(l, config.NewC(l), reg, &Interface{})
t.Run("every command is registered", func(t *testing.T) {
for _, name := range attachedCommands {
assert.Equal(t, []string{name}, reg.Match(name), "%s is not registered", name)
}
})
t.Run("help is available for every command", func(t *testing.T) {
for _, name := range attachedCommands {
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
require.NoError(t, reg.DispatchArgs([]string{"help", name}, diag.NewWriter(buf)), name)
assert.Contains(t, buf.String(), name+" - ", name)
}
})
t.Run("the command list names them all", func(t *testing.T) {
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
require.NoError(t, reg.DispatchArgs(nil, diag.NewWriter(buf)))
for _, name := range attachedCommands {
assert.Contains(t, buf.String(), name+" - ", name)
}
})
}
+1 -27
View File
@@ -108,13 +108,7 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) In(h *HostInfo) {
h.markIn()
}
// OutNoRebind records outbound traffic without consuming the rebind epoch, for relayed sends: the direct path
// to the relay consumes the edge, the via send must not.
func (cm *connectionManager) OutNoRebind(h *HostInfo) {
h.markOutOnly()
}
// Out records outbound traffic and reports whether we rebound since this tunnel last sent
// Out records outbound traffic and reports whether the local network changed since this tunnel last sent.
func (cm *connectionManager) Out(h *HostInfo) bool {
return h.markOut(cm.intf.rebindEpoch.Load())
}
@@ -329,12 +323,6 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) makeTrafficDecision(localIndex uint32, now time.Tim
return closeTunnel, hostinfo, nil
}
if hostinfo.ConnectionState != nil && hostinfo.ConnectionState.messageCounter.Load() >= RejectAfterMessages {
// Send path can't encrypt a CloseTunnel notify, so just delete locally; the peer recovers via recv_error.
hostinfo.logger(cm.l).Error("Dropping tunnel, message counter is exhausted")
return deleteTunnel, hostinfo, nil
}
primary := cm.hostMap.Hosts[hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0]]
mainHostInfo := true
if primary != nil && primary != hostinfo {
@@ -460,11 +448,6 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) shouldSwapPrimary(current *HostInfo) bool {
return false
}
if current.ConnectionState.messageCounter.Load() >= RehandshakeAfterMessages {
// This tunnel is being rolled for counter exhaustion, never swap back onto its spent key.
return false
}
crt := cm.intf.pki.getCertState().getCertificate(current.ConnectionState.myCert.Version())
if crt == nil {
//my cert was reloaded away. We should definitely swap from this tunnel
@@ -561,15 +544,6 @@ func (cm *connectionManager) tryRehandshake(hostinfo *HostInfo) {
"reason", "current cert version < pki.initiatingVersion",
)
cm.intf.handshakeManager.StartHandshake(hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0], nil)
return
}
if hostinfo.ConnectionState.messageCounter.Load() >= RehandshakeAfterMessages {
cm.l.Info("Re-handshaking with remote",
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
"reason", "message counter rehandshake threshold reached",
)
cm.intf.handshakeManager.StartHandshake(hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0], nil)
return
}
-73
View File
@@ -199,79 +199,6 @@ func Test_NewConnectionManagerTest2(t *testing.T) {
assert.Contains(t, nc.hostMap.Hosts, hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0])
}
func Test_NewConnectionManager_CounterLimits(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
localrange := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.1.1.1/24")
vpnIp := netip.MustParseAddr("172.1.1.2")
preferredRanges := []netip.Prefix{localrange}
// Very incomplete mock objects
hostMap := newHostMap(l)
hostMap.preferredRanges.Store(&preferredRanges)
cs := &CertState{
initiatingVersion: cert.Version1,
privateKey: []byte{},
v1Cert: &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1},
v1Credential: nil,
}
lh := newTestLighthouse()
ifce := &Interface{
hostMap: hostMap,
inside: &overlaytest.NoopTun{},
outside: &udp.NoopConn{},
firewall: &Firewall{},
lightHouse: lh,
pki: &PKI{},
myVpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("172.1.1.1")}, // sorts below vpnIp so shouldSwapPrimary can proceed
handshakeManager: NewHandshakeManager(l, hostMap, lh, &udp.NoopConn{}, defaultHandshakeConfig),
l: l,
}
ifce.pki.cs.Store(cs)
conf := config.NewC(test.NewLogger())
punchy := NewPunchyFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf, nil)
nc := newConnectionManagerFromConfig(test.NewLogger(), conf, hostMap, punchy)
nc.intf = ifce
hostinfo := &HostInfo{
vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{vpnIp},
localIndexId: 1099,
remoteIndexId: 9901,
}
hostinfo.ConnectionState = &ConnectionState{
myCert: &dummyCert{version: cert.Version1},
}
nc.hostMap.unlockedAddHostInfo(hostinfo, ifce)
// Below the rehandshake threshold, no handshake is started
hostinfo.ConnectionState.messageCounter.Store(RehandshakeAfterMessages - 1)
nc.tryRehandshake(hostinfo)
assert.Nil(t, ifce.handshakeManager.QueryVpnAddr(vpnIp))
// A tunnel on its current cert would normally swap to primary
assert.True(t, nc.shouldSwapPrimary(hostinfo))
// At the rehandshake threshold, a new handshake is started
hostinfo.ConnectionState.messageCounter.Store(RehandshakeAfterMessages)
nc.tryRehandshake(hostinfo)
assert.NotNil(t, ifce.handshakeManager.QueryVpnAddr(vpnIp))
// An exhausted tunnel being rolled must never swap back to primary onto its spent key
assert.False(t, nc.shouldSwapPrimary(hostinfo))
// Still below the reject limit, the tunnel stays up
nc.In(hostinfo)
decision, _, _ := nc.makeTrafficDecision(hostinfo.localIndexId, time.Now())
assert.Equal(t, tryRehandshake, decision)
// At the reject limit, the tunnel is deleted locally without a doomed CloseTunnel notify
hostinfo.ConnectionState.messageCounter.Store(RejectAfterMessages)
decision, _, _ = nc.makeTrafficDecision(hostinfo.localIndexId, time.Now())
assert.Equal(t, deleteTunnel, decision)
}
func Test_NewConnectionManager_DisconnectInactive(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
localrange := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.1.1.1/24")
+8 -48
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package nebula
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
@@ -13,26 +12,7 @@ import (
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/noiseutil"
)
const (
ReplayWindow = 8192
// RehandshakeAfterMessages rolls keys inside the AES-GCM data-volume margin (~2^-36 advantage at 64KB frames).
RehandshakeAfterMessages = uint64(1) << 34
// RejectAfterMessages is the nonce ceiling enforced by noiseutil; a tunnel here is deleted locally, not notified.
RejectAfterMessages = noiseutil.RejectAfterMessages
)
// RehandshakeAfterMessages must stay below RejectAfterMessages so tunnels roll before the hard send stop.
const _ = RejectAfterMessages - RehandshakeAfterMessages
// sessionEpoch hands out a receiver-local ordinal to every ConnectionState at creation. The RX
// staging sort (overlay/batch) orders packets by (epoch, message counter). A re-handshake never
// rekeys an existing tunnel; it brings up a new hostinfo and ConnectionState with a counter space
// starting near zero, while the old tunnel keeps decrypting until torn down. During that cutover
// one flush batch can hold packets from both tunnels, and the epoch keeps the old tunnel's
// packets sorted first.
var sessionEpoch atomic.Uint64
const ReplayWindow = 1024
type ConnectionState struct {
eKey noiseutil.CipherState
@@ -44,20 +24,13 @@ type ConnectionState struct {
window *Bits
decryptLock sync.Mutex
writeLock sync.Mutex
// epoch is this session's sessionEpoch ordinal. Immutable after creation.
epoch uint64
}
// newConnectionStateFromResult builds a fully-populated ConnectionState from a
// completed handshake.Result. It seeds messageCounter and the replay window so
// that the post-handshake message indices already used on the wire don't count
// as missed traffic in the data plane.
func newConnectionStateFromResult(r *handshake.Result) (*ConnectionState, error) {
// Refuse a MessageIndex too big for the replay window: it can only be a bug, and would spin the seed loop below.
if r.MessageIndex >= ReplayWindow {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("handshake message index %d exceeds replay window", r.MessageIndex)
}
func newConnectionStateFromResult(r *handshake.Result) *ConnectionState {
ci := &ConnectionState{
myCert: r.MyCert,
initiator: r.Initiator,
@@ -65,13 +38,12 @@ func newConnectionStateFromResult(r *handshake.Result) (*ConnectionState, error)
eKey: noiseutil.NewCipherState(r.EKey, r.Cipher),
dKey: noiseutil.NewCipherState(r.DKey, r.Cipher),
window: NewBits(ReplayWindow),
epoch: sessionEpoch.Add(1),
}
ci.messageCounter.Add(r.MessageIndex)
for i := uint64(1); i <= r.MessageIndex; i++ {
ci.window.Update(nil, i)
}
return ci, nil
return ci
}
func (cs *ConnectionState) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
@@ -82,21 +54,12 @@ func (cs *ConnectionState) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
})
}
// NextMessageCounter reserves the next 1-based counter; RejectAfterMessages is the first we refuse, pinned to not wrap.
func (cs *ConnectionState) NextMessageCounter() (uint64, bool) {
c := cs.messageCounter.Add(1)
if c >= RejectAfterMessages {
cs.messageCounter.Store(RejectAfterMessages)
return c, false
}
return c, true
}
func (cs *ConnectionState) Curve() cert.Curve {
return cs.myCert.Curve()
}
func (cs *ConnectionState) Decrypt(l *slog.Logger, messageCounter uint64, packet []byte, nb []byte) ([]byte, error) {
func (cs *ConnectionState) Decrypt(l *slog.Logger, messageCounter uint64, out []byte, packet []byte, nb []byte) ([]byte, error) {
var err error
cs.decryptLock.Lock()
result := cs.window.Check(l, messageCounter)
cs.decryptLock.Unlock()
@@ -104,7 +67,7 @@ func (cs *ConnectionState) Decrypt(l *slog.Logger, messageCounter uint64, packet
return nil, ErrAlreadySeen
}
out, err := cs.dKey.DecryptDanger(packet[header.Len:header.Len], packet[:header.Len], packet[header.Len:], messageCounter, nb)
out, err = cs.dKey.DecryptDanger(out, packet[:header.Len], packet[header.Len:], messageCounter, nb)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -118,6 +81,7 @@ func (cs *ConnectionState) Decrypt(l *slog.Logger, messageCounter uint64, packet
return out, nil
}
// VerifyRelay verifies AEAD protected (but not encrypted) relay frames. packet must be length-checked by the caller.
func (cs *ConnectionState) VerifyRelay(l *slog.Logger, messageCounter uint64, packet []byte, nb []byte) error {
cs.decryptLock.Lock()
result := cs.window.Check(l, messageCounter)
@@ -126,11 +90,6 @@ func (cs *ConnectionState) VerifyRelay(l *slog.Logger, messageCounter uint64, pa
return ErrAlreadySeen
}
// The entire body is sent as AD, not encrypted.
// The packet consists of a 16-byte parsed Nebula header, Associated Data-protected payload, and a trailing 16-byte AEAD signature value.
// The packet is guaranteed to be at least 16 bytes at this point, b/c it got past the h.Parse() call above. If it's
// otherwise malformed (meaning, there is no trailing 16 byte AEAD value), then this will result in at worst a 0-length slice
// which will gracefully fail in the DecryptDanger call.
signedPayload := packet[:len(packet)-cs.dKey.Overhead()]
signatureValue := packet[len(packet)-cs.dKey.Overhead():]
_, err := cs.dKey.DecryptDanger(nil, signedPayload, signatureValue, messageCounter, nb)
@@ -144,5 +103,6 @@ func (cs *ConnectionState) VerifyRelay(l *slog.Logger, messageCounter uint64, pa
if !result {
return ErrAlreadySeen
}
return nil
}
+2 -80
View File
@@ -6,13 +6,10 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
ct "github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
@@ -82,77 +79,11 @@ func runTestHandshake(t *testing.T) (initR, respR *handshake.Result) {
return initR, respR
}
func TestConnectionState_NextMessageCounter(t *testing.T) {
cs := &ConnectionState{}
cs.messageCounter.Store(RejectAfterMessages - 2)
c, ok := cs.NextMessageCounter()
assert.True(t, ok)
assert.Equal(t, RejectAfterMessages-1, c)
// Hitting the limit refuses and pins the counter there
c, ok = cs.NextMessageCounter()
assert.False(t, ok)
assert.Equal(t, RejectAfterMessages, c)
assert.Equal(t, RejectAfterMessages, cs.messageCounter.Load())
// Continued send attempts stay refused and the counter never wraps
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
_, ok = cs.NextMessageCounter()
assert.False(t, ok)
}
assert.Equal(t, RejectAfterMessages, cs.messageCounter.Load())
}
// TestSendNoMetricsDropsExhausted drives the send path to the exhausted drop; metric and out flag prove it.
func TestSendNoMetricsDropsExhausted(t *testing.T) {
initR, _ := runTestHandshake(t)
ci, err := newConnectionStateFromResult(initR)
require.NoError(t, err)
ci.messageCounter.Store(RejectAfterMessages - 1)
f := &Interface{l: test.NewLogger(), messageMetrics: &MessageMetrics{txExhausted: metrics.NewCounter()}}
hostinfo := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.1")}, ConnectionState: ci}
f.sendNoMetrics(header.Message, 0, ci, hostinfo, netip.AddrPort{}, []byte{}, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu), 0)
// The crossing send is refused: it records an exhaustion drop and never reaches connectionManager.Out.
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), f.messageMetrics.txExhausted.Count())
assert.False(t, hostinfo.sentSinceCheck())
}
// TestSendNoMetricsCloseTunnelKeepsRebindEpoch pins that a closing tunnel does not consume a rebind, a later
// packet on a re-established tunnel still needs that edge to trigger the far-side punch.
func TestSendNoMetricsCloseTunnelKeepsRebindEpoch(t *testing.T) {
initR, _ := runTestHandshake(t)
ci, err := newConnectionStateFromResult(initR)
require.NoError(t, err)
f := &Interface{
l: test.NewLogger(),
messageMetrics: &MessageMetrics{txExhausted: metrics.NewCounter()},
writers: []udp.Conn{udp.NoopConn{}},
connectionManager: &connectionManager{},
}
hostinfo := &HostInfo{vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.1")}, ConnectionState: ci}
// Tunnel is on epoch 0, then we rebind.
hostinfo.markOut(0)
f.rebindEpoch.Add(1)
remote := netip.MustParseAddrPort("10.0.0.2:4242")
f.sendNoMetrics(header.CloseTunnel, 0, ci, hostinfo, remote, []byte{}, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu), 0)
// markOut at the new epoch still reports the move, so the edge was preserved.
assert.True(t, hostinfo.markOut(1), "a CloseTunnel send must not consume the rebind epoch")
}
func TestNewConnectionStateFromResult(t *testing.T) {
initR, respR := runTestHandshake(t)
t.Run("initiator", func(t *testing.T) {
ci, err := newConnectionStateFromResult(initR)
require.NoError(t, err)
ci := newConnectionStateFromResult(initR)
assert.True(t, ci.initiator)
assert.Equal(t, initR.MyCert, ci.myCert)
assert.Equal(t, initR.RemoteCert, ci.peerCert)
@@ -171,17 +102,8 @@ func TestNewConnectionStateFromResult(t *testing.T) {
assert.True(t, ci.window.Check(nil, 3), "counter 3 must not be pre-seeded")
})
t.Run("message index too large is refused", func(t *testing.T) {
bad := *initR
bad.MessageIndex = ReplayWindow
ci, err := newConnectionStateFromResult(&bad)
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Nil(t, ci)
})
t.Run("responder", func(t *testing.T) {
ci, err := newConnectionStateFromResult(respR)
require.NoError(t, err)
ci := newConnectionStateFromResult(respR)
assert.False(t, ci.initiator)
assert.Equal(t, respR.MyCert, ci.myCert)
assert.Equal(t, respR.RemoteCert, ci.peerCert)
+1 -5
View File
@@ -50,7 +50,6 @@ type Control struct {
ctx context.Context
cancel context.CancelFunc
sshStart func()
ctlStart func()
statsStart func()
dnsStart func()
lighthouseStart func()
@@ -100,9 +99,6 @@ func (c *Control) Start() error {
if c.sshStart != nil {
go c.sshStart()
}
if c.ctlStart != nil {
go c.ctlStart()
}
if c.statsStart != nil {
go c.statsStart()
}
@@ -119,7 +115,7 @@ func (c *Control) Start() error {
c.lighthouseStart()
}
c.f.triggerShutdown = func() { go c.Stop() }
c.f.triggerShutdown = c.Stop
// Start reading packets.
c.f.run()
+23 -40
View File
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@ import (
"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/batch"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
@@ -32,9 +30,9 @@ func newFakeDevice() *fakeDevice {
// Read blocks until Close like a real tun with no traffic, then reports EOF
// the same way a closed device does
func (d *fakeDevice) Read() ([]tio.Packet, error) {
func (d *fakeDevice) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
<-d.closedCh
return nil, io.EOF
return 0, io.EOF
}
func (d *fakeDevice) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return len(p), nil }
@@ -51,8 +49,10 @@ func (d *fakeDevice) Activate() error { return nil }
func (d *fakeDevice) Networks() []netip.Prefix { return nil }
func (d *fakeDevice) Name() string { return "fake" }
func (d *fakeDevice) RoutesFor(netip.Addr) routing.Gateways { return nil }
func (d *fakeDevice) Queues(int) ([]tio.Queue, error) { return []tio.Queue{d}, nil }
func (d *fakeDevice) SupportsMultiqueue() bool { return false }
func (d *fakeDevice) NewMultiQueueReader() (io.ReadWriteCloser, error) {
return nil, errors.New("unsupported")
}
// newReadyControl hand-builds the minimum Control that Main would have
// produced right before Start, including the construction token NewInterface
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ func newReadyControl(t *testing.T) (*Control, *fakeDevice, *fakeConn) {
inside: dev,
outside: conn,
writers: []udp.Conn{conn},
batchers: make([]*batch.MultiCoalescer, 1),
readers: make([]io.ReadWriteCloser, 1),
routines: 1,
hostMap: newHostMap(l),
lightHouse: lh,
@@ -109,8 +109,7 @@ func TestControl_StopBeforeStart(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t, c.Wait())
// A stopped control can never be started
err := c.Start()
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAlreadyStopped)
require.ErrorIs(t, c.Start(), ErrAlreadyStopped)
// A second Stop is a harmless no-op
c.Stop()
@@ -144,29 +143,19 @@ type fakeConn struct {
rebinds int
}
func (c *fakeConn) Rebind() error { c.rebinds++; return nil }
func (c *fakeConn) LocalAddr() (netip.AddrPort, error) { return netip.AddrPort{}, nil }
func (c *fakeConn) ListenOut(_ udp.EncReader, _ func()) error { return nil }
func (c *fakeConn) WriteTo(_ []byte, _ netip.AddrPort) error { return nil }
func (c *fakeConn) WriteBatch(bufs [][]byte, _ []netip.AddrPort) (int, error) {
return len(bufs), nil
}
func (c *fakeConn) ReloadConfig(_ *config.C) {}
func (c *fakeConn) SupportsMultipleReaders() bool { return true }
func (c *fakeConn) Close() error { c.closed = true; return nil }
func (c *fakeConn) Rebind() error { c.rebinds++; return nil }
func (c *fakeConn) LocalAddr() (netip.AddrPort, error) { return netip.AddrPort{}, nil }
func (c *fakeConn) ListenOut(_ udp.EncReader) error { return nil }
func (c *fakeConn) WriteTo(_ []byte, _ netip.AddrPort) error { return nil }
func (c *fakeConn) ReloadConfig(_ *config.C) {}
func (c *fakeConn) SupportsMultipleReaders() bool { return true }
func (c *fakeConn) Close() error { c.closed = true; return nil }
type multiqueueDevice struct {
*fakeDevice
}
// Queues claims multiqueue support but fails to open the second queue,
// exercising the activation error path.
func (d *multiqueueDevice) Queues(n int) ([]tio.Queue, error) {
if n > 1 {
return nil, errors.New("second queue failed to open")
}
return d.fakeDevice.Queues(n)
}
func (d *multiqueueDevice) SupportsMultiqueue() bool { return true }
func TestControl_StartMultiqueueFailureReleases(t *testing.T) {
dev := &multiqueueDevice{fakeDevice: newFakeDevice()}
@@ -177,7 +166,7 @@ func TestControl_StartMultiqueueFailureReleases(t *testing.T) {
inside: dev,
outside: conn,
writers: []udp.Conn{conn},
batchers: make([]*batch.MultiCoalescer, 2),
readers: make([]io.ReadWriteCloser, 2),
routines: 2,
l: test.NewLogger(),
}
@@ -192,8 +181,7 @@ func TestControl_StartMultiqueueFailureReleases(t *testing.T) {
}
// The second reader fails to open, everything must be released
err := c.Start()
require.Error(t, err)
require.Error(t, c.Start())
assert.Equal(t, StateStopped, c.State())
assert.True(t, dev.closed, "the tun device should have been closed")
assert.True(t, conn.closed, "the udp socket should have been closed")
@@ -263,18 +251,15 @@ func TestControl_ConcurrentStopAndStart(t *testing.T) {
// panic and Wait must observe the final state
require.NoError(t, c.Wait())
assert.Equal(t, StateStopped, c.State())
err := c.Start()
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAlreadyStopped)
require.ErrorIs(t, c.Start(), ErrAlreadyStopped)
}
func TestControl_StartStopLifecycle(t *testing.T) {
c, dev, conn := newReadyControl(t)
err := c.Start()
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, c.Start())
assert.Equal(t, StateStarted, c.State())
err = c.Start()
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAlreadyStarted)
require.ErrorIs(t, c.Start(), ErrAlreadyStarted)
// Stop must unpark the reader blocked in the device and release everything
c.Stop()
@@ -285,8 +270,7 @@ func TestControl_StartStopLifecycle(t *testing.T) {
// The reader drained off a closed device, that is not a fatal error
require.NoError(t, c.Wait())
err = c.Start()
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrAlreadyStopped)
require.ErrorIs(t, c.Start(), ErrAlreadyStopped)
}
func TestControl_RebindIsGatedByState(t *testing.T) {
@@ -296,8 +280,7 @@ func TestControl_RebindIsGatedByState(t *testing.T) {
c.RebindUDPServer()
assert.Equal(t, 0, conn.rebinds, "rebind before start must be a no-op")
err := c.Start()
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, c.Start())
c.RebindUDPServer()
assert.Equal(t, 1, conn.rebinds, "rebind while started must reach the conn")
-10
View File
@@ -123,16 +123,6 @@ func (c *Control) SetLocalAddrsFn(fn func(*LocalAllowList) []netip.Addr) {
c.f.lightHouse.localAddrsFn = fn
}
// GetRebindEpochFor returns the rebind epoch a tunnel last sent under, so a test can tell whether a send
// consumed the epoch edge without having to infer it from lighthouse traffic.
func (c *Control) GetRebindEpochFor(vpnAddr netip.Addr) (uint32, bool) {
h := c.f.hostMap.QueryVpnAddr(vpnAddr)
if h == nil {
return 0, false
}
return h.state.Load() >> stateEpochShift, true
}
func (c *Control) KillPendingTunnel(vpnIp netip.Addr) bool {
hostinfo := c.f.handshakeManager.QueryVpnAddr(vpnIp)
if hostinfo == nil {
-187
View File
@@ -1,187 +0,0 @@
// Package cpupick chooses which CPUs the tun reader threads pin to when the
// operator has not chosen for us (tun.cpu_affinity). The stock spread —
// allowed[i] for routine i — has two failure modes this package exists to fix:
//
// - every co-located nebula starts its spread at allowed[0], so N instances
// on one box stack their readers onto the same cores, and allowed[0] is
// usually CPU 0, the core housekeeping and default IRQ affinity already
// favor;
// - on heterogeneous CPUs (ARM big.LITTLE, Intel P/E hybrids, AMD compact
// cores) low IDs are not necessarily fast cores, and pinning an encrypt
// thread to an efficiency core caps that queue's throughput.
//
// Default instead returns a preference-ordered pin list: the allowed set
// filtered to performance cores (when the platform distinguishes them and
// enough remain for every routine), confined to a single NUMA node and spread
// across distinct physical cores when the topology permits, CPU 0's physical
// core demoted to last resort, and the order rotated by a stable per-instance
// key so co-located instances spread instead of stacking.
package cpupick
import (
"log/slog"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
)
// topology is the slice of machine layout arrange consults: the NUMA node
// and the physical core behind each candidate CPU, plus which core CPU 0
// lives on (zeroCore, -1 when unknown — tracked separately because CPU 0's
// SMT sibling deserves demotion even when CPU 0 itself isn't a candidate).
// Probed from sysfs on Linux; flatTopology stands in when the platform can't
// say, which turns every topology rule into a no-op rather than a wrong
// answer.
type topology struct {
nodeOf map[int]int
coreOf map[int]int
zeroCore int
}
// flatTopology places every CPU on node 0 and on a physical core of its own.
func flatTopology(cpus []int) topology {
t := topology{
nodeOf: make(map[int]int, len(cpus)),
coreOf: make(map[int]int, len(cpus)),
zeroCore: -1,
}
for i, c := range cpus {
t.nodeOf[c] = 0
t.coreOf[c] = i
if c == 0 {
t.zeroCore = i
}
}
return t
}
// Default computes the pin order for `routines` tun readers. key is any
// stable per-instance value; the bound UDP port is ideal — distinct across
// co-located instances, stable across restarts so benchmark runs stay
// comparable. Returns nil when there is nothing useful to say (no affinity
// support on this platform, lookup failure); callers keep their existing
// fallback spread.
func Default(routines int, key uint64, l *slog.Logger) []int {
allowed, err := util.AllowedCPUs()
if err != nil || len(allowed) == 0 {
return nil
}
perf, signal := perfCPUs(allowed)
cands := pickCandidates(allowed, perf, routines)
if len(cands) == 0 {
return nil
}
if len(perf) < routines {
signal = ""
}
cpus := arrange(cands, readTopology(cands), routines, splitmix64(key))
if l != nil {
l.Info("chose default pin CPUs for tun readers",
"cpus", cpus[:min(routines, len(cpus))],
"perfSignal", signal)
}
return cpus
}
// pickCandidates applies the enough-for-everyone guard: a perf filter that
// leaves fewer candidates than routines is discarded — giving every reader
// its own (possibly slow) core beats stacking two readers on a fast one.
func pickCandidates(allowed, perf []int, routines int) []int {
if len(perf) < routines {
return allowed
}
return perf
}
// arrange turns the candidate set into the final pin order:
//
// 1. NUMA: when at least one node holds enough candidates for every
// routine, confine to one such node, chosen by the instance hash. The
// readers share hostmap and cipher state, so splitting one instance
// across nodes taxes every packet — and co-located instances that hash
// to different nodes stop competing entirely. When no node is big
// enough, span nodes rather than stack readers.
// 2. Rotate the preferred candidates by the hash so instances spread.
// 3. SMT: emit one thread per physical core before any of their siblings —
// two encrypt threads on one core split its execution units. Siblings
// still follow for the routines > cores case.
// 4. CPU 0's whole physical core goes last: housekeeping and default IRQ
// noise on CPU 0 bleeds into its SMT sibling too. Within that tail the
// sibling precedes CPU 0 itself, which only catches the bleed-through.
//
// The rotation happens before the SMT pass so each instance's one-per-core
// walk also starts at a different core, and CPU 0's core is excluded from
// the rotation so no hash value can put it back at the front.
func arrange(cands []int, topo topology, routines int, h uint64) []int {
byNode := map[int][]int{}
var nodes []int
for _, c := range cands {
n := topo.nodeOf[c]
if _, ok := byNode[n]; !ok {
nodes = append(nodes, n)
}
byNode[n] = append(byNode[n], c)
}
var eligible []int
for _, n := range nodes {
if len(byNode[n]) >= routines {
eligible = append(eligible, n)
}
}
if len(eligible) > 0 {
cands = byNode[eligible[int(h%uint64(len(eligible)))]]
}
// Split off CPU 0's core: its siblings tail the list, CPU 0 tails them.
preferred := make([]int, 0, len(cands))
var zeroTail []int
hasZero := false
for _, c := range cands {
switch {
case c == 0:
hasZero = true
case topo.zeroCore >= 0 && topo.coreOf[c] == topo.zeroCore:
zeroTail = append(zeroTail, c)
default:
preferred = append(preferred, c)
}
}
if hasZero {
zeroTail = append(zeroTail, 0)
}
if len(preferred) == 0 {
return zeroTail // CPU 0's core is all we have
}
// The node pick consumed the low hash bits; rotate by the high ones so
// the two choices stay independent.
off := int((h >> 32) % uint64(len(preferred)))
rot := make([]int, 0, len(preferred))
rot = append(rot, preferred[off:]...)
rot = append(rot, preferred[:off]...)
seenCore := make(map[int]bool, len(rot))
out := make([]int, 0, len(cands))
var siblings []int
for _, c := range rot {
g := topo.coreOf[c]
if seenCore[g] {
siblings = append(siblings, c)
continue
}
seenCore[g] = true
out = append(out, c)
}
out = append(out, siblings...)
out = append(out, zeroTail...)
return out
}
// splitmix64 decorrelates instance keys before the selection modulos: ports
// on one box often share spacing (4242/4243, or round steps like +1000) that
// raw key%len arithmetic would fold onto the same offset.
func splitmix64(x uint64) uint64 {
x += 0x9e3779b97f4a7c15
x = (x ^ (x >> 30)) * 0xbf58476d1ce4e5b9
x = (x ^ (x >> 27)) * 0x94d049bb133111eb
return x ^ (x >> 31)
}
-171
View File
@@ -1,171 +0,0 @@
package cpupick
import (
"slices"
"testing"
)
// pairTopo builds a topology where consecutive candidate pairs are SMT
// siblings: (cpus[0],cpus[1]) share a core, (cpus[2],cpus[3]) the next, ...
// All CPUs land on node 0.
func pairTopo(cpus []int) topology {
t := topology{
nodeOf: make(map[int]int, len(cpus)),
coreOf: make(map[int]int, len(cpus)),
zeroCore: -1,
}
for i, c := range cpus {
t.nodeOf[c] = 0
t.coreOf[c] = i / 2
if c == 0 {
t.zeroCore = i / 2
}
}
return t
}
func TestArrangeDemotesZeroForEveryKey(t *testing.T) {
candidates := []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}
for key := range uint64(64) {
got := arrange(candidates, flatTopology(candidates), 4, splitmix64(key))
if len(got) != len(candidates) {
t.Fatalf("key %d: len=%d want %d", key, len(got), len(candidates))
}
if got[0] == 0 {
t.Errorf("key %d: CPU 0 at the front: %v", key, got)
}
if got[len(got)-1] != 0 {
t.Errorf("key %d: CPU 0 not demoted to last: %v", key, got)
}
sorted := slices.Clone(got)
slices.Sort(sorted)
if !slices.Equal(sorted, candidates) {
t.Errorf("key %d: not a permutation: %v", key, got)
}
}
}
func TestArrangeDemotesZeroSiblings(t *testing.T) {
// Pairs (0,1),(2,3),(4,5),(6,7): CPU 0's core — 0 and its sibling 1 —
// must tail the list, sibling ahead of 0 itself.
candidates := []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}
for key := range uint64(64) {
got := arrange(candidates, pairTopo(candidates), 2, splitmix64(key))
n := len(got)
if got[n-1] != 0 || got[n-2] != 1 {
t.Fatalf("key %d: tail = %v, want [... 1 0]", key, got)
}
}
}
func TestArrangeZeroSiblingWithoutZero(t *testing.T) {
// CPU 0 excluded (cpuset) but its sibling 1 remains: the sibling still
// tails the list when the topology knows which core CPU 0 lives on.
candidates := []int{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
topo := pairTopo([]int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5})
got := arrange(candidates, topo, 2, splitmix64(7))
if got[len(got)-1] != 1 {
t.Errorf("CPU 0's sibling not demoted: %v", got)
}
}
func TestArrangeRotatesByKey(t *testing.T) {
candidates := []int{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}
seen := map[int]bool{}
for key := range uint64(64) {
seen[arrange(candidates, flatTopology(candidates), 4, splitmix64(key))[0]] = true
}
// 64 hashed keys over 8 slots must hit more than one starting CPU, or
// co-located instances would all stack again.
if len(seen) < 2 {
t.Errorf("rotation never varied across keys: %v", seen)
}
}
func TestArrangeStableForSameKey(t *testing.T) {
candidates := []int{0, 2, 4, 6}
topo := flatTopology(candidates)
a := arrange(candidates, topo, 2, splitmix64(4242))
b := arrange(candidates, topo, 2, splitmix64(4242))
if !slices.Equal(a, b) {
t.Errorf("same key ordered differently: %v vs %v", a, b)
}
}
func TestArrangeZeroOnly(t *testing.T) {
if got := arrange([]int{0}, flatTopology([]int{0}), 1, splitmix64(7)); !slices.Equal(got, []int{0}) {
t.Errorf("sole CPU 0 must survive: %v", got)
}
}
func TestArrangeSMTSiblingsLast(t *testing.T) {
// Pairs (1,2),(3,4),(5,6),(7,8): the first four picks must cover four
// distinct physical cores before any sibling repeats.
candidates := []int{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}
topo := pairTopo(candidates)
for key := range uint64(16) {
got := arrange(candidates, topo, 4, splitmix64(key))
seen := map[int]bool{}
for _, c := range got[:4] {
g := topo.coreOf[c]
if seen[g] {
t.Fatalf("key %d: sibling before all cores covered: %v", key, got)
}
seen[g] = true
}
}
}
func TestArrangeNUMAConfinesToOneNode(t *testing.T) {
// Two nodes of four; both fit routines=3, so the result must sit
// entirely inside one of them, and the hash must pick both across keys.
candidates := []int{1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 13}
topo := flatTopology(candidates)
for _, c := range []int{10, 11, 12, 13} {
topo.nodeOf[c] = 1
}
nodesSeen := map[int]bool{}
for key := range uint64(32) {
got := arrange(candidates, topo, 3, splitmix64(key))
if len(got) != 4 {
t.Fatalf("key %d: not confined to one node: %v", key, got)
}
n := topo.nodeOf[got[0]]
for _, c := range got {
if topo.nodeOf[c] != n {
t.Fatalf("key %d: spans nodes: %v", key, got)
}
}
nodesSeen[n] = true
}
if len(nodesSeen) != 2 {
t.Errorf("hash never spread instances across nodes: %v", nodesSeen)
}
}
func TestArrangeNUMASpansWhenNoNodeFits(t *testing.T) {
candidates := []int{1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 13}
topo := flatTopology(candidates)
for _, c := range []int{10, 11, 12, 13} {
topo.nodeOf[c] = 1
}
got := arrange(candidates, topo, 6, splitmix64(1))
if len(got) != len(candidates) {
t.Errorf("undersized nodes must span, got %v", got)
}
}
func TestPickCandidates(t *testing.T) {
allowed := []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}
perf := []int{4, 5}
// Enough perf cores for every routine: only they are used.
if got := pickCandidates(allowed, perf, 2); !slices.Equal(got, perf) {
t.Errorf("perf filter not applied: %v", got)
}
// Perf filter too small for the routine count: discarded, everyone
// gets their own core from the full allowed set.
if got := pickCandidates(allowed, perf, 4); !slices.Equal(got, allowed) {
t.Errorf("undersized perf filter not discarded: %v", got)
}
}
-154
View File
@@ -1,154 +0,0 @@
//go:build linux
package cpupick
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strconv"
"strings"
)
// capacityKeepPct is the cpu_capacity admission threshold, relative to the
// fastest allowed core. LITTLE cores are normalized to ~250-400 of the big
// core's 1024 while mid cores sit at ~75%+, so half of max separates little
// from the rest without splitting prime from mid on three-tier parts.
const capacityKeepPct = 50
// freqKeepPct is the cpuinfo_max_freq admission threshold. Favored-core
// turbo skew is 2-4% and ARM mid-vs-prime ~12%, while E-cores, LITTLE
// cores, and AMD compact cores all sit >= 20% below their siblings' max.
const freqKeepPct = 85
// perfCPUs partitions allowed into the subset that are "performance" cores,
// consulting (in order of authority):
//
// 1. cpu_capacity — arch_topology's normalized per-CPU capacity, exposed on
// arm/arm64/riscv; the scheduler's own view of big vs LITTLE.
// 2. /sys/devices/cpu_core/cpus — the Intel hybrid P-core PMU mask, present
// only on P/E parts (x86 has no cpu_capacity) and naming P cores outright.
// 3. cpuinfo_max_freq — the cross-vendor fallback; catches AMD compact
// cores, which neither of the above covers.
//
// Returns allowed unchanged (signal "") when nothing distinguishes the
// cores: homogeneous parts, VMs without cpufreq, sysfs unavailable.
func perfCPUs(allowed []int) ([]int, string) {
return perfCPUsFrom("/sys/devices/system/cpu", "/sys/devices/cpu_core/cpus", allowed)
}
func perfCPUsFrom(cpuDir, intelCoreMask string, allowed []int) ([]int, string) {
if cpus, ok := byPerCPUValue(cpuDir, "cpu_capacity", allowed, capacityKeepPct); ok {
return cpus, "cpu_capacity"
}
if cpus, ok := byIntelCoreMask(intelCoreMask, allowed); ok {
return cpus, "intel_core_pmu"
}
if cpus, ok := byPerCPUValue(cpuDir, "cpufreq/cpuinfo_max_freq", allowed, freqKeepPct); ok {
return cpus, "max_freq"
}
return allowed, ""
}
// byPerCPUValue keeps the allowed CPUs whose per-CPU sysfs value is at least
// keepPct percent of the maximum across allowed. Inconclusive (ok=false)
// when any CPU is missing the file or when every value is equal.
func byPerCPUValue(cpuDir, file string, allowed []int, keepPct int) ([]int, bool) {
vals := make([]int, len(allowed))
minV, maxV := 0, 0
for i, cpu := range allowed {
v, err := readIntFile(filepath.Join(cpuDir, fmt.Sprintf("cpu%d", cpu), file))
if err != nil {
return nil, false
}
vals[i] = v
if i == 0 || v < minV {
minV = v
}
if v > maxV {
maxV = v
}
}
if minV == maxV {
return nil, false // homogeneous by this signal; try the next one
}
keep := make([]int, 0, len(allowed))
for i, cpu := range allowed {
if vals[i]*100 >= maxV*keepPct {
keep = append(keep, cpu)
}
}
return keep, true
}
// byIntelCoreMask keeps the allowed CPUs named by the hybrid P-core PMU
// mask. Inconclusive when the file is absent (non-hybrid x86, other arches)
// or no allowed CPU is in the mask (the process was deliberately confined
// to E-cores; nothing useful to prefer within that).
func byIntelCoreMask(maskPath string, allowed []int) ([]int, bool) {
b, err := os.ReadFile(maskPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, false
}
set, err := parseCPUList(strings.TrimSpace(string(b)))
if err != nil || len(set) == 0 {
return nil, false
}
pcore := make(map[int]bool, len(set))
for _, c := range set {
pcore[c] = true
}
keep := make([]int, 0, len(allowed))
for _, cpu := range allowed {
if pcore[cpu] {
keep = append(keep, cpu)
}
}
if len(keep) == 0 {
return nil, false
}
return keep, true
}
// parseCPUList decodes the kernel's cpulist format ("0-7,16-23", "3") into
// individual CPU IDs. Empty input yields an empty list.
func parseCPUList(s string) ([]int, error) {
if s == "" {
return nil, nil
}
var out []int
for part := range strings.SplitSeq(s, ",") {
part = strings.TrimSpace(part)
if part == "" {
continue
}
lo, hi, isRange := strings.Cut(part, "-")
a, err := strconv.Atoi(lo)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("bad cpulist entry %q: %w", part, err)
}
if !isRange {
out = append(out, a)
continue
}
b, err := strconv.Atoi(hi)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("bad cpulist entry %q: %w", part, err)
}
if b < a || b-a > 8192 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("bad cpulist range %q", part)
}
for v := a; v <= b; v++ {
out = append(out, v)
}
}
return out, nil
}
func readIntFile(path string) (int, error) {
b, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
return strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(string(b)))
}
-163
View File
@@ -1,163 +0,0 @@
//go:build linux
package cpupick
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"slices"
"testing"
)
// fakeSysfs builds a cpuDir tree with the given per-CPU file values.
// A nil map for a file means "file absent on every CPU".
func fakeSysfs(t *testing.T, capacity, maxFreq map[int]int) string {
t.Helper()
dir := t.TempDir()
write := func(cpu int, rel string, v int) {
p := filepath.Join(dir, fmt.Sprintf("cpu%d", cpu), rel)
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(p), 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(p, fmt.Appendf(nil, "%d\n", v), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
for cpu, v := range capacity {
write(cpu, "cpu_capacity", v)
}
for cpu, v := range maxFreq {
write(cpu, "cpufreq/cpuinfo_max_freq", v)
}
return dir
}
func writeCoreMask(t *testing.T, mask string) string {
t.Helper()
p := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "cpus")
if err := os.WriteFile(p, []byte(mask+"\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return p
}
func TestPerfCPUsBigLittleCapacity(t *testing.T) {
// 4 big (1024) + 4 LITTLE (~290): capacity is authoritative on ARM.
dir := fakeSysfs(t, map[int]int{
0: 1024, 1: 1024, 2: 1024, 3: 1024,
4: 290, 5: 290, 6: 290, 7: 290,
}, nil)
got, signal := perfCPUsFrom(dir, filepath.Join(dir, "nope"), []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7})
if signal != "cpu_capacity" {
t.Fatalf("signal = %q", signal)
}
if !slices.Equal(got, []int{0, 1, 2, 3}) {
t.Errorf("got %v", got)
}
}
func TestPerfCPUsThreeTierKeepsMid(t *testing.T) {
// prime (1024) + mid (~780) + little (~280): 50% keeps prime+mid.
dir := fakeSysfs(t, map[int]int{
0: 280, 1: 280, 2: 280, 3: 280,
4: 780, 5: 780, 6: 780,
7: 1024,
}, nil)
got, _ := perfCPUsFrom(dir, filepath.Join(dir, "nope"), []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7})
if !slices.Equal(got, []int{4, 5, 6, 7}) {
t.Errorf("got %v", got)
}
}
func TestPerfCPUsIntelHybridMask(t *testing.T) {
// No cpu_capacity on x86; the P-core PMU mask decides.
dir := fakeSysfs(t, nil, nil)
mask := writeCoreMask(t, "0-7")
got, signal := perfCPUsFrom(dir, mask, []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11})
if signal != "intel_core_pmu" {
t.Fatalf("signal = %q", signal)
}
if !slices.Equal(got, []int{0, 1, 2, 3}) {
t.Errorf("got %v", got)
}
}
func TestPerfCPUsIntelMaskDisjointFallsThrough(t *testing.T) {
// Confined to E-cores only: the mask can't help, and equal freqs below
// mean nothing else distinguishes them either -> allowed unchanged.
dir := fakeSysfs(t, nil, map[int]int{8: 4300000, 9: 4300000})
mask := writeCoreMask(t, "0-7")
got, signal := perfCPUsFrom(dir, mask, []int{8, 9})
if signal != "" || !slices.Equal(got, []int{8, 9}) {
t.Errorf("got %v signal %q", got, signal)
}
}
func TestPerfCPUsMaxFreqCompactCores(t *testing.T) {
// AMD-style compact cores: no capacity, no Intel mask; 3.3 vs 5.7 GHz.
dir := fakeSysfs(t, nil, map[int]int{
0: 5700000, 1: 5700000, 2: 3300000, 3: 3300000,
})
got, signal := perfCPUsFrom(dir, filepath.Join(dir, "nope"), []int{0, 1, 2, 3})
if signal != "max_freq" {
t.Fatalf("signal = %q", signal)
}
if !slices.Equal(got, []int{0, 1}) {
t.Errorf("got %v", got)
}
}
func TestPerfCPUsFavoredCoreSkewKept(t *testing.T) {
// Turbo Boost Max favored cores run a few percent hot; they must not
// shrink the candidate set to one or two cores.
dir := fakeSysfs(t, nil, map[int]int{
0: 5800000, 1: 5700000, 2: 5700000, 3: 5600000,
})
got, _ := perfCPUsFrom(dir, filepath.Join(dir, "nope"), []int{0, 1, 2, 3})
if !slices.Equal(got, []int{0, 1, 2, 3}) {
t.Errorf("favored-core skew filtered CPUs: %v", got)
}
}
func TestPerfCPUsHomogeneousInconclusive(t *testing.T) {
dir := fakeSysfs(t, nil, map[int]int{0: 3000000, 1: 3000000})
got, signal := perfCPUsFrom(dir, filepath.Join(dir, "nope"), []int{0, 1})
if signal != "" || !slices.Equal(got, []int{0, 1}) {
t.Errorf("got %v signal %q", got, signal)
}
}
func TestPerfCPUsNoSysfs(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
got, signal := perfCPUsFrom(dir, filepath.Join(dir, "nope"), []int{0, 1, 2})
if signal != "" || !slices.Equal(got, []int{0, 1, 2}) {
t.Errorf("got %v signal %q", got, signal)
}
}
func TestParseCPUList(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
in string
want []int
wantErr bool
}{
{"0-3", []int{0, 1, 2, 3}, false},
{"0-1,16-17", []int{0, 1, 16, 17}, false},
{"5", []int{5}, false},
{"", nil, false},
{"3-1", nil, true},
{"a-b", nil, true},
{"1,x", nil, true},
}
for _, c := range cases {
got, err := parseCPUList(c.in)
if (err != nil) != c.wantErr {
t.Errorf("%q: err=%v wantErr=%v", c.in, err, c.wantErr)
continue
}
if !c.wantErr && !slices.Equal(got, c.want) {
t.Errorf("%q: got %v want %v", c.in, got, c.want)
}
}
}
-10
View File
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
//go:build !linux
package cpupick
// perfCPUs is Linux-only sysfs walking; elsewhere report "no distinction".
// Default already returns nil off-Linux (util.AllowedCPUs has no answer
// there), so this exists to keep the package compiling everywhere.
func perfCPUs(allowed []int) ([]int, string) {
return allowed, ""
}
-118
View File
@@ -1,118 +0,0 @@
//go:build linux
package cpupick
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strconv"
"strings"
)
// readTopology probes the NUMA node and physical-core layout of cpus from
// sysfs. Anything sysfs won't say degrades toward flatTopology: an unknown
// node becomes node 0, an unknown core becomes a core of its own — either
// way the corresponding arrange rule becomes a no-op instead of a wrong
// answer.
func readTopology(cpus []int) topology {
return readTopologyFrom("/sys/devices/system/node", "/sys/devices/system/cpu", cpus)
}
func readTopologyFrom(nodeDir, cpuDir string, cpus []int) topology {
coreOf, zeroCore := coreGroups(cpuDir, cpus)
return topology{
nodeOf: numaNodes(nodeDir, cpus),
coreOf: coreOf,
zeroCore: zeroCore,
}
}
// numaNodes maps each cpu to its NUMA node via
// /sys/devices/system/node/nodeN/cpulist. CPUs no node claims (or no node
// dirs at all: VMs, non-NUMA kernels) land on node 0.
func numaNodes(nodeDir string, cpus []int) map[int]int {
out := make(map[int]int, len(cpus))
for _, c := range cpus {
out[c] = 0
}
entries, err := os.ReadDir(nodeDir)
if err != nil {
return out
}
want := make(map[int]bool, len(cpus))
for _, c := range cpus {
want[c] = true
}
for _, e := range entries {
id, ok := strings.CutPrefix(e.Name(), "node")
if !ok {
continue
}
n, err := strconv.Atoi(id)
if err != nil {
continue // has_cpu, possible, ... share the prefix
}
b, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(nodeDir, e.Name(), "cpulist"))
if err != nil {
continue
}
list, err := parseCPUList(strings.TrimSpace(string(b)))
if err != nil {
continue
}
for _, c := range list {
if want[c] {
out[c] = n
}
}
}
return out
}
// coreGroups maps each cpu to a dense physical-core id derived from its
// (physical_package_id, core_id) pair — core_id alone repeats across
// sockets. CPUs whose topology files are unreadable get a core of their own.
// The second return is the group id of the core CPU 0 lives on, or -1 when
// that can't be determined; CPU 0's own files are consulted even when 0 is
// not a candidate, so its SMT siblings are recognized under cpusets that
// exclude CPU 0 itself.
func coreGroups(cpuDir string, cpus []int) (map[int]int, int) {
type pkgCore struct{ pkg, core int }
pairOf := func(cpu int) (pkgCore, bool) {
topoDir := filepath.Join(cpuDir, fmt.Sprintf("cpu%d", cpu), "topology")
pkg, err1 := readIntFile(filepath.Join(topoDir, "physical_package_id"))
core, err2 := readIntFile(filepath.Join(topoDir, "core_id"))
if err1 != nil || err2 != nil {
return pkgCore{}, false
}
return pkgCore{pkg, core}, true
}
ids := map[pkgCore]int{}
out := make(map[int]int, len(cpus))
next := 0
for _, cpu := range cpus {
k, ok := pairOf(cpu)
if !ok {
out[cpu] = next
next++
continue
}
id, ok := ids[k]
if !ok {
id = next
next++
ids[k] = id
}
out[cpu] = id
}
zeroCore := -1
if k, ok := pairOf(0); ok {
if id, ok := ids[k]; ok {
zeroCore = id
}
}
return out, zeroCore
}
-111
View File
@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
//go:build linux
package cpupick
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
)
// fakeTopoSysfs builds nodeDir/cpuDir trees. nodes maps node id -> cpulist
// string; cores maps cpu -> (package, core) pair.
func fakeTopoSysfs(t *testing.T, nodes map[int]string, cores map[int][2]int) (string, string) {
t.Helper()
base := t.TempDir()
nodeDir := filepath.Join(base, "node")
cpuDir := filepath.Join(base, "cpu")
for n, list := range nodes {
d := filepath.Join(nodeDir, fmt.Sprintf("node%d", n))
if err := os.MkdirAll(d, 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(d, "cpulist"), []byte(list+"\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
for cpu, pc := range cores {
d := filepath.Join(cpuDir, fmt.Sprintf("cpu%d", cpu), "topology")
if err := os.MkdirAll(d, 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(d, "physical_package_id"), fmt.Appendf(nil, "%d\n", pc[0]), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(d, "core_id"), fmt.Appendf(nil, "%d\n", pc[1]), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
return nodeDir, cpuDir
}
func TestReadTopology(t *testing.T) {
// Two nodes; SMT pairs (0,4),(1,5) on node 0 and (2,6),(3,7) on node 1.
// core_id repeats across packages on purpose: the pair must disambiguate.
nodeDir, cpuDir := fakeTopoSysfs(t,
map[int]string{0: "0-1,4-5", 1: "2-3,6-7"},
map[int][2]int{
0: {0, 0}, 4: {0, 0}, 1: {0, 1}, 5: {0, 1},
2: {1, 0}, 6: {1, 0}, 3: {1, 1}, 7: {1, 1},
})
cpus := []int{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}
topo := readTopologyFrom(nodeDir, cpuDir, cpus)
for _, c := range []int{0, 1, 4, 5} {
if topo.nodeOf[c] != 0 {
t.Errorf("cpu %d on node %d, want 0", c, topo.nodeOf[c])
}
}
for _, c := range []int{2, 3, 6, 7} {
if topo.nodeOf[c] != 1 {
t.Errorf("cpu %d on node %d, want 1", c, topo.nodeOf[c])
}
}
pairs := [][2]int{{0, 4}, {1, 5}, {2, 6}, {3, 7}}
for _, p := range pairs {
if topo.coreOf[p[0]] != topo.coreOf[p[1]] {
t.Errorf("siblings %v not grouped: %d vs %d", p, topo.coreOf[p[0]], topo.coreOf[p[1]])
}
}
if topo.coreOf[0] == topo.coreOf[2] {
t.Error("cross-package cores with equal core_id must not merge")
}
if topo.zeroCore != topo.coreOf[0] {
t.Errorf("zeroCore = %d, want %d", topo.zeroCore, topo.coreOf[0])
}
}
func TestReadTopologyZeroCoreWithoutZeroCandidate(t *testing.T) {
// CPU 0 is not a candidate (cpuset excludes it) but its sibling 4 is:
// zeroCore must still identify their shared core.
nodeDir, cpuDir := fakeTopoSysfs(t,
map[int]string{0: "0-7"},
map[int][2]int{0: {0, 0}, 4: {0, 0}, 1: {0, 1}, 5: {0, 1}})
topo := readTopologyFrom(nodeDir, cpuDir, []int{1, 4, 5})
if topo.zeroCore < 0 || topo.coreOf[4] != topo.zeroCore {
t.Errorf("zeroCore = %d, coreOf[4] = %d; sibling of CPU 0 not identified", topo.zeroCore, topo.coreOf[4])
}
if topo.coreOf[1] == topo.zeroCore {
t.Error("cpu 1 wrongly grouped with CPU 0's core")
}
}
func TestReadTopologyMissingSysfs(t *testing.T) {
base := t.TempDir()
cpus := []int{0, 1, 2}
topo := readTopologyFrom(filepath.Join(base, "nope"), filepath.Join(base, "also-nope"), cpus)
seen := map[int]bool{}
for _, c := range cpus {
if topo.nodeOf[c] != 0 {
t.Errorf("cpu %d node = %d, want 0", c, topo.nodeOf[c])
}
if seen[topo.coreOf[c]] {
t.Errorf("cpu %d shares a fallback core group", c)
}
seen[topo.coreOf[c]] = true
}
if topo.zeroCore != -1 {
t.Errorf("zeroCore = %d, want -1 when unknown", topo.zeroCore)
}
}
-10
View File
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
//go:build !linux
package cpupick
// readTopology has no sysfs to consult off Linux; the flat stand-in makes
// arrange's NUMA and SMT rules no-ops. Default is already nil off Linux
// (util.AllowedCPUs has no answer there) — this keeps the package compiling.
func readTopology(cpus []int) topology {
return flatTopology(cpus)
}
-234
View File
@@ -1,234 +0,0 @@
package nebula
import (
"context"
"errors"
"log/slog"
"net"
"path/filepath"
"sync"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/diag"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
)
// ctlConfig is the parsed form of the `ctl` config block. It is comparable so that a reload
// can tell "nothing changed" from "the socket moved" with ==.
type ctlConfig struct {
enabled bool
socket string
// explicit records that the operator named a socket path rather than taking the platform
// default. It only affects how loudly a failure to listen is reported: an unprivileged
// nebula that cannot create /run/nebula is a normal deployment, not a problem to shout
// about on every upgrade, but a path someone chose deliberately failing to bind is.
explicit bool
}
// ctlServer owns the unix socket `nebula ctl` connects to. It exposes the same command
// registry the ssh console does, minus the ceremony of running an ssh server: the socket is
// local only and guarded by filesystem permissions, so it needs no keys.
//
// The lifecycle mirrors statsServer: the constructor wires the reload callback, reload
// records config and reconciles a running listener, Start builds and serves the runtime, and
// Stop tears it down.
type ctlServer struct {
l *slog.Logger
ctx context.Context
srv *diag.Server
runMu sync.Mutex
runCfg *ctlConfig
run *ctlRuntime
}
// ctlRuntime is the live state owned by a single Start invocation.
type ctlRuntime struct {
cancel context.CancelFunc
listener net.Listener
}
// newCtlServerFromConfig builds a ctlServer, parses the config, and registers a reload
// callback. It deliberately does not start listening: there is no interface yet, and
// Control.Start is what launches the first runtime. The callback is registered before the
// config is parsed so a SIGHUP can fix a bad block even if the first parse failed.
//
// reg is only held, never read, until Start runs. That is what lets this be constructed
// before attachCommands has populated the registry.
func newCtlServerFromConfig(ctx context.Context, l *slog.Logger, c *config.C, reg *diag.Registry) (*ctlServer, error) {
s := &ctlServer{
l: l,
ctx: ctx,
srv: diag.NewServer(l, reg),
}
c.RegisterReloadCallback(func(c *config.C) {
if err := s.reload(c, false); err != nil {
s.l.Error("Failed to reload ctl from config", "error", err)
}
})
if err := s.reload(c, true); err != nil {
return s, err
}
return s, nil
}
// loadCtlConfig parses and validates the `ctl` block. An empty socket path while enabled is
// not an error: it means the platform has no default and the operator did not name one, so
// there is simply nothing to listen on.
func loadCtlConfig(c *config.C) (ctlConfig, error) {
cfg := ctlConfig{
enabled: c.GetBool("ctl.enabled", true),
socket: c.GetString("ctl.socket", diag.DefaultSocketPath()),
explicit: c.IsSet("ctl.socket"),
}
if cfg.enabled && cfg.socket != "" && !filepath.IsAbs(cfg.socket) {
return cfg, util.NewContextualError("ctl.socket must be an absolute path", m{"path": cfg.socket}, nil)
}
return cfg, nil
}
// reload parses the config and records it, then reconciles the running listener against it:
//
// - newly enabled -> spawn Start
// - newly disabled -> Stop the runtime
// - socket moved (still enabled) -> Stop the old, Start the new
// - no change -> no-op
//
// On the initial call it only records configuration; Control.Start is what launches the first
// runtime via ctlStart. There is no interface to serve yet at that point.
func (s *ctlServer) reload(c *config.C, initial bool) error {
newCfg, err := loadCtlConfig(c)
if err != nil {
return err
}
s.runMu.Lock()
sameCfg := s.runCfg != nil && *s.runCfg == newCfg
s.runCfg = &newCfg
running := s.run != nil
s.runMu.Unlock()
if initial || sameCfg {
return nil
}
if running {
s.Stop()
}
if newCfg.enabled && newCfg.socket != "" {
go s.Start()
}
return nil
}
// Start binds the socket and serves until Stop is called or ctx fires. Safe to call when ctl
// is disabled or already running: both no-op.
func (s *ctlServer) Start() {
s.runMu.Lock()
if s.ctx.Err() != nil || s.run != nil || s.runCfg == nil {
s.runMu.Unlock()
return
}
cfg := *s.runCfg
s.runMu.Unlock()
if !cfg.enabled || cfg.socket == "" {
if cfg.enabled {
s.l.Info("ctl has no socket path on this platform, `nebula ctl` will not be available",
"hint", "set ctl.socket to enable it",
)
}
return
}
listener, err := diag.Listen(cfg.socket)
if err != nil {
// A default path nebula cannot create is an ordinary state for an unprivileged
// install; a path the operator chose failing to bind is something they want to know
// about. Either way ctl is optional and nebula carries on without it.
if cfg.explicit {
s.l.Error("Failed to listen on the ctl socket", "ctlSocket", cfg.socket, "error", err)
} else {
s.l.Info("Not serving the ctl socket, `nebula ctl` will not be available",
"ctlSocket", cfg.socket,
"error", err,
"hint", "set ctl.socket to a path nebula can write, or ctl.enabled to false",
)
}
// Drop the cached config so a SIGHUP retries once the underlying problem is fixed,
// even when the config itself is unchanged.
s.runMu.Lock()
if s.runCfg != nil && *s.runCfg == cfg {
s.runCfg = nil
}
s.runMu.Unlock()
return
}
runCtx, cancel := context.WithCancel(s.ctx)
rt := &ctlRuntime{cancel: cancel, listener: listener}
s.runMu.Lock()
// Losing the race against a Stop or a competing Start means this listener is already
// obsolete. Close it rather than serving a socket nobody will tear down.
if s.ctx.Err() != nil || s.run != nil {
s.runMu.Unlock()
cancel()
_ = listener.Close()
return
}
s.run = rt
s.runMu.Unlock()
s.l.Info("ctl socket is listening", "ctlSocket", cfg.socket)
err = s.srv.Serve(runCtx, listener)
if err != nil {
s.l.Error("The ctl listener stopped", "ctlSocket", cfg.socket, "error", err)
}
// Clear our runtime only if nothing has replaced it.
s.runMu.Lock()
if s.run == rt {
rt.cancel()
s.run = nil
if err != nil {
// An unclean exit leaves runCfg cached as if it were applied, so drop it and let a
// SIGHUP retry.
s.runCfg = nil
}
}
s.runMu.Unlock()
}
// Stop closes the listener and unlinks the socket. It deliberately does not touch connections
// that are already being served: `nebula ctl reload` runs every reload callback inline on its
// own connection, including this one, and hanging up on it would truncate the response to a
// reload that actually succeeded.
//
// The socket file is removed by net.UnixListener's unlink-on-close, so there is no os.Remove
// here; doing it by hand would delete a successor's socket after a fast reload.
func (s *ctlServer) Stop() {
s.runMu.Lock()
rt := s.run
s.run = nil
s.runMu.Unlock()
if rt == nil {
return
}
rt.cancel()
if err := rt.listener.Close(); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, net.ErrClosed) {
s.l.Warn("Failed to close the ctl listener", "error", err)
}
}
-305
View File
@@ -1,305 +0,0 @@
//go:build !windows
package nebula
import (
"context"
"log/slog"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/diag"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func newTestCtlServer(t *testing.T) (*ctlServer, *config.C) {
t.Helper()
l := slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
t.Cleanup(cancel)
return &ctlServer{
l: l,
ctx: ctx,
srv: diag.NewServer(l, diag.NewRegistry()),
}, config.NewC(l)
}
func setCtlConfig(c *config.C, m map[string]any) {
c.Settings["ctl"] = m
}
func currentCtlRuntime(s *ctlServer) *ctlRuntime {
s.runMu.Lock()
defer s.runMu.Unlock()
return s.run
}
// testCtlSocket returns a short socket path, see the note in diag/server_test.go about
// sun_path on darwin.
func testCtlSocket(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
dir, err := os.MkdirTemp("/tmp", "nebctl")
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(dir) })
return filepath.Join(dir, "ctl.sock")
}
func startCtl(t *testing.T, s *ctlServer) chan struct{} {
t.Helper()
done := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
s.Start()
close(done)
}()
return done
}
func requireCtlStopped(t *testing.T, done chan struct{}) {
t.Helper()
select {
case <-done:
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("ctl Start did not return after Stop")
}
}
func TestCtlServer_loadConfig(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("defaults to enabled at the platform path", func(t *testing.T) {
_, c := newTestCtlServer(t)
cfg, err := loadCtlConfig(c)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, cfg.enabled)
assert.Equal(t, diag.DefaultSocketPath(), cfg.socket)
assert.False(t, cfg.explicit)
})
t.Run("an operator chosen path is recorded as explicit", func(t *testing.T) {
_, c := newTestCtlServer(t)
setCtlConfig(c, map[string]any{"socket": "/run/somewhere/ctl.sock"})
cfg, err := loadCtlConfig(c)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "/run/somewhere/ctl.sock", cfg.socket)
assert.True(t, cfg.explicit)
})
t.Run("a relative path is rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
_, c := newTestCtlServer(t)
setCtlConfig(c, map[string]any{"socket": "ctl.sock"})
_, err := loadCtlConfig(c)
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "must be an absolute path")
})
t.Run("a relative path is not rejected when ctl is off", func(t *testing.T) {
_, c := newTestCtlServer(t)
setCtlConfig(c, map[string]any{"enabled": false, "socket": "ctl.sock"})
_, err := loadCtlConfig(c)
assert.NoError(t, err)
})
}
func TestCtlServer_reload(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("the initial reload records config without listening", func(t *testing.T) {
s, c := newTestCtlServer(t)
setCtlConfig(c, map[string]any{"socket": testCtlSocket(t)})
require.NoError(t, s.reload(c, true))
assert.Nil(t, currentCtlRuntime(s), "Control.Start is what starts listening")
})
t.Run("enabling on reload starts listening", func(t *testing.T) {
s, c := newTestCtlServer(t)
path := testCtlSocket(t)
setCtlConfig(c, map[string]any{"enabled": false, "socket": path})
require.NoError(t, s.reload(c, true))
setCtlConfig(c, map[string]any{"enabled": true, "socket": path})
require.NoError(t, s.reload(c, false))
waitFor(t, func() bool { return currentCtlRuntime(s) != nil })
assert.FileExists(t, path)
s.Stop()
})
t.Run("disabling on reload stops listening and unlinks", func(t *testing.T) {
s, c := newTestCtlServer(t)
path := testCtlSocket(t)
setCtlConfig(c, map[string]any{"enabled": true, "socket": path})
require.NoError(t, s.reload(c, true))
done := startCtl(t, s)
waitFor(t, func() bool { return currentCtlRuntime(s) != nil })
setCtlConfig(c, map[string]any{"enabled": false, "socket": path})
require.NoError(t, s.reload(c, false))
requireCtlStopped(t, done)
assert.Nil(t, currentCtlRuntime(s))
assert.NoFileExists(t, path)
})
t.Run("moving the socket restarts at the new path", func(t *testing.T) {
s, c := newTestCtlServer(t)
oldPath := testCtlSocket(t)
newPath := testCtlSocket(t)
setCtlConfig(c, map[string]any{"socket": oldPath})
require.NoError(t, s.reload(c, true))
done := startCtl(t, s)
waitFor(t, func() bool { return currentCtlRuntime(s) != nil })
require.FileExists(t, oldPath)
setCtlConfig(c, map[string]any{"socket": newPath})
require.NoError(t, s.reload(c, false))
requireCtlStopped(t, done)
waitFor(t, func() bool { return currentCtlRuntime(s) != nil })
assert.FileExists(t, newPath)
assert.NoFileExists(t, oldPath, "the old socket should have been unlinked")
s.Stop()
})
t.Run("an unchanged config leaves the listener alone", func(t *testing.T) {
s, c := newTestCtlServer(t)
setCtlConfig(c, map[string]any{"socket": testCtlSocket(t)})
require.NoError(t, s.reload(c, true))
startCtl(t, s)
waitFor(t, func() bool { return currentCtlRuntime(s) != nil })
before := currentCtlRuntime(s)
require.NoError(t, s.reload(c, false))
assert.Same(t, before, currentCtlRuntime(s), "the runtime should not have been replaced")
s.Stop()
})
}
func TestCtlServer_Start(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("a command can be run over the socket", func(t *testing.T) {
l := slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
t.Cleanup(cancel)
reg := diag.NewRegistry()
s := &ctlServer{l: l, ctx: ctx, srv: diag.NewServer(l, reg)}
c := config.NewC(l)
path := testCtlSocket(t)
setCtlConfig(c, map[string]any{"socket": path})
require.NoError(t, s.reload(c, true))
startCtl(t, s)
waitFor(t, func() bool { return currentCtlRuntime(s) != nil })
client, err := diag.Dial(path)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer client.Close()
out := &testWriter{}
status, err := client.Run([]string{"help"}, out)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, diag.StatusOK, status)
assert.Contains(t, out.String(), "Available commands:")
s.Stop()
})
t.Run("Start is a no-op when ctl is disabled", func(t *testing.T) {
s, c := newTestCtlServer(t)
setCtlConfig(c, map[string]any{"enabled": false, "socket": testCtlSocket(t)})
require.NoError(t, s.reload(c, true))
s.Start()
assert.Nil(t, currentCtlRuntime(s))
})
t.Run("Start is a no-op with no socket path for this platform", func(t *testing.T) {
s, c := newTestCtlServer(t)
setCtlConfig(c, map[string]any{"enabled": true, "socket": ""})
require.NoError(t, s.reload(c, true))
s.Start()
assert.Nil(t, currentCtlRuntime(s))
})
t.Run("Start is a no-op after the context is cancelled", func(t *testing.T) {
l := slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
s := &ctlServer{l: l, ctx: ctx, srv: diag.NewServer(l, diag.NewRegistry())}
c := config.NewC(l)
path := testCtlSocket(t)
setCtlConfig(c, map[string]any{"socket": path})
require.NoError(t, s.reload(c, true))
cancel()
s.Start()
assert.Nil(t, currentCtlRuntime(s))
assert.NoFileExists(t, path)
})
// A path nebula cannot bind must not stop it from running, and a SIGHUP with the same
// config has to be able to retry once the problem is fixed.
t.Run("a listen failure is survivable and retried on the next reload", func(t *testing.T) {
s, c := newTestCtlServer(t)
path := testCtlSocket(t)
require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0700))
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, []byte("in the way"), 0600))
setCtlConfig(c, map[string]any{"socket": path})
require.NoError(t, s.reload(c, true))
s.Start()
assert.Nil(t, currentCtlRuntime(s))
s.runMu.Lock()
cachedCfg := s.runCfg
s.runMu.Unlock()
assert.Nil(t, cachedCfg, "the cached config should be dropped so a reload retries")
require.NoError(t, os.Remove(path))
require.NoError(t, s.reload(c, false))
waitFor(t, func() bool { return currentCtlRuntime(s) != nil })
s.Stop()
})
t.Run("Stop is idempotent", func(t *testing.T) {
s, c := newTestCtlServer(t)
setCtlConfig(c, map[string]any{"socket": testCtlSocket(t)})
require.NoError(t, s.reload(c, true))
done := startCtl(t, s)
waitFor(t, func() bool { return currentCtlRuntime(s) != nil })
s.Stop()
requireCtlStopped(t, done)
assert.NotPanics(t, s.Stop)
})
}
// testWriter collects command output.
type testWriter struct{ b []byte }
func (w *testWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
w.b = append(w.b, p...)
return len(p), nil
}
func (w *testWriter) String() string { return string(w.b) }
-41
View File
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
package diag
import (
"bufio"
"io"
"net"
"time"
)
// dialTimeout bounds the connect only. A command may take as long as it likes to answer.
const dialTimeout = 2 * time.Second
// Client is a connection to a nebula serving the ctl socket. It carries exactly one command.
type Client struct {
conn net.Conn
}
// Dial connects to the nebula serving at path. On a platform without socket support the
// returned error wraps ErrNotSupported.
func Dial(path string) (*Client, error) {
conn, err := dialSocket(path, dialTimeout)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &Client{conn: conn}, nil
}
// Run sends args and streams the command's output to out, returning the command's exit
// status. A non-nil error means the exchange itself failed and the status means nothing.
func (c *Client) Run(args []string, out io.Writer) (int, error) {
if err := writeRequest(c.conn, args); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
return readResponse(bufio.NewReader(c.conn), out)
}
func (c *Client) Close() error {
return c.conn.Close()
}
-226
View File
@@ -1,226 +0,0 @@
package diag
import (
"bufio"
"encoding/binary"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
)
// The ctl protocol is one request, one response, one connection.
//
// The request is a single JSON line. argv travels as a list rather than a joined string so
// that a path with a space in it survives the trip; the client already has a real argv from
// the operating system and re-splitting it would only ever lose information.
//
// The response is a stream of frames rather than raw bytes followed by a status line,
// because there is no sentinel that is safe to look for: `print-cert -raw` emits arbitrary
// PEM and `list-hostmap -json` emits arbitrary JSON, either of which could contain whatever
// terminator we picked.
const (
// ProtoVersion is the only request version this build understands. An unknown version
// gets a legible error rather than a hang, which is the whole point of sending it.
ProtoVersion = 1
// frameOutput carries raw command output, destined for the client's stdout.
frameOutput = 0x01
// frameEnd carries a JSON endPayload and is the last frame on a connection.
frameEnd = 0x02
// frameStderr is reserved. Commands write to a single writer today, so there is nothing
// to put in it, but holding the number means adding one later needs no version bump.
frameStderr = 0x03
// maxFrame bounds a single frame's payload. Larger writes are split across frames.
maxFrame = 64 * 1024
// maxRequest bounds the request line, so a client that never sends a newline cannot make
// nebula buffer without limit.
maxRequest = 64 * 1024
// outputBuffer is what keeps json.NewEncoder(w.GetWriter()) from emitting a frame per
// token; output accumulates here and flushes in useful sized chunks.
outputBuffer = 32 * 1024
)
// ErrTruncated means the connection ended before the end frame arrived, which is how a
// client notices that nebula died or was torn down partway through a command.
var ErrTruncated = errors.New("connection closed before the command finished")
// request is the JSON line a client sends.
type request struct {
Version int `json:"version"`
Args []string `json:"args"`
}
// endPayload is the JSON body of the end frame. Error is set only when Status is non-zero
// and describes a failure to run the command, not a failure the command itself reported.
type endPayload struct {
Status int `json:"status"`
Error string `json:"error,omitempty"`
}
// writeRequest sends the request line.
func writeRequest(w io.Writer, args []string) error {
b, err := json.Marshal(request{Version: ProtoVersion, Args: args})
if err != nil {
return err
}
if len(b)+1 > maxRequest {
return fmt.Errorf("command line is too long: %d bytes", len(b))
}
_, err = w.Write(append(b, '\n'))
return err
}
// readRequest reads and validates one request line.
func readRequest(r *bufio.Reader) (request, error) {
var req request
line, err := readLimitedLine(r, maxRequest)
if err != nil {
return req, err
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(line, &req); err != nil {
return req, fmt.Errorf("malformed request: %w", err)
}
if req.Version != ProtoVersion {
return req, fmt.Errorf("unsupported protocol version %d, this nebula speaks version %d", req.Version, ProtoVersion)
}
return req, nil
}
// readLimitedLine reads through the next newline, refusing a line longer than limit rather
// than buffering whatever an unfriendly client decides to send.
func readLimitedLine(r *bufio.Reader, limit int) ([]byte, error) {
line := make([]byte, 0, 256)
for {
b, err := r.ReadByte()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if b == '\n' {
return line, nil
}
if len(line) >= limit {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("request exceeded %d bytes without a newline", limit)
}
line = append(line, b)
}
}
// frameWriter turns writes into output frames. It is handed to commands wrapped in a
// bufio.Writer, so a command that makes many small writes does not make many small frames.
type frameWriter struct {
w io.Writer
}
func (f *frameWriter) Write(b []byte) (int, error) {
written := 0
for {
chunk := b[written:]
if len(chunk) > maxFrame {
chunk = chunk[:maxFrame]
}
if err := writeFrame(f.w, frameOutput, chunk); err != nil {
return written, err
}
written += len(chunk)
if written == len(b) {
return written, nil
}
}
}
// writeFrame emits one frame: a type byte, a big endian length, then the payload.
func writeFrame(w io.Writer, kind byte, payload []byte) error {
var hdr [5]byte
hdr[0] = kind
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(hdr[1:], uint32(len(payload)))
if _, err := w.Write(hdr[:]); err != nil {
return err
}
if len(payload) == 0 {
return nil
}
_, err := w.Write(payload)
return err
}
// writeEnd emits the final frame. A transport error here is unreportable by definition, the
// connection is the only channel we have.
func writeEnd(w io.Writer, status int, msg string) error {
b, err := json.Marshal(endPayload{Status: status, Error: msg})
if err != nil {
return err
}
return writeFrame(w, frameEnd, b)
}
// readResponse consumes frames until the end frame, copying output to out. It returns the
// command's exit status. A non-nil error means the exchange failed and the status is
// meaningless.
func readResponse(r io.Reader, out io.Writer) (int, error) {
var hdr [5]byte
for {
if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, hdr[:]); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, io.EOF) || errors.Is(err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) {
return 0, ErrTruncated
}
return 0, err
}
length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(hdr[1:])
if length > maxFrame {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("frame of %d bytes exceeds the %d byte maximum", length, maxFrame)
}
payload := make([]byte, length)
if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, payload); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, io.EOF) || errors.Is(err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) {
return 0, ErrTruncated
}
return 0, err
}
switch hdr[0] {
case frameOutput:
if _, err := out.Write(payload); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
case frameEnd:
var end endPayload
if err := json.Unmarshal(payload, &end); err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("malformed end frame: %w", err)
}
if end.Error != "" {
return end.Status, errors.New(end.Error)
}
return end.Status, nil
case frameStderr:
// Reserved and unused by this build. Skipping rather than failing means an older
// client stays usable against a newer nebula that starts sending them.
default:
return 0, fmt.Errorf("unknown frame type 0x%02x", hdr[0])
}
}
}
-144
View File
@@ -1,144 +0,0 @@
package diag
import (
"bufio"
"bytes"
"encoding/binary"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestRequestRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("argv survives a round trip, spaces and all", func(t *testing.T) {
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
args := []string{"start-cpu-profile", "/tmp/a path.pb.gz", "-json"}
require.NoError(t, writeRequest(buf, args))
req, err := readRequest(bufio.NewReader(buf))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, ProtoVersion, req.Version)
assert.Equal(t, args, req.Args)
})
t.Run("an unknown version is refused by name", func(t *testing.T) {
r := bufio.NewReader(strings.NewReader(`{"version":99,"args":["version"]}` + "\n"))
_, err := readRequest(r)
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "unsupported protocol version 99")
})
t.Run("malformed json is refused", func(t *testing.T) {
r := bufio.NewReader(strings.NewReader("not json\n"))
_, err := readRequest(r)
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "malformed request")
})
t.Run("a line without a newline is bounded rather than buffered forever", func(t *testing.T) {
r := bufio.NewReader(strings.NewReader(strings.Repeat("a", maxRequest+10)))
_, err := readRequest(r)
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "without a newline")
})
}
func TestResponseRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("output and status survive a round trip", func(t *testing.T) {
wire := &bytes.Buffer{}
w := bufio.NewWriterSize(&frameWriter{w: wire}, outputBuffer)
require.NoError(t, NewWriter(w).WriteLine("hello"))
require.NoError(t, w.Flush())
require.NoError(t, writeEnd(wire, StatusOK, ""))
out := &bytes.Buffer{}
status, err := readResponse(wire, out)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, StatusOK, status)
assert.Equal(t, "hello\n", out.String())
})
// print-cert -raw and list-hostmap -json both emit arbitrary bytes, so a payload larger
// than one frame has to reassemble exactly.
t.Run("a payload larger than one frame reassembles byte for byte", func(t *testing.T) {
big := bytes.Repeat([]byte("nebula"), maxFrame)
wire := &bytes.Buffer{}
fw := &frameWriter{w: wire}
n, err := fw.Write(big)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, len(big), n)
require.NoError(t, writeEnd(wire, StatusOK, ""))
out := &bytes.Buffer{}
status, err := readResponse(wire, out)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, StatusOK, status)
assert.Equal(t, big, out.Bytes())
})
t.Run("a non-zero status carries its message", func(t *testing.T) {
wire := &bytes.Buffer{}
require.NoError(t, writeEnd(wire, StatusError, "it went wrong"))
status, err := readResponse(wire, &bytes.Buffer{})
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, StatusError, status)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "it went wrong")
})
// This is how the CLI notices a nebula that died mid-command rather than silently
// reporting whatever partial output it managed to read.
t.Run("a stream ending without an end frame is truncated, not successful", func(t *testing.T) {
wire := &bytes.Buffer{}
_, err := (&frameWriter{w: wire}).Write([]byte("partial"))
require.NoError(t, err)
out := &bytes.Buffer{}
_, err = readResponse(wire, out)
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrTruncated)
})
t.Run("a truncated frame header is truncated, not successful", func(t *testing.T) {
_, err := readResponse(bytes.NewReader([]byte{frameOutput, 0x00}), &bytes.Buffer{})
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrTruncated)
})
t.Run("an oversized frame is refused rather than allocated", func(t *testing.T) {
var hdr [5]byte
hdr[0] = frameOutput
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(hdr[1:], maxFrame+1)
_, err := readResponse(bytes.NewReader(hdr[:]), &bytes.Buffer{})
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "exceeds")
})
// A reserved frame an older client does not understand must not break it.
t.Run("a reserved frame type is skipped", func(t *testing.T) {
wire := &bytes.Buffer{}
require.NoError(t, writeFrame(wire, frameStderr, []byte("future")))
require.NoError(t, writeFrame(wire, frameOutput, []byte("now")))
require.NoError(t, writeEnd(wire, StatusOK, ""))
out := &bytes.Buffer{}
status, err := readResponse(wire, out)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, StatusOK, status)
assert.Equal(t, "now", out.String())
})
t.Run("an unknown frame type is an error", func(t *testing.T) {
wire := &bytes.Buffer{}
require.NoError(t, writeFrame(wire, 0x7f, nil))
_, err := readResponse(wire, &bytes.Buffer{})
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "unknown frame type")
})
}
-125
View File
@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
package diag
import (
"fmt"
"sync"
"github.com/anmitsu/go-shlex"
"github.com/armon/go-radix"
)
// Registry is the set of commands nebula exposes for debugging and administration. It is
// transport neutral: the ssh console and the `nebula ctl` unix socket dispatch against the
// same registry, and neither knows the other exists.
//
// Registration is expected to happen once during startup, before any transport is serving,
// but the lock makes a late RegisterCommand safe rather than a data race waiting to happen.
type Registry struct {
mu sync.RWMutex
commands *radix.Tree
}
// NewRegistry returns a registry containing only `help`. Everything else is attached by
// the caller, see attachCommands in the nebula package.
func NewRegistry() *Registry {
r := &Registry{commands: radix.New()}
r.RegisterCommand(&Command{
Name: "help",
ShortDescription: "prints available commands or help <command> for specific usage info",
Callback: func(a any, args []string, w StringWriter) error {
return r.help(args, w)
},
})
return r
}
// RegisterCommand adds a command that a user can run.
func (r *Registry) RegisterCommand(c *Command) {
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
r.commands.Insert(c.Name, c)
}
// Clone returns an independent copy sharing no tree with the original. The ssh session uses
// this so the `logout` command it adds for itself is invisible to every other session, and
// to `nebula ctl`.
func (r *Registry) Clone() *Registry {
r.mu.RLock()
defer r.mu.RUnlock()
return &Registry{commands: radix.NewFromMap(r.commands.ToMap())}
}
// Match returns every registered command name carrying the given prefix, for tab completion.
func (r *Registry) Match(prefix string) []string {
r.mu.RLock()
defer r.mu.RUnlock()
return matchCommand(r.commands, prefix)
}
// Dispatch splits line the way a shell would and runs the result. The ssh console uses this
// because a terminal only ever hands it a line; a transport that already has a real argv
// should call DispatchArgs instead rather than round tripping through a quoting parser.
func (r *Registry) Dispatch(line string, w StringWriter) error {
args, err := shlex.Split(line, true)
if err != nil {
if wErr := w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Unable to parse command: %s", err)); wErr != nil {
return wErr
}
return err
}
return r.DispatchArgs(args, w)
}
// DispatchArgs runs args[0] with args[1:] as its arguments, writing everything the command
// produces to w. An empty args dumps the command list, matching what an empty line does on
// the ssh console.
//
// Callbacks report user facing problems as prose on w and return nil by convention, so a
// non-nil error here means the command could not be run at all: ErrUnknownCommand, an
// ErrUsage wrapped flag failure, or an internal failure a callback chose to surface.
func (r *Registry) DispatchArgs(args []string, w StringWriter) error {
if len(args) == 0 {
r.mu.RLock()
defer r.mu.RUnlock()
dumpCommands(r.commands, w)
return nil
}
r.mu.RLock()
cmd, err := lookupCommand(r.commands, args[0])
r.mu.RUnlock()
if err != nil {
if wErr := w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Command lookup failed: %s", err)); wErr != nil {
return wErr
}
return err
}
if cmd == nil {
if wErr := w.WriteLine(fmt.Sprintf("Did not understand: %s", args[0])); wErr != nil {
return wErr
}
r.mu.RLock()
defer r.mu.RUnlock()
dumpCommands(r.commands, w)
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrUnknownCommand, args[0])
}
// -h and -help anywhere in the arguments mean the user wants to know how the command
// works, not to run it.
if checkHelpArgs(args) {
return r.help([]string{cmd.Name}, w)
}
return execCommand(cmd, args[1:], w)
}
// help renders the command list, or one command's usage, onto w.
func (r *Registry) help(args []string, w StringWriter) error {
r.mu.RLock()
defer r.mu.RUnlock()
return helpCallback(r.commands, args, w)
}
-167
View File
@@ -1,167 +0,0 @@
package diag
import (
"bytes"
"flag"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
type testFlags struct {
Json bool
}
// testCommand builds a command carrying a flag set, recording what the callback was actually
// handed so a test can assert on it.
func testCommand(name string, seen *any, args *[]string) *Command {
return &Command{
Name: name,
ShortDescription: name + " short description",
Flags: func() (*flag.FlagSet, any) {
fl := flag.NewFlagSet("", flag.ContinueOnError)
f := &testFlags{}
fl.BoolVar(&f.Json, "json", false, "outputs json")
return fl, f
},
Callback: func(fs any, a []string, w StringWriter) error {
if seen != nil {
*seen = fs
}
if args != nil {
*args = a
}
return w.WriteLine("ran " + name)
},
}
}
func newTestRegistry(t *testing.T) (*Registry, *bytes.Buffer, StringWriter) {
t.Helper()
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
return NewRegistry(), buf, NewWriter(buf)
}
func TestRegistryDispatch(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("a new registry knows help and nothing else", func(t *testing.T) {
r, buf, w := newTestRegistry(t)
require.NoError(t, r.DispatchArgs([]string{"help"}, w))
assert.Contains(t, buf.String(), "help -")
})
t.Run("empty args dump the command list, matching an empty line on the console", func(t *testing.T) {
r, buf, w := newTestRegistry(t)
r.RegisterCommand(testCommand("do-thing", nil, nil))
require.NoError(t, r.DispatchArgs(nil, w))
assert.Contains(t, buf.String(), "Available commands:")
assert.Contains(t, buf.String(), "do-thing - do-thing short description")
})
t.Run("an unknown command reports ErrUnknownCommand and still tells the user", func(t *testing.T) {
r, buf, w := newTestRegistry(t)
err := r.DispatchArgs([]string{"nope"}, w)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrUnknownCommand)
assert.Contains(t, buf.String(), "Did not understand: nope")
assert.Contains(t, buf.String(), "Available commands:")
})
// This is the hazard the ctl transport has to preserve: every callback in ssh.go begins by
// type asserting fs to its own concrete flags struct. Reach a callback without going
// through Command.Flags and every one of them fails.
t.Run("a callback is handed the concrete struct its Flags callback returned", func(t *testing.T) {
var seen any
r, _, w := newTestRegistry(t)
r.RegisterCommand(testCommand("do-thing", &seen, nil))
require.NoError(t, r.DispatchArgs([]string{"do-thing", "-json"}, w))
flags, ok := seen.(*testFlags)
require.True(t, ok, "callback was handed %T, not *testFlags", seen)
assert.True(t, flags.Json)
})
t.Run("positional arguments survive flag parsing", func(t *testing.T) {
var args []string
r, _, w := newTestRegistry(t)
r.RegisterCommand(testCommand("do-thing", nil, &args))
require.NoError(t, r.DispatchArgs([]string{"do-thing", "-json", "10.0.0.1"}, w))
assert.Equal(t, []string{"10.0.0.1"}, args)
})
// Documents stdlib flag behaviour rather than endorsing it: parsing stops at the first
// positional, so a flag written after one is silently a positional too.
t.Run("a flag after a positional is not parsed as a flag", func(t *testing.T) {
var seen any
var args []string
r, _, w := newTestRegistry(t)
r.RegisterCommand(testCommand("do-thing", &seen, &args))
require.NoError(t, r.DispatchArgs([]string{"do-thing", "10.0.0.1", "-json"}, w))
assert.False(t, seen.(*testFlags).Json)
assert.Equal(t, []string{"10.0.0.1", "-json"}, args)
})
t.Run("a bad flag reports ErrUsage and writes the usage text", func(t *testing.T) {
r, buf, w := newTestRegistry(t)
r.RegisterCommand(testCommand("do-thing", nil, nil))
err := r.DispatchArgs([]string{"do-thing", "-nope"}, w)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrUsage)
assert.Contains(t, buf.String(), "flag provided but not defined")
})
t.Run("-h anywhere routes to help instead of running the command", func(t *testing.T) {
var seen any
r, buf, w := newTestRegistry(t)
r.RegisterCommand(testCommand("do-thing", &seen, nil))
require.NoError(t, r.DispatchArgs([]string{"do-thing", "-h"}, w))
assert.Nil(t, seen, "the callback should not have run")
assert.Contains(t, buf.String(), "do-thing - do-thing short description")
assert.Contains(t, buf.String(), "-json")
})
t.Run("Dispatch splits a line the way a shell would", func(t *testing.T) {
var args []string
r, _, w := newTestRegistry(t)
r.RegisterCommand(testCommand("do-thing", nil, &args))
require.NoError(t, r.Dispatch(`do-thing "/tmp/a path.pb.gz"`, w))
assert.Equal(t, []string{"/tmp/a path.pb.gz"}, args)
})
t.Run("Match returns names by prefix for tab completion", func(t *testing.T) {
r, _, _ := newTestRegistry(t)
r.RegisterCommand(testCommand("print-cert", nil, nil))
r.RegisterCommand(testCommand("print-tunnel", nil, nil))
r.RegisterCommand(testCommand("version", nil, nil))
assert.Equal(t, []string{"print-cert", "print-tunnel"}, r.Match("print-"))
})
}
// A clone is what keeps the ssh session's `logout` command from being visible to every other
// session, and to nebula ctl.
func TestRegistryCloneIsolation(t *testing.T) {
parent, _, w := newTestRegistry(t)
parent.RegisterCommand(testCommand("shared", nil, nil))
child := parent.Clone()
child.RegisterCommand(testCommand("logout", nil, nil))
require.NoError(t, child.DispatchArgs([]string{"logout"}, w))
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
err := parent.DispatchArgs([]string{"logout"}, NewWriter(buf))
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrUnknownCommand)
buf.Reset()
require.NoError(t, child.DispatchArgs([]string{"shared"}, NewWriter(buf)))
assert.True(t, strings.HasPrefix(buf.String(), "ran shared"))
}
-137
View File
@@ -1,137 +0,0 @@
package diag
import (
"bufio"
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net"
"time"
)
// Exit statuses the client reports. They follow shell convention closely enough that a
// script can tell "you asked for something that does not exist" from "it ran and failed".
const (
// StatusOK means the command ran. Note that commands report their own user facing
// problems as prose and still exit 0, matching the ssh console.
StatusOK = 0
// StatusError means the command could not be completed.
StatusError = 1
// StatusUsage means the arguments were not valid for that command.
StatusUsage = 2
// StatusUnknownCommand means there is no such command.
StatusUnknownCommand = 127
)
// requestTimeout bounds how long a connected client may take to send its request line. There
// is deliberately no timeout on the response: `reload` runs every reload callback inline
// before it returns, and a slow one is not a reason to hang up on the operator.
const requestTimeout = 5 * time.Second
// Server serves a Registry over a stream listener. It knows nothing about unix sockets, so
// tests can drive it over a net.Pipe.
type Server struct {
l *slog.Logger
reg *Registry
}
func NewServer(l *slog.Logger, reg *Registry) *Server {
return &Server{l: l, reg: reg}
}
// Serve accepts connections until ln is closed. Cancelling ctx closes ln, which is what ends
// the accept loop; a listener closed underneath us is a normal shutdown, not an error.
func (s *Server) Serve(ctx context.Context, ln net.Listener) error {
go func() {
<-ctx.Done()
if err := ln.Close(); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, net.ErrClosed) {
s.l.Warn("Failed to close the ctl listener", "error", err)
}
}()
for {
conn, err := ln.Accept()
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, net.ErrClosed) || ctx.Err() != nil {
return nil
}
return err
}
go s.ServeConn(ctx, conn)
}
}
// ServeConn handles one request and closes c.
func (s *Server) ServeConn(ctx context.Context, c net.Conn) {
defer func() {
if err := c.Close(); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, net.ErrClosed) {
s.l.Debug("Failed to close a ctl connection", "error", err)
}
}()
if err := c.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(requestTimeout)); err != nil {
s.l.Debug("Failed to set a ctl read deadline", "error", err)
}
req, err := readRequest(bufio.NewReaderSize(c, maxRequest))
if err != nil {
s.l.Debug("Rejected a ctl request", "error", err)
// Best effort: the client may already be gone, and there is nowhere else to report it.
_ = writeEnd(c, StatusError, err.Error())
return
}
// The request is in hand, so the command owns the rest of the connection's lifetime.
if err := c.SetReadDeadline(time.Time{}); err != nil {
s.l.Debug("Failed to clear the ctl read deadline", "error", err)
}
s.l.Debug("Running a ctl command", "args", req.Args)
buf := bufio.NewWriterSize(&frameWriter{w: c}, outputBuffer)
dispatchErr := s.reg.DispatchArgs(req.Args, NewWriter(buf))
if err := buf.Flush(); err != nil {
s.l.Debug("Failed to flush ctl output", "error", err)
return
}
status, msg := statusFor(dispatchErr)
if err := writeEnd(c, status, msg); err != nil {
s.l.Debug("Failed to write the ctl end frame", "error", err)
}
}
// StatusFor maps a dispatch error onto an exit status, for a transport that has somewhere to
// put one.
func StatusFor(err error) int {
status, _ := statusFor(err)
return status
}
// statusFor maps a dispatch error onto an exit status and, when the failure is ours to
// explain rather than one the command already wrote as prose, a message to go with it.
func statusFor(err error) (int, string) {
switch {
case err == nil:
return StatusOK, ""
case errors.Is(err, ErrUnknownCommand):
return StatusUnknownCommand, ""
case errors.Is(err, ErrUsage):
return StatusUsage, ""
default:
return StatusError, fmt.Sprintf("%s", err)
}
}
// ErrNotSupported means this platform has no ctl transport. Windows is waiting on a named
// pipe implementation; mobile has no daemon for a CLI to attach to in the first place.
var ErrNotSupported = errors.New("nebula ctl is not supported on this platform")
// Listen creates the ctl listener at path. It is the platform boundary: everything above it
// in this package is portable.
func Listen(path string) (net.Listener, error) {
return listenSocket(path)
}
-273
View File
@@ -1,273 +0,0 @@
//go:build !windows
package diag
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io/fs"
"log/slog"
"net"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// testSocketPath returns a short socket path. t.TempDir on darwin lives under
// /var/folders/... and readily exceeds the 104 byte sun_path limit, which fails as a bare
// "invalid argument" a long way from the cause.
func testSocketPath(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
dir, err := os.MkdirTemp("/tmp", "nebctl")
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(dir) })
path := filepath.Join(dir, "sub", "ctl.sock")
require.LessOrEqual(t, len(path), maxSocketPath, "test socket path is too long for sun_path")
return path
}
func newTestServer(t *testing.T) (*Registry, string) {
t.Helper()
reg := NewRegistry()
path := testSocketPath(t)
ln, err := Listen(path)
require.NoError(t, err)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
srv := NewServer(slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler), reg)
var wg sync.WaitGroup
wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
assert.NoError(t, srv.Serve(ctx, ln))
}()
t.Cleanup(func() {
cancel()
wg.Wait()
})
return reg, path
}
func run(t *testing.T, path string, args ...string) (string, int, error) {
t.Helper()
c, err := Dial(path)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer c.Close()
out := &bytes.Buffer{}
status, err := c.Run(args, out)
return out.String(), status, err
}
func TestServeConn(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("a command runs and its output comes back", func(t *testing.T) {
reg, path := newTestServer(t)
reg.RegisterCommand(&Command{
Name: "version",
ShortDescription: "prints a version",
Callback: func(fs any, a []string, w StringWriter) error {
return w.WriteLine("1.2.3")
},
})
out, status, err := run(t, path, "version")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, StatusOK, status)
assert.Equal(t, "1.2.3\n", out)
})
t.Run("no args gets the command list", func(t *testing.T) {
_, path := newTestServer(t)
out, status, err := run(t, path)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, StatusOK, status)
assert.Contains(t, out, "Available commands:")
})
t.Run("an unknown command exits 127", func(t *testing.T) {
_, path := newTestServer(t)
out, status, err := run(t, path, "nope")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, StatusUnknownCommand, status)
assert.Contains(t, out, "Did not understand: nope")
})
t.Run("a bad flag exits 2", func(t *testing.T) {
reg, path := newTestServer(t)
var seen any
reg.RegisterCommand(testCommand("do-thing", &seen, nil))
out, status, err := run(t, path, "do-thing", "-nope")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, StatusUsage, status)
assert.Contains(t, out, "flag provided but not defined")
})
t.Run("a callback error exits 1 and reports why", func(t *testing.T) {
reg, path := newTestServer(t)
reg.RegisterCommand(&Command{
Name: "explode",
ShortDescription: "fails",
Callback: func(fs any, a []string, w StringWriter) error {
return errors.New("boom")
},
})
_, status, err := run(t, path, "explode")
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, StatusError, status)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "boom")
})
t.Run("output larger than the buffer arrives intact", func(t *testing.T) {
reg, path := newTestServer(t)
want := bytes.Repeat([]byte("x"), outputBuffer*3+7)
reg.RegisterCommand(&Command{
Name: "big",
ShortDescription: "writes a lot",
Callback: func(fs any, a []string, w StringWriter) error {
return w.WriteBytes(want)
},
})
out, status, err := run(t, path, "big")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, StatusOK, status)
assert.Equal(t, string(want), out)
})
t.Run("concurrent clients are all served", func(t *testing.T) {
reg, path := newTestServer(t)
reg.RegisterCommand(&Command{
Name: "slow",
ShortDescription: "takes a moment",
Callback: func(fs any, a []string, w StringWriter) error {
time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
return w.WriteLine("done")
},
})
var wg sync.WaitGroup
for i := 0; i < 8; i++ {
wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
out, status, err := run(t, path, "slow")
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, StatusOK, status)
assert.Equal(t, "done\n", out)
}()
}
wg.Wait()
})
t.Run("a client that hangs up mid command does not take the server down", func(t *testing.T) {
reg, path := newTestServer(t)
reg.RegisterCommand(&Command{
Name: "version",
ShortDescription: "prints a version",
Callback: func(fs any, a []string, w StringWriter) error {
return w.WriteLine("1.2.3")
},
})
c, err := Dial(path)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, writeRequest(c.conn, []string{"version"}))
require.NoError(t, c.Close())
// The next client still gets served.
out, status, err := run(t, path, "version")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, StatusOK, status)
assert.Equal(t, "1.2.3\n", out)
})
}
func TestListenSocket(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("the socket is 0600 inside a 0700 directory", func(t *testing.T) {
path := testSocketPath(t)
ln, err := Listen(path)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer ln.Close()
fi, err := os.Stat(path)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, os.FileMode(0600), fi.Mode().Perm(), "socket mode")
di, err := os.Stat(filepath.Dir(path))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, os.FileMode(0700), di.Mode().Perm(), "socket directory mode")
})
t.Run("the socket is unlinked when the listener closes", func(t *testing.T) {
path := testSocketPath(t)
ln, err := Listen(path)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, ln.Close())
_, err = os.Stat(path)
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, fs.ErrNotExist)
})
// A crashed nebula leaves its socket behind, and the next one has to be able to start.
t.Run("a socket left behind by a dead nebula is replaced", func(t *testing.T) {
path := testSocketPath(t)
ln, err := Listen(path)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Close the listener without unlinking, the way a killed process leaves things.
unix, ok := ln.(*net.UnixListener)
require.True(t, ok)
unix.SetUnlinkOnClose(false)
require.NoError(t, ln.Close())
require.FileExists(t, path)
ln2, err := Listen(path)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.NoError(t, ln2.Close())
})
// Silently stealing it would break the nebula that got there first.
t.Run("a socket another nebula is serving is refused", func(t *testing.T) {
_, path := newTestServer(t)
_, err := Listen(path)
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "already being served")
})
t.Run("a path that is not a socket is refused rather than removed", func(t *testing.T) {
path := testSocketPath(t)
require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0700))
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, []byte("precious"), 0600))
_, err := Listen(path)
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "is not a socket")
assert.FileExists(t, path, "the file must not have been removed")
})
t.Run("a path too long for sun_path says so", func(t *testing.T) {
_, err := Listen("/tmp/" + fmt.Sprintf("%0*d", maxSocketPath, 0) + "/ctl.sock")
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "the maximum is")
})
}
-107
View File
@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
//go:build !windows
package diag
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"io/fs"
"net"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"time"
)
// maxSocketPath is the smallest sun_path across the platforms nebula ships on: 104 bytes on
// darwin and the BSDs, 108 on Linux. Checking it ourselves turns a bare "invalid argument"
// into something an operator can act on.
const maxSocketPath = 103
// DefaultSocketPath is where nebula listens when ctl.socket is unset. An empty string means
// the platform has no sensible default and ctl stays off unless an operator names a path.
func DefaultSocketPath() string {
switch runtime.GOOS {
case "ios", "android":
// No daemon to attach to and no shell to attach from, and nowhere writable that
// would survive being guessed. Mobile embedders drive nebula through Control.
return ""
case "linux":
return "/run/nebula/ctl.sock"
default:
// /run does not exist on darwin, and /var/run is the portable spelling everywhere
// else nebula builds.
return "/var/run/nebula/ctl.sock"
}
}
// listenSocket creates the listening socket at path, taking over one a previous nebula left
// behind but refusing one that is still being served.
func listenSocket(path string) (net.Listener, error) {
if len(path) > maxSocketPath {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("socket path is %d bytes, the maximum is %d", len(path), maxSocketPath)
}
// The directory, not the socket, is what enforces access control. net.Listen creates the
// socket with 0777&^umask, so with a typical 0022 umask it is world connectable for the
// window between bind and chmod. Nobody can traverse into a 0700 directory to reach it in
// that window, and unlike the socket's own mode, directory traversal is enforced
// consistently across every platform this file builds for.
dir := filepath.Dir(path)
if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0700); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create %s: %w", dir, err)
}
if err := os.Chmod(dir, 0700); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to set permissions on %s: %w", dir, err)
}
if err := clearStaleSocket(path); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
ln, err := net.Listen("unix", path)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Defence in depth behind the directory, for anyone who relocates the socket somewhere
// more permissive.
if err := os.Chmod(path, 0600); err != nil {
_ = ln.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to set permissions on %s: %w", path, err)
}
return ln, nil
}
// dialSocket connects to a nebula serving at path.
func dialSocket(path string, timeout time.Duration) (net.Conn, error) {
return net.DialTimeout("unix", path, timeout)
}
// clearStaleSocket removes a socket a crashed nebula left behind, but refuses to steal one
// another nebula is still serving. Two instances on one host need two paths; they cannot
// share one, and silently taking the socket would break the instance that got there first.
func clearStaleSocket(path string) error {
fi, err := os.Lstat(path)
if errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist) {
return nil
}
if err != nil {
return err
}
if fi.Mode()&fs.ModeSocket == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("%s exists and is not a socket, refusing to remove it", path)
}
// A successful dial is the only reliable way to tell a live socket from an abandoned
// one; the inode looks identical either way.
c, err := net.DialTimeout("unix", path, 100*time.Millisecond)
if err == nil {
_ = c.Close()
return fmt.Errorf("%s is already being served, is another nebula running?", path)
}
return os.Remove(path)
}
-27
View File
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
//go:build windows
package diag
import (
"net"
"time"
)
// Windows has AF_UNIX since Windows 10 1803, but no way to secure the socket that resembles
// what the unix build does: os.Chmod cannot express an ACL, and a socket's reachability comes
// down to whatever its directory inherited. Doing this properly means a named pipe with an
// explicit security descriptor, which is a dependency and a design this change does not carry.
// Until then the stub keeps the package building and gives operators a real answer.
// DefaultSocketPath returns an empty string: there is no path worth defaulting to here.
func DefaultSocketPath() string {
return ""
}
func listenSocket(path string) (net.Listener, error) {
return nil, ErrNotSupported
}
func dialSocket(path string, timeout time.Duration) (net.Conn, error) {
return nil, ErrNotSupported
}
+4 -8
View File
@@ -4,13 +4,15 @@
package e2e
import (
"log/slog"
"io"
"net/netip"
"os"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"log/slog"
"dario.cat/mergo"
"github.com/google/gopacket"
"github.com/google/gopacket/layers"
@@ -116,9 +118,6 @@ func newSimpleServerWithUdpAndUnsafeNetworks(v cert.Version, caCrt cert.Certific
"key": string(myPrivKey),
},
//"tun": m{"disabled": true},
// Several tests bring up more than one nebula in this process, and they would all
// contend for the same default ctl socket path. None of them exercise it.
"ctl": m{"enabled": false},
"firewall": m{
"outbound": []m{{
"proto": "any",
@@ -216,9 +215,6 @@ func newServer(caCrt []cert.Certificate, certs []cert.Certificate, key []byte, o
"key": string(key),
},
//"tun": m{"disabled": true},
// Several tests bring up more than one nebula in this process, and they would all
// contend for the same default ctl socket path. None of them exercise it.
"ctl": m{"enabled": false},
"firewall": m{
"outbound": []m{{
"proto": "any",
@@ -386,7 +382,7 @@ func getAddrs(ns []netip.Prefix) []netip.Addr {
func NewTestLogger() *slog.Logger {
v := os.Getenv("TEST_LOGS")
if v == "" {
return slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)
return slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil))
}
level := slog.LevelInfo
-57
View File
@@ -223,60 +223,3 @@ func TestRebindAdvertisesNewAddressAfterMove(t *testing.T) {
lhControl.Stop()
myControl.Stop()
}
// A relayed send records traffic but must not consume the rebind epoch. If it does, the next direct send to the
// relay host sees the epoch already current and never requeries, so the far side is never told to punch at our
// new address. This pins the SendVia call site, which the unit tests cannot reach.
func TestRebindRequeriesAfterRelayedSend(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
// No lighthouse on purpose: it would hand out a direct address for them and nothing would relay.
// Long connection manager timers so it never fires a direct test packet at the relay tunnel and bumps its
// epoch mid-test, which is the only other thing that touches that tunnel and would flake the assertion below.
myControl, myVpnIpNet, _, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "me", "10.128.0.1/24",
m{"relay": m{"use_relays": true}, "timers": m{"connection_alive_interval": 3600, "pending_deletion_interval": 3600}})
relayControl, relayVpnIpNet, relayUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "relay", "10.128.0.128/24", m{"relay": m{"am_relay": true}})
theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "them", "10.128.0.2/24", m{"relay": m{"use_relays": true}})
myControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(relayVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), relayUdpAddr)
myControl.InjectRelays(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), []netip.Addr{relayVpnIpNet[0].Addr()})
relayControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirUdpAddr)
r := router.NewR(t, myControl, relayControl, theirControl)
defer r.RenderFlow()
myControl.Start()
relayControl.Start()
theirControl.Start()
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("establish")))
r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
r.RouteFor(time.Millisecond * 500)
hi := myControl.GetHostInfoByVpnAddr(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), false)
require.NotNil(t, hi, "expected a tunnel to them")
require.NotEmpty(t, hi.CurrentRelaysToMe, "them must be reachable only via the relay for this test to mean anything")
// sendNoMetrics only reaches SendVia when there is no direct remote, so pin that too. Without this the test
// keeps passing while quietly sending direct and never exercising the relay path.
require.False(t, hi.CurrentRemote.IsValid(), "them must have no direct remote, otherwise SendVia is never called")
before, ok := myControl.GetRebindEpochFor(relayVpnIpNet[0].Addr())
require.True(t, ok, "expected a tunnel to the relay")
myControl.RebindUDPServer()
// Traffic to them goes through SendVia on the relay tunnel. That must record traffic without consuming the
// relay tunnel's own epoch edge, which belongs to the direct path.
myControl.InjectTunPacket(BuildTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("relayed")))
r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
after, ok := myControl.GetRebindEpochFor(relayVpnIpNet[0].Addr())
require.True(t, ok)
assert.Equal(t, before, after,
"a relayed send consumed the relay tunnel's rebind epoch, so the next direct send will not requery")
myControl.Stop()
relayControl.Stop()
theirControl.Stop()
}
+2 -3
View File
@@ -6,13 +6,11 @@ package router
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"maps"
"net/netip"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"reflect"
"regexp"
"slices"
"sort"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
@@ -24,6 +22,7 @@ import (
"github.com/slackhq/nebula"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
"golang.org/x/exp/maps"
)
// outNatKey is the (from, to) pair used by outNat. Comparable struct, so it works as a map key without the
@@ -375,7 +374,7 @@ func (r *R) RenderHostmaps(title string, controls ...*nebula.Control) {
}
func (r *R) renderHostmaps(title string) {
c := slices.AppendSeq(make([]*nebula.Control, 0, len(r.controls)), maps.Values(r.controls))
c := maps.Values(r.controls)
sort.SliceStable(c, func(i, j int) bool {
return c[i].GetVpnAddrs()[0].Compare(c[j].GetVpnAddrs()[0]) > 0
})
-56
View File
@@ -131,9 +131,6 @@ listen:
port: 4242
# Sets the max number of packets to pull from the kernel for each syscall (under systems that support recvmmsg)
# default is 64, does not support reload
# Note: on Linux with UDP GRO (kernel 5.10+), each receive slot is sized for a full 64KiB coalesced
# superpacket, so the receive scratch is batch * 64KiB per listening socket (~4MiB per routine at the
# default of 64). Lower this to trade peak per-syscall throughput for memory on constrained hosts.
#batch: 64
# Configure socket buffers for the udp side (outside), leave unset to use the system defaults. Values will be doubled by the kernel
# Default is net.core.rmem_default and net.core.wmem_default (/proc/sys/net/core/rmem_default and /proc/sys/net/core/rmem_default)
@@ -172,8 +169,6 @@ listen:
# allowing for more precise routing decisions based on the packet tags. Default is 0 meaning no mark is set.
# This setting is reloadable.
#so_mark: 0
# the udp_offloads setting controls if Nebula will attempt to enable GSO and GRO for its UDP socket(s). Linux only, not reloadable.
# udp_offloads: false
# Routines is the number of thread pairs to run that consume from the tun and UDP queues.
# Currently, this defaults to 1 which means we have 1 tun queue reader and 1
@@ -236,30 +231,6 @@ punchy:
# Overriding this to "" is the same as "/" and will allow overwriting any path on the host.
#sandbox_dir: /var/tmp/nebula-debug
# ctl exposes nebula's debug and administrative commands over a local unix socket, so that `nebula ctl <command>` can
# reach the same commands the sshd block offers above without running an ssh server. Run `nebula ctl` on its own for the
# list of commands. Anyone who can open the socket can do everything the ssh console can, including closing tunnels,
# changing remotes, and writing profile data to disk, so the socket lives in a directory only the user nebula runs as
# can enter. Enabled by default. Not supported on Windows yet, and never enabled on iOS or Android.
#ctl:
# Toggles the feature. This setting is reloadable.
#enabled: true
# socket is the unix socket to listen on. The parent directory is created if it is missing and made readable only by
# the user nebula runs as, and a socket left behind by a crashed nebula is replaced. Defaults to /run/nebula/ctl.sock
# on Linux and /var/run/nebula/ctl.sock everywhere else; running nebula as a non-root user means picking a path it can
# write. Two nebulas on one host need two paths, the second to start will log that the socket is already being served
# and carry on without one. `nebula ctl` reads this value from the same config file when it is given -config, and
# otherwise assumes the default above. This setting is reloadable.
#socket: /run/nebula/ctl.sock
# sandbox_dir restricts the file paths the profiling commands (start-cpu-profile, save-heap-profile,
# save-mutex-profile) may write, exactly like sshd.sandbox_dir above, which it defaults to. Note that these paths are
# resolved by the nebula process and not by the shell running `nebula ctl`, so a relative path lands in this directory
# rather than in your working directory, and under a systemd unit with PrivateTmp=yes it lands somewhere your shell
# cannot see at all. The directory is NOT automatically created.
#sandbox_dir: /var/tmp/nebula-debug
# EXPERIMENTAL: relay support for networks that can't establish direct connections.
relay:
# Relays are a list of Nebula IP's that peers can use to relay packets to me.
@@ -291,33 +262,6 @@ tun:
# Default MTU for every packet, safe setting is (and the default) 1300 for internet based traffic
mtu: 1300
# the use_offloads setting controls if Nebula will attempt to enable GSO and GRO for the tun device. Linux only, not reloadable.
#use_offloads: false
# Linux only. pin_threads pins each tun reader/encrypt OS thread to a single CPU. This keeps every goroutine's
# batched sends flowing through one XPS-selected NIC TX ring, so packets within a flow stay ordered on the wire
# instead of being sprayed across multiple TX rings and reordered. Not reloadable. Coerced to false if routines <= 1.
#pin_threads: true
# pin_threads_key helps the CPU-auto-selector shuffle which CPUs are chosen for pinning.
# Valid options are "pid" or "port". Use "port" if you want Nebula to choose the same cores every time, which is nice for benchmarking.
# Linux only, not reloadable.
#pin_threads_key: "pid"
# Linux only. cpu_affinity overrides which CPUs the tun reader threads pin to: a list of CPU IDs, one per routine
# (see the top-level `routines` setting). Lists shorter than `routines` are modulo-cycled across the queues; extra
# entries are ignored. IDs must be within the process's allowed CPU set, so this respects taskset / cgroup cpusets;
# a non-integer or not-allowed entry disables the override, leaving the default pin selection described below.
# Only meaningful while pin_threads is true. Not reloadable.
# When unset (or rejected), the default spread prefers performance cores on heterogeneous CPUs (ARM big.LITTLE,
# Intel P/E hybrids, AMD compact cores), keeps all readers on one NUMA node and on distinct physical cores when the
# topology allows (SMT siblings last), leaves CPU 0's physical core as a last resort, and rotates its starting
# point per instance (keyed by the bound UDP port) so co-located nebulas don't stack their readers onto the
# same cores.
#cpu_affinity:
# - 2
# - 4
# Route based MTU overrides, you have known vpn ip paths that can support larger MTUs you can increase/decrease them here
routes:
#- mtu: 8800
+14 -15
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ import (
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/iputil"
)
type FirewallInterface interface {
@@ -263,11 +262,11 @@ func (f *Firewall) AddRule(incoming bool, proto uint8, startPort int32, endPort
}
switch proto {
case iputil.IPProtocolTCP:
case firewall.ProtoTCP:
fp = ft.TCP
case iputil.IPProtocolUDP:
case firewall.ProtoUDP:
fp = ft.UDP
case iputil.IPProtocolICMP, iputil.IPProtocolICMPv6:
case firewall.ProtoICMP, firewall.ProtoICMPv6:
//ICMP traffic doesn't have ports, so we always coerce to "any", even if a value is provided
if startPort != firewall.PortAny {
f.l.Warn("ignoring port specification for ICMP firewall rule", "startPort", startPort)
@@ -365,13 +364,13 @@ func AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l *slog.Logger, inbound bool, c *config.C, fw Fi
proto = firewall.ProtoAny
startPort, endPort, err = parsePort(sPort)
case "tcp":
proto = iputil.IPProtocolTCP
proto = firewall.ProtoTCP
startPort, endPort, err = parsePort(sPort)
case "udp":
proto = iputil.IPProtocolUDP
proto = firewall.ProtoUDP
startPort, endPort, err = parsePort(sPort)
case "icmp":
proto = iputil.IPProtocolICMP
proto = firewall.ProtoICMP
startPort = firewall.PortAny
endPort = firewall.PortAny
if sPort != "" {
@@ -561,9 +560,9 @@ func (f *Firewall) inConns(fp firewall.Packet, h *HostInfo, caPool *cert.CAPool,
}
switch fp.Protocol {
case iputil.IPProtocolTCP:
case firewall.ProtoTCP:
c.Expires = time.Now().Add(f.TCPTimeout)
case iputil.IPProtocolUDP:
case firewall.ProtoUDP:
c.Expires = time.Now().Add(f.UDPTimeout)
default:
c.Expires = time.Now().Add(f.DefaultTimeout)
@@ -583,9 +582,9 @@ func (f *Firewall) addConn(fp firewall.Packet, incoming bool) {
c := &conn{}
switch fp.Protocol {
case iputil.IPProtocolTCP:
case firewall.ProtoTCP:
timeout = f.TCPTimeout
case iputil.IPProtocolUDP:
case firewall.ProtoUDP:
timeout = f.UDPTimeout
default:
timeout = f.DefaultTimeout
@@ -636,15 +635,15 @@ func (ft *FirewallTable) match(p firewall.Packet, incoming bool, c *cert.CachedC
}
switch p.Protocol {
case iputil.IPProtocolTCP:
case firewall.ProtoTCP:
if ft.TCP.match(p, incoming, c, caPool) {
return true
}
case iputil.IPProtocolUDP:
case firewall.ProtoUDP:
if ft.UDP.match(p, incoming, c, caPool) {
return true
}
case iputil.IPProtocolICMP, iputil.IPProtocolICMPv6:
case firewall.ProtoICMP, firewall.ProtoICMPv6:
if ft.ICMP.match(p, incoming, c, caPool) {
return true
}
@@ -681,7 +680,7 @@ func (fp firewallPort) match(p firewall.Packet, incoming bool, c *cert.CachedCer
}
// this branch is here to catch traffic from FirewallTable.Any.match and FirewallTable.ICMP.match
if p.Protocol == iputil.IPProtocolICMP || p.Protocol == iputil.IPProtocolICMPv6 {
if p.Protocol == firewall.ProtoICMP || p.Protocol == firewall.ProtoICMPv6 {
// port numbers are re-used for connection tracking of ICMP,
// but we don't want to actually filter on them.
return fp[firewall.PortAny].match(p, c, caPool)
+2 -4
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@ import (
"log/slog"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/logging"
)
// ConntrackCache is used as a local routine cache to know if a given flow
@@ -58,8 +56,8 @@ func (c *ConntrackCacheTicker) Get() ConntrackCache {
if tick := c.cacheTick.Load(); tick != c.cacheV {
c.cacheV = tick
if ll := len(c.cache); ll > 0 {
if c.l.Enabled(context.Background(), logging.LevelTrace) {
c.l.Log(context.Background(), logging.LevelTrace, "resetting conntrack cache", "len", ll)
if c.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
c.l.Debug("resetting conntrack cache", "len", ll)
}
c.cache = make(ConntrackCache, ll)
}
+7 -8
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/logging"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
)
@@ -31,27 +30,27 @@ func newFixedTicker(t *testing.T, l *slog.Logger, cacheLen int) *ConntrackCacheT
func TestConntrackCacheTicker_Get_TextFormat(t *testing.T) {
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
l := test.NewLoggerWithOutputAndLevel(buf, logging.LevelTrace)
l := test.NewLoggerWithOutputAndLevel(buf, slog.LevelDebug)
c := newFixedTicker(t, l, 3)
c.Get()
assert.Equal(t, "level=DEBUG-4 msg=\"resetting conntrack cache\" len=3\n", buf.String())
assert.Equal(t, "level=DEBUG msg=\"resetting conntrack cache\" len=3\n", buf.String())
}
func TestConntrackCacheTicker_Get_JSONFormat(t *testing.T) {
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
l := test.NewJSONLoggerWithOutput(buf, logging.LevelTrace)
l := test.NewJSONLoggerWithOutput(buf, slog.LevelDebug)
c := newFixedTicker(t, l, 2)
c.Get()
assert.JSONEq(t, `{"level":"DEBUG-4","msg":"resetting conntrack cache","len":2}`, strings.TrimSpace(buf.String()))
assert.JSONEq(t, `{"level":"DEBUG","msg":"resetting conntrack cache","len":2}`, strings.TrimSpace(buf.String()))
}
func TestConntrackCacheTicker_Get_QuietBelowTrace(t *testing.T) {
func TestConntrackCacheTicker_Get_QuietBelowDebug(t *testing.T) {
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
l := test.NewLoggerWithOutputAndLevel(buf, slog.LevelDebug)
l := test.NewLoggerWithOutputAndLevel(buf, slog.LevelInfo)
c := newFixedTicker(t, l, 5)
c.Get()
@@ -61,7 +60,7 @@ func TestConntrackCacheTicker_Get_QuietBelowTrace(t *testing.T) {
func TestConntrackCacheTicker_Get_QuietWhenCacheEmpty(t *testing.T) {
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
l := test.NewLoggerWithOutputAndLevel(buf, logging.LevelTrace)
l := test.NewLoggerWithOutputAndLevel(buf, slog.LevelDebug)
c := newFixedTicker(t, l, 0)
c.Get()
+10 -16
View File
@@ -4,14 +4,17 @@ import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/netip"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/iputil"
)
type m = map[string]any
const (
ProtoAny = 0 // When we want to handle HOPOPT (0) we can change this, if ever
ProtoAny = 0 // When we want to handle HOPOPT (0) we can change this, if ever
ProtoTCP = 6
ProtoUDP = 17
ProtoICMP = 1
ProtoICMPv6 = 58
PortAny = 0 // Special value for matching `port: any`
PortFragment = -1 // Special value for matching `port: fragment`
)
@@ -42,13 +45,13 @@ func (fp *Packet) Copy() *Packet {
func (fp Packet) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
var proto string
switch fp.Protocol {
case iputil.IPProtocolTCP:
case ProtoTCP:
proto = "tcp"
case iputil.IPProtocolICMP:
case ProtoICMP:
proto = "icmp"
case iputil.IPProtocolICMPv6:
case ProtoICMPv6:
proto = "icmpv6"
case iputil.IPProtocolUDP:
case ProtoUDP:
proto = "udp"
default:
proto = fmt.Sprintf("unknown %v", fp.Protocol)
@@ -62,12 +65,3 @@ func (fp Packet) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
"Fragment": fp.Fragment,
})
}
// ParsedPacket is a Packet plus the parse byproducts the RX path reuses
type ParsedPacket struct {
Packet
IPHdrLen int
// FragAny reports any fragmentation at all: MF flag or nonzero offset for IPv4, a fragment extension header for IPv6.
// Distinct from Packet.Fragment, which is true only for NON-FIRST fragments
FragAny bool
}
+33 -34
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import (
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/iputil"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
@@ -73,20 +72,20 @@ func TestFirewall_AddRule(t *testing.T) {
ti6, err := netip.ParsePrefix("fd12::34/128")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, iputil.IPProtocolTCP, 1, 1, []string{}, "", "", "", "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoTCP, 1, 1, []string{}, "", "", "", "", ""))
// An empty rule is any
assert.True(t, fw.InRules.TCP[1].Any.Any.Any)
assert.Empty(t, fw.InRules.TCP[1].Any.Groups)
assert.Empty(t, fw.InRules.TCP[1].Any.Hosts)
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, iputil.IPProtocolUDP, 1, 1, []string{"g1"}, "", "", "", "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoUDP, 1, 1, []string{"g1"}, "", "", "", "", ""))
assert.Nil(t, fw.InRules.UDP[1].Any.Any)
assert.Contains(t, fw.InRules.UDP[1].Any.Groups[0].Groups, "g1")
assert.Empty(t, fw.InRules.UDP[1].Any.Hosts)
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, iputil.IPProtocolICMP, 1, 1, []string{}, "h1", "", "", "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoICMP, 1, 1, []string{}, "h1", "", "", "", ""))
//no matter what port is given for icmp, it should end up as "any"
assert.Nil(t, fw.InRules.ICMP[firewall.PortAny].Any.Any)
assert.Empty(t, fw.InRules.ICMP[firewall.PortAny].Any.Groups)
@@ -117,11 +116,11 @@ func TestFirewall_AddRule(t *testing.T) {
assert.True(t, ok)
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, iputil.IPProtocolUDP, 1, 1, []string{"g1"}, "", "", "", "ca-name", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoUDP, 1, 1, []string{"g1"}, "", "", "", "ca-name", ""))
assert.Contains(t, fw.InRules.UDP[1].CANames, "ca-name")
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, iputil.IPProtocolUDP, 1, 1, []string{"g1"}, "", "", "", "", "ca-sha"))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoUDP, 1, 1, []string{"g1"}, "", "", "", "", "ca-sha"))
assert.Contains(t, fw.InRules.UDP[1].CAShas, "ca-sha")
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c)
@@ -186,7 +185,7 @@ func TestFirewall_Drop(t *testing.T) {
RemoteAddr: netip.MustParseAddr("1.2.3.4"),
LocalPort: 10,
RemotePort: 90,
Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolUDP,
Protocol: firewall.ProtoUDP,
Fragment: false,
}
@@ -264,7 +263,7 @@ func TestFirewall_DropV6(t *testing.T) {
RemoteAddr: netip.MustParseAddr("fd12::34"),
LocalPort: 10,
RemotePort: 90,
Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolUDP,
Protocol: firewall.ProtoUDP,
Fragment: false,
}
@@ -351,7 +350,7 @@ func BenchmarkFirewallTable_match(b *testing.B) {
Certificate: &dummyCert{},
}
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
assert.False(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolUDP}, true, c, cp))
assert.False(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: firewall.ProtoUDP}, true, c, cp))
}
})
@@ -361,7 +360,7 @@ func BenchmarkFirewallTable_match(b *testing.B) {
Certificate: &dummyCert{},
}
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
assert.False(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolTCP, LocalPort: 1}, true, c, cp))
assert.False(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: firewall.ProtoTCP, LocalPort: 1}, true, c, cp))
}
})
@@ -371,7 +370,7 @@ func BenchmarkFirewallTable_match(b *testing.B) {
}
ip := netip.MustParsePrefix("9.254.254.254/32")
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
assert.False(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolTCP, LocalPort: 100, LocalAddr: ip.Addr()}, true, c, cp))
assert.False(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: firewall.ProtoTCP, LocalPort: 100, LocalAddr: ip.Addr()}, true, c, cp))
}
})
b.Run("pass proto, port, fail on local CIDRv6", func(b *testing.B) {
@@ -380,7 +379,7 @@ func BenchmarkFirewallTable_match(b *testing.B) {
}
ip := netip.MustParsePrefix("fd99::99/128")
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
assert.False(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolTCP, LocalPort: 100, LocalAddr: ip.Addr()}, true, c, cp))
assert.False(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: firewall.ProtoTCP, LocalPort: 100, LocalAddr: ip.Addr()}, true, c, cp))
}
})
@@ -393,7 +392,7 @@ func BenchmarkFirewallTable_match(b *testing.B) {
InvertedGroups: map[string]struct{}{"nope": {}},
}
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
assert.False(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolTCP, LocalPort: 10}, true, c, cp))
assert.False(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: firewall.ProtoTCP, LocalPort: 10}, true, c, cp))
}
})
b.Run("pass proto, port, any local CIDRv6, fail all group, name, and cidr", func(b *testing.B) {
@@ -405,7 +404,7 @@ func BenchmarkFirewallTable_match(b *testing.B) {
InvertedGroups: map[string]struct{}{"nope": {}},
}
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
assert.False(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolTCP, LocalPort: 10}, true, c, cp))
assert.False(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: firewall.ProtoTCP, LocalPort: 10}, true, c, cp))
}
})
@@ -418,7 +417,7 @@ func BenchmarkFirewallTable_match(b *testing.B) {
InvertedGroups: map[string]struct{}{"nope": {}},
}
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
assert.False(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolTCP, LocalPort: 100, LocalAddr: pfix.Addr()}, true, c, cp))
assert.False(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: firewall.ProtoTCP, LocalPort: 100, LocalAddr: pfix.Addr()}, true, c, cp))
}
})
b.Run("pass proto, port, specific local CIDRv6, fail all group, name, and cidr", func(b *testing.B) {
@@ -430,7 +429,7 @@ func BenchmarkFirewallTable_match(b *testing.B) {
InvertedGroups: map[string]struct{}{"nope": {}},
}
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
assert.False(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolTCP, LocalPort: 100, LocalAddr: pfix6.Addr()}, true, c, cp))
assert.False(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: firewall.ProtoTCP, LocalPort: 100, LocalAddr: pfix6.Addr()}, true, c, cp))
}
})
@@ -442,7 +441,7 @@ func BenchmarkFirewallTable_match(b *testing.B) {
InvertedGroups: map[string]struct{}{"good-group": {}},
}
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
assert.True(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolTCP, LocalPort: 10}, true, c, cp))
assert.True(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: firewall.ProtoTCP, LocalPort: 10}, true, c, cp))
}
})
@@ -454,7 +453,7 @@ func BenchmarkFirewallTable_match(b *testing.B) {
InvertedGroups: map[string]struct{}{"good-group": {}},
}
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
assert.True(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolTCP, LocalPort: 100, LocalAddr: pfix.Addr()}, true, c, cp))
assert.True(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: firewall.ProtoTCP, LocalPort: 100, LocalAddr: pfix.Addr()}, true, c, cp))
}
})
b.Run("pass on group on specific local cidr6", func(b *testing.B) {
@@ -465,7 +464,7 @@ func BenchmarkFirewallTable_match(b *testing.B) {
InvertedGroups: map[string]struct{}{"good-group": {}},
}
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
assert.True(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolTCP, LocalPort: 100, LocalAddr: pfix6.Addr()}, true, c, cp))
assert.True(b, ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: firewall.ProtoTCP, LocalPort: 100, LocalAddr: pfix6.Addr()}, true, c, cp))
}
})
@@ -477,7 +476,7 @@ func BenchmarkFirewallTable_match(b *testing.B) {
InvertedGroups: map[string]struct{}{"nope": {}},
}
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolTCP, LocalPort: 10}, true, c, cp)
ft.match(firewall.Packet{Protocol: firewall.ProtoTCP, LocalPort: 10}, true, c, cp)
}
})
}
@@ -493,7 +492,7 @@ func TestFirewall_Drop2(t *testing.T) {
RemoteAddr: netip.MustParseAddr("1.2.3.4"),
LocalPort: 10,
RemotePort: 90,
Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolUDP,
Protocol: firewall.ProtoUDP,
Fragment: false,
}
@@ -551,7 +550,7 @@ func TestFirewall_Drop3(t *testing.T) {
RemoteAddr: netip.MustParseAddr("1.2.3.4"),
LocalPort: 1,
RemotePort: 1,
Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolUDP,
Protocol: firewall.ProtoUDP,
Fragment: false,
}
@@ -639,7 +638,7 @@ func TestFirewall_Drop3V6(t *testing.T) {
RemoteAddr: netip.MustParseAddr("fd12::34"),
LocalPort: 1,
RemotePort: 1,
Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolUDP,
Protocol: firewall.ProtoUDP,
Fragment: false,
}
@@ -676,7 +675,7 @@ func TestFirewall_DropConntrackReload(t *testing.T) {
RemoteAddr: netip.MustParseAddr("1.2.3.4"),
LocalPort: 10,
RemotePort: 90,
Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolUDP,
Protocol: firewall.ProtoUDP,
Fragment: false,
}
network := netip.MustParsePrefix("1.2.3.4/24")
@@ -759,13 +758,13 @@ func TestFirewall_ICMPPortBehavior(t *testing.T) {
templ := firewall.Packet{
LocalAddr: netip.MustParseAddr("1.2.3.4"),
RemoteAddr: netip.MustParseAddr("1.2.3.4"),
Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolICMP,
Protocol: firewall.ProtoICMP,
Fragment: false,
}
t.Run("ICMP allowed", func(t *testing.T) {
fw := NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c.Certificate)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, iputil.IPProtocolICMP, 0, 0, []string{"any"}, "", "", "", "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoICMP, 0, 0, []string{"any"}, "", "", "", "", ""))
t.Run("zero ports", func(t *testing.T) {
p := templ.Copy()
p.LocalPort = 0
@@ -911,7 +910,7 @@ func TestFirewall_DropIPSpoofing(t *testing.T) {
RemoteAddr: netip.MustParseAddr("192.0.2.3"),
LocalPort: 1,
RemotePort: 1,
Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolUDP,
Protocol: firewall.ProtoUDP,
Fragment: false,
}
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h1, cp, nil), ErrInvalidRemoteIP)
@@ -962,7 +961,7 @@ func TestFirewall_ConntrackSourceSpoofingAcrossPeers(t *testing.T) {
RemoteAddr: netip.MustParseAddr("192.0.2.2"),
LocalPort: 443,
RemotePort: 55000,
Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolUDP,
Protocol: firewall.ProtoUDP,
}
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(flow, true, &victimHI, cp, nil),
@@ -1032,7 +1031,7 @@ func BenchmarkFirewallDropConntrackHit(b *testing.B) {
RemoteAddr: netip.MustParseAddr("192.0.2.2"),
LocalPort: 443,
RemotePort: 55000,
Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolUDP,
Protocol: firewall.ProtoUDP,
}
cases := []struct {
@@ -1318,28 +1317,28 @@ func TestAddFirewallRulesFromConfig(t *testing.T) {
mf := &mockFirewall{}
conf.Settings["firewall"] = map[string]any{"outbound": []any{map[string]any{"port": "1", "proto": "tcp", "host": "a"}}}
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, conf, mf))
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: false, proto: iputil.IPProtocolTCP, startPort: 1, endPort: 1, groups: nil, host: "a", ip: "", localIp: ""}, mf.lastCall)
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: false, proto: firewall.ProtoTCP, startPort: 1, endPort: 1, groups: nil, host: "a", ip: "", localIp: ""}, mf.lastCall)
// Test adding udp rule
conf = config.NewC(test.NewLogger())
mf = &mockFirewall{}
conf.Settings["firewall"] = map[string]any{"outbound": []any{map[string]any{"port": "1", "proto": "udp", "host": "a"}}}
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, conf, mf))
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: false, proto: iputil.IPProtocolUDP, startPort: 1, endPort: 1, groups: nil, host: "a", ip: "", localIp: ""}, mf.lastCall)
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: false, proto: firewall.ProtoUDP, startPort: 1, endPort: 1, groups: nil, host: "a", ip: "", localIp: ""}, mf.lastCall)
// Test adding icmp rule
conf = config.NewC(test.NewLogger())
mf = &mockFirewall{}
conf.Settings["firewall"] = map[string]any{"outbound": []any{map[string]any{"port": "1", "proto": "icmp", "host": "a"}}}
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, conf, mf))
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: false, proto: iputil.IPProtocolICMP, startPort: firewall.PortAny, endPort: firewall.PortAny, groups: nil, host: "a", ip: "", localIp: ""}, mf.lastCall)
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: false, proto: firewall.ProtoICMP, startPort: firewall.PortAny, endPort: firewall.PortAny, groups: nil, host: "a", ip: "", localIp: ""}, mf.lastCall)
// Test adding icmp rule no port
conf = config.NewC(test.NewLogger())
mf = &mockFirewall{}
conf.Settings["firewall"] = map[string]any{"outbound": []any{map[string]any{"proto": "icmp", "host": "a"}}}
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, conf, mf))
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: false, proto: iputil.IPProtocolICMP, startPort: firewall.PortAny, endPort: firewall.PortAny, groups: nil, host: "a", ip: "", localIp: ""}, mf.lastCall)
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: false, proto: firewall.ProtoICMP, startPort: firewall.PortAny, endPort: firewall.PortAny, groups: nil, host: "a", ip: "", localIp: ""}, mf.lastCall)
// Test adding any rule
conf = config.NewC(test.NewLogger())
@@ -1583,7 +1582,7 @@ func buildTestCase(setup testsetup, err error, theirPrefixes ...netip.Prefix) te
RemoteAddr: theirPrefixes[0].Addr(),
LocalPort: 10,
RemotePort: 90,
Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolUDP,
Protocol: firewall.ProtoUDP,
Fragment: false,
}
return testcase{
+10 -5
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ require (
filippo.io/bigmod v0.1.0
github.com/anmitsu/go-shlex v0.0.0-20200514113438-38f4b401e2be
github.com/armon/go-radix v1.0.0
github.com/cyberdelia/go-metrics-graphite v0.0.0-20161219230853-39f87cc3b432
github.com/flynn/noise v1.1.0
github.com/gaissmai/bart v0.28.0
github.com/gogo/protobuf v1.3.2
@@ -15,15 +16,16 @@ require (
github.com/miekg/dns v1.1.72
github.com/miekg/pkcs11 v1.1.2
github.com/nbrownus/go-metrics-prometheus v0.0.0-20210712211119-974a6260965f
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.24.1
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.23.2
github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics v0.0.0-20201227073835-cf1acfcdf475
github.com/skip2/go-qrcode v0.0.0-20200617195104-da1b6568686e
github.com/stefanberger/go-pkcs11uri v0.0.0-20230803200340-78284954bff6
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.12.0
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1
github.com/vishvananda/netlink v1.3.1
go.uber.org/goleak v1.3.0
go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.5
go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.4
golang.org/x/crypto v0.54.0
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20230725093048-515e97ebf090
golang.org/x/net v0.57.0
golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0
golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0
@@ -39,12 +41,15 @@ require (
require (
github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1 // indirect
github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.3.0 // indirect
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1 // indirect
github.com/google/btree v1.1.2 // indirect
github.com/munnerz/goautoneg v0.0.0-20191010083416-a7dc8b61c822 // indirect
github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0 // indirect
github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.6.2 // indirect
github.com/prometheus/common v0.70.1 // indirect
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.21.1 // indirect
github.com/prometheus/common v0.66.1 // indirect
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.16.1 // indirect
github.com/vishvananda/netns v0.0.5 // indirect
go.yaml.in/yaml/v2 v2.4.2 // indirect
golang.org/x/mod v0.36.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/time v0.5.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/tools v0.45.0 // indirect
+24 -15
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,10 @@ github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1/go.mod h1:G2ZrVWU2WbWT9wwq4/hrbKbnv/1ERSJQ0ibhJ6r
github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.1.1/go.mod h1:VGX0DQ3Q6kWi7AoAeZDth3/j3BFtOZR5XLFGgcrjCOs=
github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.3.0 h1:UL815xU9SqsFlibzuggzjXhog7bL6oX9BbNZnL2UFvs=
github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.3.0/go.mod h1:VGX0DQ3Q6kWi7AoAeZDth3/j3BFtOZR5XLFGgcrjCOs=
github.com/cyberdelia/go-metrics-graphite v0.0.0-20161219230853-39f87cc3b432 h1:M5QgkYacWj0Xs8MhpIK/5uwU02icXpEoSo9sM2aRCps=
github.com/cyberdelia/go-metrics-graphite v0.0.0-20161219230853-39f87cc3b432/go.mod h1:xwIwAxMvYnVrGJPe2FKx5prTrnAjGOD8zvDOnxnrrkM=
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.0/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38=
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1 h1:vj9j/u1bqnvCEfJOwUhtlOARqs3+rkHYY13jYWTU97c=
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38=
github.com/flynn/noise v1.1.0 h1:KjPQoQCEFdZDiP03phOvGi11+SVVhBG2wOWAorLsstg=
github.com/flynn/noise v1.1.0/go.mod h1:xbMo+0i6+IGbYdJhF31t2eR1BIU0CYc12+BNAKwUTag=
@@ -67,14 +70,15 @@ github.com/kardianos/service v1.3.0 h1:/LGy+xPP2TM+GLTiCZ2di7cy0Jd/qrawlTUfqKYFd
github.com/kardianos/service v1.3.0/go.mod h1:E4V9ufUuY82F7Ztlu1eN9VXWIQxg8NoLQlmFe0MtrXc=
github.com/kisielk/errcheck v1.5.0/go.mod h1:pFxgyoBC7bSaBwPgfKdkLd5X25qrDl4LWUI2bnpBCr8=
github.com/kisielk/gotool v1.0.0/go.mod h1:XhKaO+MFFWcvkIS/tQcRk01m1F5IRFswLeQ+oQHNcck=
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.19.1 h1:VsB4HPswih7mmZ8WleSFQ75c/Ui1M4trX5oAsJnhSlk=
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.19.1/go.mod h1:cwPg85FWrGar70rWktvGQj8/hthj3wpl0PGDogxkrSQ=
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.18.0 h1:c/Cqfb0r+Yi+JtIEq73FWXVkRonBlf0CRNYc8Zttxdo=
github.com/klauspost/compress v1.18.0/go.mod h1:2Pp+KzxcywXVXMr50+X0Q/Lsb43OQHYWRCY2AiWywWQ=
github.com/konsorten/go-windows-terminal-sequences v1.0.1/go.mod h1:T0+1ngSBFLxvqU3pZ+m/2kptfBszLMUkC4ZK/EgS/cQ=
github.com/konsorten/go-windows-terminal-sequences v1.0.3/go.mod h1:T0+1ngSBFLxvqU3pZ+m/2kptfBszLMUkC4ZK/EgS/cQ=
github.com/kr/logfmt v0.0.0-20140226030751-b84e30acd515/go.mod h1:+0opPa2QZZtGFBFZlji/RkVcI2GknAs/DXo4wKdlNEc=
github.com/kr/pretty v0.1.0/go.mod h1:dAy3ld7l9f0ibDNOQOHHMYYIIbhfbHSm3C4ZsoJORNo=
github.com/kr/pretty v0.2.1 h1:Fmg33tUaq4/8ym9TJN1x7sLJnHVwhP33CNkpYV/7rwI=
github.com/kr/pretty v0.2.1/go.mod h1:ipq/a2n7PKx3OHsz4KJII5eveXtPO4qwEXGdVfWzfnI=
github.com/kr/pretty v0.3.1 h1:flRD4NNwYAUpkphVc1HcthR4KEIFJ65n8Mw5qdRn3LE=
github.com/kr/pretty v0.3.1/go.mod h1:hoEshYVHaxMs3cyo3Yncou5ZscifuDolrwPKZanG3xk=
github.com/kr/pty v1.1.1/go.mod h1:pFQYn66WHrOpPYNljwOMqo10TkYh1fy3cYio2l3bCsQ=
github.com/kr/text v0.1.0 h1:45sCR5RtlFHMR4UwH9sdQ5TC8v0qDQCHnXt+kaKSTVE=
github.com/kr/text v0.1.0/go.mod h1:4Jbv+DJW3UT/LiOwJeYQe1efqtUx/iVham/4vfdArNI=
@@ -98,13 +102,14 @@ github.com/nbrownus/go-metrics-prometheus v0.0.0-20210712211119-974a6260965f/go.
github.com/pkg/errors v0.8.0/go.mod h1:bwawxfHBFNV+L2hUp1rHADufV3IMtnDRdf1r5NINEl0=
github.com/pkg/errors v0.8.1/go.mod h1:bwawxfHBFNV+L2hUp1rHADufV3IMtnDRdf1r5NINEl0=
github.com/pkg/errors v0.9.1/go.mod h1:bwawxfHBFNV+L2hUp1rHADufV3IMtnDRdf1r5NINEl0=
github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0 h1:4DBwDE0NGyQoBHbLQYPwSUPoCMWR5BEzIk/f1lZbAQM=
github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0/go.mod h1:iKH77koFhYxTK1pcRnkKkqfTogsbg7gZNVY4sRDYZ/4=
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v0.9.1/go.mod h1:7SWBe2y4D6OKWSNQJUaRYU/AaXPKyh/dDVn+NZz0KFw=
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.0.0/go.mod h1:db9x61etRT2tGnBNRi70OPL5FsnadC4Ky3P0J6CfImo=
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.7.1/go.mod h1:PY5Wy2awLA44sXw4AOSfFBetzPP4j5+D6mVACh+pe2M=
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.11.0/go.mod h1:Z6t4BnS23TR94PD6BsDNk8yVqroYurpAkEiz0P2BEV0=
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.24.1 h1:JnJkREXzWxUdCuPFpIWZiPispT9xVV59uiuyR2bPlnU=
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.24.1/go.mod h1:F+oSRECHg4sse5ucfYpYDeIv/hu68Zo0uoHKetWnzcE=
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.23.2 h1:Je96obch5RDVy3FDMndoUsjAhG5Edi49h0RJWRi/o0o=
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.23.2/go.mod h1:Tb1a6LWHB3/SPIzCoaDXI4I8UHKeFTEQ1YCr+0Gyqmg=
github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.0.0-20180712105110-5c3871d89910/go.mod h1:MbSGuTsp3dbXC40dX6PRTWyKYBIrTGTE9sqQNg2J8bo=
github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.0.0-20190129233127-fd36f4220a90/go.mod h1:xMI15A0UPsDsEKsMN9yxemIoYk6Tm2C1GtYGdfGttqA=
github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.2.0/go.mod h1:xMI15A0UPsDsEKsMN9yxemIoYk6Tm2C1GtYGdfGttqA=
@@ -113,16 +118,18 @@ github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.6.2/go.mod h1:y3m2F6Gdpfy6Ut/GBsUqTWZqCUvM
github.com/prometheus/common v0.4.1/go.mod h1:TNfzLD0ON7rHzMJeJkieUDPYmFC7Snx/y86RQel1bk4=
github.com/prometheus/common v0.10.0/go.mod h1:Tlit/dnDKsSWFlCLTWaA1cyBgKHSMdTB80sz/V91rCo=
github.com/prometheus/common v0.26.0/go.mod h1:M7rCNAaPfAosfx8veZJCuw84e35h3Cfd9VFqTh1DIvc=
github.com/prometheus/common v0.70.1 h1:1HvjP4D5oL3t8RsPlwxA9onvvStjtIHYE5XuuwOi/PY=
github.com/prometheus/common v0.70.1/go.mod h1:VdFUQDMZK3VLkurFUVhia6uys/0suUp86TJz5qbJRhc=
github.com/prometheus/common v0.66.1 h1:h5E0h5/Y8niHc5DlaLlWLArTQI7tMrsfQjHV+d9ZoGs=
github.com/prometheus/common v0.66.1/go.mod h1:gcaUsgf3KfRSwHY4dIMXLPV0K/Wg1oZ8+SbZk/HH/dA=
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.0.0-20181005140218-185b4288413d/go.mod h1:c3At6R/oaqEKCNdg8wHV1ftS6bRYblBhIjjI8uT2IGk=
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.0.2/go.mod h1:TjEm7ze935MbeOT/UhFTIMYKhuLP4wbCsTZCD3I8kEA=
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.1.3/go.mod h1:lV6e/gmhEcM9IjHGsFOCxxuZ+z1YqCvr4OA4YeYWdaU=
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.6.0/go.mod h1:cz+aTbrPOrUb4q7XlbU9ygM+/jj0fzG6c1xBZuNvfVA=
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.21.1 h1:GljZCt+zSTS+NZq88cyQ1LjZ+RCHp3uVuabBWA5+OJI=
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.21.1/go.mod h1:aB55Cww9pdSJVHk0hUf0inxWyyjPogFIjmHKYgMKmtY=
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.16.1 h1:hZ15bTNuirocR6u0JZ6BAHHmwS1p8B4P6MRqxtzMyRg=
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.16.1/go.mod h1:teAbpZRB1iIAJYREa1LsoWUXykVXA1KlTmWl8x/U+Is=
github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics v0.0.0-20201227073835-cf1acfcdf475 h1:N/ElC8H3+5XpJzTSTfLsJV/mx9Q9g7kxmchpfZyxgzM=
github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics v0.0.0-20201227073835-cf1acfcdf475/go.mod h1:bCqnVzQkZxMG4s8nGwiZ5l3QUCyqpo9Y+/ZMZ9VjZe4=
github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.10.0 h1:TMyTOH3F/DB16zRVcYyreMH6GnZZrwQVAoYjRBZyWFQ=
github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.10.0/go.mod h1:UQnix2H7Ngw/k4C5ijL5+65zddjncjaFoBhdsK/akog=
github.com/sirupsen/logrus v1.2.0/go.mod h1:LxeOpSwHxABJmUn/MG1IvRgCAasNZTLOkJPxbbu5VWo=
github.com/sirupsen/logrus v1.4.2/go.mod h1:tLMulIdttU9McNUspp0xgXVQah82FyeX6MwdIuYE2rE=
github.com/sirupsen/logrus v1.6.0/go.mod h1:7uNnSEd1DgxDLC74fIahvMZmmYsHGZGEOFrfsX/uA88=
@@ -136,8 +143,8 @@ github.com/stretchr/testify v1.2.2/go.mod h1:a8OnRcib4nhh0OaRAV+Yts87kKdq0PP7pXf
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.3.0/go.mod h1:M5WIy9Dh21IEIfnGCwXGc5bZfKNJtfHm1UVUgZn+9EI=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.4.0/go.mod h1:j7eGeouHqKxXV5pUuKE4zz7dFj8WfuZ+81PSLYec5m4=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.7.0/go.mod h1:6Fq8oRcR53rry900zMqJjRRixrwX3KX962/h/Wwjteg=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.12.0 h1:K6Mr6jO9JICuend/5xzTM03ydSV3vdNRYAdPSukj8uI=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.12.0/go.mod h1:bOYBZb5qJ00vPzWfIqBUZPaxK8jWiXc6d3ErP4Ca9Gw=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1 h1:7s2iGBzp5EwR7/aIZr8ao5+dra3wiQyKjjFuvgVKu7U=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1/go.mod h1:wZwfW3scLgRK+23gO65QZefKpKQRnfz6sD981Nm4B6U=
github.com/vishvananda/netlink v1.3.1 h1:3AEMt62VKqz90r0tmNhog0r/PpWKmrEShJU0wJW6bV0=
github.com/vishvananda/netlink v1.3.1/go.mod h1:ARtKouGSTGchR8aMwmkzC0qiNPrrWO5JS/XMVl45+b4=
github.com/vishvananda/netns v0.0.5 h1:DfiHV+j8bA32MFM7bfEunvT8IAqQ/NzSJHtcmW5zdEY=
@@ -146,10 +153,10 @@ github.com/yuin/goldmark v1.1.27/go.mod h1:3hX8gzYuyVAZsxl0MRgGTJEmQBFcNTphYh9de
github.com/yuin/goldmark v1.2.1/go.mod h1:3hX8gzYuyVAZsxl0MRgGTJEmQBFcNTphYh9decYSb74=
go.uber.org/goleak v1.3.0 h1:2K3zAYmnTNqV73imy9J1T3WC+gmCePx2hEGkimedGto=
go.uber.org/goleak v1.3.0/go.mod h1:CoHD4mav9JJNrW/WLlf7HGZPjdw8EucARQHekz1X6bE=
go.yaml.in/yaml/v2 v2.4.4 h1:tuyd0P+2Ont/d6e2rl3be67goVK4R6deVxCUX5vyPaQ=
go.yaml.in/yaml/v2 v2.4.4/go.mod h1:gMZqIpDtDqOfM0uNfy0SkpRhvUryYH0Z6wdMYcacYXQ=
go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.5 h1:N6y/pJk8buWs9NY5ERU2HSMfm+IuD/OtfdAnq6kESPw=
go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.5/go.mod h1:HVTZu1O7/Vkt2N+BFy8Zza+lnLsABggaTM2ZpNIGuKg=
go.yaml.in/yaml/v2 v2.4.2 h1:DzmwEr2rDGHl7lsFgAHxmNz/1NlQ7xLIrlN2h5d1eGI=
go.yaml.in/yaml/v2 v2.4.2/go.mod h1:081UH+NErpNdqlCXm3TtEran0rJZGxAYx9hb/ELlsPU=
go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.4 h1:tfq32ie2Jv2UxXFdLJdh3jXuOzWiL1fo0bu/FbuKpbc=
go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.4/go.mod h1:DhzuOOF2ATzADvBadXxruRBLzYTpT36CKvDb3+aBEFg=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20180904163835-0709b304e793/go.mod h1:6SG95UA2DQfeDnfUPMdvaQW0Q7yPrPDi9nlGo2tz2b4=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190308221718-c2843e01d9a2/go.mod h1:djNgcEr1/C05ACkg1iLfiJU5Ep61QUkGW8qpdssI0+w=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20191011191535-87dc89f01550/go.mod h1:yigFU9vqHzYiE8UmvKecakEJjdnWj3jj499lnFckfCI=
@@ -157,6 +164,8 @@ golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20200622213623-75b288015ac9/go.mod h1:LzIPMQfyMNhhGPh
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20210322153248-0c34fe9e7dc2/go.mod h1:T9bdIzuCu7OtxOm1hfPfRQxPLYneinmdGuTeoZ9dtd4=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.54.0 h1:YLIA59K4fiNzHzjnZt2tUJQjQtUWfWbeHBqKtk3eScw=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.54.0/go.mod h1:KWL8ny2AZdGR2cWmzeHrp2azQPGogOv+HeQaVEXC2dk=
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20230725093048-515e97ebf090 h1:Di6/M8l0O2lCLc6VVRWhgCiApHV8MnQurBnFSHsQtNY=
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20230725093048-515e97ebf090/go.mod h1:FXUEEKJgO7OQYeo8N01OfiKP8RXMtf6e8aTskBGqWdc=
golang.org/x/lint v0.0.0-20200302205851-738671d3881b/go.mod h1:3xt1FjdF8hUf6vQPIChWIBhFzV8gjjsPE/fR3IyQdNY=
golang.org/x/mod v0.1.1-0.20191105210325-c90efee705ee/go.mod h1:QqPTAvyqsEbceGzBzNggFXnrqF1CaUcvgkdR5Ot7KZg=
golang.org/x/mod v0.2.0/go.mod h1:s0Qsj1ACt9ePp/hMypM3fl4fZqREWJwdYDEqhRiZZUA=
-117
View File
@@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
package nebula
// This file is a trimmed, inlined copy of the graphite exporter from
// github.com/cyberdelia/go-metrics-graphite, retaining only the Config type and
// the Once entrypoint that Nebula uses. The upstream package has been
// unmaintained for 10+ years, so it was vendored here to drop the dependency.
// See https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/issues/1831.
//
// Copyright 2015 Timothée Peignier. All rights reserved.
//
// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
// modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
//
// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
// this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
//
// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
// this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
// and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
//
// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
// AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
// IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
// DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
// FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
// DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
// SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
// CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY,
// OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
// OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
import (
"bufio"
"fmt"
"net"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
)
// graphiteConfigExport provides a container with configuration parameters for
// the Graphite exporter.
type graphiteConfigExport struct {
Addr *net.TCPAddr // Network address to connect to
Registry metrics.Registry // Registry to be exported
FlushInterval time.Duration // Flush interval
DurationUnit time.Duration // Time conversion unit for durations
Prefix string // Prefix to be prepended to metric names
Percentiles []float64 // Percentiles to export from timers and histograms
}
// graphiteOnce performs a single submission to Graphite, returning a non-nil
// error on failed connections.
func graphiteOnce(c graphiteConfigExport) error {
now := time.Now().Unix()
du := float64(c.DurationUnit)
flushSeconds := float64(c.FlushInterval) / float64(time.Second)
conn, err := net.DialTCP("tcp", nil, c.Addr)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer conn.Close()
w := bufio.NewWriter(conn)
c.Registry.Each(func(name string, i any) {
switch metric := i.(type) {
case metrics.Counter:
count := metric.Count()
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.count %d %d\n", c.Prefix, name, count, now)
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.count_ps %.2f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, float64(count)/flushSeconds, now)
case metrics.Gauge:
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.value %d %d\n", c.Prefix, name, metric.Value(), now)
case metrics.GaugeFloat64:
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.value %f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, metric.Value(), now)
case metrics.Histogram:
h := metric.Snapshot()
ps := h.Percentiles(c.Percentiles)
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.count %d %d\n", c.Prefix, name, h.Count(), now)
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.min %d %d\n", c.Prefix, name, h.Min(), now)
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.max %d %d\n", c.Prefix, name, h.Max(), now)
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.mean %.2f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, h.Mean(), now)
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.std-dev %.2f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, h.StdDev(), now)
for psIdx, psKey := range c.Percentiles {
key := strings.Replace(strconv.FormatFloat(psKey*100.0, 'f', -1, 64), ".", "", 1)
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.%s-percentile %.2f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, key, ps[psIdx], now)
}
case metrics.Meter:
m := metric.Snapshot()
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.count %d %d\n", c.Prefix, name, m.Count(), now)
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.one-minute %.2f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, m.Rate1(), now)
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.five-minute %.2f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, m.Rate5(), now)
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.fifteen-minute %.2f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, m.Rate15(), now)
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.mean %.2f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, m.RateMean(), now)
case metrics.Timer:
t := metric.Snapshot()
ps := t.Percentiles(c.Percentiles)
count := t.Count()
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.count %d %d\n", c.Prefix, name, count, now)
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.count_ps %.2f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, float64(count)/flushSeconds, now)
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.min %d %d\n", c.Prefix, name, t.Min()/int64(du), now)
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.max %d %d\n", c.Prefix, name, t.Max()/int64(du), now)
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.mean %.2f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, t.Mean()/du, now)
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.std-dev %.2f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, t.StdDev()/du, now)
for psIdx, psKey := range c.Percentiles {
key := strings.Replace(strconv.FormatFloat(psKey*100.0, 'f', -1, 64), ".", "", 1)
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.%s-percentile %.2f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, key, ps[psIdx]/du, now)
}
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.one-minute %.2f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, t.Rate1(), now)
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.five-minute %.2f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, t.Rate5(), now)
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.fifteen-minute %.2f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, t.Rate15(), now)
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s.%s.mean-rate %.2f %d\n", c.Prefix, name, t.RateMean(), now)
}
w.Flush()
})
return nil
}
+3 -18
View File
@@ -749,14 +749,8 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) beginHandshake(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *head
return
}
connState, err := newConnectionStateFromResult(result)
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Discarding handshake with an invalid message index", "error", err, "vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs)
return
}
hostinfo := &HostInfo{
ConnectionState: connState,
ConnectionState: newConnectionStateFromResult(result),
localIndexId: result.LocalIndex,
remoteIndexId: result.RemoteIndex,
vpnAddrs: vpnAddrs,
@@ -874,13 +868,7 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) continueHandshake(via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostIn
}
// Handshake complete; build the ConnectionState now that we have keys and a verified peer cert.
cs, err := newConnectionStateFromResult(result)
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Discarding handshake with an invalid message index", "error", err, "vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs)
hm.DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo)
return
}
hostinfo.ConnectionState = cs
hostinfo.ConnectionState = newConnectionStateFromResult(result)
remoteCert := result.RemoteCert
if remoteCert == nil {
@@ -987,9 +975,6 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) continueHandshake(via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostIn
nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
out := make([]byte, mtu)
for _, cp := range hh.packetStore {
// TODO: use a SendBatch here. Each callback lands in
// sendNoMetrics -> WriteTo: one syscall per cached packet,
// where one sendmmsg could flush the whole store.
cp.callback(cp.messageType, cp.messageSubType, hostinfo, cp.packet, nb, out)
}
f.cachedPacketMetrics.sent.Inc(int64(len(hh.packetStore)))
@@ -1101,7 +1086,7 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) sendHandshakeResponse(via ViaSender, msg []byte, hos
// We received a valid handshake on this relay, so make sure the relay
// state reflects that, in case it had been marked Disestablished.
via.relayHI.relayState.UpdateRelayForByIdxState(via.relay.LocalIndex, Established)
f.SendVia(via.relayHI, via.relay, msg, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu), false, 0)
f.SendVia(via.relayHI, via.relay, msg, make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, mtu), false)
f.l.Info("Handshake message sent", append(logFields, "relay", via.relayHI.vpnAddrs[0])...)
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ func (mw *mockEncWriter) SendMessageToVpnAddr(_ header.MessageType, _ header.Mes
return
}
func (mw *mockEncWriter) SendVia(via *HostInfo, relay *Relay, ad, nb, out []byte, nocopy bool, q int) {
func (mw *mockEncWriter) SendVia(_ *HostInfo, _ *Relay, _, _, _ []byte, _ bool) {
return
}
+6 -11
View File
@@ -190,18 +190,13 @@ func SubTypeName(t MessageType, s MessageSubType) string {
}
func IsValidSubType(t MessageType, s MessageSubType) bool {
switch t {
case Message:
return s == MessageNone || s == MessageRelay
case Handshake:
return s == HandshakeIXPSK0
case Test:
return s == TestReply || s == TestRequest
case Control, CloseTunnel, RecvError, LightHouse:
return s == 0
default:
return false
if n, ok := subTypeMap[t]; ok {
if _, ok := (*n)[s]; ok {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// NewHeader turns bytes into a header
-51
View File
@@ -102,57 +102,6 @@ func TestTypeMap(t *testing.T) {
}, subTypeMap)
}
// mapIsValidSubType is the pre-refactor, map-driven definition of a valid
// subtype. IsValidSubType was reimplemented as an explicit switch; this keeps
// the original behavior around so we can prove the switch is equivalent to it.
func mapIsValidSubType(t MessageType, s MessageSubType) bool {
if n, ok := subTypeMap[t]; ok {
if _, ok := (*n)[s]; ok {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func TestIsValidSubType(t *testing.T) {
// Explicit intent table: documents exactly which subtypes are valid so the
// test stays meaningful even if both the switch and subTypeMap change.
assert.True(t, IsValidSubType(Message, MessageNone))
assert.True(t, IsValidSubType(Message, MessageRelay))
assert.False(t, IsValidSubType(Message, 2))
assert.True(t, IsValidSubType(Handshake, HandshakeIXPSK0))
// HandshakeXXPSK0 is defined but not a wire-valid subtype.
assert.False(t, IsValidSubType(Handshake, HandshakeXXPSK0))
assert.True(t, IsValidSubType(Test, TestRequest))
assert.True(t, IsValidSubType(Test, TestReply))
assert.False(t, IsValidSubType(Test, 2))
// These types only ever carry subtype 0.
for _, mt := range []MessageType{Control, CloseTunnel, RecvError, LightHouse} {
assert.True(t, IsValidSubType(mt, 0), "type %d subtype 0 should be valid", mt)
assert.False(t, IsValidSubType(mt, 1), "type %d subtype 1 should be invalid", mt)
}
// Unknown/unassigned types are never valid.
assert.False(t, IsValidSubType(99, 0))
// Exhaustive proof of equivalence with the original map-driven logic across
// the entire (type, subtype) input space.
for ti := 0; ti <= 0xff; ti++ {
for si := 0; si <= 0xff; si++ {
mt, mst := MessageType(ti), MessageSubType(si)
assert.Equalf(t, mapIsValidSubType(mt, mst), IsValidSubType(mt, mst),
"IsValidSubType(%d, %d) diverged from map-driven definition", ti, si)
}
}
// H method must delegate to the package function.
assert.True(t, (&H{Type: Test, Subtype: TestReply}).IsValidSubType())
assert.False(t, (&H{Type: Handshake, Subtype: HandshakeXXPSK0}).IsValidSubType())
}
func TestHeader_String(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(
t,
+20 -23
View File
@@ -238,10 +238,16 @@ const (
)
type HostInfo struct {
// The first cache line is everything the packet paths touch. Grouping them here means a send or receive
// pulls in one line instead of two, which is what the layout looked like when state lived at the end.
remote atomic.Pointer[netip.AddrPort]
ConnectionState *ConnectionState
// Traffic bits, pendingDeletion, and the rebind epoch we last sent under
// state holds everything the hot paths need to touch per packet, in one word: whether we have seen traffic
// each way since the connection manager last looked, whether it has given up on us, and the
// Interface.rebindEpoch this tunnel last sent under. Keeping the epoch here means it survives the traffic
// bits being cleared, so a tunnel that has not sent since a rebind still notices when it does.
state atomic.Uint32
promoteCounter atomic.Uint32
@@ -254,6 +260,8 @@ type HostInfo struct {
// vpn networks but were removed because they are not usable
vpnAddrs []netip.Addr
// Everything below is off the packet path: handshakes, relays, roaming and the connection manager.
// networks is a combination of specific vpn addresses (not prefixes!) and full unsafe networks assigned to this host.
networks *bart.Table[NetworkType]
relayState RelayState
@@ -539,17 +547,6 @@ func (hm *HostMap) unlockedDeleteHostInfo(hostinfo *HostInfo) bool {
return final
}
func (hm *HostMap) QueryIndexCached(index uint32, cache map[uint32]*HostInfo) *HostInfo {
if out, ok := cache[index]; ok {
return out
}
out := hm.QueryIndex(index)
if out != nil {
cache[index] = out
}
return out
}
func (hm *HostMap) QueryIndex(index uint32) *HostInfo {
hm.RLock()
if h, ok := hm.Indexes[index]; ok {
@@ -766,25 +763,27 @@ func (i *HostInfo) TryPromoteBest(preferredRanges []netip.Prefix, ifce *Interfac
}
}
// Bits within HostInfo.state, everything above stateEpochShift is the epoch
// Bits within HostInfo.state. Everything above stateEpochShift is the rebind epoch.
const (
stateIn uint32 = 1 << iota
stateOut
statePendingDeletion
stateFlags = stateIn | stateOut | statePendingDeletion
// The epoch is the top 29 bits, it would take 2^29 rebinds to wrap and we will never get there
stateFlags = stateIn | stateOut | statePendingDeletion
stateEpochShift = 3
)
// markIn records inbound traffic
// markIn records inbound traffic. Reading first keeps the cache line shared on the common path, where the bit
// is already set.
func (i *HostInfo) markIn() {
if i.state.Load()&stateIn == 0 {
i.state.Or(stateIn)
}
}
// markOut records a send and reports whether the epoch moved, meaning we want a punch from the far side
// markOut records that we sent on this tunnel under the given rebind epoch. It reports whether the epoch moved
// since our last send, which means the local network changed and we want the far side to punch at us again.
// The common path is a single load that matches and returns.
func (i *HostInfo) markOut(epoch uint32) bool {
e := epoch << stateEpochShift
for {
@@ -799,14 +798,12 @@ func (i *HostInfo) markOut(epoch uint32) bool {
}
}
// markOutOnly records a send without consuming the rebind epoch, for paths that cannot act on a requery
func (i *HostInfo) markOutOnly() {
if i.state.Load()&stateOut == 0 {
i.state.Or(stateOut)
}
// sentSinceCheck reports whether anything has been sent since the connection manager last looked.
func (i *HostInfo) sentSinceCheck() bool {
return i.state.Load()&stateOut != 0
}
// takeTraffic clears both traffic bits, leaving the epoch alone, and reports what they were
// takeTraffic clears both traffic bits, leaving the epoch alone, and reports what they were.
func (i *HostInfo) takeTraffic() (in bool, out bool) {
old := i.state.And(^(stateIn | stateOut))
return old&stateIn != 0, old&stateOut != 0
-46
View File
@@ -401,49 +401,3 @@ func TestHostMap_RelayState(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, []netip.Addr{}, h1.relayState.relays)
}
// sentSinceCheck reports whether anything has been sent since the connection manager last looked. Test only:
// production reads the out bit through takeTraffic on the connection manager tick.
func (i *HostInfo) sentSinceCheck() bool {
return i.state.Load()&stateOut != 0
}
func TestHostInfo_markOut(t *testing.T) {
h := &HostInfo{}
h.markOut(5) // stamped when the tunnel was added
// A tunnel already on the current epoch has nothing to report, which is what keeps a fresh tunnel from
// requerying on its first packet
assert.False(t, h.markOut(5), "an unchanged epoch should not report a move")
assert.True(t, h.sentSinceCheck(), "the send is still recorded as traffic")
// A rebind is observed exactly once, so we requery once per rebind
assert.True(t, h.markOut(6), "a bumped epoch should report a move")
assert.False(t, h.markOut(6), "the epoch move should only be reported once")
// Traffic and pendingDeletion live in the same word and must survive an epoch change
h.setPendingDeletion(true)
h.markIn()
assert.True(t, h.markOut(7))
assert.True(t, h.isPendingDeletion(), "pendingDeletion must survive an epoch change")
in, out := h.takeTraffic()
assert.True(t, in, "inbound traffic must survive an epoch change")
assert.True(t, out)
// Clearing the traffic bits leaves the epoch alone, otherwise an idle tunnel would requery forever
assert.False(t, h.markOut(7), "takeTraffic must not disturb the epoch")
}
// A relayed send records traffic but must leave the rebind epoch for the direct path to consume, otherwise
// relaying to a host swallows the requery that gets the far side punching at our new address.
func TestHostInfo_markOutOnly(t *testing.T) {
h := &HostInfo{}
h.markOut(5)
h.markOutOnly()
assert.True(t, h.sentSinceCheck(), "a relayed send is still outbound traffic")
assert.False(t, h.markOut(5), "a relayed send must not disturb the epoch")
assert.True(t, h.markOut(6), "a relayed send must not consume the epoch edge")
assert.False(t, h.markOut(6))
}
+39 -228
View File
@@ -2,8 +2,6 @@ package nebula
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/netip"
@@ -11,24 +9,10 @@ import (
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/iputil"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/noiseutil"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/batch"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
)
func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(pkt tio.Packet, fwPacket *firewall.ParsedPacket, nb []byte, sendBatch *batch.SendBatch, rejectBuf []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
// borrowed: pkt.Bytes is owned by the originating tio.Queue and is
// only valid until the next Read on that queue. Every consumer below
// (parse, self-forward, handshake cache, sendInsideMessage) reads it
// synchronously; do not retain pkt outside this call. If a future
// caller needs to keep the packet, use pkt.Clone() to detach it from
// the borrow.
//
// pkt.Bytes is either one IP datagram (GSO zero) or a TSO/USO
// superpacket. In both cases the L3+L4 headers at the start describe
// the same 5-tuple every segment will share, so a single newPacket /
// firewall check covers the whole superpacket.
packet := pkt.Bytes
func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(packet []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, nb, out []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
err := newPacket(packet, false, fwPacket)
if err != nil {
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
@@ -53,17 +37,7 @@ func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(pkt tio.Packet, fwPacket *firewall.Parse
// routes packets from the Nebula addr to the Nebula addr through the Nebula
// TUN device.
if immediatelyForwardToSelf {
// Write copies into the kernel queue synchronously, so seg's lifetime ends at return.
// A self-forwarded superpacket would be re-handed to the
// kernel as one giant blob; segment first so the loopback
// path sees one IP datagram per Write.
err := tio.SegmentSuperpacket(pkt, func(seg []byte) error {
// The kernel may have left the transport checksum for hardware
// offload to finish; nothing between here and the tun will.
iputil.SetTransportChecksum(seg)
_, werr := f.queues[q].Write(seg)
return werr
})
_, err := f.readers[q].Write(packet)
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to forward to tun", "error", err)
}
@@ -78,24 +52,12 @@ func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(pkt tio.Packet, fwPacket *firewall.Parse
return
}
hostinfo, ready := f.getOrHandshakeConsiderRouting(&fwPacket.Packet, func(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) {
// borrowed: SegmentSuperpacket builds each segment in the kernel-supplied pkt
// bytes underneath. cachePacket explicitly copies its argument (handshake_manager.go cachePacket),
// so retaining segments past the loop is safe.
err := tio.SegmentSuperpacket(pkt, func(seg []byte) error {
hh.cachePacket(f.l, header.Message, 0, seg, f.sendMessageNow, f.cachedPacketMetrics)
return nil
})
if err != nil && f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
f.l.Debug("Failed to segment superpacket for handshake cache",
"error", err,
"vpnAddr", fwPacket.RemoteAddr,
)
}
hostinfo, ready := f.getOrHandshakeConsiderRouting(fwPacket, func(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) {
hh.cachePacket(f.l, header.Message, 0, packet, f.sendMessageNow, f.cachedPacketMetrics)
})
if hostinfo == nil {
f.rejectInside(packet, rejectBuf, q)
f.rejectInside(packet, out, q)
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
f.l.Debug("dropping outbound packet, vpnAddr not in our vpn networks or in unsafe networks",
"vpnAddr", fwPacket.RemoteAddr,
@@ -109,11 +71,12 @@ func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(pkt tio.Packet, fwPacket *firewall.Parse
return
}
dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(fwPacket.Packet, false, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), localCache)
dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(*fwPacket, false, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), localCache)
if dropReason == nil {
f.sendInsideMessage(hostinfo, pkt, nb, sendBatch)
f.sendNoMetrics(header.Message, 0, hostinfo.ConnectionState, hostinfo, netip.AddrPort{}, packet, nb, out, q)
} else {
f.rejectInside(packet, rejectBuf, q)
f.rejectInside(packet, out, q)
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("dropping outbound packet",
"fwPacket", fwPacket,
@@ -123,122 +86,6 @@ func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(pkt tio.Packet, fwPacket *firewall.Parse
}
}
func (f *Interface) sendInsideEncrypt(hostinfo *HostInfo, ci *ConnectionState, seg, scratch, nb []byte) []byte {
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
ci.writeLock.Lock()
}
c := ci.messageCounter.Add(1)
out := header.Encode(scratch, header.Version, header.Message, 0, hostinfo.remoteIndexId, c)
out, encErr := ci.eKey.EncryptDanger(out, out, seg, c, nb)
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
ci.writeLock.Unlock()
}
if encErr != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to encrypt outgoing packet",
"error", encErr,
"udpAddr", hostinfo.GetRemote(),
"counter", c,
)
// Skip this segment; the rest of the superpacket can still go out. TCP will retransmit anything we drop here.
return nil
}
return out
}
// sendInsideMessage encrypts a firewall-approved inside packet (or every
// segment of a TSO/USO superpacket) into the caller's batch slot for
// later sendmmsg flush. Segmentation is fused with encryption here so the
// kernel-supplied superpacket bytes never get written into a separate
// scratch arena: SegmentSuperpacket builds each segment's plaintext in
// segScratch[:segLen] in turn, and we encrypt directly into a fresh SendBatch slot.
func (f *Interface) sendInsideMessage(hostinfo *HostInfo, pkt tio.Packet, nb []byte, sendBatch *batch.SendBatch) {
ci := hostinfo.ConnectionState
if ci.eKey == nil {
return
}
// One traffic-out mark covers every segment of the superpacket; doing it
// per segment in sendInsideEncrypt paid an atomic store up to ~45 extra
// times per TSO packet, inside writeLock under boring crypto.
//
// We rebound since this tunnel last sent, ask the lighthouse to get the far side punching at us again
if f.connectionManager.Out(hostinfo) {
f.lightHouse.QueryServer(hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0])
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("Lighthouse update triggered for punch due to rebind epoch",
"vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs,
)
}
}
remote := hostinfo.GetRemote()
if !remote.IsValid() { //the relay path
//first, find our relay hostinfo:
var relayHostInfo *HostInfo
var relay *Relay
var err error
for _, relayIP := range hostinfo.relayState.CopyRelayIps() {
relayHostInfo, relay, err = f.hostMap.QueryVpnAddrsRelayFor(hostinfo.vpnAddrs, relayIP)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.relayState.DeleteRelay(relayIP)
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Info("sendNoMetrics failed to find HostInfo",
"relay", relayIP,
"error", err,
)
continue
}
break
}
if relayHostInfo == nil || relay == nil {
//failure already logged
return
}
err = tio.SegmentSuperpacket(pkt, func(seg []byte) error {
//relay header + header + plaintext + AEAD tag (16 bytes for both AES-GCM and ChaCha20-Poly1305) + relay tag
scratch := sendBatch.Reserve(header.Len + header.Len + len(seg) + 16 + 16)
innerPacket := f.sendInsideEncrypt(hostinfo, ci, seg, scratch[header.Len:], nb)
if innerPacket == nil {
return nil
}
//now we need to do a relay-encrypt:
toSend, err := f.prepareSendVia(relayHostInfo, relay, innerPacket, nb, scratch, true)
if err != nil {
//already logged
return nil
}
sendBatch.Commit(toSend, relayHostInfo.GetRemote())
return nil
})
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to segment superpacket for relay send", "error", err)
}
return
}
err := tio.SegmentSuperpacket(pkt, func(seg []byte) error {
// header + plaintext + AEAD tag (16 bytes for both AES-GCM and ChaCha20-Poly1305)
scratch := sendBatch.Reserve(header.Len + len(seg) + 16)
out := f.sendInsideEncrypt(hostinfo, ci, seg, scratch, nb)
if out == nil {
return nil
}
sendBatch.Commit(out, remote)
return nil
})
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to segment superpacket for send", "error", err)
}
}
func (f *Interface) rejectInside(packet []byte, out []byte, q int) {
if !f.firewall.OutboundSendReject {
return
@@ -249,36 +96,33 @@ func (f *Interface) rejectInside(packet []byte, out []byte, q int) {
return
}
_, err := f.queues[q].Write(out)
_, err := f.readers[q].Write(out)
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to write to tun", "error", err)
}
}
func (f *Interface) rejectOutside(packet []byte, ci *ConnectionState, hostinfo *HostInfo, nb, rejectBuf []byte, q int) {
func (f *Interface) rejectOutside(packet []byte, ci *ConnectionState, hostinfo *HostInfo, nb, out []byte, q int) {
if !f.firewall.InboundSendReject {
return
}
// split rejectBuf to make sure we have room to write the plaintext rejection, then encrypt it, without trampling anything
// we can't re-use packet, if we need to send an icmp reject, it won't be long enough.
half := len(rejectBuf) / 2
encryptBuf := rejectBuf[0:0:half] //the first half of rejectBuf's capacity, len set to 0
buildBuf := rejectBuf[half:]
out := iputil.CreateRejectPacket(packet, buildBuf)
out = iputil.CreateRejectPacket(packet, out)
if len(out) == 0 {
return
}
if len(out) > iputil.MaxRejectPacketSize {
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelInfo) {
f.l.Info("rejectOutside: packet too big, not sending", "packet", packet, "outPacket", out)
f.l.Info("rejectOutside: packet too big, not sending",
"packet", packet,
"outPacket", out,
)
}
return
}
f.sendNoMetrics(header.Message, 0, ci, hostinfo, netip.AddrPort{}, out, nb, encryptBuf, q)
f.sendNoMetrics(header.Message, 0, ci, hostinfo, netip.AddrPort{}, out, nb, packet, q)
}
// Handshake will attempt to initiate a tunnel with the provided vpn address. This is a no-op if the tunnel is already established or being established
@@ -372,7 +216,7 @@ func (f *Interface) getOrHandshakeConsiderRouting(fwPacket *firewall.Packet, cac
}
func (f *Interface) sendMessageNow(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, hostinfo *HostInfo, p, nb, out []byte) {
fp := &firewall.ParsedPacket{}
fp := &firewall.Packet{}
err := newPacket(p, false, fp)
if err != nil {
f.l.Warn("error while parsing outgoing packet for firewall check", "error", err)
@@ -380,7 +224,7 @@ func (f *Interface) sendMessageNow(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubTyp
}
// check if packet is in outbound fw rules
dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(fp.Packet, false, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), nil)
dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(*fp, false, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), nil)
if dropReason != nil {
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
f.l.Debug("dropping cached packet",
@@ -431,36 +275,29 @@ func (f *Interface) sendTo(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, ci *C
f.sendNoMetrics(t, st, ci, hostinfo, remote, p, nb, out, 0)
}
// dropExhausted records an exhaustion drop and logs once, on the crossing send, for a spent tunnel.
func (f *Interface) dropExhausted(hostinfo *HostInfo, c uint64, msg string) {
f.messageMetrics.TxExhausted(1)
if c == RejectAfterMessages {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error(msg)
}
}
func (f *Interface) prepareSendVia(via *HostInfo,
// SendVia sends a payload through a Relay tunnel. No authentication or encryption is done
// to the payload for the ultimate target host, making this a useful method for sending
// handshake messages to peers through relay tunnels.
// via is the HostInfo through which the message is relayed.
// ad is the plaintext data to authenticate, but not encrypt
// nb is a buffer used to store the nonce value, re-used for performance reasons.
// out is a buffer used to store the result of the Encrypt operation
// q indicates which writer to use to send the packet.
func (f *Interface) SendVia(via *HostInfo,
relay *Relay,
ad,
nb,
out []byte,
nocopy bool,
) ([]byte, error) {
) {
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
// NOTE: for goboring AESGCMTLS we need to lock because of the nonce check
via.ConnectionState.writeLock.Lock()
}
c, ok := via.ConnectionState.NextMessageCounter()
if !ok {
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
via.ConnectionState.writeLock.Unlock()
}
f.dropExhausted(via, c, "Dropping outbound relay packets, tunnel message counter is exhausted")
return nil, fmt.Errorf("tunnel message counter is exhausted")
}
c := via.ConnectionState.messageCounter.Add(1)
out = header.Encode(out, header.Version, header.Message, header.MessageRelay, relay.RemoteIndex, c)
f.connectionManager.OutNoRebind(via)
f.connectionManager.Out(via)
// Authenticate the header and payload, but do not encrypt for this message type.
// The payload consists of the inner, unencrypted Nebula header, as well as the end-to-end encrypted payload.
@@ -474,7 +311,7 @@ func (f *Interface) prepareSendVia(via *HostInfo,
"headerLen", len(out),
"cipherOverhead", via.ConnectionState.eKey.Overhead(),
)
return nil, io.ErrShortBuffer
return
}
// The header bytes are written to the 'out' slice; Grow the slice to hold the header and associated data payload.
@@ -494,31 +331,13 @@ func (f *Interface) prepareSendVia(via *HostInfo,
}
if err != nil {
via.logger(f.l).Info("Failed to EncryptDanger in sendVia", "error", err)
return nil, err
}
f.connectionManager.RelayUsed(relay.LocalIndex)
return out, nil
}
// SendVia sends a payload through a Relay tunnel. No authentication or encryption is done
// to the payload for the ultimate target host, making this a useful method for sending
// handshake messages to peers through relay tunnels.
// via is the HostInfo through which the message is relayed.
// ad is the plaintext data to authenticate, but not encrypt
// nb is a buffer used to store the nonce value, re-used for performance reasons.
// out is a buffer used to store the result of the Encrypt operation
// q indicates which writer to use to send the packet.
func (f *Interface) SendVia(via *HostInfo, relay *Relay, ad, nb, out []byte, nocopy bool, q int) {
toSend, err := f.prepareSendVia(via, relay, ad, nb, out, nocopy)
if err != nil {
// already logged by prepareSendVia
return
}
err = f.writers[q].WriteTo(toSend, via.GetRemote())
err = f.writers[0].WriteTo(out, via.GetRemote())
if err != nil {
via.logger(f.l).Info("Failed to WriteTo in sendVia", "error", err)
}
f.connectionManager.RelayUsed(relay.LocalIndex)
}
func (f *Interface) sendNoMetrics(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, ci *ConnectionState, hostinfo *HostInfo, remote netip.AddrPort, p, nb, out []byte, q int) {
@@ -542,21 +361,13 @@ func (f *Interface) sendNoMetrics(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType
// NOTE: for goboring AESGCMTLS we need to lock because of the nonce check
ci.writeLock.Lock()
}
c, ok := ci.NextMessageCounter()
if !ok {
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
ci.writeLock.Unlock()
}
f.dropExhausted(hostinfo, c, "Dropping outbound packets, tunnel message counter is exhausted")
return
}
c := ci.messageCounter.Add(1)
//l.WithField("trace", string(debug.Stack())).Error("out Header ", &Header{Version, t, st, 0, hostinfo.remoteIndexId, c}, p)
out = header.Encode(out, header.Version, t, st, hostinfo.remoteIndexId, c)
// A closing tunnel is torn down right after this, so skip the connection manager entirely: no point recording
// traffic or asking the lighthouse for a punch. Otherwise, if we rebound since this tunnel last sent, ask the
// lighthouse to get the far side punching at us again.
if t != header.CloseTunnel && f.connectionManager.Out(hostinfo) {
// We rebound since this tunnel last sent, so the local network moved. Ask the lighthouse to have the far side
// punch at where we are now, which primes their conntrack the same way a handshake would.
if f.connectionManager.Out(hostinfo) && t != header.CloseTunnel {
f.lightHouse.QueryServer(hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0])
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
f.l.Debug("Lighthouse update triggered for punch due to rebind epoch",
@@ -607,7 +418,7 @@ func (f *Interface) sendNoMetrics(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType
)
continue
}
f.SendVia(relayHostInfo, relay, out, nb, fullOut[:header.Len+len(out)], true, q)
f.SendVia(relayHostInfo, relay, out, nb, fullOut[:header.Len+len(out)], true)
break
}
}
-265
View File
@@ -1,265 +0,0 @@
package nebula
import (
"encoding/binary"
"io"
"net/netip"
"testing"
"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/iputil"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
const (
ipv4HeaderLen = 20
ipv6HeaderLen = 40
)
// capturingTun is a tio.Queue that records what is written to it. A queue that
// discards writes is indistinguishable from a packet that was never forwarded.
type capturingTun struct {
writes [][]byte
}
func (c *capturingTun) Read() ([]tio.Packet, error) { return nil, io.EOF }
func (c *capturingTun) Close() error { return nil }
func (c *capturingTun) Write(b []byte) (int, error) {
c.writes = append(c.writes, append([]byte(nil), b...))
return len(b), nil
}
func newSelfForwardInterface(myAddrs ...netip.Addr) (*Interface, *capturingTun) {
vpnAddrs := &bart.Lite{}
for _, a := range myAddrs {
vpnAddrs.Insert(netip.PrefixFrom(a, a.BitLen()))
}
tun := &capturingTun{}
return &Interface{
l: test.NewLogger(),
myVpnAddrsTable: vpnAddrs,
myBroadcastAddrsTable: &bart.Lite{},
queues: []tio.Queue{tun},
}, tun
}
func consumeInside(f *Interface, packet []byte) {
f.consumeInsidePacket(tio.Packet{Bytes: packet}, &firewall.ParsedPacket{}, make([]byte, 12), nil, make([]byte, mtu), 0, nil)
}
// l4Proto describes one upper-layer header for these tests: its IP next-header
// value, where its checksum field sits within the header, and how to build a
// minimal instance of it.
type l4Proto struct {
name string
nextHdr uint8
cksumAt int
build func() []byte
}
var (
tcpSyn = l4Proto{"tcp", iputil.IPProtocolTCP, 16, func() []byte {
h := make([]byte, 20)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(h[0:2], 49152)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(h[2:4], 443)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(h[4:8], 0x11223344) // sequence
h[12] = 5 << 4 // data offset, no options
h[13] = 0x02 // SYN
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(h[14:16], 65535) // window
return h
}}
udpDatagram = l4Proto{"udp", iputil.IPProtocolUDP, 6, func() []byte {
h := make([]byte, 8+4)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(h[0:2], 49152)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(h[2:4], 53)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(h[4:6], uint16(len(h)))
copy(h[8:], "ping")
return h
}}
icmpEcho = l4Proto{"icmp", iputil.IPProtocolICMP, 2, func() []byte { return echoRequest(8) }}
icmpv6Echo = l4Proto{"icmpv6", iputil.IPProtocolICMPv6, 2, func() []byte { return echoRequest(128) }}
)
// echoRequest builds an echo request body. The type differs between ICMP and
// ICMPv6, the rest of the header does not.
func echoRequest(typ uint8) []byte {
h := make([]byte, 8)
h[0] = typ
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(h[4:6], 0xbeef) // identifier
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(h[6:8], 1) // sequence
return h
}
func buildIPv6(src, dst netip.Addr, p l4Proto) []byte {
l4 := p.build()
pkt := make([]byte, ipv6HeaderLen+len(l4))
pkt[0] = 0x60
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(len(l4)))
pkt[6] = p.nextHdr
pkt[7] = 64
copy(pkt[8:24], src.AsSlice())
copy(pkt[24:40], dst.AsSlice())
copy(pkt[ipv6HeaderLen:], l4)
if l4 := pkt[ipv6HeaderLen:]; p.nextHdr == iputil.IPProtocolTCP || p.nextHdr == iputil.IPProtocolUDP {
sum := ipv6PseudoheaderSum(src, dst, uint32(p.nextHdr), uint32(len(l4)))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(l4[p.cksumAt:], ^fold(sumBytes(l4, sum)))
}
return pkt
}
func buildIPv4(src, dst netip.Addr, p l4Proto) []byte {
l4 := p.build()
pkt := make([]byte, ipv4HeaderLen+len(l4))
pkt[0] = 0x45
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[2:4], uint16(len(pkt)))
pkt[8] = 64
pkt[9] = p.nextHdr
copy(pkt[12:16], src.AsSlice())
copy(pkt[16:20], dst.AsSlice())
copy(pkt[ipv4HeaderLen:], l4)
if l4 := pkt[ipv4HeaderLen:]; p.nextHdr == iputil.IPProtocolTCP || p.nextHdr == iputil.IPProtocolUDP {
sum := sumBytes(pkt[12:20], uint32(p.nextHdr)+uint32(len(l4)))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(l4[p.cksumAt:], ^fold(sumBytes(l4, sum)))
}
return pkt
}
// ipv6PseudoheaderSum is the RFC 2460 section 8.1 pseudo-header sum: source,
// destination, a 32 bit upper-layer packet length and a 32 bit zero-padded next
// header. Kept local to the test so these assertions do not check nebula's
// checksum code against itself.
func ipv6PseudoheaderSum(src, dst netip.Addr, nextHeader, length uint32) uint32 {
var csum uint32
s, d := src.AsSlice(), dst.AsSlice()
for i := 0; i < 16; i += 2 {
csum += uint32(s[i])<<8 | uint32(s[i+1])
csum += uint32(d[i])<<8 | uint32(d[i+1])
}
return csum + length + nextHeader
}
func sumBytes(b []byte, csum uint32) uint32 {
for i := 0; i+1 < len(b); i += 2 {
csum += uint32(b[i])<<8 | uint32(b[i+1])
}
if len(b)%2 == 1 {
csum += uint32(b[len(b)-1]) << 8
}
return csum
}
func fold(csum uint32) uint16 {
for csum > 0xffff {
csum = (csum >> 16) + (csum & 0xffff)
}
return uint16(csum)
}
// l4ChecksumValid6 verifies an IPv6 upper-layer checksum the way a receiver
// does: the pseudo-header plus the whole upper-layer segment, checksum field
// included, folds to 0xffff. The next header field is the upper-layer protocol
// only while there are no extension headers, which is all this file builds.
func l4ChecksumValid6(pkt []byte) bool {
src, _ := netip.AddrFromSlice(pkt[8:24])
dst, _ := netip.AddrFromSlice(pkt[24:40])
l4 := pkt[ipv6HeaderLen:]
return fold(sumBytes(l4, ipv6PseudoheaderSum(src, dst, uint32(pkt[6]), uint32(len(l4))))) == 0xffff
}
// l4ChecksumValid4 is the IPv4 counterpart: the RFC 793/768 pseudo-header is
// source, destination, a zero byte, the protocol and the upper-layer length.
func l4ChecksumValid4(pkt []byte) bool {
ihl := int(pkt[0]&0x0f) << 2
l4 := pkt[ihl:]
return fold(sumBytes(l4, sumBytes(pkt[12:20], uint32(pkt[9])+uint32(len(l4))))) == 0xffff
}
// TestConsumeInsidePacketSelfTraffic covers the self-addressed branch of
// consumeInsidePacket, taken where immediatelyForwardToSelf is set (see
// inside_bsd.go): the packet goes straight back to the tun, ahead of the
// firewall and the handshake.
func TestConsumeInsidePacketSelfTraffic(t *testing.T) {
v4 := netip.MustParseAddr("100.100.1.42")
v6 := netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::42")
tests := []struct {
name string
addr netip.Addr
pkt []byte
}{
{"ipv4/tcp", v4, buildIPv4(v4, v4, tcpSyn)},
{"ipv4/udp", v4, buildIPv4(v4, v4, udpDatagram)},
{"ipv4/icmp", v4, buildIPv4(v4, v4, icmpEcho)},
{"ipv6/tcp", v6, buildIPv6(v6, v6, tcpSyn)},
{"ipv6/udp", v6, buildIPv6(v6, v6, udpDatagram)},
{"ipv6/icmpv6", v6, buildIPv6(v6, v6, icmpv6Echo)},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
f, tun := newSelfForwardInterface(tt.addr)
// consumeInsidePacket writes through the slice it is handed, so a
// packet that arrived with a valid checksum must come back out of
// bytes taken before the call, unchanged.
want := append([]byte(nil), tt.pkt...)
consumeInside(f, tt.pkt)
if immediatelyForwardToSelf {
require.Len(t, tun.writes, 1)
assert.Equal(t, want, tun.writes[0])
} else {
assert.Empty(t, tun.writes, "self traffic reaches the tun over loopback here and must be dropped")
}
})
}
}
// TestConsumeInsidePacketSelfTrafficChecksum shows that the self-forward
// returns the bytes it was handed, so a packet that arrived with a wrong
// upper-layer checksum is written back with that same wrong checksum and the
// kernel drops it on re-entry.
//
// This is how a macOS host loses TCP and UDP to its own IPv6 overlay address:
// the kernel writes only the pseudo-header sum into the checksum field and
// defers completion to hardware offload, state that does not survive the
// crossing into userspace. Which kernels do this, for which protocols and IP
// versions, is a property of the kernel and belongs to a test against a live
// one; here the checksum is simply wrong, and the forward must make it right.
func TestConsumeInsidePacketSelfTrafficChecksum(t *testing.T) {
if !immediatelyForwardToSelf {
t.Skip("self traffic never reaches the tun on this platform")
}
versions := []struct {
name string
addr netip.Addr
build func(src, dst netip.Addr, p l4Proto) []byte
l4At int
valid func(pkt []byte) bool
}{
{"v4", netip.MustParseAddr("100.100.1.42"), buildIPv4, ipv4HeaderLen, l4ChecksumValid4},
{"v6", netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::42"), buildIPv6, ipv6HeaderLen, l4ChecksumValid6},
}
for _, v := range versions {
for _, p := range []l4Proto{tcpSyn, udpDatagram} {
t.Run(v.name+"/"+p.name, func(t *testing.T) {
pkt := v.build(v.addr, v.addr, p)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[v.l4At+p.cksumAt:], 0x1234)
require.False(t, v.valid(pkt), "the packet under test must start with a wrong checksum")
f, tun := newSelfForwardInterface(v.addr)
consumeInside(f, pkt)
require.Len(t, tun.writes, 1)
assert.True(t, v.valid(tun.writes[0]),
"a forwarded %s packet must carry a valid checksum, got 0x%04x",
p.name, binary.BigEndian.Uint16(tun.writes[0][v.l4At+p.cksumAt:]))
})
}
}
}
+47 -170
View File
@@ -2,12 +2,11 @@ package nebula
import (
"context"
"crypto/fips140"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/netip"
"runtime"
"slices"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
@@ -15,15 +14,12 @@ import (
"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/batch"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
)
@@ -53,19 +49,7 @@ type InterfaceConfig struct {
reQueryWait time.Duration
ConntrackCacheTimeout time.Duration
// CpuAffinity, when non-empty, names the CPUs each TUN reader goroutine
// should pin to. Queue i pins to CpuAffinity[i % len(CpuAffinity)] —
// shorter lists than `routines` cycle. Empty list keeps the default
// pin-to-(i % NumCPU) behavior. Only consulted when PinThreads is true.
CpuAffinity []int
// PinThreads controls whether each TUN reader OS thread is pinned to a
// single CPU (via tun.pin_threads, default true). Pinning keeps each
// goroutine's sendmmsg on one XPS-selected NIC TX ring so per-flow
// packets stay ordered on the wire.
PinThreads bool
l *slog.Logger
l *slog.Logger
}
type Interface struct {
@@ -89,16 +73,7 @@ type Interface struct {
routines int
disconnectInvalid atomic.Bool
closed atomic.Bool
// cpuAffinity, when non-empty, names the CPUs each TUN reader goroutine
// should pin to. Queue i pins to cpuAffinity[i % len(cpuAffinity)].
// Empty falls back to the default pin-to-(allowed CPU) behavior.
// Only consulted when pinThreads is true.
cpuAffinity []int
// pinThreads controls whether listenIn pins each TUN reader OS thread to
// a CPU at all (tun.pin_threads, default true). When false, threads are
// left free to migrate as on stock nebula.
pinThreads bool
relayManager *relayManager
relayManager *relayManager
tryPromoteEvery atomic.Uint32
reQueryEvery atomic.Uint32
@@ -107,7 +82,9 @@ type Interface struct {
sendRecvErrorConfig recvErrorConfig
acceptRecvErrorConfig recvErrorConfig
// Bumped on every udp rebind, tunnels compare it to decide they need a punch from the far side
// rebindEpoch bumps every time the udp listener is rebound, which means the local network moved. Tunnels
// compare it against their own copy to decide they need a punch from the far side. Read on every send, only
// written on a rebind, so the cache line stays shared across the routines.
rebindEpoch atomic.Uint32
version string
@@ -115,14 +92,8 @@ type Interface struct {
ctx context.Context
writers []udp.Conn
queues []tio.Queue
// batchers is one per tun queue, wrapping queues[i]. readOutsidePackets
// commits plaintext into the batcher; the plaintext is decrypted
// in place inside the UDP receive buffers, so listenOut must call Flush
// at the end of each UDP recvmmsg batch, before those buffers are
// reused (every udp.Conn ListenOut guarantees that ordering).
batchers []*batch.MultiCoalescer
wg sync.WaitGroup
readers []io.ReadWriteCloser
wg sync.WaitGroup
// fatalErr holds the first unexpected reader error that caused shutdown.
// nil means "no fatal error" (yet)
@@ -133,13 +104,18 @@ type Interface struct {
metricHandshakes metrics.Histogram
messageMetrics *MessageMetrics
cachedPacketMetrics *cachedPacketMetrics
metricTxDropped metrics.Counter
l *slog.Logger
}
type EncWriter interface {
SendVia(via *HostInfo, relay *Relay, ad, nb, out []byte, nocopy bool, q int)
SendVia(via *HostInfo,
relay *Relay,
ad,
nb,
out []byte,
nocopy bool,
)
SendMessageToVpnAddr(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, vpnAddr netip.Addr, p, nb, out []byte)
SendMessageToHostInfo(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, hostinfo *HostInfo, p, nb, out []byte)
Handshake(vpnAddr netip.Addr)
@@ -198,10 +174,6 @@ func NewInterface(ctx context.Context, c *InterfaceConfig) (*Interface, error) {
return nil, errors.New("no connection manager")
}
if c.routines <= 1 {
c.PinThreads = false //pinning is not useful unless there's more than one tun reader
}
cs := c.pki.getCertState()
ifce := &Interface{
ctx: ctx,
@@ -219,7 +191,7 @@ func NewInterface(ctx context.Context, c *InterfaceConfig) (*Interface, error) {
routines: c.routines,
version: c.version,
writers: make([]udp.Conn, c.routines),
batchers: make([]*batch.MultiCoalescer, c.routines),
readers: make([]io.ReadWriteCloser, c.routines),
myVpnNetworks: cs.myVpnNetworks,
myVpnNetworksTable: cs.myVpnNetworksTable,
myVpnAddrs: cs.myVpnAddrs,
@@ -228,11 +200,8 @@ func NewInterface(ctx context.Context, c *InterfaceConfig) (*Interface, error) {
relayManager: c.relayManager,
connectionManager: c.connectionManager,
conntrackCacheTimeout: c.ConntrackCacheTimeout,
cpuAffinity: c.CpuAffinity,
pinThreads: c.PinThreads,
metricHandshakes: metrics.GetOrRegisterHistogram("handshakes", nil, metrics.NewExpDecaySample(1028, 0.015)),
metricTxDropped: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("udp.tx.dropped", nil),
messageMetrics: c.MessageMetrics,
cachedPacketMetrics: &cachedPacketMetrics{
sent: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("hostinfo.cached_packets.sent", nil),
@@ -271,41 +240,27 @@ func (f *Interface) activate() error {
"build", f.version,
"udpAddr", addr,
"boringcrypto", boringEnabled(),
"fips140Version", fips140.Version(),
"fips140Enabled", fips140.Enabled(),
"fips140Enforced", fips140.Enforced(),
)
if f.routines > 1 && !f.outside.SupportsMultipleReaders() {
f.routines = 1
f.l.Warn("multiple udp readers are not supported on this platform, falling back to a single routine")
if f.routines > 1 {
if !f.inside.SupportsMultiqueue() || !f.outside.SupportsMultipleReaders() {
f.routines = 1
f.l.Warn("routines is not supported on this platform, falling back to a single routine")
}
}
// Prepare the tun queues. A device that can't open that many hands back
// fewer (a single queue on platforms without multiqueue support) and we
// size the reader routines to what we actually got.
queues, err := f.inside.Queues(f.routines)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if len(queues) < f.routines {
// TODO: this clamp is only safe because it is unreachable when the
// udp side has multiple readers (linux Queues opens exactly n or
// errors; every other platform already clamped routines to 1 above).
// If a platform ever returns fewer queues than routines with
// SO_REUSEPORT sockets already bound, the surplus sockets get no
// listenOut and the kernel blackholes every flow it hashes to them —
// fail loudly or close the extra sockets instead.
f.l.Warn("tun multiqueue is not supported on this platform, falling back to fewer routines",
"requested", f.routines, "opened", len(queues))
f.routines = len(queues)
}
f.queues = queues
metrics.GetOrRegisterGauge("routines", nil).Update(int64(f.routines))
for i := range f.queues {
f.batchers[i] = batch.NewMultiCoalescer(f.queues[i], f.l)
// Prepare n tun queues
var reader io.ReadWriteCloser = f.inside
for i := 0; i < f.routines; i++ {
if i > 0 {
reader, err = f.inside.NewMultiQueueReader()
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
f.readers[i] = reader
}
// On error the caller owns the cleanup, Control.Start cancels the service context
@@ -328,7 +283,7 @@ func (f *Interface) run() {
// Launch n queues to read packets from tun dev
for i := 0; i < f.routines; i++ {
f.wg.Go(func() {
f.listenIn(f.queues[i], i)
f.listenIn(f.readers[i], i)
})
}
@@ -353,31 +308,6 @@ func (f *Interface) onFatal(err error) {
}
}
type rxContext struct {
q int
scratch []byte
// nb is a re-usable nonce buffer for decrypt calls to use
nb []byte
h *header.H
fwPacket *firewall.ParsedPacket
hostmapCache map[uint32]*HostInfo
lhh *LightHouseHandler
ctCache *firewall.ConntrackCacheTicker
}
func newRxContext(f *Interface, q int) *rxContext {
return &rxContext{
q: q,
scratch: make([]byte, mtu),
nb: make([]byte, 12, 12),
h: &header.H{},
fwPacket: &firewall.ParsedPacket{},
hostmapCache: map[uint32]*HostInfo{},
lhh: f.lightHouse.NewRequestHandler(),
ctCache: firewall.NewConntrackCacheTicker(f.ctx, f.l, f.conntrackCacheTimeout),
}
}
func (f *Interface) listenOut(i int) {
var li udp.Conn
if i > 0 {
@@ -386,20 +316,16 @@ func (f *Interface) listenOut(i int) {
li = f.outside
}
rxc := newRxContext(f, i)
ctCache := firewall.NewConntrackCacheTicker(f.ctx, f.l, f.conntrackCacheTimeout)
lhh := f.lightHouse.NewRequestHandler()
plaintext := make([]byte, udp.MTU)
h := &header.H{}
fwPacket := &firewall.Packet{}
nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
listener := func(fromUdpAddr netip.AddrPort, payload []byte) {
f.readOutsidePackets(ViaSender{UdpAddr: fromUdpAddr}, payload, rxc)
}
flusher := func() {
if err := f.batchers[i].Flush(); err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to flush tun coalescer", "error", err)
}
clear(rxc.hostmapCache)
}
err := li.ListenOut(listener, flusher)
err := li.ListenOut(func(fromUdpAddr netip.AddrPort, payload []byte) {
f.readOutsidePackets(ViaSender{UdpAddr: fromUdpAddr}, plaintext[:0], payload, h, fwPacket, lhh, nb, i, ctCache.Get())
})
// An error after teardown began is shutdown noise, the closed flag covers resources
// Close releases itself and the cancelled ctx covers ones torn down by their owners
@@ -412,42 +338,16 @@ func (f *Interface) listenOut(i int) {
f.l.Debug("underlay reader is done", "reader", i)
}
func (f *Interface) pinThisThread(i int) {
var cpu int
if n := len(f.cpuAffinity); n > 0 {
// Explicit tun.cpu_affinity list wins; parseCpuAffinity already
// validated the entries against the allowed CPU set.
cpu = f.cpuAffinity[i%n]
} else if allowed, err := util.AllowedCPUs(); err == nil && len(allowed) > 0 {
// Default: spread queues across the CPUs we're actually allowed to
// run on. Under a cpuset/taskset mask these aren't 0..NumCPU-1, so
// i % NumCPU would pick unrunnable IDs and every pin would fail.
cpu = allowed[i%len(allowed)]
} else {
cpu = i % runtime.NumCPU()
}
if err := util.PinThreadToCPU(cpu); err != nil {
f.l.Warn("failed to pin tun reader to CPU", "queue", i, "cpu", cpu, "err", err)
}
}
func (f *Interface) listenIn(queue tio.Queue, i int) {
// Pinning this thread (and goroutine) to a single CPU keeps every sendmmsg from this goroutine going through the
// same TX ring on the nic, so the wire sees per-flow order. Skip entirely when tun.pin_threads is false.
if f.pinThreads {
f.pinThisThread(i)
}
rejectBuf := make([]byte, mtu)
arenaSize := batch.SendBatchCap * (udp.MTU + 32)
sb := batch.NewSendBatch(f.writers[i], batch.SendBatchCap, arenaSize)
fwPacket := &firewall.ParsedPacket{}
func (f *Interface) listenIn(reader io.ReadWriteCloser, i int) {
packet := make([]byte, mtu)
out := make([]byte, mtu)
fwPacket := &firewall.Packet{}
nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
conntrackCache := firewall.NewConntrackCacheTicker(f.ctx, f.l, f.conntrackCacheTimeout)
for {
pkts, err := queue.Read()
n, err := reader.Read(packet)
if err != nil {
// Same shutdown noise handling as listenOut
if !f.closed.Load() && f.ctx.Err() == nil {
@@ -457,35 +357,12 @@ func (f *Interface) listenIn(queue tio.Queue, i int) {
break
}
for _, pkt := range pkts {
f.consumeInsidePacket(pkt, fwPacket, nb, sb, rejectBuf, i, conntrackCache.Get())
// Flush incrementally once a full sendmmsg batch has
// accumulated so the first packets of a deep read drain
// hit the wire while the rest are still being encrypted.
if sb.Len() >= batch.SendBatchCap {
f.flushSendBatch(sb, i)
}
}
f.flushSendBatch(sb, i)
f.consumeInsidePacket(packet[:n], fwPacket, nb, out, i, conntrackCache.Get())
}
f.l.Debug("overlay reader is done", "reader", i)
}
// flushSendBatch drains sb to the underlay and accounts for anything it could not deliver. A shortfall means
// specific destinations were undeliverable (a stale remote, a reject rule), which the backend logs per peer at
// debug; here it is only a counter, so one unreachable peer cannot spam a log line per batch.
func (f *Interface) flushSendBatch(sb *batch.SendBatch, q int) {
queued := sb.Len()
written, err := sb.Flush()
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to write outgoing batch", "error", err, "writer", q)
}
if dropped := queued - written; dropped > 0 {
f.metricTxDropped.Inc(int64(dropped))
}
}
func (f *Interface) RegisterConfigChangeCallbacks(c *config.C) {
c.RegisterReloadCallback(f.reloadFirewall)
c.RegisterReloadCallback(f.reloadSendRecvError)
-146
View File
@@ -1,146 +0,0 @@
package iputil
import (
"encoding/binary"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/checksum"
"golang.org/x/net/ipv4"
"golang.org/x/net/ipv6"
)
const udpHeaderLen = 8
// SetTransportChecksum recomputes the TCP or UDP checksum of an IPv4 or IPv6
// packet in place.
//
// A kernel that offloads checksums to the NIC hands a packet to a tun with the
// transport checksum unfinished: only the pseudo-header sum is in the field and
// the rest is left for hardware that a tun does not have. A packet written
// straight back to that tun is dropped on re-entry unless the checksum is
// completed first. ICMP is left alone; it arrived complete on the kernels this
// was measured against.
//
// So is any packet whose transport header cannot be located: fragments, unknown
// extension headers and truncated packets. An IPv6 fragment header is declined
// even when it carries the whole datagram (RFC 6946 atomic fragment), because
// the walk reports only that a fragment header was present.
func SetTransportChecksum(packet []byte) {
if len(packet) < 1 {
return
}
switch int(packet[0] >> 4) {
case ipv4.Version:
setTransportChecksum4(packet)
case ipv6.Version:
setTransportChecksum6(packet)
}
}
func setTransportChecksum4(packet []byte) {
if len(packet) < ipv4.HeaderLen {
return
}
ihl := int(packet[0]&0x0f) << 2
end := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(packet[2:4]))
if ihl < ipv4.HeaderLen || end < ihl || end > len(packet) {
return
}
// The checksum covers the whole datagram, which a fragment (MF set or a
// non-zero offset) does not carry.
if binary.BigEndian.Uint16(packet[6:8])&0x3fff != 0 {
return
}
transport, ok := transportExtent(packet[ihl:end], packet[9])
if !ok {
return
}
csum := ipv4PseudoheaderChecksum(packet[12:16], packet[16:20], uint32(packet[9]), uint32(len(transport)))
writeTransportChecksum(transport, packet[9], csum)
}
func setTransportChecksum6(packet []byte) {
if len(packet) < ipv6.HeaderLen {
return
}
end := ipv6.HeaderLen + int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(packet[4:6]))
if end > len(packet) {
return
}
// The checksum covers the whole datagram, which a fragment does not carry.
// An unknown extension header hides where the transport header starts. A
// chain longer than the walk's budget ends it early, at an offset that was
// never checked against the packet.
proto, offset, _, anyFragment, err := IPv6FindUpperProtocol(packet[:end])
if err != nil || anyFragment || offset >= end {
return
}
transport, ok := transportExtent(packet[offset:end], proto)
if !ok {
return
}
csum := ipv6PseudoheaderChecksum(packet[8:24], packet[24:40], uint32(proto), uint32(len(transport)))
writeTransportChecksum(transport, proto, csum)
}
// transportExtent narrows a segment to the length its own header declares. UDP
// carries a Length field, and RFC 768 and RFC 8200 section 8.1 both make that
// field, not the IP payload extent, the length the pseudo-header counts and the
// checksum covers; a datagram padded out to a link's minimum frame is the usual
// way the two differ. TCP has no such field, so its segment runs to the end of
// the IP payload. A Length that overruns the bytes IP delivered describes a
// datagram that is not there.
func transportExtent(transport []byte, proto uint8) ([]byte, bool) {
if proto != IPProtocolUDP {
return transport, true
}
if len(transport) < udpHeaderLen {
return nil, false
}
ulen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(transport[4:6]))
if ulen < udpHeaderLen || ulen > len(transport) {
return nil, false
}
return transport[:ulen], true
}
// writeTransportChecksum stores the checksum of transport, taken over the
// pseudo-header sum csum, in the header's checksum field. A UDP checksum that
// computes to zero goes on the wire as 0xffff: zero means no checksum was
// computed (RFC 768), and over IPv6 the checksum is mandatory (RFC 8200
// section 8.1).
func writeTransportChecksum(transport []byte, proto uint8, csum uint32) {
var at, minLen int
switch proto {
case IPProtocolTCP:
at, minLen = 16, 20
case IPProtocolUDP:
at, minLen = 6, udpHeaderLen
default:
return
}
if len(transport) < minLen {
return
}
transport[at], transport[at+1] = 0, 0
sum := ^checksum.Checksum(transport, fold(csum))
if sum == 0 && proto == IPProtocolUDP {
sum = 0xffff
}
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(transport[at:], sum)
}
// fold reduces a pseudo-header sum to the 16 bit seed Checksum takes. Carrying
// the high half back into the low half is what keeps the reduction lossless, so
// the seed sums exactly as the wider value would; 0xffff is its fixed point.
// Every term of that sum comes from a 16 bit field, so it stays far below the
// width at which the accumulator would wrap.
func fold(csum uint32) uint16 {
for csum > 0xffff {
csum = (csum >> 16) + (csum & 0xffff)
}
return uint16(csum)
}
-242
View File
@@ -1,242 +0,0 @@
package iputil
import (
"encoding/binary"
"net"
"testing"
"github.com/google/gopacket"
"github.com/google/gopacket/layers"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"golang.org/x/net/ipv6"
)
// serialize builds a packet with gopacket, whose checksums are computed
// independently of this package.
func serialize(t *testing.T, ls ...gopacket.SerializableLayer) []byte {
buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
require.NoError(t, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, gopacket.SerializeOptions{FixLengths: true, ComputeChecksums: true}, ls...))
return append([]byte(nil), buf.Bytes()...)
}
// withExtensionHeader inserts an 8 byte IPv6 extension header of the given
// type between the IPv6 header and its payload. The transport checksum does not
// change: the pseudo-header counts only upper-layer bytes.
func withExtensionHeader(pkt []byte, typ layers.IPProtocol, hdr [8]byte) []byte {
hdr[0] = pkt[6]
out := make([]byte, 0, len(pkt)+8)
out = append(out, pkt[:40]...)
out = append(out, hdr[:]...)
out = append(out, pkt[40:]...)
out[6] = byte(typ)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[4:6], binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[4:6])+8)
return out
}
// truncate copies the first n bytes into a buffer of exactly that capacity, so
// a read past the length panics instead of quietly succeeding.
func truncate(pkt []byte, n int) []byte {
out := make([]byte, n)
copy(out, pkt)
return out
}
// extChain builds an IPv6 packet fronted by n Destination Options headers. Each
// points at another one, so the walk spends its whole budget without reaching a
// transport header. lastExtLen inflates the final header's declared length,
// which is how the walk ends up past the end of the packet.
func extChain(n int, lastExtLen byte) []byte {
pkt := make([]byte, ipv6.HeaderLen)
pkt[0], pkt[6], pkt[7] = 0x60, 60, 64
for i := range n {
h := make([]byte, 8)
h[0] = 60
if i == n-1 {
h[1] = lastExtLen
}
pkt = append(pkt, h...)
}
pkt = append(pkt, make([]byte, 20)...)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(len(pkt)-ipv6.HeaderLen))
return pkt
}
func TestSetTransportChecksum(t *testing.T) {
// Source and destination differ so that a pseudo-header built from the wrong
// one, or from the two swapped, does not land on the same checksum anyway.
v4 := func(proto layers.IPProtocol) *layers.IPv4 {
return &layers.IPv4{Version: 4, TTL: 64, Id: 0x1234, Protocol: proto, SrcIP: net.IPv4(192, 0, 2, 1).To4(), DstIP: net.IPv4(198, 51, 100, 2).To4()}
}
v6 := func(proto layers.IPProtocol) *layers.IPv6 {
return &layers.IPv6{Version: 6, HopLimit: 64, NextHeader: proto, SrcIP: net.ParseIP("2001:db8::1"), DstIP: net.ParseIP("2001:db8:1::2")}
}
tcp := func(ip gopacket.NetworkLayer) *layers.TCP {
l := &layers.TCP{SrcPort: 49152, DstPort: 443, SYN: true, Window: 65535}
require.NoError(t, l.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
return l
}
udp := func(ip gopacket.NetworkLayer) *layers.UDP {
l := &layers.UDP{SrcPort: 49152, DstPort: 53}
require.NoError(t, l.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
return l
}
payload := gopacket.Payload("self")
nop := layers.IPv4Option{OptionType: 1, OptionLength: 1}
ip4tcp := v4(layers.IPProtocolTCP)
ip4opts := v4(layers.IPProtocolTCP)
ip4opts.Options = []layers.IPv4Option{nop, nop, nop, nop}
ip4udp := v4(layers.IPProtocolUDP)
ip6tcp := v6(layers.IPProtocolTCP)
ip6udp := v6(layers.IPProtocolUDP)
hopByHop := [8]byte{0, 0, 1, 4} // next header, length 0, PadN of 4
// Bytes past the length the IP header declares are not part of the
// datagram and must not be summed.
trailing4 := append(serialize(t, ip4tcp, tcp(ip4tcp), payload), []byte("trailing")...)
trailing6 := append(serialize(t, ip6tcp, tcp(ip6tcp), payload), []byte("trailing")...)
// A datagram padded out past the length UDP declares: the pseudo-header
// counts the UDP Length field, so the checksum is the unpadded one.
padded4 := append(serialize(t, ip4udp, udp(ip4udp), payload), []byte("pad!")...)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(padded4[2:4], uint16(len(padded4)))
padded6 := append(serialize(t, ip6udp, udp(ip6udp), payload), []byte("pad!")...)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(padded6[4:6], uint16(len(padded6)-ipv6.HeaderLen))
// Corrupting the checksum and asking for it back must yield gopacket's
// packet, byte for byte.
recomputed := []struct {
name string
pkt []byte
cksum int
}{
{"v4 tcp", serialize(t, ip4tcp, tcp(ip4tcp), payload), 20 + 16},
{"v4 tcp with ip options", serialize(t, ip4opts, tcp(ip4opts), payload), 24 + 16},
{"v4 udp", serialize(t, ip4udp, udp(ip4udp), payload), 20 + 6},
{"v4 tcp header only", serialize(t, ip4tcp, tcp(ip4tcp)), 20 + 16},
{"v4 udp header only", serialize(t, ip4udp, udp(ip4udp)), 20 + 6},
{"v6 tcp", serialize(t, ip6tcp, tcp(ip6tcp), payload), 40 + 16},
{"v6 udp", serialize(t, ip6udp, udp(ip6udp), payload), 40 + 6},
{"v6 udp header only", serialize(t, ip6udp, udp(ip6udp)), 40 + 6},
{"v6 tcp behind hop-by-hop", withExtensionHeader(serialize(t, ip6tcp, tcp(ip6tcp), payload), layers.IPProtocolIPv6HopByHop, hopByHop), 48 + 16},
{"v4 tcp with bytes past the total length", trailing4, 20 + 16},
{"v6 tcp with bytes past the payload length", trailing6, 40 + 16},
{"v4 udp padded past its declared length", padded4, 20 + 6},
{"v6 udp padded past its declared length", padded6, 40 + 6},
}
for _, tt := range recomputed {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := append([]byte(nil), tt.pkt...)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(got[tt.cksum:], 0x1234)
require.NotEqual(t, tt.pkt, got)
SetTransportChecksum(got)
assert.Equal(t, tt.pkt, got)
})
}
ip4frag := v4(layers.IPProtocolTCP)
ip4frag.Flags = layers.IPv4MoreFragments
ip4later := v4(layers.IPProtocolTCP)
ip4later.FragOffset = 1
ip4icmp := v4(layers.IPProtocolICMPv4)
badIHL := serialize(t, ip4tcp, tcp(ip4tcp), payload)
badIHL[0] = 0x44 // header length 16, shorter than an ipv4 header
shortTotalLen := serialize(t, ip4tcp, tcp(ip4tcp), payload)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(shortTotalLen[2:4], 10) // shorter than the header it introduces
cutTCP := serialize(t, ip4tcp, tcp(ip4tcp), payload)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(cutTCP[2:4], 20+19) // one byte short of a tcp header
cutTCP = truncate(cutTCP, 20+19)
cutUDP := serialize(t, ip4udp, udp(ip4udp), payload)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(cutUDP[2:4], 20+7) // one byte short of a udp header
cutUDP = truncate(cutUDP, 20+7)
// Two bytes short, so a transport header survives whole and the minimum
// length check cannot stand in for the bounds check.
cutV6 := truncate(serialize(t, ip6tcp, tcp(ip6tcp), payload), 62)
fragment := [8]byte{0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1} // next header, reserved, offset 0 with M set, id
overrun4 := serialize(t, ip4udp, udp(ip4udp), payload)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(overrun4[24:26], uint16(len(overrun4)-20+1)) // one byte past what ip delivered
overrun6 := serialize(t, ip6udp, udp(ip6udp), payload)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(overrun6[44:46], uint16(len(overrun6)-ipv6.HeaderLen+1))
shortUDPLen := serialize(t, ip4udp, udp(ip4udp), payload)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(shortUDPLen[24:26], 7) // shorter than the header it counts
// Where the checksum cannot be completed the packet is left as it came.
untouched := []struct {
name string
pkt []byte
cksum int
}{
{"v4 first fragment", serialize(t, ip4frag, tcp(ip4frag), payload), 20 + 16},
{"v4 later fragment", serialize(t, ip4later, tcp(ip4later), payload), 20 + 16},
{"v4 icmp", serialize(t, ip4icmp, &layers.ICMPv4{TypeCode: layers.CreateICMPv4TypeCode(8, 0), Id: 1, Seq: 1}, payload), 20 + 2},
{"v4 header length below the minimum", badIHL, 20 + 16},
{"v4 total length below the header length", shortTotalLen, 20 + 16},
{"v4 truncated below its total length", truncate(serialize(t, ip4tcp, tcp(ip4tcp), payload), 30), -1},
{"v4 tcp header cut short", cutTCP, 20 + 16},
{"v4 udp header cut short", cutUDP, -1},
{"v6 fragment", withExtensionHeader(serialize(t, ip6tcp, tcp(ip6tcp), payload), layers.IPProtocolIPv6Fragment, fragment), 48 + 16},
{"v6 truncated below its payload length", truncate(serialize(t, ip6tcp, tcp(ip6tcp), payload), 50), -1},
{"v6 truncated with a whole transport header still present", cutV6, 40 + 16},
{"v6 extension header chain longer than the walk", extChain(9, 0), 112 + 16},
{"v6 extension header chain running past the packet", extChain(8, 255), 104 + 16},
{"v4 udp length past the end of the datagram", overrun4, 20 + 6},
{"v6 udp length past the end of the datagram", overrun6, 40 + 6},
{"v4 udp length below a udp header", shortUDPLen, 20 + 6},
}
for _, tt := range untouched {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
if tt.cksum >= 0 {
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(tt.pkt[tt.cksum:], 0x1234)
}
want := append([]byte(nil), tt.pkt...)
SetTransportChecksum(tt.pkt)
assert.Equal(t, want, tt.pkt)
})
}
t.Run("too short to carry a header", func(t *testing.T) {
for _, pkt := range [][]byte{nil, {}, {0x45}, {0x60}} {
assert.NotPanics(t, func() { SetTransportChecksum(pkt) })
}
})
t.Run("tcp checksum of zero goes out as zero", func(t *testing.T) {
pkt := serialize(t, ip4tcp, tcp(ip4tcp), gopacket.Payload{0, 0})
c := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[36:38])
require.NotZero(t, c)
// Only udp reserves zero to mean "not computed", so tcp keeps it.
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[40:42], c)
SetTransportChecksum(pkt)
assert.Zero(t, binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[36:38]))
})
t.Run("udp checksum of zero goes out as 0xffff", func(t *testing.T) {
pkt := serialize(t, ip4udp, udp(ip4udp), gopacket.Payload{0, 0})
c := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[26:28])
require.NotZero(t, c)
// The one's complement sum is now 0xffff - c; adding c to the payload
// makes it 0xffff, whose complement is zero.
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[28:30], c)
SetTransportChecksum(pkt)
assert.Equal(t, uint16(0xffff), binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[26:28]))
})
}
func TestFold(t *testing.T) {
// 0xffff is the fold's fixed point, so a loop bound one notch tight never
// terminates on it.
for _, tt := range []struct {
in uint32
want uint16
}{
{0, 0},
{0xffff, 0xffff},
{0x10000, 1},
{0x1fffe, 0xffff},
{0xffffffff, 0xffff},
} {
assert.Equal(t, tt.want, fold(tt.in))
}
}
+9 -41
View File
@@ -2,16 +2,11 @@ package iputil
import (
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"golang.org/x/net/ipv4"
"golang.org/x/net/ipv6"
)
// ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload is returned when the ipv6 extension header chain is truncated before a terminal
// upper layer protocol is reached.
var ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload = errors.New("could not find payload in ipv6 packet")
const (
// MaxIPv4RejectPacketSize is the largest IPv4 reject packet:
// - 20 byte ipv4 header
@@ -27,13 +22,6 @@ const (
maxIPv6RejectPacketSize = ipv6.HeaderLen + 8 + 1000
MaxRejectPacketSize = maxIPv6RejectPacketSize
IPProtocolICMP = 1
IPProtocolICMPv6 = 58
IPProtocolTCP = 6
IPProtocolUDP = 17
ICMPv6TypeEchoRequest = 128
ICMPv6TypeEchoReply = 129
)
func CreateRejectPacket(packet []byte, out []byte) []byte {
@@ -211,8 +199,8 @@ func ipv4CreateRejectTCPPacket(packet []byte, out []byte) []byte {
}
func ipv6CreateRejectPacket(packet []byte, out []byte) []byte {
proto, offset, isFragment, _, err := IPv6FindUpperProtocol(packet)
if err != nil || isFragment {
proto, offset, isFragment := ipv6FindUpperProtocol(packet)
if isFragment {
return nil
}
switch proto {
@@ -345,60 +333,40 @@ func ipv6CreateRejectTCPPacket(packet []byte, out []byte, offset int) []byte {
return out
}
// IPv6FindUpperProtocol walks the ipv6 extension header chain and returns the upper layer protocol, the
// offset it begins at, and whether the packet is a non-first fragment. Only the RFC 8200 and IANA extension
// headers below are walked. Everything else, including Mobility (135), HIP (139), Shim6 (140), experimental
// 253/254, and real upper layer protocols like SCTP or GRE, is terminal. Walking those as extension headers
// is a firewall bypass, so they fail closed. For a non-first fragment the returned protocol is the fragmented
// protocol and offset points at the fragment header, there is no transport header to locate. Returns
// ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload if packet is smaller than an ipv6 header or the chain is truncated before a
// terminal protocol is reached.
func IPv6FindUpperProtocol(packet []byte) (nextHeader uint8, offset int, isFragment bool, anyFragment bool, err error) {
const maxIPv6ExtHeaders = 8
if len(packet) < ipv6.HeaderLen {
return 0, 0, false, false, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload
}
func ipv6FindUpperProtocol(packet []byte) (nextHeader uint8, offset int, isFragment bool) {
nextHeader = packet[6]
offset = ipv6.HeaderLen
for range maxIPv6ExtHeaders {
for {
switch nextHeader {
case 0, 43, 60: // Hop-by-Hop, Routing, Destination
if len(packet) < offset+2 {
return nextHeader, offset, isFragment, anyFragment, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload
return nextHeader, offset, isFragment
}
nextHeader = packet[offset]
offset += (int(packet[offset+1]) + 1) << 3
case 44: // Fragment
if len(packet) < offset+8 {
return nextHeader, offset, isFragment, anyFragment, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload
return nextHeader, offset, isFragment
}
anyFragment = true
// Non-first fragments carry no transport header, report the fragmented protocol and stop
if packet[offset+2] != 0 || packet[offset+3]&0xf8 != 0 {
return packet[offset], offset, true, anyFragment, nil
isFragment = true
}
nextHeader = packet[offset]
offset += 8
case 51: // AH
if len(packet) < offset+2 {
return nextHeader, offset, isFragment, anyFragment, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload
return nextHeader, offset, isFragment
}
nextHeader = packet[offset]
offset += (int(packet[offset+1]) + 2) << 2
default:
// A prior extension header can declare a length that advances offset past the packet. The terminal
// protocol's header isn't actually here, so treat the chain as truncated rather than classifying it.
if offset > len(packet) {
return nextHeader, offset, isFragment, anyFragment, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload
}
return nextHeader, offset, isFragment, anyFragment, nil
return nextHeader, offset, isFragment
}
}
return nextHeader, offset, isFragment, anyFragment, nil
}
func CreateICMPEchoResponse(packet, out []byte) []byte {
-102
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,11 @@
package iputil
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/binary"
"net"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"golang.org/x/net/ipv4"
"golang.org/x/net/ipv6"
)
@@ -181,46 +179,6 @@ func Test_CreateRejectPacket_NoICMPError(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// Test_CreateRejectPacket_RespectsCap ensures it is impossible for
// an oversized ICMPv6 reject to overwrite the neighbor segment's bytes.
func Test_CreateRejectPacket_RespectsCap(t *testing.T) {
src := net.ParseIP("fd00::1")
dst := net.ParseIP("fd00::2")
// Inner IPv6 UDP packet. An ICMPv6 reject copies the whole inner packet
// plus a 48-byte header (40 IPv6 + 8 ICMPv6), so it needs 48 more bytes
// than the inner packet length.
inner := makeIPv6Packet(src, dst, 17, make([]byte, 20))
// The ciphertext scratch reused as the reject buffer is the received
// datagram: 16-byte Nebula header + inner + 16-byte AEAD tag. That is only
// 32 bytes of slack, so a full ICMPv6 reject overruns it by 16 bytes.
const nebulaOverhead = 32
segLen := len(inner) + nebulaOverhead
// Shared backing row laid out as [segment][neighbor's 16-byte Nebula header].
const neighborHdr = 16
sentinel := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xAB}, neighborHdr)
// Uncapped: the slice's capacity reaches into the neighbor, reproducing
// the overrun that silently drops the neighbor packet.
backing := make([]byte, segLen+neighborHdr)
copy(backing[segLen:], sentinel)
reject := CreateRejectPacket(inner, backing[:segLen])
assert.NotNil(t, reject, "uncapped buffer reaches into the neighbor, so the reject is built")
assert.NotEqual(t, sentinel, backing[segLen:segLen+neighborHdr],
"without the cap the oversized reject overruns into the neighbor segment")
// Capped (the fix): cap==len, so the builder cannot exceed the segment. The
// reject does not fit, so it is refused rather than corrupting the neighbor.
backing = make([]byte, segLen+neighborHdr)
copy(backing[segLen:], sentinel)
reject = CreateRejectPacket(inner, backing[:segLen:segLen])
assert.Nil(t, reject, "capped segment is 16 bytes too small for a full ICMPv6 reject, so it is refused")
assert.Equal(t, sentinel, backing[segLen:segLen+neighborHdr],
"capped segment must leave the neighbor untouched")
}
func makeIPv6Packet(src, dst net.IP, nextHeader uint8, payload []byte) []byte {
b := make([]byte, ipv6.HeaderLen+len(payload))
b[0] = ipv6.Version << 4
@@ -516,63 +474,3 @@ func TestCreateICMPEchoResponse_IPv6_NotICMPv6(t *testing.T) {
result := CreateICMPEchoResponse(packet, out)
assert.Nil(t, result)
}
func Test_IPv6FindUpperProtocol(t *testing.T) {
src := net.ParseIP("fd00::1")
dst := net.ParseIP("fd00::2")
// 8 byte extension/transport stand-ins, first byte is the next header, second is the length field
extToTCP := []byte{6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} // len 0 -> 8 bytes, next = TCP
extToUDP := []byte{17, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} // len 0 -> 8 bytes, next = UDP
extToRouting := []byte{43, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} // len 0 -> 8 bytes, next = Routing
ahToUDP := []byte{17, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} // AH len 0 -> (0+2)<<2 = 8 bytes, next = UDP
firstFragToUDP := []byte{17, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1} // frag offset 0, M=1, next = UDP
nonFirstFrag := []byte{17, 0, 0, 9, 0, 0, 0, 1} // frag offset non-zero, next = UDP
transport := []byte{0, 80, 1, 187, 0, 0, 0, 0} // stand-in bytes, IPv6FindUpperProtocol never reads ports
tests := []struct {
name string
nextHeader uint8
payload []byte
wantProto uint8
wantOffset int
wantFragment bool
wantAnyFrag bool
wantErr error
}{
{"plain udp", 17, transport, 17, ipv6.HeaderLen, false, false, nil},
{"hop-by-hop then tcp", 0, append(extToTCP, transport...), 6, ipv6.HeaderLen + 8, false, false, nil},
{"routing then tcp", 43, append(extToTCP, transport...), 6, ipv6.HeaderLen + 8, false, false, nil},
{"destination then udp", 60, append(extToUDP, transport...), 17, ipv6.HeaderLen + 8, false, false, nil},
{"hop-by-hop, routing, then tcp", 0, append(append(extToRouting, extToTCP...), transport...), 6, ipv6.HeaderLen + 16, false, false, nil},
{"ah then udp", 51, append(ahToUDP, transport...), 17, ipv6.HeaderLen + 8, false, false, nil},
{"first fragment walks to transport", 44, append(firstFragToUDP, transport...), 17, ipv6.HeaderLen + 8, false, true, nil},
{"non-first fragment stops", 44, append(nonFirstFrag, transport...), 17, ipv6.HeaderLen, true, true, nil},
{"unknown protocol is terminal", 132, transport, 132, ipv6.HeaderLen, false, false, nil}, // SCTP
{"truncated extension header", 0, nil, 0, ipv6.HeaderLen, false, false, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload},
// Destination Options with a declared length (255+1)*8 = 2048 that runs past the 48 byte buffer, next = SCTP
{"extension length past buffer", 60, []byte{132, 255, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 132, ipv6.HeaderLen + 2048, false, false, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
packet := makeIPv6Packet(src, dst, tt.nextHeader, tt.payload)
proto, offset, isFragment, anyFragment, err := IPv6FindUpperProtocol(packet)
if tt.wantErr != nil {
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, tt.wantErr)
return
}
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, tt.wantProto, proto)
assert.Equal(t, tt.wantOffset, offset)
assert.Equal(t, tt.wantFragment, isFragment)
assert.Equal(t, tt.wantAnyFrag, anyFragment)
})
}
// A packet smaller than an ipv6 header must error rather than panic reading byte 6
t.Run("shorter than ipv6 header", func(t *testing.T) {
_, _, _, _, err := IPv6FindUpperProtocol(make([]byte, 6))
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload)
})
}
+1 -15
View File
@@ -34,9 +34,7 @@ type LightHouse struct {
myVpnNetworks []netip.Prefix
myVpnNetworksTable *bart.Lite
// myVpnAddrsTable contains our overlay host addrs, as opposed to the overlay networks
myVpnAddrsTable *bart.Lite
punchy *Punchy
punchy *Punchy
// localAddrsFn enumerates the underlay addresses we advertise. It is a field so tests can supply simulated
// addresses rather than whatever this machine's NICs happen to be. Set it before Start.
@@ -106,7 +104,6 @@ func NewLightHouseFromConfig(ctx context.Context, l *slog.Logger, c *config.C, c
amLighthouse: amLighthouse,
myVpnNetworks: cs.myVpnNetworks,
myVpnNetworksTable: cs.myVpnNetworksTable,
myVpnAddrsTable: cs.myVpnAddrsTable,
addrMap: make(map[netip.Addr]*RemoteList),
nebulaPort: nebulaPort,
punchy: p,
@@ -1161,17 +1158,6 @@ func (lhh *LightHouseHandler) handleHostQuery(n *NebulaMeta, fromVpnAddrs []neti
return
}
// Don't respond to requests for us.
if lhh.lh.myVpnAddrsTable.Contains(queryVpnAddr) {
if lhh.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
lhh.l.Debug("Ignoring HostQuery for one of my own addresses",
"fromVpnAddrs", fromVpnAddrs,
"queryVpnAddr", queryVpnAddr,
)
}
return
}
found, ln, err := lhh.lh.queryAndPrepMessage(queryVpnAddr, func(c *cache) (int, error) {
n = lhh.resetMeta()
n.Type = NebulaMeta_HostQueryReply
+54 -80
View File
@@ -27,27 +27,15 @@ func TestOldIPv4Only(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, binary.BigEndian.Uint32(bp[:]), m.GetAddr())
}
func testCertState(networks ...netip.Prefix) *CertState {
cs := &CertState{
myVpnNetworks: networks,
myVpnNetworksTable: new(bart.Lite),
myVpnAddrs: make([]netip.Addr, 0, len(networks)),
myVpnAddrsTable: new(bart.Lite),
}
for _, n := range networks {
cs.myVpnNetworksTable.Insert(n)
cs.myVpnAddrs = append(cs.myVpnAddrs, n.Addr())
cs.myVpnAddrsTable.Insert(netip.PrefixFrom(n.Addr(), n.Addr().BitLen()))
}
return cs
}
func Test_lhStaticMapping(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
myVpnNet := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.128.0.1/16")
cs := testCertState(myVpnNet)
nt := new(bart.Lite)
nt.Insert(myVpnNet)
cs := &CertState{
myVpnNetworks: []netip.Prefix{myVpnNet},
myVpnNetworksTable: nt,
}
lh1 := "10.128.0.2"
c := config.NewC(l)
@@ -67,7 +55,12 @@ func Test_lhStaticMapping(t *testing.T) {
func TestReloadLighthouseInterval(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
myVpnNet := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.128.0.1/16")
cs := testCertState(myVpnNet)
nt := new(bart.Lite)
nt.Insert(myVpnNet)
cs := &CertState{
myVpnNetworks: []netip.Prefix{myVpnNet},
myVpnNetworksTable: nt,
}
lh1 := "10.128.0.2"
c := config.NewC(l)
@@ -97,7 +90,12 @@ func TestReloadLighthouseInterval(t *testing.T) {
func BenchmarkLighthouseHandleRequest(b *testing.B) {
l := test.NewLogger()
myVpnNet := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.128.0.1/0")
cs := testCertState(myVpnNet)
nt := new(bart.Lite)
nt.Insert(myVpnNet)
cs := &CertState{
myVpnNetworks: []netip.Prefix{myVpnNet},
myVpnNetworksTable: nt,
}
c := config.NewC(l)
lh, err := NewLightHouseFromConfig(b.Context(), l, c, cs, nil, nil)
@@ -197,7 +195,12 @@ func TestLighthouse_Memory(t *testing.T) {
c.Settings["listen"] = map[string]any{"port": 4242}
myVpnNet := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.128.0.1/24")
cs := testCertState(myVpnNet)
nt := new(bart.Lite)
nt.Insert(myVpnNet)
cs := &CertState{
myVpnNetworks: []netip.Prefix{myVpnNet},
myVpnNetworksTable: nt,
}
lh, err := NewLightHouseFromConfig(t.Context(), l, c, cs, nil, nil)
lh.ifce = &mockEncWriter{}
require.NoError(t, err)
@@ -277,7 +280,12 @@ func TestLighthouse_reload(t *testing.T) {
c.Settings["listen"] = map[string]any{"port": 4242}
myVpnNet := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.128.0.1/24")
cs := testCertState(myVpnNet)
nt := new(bart.Lite)
nt.Insert(myVpnNet)
cs := &CertState{
myVpnNetworks: []netip.Prefix{myVpnNet},
myVpnNetworksTable: nt,
}
lh, err := NewLightHouseFromConfig(t.Context(), l, c, cs, nil, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
@@ -307,7 +315,12 @@ func TestLighthouse_reloadStaticHostMap(t *testing.T) {
}
myVpnNet := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.128.0.1/24")
cs := testCertState(myVpnNet)
nt := new(bart.Lite)
nt.Insert(myVpnNet)
cs := &CertState{
myVpnNetworks: []netip.Prefix{myVpnNet},
myVpnNetworksTable: nt,
}
lh, err := NewLightHouseFromConfig(t.Context(), l, c, cs, nil, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
@@ -416,9 +429,7 @@ func TestLighthouse_reloadStaticHostMap(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, []netip.AddrPort{netip.MustParseAddrPort("3.3.3.3:4242")}, rl.CopyAddrs([]netip.Prefix{}))
}
// sendLHHostRequest delivers a HostQuery to lhh and hands back the writer that
// captured what it emitted. Pass a nil filter to see every message.
func sendLHHostRequest(fromAddr netip.AddrPort, myVpnIp, queryVpnIp netip.Addr, lhh *LightHouseHandler, filter *NebulaMeta_MessageType) *testEncWriter {
func newLHHostRequest(fromAddr netip.AddrPort, myVpnIp, queryVpnIp netip.Addr, lhh *LightHouseHandler) testLhReply {
req := &NebulaMeta{
Type: NebulaMeta_HostQuery,
Details: &NebulaMetaDetails{},
@@ -436,59 +447,12 @@ func sendLHHostRequest(fromAddr netip.AddrPort, myVpnIp, queryVpnIp netip.Addr,
panic(err)
}
w := &testEncWriter{metaFilter: filter}
lhh.HandleRequest(fromAddr, []netip.Addr{myVpnIp}, b, w)
return w
}
func newLHHostRequest(fromAddr netip.AddrPort, myVpnIp, queryVpnIp netip.Addr, lhh *LightHouseHandler) testLhReply {
filter := NebulaMeta_HostQueryReply
return sendLHHostRequest(fromAddr, myVpnIp, queryVpnIp, lhh, &filter).lastReply
}
func TestLighthouse_IgnoresHostQueryForItself(t *testing.T) {
// Validate that we don't answer host queries for our own address.
l := test.NewLogger()
myVpnNet := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.128.0.1/24")
myVpnIp := myVpnNet.Addr()
c := config.NewC(l)
c.Settings["lighthouse"] = map[string]any{"am_lighthouse": true}
c.Settings["listen"] = map[string]any{"port": 4242}
// Add a static_host_map entry for ourselves, so our address
// is in the addrMap.
c.Settings["static_host_map"] = map[string]any{
myVpnIp.String(): []any{"192.168.100.1:4242"},
w := &testEncWriter{
metaFilter: &filter,
}
lh, err := NewLightHouseFromConfig(t.Context(), l, c, testCertState(myVpnNet), nil, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
lh.ifce = &mockEncWriter{}
lhh := lh.NewRequestHandler()
peerVpnIp := netip.MustParseAddr("10.128.0.2")
peerUdpAddr := netip.MustParseAddrPort("10.0.0.2:4242")
otherVpnIp := netip.MustParseAddr("10.128.0.3")
otherUdpAddr := netip.MustParseAddrPort("10.0.0.3:4242")
newLHHostUpdate(peerUdpAddr, peerVpnIp, []netip.AddrPort{peerUdpAddr}, lhh)
newLHHostUpdate(otherUdpAddr, otherVpnIp, []netip.AddrPort{otherUdpAddr}, lhh)
// Control: a query about a real peer is still answered, and still ends with
// the punch notification aimed at the host that was asked about.
w := sendLHHostRequest(peerUdpAddr, peerVpnIp, otherVpnIp, lhh, nil)
require.NotNil(t, w.lastReply.msg)
assert.Equal(t, NebulaMeta_HostPunchNotification, w.lastReply.msg.Type)
assert.Equal(t, otherVpnIp, w.lastReply.vpnIp)
// Now validate that we don't send to ourselves.
found, _, err := lh.queryAndPrepMessage(myVpnIp, func(*cache) (int, error) { return 0, nil })
require.NoError(t, err)
require.True(t, found, "the lighthouse should hold a cache entry for its own address")
w = sendLHHostRequest(peerUdpAddr, peerVpnIp, myVpnIp, lhh, nil)
assert.Nil(t, w.lastReply.msg, "a query about our own address must produce no reply and no punch notification")
lhh.HandleRequest(fromAddr, []netip.Addr{myVpnIp}, b, w)
return w.lastReply
}
func newLHHostUpdate(fromAddr netip.AddrPort, vpnIp netip.Addr, addrs []netip.AddrPort, lhh *LightHouseHandler) {
@@ -534,7 +498,7 @@ type testEncWriter struct {
protocolVersion cert.Version
}
func (tw *testEncWriter) SendVia(via *HostInfo, relay *Relay, ad, nb, out []byte, nocopy bool, q int) {
func (tw *testEncWriter) SendVia(via *HostInfo, relay *Relay, ad, nb, out []byte, nocopy bool) {
}
func (tw *testEncWriter) Handshake(vpnIp netip.Addr) {
}
@@ -678,7 +642,12 @@ func TestLighthouse_Dont_Delete_Static_Hosts(t *testing.T) {
}
myVpnNet := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.128.0.1/24")
cs := testCertState(myVpnNet)
nt := new(bart.Lite)
nt.Insert(myVpnNet)
cs := &CertState{
myVpnNetworks: []netip.Prefix{myVpnNet},
myVpnNetworksTable: nt,
}
lh, err := NewLightHouseFromConfig(t.Context(), l, c, cs, nil, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
lh.ifce = &mockEncWriter{}
@@ -739,7 +708,12 @@ func TestLighthouse_DeletesWork(t *testing.T) {
}
myVpnNet := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.128.0.1/24")
cs := testCertState(myVpnNet)
nt := new(bart.Lite)
nt.Insert(myVpnNet)
cs := &CertState{
myVpnNetworks: []netip.Prefix{myVpnNet},
myVpnNetworksTable: nt,
}
lh, err := NewLightHouseFromConfig(t.Context(), l, c, cs, nil, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
lh.ifce = &mockEncWriter{}
+7 -144
View File
@@ -6,16 +6,11 @@ import (
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/netip"
"os"
"runtime/debug"
"slices"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cpupick"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/diag"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/noiseutil"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/sshd"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
@@ -25,12 +20,6 @@ import (
type m = map[string]any
// maxRoutines caps routines below the RejectHeadroom nonce gap so concurrent senders can't race the counter past wrap.
const maxRoutines = 1 << 16
// The reject headroom must exceed every sender that can be mid-reservation at once, about two per routine.
const _ = noiseutil.RejectHeadroom - 4*maxRoutines
func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, deviceFactory overlay.DeviceFactory) (retcon *Control, reterr error) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
// Automatically cancel the context if Main returns an error, to signal all created goroutines to quit.
@@ -44,9 +33,6 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
buildVersion = moduleVersion()
}
// Debug builds (-tags debug) serve pprof on :6060; a no-op otherwise.
startPprofServer(ctx, l)
// Print the config if in test, the exit comes later
if configTest {
b, err := yaml.Marshal(c.Settings)
@@ -69,9 +55,7 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
}
l.Info("Firewall started", "firewallHashes", fw.GetRuleHashes())
commands := diag.NewRegistry()
ssh, err := sshd.NewSSHServer(ctx, l.With("subsystem", "sshd"), commands)
ssh, err := sshd.NewSSHServer(ctx, l.With("subsystem", "sshd"))
if err != nil {
return nil, util.ContextualizeIfNeeded("Error while creating SSH server", err)
}
@@ -97,6 +81,9 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
if routines < 1 {
routines = 1
}
if routines > 1 {
l.Info("Using multiple routines", "routines", routines)
}
} else {
// deprecated and undocumented
tunQueues := c.GetInt("tun.routines", 1)
@@ -106,12 +93,6 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
l.Warn("Setting tun.routines and listen.routines is deprecated. Use `routines` instead", "routines", routines)
}
}
if routines > maxRoutines {
l.Warn("Using multiple routines", "routines", maxRoutines, "clamped", true, "requestedRoutines", routines)
routines = maxRoutines
} else if routines > 1 {
l.Info("Using multiple routines", "routines", routines)
}
// EXPERIMENTAL
// Intentionally not documented yet while we do more testing and determine
@@ -179,21 +160,8 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
}
for i := 0; i < routines; i++ {
listen := netip.AddrPortFrom(listenHost, uint16(port))
l.Info("listening", "addr", listen)
batchSize := c.GetInt("listen.batch", 64)
if batchSize < 1 {
oldBatch := batchSize
batchSize = 1
l.Warn("listen.batch size is invalid", "provided", oldBatch, "overridden to", batchSize)
}
udpSettings := udp.Settings{
Listen: listen,
Multi: routines > 1,
Batch: batchSize,
Offloads: c.GetBool("listen.udp_offloads", false),
}
udpServer, err := udp.NewListener(l, udpSettings)
l.Info("listening", "addr", netip.AddrPortFrom(listenHost, uint16(port)))
udpServer, err := udp.NewListener(l, listenHost, port, routines > 1, c.GetInt("listen.batch", 64))
if err != nil {
return nil, util.NewContextualError("Failed to open udp listener", m{"queue": i}, err)
}
@@ -242,37 +210,6 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
l.Warn("Failed to start DNS responder", "error", err)
}
pinThreads := c.GetBool("tun.pin_threads", true)
cpuAffinity := parseCpuAffinity(c, l, routines)
if pinThreads && routines > 1 && len(cpuAffinity) == 0 && !configTest {
// The operator didn't choose pin CPUs, so pick a default set that
// prefers performance cores and doesn't stack co-located instances
// onto allowed[0].
// key is used to seed the spreading of routines->cores.
// use PID if you want to ensure many different Nebulas in VMs or containers land on different cores
// use port if you want to always end up on the same cores, ideal for benchmarking.
key := uint64(os.Getpid()) //default to PID
pinKeyStr := strings.ToLower(c.GetString("tun.pin_threads_key", ""))
switch pinKeyStr {
case "":
l.Debug("tun.pin_threads_key is empty, using PID")
case "pid":
l.Debug("tun.pin_threads_key is PID")
case "port":
if ap, err := udpConns[0].LocalAddr(); err == nil && ap.Port() != 0 {
l.Info("tun.pin_threads_key is port number")
key = uint64(ap.Port())
} else {
l.Warn("Failed to get a port number for tun.pin_threads_key, falling back to PID", "err", err)
}
default:
l.Warn("tun.pin_threads_key is invalid, using PID")
}
cpuAffinity = cpupick.Default(routines, key, l)
}
ifConfig := &InterfaceConfig{
HostMap: hostMap,
Inside: tun,
@@ -294,8 +231,6 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
relayManager: NewRelayManager(ctx, l, hostMap, c),
punchy: punchy,
ConntrackCacheTimeout: conntrackCacheTimeout,
CpuAffinity: cpuAffinity,
PinThreads: pinThreads,
l: l,
}
@@ -325,20 +260,13 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
return nil, util.ContextualizeIfNeeded("Failed to start stats emitter", err)
}
// Built before the configTest return so that a bad ctl block fails `nebula -test`. It only
// holds the registry, which attachCommands populates below, and reads nothing until Start.
ctlServer, err := newCtlServerFromConfig(ctx, l.With("subsystem", "ctl"), c, commands)
if err != nil {
return nil, util.ContextualizeIfNeeded("Failed to configure the ctl socket", err)
}
if configTest {
return nil, nil
}
go ifce.emitStats(ctx, c.GetDuration("stats.interval", time.Second*10))
attachCommands(l, c, commands, ifce)
attachCommands(l, c, ssh, ifce)
networkChanges := udp.NewNetworkChangeMonitor(ctx, l, c)
@@ -349,7 +277,6 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
ctx: ctx,
cancel: cancel,
sshStart: sshStart,
ctlStart: ctlServer.Start,
statsStart: stats.Start,
dnsStart: ds.Start,
lighthouseStart: lightHouse.StartUpdateWorker,
@@ -358,70 +285,6 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, l *slog.Logger, dev
}, nil
}
// parseCpuAffinity reads `tun.cpu_affinity` from the config — a list of
// integer CPU IDs, one per TUN reader goroutine. Empty / unset returns nil
// (listenIn falls back to spreading queues across the allowed CPU set).
// Length mismatch with `routines` is a warning, not an error: shorter lists
// are modulo-cycled across queues, longer lists' tail is ignored. Invalid
// entries (non-integer, or a CPU ID we're not allowed to run on) are also a
// warning and disable the override entirely so we don't silently pin to the
// wrong CPU. Entries are validated against the process's current affinity
// mask (util.AllowedCPUs) rather than 0..NumCPU-1: under a cgroup cpuset or
// taskset the runnable IDs are frequently not that contiguous range, and
// pinning to an unrunnable ID always fails. If the allowed set can't be
// determined we fall back to a plain non-negative check.
func parseCpuAffinity(c *config.C, l *slog.Logger, routines int) []int {
raw := c.Get("tun.cpu_affinity")
if raw == nil {
return nil
}
rv, ok := raw.([]any)
if !ok {
l.Warn("tun.cpu_affinity must be a list of integers; ignoring", "value", raw)
return nil
}
// allowed is the set of CPU IDs we're actually permitted to run on. A nil
// slice (unsupported platform or lookup error) means "can't tell", so we
// only apply the weaker non-negative check in that case.
allowed, err := util.AllowedCPUs()
if err != nil {
l.Warn("could not determine allowed CPUs; validating tun.cpu_affinity against non-negative only", "error", err)
allowed = nil
}
cpus := make([]int, 0, len(rv))
for i, e := range rv {
var cpu int
switch v := e.(type) {
case int:
cpu = v
case int64:
cpu = int(v)
case float64:
cpu = int(v)
default:
l.Warn("tun.cpu_affinity entry not an integer; ignoring affinity",
"index", i, "value", e)
return nil
}
if cpu < 0 {
l.Warn("tun.cpu_affinity entry out of range; ignoring affinity",
"index", i, "cpu", cpu)
return nil
}
if len(allowed) > 0 && !slices.Contains(allowed, cpu) {
l.Warn("tun.cpu_affinity entry not in allowed CPU set; ignoring affinity",
"index", i, "cpu", cpu, "allowed", allowed)
return nil
}
cpus = append(cpus, cpu)
}
if len(cpus) != routines {
l.Warn("tun.cpu_affinity length doesn't match routines; queues will modulo-cycle through the list",
"affinity_len", len(cpus), "routines", routines)
}
return cpus
}
func moduleVersion() string {
info, ok := debug.ReadBuildInfo()
if !ok {
-51
View File
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
package nebula
import (
"testing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/util"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
)
func TestParseCpuAffinity(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
// newConfig returns a config.C with tun.cpu_affinity set to v. A nil v
// leaves the key unset.
newConfig := func(v any) *config.C {
c := config.NewC(l)
if v != nil {
c.Settings["tun"] = map[string]any{"cpu_affinity": v}
}
return c
}
// unset -> nil (listenIn falls back to spreading across the allowed set)
assert.Nil(t, parseCpuAffinity(newConfig(nil), l, 1))
// Pick a CPU we're actually allowed to run on so a valid list survives
// validation regardless of the host's affinity mask.
allowed, _ := util.AllowedCPUs()
validCPU := 0
if len(allowed) > 0 {
validCPU = allowed[0]
}
// valid list -> parsed through unchanged
assert.Equal(t, []int{validCPU, validCPU}, parseCpuAffinity(newConfig([]any{validCPU, validCPU}), l, 2))
// a negative entry is out of range on every platform -> disables the override
assert.Nil(t, parseCpuAffinity(newConfig([]any{validCPU, -1}), l, 2))
// a non-integer entry -> disables the override
assert.Nil(t, parseCpuAffinity(newConfig([]any{validCPU, "not-a-cpu"}), l, 2))
// a CPU id outside the allowed set -> disables the override. Only assertable
// where we can enumerate the allowed set (e.g. linux); 1<<20 is far beyond
// any representable CPU id so it can never be in the mask.
if len(allowed) > 0 {
assert.Nil(t, parseCpuAffinity(newConfig([]any{1 << 20}), l, 1))
}
}
+4 -13
View File
@@ -14,8 +14,7 @@ type MessageMetrics struct {
rxUnknown metrics.Counter
txUnknown metrics.Counter
rxInvalid metrics.Counter
txExhausted metrics.Counter
rxInvalid metrics.Counter
}
func (m *MessageMetrics) Rx(t header.MessageType, s header.MessageSubType, i int64) {
@@ -42,13 +41,6 @@ func (m *MessageMetrics) RxInvalid(i int64) {
}
}
// TxExhausted counts outbound packets dropped because the tunnel's message counter is spent.
func (m *MessageMetrics) TxExhausted(i int64) {
if m != nil && m.txExhausted != nil {
m.txExhausted.Inc(i)
}
}
func newMessageMetrics() *MessageMetrics {
gen := func(t string) [][]metrics.Counter {
return [][]metrics.Counter{
@@ -69,10 +61,9 @@ func newMessageMetrics() *MessageMetrics {
rx: gen("rx"),
tx: gen("tx"),
rxUnknown: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("messages.rx.other", nil),
txUnknown: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("messages.tx.other", nil),
rxInvalid: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("messages.rx.invalid", nil),
txExhausted: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("messages.tx.exhausted", nil),
rxUnknown: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("messages.rx.other", nil),
txUnknown: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("messages.tx.other", nil),
rxInvalid: metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("messages.rx.invalid", nil),
}
}
-3
View File
@@ -25,9 +25,6 @@ func (s *CipherStateAESGCM) EncryptDanger(out, ad, plaintext []byte, n uint64, n
if s == nil {
return nil, errors.New("no cipher state available to encrypt")
}
if n >= RejectAfterMessages {
return nil, ErrMessageCounterExhausted
}
nb[0] = 0
nb[1] = 0
nb[2] = 0
+65 -4
View File
@@ -4,16 +4,77 @@
package noiseutil
import (
"crypto/boring"
"crypto/aes"
"crypto/cipher"
"encoding/binary"
// unsafe needed for go:linkname
_ "unsafe"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
)
var CipherAESGCM noise.CipherFunc = CipherAESGCMFIPS140
// EncryptLockNeeded indicates if calls to Encrypt need a lock
// This is true for boringcrypto because the Seal function verifies that the
// nonce is strictly increasing.
const EncryptLockNeeded = true
var boringEnabled = boring.Enabled()
// NewGCMTLS is no longer exposed in go1.19+, so we need to link it in
// See: https://github.com/golang/go/issues/56326
//
// NewGCMTLS is the internal method used with boringcrypto that provides a
// validated mode of AES-GCM which enforces the nonce is strictly
// monotonically increasing. This is the TLS 1.2 specification for nonce
// generation (which also matches the method used by the Noise Protocol)
//
// - https://github.com/golang/go/blob/go1.19/src/crypto/tls/cipher_suites.go#L520-L522
// - https://github.com/golang/go/blob/go1.19/src/crypto/internal/boring/aes.go#L235-L237
// - https://github.com/golang/go/blob/go1.19/src/crypto/internal/boring/aes.go#L250
// - https://github.com/google/boringssl/blob/ae223d6138807a13006342edfeef32e813246b39/include/openssl/aead.h#L379-L381
// - https://github.com/google/boringssl/blob/ae223d6138807a13006342edfeef32e813246b39/crypto/fipsmodule/cipher/e_aes.c#L1082-L1093
//
//go:linkname newGCMTLS crypto/internal/boring.NewGCMTLS
func newGCMTLS(c cipher.Block) (cipher.AEAD, error)
type cipherFn struct {
fn func([32]byte) noise.Cipher
name string
}
func (c cipherFn) Cipher(k [32]byte) noise.Cipher { return c.fn(k) }
func (c cipherFn) CipherName() string { return c.name }
// CipherAESGCM is the AES256-GCM AEAD cipher (using NewGCMTLS when GoBoring is present)
var CipherAESGCM noise.CipherFunc = cipherFn{cipherAESGCMBoring, "AESGCM"}
func cipherAESGCMBoring(k [32]byte) noise.Cipher {
c, err := aes.NewCipher(k[:])
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
gcm, err := newGCMTLS(c)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
return aeadCipher{
gcm,
func(n uint64) []byte {
var nonce [12]byte
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(nonce[4:], n)
return nonce[:]
},
}
}
type aeadCipher struct {
cipher.AEAD
nonce func(uint64) []byte
}
func (c aeadCipher) Encrypt(out []byte, n uint64, ad, plaintext []byte) []byte {
return c.Seal(out, c.nonce(n), plaintext, ad)
}
func (c aeadCipher) Decrypt(out []byte, n uint64, ad, ciphertext []byte) ([]byte, error) {
return c.Open(out, c.nonce(n), ciphertext, ad)
}
+32
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
package noiseutil
import (
"crypto/boring"
"encoding/hex"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
@@ -12,3 +14,33 @@ import (
func TestEncryptLockNeeded(t *testing.T) {
assert.True(t, EncryptLockNeeded)
}
// Ensure NewGCMTLS validates the nonce is non-repeating
func TestNewGCMTLS(t *testing.T) {
assert.True(t, boring.Enabled())
// Test Case 16 from GCM Spec:
// - (now dead link): http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/proposedmodes/gcm/gcm-spec.pdf
// - as listed in boringssl tests: https://github.com/google/boringssl/blob/fips-20220613/crypto/cipher_extra/test/cipher_tests.txt#L412-L418
key, _ := hex.DecodeString("feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308")
iv, _ := hex.DecodeString("cafebabefacedbaddecaf888")
plaintext, _ := hex.DecodeString("d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39")
aad, _ := hex.DecodeString("feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2")
expected, _ := hex.DecodeString("522dc1f099567d07f47f37a32a84427d643a8cdcbfe5c0c97598a2bd2555d1aa8cb08e48590dbb3da7b08b1056828838c5f61e6393ba7a0abcc9f662")
expectedTag, _ := hex.DecodeString("76fc6ece0f4e1768cddf8853bb2d551b")
expected = append(expected, expectedTag...)
var keyArray [32]byte
copy(keyArray[:], key)
c := CipherAESGCM.Cipher(keyArray)
aead := c.(aeadCipher).AEAD
dst := aead.Seal([]byte{}, iv, plaintext, aad)
assert.Equal(t, expected, dst)
// We expect this to fail since we are re-encrypting with a repeat IV
assert.PanicsWithError(t, "boringcrypto: EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal failed", func() {
dst = aead.Seal([]byte{}, iv, plaintext, aad)
})
}
-3
View File
@@ -24,9 +24,6 @@ func (s *CipherStateChaChaPoly) EncryptDanger(out, ad, plaintext []byte, n uint6
if s == nil {
return nil, errors.New("no cipher state available to encrypt")
}
if n >= RejectAfterMessages {
return nil, ErrMessageCounterExhausted
}
nb[0] = 0
nb[1] = 0
nb[2] = 0
+1 -15
View File
@@ -1,22 +1,11 @@
package noiseutil
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"math"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
)
// RejectHeadroom is the wrap gap for senders racing the counter, sized large enough for any routine count.
const RejectHeadroom = uint64(1) << 40
// RejectAfterMessages is the nonce ceiling: encrypting stops RejectHeadroom short of the wrap.
const RejectAfterMessages = math.MaxUint64 - RejectHeadroom
// ErrMessageCounterExhausted is returned by EncryptDanger once the nonce reaches RejectAfterMessages.
var ErrMessageCounterExhausted = errors.New("message counter exhausted")
// CipherState is the post-handshake AEAD cipher used for the data plane.
// Each supported cipher has its own concrete implementation in this package with the nonce endianness hardcoded,
// so the encrypt/decrypt fast path avoids interface dispatch on the byte order.
@@ -40,11 +29,8 @@ type CipherState interface {
// NewCipherState wraps the post-handshake noise.CipherState in the per-cipher type that matches cipherFunc.
// cipherFunc must be the same cipher used to build the noise CipherSuite that produced s.
func NewCipherState(s *noise.CipherState, cipherFunc noise.CipherFunc) CipherState {
if cs, ok := s.Cipher().(CipherState); ok {
return cs
}
switch cipherFunc.CipherName() {
case noise.CipherAESGCM.CipherName():
case CipherAESGCM.CipherName():
return NewCipherStateAESGCM(s)
case noise.CipherChaChaPoly.CipherName():
return NewCipherStateChaChaPoly(s)
+4 -75
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
package noiseutil
import (
"crypto/fips140"
"math"
"testing"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
@@ -12,30 +10,24 @@ import (
func TestCipherStateAESGCMRoundtrip(t *testing.T) {
enc, dec := buildCipherStates(t, CipherAESGCM)
roundtrip(t, NewCipherState(enc, CipherAESGCM), NewCipherState(dec, CipherAESGCM))
roundtrip(t, NewCipherStateAESGCM(enc), NewCipherStateAESGCM(dec))
}
func TestCipherStateChaChaPolyRoundtrip(t *testing.T) {
enc, dec := buildCipherStates(t, noise.CipherChaChaPoly)
roundtrip(t, NewCipherState(enc, noise.CipherChaChaPoly), NewCipherState(dec, noise.CipherChaChaPoly))
roundtrip(t, NewCipherStateChaChaPoly(enc), NewCipherStateChaChaPoly(dec))
}
func TestNewCipherStateDispatch(t *testing.T) {
encA, _ := buildCipherStates(t, CipherAESGCM)
encC, _ := buildCipherStates(t, noise.CipherChaChaPoly)
if !boringEnabled && !fips140.Enabled() {
assert.IsType(t, &CipherStateAESGCM{}, NewCipherState(encA, CipherAESGCM))
} else {
// fips140
assert.IsType(t, encA.Cipher(), NewCipherState(encA, CipherAESGCM))
}
assert.IsType(t, &CipherStateAESGCM{}, NewCipherState(encA, CipherAESGCM))
assert.IsType(t, &CipherStateChaChaPoly{}, NewCipherState(encC, noise.CipherChaChaPoly))
}
func TestNewCipherStateUnsupportedPanics(t *testing.T) {
enc, _ := buildCipherStates(t, noise.CipherChaChaPoly)
enc, _ := buildCipherStates(t, CipherAESGCM)
assert.Panics(t, func() {
NewCipherState(enc, fakeCipher{})
})
@@ -97,24 +89,6 @@ func roundtrip(t *testing.T, enc, dec CipherState) {
assert.Equal(t, 16, enc.Overhead())
}
func TestEncryptRejectsExhaustedCounter(t *testing.T) {
// Pin the headroom below the uint64 wrap so a typo can't silently move the ceiling.
require.Equal(t, uint64(1)<<40, RejectHeadroom)
require.Equal(t, math.MaxUint64-RejectHeadroom, RejectAfterMessages)
encA, _ := buildCipherStates(t, CipherAESGCM)
encC, _ := buildCipherStates(t, noise.CipherChaChaPoly)
nb := make([]byte, 12)
for _, cs := range []CipherState{NewCipherStateAESGCM(encA), NewCipherStateChaChaPoly(encC)} {
_, err := cs.EncryptDanger(nil, nil, []byte("x"), RejectAfterMessages-1, nb)
require.NoError(t, err)
_, err = cs.EncryptDanger(nil, nil, []byte("x"), RejectAfterMessages, nb)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrMessageCounterExhausted)
}
}
func BenchmarkCipherStateEncryptAESGCM(b *testing.B) {
enc, _ := buildCipherStatesB(b, CipherAESGCM)
benchEncryptCipherState(b, NewCipherState(enc, CipherAESGCM))
@@ -190,48 +164,3 @@ func TestCipherStateNilSafety(t *testing.T) {
assert.Empty(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, 0, cc.Overhead())
}
func TestCipherStateAESGCMInPlaceDecrypt(t *testing.T) {
enc, dec := buildCipherStates(t, CipherAESGCM)
inPlaceDecrypt(t, NewCipherStateAESGCM(enc), NewCipherStateAESGCM(dec))
}
func TestCipherStateChaChaPolyInPlaceDecrypt(t *testing.T) {
enc, dec := buildCipherStates(t, noise.CipherChaChaPoly)
inPlaceDecrypt(t, NewCipherStateChaChaPoly(enc), NewCipherStateChaChaPoly(dec))
}
func inPlaceDecrypt(t *testing.T, enc, dec CipherState) {
t.Helper()
const hdrLen = 16
plaintext := []byte("in-place decrypt should replace the ciphertext bytes")
nb := make([]byte, 12)
// packet = [16-byte header | ciphertext+tag], like a nebula Message.
packet := make([]byte, hdrLen, hdrLen+len(plaintext)+enc.Overhead())
for i := range packet {
packet[i] = byte(i)
}
packet, err := enc.EncryptDanger(packet, packet[:hdrLen], plaintext, 1, nb)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Simulate a GRO row: [packet | next segment]. A failed auth on packet
// may zero packet's plaintext region but must not touch the header, the
// tag, or the neighboring segment.
neighbor := []byte("next coalesced segment, must stay intact")
row := append(append([]byte(nil), packet...), neighbor...)
tampered := row[:len(packet)]
tampered[hdrLen] ^= 0x01
_, err = dec.DecryptDanger(tampered[hdrLen:hdrLen], tampered[:hdrLen], tampered[hdrLen:], 1, nb)
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, packet[:hdrLen], tampered[:hdrLen], "failed auth must not touch the header")
assert.Equal(t, packet[len(packet)-dec.Overhead():], tampered[len(tampered)-dec.Overhead():],
"failed auth must not touch the tag")
assert.Equal(t, neighbor, row[len(packet):], "failed auth must not touch the next segment")
out, err := dec.DecryptDanger(packet[hdrLen:hdrLen], packet[:hdrLen], packet[hdrLen:], 1, nb)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, plaintext, out)
// The plaintext must be IN the packet buffer, not a fresh allocation.
assert.Equal(t, &packet[hdrLen], &out[0], "plaintext must alias the packet buffer")
}
-197
View File
@@ -1,197 +0,0 @@
package noiseutil
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/cipher"
"crypto/fips140"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"fmt"
"reflect"
"runtime"
"unsafe"
// unsafe needed for go:linkname
_ "crypto/tls"
_ "unsafe"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
)
// TODO: Use NewGCMWithCounterNonce or NewGCMForQUIC once available:
// - https://github.com/golang/go/issues/73110
// - https://github.com/golang/go/issues/79219
// Using tls.aeadAESGCMTLS13 gives us the TLS 1.3 GCM, which also verifies
// that the nonce is strictly increasing. This works for both boringcrypto
// and fips140.
//
//go:linkname aeadAESGCMTLS13 crypto/tls.aeadAESGCMTLS13
func aeadAESGCMTLS13(key, noncePrefix []byte) cipher.AEAD
type cipherFn struct {
fn func([32]byte) noise.Cipher
name string
}
func (c cipherFn) Cipher(k [32]byte) noise.Cipher { return c.fn(k) }
func (c cipherFn) CipherName() string { return c.name }
// CipherAESGCMFIPS140 is the AES256-GCM AEAD cipher (using tls.aeadAESGCMTLS13, for both boringcrypto and fips140)
var CipherAESGCMFIPS140 noise.CipherFunc = cipherFn{cipherAESGCMFIPS140, "AESGCM"}
// tls.aeadAESGCMTLS13 uses a 4 byte static prefix and an 8 byte XOR mask
var emptyNonce = []byte{0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
func cipherAESGCMFIPS140(k [32]byte) noise.Cipher {
gcm := aeadAESGCMTLS13(k[:], emptyNonce)
gcm = extractFIPSAEAD(gcm)
return &aeadGCMFIPS140Cipher{
AEAD: gcm,
}
}
type aeadGCMFIPS140Cipher struct {
cipher.AEAD
ready bool
}
// Extract the internal FIPS GCM implementation from the tls wrapper. The TLS
// wrapper is not thread safe around Open, so instead of locking around it we
// can grab the internal implementation that is thread safe. This is the FIPS
// module implementation: `crypto/internal/fips140/aes/gcm.GCMWithXORCounterNonce`
//
// - https://github.com/golang/go/blob/go1.26.4/src/crypto/internal/fips140/aes/gcm/gcm_nonces.go#L212-L287
//
// The wrapper is struct `crypto/tls.xorNonceAEAD` , with field `aead`:
//
// - https://github.com/golang/go/blob/go1.26.4/src/crypto/tls/cipher_suites.go#L482-L487
//
// This can be cleaned up once these FIPS implementations are exposed directly:
//
// - https://github.com/golang/go/issues/73110
func extractFIPSAEAD(xorNonceAEAD cipher.AEAD) cipher.AEAD {
r := reflect.ValueOf(xorNonceAEAD)
v := r.Elem().FieldByName("aead")
if !v.IsValid() {
// The internal crypto/tls.xorNonceAEAD struct no longer has an `aead`
// field. This can only happen on a Go version this code was not built
// against; the package init() self-test guards against ever reaching
// this at runtime, so this is a defensive fail-fast.
panic(fmt.Sprintf("noiseutil: could not extract FIPS AEAD from %T on %s: no `aead` field (incompatible Go version)", xorNonceAEAD, runtime.Version()))
}
v2 := reflect.NewAt(v.Type(), unsafe.Pointer(v.UnsafeAddr())).Elem()
aead, ok := v2.Interface().(cipher.AEAD)
if !ok {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("noiseutil: extracted FIPS `aead` field is %s, not a cipher.AEAD, on %s (incompatible Go version)", v2.Type(), runtime.Version()))
}
return aead
}
func (c *aeadGCMFIPS140Cipher) init(nonce []byte) {
// GCMWithXORCounterNonce expects that the first call to Seal
// is with a counter of `0`, this is how it extracts the nonce mask.
// We can clean this up in the future when NewGCMWithCounterNonce or
// NewGCMForQUIC are available:
if !bytes.Equal(emptyNonce, nonce) {
c.AEAD.Seal([]byte{}, emptyNonce, []byte{}, []byte{})
}
c.ready = true
}
func (c *aeadGCMFIPS140Cipher) Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte {
if !c.ready {
c.init(nonce)
}
return c.AEAD.Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, additionalData)
}
func (c *aeadGCMFIPS140Cipher) Encrypt(out []byte, n uint64, ad, plaintext []byte) []byte {
return c.Seal(out, aeadGCMFIPS140CipherNonce(n), plaintext, ad)
}
func (c *aeadGCMFIPS140Cipher) Decrypt(out []byte, n uint64, ad, ciphertext []byte) ([]byte, error) {
return c.Open(out, aeadGCMFIPS140CipherNonce(n), ciphertext, ad)
}
func (c *aeadGCMFIPS140Cipher) EncryptDanger(out, ad, plaintext []byte, n uint64, nb []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if c == nil {
return nil, errors.New("no cipher state available to encrypt")
}
if n >= RejectAfterMessages {
return nil, ErrMessageCounterExhausted
}
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(nb[4:], n)
out = c.Seal(out, nb, plaintext, ad)
return out, nil
}
func (c *aeadGCMFIPS140Cipher) DecryptDanger(out, ad, ciphertext []byte, n uint64, nb []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if c == nil {
return []byte{}, nil
}
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(nb[4:], n)
return c.Open(out, nb, ciphertext, ad)
}
func (c *aeadGCMFIPS140Cipher) Overhead() int {
if c == nil {
return 0
}
return c.AEAD.Overhead()
}
func aeadGCMFIPS140CipherNonce(n uint64) []byte {
// GCMWithXORCounterNonce uses a 4 byte static prefix and an 8 byte nonce
var nonce [12]byte
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(nonce[4:], n)
return nonce[:]
}
func init() {
if boringEnabled || fips140.Enabled() {
initSelfTestAESGCMFIPS140()
}
}
// validates the go:linkname + reflection extraction and the nonce-reuse
// protection at startup. cipherAESGCMFIPS140 relies on unexported
// crypto/tls and crypto/internal/fips140 internals; if a future Go version changes
// those, this fails fast with a clear message instead of panicking per-handshake
// (or, worse, silently losing the strictly-increasing nonce check that is the whole
// point of using this cipher).
func initSelfTestAESGCMFIPS140() {
var key [32]byte
c := cipherAESGCMFIPS140(key)
// Verify the extracted AEAD produces a working encrypt/decrypt roundtrip.
plaintext := []byte("nebula fips140 self-test")
ad := []byte("ad")
ct := c.Encrypt(nil, 1, ad, plaintext)
pt, err := c.Decrypt(nil, 1, ad, ct)
if err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("noiseutil: FIPS AES-GCM self-test roundtrip failed on %s: %v", runtime.Version(), err))
}
if !bytes.Equal(pt, plaintext) {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("noiseutil: FIPS AES-GCM self-test roundtrip returned wrong plaintext on %s", runtime.Version()))
}
// Verify the nonce-reuse protection still fires: re-encrypting with the same
// counter must panic. This is the defensive check that FIPS-140 requires, so
// if the extraction ever silently yields an AEAD without it, refuse to start.
if !reusePanics(c) {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("noiseutil: FIPS AES-GCM self-test did not reject a reused nonce on %s; nonce-reuse protection is missing (incompatible Go version)", runtime.Version()))
}
}
// reusePanics reports whether re-encrypting with an already-used counter panics,
// as GCMWithXORCounterNonce is expected to.
func reusePanics(c noise.Cipher) (panicked bool) {
c.Encrypt(nil, 2, nil, nil)
defer func() {
if recover() != nil {
panicked = true
}
}()
c.Encrypt(nil, 2, nil, nil)
return false
}
-48
View File
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
package noiseutil
import (
"crypto/cipher"
"crypto/fips140"
"encoding/hex"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
)
// Ensure NewAESGCM validates the nonce is non-repeating
func TestNewAESGCM(t *testing.T) {
if !boringEnabled && !fips140.Enabled() {
t.Skip("TestNewAESGCM is only for fips140/boringcrypto")
}
key, _ := hex.DecodeString("feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308")
iv, _ := hex.DecodeString("00000000facedbaddecaf888")
plaintext, _ := hex.DecodeString("d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39")
aad, _ := hex.DecodeString("feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2")
expected, _ := hex.DecodeString("6a65c2edd45bd63c7e29f40e3d2ed8ba2b99f4c83135383d5676652f255059ceb24863ff10afb1089db701245da87fb88d3acd5f9dd0770cac220c3c04145caf25e190aeb775e7080401c628")
var keyArray [32]byte
copy(keyArray[:], key)
c := CipherAESGCM.Cipher(keyArray)
aead := c.(cipher.AEAD)
dst := aead.Seal([]byte{}, iv, plaintext, aad)
t.Logf("%x", dst)
assert.Equal(t, expected, dst)
// We expect this to fail since we are re-encrypting with a repeat IV
switch {
case boringEnabled:
assert.PanicsWithError(t, "boringcrypto: EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal failed", func() {
dst = aead.Seal([]byte{}, iv, plaintext, aad)
})
case fips140.Version() == "v1.0.0":
assert.PanicsWithValue(t, "crypto/cipher: counter decreased", func() {
dst = aead.Seal([]byte{}, iv, plaintext, aad)
})
default:
assert.PanicsWithValue(t, "crypto/cipher: counter decreased or remained the same", func() {
dst = aead.Seal([]byte{}, iv, plaintext, aad)
})
}
}
-13
View File
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
//go:build fips140enforce
package noiseutil
import (
"crypto/fips140"
)
func init() {
if !fips140.Enforced() {
panic("Nebula compiled with fips140 expects FIPS140 to be enforced. Do not set GODEBUG=fips140, or if you do it must be set as GODEBUG=fips140=only")
}
}
+4 -15
View File
@@ -1,25 +1,14 @@
//go:build !boringcrypto
// +build !boringcrypto
package noiseutil
import (
"crypto/fips140"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
)
// EncryptLockNeeded indicates if calls to Encrypt need a lock
var EncryptLockNeeded = fips140.Enabled()
const EncryptLockNeeded = false
var CipherAESGCM noise.CipherFunc = initAESGCM()
func initAESGCM() noise.CipherFunc {
if fips140.Enabled() {
return CipherAESGCMFIPS140
} else {
return noise.CipherAESGCM
}
}
var boringEnabled = false
// CipherAESGCM is the standard noise.CipherAESGCM when boringcrypto is not enabled
var CipherAESGCM noise.CipherFunc = noise.CipherAESGCM
+14
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
//go:build !boringcrypto
// +build !boringcrypto
package noiseutil
import (
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
)
func TestEncryptLockNeeded(t *testing.T) {
assert.False(t, EncryptLockNeeded)
}
+122 -95
View File
@@ -8,12 +8,11 @@ import (
"net/netip"
"time"
"github.com/google/gopacket/layers"
"golang.org/x/net/ipv6"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/iputil"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/batch"
"golang.org/x/net/ipv4"
)
@@ -23,11 +22,7 @@ const (
var ErrOutOfWindow = errors.New("out of window packet")
// readOutsidePackets processes one received underlay packet.
// Message payloads are decrypted IN PLACE, so packet must stay untouched
// by the caller until the batcher for queue q has been flushed
func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, packet []byte, rxc *rxContext) {
h := rxc.h
func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte, h *header.H, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, lhf *LightHouseHandler, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
err := h.Parse(packet)
if err != nil {
// Hole punch packets are 0 or 1 byte big, so lets ignore printing those errors
@@ -95,7 +90,7 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, packet []byte, rxc *rxCont
if isMessageRelay {
hostinfo = f.hostMap.QueryRelayIndex(h.RemoteIndex)
} else {
hostinfo = f.hostMap.QueryIndexCached(h.RemoteIndex, rxc.hostmapCache)
hostinfo = f.hostMap.QueryIndex(h.RemoteIndex)
}
// At this point we should have a valid existing tunnel, verify and send
@@ -118,18 +113,17 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, packet []byte, rxc *rxCont
// All remaining packets are encrypted
if isMessageRelay {
// Relay packets are special, this branch should always early-return
err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.VerifyRelay(f.l, h.MessageCounter, packet, rxc.nb)
if err != nil {
if err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.VerifyRelay(f.l, h.MessageCounter, packet, nb); err != nil {
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("Failed to verify relay packet", "error", err, "from", via, "header", h)
}
return
}
f.handleOutsideRelayPacket(hostinfo, via, packet, rxc)
f.handleOutsideRelayPacket(hostinfo, via, out, packet, h, fwPacket, lhf, nb, q, localCache)
return
}
out, err := hostinfo.ConnectionState.Decrypt(f.l, h.MessageCounter, packet, rxc.nb)
out, err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.Decrypt(f.l, h.MessageCounter, out, packet, nb)
if err != nil {
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("Failed to decrypt packet", "error", err, "from", via, "header", h)
@@ -145,7 +139,7 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, packet []byte, rxc *rxCont
case header.Message:
switch h.Subtype {
case header.MessageNone:
f.handleOutsideMessagePacket(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out, rxc)
f.handleOutsideMessagePacket(hostinfo, out, packet, fwPacket, nb, q, localCache)
default:
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("IsValidSubType was true, but unexpected message subtype seen", "from", via, "header", h)
return
@@ -153,23 +147,15 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, packet []byte, rxc *rxCont
case header.LightHouse:
//TODO: assert via is not relayed
rxc.lhh.HandleRequest(via.UdpAddr, hostinfo.vpnAddrs, out, f)
lhf.HandleRequest(via.UdpAddr, hostinfo.vpnAddrs, out, f)
case header.Test:
switch h.Subtype {
case header.TestReply:
// No-op, useful for the Roaming and connectionManager side-effects above
case header.TestRequest:
const maxCipherOverhead = 16 //todo we use this too often, needs a real importable const
const maxOverhead = header.Len + header.Len + maxCipherOverhead + maxCipherOverhead
if maxOverhead+len(out) > len(rxc.scratch) {
// A reply that cannot fit in scratch is dropped no matter the log level.
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("dropping oversized test request", "payloadLen", len(out), "from", via)
}
return
}
f.send(header.Test, header.TestReply, hostinfo.ConnectionState, hostinfo, out, rxc.nb, rxc.scratch[:0])
//recycle the input packet ciphertext as our output buffer
f.send(header.Test, header.TestReply, hostinfo.ConnectionState, hostinfo, out, nb, packet)
default:
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("IsValidSubType was true, but unexpected test subtype seen", "from", via, "header", h)
return
@@ -187,8 +173,7 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, packet []byte, rxc *rxCont
}
}
func (f *Interface) handleOutsideRelayPacket(hostinfo *HostInfo, via ViaSender, packet []byte, rxc *rxContext) {
h := rxc.h
func (f *Interface) handleOutsideRelayPacket(hostinfo *HostInfo, via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte, h *header.H, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, lhf *LightHouseHandler, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
// Successfully validated the thing. Get rid of the Relay header and the AEAD tag
signedPayload := packet[header.Len : len(packet)-hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.Overhead()]
// Pull the Roaming parts up here, and return in all call paths.
@@ -201,7 +186,9 @@ func (f *Interface) handleOutsideRelayPacket(hostinfo *HostInfo, via ViaSender,
if !ok {
// The only way this happens is if hostmap has an index to the correct HostInfo, but the HostInfo is missing
// its internal mapping. This should never happen.
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("HostInfo missing remote relay index", "relayRemoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex)
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("HostInfo missing remote relay index",
"relayRemoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex,
)
return
}
@@ -215,7 +202,7 @@ func (f *Interface) handleOutsideRelayPacket(hostinfo *HostInfo, via ViaSender,
relay: relay,
IsRelayed: true,
}
f.readOutsidePackets(via, signedPayload, rxc)
f.readOutsidePackets(via, out[:0], signedPayload, h, fwPacket, lhf, nb, q, localCache)
case ForwardingType:
// Find the target HostInfo relay object
targetHI, targetRelay, err := f.hostMap.QueryVpnAddrsRelayFor(hostinfo.vpnAddrs, relay.PeerAddr)
@@ -234,9 +221,8 @@ func (f *Interface) handleOutsideRelayPacket(hostinfo *HostInfo, via ViaSender,
case ForwardingType:
// Forward this packet through the relay tunnel, rebuilding it in place.
// Encode overwrites the old outer header, and the new AEAD tag lands where the old one was
fwdBuf := packet[:0]
//todo it would potentially be nice to batch these
f.SendVia(targetHI, targetRelay, signedPayload, rxc.nb, fwdBuf, true, rxc.q)
fwdBuf := packet[:0:len(packet)] // Cap to len(packet) to protect memory from a larger parent buffer
f.SendVia(targetHI, targetRelay, signedPayload, nb, fwdBuf, true)
case TerminalType:
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Unexpected Relay Type of Terminal")
return
@@ -313,14 +299,11 @@ var (
ErrIPv4InvalidHeaderLength = errors.New("invalid ipv4 header length")
ErrIPv4PacketTooShort = errors.New("ipv4 packet is too short")
ErrIPv6PacketTooShort = errors.New("ipv6 packet is too short")
ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload = errors.New("could not find payload in ipv6 packet")
)
// newPacket validates and parses the interesting bits for the firewall out of the ip and sub protocol headers
func newPacket(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.ParsedPacket) error {
// fp is reused across packets; reset the parse byproducts so an early-error return cannot
// leak the previous packet's offsets.
fp.IPHdrLen = 0
fp.FragAny = false
func newPacket(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.Packet) error {
if len(data) < 1 {
return ErrPacketTooShort
}
@@ -335,7 +318,7 @@ func newPacket(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.ParsedPacket) error {
return ErrUnknownIPVersion
}
func parseV6(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.ParsedPacket) error {
func parseV6(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.Packet) error {
dataLen := len(data)
if dataLen < ipv6.HeaderLen {
return ErrIPv6PacketTooShort
@@ -349,64 +332,104 @@ func parseV6(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.ParsedPacket) error {
fp.RemoteAddr, _ = netip.AddrFromSlice(data[24:40])
}
// Walk the extension header chain to the upper layer protocol. iputil.IPv6FindUpperProtocol is the single
// source of truth for which headers are extension headers, so this stays in lockstep with the reject path
// and cannot drift into misreading an unknown protocol (SCTP, GRE, etc.) as a forged transport.
proto, offset, isFragment, anyFragment, err := iputil.IPv6FindUpperProtocol(data)
if err != nil {
return ErrIPv6PacketTooShort
}
fp.Protocol = proto
fp.Fragment = isFragment
fp.FragAny = anyFragment
fp.IPHdrLen = offset
if isFragment {
// Non-first fragments carry no transport header, so we have no ports to read
fp.RemotePort = 0
fp.LocalPort = 0
return nil
}
switch proto {
case iputil.IPProtocolICMPv6:
// An ICMPv6 message is at least type, code and checksum, 4 bytes. Only echo carries more than we read.
if dataLen < offset+4 {
return ErrIPv6PacketTooShort
protoAt := 6 // NextHeader is at 6 bytes into the ipv6 header
offset := ipv6.HeaderLen // Start at the end of the ipv6 header
next := 0
for {
if protoAt >= dataLen {
break
}
fp.LocalPort = 0 //incoming vs outgoing doesn't matter for icmpv6
switch data[offset] { //icmp type
case iputil.ICMPv6TypeEchoRequest, iputil.ICMPv6TypeEchoReply:
proto := layers.IPProtocol(data[protoAt])
switch proto {
case layers.IPProtocolESP, layers.IPProtocolNoNextHeader:
fp.Protocol = uint8(proto)
fp.RemotePort = 0
fp.LocalPort = 0
fp.Fragment = false
return nil
case layers.IPProtocolICMPv6:
if dataLen < offset+6 {
return ErrIPv6PacketTooShort
}
fp.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[offset+4 : offset+6]) //identifier
fp.Protocol = uint8(proto)
fp.LocalPort = 0 //incoming vs outgoing doesn't matter for icmpv6
icmptype := data[offset+1]
switch icmptype {
case layers.ICMPv6TypeEchoRequest, layers.ICMPv6TypeEchoReply:
fp.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[offset+4 : offset+6]) //identifier
default:
fp.RemotePort = 0
}
fp.Fragment = false
return nil
case layers.IPProtocolTCP, layers.IPProtocolUDP:
if dataLen < offset+4 {
return ErrIPv6PacketTooShort
}
fp.Protocol = uint8(proto)
if incoming {
fp.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[offset : offset+2])
fp.LocalPort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[offset+2 : offset+4])
} else {
fp.LocalPort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[offset : offset+2])
fp.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[offset+2 : offset+4])
}
fp.Fragment = false
return nil
case layers.IPProtocolIPv6Fragment:
// Fragment header is 8 bytes, need at least offset+4 to read the offset field
if dataLen < offset+8 {
return ErrIPv6PacketTooShort
}
// Check if this is the first fragment
fragmentOffset := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[offset+2:offset+4]) &^ uint16(0x7) // Remove the reserved and M flag bits
if fragmentOffset != 0 {
// Non-first fragment, use what we have now and stop processing
fp.Protocol = data[offset]
fp.Fragment = true
fp.RemotePort = 0
fp.LocalPort = 0
return nil
}
// The next loop should be the transport layer since we are the first fragment
next = 8 // Fragment headers are always 8 bytes
case layers.IPProtocolAH:
// Auth headers, used by IPSec, have a different meaning for header length
if dataLen <= offset+1 {
break
}
next = (int(data[offset+1]) + 2) << 2
default:
fp.RemotePort = 0
// Normal ipv6 header length processing
if dataLen <= offset+1 {
break
}
next = (int(data[offset+1]) + 1) << 3
}
case iputil.IPProtocolTCP, iputil.IPProtocolUDP:
if dataLen < offset+4 {
return ErrIPv6PacketTooShort
}
if incoming {
fp.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[offset : offset+2])
fp.LocalPort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[offset+2 : offset+4])
} else {
fp.LocalPort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[offset : offset+2])
fp.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[offset+2 : offset+4])
if next <= 0 {
// Safety check, each ipv6 header has to be at least 8 bytes
next = 8
}
default:
// don't set ports for protocols Nebula doesn't inspect
fp.RemotePort = 0
fp.LocalPort = 0
protoAt = offset
offset = offset + next
}
return nil
return ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload
}
func parseV4(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.ParsedPacket) error {
func parseV4(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.Packet) error {
// Do we at least have an ipv4 header worth of data?
if len(data) < ipv4.HeaderLen {
return ErrIPv4PacketTooShort
@@ -423,10 +446,6 @@ func parseV4(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.ParsedPacket) error {
// Check if this is the second or further fragment of a fragmented packet.
flagsfrags := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[6:8])
fp.Fragment = (flagsfrags & 0x1FFF) != 0
// Any fragmentation at all (MF or offset): first fragments have readable ports for the
// firewall but must never be coalesced.
fp.FragAny = (flagsfrags & 0x3fff) != 0
fp.IPHdrLen = ihl
// Firewall handles protocol checks
fp.Protocol = data[9]
@@ -434,7 +453,7 @@ func parseV4(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.ParsedPacket) error {
// Accounting for a variable header length, do we have enough data for our src/dst tuples?
minLen := ihl
if !fp.Fragment {
if fp.Protocol == iputil.IPProtocolICMP {
if fp.Protocol == firewall.ProtoICMP {
minLen += minFwPacketLen + 2
} else {
minLen += minFwPacketLen
@@ -456,7 +475,7 @@ func parseV4(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.ParsedPacket) error {
if fp.Fragment {
fp.RemotePort = 0
fp.LocalPort = 0
} else if fp.Protocol == iputil.IPProtocolICMP { //note that orientation doesn't matter on ICMP
} else if fp.Protocol == firewall.ProtoICMP { //note that orientation doesn't matter on ICMP
fp.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[ihl+4 : ihl+6]) //identifier
fp.LocalPort = 0 //code would be uint16(data[ihl+1])
} else if incoming {
@@ -470,23 +489,31 @@ func parseV4(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.ParsedPacket) error {
return nil
}
func (f *Interface) handleOutsideMessagePacket(hostinfo *HostInfo, messageCounter uint64, out []byte, rxc *rxContext) {
err := newPacket(out, true, rxc.fwPacket)
func (f *Interface) handleOutsideMessagePacket(hostinfo *HostInfo, out []byte, packet []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
err := newPacket(out, true, fwPacket)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Warn("Error while validating inbound packet", "error", err, "packet", out)
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Warn("Error while validating inbound packet",
"error", err,
"packet", out,
)
return
}
dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(rxc.fwPacket.Packet, true, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), rxc.ctCache.Get())
dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(*fwPacket, true, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), localCache)
if dropReason != nil {
f.rejectOutside(out, hostinfo.ConnectionState, hostinfo, rxc.nb, rxc.scratch, rxc.q)
// NOTE: We give `packet` as the `out` here since we already decrypted from it and we don't need it anymore
// This gives us a buffer to build the reject packet in
f.rejectOutside(out, hostinfo.ConnectionState, hostinfo, nb, packet, q)
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("dropping inbound packet", "fwPacket", rxc.fwPacket, "reason", dropReason)
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("dropping inbound packet",
"fwPacket", fwPacket,
"reason", dropReason,
)
}
return
}
err = f.batchers[rxc.q].Commit(out, batch.SortKey{Epoch: hostinfo.ConnectionState.epoch, Counter: messageCounter}, rxc.fwPacket)
_, err = f.readers[q].Write(out)
if err != nil {
f.l.Error("Failed to write to tun", "error", err)
}
+24 -190
View File
@@ -9,17 +9,15 @@ import (
"github.com/google/gopacket"
"github.com/google/gopacket/layers"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/iputil"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"golang.org/x/net/ipv4"
"golang.org/x/net/ipv6"
)
func Test_newPacket(t *testing.T) {
p := &firewall.ParsedPacket{}
p := &firewall.Packet{}
// length fails
err := newPacket([]byte{}, true, p)
@@ -59,7 +57,7 @@ func Test_newPacket(t *testing.T) {
Src: net.IPv4(10, 0, 0, 1),
Dst: net.IPv4(10, 0, 0, 2),
Options: []byte{0, 1, 0, 2},
Protocol: iputil.IPProtocolTCP,
Protocol: firewall.ProtoTCP,
}
b, _ = h.Marshal()
@@ -67,7 +65,7 @@ func Test_newPacket(t *testing.T) {
err = newPacket(b, true, p)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, uint8(iputil.IPProtocolTCP), p.Protocol)
assert.Equal(t, uint8(firewall.ProtoTCP), p.Protocol)
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.2"), p.LocalAddr)
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.1"), p.RemoteAddr)
assert.Equal(t, uint16(3), p.RemotePort)
@@ -98,7 +96,7 @@ func Test_newPacket(t *testing.T) {
}
func Test_newPacket_v6(t *testing.T) {
p := &firewall.ParsedPacket{}
p := &firewall.Packet{}
// invalid ipv6
ip := layers.IPv6{
@@ -117,12 +115,12 @@ func Test_newPacket_v6(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t, err)
err = newPacket(buffer.Bytes(), true, p)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIPv6PacketTooShort)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload)
// A v6 packet with a hop-by-hop extension
// ICMPv6 Payload (Echo Request)
icmpLayer := layers.ICMPv6{
TypeCode: layers.CreateICMPv6TypeCode(layers.ICMPv6TypeEchoRequest, 0),
TypeCode: layers.ICMPv6TypeEchoRequest,
}
// Hop-by-Hop Extension Header
hopOption := layers.IPv6HopByHopOption{}
@@ -151,12 +149,12 @@ func Test_newPacket_v6(t *testing.T) {
// A full IPv6 header and 1 byte in the first extension, but missing
// the length byte.
err = newPacket(buffer.Bytes()[:41], true, p)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIPv6PacketTooShort)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload)
// A full IPv6 header plus 1 full extension, but only 1 byte of the
// next layer, missing length byte
err = newPacket(buffer.Bytes()[:49], true, p)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIPv6PacketTooShort)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload)
err = nil
// A good ICMP packet
@@ -169,7 +167,7 @@ func Test_newPacket_v6(t *testing.T) {
}
icmp := layers.ICMPv6{
TypeCode: layers.CreateICMPv6TypeCode(layers.ICMPv6TypeEchoRequest, 0),
TypeCode: layers.ICMPv6TypeEchoRequest,
Checksum: 0x1234,
}
@@ -191,18 +189,6 @@ func Test_newPacket_v6(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, uint16(0), p.LocalPort)
assert.False(t, p.Fragment)
// A minimal 4 byte non-echo ICMPv6 message (type, code, checksum), no identifier to read
icmpMin := make([]byte, ipv6.HeaderLen+4)
copy(icmpMin, buffer.Bytes()[:ipv6.HeaderLen])
icmpMin[6] = byte(layers.IPProtocolICMPv6)
icmpMin[ipv6.HeaderLen] = 1 // type 1, destination unreachable, not echo
err = newPacket(icmpMin, true, p)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, uint8(layers.IPProtocolICMPv6), p.Protocol)
assert.Equal(t, uint16(0), p.RemotePort)
assert.Equal(t, uint16(0), p.LocalPort)
assert.False(t, p.Fragment)
// A good ESP packet
b := buffer.Bytes()
b[6] = byte(layers.IPProtocolESP)
@@ -227,20 +213,16 @@ func Test_newPacket_v6(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, uint16(0), p.LocalPort)
assert.False(t, p.Fragment)
// An unknown protocol packet, we don't dissect it so we fail closed on its true protocol with no ports
// An unknown protocol packet
b = buffer.Bytes()
b[6] = 255 // 255 is a reserved protocol number
err = newPacket(b, true, p)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, uint8(255), p.Protocol)
assert.Equal(t, uint16(0), p.RemotePort)
assert.Equal(t, uint16(0), p.LocalPort)
assert.False(t, p.Fragment)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload)
// A good UDP packet
ip = layers.IPv6{
Version: 6,
NextHeader: iputil.IPProtocolUDP,
NextHeader: firewall.ProtoUDP,
HopLimit: 128,
SrcIP: net.IPv6linklocalallrouters,
DstIP: net.IPv6linklocalallnodes,
@@ -263,7 +245,7 @@ func Test_newPacket_v6(t *testing.T) {
// incoming
err = newPacket(b, true, p)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, uint8(iputil.IPProtocolUDP), p.Protocol)
assert.Equal(t, uint8(firewall.ProtoUDP), p.Protocol)
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("ff02::2"), p.RemoteAddr)
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("ff02::1"), p.LocalAddr)
assert.Equal(t, uint16(36123), p.RemotePort)
@@ -273,7 +255,7 @@ func Test_newPacket_v6(t *testing.T) {
// outgoing
err = newPacket(b, false, p)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, uint8(iputil.IPProtocolUDP), p.Protocol)
assert.Equal(t, uint8(firewall.ProtoUDP), p.Protocol)
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("ff02::2"), p.LocalAddr)
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("ff02::1"), p.RemoteAddr)
assert.Equal(t, uint16(36123), p.LocalPort)
@@ -290,7 +272,7 @@ func Test_newPacket_v6(t *testing.T) {
// incoming
err = newPacket(b, true, p)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, uint8(iputil.IPProtocolTCP), p.Protocol)
assert.Equal(t, uint8(firewall.ProtoTCP), p.Protocol)
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("ff02::2"), p.RemoteAddr)
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("ff02::1"), p.LocalAddr)
assert.Equal(t, uint16(36123), p.RemotePort)
@@ -300,7 +282,7 @@ func Test_newPacket_v6(t *testing.T) {
// outgoing
err = newPacket(b, false, p)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, uint8(iputil.IPProtocolTCP), p.Protocol)
assert.Equal(t, uint8(firewall.ProtoTCP), p.Protocol)
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("ff02::2"), p.LocalAddr)
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("ff02::1"), p.RemoteAddr)
assert.Equal(t, uint16(36123), p.LocalPort)
@@ -345,25 +327,25 @@ func Test_newPacket_v6(t *testing.T) {
err = newPacket(b, true, p)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, uint8(iputil.IPProtocolUDP), p.Protocol)
assert.Equal(t, uint8(firewall.ProtoUDP), p.Protocol)
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("ff02::2"), p.RemoteAddr)
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("ff02::1"), p.LocalAddr)
assert.Equal(t, uint16(36123), p.RemotePort)
assert.Equal(t, uint16(22), p.LocalPort)
assert.False(t, p.Fragment)
// Ensure buffer bounds checking during processing, a truncated AH header can't reach the payload
// Ensure buffer bounds checking during processing
err = newPacket(b[:41], true, p)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIPv6PacketTooShort)
// Invalid AH header
b = buffer.Bytes()
err = newPacket(b, true, p)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIPv6PacketTooShort)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload)
}
func Test_newPacket_ipv6Fragment(t *testing.T) {
p := &firewall.ParsedPacket{}
p := &firewall.Packet{}
ip := &layers.IPv6{
Version: 6,
@@ -543,7 +525,7 @@ func BenchmarkParseV6(b *testing.B) {
secondFrag = append(secondFrag, fragHeader...)
secondFrag = append(secondFrag, []byte{0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef}...)
fp := &firewall.ParsedPacket{}
fp := &firewall.Packet{}
b.Run("Normal", func(b *testing.B) {
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
@@ -667,7 +649,7 @@ func serializeAH(ah *layers.IPSecAH) []byte {
// host OS parses the real header, a firewall port/proto bypass. The fix makes parseV6 land
// on the same offset the host does.
func Test_newPacket_v6ExtHeaderOverflow(t *testing.T) {
p := &firewall.ParsedPacket{}
p := &firewall.Packet{}
const (
hdrLen = 40 // IPv6 header
@@ -679,7 +661,7 @@ func Test_newPacket_v6ExtHeaderOverflow(t *testing.T) {
pkt := make([]byte, realTCPAt+4)
pkt[0] = 0x60 // version 6
pkt[6] = byte(layers.IPProtocolIPv6Destination) // NextHeader -> Destination Options
pkt[40] = byte(iputil.IPProtocolTCP) // Dest-Options NextHeader -> TCP
pkt[40] = byte(firewall.ProtoTCP) // Dest-Options NextHeader -> TCP
pkt[41] = 255 // HdrExtLen = 255
// Forged transport header at the pre-fix (wrong) offset: dst port 443.
@@ -688,156 +670,8 @@ func Test_newPacket_v6ExtHeaderOverflow(t *testing.T) {
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[realTCPAt+2:realTCPAt+4], 22)
require.NoError(t, newPacket(pkt, true, p))
assert.Equal(t, uint8(iputil.IPProtocolTCP), p.Protocol)
assert.Equal(t, uint8(firewall.ProtoTCP), p.Protocol)
// LocalPort is the destination port for incoming traffic. It must be the real port (22)
// the host delivers to, not the forged 443 at the overflowed offset.
assert.Equal(t, uint16(22), p.LocalPort, "firewall must parse the real transport header, not the overflowed offset")
}
// Test_newPacket_v6ExtHeaderPastBuffer is a regression test for an extension header whose declared length
// advances the walk past the end of the packet. The upper layer protocol's header isn't actually present,
// so parseV6 must drop the packet rather than classify it as the terminal protocol with no ports.
func Test_newPacket_v6ExtHeaderPastBuffer(t *testing.T) {
p := &firewall.ParsedPacket{}
pkt := make([]byte, 48)
pkt[0] = 0x60
pkt[6] = byte(layers.IPProtocolIPv6Destination) // Destination Options
pkt[7] = 64 // hop limit
pkt[40] = byte(layers.IPProtocolSCTP) // Dest Options next header = SCTP
pkt[41] = 255 // declared length (255+1)*8 = 2048, past the 48 byte buffer
require.ErrorIs(t, newPacket(pkt, true, p), ErrIPv6PacketTooShort)
}
// Test_newPacket_v6ExtHeaderConfusion is a regression test for parseV6 walking any unrecognized
// Next Header as if it were an ipv6 extension header. A real upper layer protocol Nebula doesn't
// dissect (SCTP here) is not walkable, so applying the (len+1)*8 formula marched into the SCTP
// payload and landed on a byte that looked like UDP, forging a protocol/port pair the firewall
// would trust while the host delivered the real SCTP datagram. The fix fails closed: the packet
// is classified as its true protocol with no ports, so it only matches an `any` rule.
func Test_newPacket_v6ExtHeaderConfusion(t *testing.T) {
p := &firewall.ParsedPacket{}
pkt := make([]byte, 52)
pkt[0] = 0x60 // version 6
pkt[6] = byte(layers.IPProtocolSCTP) // NextHeader = SCTP, a real protocol, not an extension header
pkt[7] = 64 // hop limit
// Real SCTP header at offset 40. Pre-fix parseV6 walked SCTP as an extension header: byte 41 (0x00, the
// low byte of the src port below) was read as the header length, giving next=(0+1)*8=8, which landed the
// walk on byte 40 (0x11), misread as NextHeader=UDP, then bytes 48-51 as ports.
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[40:42], 0x1100) // SCTP src port; byte 40=0x11, byte 41=0x00
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[42:44], 445) // SCTP dst port, never read by parseV6
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[48:50], 53) // SCTP checksum bytes, pre-fix forged RemotePort
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[50:52], 53) // pre-fix forged LocalPort
require.NoError(t, newPacket(pkt, true, p))
assert.Equal(t, uint8(layers.IPProtocolSCTP), p.Protocol, "must classify as the true protocol, not the forged UDP")
assert.Equal(t, uint16(0), p.RemotePort)
assert.Equal(t, uint16(0), p.LocalPort)
assert.False(t, p.Fragment)
// Same confusion, but the unknown protocol sits after a real extension header. The HopByHop is walked
// correctly, then SCTP must still fail closed instead of being walked into its own payload. Protocol is
// the only assertion that discriminates the fix here, a regression that walked SCTP would misclassify it.
chained := make([]byte, 60)
chained[0] = 0x60 // version 6
chained[6] = byte(layers.IPProtocolIPv6HopByHop) // NextHeader = HopByHop extension
chained[7] = 64 // hop limit
chained[40] = byte(layers.IPProtocolSCTP) // HopByHop NextHeader = SCTP
chained[41] = 0 // HopByHop length 0 -> 8 bytes, SCTP begins at offset 48
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(chained[48:50], 0x1100) // SCTP src port, pre-fix forged NextHeader/length bait
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(chained[50:52], 445) // SCTP dst port, never read by parseV6
require.NoError(t, newPacket(chained, true, p))
assert.Equal(t, uint8(layers.IPProtocolSCTP), p.Protocol, "must fail closed on the unknown protocol after the extension header")
assert.Equal(t, uint16(0), p.RemotePort)
assert.Equal(t, uint16(0), p.LocalPort)
assert.False(t, p.Fragment)
}
// Test_newPacket_parsedFields pins the ParsedPacket byproducts the RX
// batcher consumes: IPHdrLen (the true L4 offset) and FragAny (any fragment
// shape at all — unlike Packet.Fragment, which is port-oriented and true
// only for non-first fragments).
func Test_newPacket_parsedFields(t *testing.T) {
p := &firewall.ParsedPacket{}
// Plain IPv4 TCP, IHL 20: L4 offset 20, no fragment shape.
v4 := make([]byte, 28)
v4[0] = 0x45
v4[9] = iputil.IPProtocolTCP
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(v4[6:8], 0x4000) // DF only
require.NoError(t, newPacket(v4, true, p))
assert.Equal(t, 20, p.IPHdrLen)
assert.False(t, p.FragAny)
assert.False(t, p.Fragment)
// IPv4 first fragment (MF set, offset 0): the firewall can read ports
// (Fragment false) but the coalescer must not touch it (FragAny true).
ff := make([]byte, 28)
ff[0] = 0x45
ff[9] = iputil.IPProtocolUDP
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(ff[6:8], 0x2000) // MF, offset 0
require.NoError(t, newPacket(ff, true, p))
assert.False(t, p.Fragment)
assert.True(t, p.FragAny)
assert.Equal(t, 20, p.IPHdrLen)
// IPv4 non-first fragment (nonzero offset): both flags set.
nf := make([]byte, 28)
nf[0] = 0x45
nf[9] = iputil.IPProtocolUDP
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(nf[6:8], 0x00b9)
require.NoError(t, newPacket(nf, true, p))
assert.True(t, p.Fragment)
assert.True(t, p.FragAny)
// IPv4 with options (IHL 24): IPHdrLen tracks the real L4 offset.
opts := make([]byte, 32)
opts[0] = 0x46
opts[9] = iputil.IPProtocolTCP
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(opts[6:8], 0x4000)
require.NoError(t, newPacket(opts, true, p))
assert.Equal(t, 24, p.IPHdrLen)
assert.False(t, p.FragAny)
// Plain IPv6 TCP: L4 at 40.
v6 := make([]byte, 60)
v6[0] = 0x60
v6[6] = iputil.IPProtocolTCP
require.NoError(t, newPacket(v6, true, p))
assert.Equal(t, 40, p.IPHdrLen)
assert.False(t, p.FragAny)
// IPv6 hop-by-hop then TCP: IPHdrLen lands past the extension header.
hbh := make([]byte, 60)
hbh[0] = 0x60
hbh[6] = 0 // hop-by-hop
hbh[40] = iputil.IPProtocolTCP
hbh[41] = 0 // HdrExtLen 0 -> 8-byte header
require.NoError(t, newPacket(hbh, true, p))
assert.Equal(t, 48, p.IPHdrLen)
assert.False(t, p.FragAny)
// IPv6 first fragment: terminal proto resolved, FragAny set, Fragment not.
f6 := make([]byte, 60)
f6[0] = 0x60
f6[6] = 44 // fragment extension header
f6[40] = iputil.IPProtocolUDP
require.NoError(t, newPacket(f6, true, p))
assert.True(t, p.FragAny)
assert.False(t, p.Fragment)
assert.Equal(t, uint8(iputil.IPProtocolUDP), p.Protocol)
// IPv6 non-first fragment: both set, walk stops at the fragment header.
f6n := make([]byte, 60)
f6n[0] = 0x60
f6n[6] = 44
f6n[40] = iputil.IPProtocolUDP
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(f6n[42:44], 0x0008)
require.NoError(t, newPacket(f6n, true, p))
assert.True(t, p.Fragment)
assert.True(t, p.FragAny)
}
-187
View File
@@ -1,187 +0,0 @@
package batch
import (
"encoding/binary"
"math/rand"
"testing"
)
// The checksum-seeding helpers feed the virtio NEEDS_CSUM contract: the L4
// checksum field is pre-loaded with the folded (not inverted) pseudo-header
// sum, and the kernel later adds the L4 byte sum and inverts. A wrong seed
// produces packets every receiver silently drops, with nothing failing on
// our side — so these tests check the helpers against an independent
// RFC 1071 reference built from explicit pseudo-header bytes, never against
// the production checksum code.
// refSum accumulates big-endian 16-bit words of b (odd tail zero-padded)
// into a wide one's-complement accumulator.
func refSum(b []byte) uint64 {
var s uint64
for i := 0; i+1 < len(b); i += 2 {
s += uint64(b[i])<<8 | uint64(b[i+1])
}
if len(b)%2 == 1 {
s += uint64(b[len(b)-1]) << 8
}
return s
}
// refFold folds a wide one's-complement accumulator to 16 bits.
func refFold(s uint64) uint16 {
for s>>16 != 0 {
s = s&0xffff + s>>16
}
return uint16(s)
}
func TestFoldOnceNoInvertEdgeCases(t *testing.T) {
cases := []uint32{
0, 1, 0xffff,
0x10000, // single carry
0x1fffe, // 0xffff + 0xffff: carry produces another 0xffff
0xffff0000, // high half only
0xfffeffff, // fold yields 0x1fffd: needs a second fold
0xffffffff, // worst case
0x00010001, // simple two-word
}
for _, c := range cases {
want := refFold(uint64(c))
if got := foldOnceNoInvert(c); got != want {
t.Errorf("foldOnceNoInvert(%#x) = %#x, want %#x", c, got, want)
}
// Folding a folded value must be a no-op.
if got := foldOnceNoInvert(uint32(foldOnceNoInvert(c))); got != foldOnceNoInvert(c) {
t.Errorf("foldOnceNoInvert not idempotent at %#x", c)
}
}
}
func TestPseudoSumIPv4MatchesReference(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
src, dst [4]byte
proto byte
l4Len int
}{
{"simple", [4]byte{10, 0, 0, 1}, [4]byte{10, 0, 0, 2}, 6, 20},
{"zero-len", [4]byte{192, 168, 1, 1}, [4]byte{192, 168, 1, 2}, 17, 0},
{"max-len", [4]byte{1, 2, 3, 4}, [4]byte{5, 6, 7, 8}, 6, 65535},
{"carry-heavy", [4]byte{255, 255, 255, 255}, [4]byte{255, 255, 255, 254}, 17, 65535},
{"broadcastish", [4]byte{255, 255, 255, 255}, [4]byte{255, 255, 255, 255}, 255, 65535},
}
for _, c := range cases {
t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// RFC 793 pseudo-header: src(4) dst(4) zero(1) proto(1) len(2).
ph := make([]byte, 12)
copy(ph[0:4], c.src[:])
copy(ph[4:8], c.dst[:])
ph[9] = c.proto
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(ph[10:12], uint16(c.l4Len))
want := refFold(refSum(ph))
got := foldOnceNoInvert(pseudoSumIPv4(c.src[:], c.dst[:], c.proto, c.l4Len))
if got != want {
t.Errorf("fold(pseudoSumIPv4) = %#x, want %#x", got, want)
}
})
}
}
func TestPseudoSumIPv6MatchesReference(t *testing.T) {
ones := func(b byte) (a [16]byte) {
for i := range a {
a[i] = b
}
return
}
cases := []struct {
name string
src, dst [16]byte
proto byte
l4Len int
}{
{"simple", [16]byte{0xfe, 0x80, 15: 1}, [16]byte{0xfe, 0x80, 15: 2}, 6, 20},
{"zero-len", [16]byte{0x20, 0x01, 15: 9}, [16]byte{0x20, 0x01, 15: 8}, 17, 0},
{"max-u16-len", ones(0xff), ones(0xfe), 6, 65535},
{"len-past-u16", ones(0xff), ones(0xff), 17, 0x12345}, // exercises the 32-bit split
}
for _, c := range cases {
t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// RFC 8200 pseudo-header: src(16) dst(16) len(4) zero(3) next(1).
ph := make([]byte, 40)
copy(ph[0:16], c.src[:])
copy(ph[16:32], c.dst[:])
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(ph[32:36], uint32(c.l4Len))
ph[39] = c.proto
want := refFold(refSum(ph))
got := foldOnceNoInvert(pseudoSumIPv6(c.src[:], c.dst[:], c.proto, c.l4Len))
if got != want {
t.Errorf("fold(pseudoSumIPv6) = %#x, want %#x", got, want)
}
})
}
}
func TestIPv4HdrChecksumMatchesReference(t *testing.T) {
rng := rand.New(rand.NewSource(0x1791))
for _, hdrLen := range []int{20, 24, 40, 60} {
for trial := 0; trial < 200; trial++ {
hdr := make([]byte, hdrLen)
rng.Read(hdr)
hdr[0] = 0x40 | byte(hdrLen/4)
hdr[10], hdr[11] = 0, 0 // checksum field zeroed, as the contract requires
want := ^refFold(refSum(hdr))
got := ipv4HdrChecksum(hdr)
if got != want {
t.Fatalf("ipv4HdrChecksum(len=%d trial=%d) = %#x, want %#x", hdrLen, trial, got, want)
}
// Receiver-side property: with the checksum stored, the full
// header must sum to all-ones.
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[10:12], got)
if v := refFold(refSum(hdr)); v != 0xffff {
t.Fatalf("stored checksum does not validate: full-header fold = %#x", v)
}
}
}
}
// TestChecksumSeedReceiverAcceptance is the end-to-end property the helpers
// exist for: seed the TCP checksum field with fold(pseudoSum), do what the
// kernel's NEEDS_CSUM completion does (one's-complement sum over the L4
// bytes including the seed, then invert, then store), and verify the result
// the way a receiver does (pseudo-header + L4 must sum to all-ones).
func TestChecksumSeedReceiverAcceptance(t *testing.T) {
rng := rand.New(rand.NewSource(0x1826))
for trial := 0; trial < 200; trial++ {
src := [4]byte{byte(rng.Intn(256)), byte(rng.Intn(256)), byte(rng.Intn(256)), byte(rng.Intn(256))}
dst := [4]byte{byte(rng.Intn(256)), byte(rng.Intn(256)), byte(rng.Intn(256)), byte(rng.Intn(256))}
payLen := rng.Intn(1500)
l4 := make([]byte, 20+payLen)
rng.Read(l4)
// Seed exactly as flushSlot does.
seed := foldOnceNoInvert(pseudoSumIPv4(src[:], dst[:], 6, len(l4)))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(l4[16:18], seed)
// Kernel NEEDS_CSUM completion: sum the L4 region (seed included,
// which is equivalent to summing with the field zeroed and folding
// the seed in), invert, store.
final := ^refFold(refSum(l4[:16]) + uint64(seed) + refSum(l4[18:]))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(l4[16:18], final)
// Receiver validation.
ph := make([]byte, 12)
copy(ph[0:4], src[:])
copy(ph[4:8], dst[:])
ph[9] = 6
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(ph[10:12], uint16(len(l4)))
if v := refFold(refSum(ph) + refSum(l4)); v != 0xffff {
t.Fatalf("trial %d: receiver rejects packet: fold = %#x (seed=%#x final=%#x payLen=%d)",
trial, v, seed, final, payLen)
}
}
}
-169
View File
@@ -1,169 +0,0 @@
package batch
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/binary"
)
// SortKey identifies a packet's position in its sender's transmission order.
type SortKey struct {
// Epoch is a receiver-local ordinal for the tunnel (ConnectionState) that decrypted the packet:
// a re-handshake replaces the tunnel outright and the replacement's epoch is higher,
// so the old tunnel's packets sort first during the cutover overlap.
Epoch uint64
// Counter is the packet's AEAD message counter within that tunnel.
Counter uint64
}
// flowKey identifies a transport flow by {src, dst, sport, dport, family}.
// Comparable, so map lookups and linear scans over the slot list stay tight.
// Shared by the TCP and UDP coalescers; each coalescer keeps its own
// openSlots map, so a TCP and UDP flow on the same 5-tuple-without-proto never alias.
type flowKey struct {
src, dst [16]byte
sport, dport uint16
isV6 bool
}
// initialSlots is the starting capacity of the slot pool.
// One flow per packet is the worst case, so this matches a typical carrier-side recvmmsg batch on the UDP socket.
const initialSlots = 64
// parseIPAt validates the IP header for lane parsing. newPacket already resolved the L4 protocol
// and offset for the firewall, so there is no proto sniff here; the caller's ipHdrLen is
// cross-checked instead. A plain header (v4 IHL 20, v6 exactly 40) is the only coalesceable
// shape. The v6 check is load-bearing: it rejects extension-header packets whose L4 is not at byte 40.
//
// The prologues fill fk's addresses and family in place (ports belong to the L4 parser; fk must
// be zero on entry so the v4 path leaves src[4:]/dst[4:] clear for map equality) and return pkt
// trimmed to the IP-declared length. The receiver-as-out-pointer shape is deliberate: these
// functions are too big to inline, and returning structs by value put five 64-byte copies on the
// per-packet path.
func (fk *flowKey) parseIPAt(pkt []byte, ipHdrLen int) ([]byte, bool) {
if len(pkt) < 20 {
return nil, false
}
switch pkt[0] >> 4 {
case 4:
if ipHdrLen != 20 {
return nil, false
}
return fk.parseIPv4Prologue(pkt)
case 6:
if ipHdrLen != 40 || len(pkt) < 40 {
return nil, false
}
return fk.parseIPv6Prologue(pkt)
}
return nil, false
}
// parseIPv4Prologue is the shared IPv4 tail of the prologue entries; the caller has verified
// len(pkt) >= 20 and the version.
func (fk *flowKey) parseIPv4Prologue(pkt []byte) ([]byte, bool) {
ihl := int(pkt[0]&0x0f) * 4
if ihl != 20 {
return nil, false
}
// Reject any fragmentation (MF or nonzero offset). The dispatcher already gated FragAny; kept
// as defense in depth, since a fragment folded into a superpacket would corrupt reassembly.
if binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[6:8])&0x3fff != 0 {
return nil, false
}
totalLen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[2:4]))
if totalLen > len(pkt) || totalLen < ihl {
return nil, false
}
fk.isV6 = false
copy(fk.src[:4], pkt[12:16])
copy(fk.dst[:4], pkt[16:20])
return pkt[:totalLen], true
}
// parseIPv6Prologue is the shared IPv6 tail; the caller has verified len(pkt) >= 40, the version,
// and that the L4 header sits at byte 40.
func (fk *flowKey) parseIPv6Prologue(pkt []byte) ([]byte, bool) {
payloadLen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[4:6]))
if 40+payloadLen > len(pkt) {
return nil, false
}
fk.isV6 = true
copy(fk.src[:], pkt[8:24])
copy(fk.dst[:], pkt[24:40])
return pkt[:40+payloadLen], true
}
// ipHeadersMatch compares the IP portion of two packet header prefixes for
// byte-for-byte equality on every field that must be identical across coalesced segments.
// Size/IPID/IPCsum are masked out.
// The full DSCP/ECN byte (IPv4 ToS / IPv6 traffic class) is compared, matching Linux kernel GRO:
// segments with differing ECN codepoints must not coalesce,
// otherwise ORing e.g. ECT(0) with ECT(1) would fabricate a false CE (congestion) mark or mark a Not-ECT flow as ECN-capable.
//
// The transport (L4) portion of the header is checked separately by the per-protocol matcher.
func ipHeadersMatch(a, b []byte, isV6 bool) bool {
if isV6 {
// IPv6: [0:4] = version/TC/flow label (TC[1:0] is ECN, so the full TC byte must match),
// [6:40] = next_hdr/hop + src + dst. Skip [4:6] payload_len.
return bytes.Equal(a[:4], b[:4]) && bytes.Equal(a[6:40], b[6:40])
}
// IPv4: [0:2] = version/IHL + DSCP|ECN (full ECN byte must match),
// [6:10] = flags/fragoff/TTL/proto, [12:20] = src+dst.
// Skip [2:4] total len, [4:6] id, [10:12] csum.
return bytes.Equal(a[:2], b[:2]) && bytes.Equal(a[6:10], b[6:10]) && bytes.Equal(a[12:20], b[12:20])
}
// ipv4FlagDF is the Don't Fragment bit in the IPv4 flags byte (header byte 6).
const ipv4FlagDF = 0x40
// ipv4CanCoalesceID reports whether an IPv4 packet whose header starts at
// nextHdr may join a chain whose seed header is seedHdr as segment index seg
// (the seed is segment 0). Kernel GSO re-stamps outgoing segment IDs as
// seed_id+n, so coalescing is only transparent when that re-stamp is either
// harmless (DF set: RFC 6864 atomic datagrams, the ID carries no meaning) or
// reproduces the original IDs exactly (DF clear + IDs already sequential —
// the same admission rule kernel GRO applies). Without this, a DF=0 sender
// with non-sequential IDs (e.g. OpenBSD's randomized IDs) could have IDs
// rewritten into ranges that collide across superpackets, corrupting
// reassembly if the packets are fragmented after the TUN write.
//
// DF itself is guaranteed uniform across a chain by ipHeadersMatch (byte 6
// is inside its compared range), so checking the seed's copy suffices.
func ipv4CanCoalesceID(seedHdr, nextHdr []byte, seg int) bool {
if seedHdr[6]&ipv4FlagDF != 0 {
return true
}
expect := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(seedHdr[4:6]) + uint16(seg)
return binary.BigEndian.Uint16(nextHdr[4:6]) == expect
}
// Arena is an injectable byte-slab that hands out non-overlapping borrowed
// slices via Reserve and releases them in bulk via Reset.
type Arena struct {
buf []byte
}
// NewArena returns an Arena with a pre-allocated backing of the given capacity.
func NewArena(capacity int) *Arena {
return &Arena{buf: make([]byte, 0, capacity)}
}
// Reserve hands out a non-overlapping sz-byte slice from the arena.
// If the request doesn't fit the current backing, a fresh, larger backing is allocated.
// Already-borrowed slices reference the old backing and remain valid until Reset.
func (a *Arena) Reserve(sz int) []byte {
if len(a.buf)+sz > cap(a.buf) {
newCap := max(cap(a.buf)*2, sz)
a.buf = make([]byte, 0, newCap)
}
start := len(a.buf)
a.buf = a.buf[:start+sz]
return a.buf[start : start+sz : start+sz]
}
// Reset releases every slice handed out since the last Reset.
// Callers must not use any previously-borrowed slice after this returns.
// The underlying backing array is retained so subsequent Reserves don't re-allocate.
func (a *Arena) Reset() {
a.buf = a.buf[:0]
}
-112
View File
@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
package batch
import (
"testing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
)
// stagePackets builds the stagedPacket entries Commit would have produced, so dispatch benchmarks
// bypass staging and the sort entirely.
func stagePackets(pkts [][]byte) []stagedPacket {
staged := make([]stagedPacket, len(pkts))
for i, p := range pkts {
pp := testPP(p)
staged[i] = stagedPacket{
pkt: p,
key: SortKey{Epoch: 1, Counter: uint64(i + 1)},
proto: pp.Protocol,
fragAny: pp.FragAny,
ipHdrLen: uint16(pp.IPHdrLen),
}
}
return staged
}
func flushLanes(b *testing.B, m *MultiCoalescer) {
b.Helper()
if m.tcp != nil {
if err := m.tcp.Flush(); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
}
if m.udp != nil {
if err := m.udp.Flush(); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
}
if err := m.pt.Flush(); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
}
// runDispatchBench measures dispatch plus the per-batch lane flush: the post-sort half of the
// batcher, which is where the production profile concentrates.
func runDispatchBench(b *testing.B, pkts [][]byte, batchSize int) {
b.Helper()
m := NewMultiCoalescer(nopTunWriter{}, test.NewLogger())
staged := stagePackets(pkts)
b.ReportAllocs()
b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkts[0])))
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
if err := m.dispatch(staged[i%len(staged)]); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
if (i+1)%batchSize == 0 {
flushLanes(b, m)
}
}
b.StopTimer()
flushLanes(b, m)
}
// BenchmarkDispatchSingleFlow is the bulk steady state: every packet past the seed appends.
func BenchmarkDispatchSingleFlow(b *testing.B) {
runDispatchBench(b, buildTCPv4BulkFlow(tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200), tcpCoalesceMaxSegs)
}
// BenchmarkDispatchInterleaved16 stresses the openSlots map: 16 flows round-robined defeats the
// lastSlot cache on every packet.
func BenchmarkDispatchInterleaved16(b *testing.B) {
pkts := buildTCPv4Interleaved(16, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
runDispatchBench(b, pkts, len(pkts))
}
// BenchmarkDispatchAckHeavy alternates MSS data with pure ACKs on one flow — the RX shape of a
// bidirectional transfer (the peer's data and its ACKs of our data share the tunnel direction).
func BenchmarkDispatchAckHeavy(b *testing.B) {
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
var pkts [][]byte
seq := uint32(1000)
for range tcpCoalesceMaxSegs / 2 {
pkts = append(pkts, buildTCPv4(seq, tcpAck, pay))
seq += uint32(len(pay))
pkts = append(pkts, buildTCPv4(seq, tcpAck, nil))
}
runDispatchBench(b, pkts, len(pkts))
}
// BenchmarkDispatchUDPFlow is the QUIC-ish bulk UDP shape.
func BenchmarkDispatchUDPFlow(b *testing.B) {
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
pkts := make([][]byte, udpCoalesceMaxSegs)
for i := range pkts {
pkts[i] = buildUDPv4(2000, 443, pay)
}
runDispatchBench(b, pkts, len(pkts))
}
// BenchmarkDispatchSeedHeavy sets PSH on every packet so each one seeds and immediately closes
// its own slot — the small-write RPC shape, and the upper bound on what the seed path (including
// the parsedTCP-to-slot field transfer) can cost.
func BenchmarkDispatchSeedHeavy(b *testing.B) {
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
pkts := make([][]byte, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs)
seq := uint32(1000)
for i := range pkts {
pkts[i] = buildTCPv4(seq, tcpAckPsh, pay)
seq += uint32(len(pay))
}
runDispatchBench(b, pkts, len(pkts))
}
-76
View File
@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
package batch
//TODO refactor this away
// This file holds the lanes' self-parsing Commit entries and the proto-checking parsers behind
// them. Production traffic enters the lanes only through MultiCoalescer.dispatch and the At
// parsers; these wrappers reproduce that path (including seal-all on unparseable shapes) on top
// of a local parse, so tests and benches can drive one lane with nothing but a packet.
// parseIPPrologue resolves the IP version, requires the L4 protocol to match wantProto (6 TCP,
// 17 UDP), and defers to the shared per-version cores. Returns the trimmed packet and the L4
// offset; fk must be zero on entry and is filled in place.
func (fk *flowKey) parseIPPrologue(pkt []byte, wantProto byte) ([]byte, int, bool) {
if len(pkt) < 20 {
return nil, 0, false
}
switch pkt[0] >> 4 {
case 4:
if pkt[9] != wantProto {
return nil, 0, false
}
trimmed, ok := fk.parseIPv4Prologue(pkt)
return trimmed, 20, ok
case 6:
if len(pkt) < 40 {
return nil, 0, false
}
if pkt[6] != wantProto {
return nil, 0, false
}
trimmed, ok := fk.parseIPv6Prologue(pkt)
return trimmed, 40, ok
}
return nil, 0, false
}
// parseBase extracts the flow key and IP/TCP offsets for any TCP packet, admissible for
// coalescing or not. Returns false for non-TCP or malformed input.
func (p *parsedTCP) parseBase(pkt []byte) bool {
trimmed, ipHdrLen, ok := p.fk.parseIPPrologue(pkt, ipProtoTCP)
if !ok {
return false
}
return p.parseTail(trimmed, ipHdrLen)
}
// parseBase extracts the flow key and IP/UDP offsets for a UDP packet.
func (p *parsedUDP) parseBase(pkt []byte) bool {
trimmed, ipHdrLen, ok := p.fk.parseIPPrologue(pkt, ipProtoUDP)
if !ok {
return false
}
return p.parseTail(trimmed, ipHdrLen)
}
// Commit borrows pkt. The caller must keep pkt valid until the next Flush.
func (c *TCPCoalescer) Commit(pkt []byte) error {
var info parsedTCP
if !info.parseBase(pkt) {
// Unparseable: flow key unknown, seal everything so later data cannot emit ahead of it.
c.sealAllOpen()
c.addVerbatim(pkt)
return nil
}
return c.commitParsed(pkt, &info)
}
// Commit borrows pkt. The caller must keep pkt valid until the next Flush.
func (c *UDPCoalescer) Commit(pkt []byte) error {
var info parsedUDP
if !info.parseBase(pkt) {
c.sealAllOpen()
c.addVerbatim(pkt)
return nil
}
return c.commitParsed(pkt, &info)
}
-133
View File
@@ -1,133 +0,0 @@
package batch
import (
"cmp"
"errors"
"io"
"log/slog"
"slices"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
)
// MultiCoalescer stages plaintext packets with their (epoch, counter) sort keys and, at Flush,
// replays them in sender-transmission order into lane-specific batchers selected by L4 protocol.
//
// Sorting before dispatch keeps the ordering story simple: each lane consumes packets in
// transmission order, builds slots in that order, and emits them in creation order. Wire reorder
// inside a flush batch is repaired here, before it can fragment a lane's coalesce chains, so the
// lanes carry no reorder-repair machinery.
//
// The contract is per-tunnel transmission order within each lane, with two exceptions: a pure TCP
// ACK may be overtaken by later same-flow data (it does not close the flow's open chain; a late
// ACK is just a stale ACK), and an unparseable shape seals every open chain in its lane (its flow
// is unknown) and rides the lane as an in-lane verbatim, still in transmission order. Routing
// follows the flow: a flow's non-coalesceable shapes ride its protocol lane rather than falling
// to the later-flushed pt lane.
//
// Cross-lane order (TCP vs UDP vs everything else) is not preserved.
type MultiCoalescer struct {
tcp *TCPCoalescer
udp *UDPCoalescer
pt *Passthrough
// staged holds this batch's packets and sort keys until Flush. Borrowed: the caller keeps
// each pkt alive until Flush returns.
staged []stagedPacket
}
// stagedPacket carries the scalars dispatch needs from the firewall's ParsedPacket, copied by
// value: pp is reused by the caller per packet and must not be retained past Commit.
type stagedPacket struct {
pkt []byte
key SortKey
proto byte
fragAny bool
ipHdrLen uint16
}
// NewMultiCoalescer builds a multi-lane batcher over w, based on available protocol support. The
// staging sort applies even when no GSO lane is available: passthrough-only platforms still get
// transmission-order repair.
func NewMultiCoalescer(w io.Writer, l *slog.Logger) *MultiCoalescer {
m := &MultiCoalescer{
pt: NewPassthrough(w),
staged: make([]stagedPacket, 0, initialSlots),
}
m.tcp = NewTCPCoalescer(w, l)
m.udp = NewUDPCoalescer(w)
return m
}
// Commit stages pkt for the next Flush; dispatch is deferred so it runs on packets already in
// transmission order. key carries the packet's tunnel epoch and message counter. pkt is borrowed:
// the caller must keep it valid until the next Flush and not re-use it, and Flush may patch a
// coalesced packet's headers in place. pp is the firewall's parse of pkt and is borrowed only
// for this call, so the fields dispatch needs are copied here.
func (m *MultiCoalescer) Commit(pkt []byte, key SortKey, pp *firewall.ParsedPacket) error {
m.staged = append(m.staged, stagedPacket{
pkt: pkt,
key: key,
proto: pp.Protocol,
fragAny: pp.FragAny,
ipHdrLen: uint16(pp.IPHdrLen),
})
return nil
}
// compareStaged orders staged packets by (epoch, counter)
func compareStaged(a, b stagedPacket) int {
if c := cmp.Compare(a.key.Epoch, b.key.Epoch); c != 0 {
return c
}
return cmp.Compare(a.key.Counter, b.key.Counter)
}
// dispatch routes one staged packet to its protocol lane (see commitStaged), or to the verbatim
// passthrough when the lane has no GSO support.
func (m *MultiCoalescer) dispatch(sp stagedPacket) error {
switch sp.proto {
case ipProtoTCP:
if m.tcp != nil {
return m.tcp.commitStaged(sp)
}
case ipProtoUDP:
if m.udp != nil {
return m.udp.commitStaged(sp)
}
}
return m.pt.enqueue(sp.pkt)
}
// Flush sorts the staged batch into transmission order, replays it into the lanes, then flushes each lane.
// Drains everything and returns the joined errors; one bad packet does not hold up the rest.
// After Flush returns, committed payload slices may be recycled.
func (m *MultiCoalescer) Flush() error {
// Arrival order is already almost sorted (reorder is the exception), which pdqsort detects
// and handles in near-linear time.
slices.SortFunc(m.staged, compareStaged)
var errs []error
for _, sp := range m.staged {
if err := m.dispatch(sp); err != nil {
errs = append(errs, err)
}
}
clear(m.staged) // drop borrowed pkt refs
m.staged = m.staged[:0]
if m.tcp != nil {
if err := m.tcp.Flush(); err != nil {
errs = append(errs, err)
}
}
if m.udp != nil {
if err := m.udp.Flush(); err != nil {
errs = append(errs, err)
}
}
if err := m.pt.Flush(); err != nil {
errs = append(errs, err)
}
return errors.Join(errs...)
}
-437
View File
@@ -1,437 +0,0 @@
package batch
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/binary"
"io"
"testing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
)
// keySeq hands out SortKeys with ascending counters in a fixed epoch, for
// tests where commit order IS transmission order.
type keySeq struct {
epoch, counter uint64
}
func (k *keySeq) next() SortKey {
k.counter++
return SortKey{Epoch: k.epoch, Counter: k.counter}
}
// newTestMultiCoalescer builds a batcher over w.
func newTestMultiCoalescer(tb testing.TB, w io.Writer) *MultiCoalescer {
tb.Helper()
return NewMultiCoalescer(w, test.NewLogger())
}
// TestMultiCoalescerRoutesByProto confirms TCP/UDP/other land in the right
// lane: TCP and UDP get coalesced when their lanes are enabled, anything
// else (ICMP here) falls through to plain Write.
func TestMultiCoalescerRoutesByProto(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
m := newTestMultiCoalescer(t, w)
k := &keySeq{epoch: 1}
tcpPay := make([]byte, 1200)
udpPay := make([]byte, 1200)
icmp := make([]byte, 28)
icmp[0] = 0x45
icmp[2] = 0
icmp[3] = 28
icmp[9] = 1
if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, tcpPay), k.next(), testPP(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, tcpPay))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4(2200, tcpAck, tcpPay), k.next(), testPP(buildTCPv4(2200, tcpAck, tcpPay))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Commit(buildUDPv4(2000, 53, udpPay), k.next(), testPP(buildUDPv4(2000, 53, udpPay))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Commit(buildUDPv4(2000, 53, udpPay), k.next(), testPP(buildUDPv4(2000, 53, udpPay))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Commit(icmp, k.next(), testPP(icmp)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// 1 TCP super (2 segments) + 1 UDP super (2 segments) = 2 gso writes.
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 gso writes (one TCP + one UDP), got %d", len(w.gsoWrites))
}
if len(w.writes) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("want 1 plain write (ICMP), got %d", len(w.writes))
}
}
// TestMultiCoalescerRestoresTransmissionOrder is the core staging-sort
// property: packets committed out of counter order (wire reorder inside one
// flush batch) are replayed into the lanes in transmission order, so the
// reorder never fragments the coalesce chain — one superpacket, in seq
// order, exactly as if the wire had never reordered. The retransmit shape
// falls out of the same key: a retransmit carries a lower seq but a HIGHER
// counter (it was encrypted later), so it emits after the data it trails.
func TestMultiCoalescerRestoresTransmissionOrder(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
m := newTestMultiCoalescer(t, w)
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
// Transmission order: seq 1000 (c1), 2200 (c2), 3400 (c3).
// Arrival order: 3400, 1000, 2200.
if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4(3400, tcpAck, pay), SortKey{Epoch: 1, Counter: 3}, testPP(buildTCPv4(3400, tcpAck, pay))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, pay), SortKey{Epoch: 1, Counter: 1}, testPP(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, pay))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4(2200, tcpAck, pay), SortKey{Epoch: 1, Counter: 2}, testPP(buildTCPv4(2200, tcpAck, pay))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 1 || len(w.writes) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("want 1 gso write (unfragmented chain), got gso=%d plain=%d", len(w.gsoWrites), len(w.writes))
}
g := w.gsoWrites[0]
if len(g.pays) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("segs=%d want 3", len(g.pays))
}
const ipHdrLen = 20
if seedSeq := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(g.hdr[ipHdrLen+4 : ipHdrLen+8]); seedSeq != 1000 {
t.Errorf("seed seq=%d want 1000", seedSeq)
}
// Retransmit: seq 1000 again but counter 4 — sorts after seq 4600 (c3).
w.writes, w.gsoWrites, w.order = nil, nil, nil
if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, pay), SortKey{Epoch: 1, Counter: 4}, testPP(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, pay))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4(4600, tcpAck, pay), SortKey{Epoch: 1, Counter: 3}, testPP(buildTCPv4(4600, tcpAck, pay))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.writes) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 plain writes, got %d (gso=%d)", len(w.writes), len(w.gsoWrites))
}
first := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(w.writes[0][24:28])
second := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(w.writes[1][24:28])
if first != 4600 || second != 1000 {
t.Fatalf("emission (%d, %d), want (4600, 1000): retransmit must not overtake in-flight data", first, second)
}
}
// TestMultiCoalescerRestoresOrderAcrossFlows scrambles two interleaved flows;
// the staging sort must repair each flow into one superpacket without any
// cross-flow contamination.
func TestMultiCoalescerRestoresOrderAcrossFlows(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
m := newTestMultiCoalescer(t, w)
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
// Transmission: A.100 (c1), B.500 (c2), A.1300 (c3), B.1700 (c4).
// Arrival: A.1300, B.1700, A.100, B.500.
if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4Ports(1000, 2000, 1300, tcpAck, pay), SortKey{Epoch: 1, Counter: 3}, testPP(buildTCPv4Ports(1000, 2000, 1300, tcpAck, pay))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4Ports(3000, 2000, 1700, tcpAck, pay), SortKey{Epoch: 1, Counter: 4}, testPP(buildTCPv4Ports(3000, 2000, 1700, tcpAck, pay))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4Ports(1000, 2000, 100, tcpAck, pay), SortKey{Epoch: 1, Counter: 1}, testPP(buildTCPv4Ports(1000, 2000, 100, tcpAck, pay))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4Ports(3000, 2000, 500, tcpAck, pay), SortKey{Epoch: 1, Counter: 2}, testPP(buildTCPv4Ports(3000, 2000, 500, tcpAck, pay))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 gso writes (one per flow), got %d (plain=%d)", len(w.gsoWrites), len(w.writes))
}
for i, g := range w.gsoWrites {
if len(g.pays) != 2 {
t.Errorf("gso[%d] segs=%d want 2", i, len(g.pays))
}
const ipHdrLen = 20
seedSeq := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(g.hdr[ipHdrLen+4 : ipHdrLen+8])
sport := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(g.hdr[ipHdrLen : ipHdrLen+2])
switch sport {
case 1000:
if seedSeq != 100 {
t.Errorf("flow A seed seq=%d want 100", seedSeq)
}
case 3000:
if seedSeq != 500 {
t.Errorf("flow B seed seq=%d want 500", seedSeq)
}
default:
t.Errorf("unexpected sport %d", sport)
}
}
}
// TestMultiCoalescerEpochOrdersAcrossRehandshake: a re-handshake replaces
// the tunnel, and the replacement's counter space starts near zero — raw
// counter order would emit the new tunnel's packets first while the old
// tunnel's backlog is still arriving. The epoch key must dominate:
// everything from the old tunnel emits before anything from the new one.
func TestMultiCoalescerEpochOrdersAcrossRehandshake(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
m := newTestMultiCoalescer(t, w)
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
// New session's first data arrives before the old session's last data.
if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4(2200, tcpAck, pay), SortKey{Epoch: 8, Counter: 1}, testPP(buildTCPv4(2200, tcpAck, pay))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, pay), SortKey{Epoch: 7, Counter: 9_000_000}, testPP(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, pay))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Same flow, contiguous seq, identical headers: after the epoch sort the
// two segments append into one superpacket seeded by the OLD session's
// packet.
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("want 1 gso write, got %d (plain=%d)", len(w.gsoWrites), len(w.writes))
}
const ipHdrLen = 20
if seedSeq := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(w.gsoWrites[0].hdr[ipHdrLen+4 : ipHdrLen+8]); seedSeq != 1000 {
t.Errorf("seed seq=%d want 1000 (old session first)", seedSeq)
}
}
// TestMultiCoalescerNoUSOFallsThrough verifies that on a queue without USO
// (older kernel: TSO but no GSO_UDP_L4) the UDP lane never comes up and UDP
// packets still reach the kernel via verbatim rather than being lost.
func TestMultiCoalescerNoUSOFallsThrough(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true, noUSO: true}
m := newTestMultiCoalescer(t, w)
k := &keySeq{epoch: 1}
if m.udp != nil {
t.Fatal("UDP lane must not come up without USO")
}
if err := m.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, make([]byte, 800)), k.next(), testPP(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, make([]byte, 800)))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Commit(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, make([]byte, 800)), k.next(), testPP(buildUDPv4(1000, 53, make([]byte, 800)))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 0 {
t.Errorf("UDP must NOT be coalesced when USO disabled, got %d gso writes", len(w.gsoWrites))
}
if len(w.writes) != 2 {
t.Errorf("UDP must pass through as 2 plain writes, got %d", len(w.writes))
}
}
// TestMultiCoalescerNoOffloadsStillSorts covers a queue that can't offload
// anything. Both lane constructors refuse, so every packet rides the
// verbatim lane — but the staging sort still applies, so emission follows
// transmission order even without GSO.
func TestMultiCoalescerNoOffloadsStillSorts(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: false}
m := newTestMultiCoalescer(t, w)
if m.tcp != nil || m.udp != nil {
t.Fatal("no lane may come up without offloads")
}
pkts := [][]byte{
buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, make([]byte, 1200)),
buildUDPv4(1000, 53, make([]byte, 800)),
buildTCPv4(2200, tcpAck, make([]byte, 1200)),
}
// Committed in reverse transmission order; keys carry the truth.
for i := len(pkts) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
if err := m.Commit(pkts[i], SortKey{Epoch: 1, Counter: uint64(i + 1)}, testPP(pkts[i])); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 0 {
t.Errorf("no GSO writes possible, got %d", len(w.gsoWrites))
}
if len(w.writes) != len(pkts) {
t.Fatalf("want %d plain writes, got %d", len(pkts), len(w.writes))
}
// One lane for everything means the sorted order survives end to end.
for i, want := range pkts {
if !bytes.Equal(w.writes[i], want) {
t.Errorf("write %d out of order or corrupt", i)
}
}
}
// buildUDPv6Fragment builds an IPv6 packet whose extension chain is a
// single fragment header (NH=44) naming UDP as the terminal protocol —
// a first fragment (offset 0, MF set) carrying the UDP header and a
// partial payload.
func buildUDPv6Fragment(sport, dport uint16, payload []byte) []byte {
const ipHdrLen = 40
const fragHdrLen = 8
const udpHdrLen = 8
total := ipHdrLen + fragHdrLen + udpHdrLen + len(payload)
pkt := make([]byte, total)
pkt[0] = 0x60
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(total-ipHdrLen))
pkt[6] = 44 // fragment extension header
pkt[7] = 64
pkt[8] = 0xfe
pkt[9] = 0x80
pkt[23] = 1
pkt[24] = 0xfe
pkt[25] = 0x80
pkt[39] = 2
pkt[40] = ipProtoUDP // fragment's next header
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[42:44], 0x0001) // offset 0, MF set
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(pkt[44:48], 0x1badf00) // identification
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[48:50], sport)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[50:52], dport)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[52:54], uint16(udpHdrLen+len(payload)))
copy(pkt[56:], payload)
return pkt
}
// TestMultiCoalescerIPv6FragmentStaysInLane locks in extension-header
// routing: a fragment whose chain terminates in UDP must ride the UDP lane
// as an in-lane verbatim — emitted ahead of later same-flow datagrams —
// not the verbatim lane, which flushes after every coalescer lane and
// would reorder it behind data that arrived after it.
func TestMultiCoalescerIPv6FragmentStaysInLane(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
m := newTestMultiCoalescer(t, w)
k := &keySeq{epoch: 1}
if err := m.Commit(buildUDPv6Fragment(2000, 53, make([]byte, 512)), k.next(), testPP(buildUDPv6Fragment(2000, 53, make([]byte, 512)))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Commit(buildUDPv6(2000, 53, make([]byte, 800)), k.next(), testPP(buildUDPv6(2000, 53, make([]byte, 800)))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Commit(buildUDPv6(2000, 53, make([]byte, 800)), k.next(), testPP(buildUDPv6(2000, 53, make([]byte, 800)))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.writes) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("want the fragment as 1 plain write, got %d", len(w.writes))
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("want the two whole datagrams coalesced into 1 gso write, got %d", len(w.gsoWrites))
}
// Transmission order was fragment-then-data; same-lane routing must keep it.
if w.order[0] != "write" {
t.Fatalf("fragment must be emitted before later data (in-lane verbatim), order=%v", w.order)
}
}
// TestMultiCoalescerFragmentSealsUDPChains: an unparseable datagram
// (fragment) seals every open UDP chain, so datagrams from before and after
// it land in separate superpackets and the fragment holds its transmission-
// order position between them.
func TestMultiCoalescerFragmentSealsUDPChains(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true}
m := newTestMultiCoalescer(t, w)
k := &keySeq{epoch: 1}
if err := m.Commit(buildUDPv6(2000, 53, make([]byte, 800)), k.next(), testPP(buildUDPv6(2000, 53, make([]byte, 800)))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Commit(buildUDPv6(2000, 53, make([]byte, 800)), k.next(), testPP(buildUDPv6(2000, 53, make([]byte, 800)))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Commit(buildUDPv6Fragment(2000, 53, make([]byte, 512)), k.next(), testPP(buildUDPv6Fragment(2000, 53, make([]byte, 512)))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Commit(buildUDPv6(2000, 53, make([]byte, 800)), k.next(), testPP(buildUDPv6(2000, 53, make([]byte, 800)))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Commit(buildUDPv6(2000, 53, make([]byte, 800)), k.next(), testPP(buildUDPv6(2000, 53, make([]byte, 800)))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 gso writes (chains sealed around the fragment), got %d", len(w.gsoWrites))
}
if len(w.writes) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("want the fragment as 1 plain write, got %d", len(w.writes))
}
want := []string{"gso", "write", "gso"}
if len(w.order) != 3 || w.order[0] != want[0] || w.order[1] != want[1] || w.order[2] != want[2] {
t.Fatalf("emission order = %v, want %v", w.order, want)
}
}
// TestMultiCoalescerNoTSOFallsThrough mirrors the no-TSO case.
func TestMultiCoalescerNoTSOFallsThrough(t *testing.T) {
w := &fakeTunWriter{gsoEnabled: true, noTSO: true}
m := newTestMultiCoalescer(t, w)
k := &keySeq{epoch: 1}
if m.tcp != nil {
t.Fatal("TCP lane must not come up without TSO")
}
pay := make([]byte, 1200)
if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, pay), k.next(), testPP(buildTCPv4(1000, tcpAck, pay))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Commit(buildTCPv4(2200, tcpAck, pay), k.next(), testPP(buildTCPv4(2200, tcpAck, pay))); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(w.gsoWrites) != 0 {
t.Errorf("TCP must NOT be coalesced when TSO disabled, got %d gso writes", len(w.gsoWrites))
}
if len(w.writes) != 2 {
t.Errorf("TCP must pass through as 2 plain writes, got %d", len(w.writes))
}
}
// testPP derives the ParsedPacket newPacket would produce for the packet
// shapes the tests build: plain v4/v6, v4 with options or fragment bits set,
// and the single-fragment-header v6 shape from buildUDPv6Fragment. Anything
// unrecognizable stays zero (proto 0 routes to the passthrough lane).
func testPP(pkt []byte) *firewall.ParsedPacket {
pp := &firewall.ParsedPacket{}
if len(pkt) < 20 {
return pp
}
switch pkt[0] >> 4 {
case 4:
pp.Protocol = pkt[9]
pp.IPHdrLen = int(pkt[0]&0x0f) * 4
pp.FragAny = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[6:8])&0x3fff != 0
case 6:
pp.Protocol = pkt[6]
pp.IPHdrLen = 40
if pp.Protocol == 44 { // fragment extension header
pp.Protocol = pkt[40]
pp.IPHdrLen = 48
pp.FragAny = true
}
}
return pp
}
-38
View File
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
package batch
import (
"io"
)
// Passthrough is MultiCoalescer's verbatim lane: no batching, packets are written at Flush in the
// order enqueued.
type Passthrough struct {
out io.Writer
slots [][]byte
}
func NewPassthrough(w io.Writer) *Passthrough {
return &Passthrough{
out: w,
slots: make([][]byte, 0, 128),
}
}
// enqueue accepts one packet, already sorted into transmission order by dispatch.
func (p *Passthrough) enqueue(pkt []byte) error {
p.slots = append(p.slots, pkt)
return nil
}
func (p *Passthrough) Flush() error {
var firstErr error
for _, s := range p.slots {
_, err := p.out.Write(s)
if err != nil && firstErr == nil {
firstErr = err
}
}
clear(p.slots)
p.slots = p.slots[:0]
return firstErr
}
-472
View File
@@ -1,472 +0,0 @@
package batch
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/binary"
"io"
"log/slog"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
)
// ipProtoTCP is the IANA protocol number for TCP. Defined here to help Windows out.
const ipProtoTCP = 6
// tcpCoalesceBufSize caps total bytes per superpacket. Mirrors the kernel's
// sk_gso_max_size of ~64KiB; anything beyond this would be rejected anyway.
const tcpCoalesceBufSize = 65535
// tcpCoalesceMaxSegs caps how many segments we'll coalesce into a single
// superpacket. Keeping this well below the kernel's TSO ceiling bounds latency.
const tcpCoalesceMaxSegs = 64
// coalesceSlot is one entry in the coalescer's ordered event queue. A verbatim slot holds a single
// borrowed packet emitted as-is (pure ACK, non-admissible TCP, unparseable, or oversize seed); a
// non-verbatim slot is an in-progress coalesced superpacket. payIovs are borrowed slices of the
// caller's plaintext buffers; the caller must keep them alive until Flush.
type coalesceSlot struct {
verbatim bool
// rawPkt is borrowed: the whole packet for verbatim slots, the seed packet for coalesce
// slots. A slot that never grows past one segment is emitted from rawPkt so its original
// (already valid) L4 checksum ships DATA_VALID instead of making the kernel recompute it.
// A multi-segment slot's superpacket header is rawPkt's, patched in place at flush.
rawPkt []byte
fk flowKey
hdrLen int
ipHdrLen int
isV6 bool
gsoSize int
numSeg int
totalPay int
nextSeq uint32
payIovs [][]byte
}
// TCPCoalescer accumulates adjacent in-flow TCP data segments across multiple concurrent flows and
// emits each flow's run as a single TSO superpacket via tio.GSOWriter. Input must be in sender
// transmission order (MultiCoalescer sorts by (epoch, counter) before dispatch); slots are emitted
// in creation order, so emission reproduces transmission order except for the pure-ACK case in
// commitParsed. Owns no locks; one coalescer per TUN write queue.
type TCPCoalescer struct {
w tio.GSOWriter
// slots is the ordered event queue. Flush walks it once and emits each
// entry as either a WriteGSO (coalesced) or a w.Write (verbatim).
slots []*coalesceSlot
// openSlots maps a flow key to its open slot so new segments can extend an in-progress
// superpacket in O(1). Removal is what closes a chain: on PSH or a short last segment, on a
// non-admissible packet for the flow, or in Flush.
openSlots map[flowKey]*coalesceSlot
// lastSlot caches the most recently touched open slot. Bulk traffic
// arrives in same-flow runs (single-flow steady state, or GRO bursts
// under multi-flow), so comparing the incoming key against the cached
// slot's own fk lets the hot path skip the map lookup (and the aeshash
// of a 38-byte key) for the length of each run.
// Kept in lockstep with openSlots: nil whenever the slot it pointed
// at is removed.
lastSlot *coalesceSlot
pool []*coalesceSlot // free list for reuse
l *slog.Logger
}
// NewTCPCoalescer wraps w, returning nil if w can't accept GSO_TCP writes.
func NewTCPCoalescer(w io.Writer, l *slog.Logger) *TCPCoalescer {
gw, ok := tio.SupportsGSO(w, tio.GSOProtoTCP)
if !ok {
return nil
}
return &TCPCoalescer{
w: gw,
slots: make([]*coalesceSlot, 0, initialSlots),
openSlots: make(map[flowKey]*coalesceSlot, initialSlots),
pool: make([]*coalesceSlot, 0, initialSlots),
l: l,
}
}
// parsedTCP holds the fields extracted from a single parse so later steps
// (admission, slot lookup, canAppend) don't re-walk the header.
type parsedTCP struct {
fk flowKey
ipHdrLen int
hdrLen int
payLen int
seq uint32
flags byte
}
// parseAt extracts the flow key and IP/TCP offsets for a packet the dispatcher already knows is
// TCP; ipHdrLen is the upstream-resolved L4 offset (see flowKey.parseIPAt). p must be zero on
// entry and is filled in place; see flowKey.parseIPAt for why. Returns false for malformed input
// or any shape that must not coalesce (IPv4 options/fragmentation, IPv6 extension headers).
func (p *parsedTCP) parseAt(pkt []byte, ipHdrLen int) bool {
trimmed, ok := p.fk.parseIPAt(pkt, ipHdrLen)
if !ok {
return false
}
return p.parseTail(trimmed, ipHdrLen)
}
// parseTail layers the TCP-header parse on a validated IP prologue. pkt is the trimmed packet;
// fk's addresses are already filled.
func (p *parsedTCP) parseTail(pkt []byte, ipHdrLen int) bool {
if len(pkt) < ipHdrLen+20 {
return false
}
tcpOff := int(pkt[ipHdrLen+12]>>4) * 4
if tcpOff < 20 || tcpOff > 60 {
return false
}
if len(pkt) < ipHdrLen+tcpOff {
return false
}
p.ipHdrLen = ipHdrLen
p.hdrLen = ipHdrLen + tcpOff
p.payLen = len(pkt) - p.hdrLen
p.fk.sport = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[ipHdrLen : ipHdrLen+2])
p.fk.dport = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[ipHdrLen+2 : ipHdrLen+4])
p.seq = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(pkt[ipHdrLen+4 : ipHdrLen+8])
p.flags = pkt[ipHdrLen+13]
return true
}
// TCP flag bits (byte 13 of the TCP header). Only the bits the coalescer consults are named;
// FIN/SYN/RST/URG/CWR are rejected by the negative mask in commitParsed.
const (
tcpFlagPsh = 0x08
tcpFlagAck = 0x10
tcpFlagEce = 0x40
)
// sealAllOpen closes every open coalesce chain. Called for unparseable packets: the flow key is
// unknown, so any open chain could otherwise absorb later data and emit it ahead of this packet.
func (c *TCPCoalescer) sealAllOpen() {
clear(c.openSlots)
c.lastSlot = nil
}
// sealFlow closes fk's open chain, if any, keeping lastSlot in lockstep. The len guard skips
// hashing the 38-byte key when no chains are open (e.g. ack-dominant queues).
func (c *TCPCoalescer) sealFlow(fk flowKey) {
if len(c.openSlots) == 0 {
return
}
if last := c.lastSlot; last != nil && last.fk == fk {
c.lastSlot = nil
}
delete(c.openSlots, fk)
}
// commitStaged commits one staged packet dispatch routed to this lane. A shape the lane cannot
// coalesce (any fragmentation, unparseable header) seals every open chain
// and rides the lane as an in-lane verbatim, still in transmission order.
func (c *TCPCoalescer) commitStaged(sp stagedPacket) error {
if sp.fragAny {
c.sealAllOpen()
c.addVerbatim(sp.pkt)
return nil
}
var info parsedTCP
if !info.parseAt(sp.pkt, int(sp.ipHdrLen)) {
c.sealAllOpen()
c.addVerbatim(sp.pkt)
return nil
}
return c.commitParsed(sp.pkt, &info)
}
// commitParsed commits one parsed TCP packet. The caller (dispatch, via parseAt) supplies a
// valid parse so the header is not re-walked here.
func (c *TCPCoalescer) commitParsed(pkt []byte, info *parsedTCP) error {
// Admission: only ACK, ACK|PSH, ACK|ECE, ACK|PSH|ECE may ride a coalesce chain. CWR marks a
// one-shot congestion transition the receiver must observe at a segment boundary. NB: AccECN
// reuses CWR as ACE counter bits; revisit this check if inner hosts adopt AccECN.
if info.flags&tcpFlagAck == 0 || info.flags&^(tcpFlagAck|tcpFlagPsh|tcpFlagEce) != 0 {
// SYN/FIN/RST/URG/CWR must be observed in sequence. Seal the flow's open slot so later
// in-flow packets cannot extend it and emit ahead of this verbatim.
c.sealFlow(info.fk)
c.addVerbatim(pkt)
return nil
}
if info.payLen == 0 {
// Pure ACK: no ordering obligation toward the flow's data. Delivering it after
// later-transmitted data only makes it a stale ACK, which receivers ignore. Not sealing
// keeps a bidirectional flow's data run coalescing across interleaved peer ACKs, matching
// kernel GRO. This is the only place emission deviates from transmission order.
c.addVerbatim(pkt)
return nil
}
// Cached-slot fast path. Arrival isn't per-packet interleaved even with
// many flows: wire-side GRO delivers runs of same-flow packets
// (deliverSegments splits a superdatagram into up to 64), so the cache
// hits for the length of each run and a miss costs one fk compare
// before the map lookup carries the weight.
var open *coalesceSlot
if last := c.lastSlot; last != nil && last.fk == info.fk {
open = last
} else {
open = c.openSlots[info.fk]
}
if open != nil {
if c.canAppend(open, pkt, info) {
if c.appendPayload(open, pkt, info) {
// Chain closed (PSH or short segment): stop extending it.
c.sealFlow(info.fk)
} else {
c.lastSlot = open
}
return nil
}
// Can't extend (seq gap from upstream loss, header change, or a full
// chain): evict it from openSlots and fall through to seed a fresh slot.
c.sealFlow(info.fk)
}
c.seed(pkt, info)
return nil
}
func (c *TCPCoalescer) Flush() error {
var first error
for _, s := range c.slots {
var err error
if s.verbatim || s.numSeg == 1 {
// A slot that never grew is byte-identical to its seed packet; ship the original so
// its valid checksum rides the DATA_VALID path instead of a kernel software csum.
// rawPkt is only mutated once numSeg >= 2 (PSH propagate, flush patches), so it is
// pristine here.
_, err = c.w.Write(s.rawPkt)
} else {
err = c.flushSlot(s)
}
if err != nil && first == nil {
first = err
}
c.release(s)
}
clear(c.slots)
c.slots = c.slots[:0]
clear(c.openSlots)
c.lastSlot = nil
return first
}
func (c *TCPCoalescer) addVerbatim(pkt []byte) {
s := c.take()
s.verbatim = true
s.rawPkt = pkt
c.slots = append(c.slots, s)
}
func (c *TCPCoalescer) seed(pkt []byte, info *parsedTCP) {
if info.hdrLen+info.payLen > tcpCoalesceBufSize {
// Pathological shape that can't ride a superpacket; emit as-is. No chain for this flow can
// be open here (commitParsed evicts before seeding), so sealFlow is defense in depth
// against a stale cache entry absorbing later data.
c.sealFlow(info.fk)
c.addVerbatim(pkt)
return
}
s := c.take()
s.verbatim = false
// rawPkt serves the numSeg==1 fast path in Flush, is the header source for canAppend, and is
// the superpacket header flushSlot patches in place.
s.rawPkt = pkt
s.hdrLen = info.hdrLen
s.ipHdrLen = info.ipHdrLen
s.isV6 = info.fk.isV6
s.fk = info.fk
s.gsoSize = info.payLen
s.numSeg = 1
s.totalPay = info.payLen
s.nextSeq = info.seq + uint32(info.payLen)
s.payIovs = append(s.payIovs[:0], pkt[info.hdrLen:info.hdrLen+info.payLen])
c.slots = append(c.slots, s)
if info.flags&tcpFlagPsh == 0 {
c.openSlots[info.fk] = s
c.lastSlot = s
} else {
// PSH on the seed closes the chain immediately; it is never registered as open.
// Drop any stale entry for this flow too (defense in depth, unreachable if lastSlot's lockstep invariant holds).
c.sealFlow(info.fk)
}
}
// canAppend reports whether info's packet extends the slot's seed: same header shape and stable
// contents, adjacent seq, not oversized. A closed chain never reaches here; closing removes the
// slot from openSlots, the only path in. The header fields read from rawPkt are always pristine:
// the only pre-flush mutation is the PSH propagate, which also closes the chain.
func (c *TCPCoalescer) canAppend(s *coalesceSlot, pkt []byte, info *parsedTCP) bool {
if info.hdrLen != s.hdrLen {
return false
}
if info.seq != s.nextSeq {
return false
}
if s.numSeg >= tcpCoalesceMaxSegs {
return false
}
if info.payLen > s.gsoSize {
return false
}
if s.hdrLen+s.totalPay+info.payLen > tcpCoalesceBufSize {
return false
}
// ECE state must be stable across a burst.
// Receivers expect the flag set on every segment of a CE-echoing window or none.
seedFlags := s.rawPkt[s.ipHdrLen+13]
if (seedFlags^info.flags)&tcpFlagEce != 0 {
return false
}
if !s.isV6 && !ipv4CanCoalesceID(s.rawPkt, pkt, s.numSeg) {
return false
}
if !headersMatch(s.rawPkt[:s.hdrLen], pkt[:info.hdrLen], s.isV6, s.ipHdrLen) {
return false
}
return true
}
// appendPayload folds info's packet into s and reports whether the chain is now closed: the
// segment was sub-gsoSize (kernel TSO allows only the final segment to be short) or carried PSH.
// The caller must deregister a closed slot from openSlots.
func (c *TCPCoalescer) appendPayload(s *coalesceSlot, pkt []byte, info *parsedTCP) bool {
s.payIovs = append(s.payIovs, pkt[info.hdrLen:info.hdrLen+info.payLen])
s.numSeg++
s.totalPay += info.payLen
s.nextSeq = info.seq + uint32(info.payLen)
if info.flags&tcpFlagPsh != 0 {
// Propagate PSH into the seed header so kernel TSO sets it on the last segment. Mutating
// rawPkt is safe: PSH also closes the chain, so no admission check re-reads this header.
s.rawPkt[s.ipHdrLen+13] |= tcpFlagPsh
}
return info.payLen < s.gsoSize || info.flags&tcpFlagPsh != 0
}
func (c *TCPCoalescer) take() *coalesceSlot {
if n := len(c.pool); n > 0 {
s := c.pool[n-1]
c.pool[n-1] = nil
c.pool = c.pool[:n-1]
return s
}
return &coalesceSlot{}
}
func (c *TCPCoalescer) release(s *coalesceSlot) {
clear(s.payIovs)
*s = coalesceSlot{payIovs: s.payIovs[:0]}
c.pool = append(c.pool, s)
}
// flushSlot patches the superpacket header in place in rawPkt (total length, IPv4 header
// checksum, pseudo-header checksum seed) and calls WriteGSO. The slot is released right after,
// so nothing re-reads the patched header. Does not remove the slot from c.slots.
func (c *TCPCoalescer) flushSlot(s *coalesceSlot) error {
total := s.hdrLen + s.totalPay
l4Len := total - s.ipHdrLen
hdr := s.rawPkt[:s.hdrLen]
if s.isV6 {
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[4:6], uint16(l4Len))
} else {
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[2:4], uint16(total))
hdr[10] = 0
hdr[11] = 0
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[10:12], ipv4HdrChecksum(hdr[:s.ipHdrLen]))
}
var psum uint32
if s.isV6 {
psum = pseudoSumIPv6(hdr[8:24], hdr[24:40], ipProtoTCP, l4Len)
} else {
psum = pseudoSumIPv4(hdr[12:16], hdr[16:20], ipProtoTCP, l4Len)
}
tcsum := s.ipHdrLen + 16
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[tcsum:tcsum+2], foldOnceNoInvert(psum))
return c.w.WriteGSO(hdr[:s.ipHdrLen], hdr[s.ipHdrLen:], s.payIovs, tio.GSOProtoTCP)
}
// headersMatch compares two IP+TCP header prefixes for byte-for-byte
// equality on every field that must be identical across coalesced
// segments. Size/IPID/IPCsum/seq/flags/tcpCsum are masked out.
func headersMatch(a, b []byte, isV6 bool, ipHdrLen int) bool {
if len(a) != len(b) {
return false
}
if !ipHeadersMatch(a, b, isV6) {
return false
}
// TCP: compare [0:4] ports, [8:13] ack+dataoff, [14:16] window,
// [18:tcpHdrLen] options (incl. urgent).
tcp := ipHdrLen
if !bytes.Equal(a[tcp:tcp+4], b[tcp:tcp+4]) {
return false
}
if !bytes.Equal(a[tcp+8:tcp+13], b[tcp+8:tcp+13]) {
return false
}
if !bytes.Equal(a[tcp+14:tcp+16], b[tcp+14:tcp+16]) {
return false
}
if !bytes.Equal(a[tcp+18:], b[tcp+18:]) {
return false
}
return true
}
// ipv4HdrChecksum computes the IPv4 header checksum over hdr (which must
// already have its checksum field zeroed) and returns the folded/inverted
// 16-bit value to store.
func ipv4HdrChecksum(hdr []byte) uint16 {
var sum uint32
for i := 0; i+1 < len(hdr); i += 2 {
sum += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(hdr[i : i+2]))
}
if len(hdr)%2 == 1 {
sum += uint32(hdr[len(hdr)-1]) << 8
}
for sum>>16 != 0 {
sum = (sum & 0xffff) + (sum >> 16)
}
return ^uint16(sum)
}
// pseudoSumIPv4 / pseudoSumIPv6 build the L4 pseudo-header partial sum
// expected by the virtio NEEDS_CSUM kernel path: the 32-bit accumulator
// before folding. proto selects the L4 (TCP or UDP); the UDP coalescer
// reuses these helpers.
func pseudoSumIPv4(src, dst []byte, proto byte, l4Len int) uint32 {
var sum uint32
sum += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(src[0:2]))
sum += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(src[2:4]))
sum += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(dst[0:2]))
sum += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(dst[2:4]))
sum += uint32(proto)
sum += uint32(l4Len)
return sum
}
func pseudoSumIPv6(src, dst []byte, proto byte, l4Len int) uint32 {
var sum uint32
for i := 0; i < 16; i += 2 {
sum += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(src[i : i+2]))
sum += uint32(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(dst[i : i+2]))
}
sum += uint32(l4Len >> 16)
sum += uint32(l4Len & 0xffff)
sum += uint32(proto)
return sum
}
// foldOnceNoInvert folds the 32-bit accumulator to 16 bits and returns it unchanged (no one's complement).
// This is what virtio NEEDS_CSUM wants in the L4 checksum field
func foldOnceNoInvert(sum uint32) uint16 {
for sum>>16 != 0 {
sum = (sum & 0xffff) + (sum >> 16)
}
return uint16(sum)
}
-214
View File
@@ -1,214 +0,0 @@
package batch
import (
"encoding/binary"
"testing"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/overlay/tio"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/test"
)
// nopTunWriter is a zero-alloc tio.GSOWriter for benchmarks. Discards
// everything but satisfies the interface the coalescer detects.
type nopTunWriter struct{}
func (nopTunWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return len(p), nil }
func (nopTunWriter) WriteGSO(hdr []byte, transportHdr []byte, pays [][]byte, _ tio.GSOProto) error {
return nil
}
func (nopTunWriter) Capabilities() tio.Capabilities {
return tio.Capabilities{TSO: true, USO: true}
}
// buildTCPv4BulkFlow returns a slice of N adjacent ACK-only TCP segments
// on a single 5-tuple, each carrying payloadLen bytes. Seq numbers are
// contiguous so every packet is coalesceable onto the previous one.
func buildTCPv4BulkFlow(n, payloadLen int) [][]byte {
pkts := make([][]byte, n)
pay := make([]byte, payloadLen)
seq := uint32(1000)
for i := range n {
pkts[i] = buildTCPv4(seq, tcpAck, pay)
seq += uint32(payloadLen)
}
return pkts
}
// buildTCPv4Interleaved returns nFlows * perFlow packets with per-flow
// seq continuity but round-robin across flows — worst case for any
// "last-slot" cache.
func buildTCPv4Interleaved(nFlows, perFlow, payloadLen int) [][]byte {
pay := make([]byte, payloadLen)
seqs := make([]uint32, nFlows)
for i := range seqs {
seqs[i] = uint32(1000 + i*1000000)
}
pkts := make([][]byte, 0, nFlows*perFlow)
for range perFlow {
for f := range nFlows {
sport := uint16(10000 + f)
pkts = append(pkts, buildTCPv4Ports(sport, 2000, seqs[f], tcpAck, pay))
seqs[f] += uint32(payloadLen)
}
}
return pkts
}
// buildTCPv4RunInterleaved returns nFlows*perFlow packets delivered in
// runs of runLen per flow — the arrival pattern wire-side GRO actually
// produces (deliverSegments splits each superdatagram into up to 64
// same-flow packets back to back). Contrast with buildTCPv4Interleaved's
// per-packet round-robin, the adversarial worst case for a last-slot cache.
func buildTCPv4RunInterleaved(nFlows, perFlow, runLen, payloadLen int) [][]byte {
pay := make([]byte, payloadLen)
seqs := make([]uint32, nFlows)
for i := range seqs {
seqs[i] = uint32(1000 + i*1000000)
}
pkts := make([][]byte, 0, nFlows*perFlow)
for done := 0; done < perFlow; done += runLen {
for f := range nFlows {
sport := uint16(10000 + f)
for range runLen {
pkts = append(pkts, buildTCPv4Ports(sport, 2000, seqs[f], tcpAck, pay))
seqs[f] += uint32(payloadLen)
}
}
}
return pkts
}
// buildICMPv4 returns a minimal non-TCP packet that takes the verbatim
// branch in Commit.
func buildICMPv4() []byte {
pkt := make([]byte, 28)
pkt[0] = 0x45
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[2:4], 28)
pkt[9] = 1 // ICMP
copy(pkt[12:16], []byte{10, 0, 0, 1})
copy(pkt[16:20], []byte{10, 0, 0, 2})
return pkt
}
// runCommitBench drives Commit over pkts batchSize at a time, flushing
// between batches, and reports per-packet cost.
func runCommitBench(b *testing.B, pkts [][]byte, batchSize int) {
b.Helper()
c := newTestTCPCoalescer(b, nopTunWriter{})
b.ReportAllocs()
b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkts[0])))
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
pkt := pkts[i%len(pkts)]
if err := c.Commit(pkt); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
if (i+1)%batchSize == 0 {
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
}
}
// Drain any trailing partial batch so slot state doesn't leak across runs.
_ = c.Flush()
}
// BenchmarkCommitSingleFlow is the bulk-TCP steady state: one flow,
// contiguous seq, 1200-byte payloads. Every packet past the seed should
// append onto the open slot. This is the case we most care about.
func BenchmarkCommitSingleFlow(b *testing.B) {
pkts := buildTCPv4BulkFlow(tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
runCommitBench(b, pkts, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs)
}
// BenchmarkCommitInterleaved4 has 4 concurrent bulk flows round-robined.
// A single-entry fast-path cache will miss on every packet; an N-way
// cache or map lookup carries the weight.
func BenchmarkCommitInterleaved4(b *testing.B) {
pkts := buildTCPv4Interleaved(4, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
runCommitBench(b, pkts, len(pkts))
}
// BenchmarkCommitInterleaved16 stresses the map at higher flow counts.
func BenchmarkCommitInterleaved16(b *testing.B) {
pkts := buildTCPv4Interleaved(16, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
runCommitBench(b, pkts, len(pkts))
}
// BenchmarkCommitRunInterleaved4 is 4 concurrent flows arriving in
// GRO-burst runs of 16 — the realistic multi-flow pattern. A last-slot
// cache hits for the length of each run; the per-packet round-robin
// benches above are its worst case.
func BenchmarkCommitRunInterleaved4(b *testing.B) {
pkts := buildTCPv4RunInterleaved(4, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 16, 1200)
runCommitBench(b, pkts, len(pkts))
}
// BenchmarkCommitPassthrough exercises the non-TCP branch: parseBase
// bails early and addVerbatim is the only work.
func BenchmarkCommitPassthrough(b *testing.B) {
pkt := buildICMPv4()
pkts := make([][]byte, 64)
for i := range pkts {
pkts[i] = pkt
}
runCommitBench(b, pkts, 64)
}
// BenchmarkCommitNonCoalesceableTCP sends SYN|ACK packets on one flow.
// Each packet takes the "TCP but not admissible" branch which does a
// map delete + verbatim. Measures the seal-without-slot cost.
func BenchmarkCommitNonCoalesceableTCP(b *testing.B) {
pay := make([]byte, 0)
pkts := make([][]byte, 64)
for i := range pkts {
pkts[i] = buildTCPv4(uint32(1000+i), tcpSyn|tcpAck, pay)
}
runCommitBench(b, pkts, 64)
}
// runMultiCommitBench drives MultiCoalescer.Commit with in-order keys, so
// it includes the staging sort's already-sorted fast path plus the
// dispatch-time parse — the full steady-state cost of the batcher. The
// ParsedPackets are precomputed: in production they fall out of the
// firewall's newPacket, which this bench does not model.
func runMultiCommitBench(b *testing.B, pkts [][]byte, batchSize int) {
b.Helper()
m := NewMultiCoalescer(nopTunWriter{}, test.NewLogger())
pps := make([]*firewall.ParsedPacket, len(pkts))
for i, p := range pkts {
pps[i] = testPP(p)
}
b.ReportAllocs()
b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkts[0])))
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
j := i % len(pkts)
if err := m.Commit(pkts[j], SortKey{Epoch: 1, Counter: uint64(i + 1)}, pps[j]); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
if (i+1)%batchSize == 0 {
if err := m.Flush(); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
}
}
_ = m.Flush()
}
// BenchmarkMultiCommitSingleFlow is the multi-lane analogue of
// BenchmarkCommitSingleFlow — same workload but routed through the
// dispatcher. The delta vs the single-lane bench measures dispatcher
// overhead.
func BenchmarkMultiCommitSingleFlow(b *testing.B) {
pkts := buildTCPv4BulkFlow(tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
runMultiCommitBench(b, pkts, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs)
}
// BenchmarkMultiCommitInterleaved4 mirrors BenchmarkCommitInterleaved4
// through the dispatcher.
func BenchmarkMultiCommitInterleaved4(b *testing.B) {
pkts := buildTCPv4Interleaved(4, tcpCoalesceMaxSegs, 1200)
runMultiCommitBench(b, pkts, len(pkts))
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More