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5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Nate Brown e25016a946 Fix e2e unsafe inbound test 2025-11-21 15:51:02 -06:00
Nate Brown c2381e7019 Add some comments to make table config clearer 2025-11-21 14:29:46 -06:00
Nate Brown 2b0d57b464 Track unsafe in the mock firewall 2025-11-21 14:23:00 -06:00
Nate Brown c69b009650 Change name from forward to unsafe 2025-11-21 14:21:08 -06:00
Nate Brown 281a9017ce Add forward tables to handle unsafe network packets distinctly from vpn network packets 2025-11-21 14:18:26 -06:00
75 changed files with 770 additions and 4331 deletions
+1 -1
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
+11 -11
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ jobs:
name: Build Linux/BSD All
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ jobs:
mv build/*.tar.gz release
- name: Upload artifacts
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v5
with:
name: linux-latest
path: release
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ jobs:
name: Build Windows
runs-on: windows-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ jobs:
mv dist\windows\wintun build\dist\windows\
- name: Upload artifacts
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v5
with:
name: windows-latest
path: build
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ jobs:
HAS_SIGNING_CREDS: ${{ secrets.AC_USERNAME != '' }}
runs-on: macos-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Import certificates
if: env.HAS_SIGNING_CREDS == 'true'
uses: Apple-Actions/import-codesign-certs@v6
uses: Apple-Actions/import-codesign-certs@v5
with:
p12-file-base64: ${{ secrets.APPLE_DEVELOPER_CERTIFICATE_P12_BASE64 }}
p12-password: ${{ secrets.APPLE_DEVELOPER_CERTIFICATE_PASSWORD }}
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ jobs:
fi
- name: Upload artifacts
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v5
with:
name: darwin-latest
path: ./release/*
@@ -124,11 +124,11 @@ jobs:
# be overwritten
- name: Checkout code
if: ${{ env.HAS_DOCKER_CREDS == 'true' }}
uses: actions/checkout@v6
uses: actions/checkout@v5
- name: Download artifacts
if: ${{ env.HAS_DOCKER_CREDS == 'true' }}
uses: actions/download-artifact@v7
uses: actions/download-artifact@v6
with:
name: linux-latest
path: artifacts
@@ -160,10 +160,10 @@ jobs:
needs: [build-linux, build-darwin, build-windows]
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- name: Download artifacts
uses: actions/download-artifact@v7
uses: actions/download-artifact@v6
with:
path: artifacts
+1 -4
View File
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
@@ -30,9 +30,6 @@ jobs:
- name: add hashicorp source
run: wget -O- https://apt.releases.hashicorp.com/gpg | gpg --dearmor | sudo tee /usr/share/keyrings/hashicorp-archive-keyring.gpg && echo "deb [signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/hashicorp-archive-keyring.gpg] https://apt.releases.hashicorp.com $(lsb_release -cs) main" | sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/hashicorp.list
- name: workaround AMD-V issue # https://github.com/cri-o/packaging/pull/306
run: sudo rmmod kvm_amd
- name: install vagrant
run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y vagrant virtualbox
+1 -1
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
+9 -10
View File
@@ -37,18 +37,17 @@ docker run --name host4 --device /dev/net/tun:/dev/net/tun --cap-add NET_ADMIN -
sleep 1
# grab tcpdump pcaps for debugging
docker exec lighthouse1 tcpdump -i tun0 -q -w - -U 2>logs/lighthouse1.inside.log >logs/lighthouse1.inside.pcap &
docker exec lighthouse1 tcpdump -i nebula1 -q -w - -U 2>logs/lighthouse1.inside.log >logs/lighthouse1.inside.pcap &
docker exec lighthouse1 tcpdump -i eth0 -q -w - -U 2>logs/lighthouse1.outside.log >logs/lighthouse1.outside.pcap &
docker exec host2 tcpdump -i tun0 -q -w - -U 2>logs/host2.inside.log >logs/host2.inside.pcap &
docker exec host2 tcpdump -i nebula1 -q -w - -U 2>logs/host2.inside.log >logs/host2.inside.pcap &
docker exec host2 tcpdump -i eth0 -q -w - -U 2>logs/host2.outside.log >logs/host2.outside.pcap &
docker exec host3 tcpdump -i tun0 -q -w - -U 2>logs/host3.inside.log >logs/host3.inside.pcap &
docker exec host3 tcpdump -i nebula1 -q -w - -U 2>logs/host3.inside.log >logs/host3.inside.pcap &
docker exec host3 tcpdump -i eth0 -q -w - -U 2>logs/host3.outside.log >logs/host3.outside.pcap &
docker exec host4 tcpdump -i tun0 -q -w - -U 2>logs/host4.inside.log >logs/host4.inside.pcap &
docker exec host4 tcpdump -i nebula1 -q -w - -U 2>logs/host4.inside.log >logs/host4.inside.pcap &
docker exec host4 tcpdump -i eth0 -q -w - -U 2>logs/host4.outside.log >logs/host4.outside.pcap &
docker exec host2 ncat -nklv 0.0.0.0 2000 &
docker exec host3 ncat -nklv 0.0.0.0 2000 &
docker exec host4 ncat -nkluv 0.0.0.0 4000 &
docker exec host2 ncat -e '/usr/bin/echo host2' -nkluv 0.0.0.0 3000 &
docker exec host3 ncat -e '/usr/bin/echo host3' -nkluv 0.0.0.0 3000 &
@@ -120,11 +119,11 @@ echo
echo " *** Testing conntrack"
echo
set -x
# host2 speaking to host4 on UDP 4000 should allow it to reply, when firewall rules would normally not permit this
docker exec host2 sh -c "/usr/bin/echo host2 | ncat -nuv 192.168.100.4 4000"
docker exec host2 ncat -e '/usr/bin/echo helloagainfromhost2' -nkluv 0.0.0.0 4000 &
docker exec host4 sh -c "/usr/bin/echo host4 | ncat -nuv 192.168.100.2 4000"
# host2 can ping host3 now that host3 pinged it first
docker exec host2 ping -c1 192.168.100.3
# host4 can ping host2 once conntrack established
docker exec host2 ping -c1 192.168.100.4
docker exec host4 ping -c1 192.168.100.2
docker exec host4 sh -c 'kill 1'
docker exec host3 sh -c 'kill 1'
+6 -6
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Build test mobile
run: make build-test-mobile
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v5
with:
name: e2e packet flow linux-latest
path: e2e/mermaid/linux-latest
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ jobs:
os: [windows-latest, macos-latest]
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: actions/setup-go@v6
with:
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ jobs:
- name: End 2 end
run: make e2evv
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v5
with:
name: e2e packet flow ${{ matrix.os }}
path: e2e/mermaid/${{ matrix.os }}
+3 -127
View File
@@ -7,129 +7,12 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
## [Unreleased]
## [1.10.3] - 2026-02-06
### Security
- Fix an issue where blocklist bypass is possible when using curve P256 since the signature can have 2 valid representations.
Both fingerprint representations will be tested against the blocklist.
Any newly issued P256 based certificates will have their signature clamped to the low-s form.
Nebula will assert the low-s signature form when validating certificates in a future version. [GHSA-69x3-g4r3-p962](https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/security/advisories/GHSA-69x3-g4r3-p962)
### Changed
- Improve error reporting if nebula fails to start due to a tun device naming issue. (#1588)
## [1.10.2] - 2026-01-21
### Fixed
- Fix panic when using `use_system_route_table` that was introduced in v1.10.1. (#1580)
### Changed
- Fix some typos in comments. (#1582)
- Dependency updates. (#1581)
## [1.10.1] - 2026-01-16
See the [v1.10.1](https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/milestone/26?closed=1) milestone for a complete list of changes.
### Fixed
- Fix a bug where an unsafe route derived from the system route table could be lost on a config reload. (#1573)
- Fix the PEM banner for ECDSA P256 public keys. (#1552)
- Fix a regression on Windows from 1.9.x where nebula could fall back to a less performant UDP listener if
non-critical ioctls failed. (#1568)
- Fix a bug in handshake processing when a peer sends an unexpected public key. (#1566)
### Added
- Add a config option to control accepting `recv_error` packets which defaults to `always`. (#1569)
### Changed
- Various dependency updates. (#1541, #1549, #1550, #1557, #1558, #1560, #1561, #1570, #1571)
## [1.10.0] - 2025-12-04
See the [v1.10.0](https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/milestone/16?closed=1) milestone for a complete list of changes.
### Added
- Support for ipv6 and multiple ipv4/6 addresses in the overlay.
A new v2 ASN.1 based certificate format.
Certificates now have a unified interface for external implementations.
(#1212, #1216, #1345, #1359, #1381, #1419, #1464, #1466, #1451, #1476, #1467, #1481, #1399, #1488, #1492, #1495, #1468, #1521, #1535, #1538)
- Add the ability to mark packets on linux to better target nebula packets in iptables/nftables. (#1331)
- Add ECMP support for `unsafe_routes`. (#1332)
- PKCS11 support for P256 keys when built with `pkcs11` tag (#1153, #1482)
### Changed
- **NOTE**: `default_local_cidr_any` now defaults to false, meaning that any firewall rule
- `default_local_cidr_any` now defaults to false, meaning that any firewall rule
intended to target an `unsafe_routes` entry must explicitly declare it via the
`local_cidr` field. This is almost always the intended behavior. This flag is
deprecated and will be removed in a future release. (#1373)
- Improve logging when a relay is in use on an inbound packet. (#1533)
- Avoid fatal errors if `rountines` is > 1 on systems that don't support more than 1 routine. (#1531)
- Log a warning if a firewall rule contains an `any` that negates a more restrictive filter. (#1513)
- Accept encrypted CA passphrase from an environment variable. (#1421)
- Allow handshaking with any trusted remote. (#1509)
- Log only the count of blocklisted certificate fingerprints instead of the entire list. (#1525)
- Don't fatal when the ssh server is unable to be configured successfully. (#1520)
- Update to build against go v1.25. (#1483)
- Allow projects using `nebula` as a library with userspace networking to configure the `logger` and build version. (#1239)
- Upgrade to `yaml.v3`. (#1148, #1371, #1438, #1478)
### Fixed
- Fix a potential bug with udp ipv4 only on darwin. (#1532)
- Improve lost packet statistics. (#1441, #1537)
- Honor `remote_allow_list` in hole punch response. (#1186)
- Fix a panic when `tun.use_system_route_table` is `true` and a route lacks a destination. (#1437)
- Fix an issue when `tun.use_system_route_table: true` could result in heavy CPU utilization when many thousands of routes
are present. (#1326)
- Fix tests for 32 bit machines. (#1394)
- Fix a possible 32bit integer underflow in config handling. (#1353)
- Fix moving a udp address from one vpn address to another in the `static_host_map`
which could cause rapid re-handshaking with an incorrect remote. (#1259)
- Improve smoke tests in environments where the docker network is not the default. (#1347)
## [1.9.7] - 2025-10-10
### Security
- Fix an issue where Nebula could incorrectly accept and process a packet from an erroneous source IP when the sender's
certificate is configured with unsafe_routes (cert v1/v2) or multiple IPs (cert v2). (#1494)
### Changed
- Disable sending `recv_error` messages when a packet is received outside the allowable counter window. (#1459)
- Improve error messages and remove some unnecessary fatal conditions in the Windows and generic udp listener. (#1453)
## [1.9.6] - 2025-7-15
### Added
- Support dropping inactive tunnels. This is disabled by default in this release but can be enabled with `tunnels.drop_inactive`. See example config for more details. (#1413)
### Fixed
- Fix Darwin freeze due to presence of some Network Extensions (#1426)
- Ensure the same relay tunnel is always used when multiple relay tunnels are present (#1422)
- Fix Windows freeze due to ICMP error handling (#1412)
- Fix relay migration panic (#1403)
## [1.9.5] - 2024-12-05
### Added
- Gracefully ignore v2 certificates. (#1282)
### Fixed
- Fix relays that refuse to re-establish after one of the remote tunnel pairs breaks. (#1277)
deprecated and will be removed in a future release.
## [1.9.4] - 2024-09-09
@@ -788,14 +671,7 @@ created.)
- Initial public release.
[Unreleased]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/compare/v1.10.3...HEAD
[1.10.3]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.10.3
[1.10.2]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.10.2
[1.10.1]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.10.1
[1.10.0]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.10.0
[1.9.7]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.9.7
[1.9.6]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.9.6
[1.9.5]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.9.5
[Unreleased]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/compare/v1.9.4...HEAD
[1.9.4]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.9.4
[1.9.3]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.9.3
[1.9.2]: https://github.com/slackhq/nebula/releases/tag/v1.9.2
+1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
//go:build boringcrypto
// +build boringcrypto
package nebula
-18
View File
@@ -141,23 +141,10 @@ func (ncp *CAPool) VerifyCertificate(now time.Time, c Certificate) (*CachedCerti
return nil, err
}
// Pre nebula v1.10.3 could generate signatures in either high or low s form and validation
// of signatures allowed for either. Nebula v1.10.3 and beyond clamps signature generation to low-s form
// but validation still allows for either. Since a change in the signature bytes affects the fingerprint, we
// need to test both forms until such a time comes that we enforce low-s form on signature validation.
fp2, err := CalculateAlternateFingerprint(c)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not calculate alternate fingerprint to verify: %w", err)
}
if fp2 != "" && ncp.IsBlocklisted(fp2) {
return nil, ErrBlockListed
}
cc := CachedCertificate{
Certificate: c,
InvertedGroups: make(map[string]struct{}),
Fingerprint: fp,
fingerprint2: fp2,
signerFingerprint: signer.Fingerprint,
}
@@ -171,11 +158,6 @@ func (ncp *CAPool) VerifyCertificate(now time.Time, c Certificate) (*CachedCerti
// VerifyCachedCertificate is the same as VerifyCertificate other than it operates on a pre-verified structure and
// is a cheaper operation to perform as a result.
func (ncp *CAPool) VerifyCachedCertificate(now time.Time, c *CachedCertificate) error {
// Check any available alternate fingerprint forms for this certificate, re P256 high-s/low-s
if c.fingerprint2 != "" && ncp.IsBlocklisted(c.fingerprint2) {
return ErrBlockListed
}
_, err := ncp.verify(c.Certificate, now, c.Fingerprint, c.signerFingerprint)
return err
}
+4 -43
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert/p256"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
@@ -171,15 +170,6 @@ func TestCertificateV1_VerifyP256(t *testing.T) {
_, err = caPool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), c)
require.EqualError(t, err, "certificate is in the block list")
// Create a copy of the cert and swap to the alternate form for the signature
nc := c.Copy()
b, err := p256.Swap(c.Signature())
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, nc.(*certificateV1).setSignature(b))
_, err = caPool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), nc)
require.EqualError(t, err, "certificate is in the block list")
caPool.ResetCertBlocklist()
_, err = caPool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), c)
require.NoError(t, err)
@@ -197,7 +187,7 @@ func TestCertificateV1_VerifyP256(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t, err)
caPool = NewCAPool()
b, err = caPool.AddCAFromPEM(caPem)
b, err := caPool.AddCAFromPEM(caPem)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, b)
@@ -206,17 +196,7 @@ func TestCertificateV1_VerifyP256(t *testing.T) {
})
c, _, _, _ = NewTestCert(Version1, Curve_P256, ca, caKey, "test", time.Now(), time.Now().Add(5*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{"test1"})
cc, err := caPool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), c)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Reset the blocklist and block the alternate form fingerprint
caPool.ResetCertBlocklist()
caPool.BlocklistFingerprint(cc.fingerprint2)
err = caPool.VerifyCachedCertificate(time.Now(), cc)
require.EqualError(t, err, "certificate is in the block list")
caPool.ResetCertBlocklist()
err = caPool.VerifyCachedCertificate(time.Now(), cc)
_, err = caPool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), c)
require.NoError(t, err)
}
@@ -414,15 +394,6 @@ func TestCertificateV2_VerifyP256(t *testing.T) {
_, err = caPool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), c)
require.EqualError(t, err, "certificate is in the block list")
// Create a copy of the cert and swap to the alternate form for the signature
nc := c.Copy()
b, err := p256.Swap(c.Signature())
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, nc.(*certificateV2).setSignature(b))
_, err = caPool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), nc)
require.EqualError(t, err, "certificate is in the block list")
caPool.ResetCertBlocklist()
_, err = caPool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), c)
require.NoError(t, err)
@@ -440,7 +411,7 @@ func TestCertificateV2_VerifyP256(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t, err)
caPool = NewCAPool()
b, err = caPool.AddCAFromPEM(caPem)
b, err := caPool.AddCAFromPEM(caPem)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, b)
@@ -449,17 +420,7 @@ func TestCertificateV2_VerifyP256(t *testing.T) {
})
c, _, _, _ = NewTestCert(Version2, Curve_P256, ca, caKey, "test", time.Now(), time.Now().Add(5*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{"test1"})
cc, err := caPool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), c)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Reset the blocklist and block the alternate form fingerprint
caPool.ResetCertBlocklist()
caPool.BlocklistFingerprint(cc.fingerprint2)
err = caPool.VerifyCachedCertificate(time.Now(), cc)
require.EqualError(t, err, "certificate is in the block list")
caPool.ResetCertBlocklist()
err = caPool.VerifyCachedCertificate(time.Now(), cc)
_, err = caPool.VerifyCertificate(time.Now(), c)
require.NoError(t, err)
}
-34
View File
@@ -4,8 +4,6 @@ import (
"fmt"
"net/netip"
"time"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert/p256"
)
type Version uint8
@@ -112,9 +110,6 @@ type CachedCertificate struct {
InvertedGroups map[string]struct{}
Fingerprint string
signerFingerprint string
// A place to store a 2nd fingerprint if the certificate could have one, such as with P256
fingerprint2 string
}
func (cc *CachedCertificate) String() string {
@@ -124,7 +119,6 @@ func (cc *CachedCertificate) String() string {
// Recombine will attempt to unmarshal a certificate received in a handshake.
// Handshakes save space by placing the peers public key in a different part of the packet, we have to
// reassemble the actual certificate structure with that in mind.
// Implementations MUST assert the public key is not in the raw certificate bytes if the passed in public key is not empty.
func Recombine(v Version, rawCertBytes, publicKey []byte, curve Curve) (Certificate, error) {
if publicKey == nil {
return nil, ErrNoPeerStaticKey
@@ -157,31 +151,3 @@ func Recombine(v Version, rawCertBytes, publicKey []byte, curve Curve) (Certific
return c, nil
}
// CalculateAlternateFingerprint calculates a 2nd fingerprint representation for P256 certificates
// CAPool blocklist testing through `VerifyCertificate` and `VerifyCachedCertificate` automatically performs this step.
func CalculateAlternateFingerprint(c Certificate) (string, error) {
if c.Curve() != Curve_P256 {
return "", nil
}
nc := c.Copy()
b, err := p256.Swap(nc.Signature())
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
switch v := nc.(type) {
case *certificateV1:
err = v.setSignature(b)
case *certificateV2:
err = v.setSignature(b)
default:
return "", ErrUnknownVersion
}
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return nc.Fingerprint()
}
+4 -11
View File
@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ func unmarshalCertificateV1(b []byte, publicKey []byte) (*certificateV1, error)
unsafeNetworks: make([]netip.Prefix, len(rc.Details.Subnets)/2),
notBefore: time.Unix(rc.Details.NotBefore, 0),
notAfter: time.Unix(rc.Details.NotAfter, 0),
publicKey: nil,
publicKey: make([]byte, len(rc.Details.PublicKey)),
isCA: rc.Details.IsCA,
curve: rc.Details.Curve,
},
@@ -437,19 +437,12 @@ func unmarshalCertificateV1(b []byte, publicKey []byte) (*certificateV1, error)
copy(nc.details.groups, rc.Details.Groups)
nc.details.issuer = hex.EncodeToString(rc.Details.Issuer)
// If a public key is passed in as an argument, the certificate pubkey must be empty
// and the passed-in pubkey copied into the cert.
if len(publicKey) > 0 {
if len(rc.Details.PublicKey) != 0 {
return nil, ErrCertPubkeyPresent
}
nc.details.publicKey = make([]byte, len(publicKey))
copy(nc.details.publicKey, publicKey)
} else {
nc.details.publicKey = make([]byte, len(rc.Details.PublicKey))
copy(nc.details.publicKey, rc.Details.PublicKey)
nc.details.publicKey = publicKey
}
copy(nc.details.publicKey, rc.Details.PublicKey)
var ip netip.Addr
for i, rawIp := range rc.Details.Ips {
if i%2 == 0 {
+1 -63
View File
@@ -62,62 +62,6 @@ func TestCertificateV1_Marshal(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, nc.Groups(), nc2.Groups())
}
func TestCertificateV1_Unmarshal(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
before := time.Now().Add(time.Second * -60).Round(time.Second)
after := time.Now().Add(time.Second * 60).Round(time.Second)
pubKey := []byte("1234567890abcedfghij1234567890ab")
invalidPubkey := []byte("00000000000000000000000000000000")
nc := certificateV1{
details: detailsV1{
name: "testing",
networks: []netip.Prefix{
mustParsePrefixUnmapped("10.1.1.1/24"),
mustParsePrefixUnmapped("10.1.1.2/16"),
},
unsafeNetworks: []netip.Prefix{
mustParsePrefixUnmapped("9.1.1.2/24"),
mustParsePrefixUnmapped("9.1.1.3/16"),
},
groups: []string{"test-group1", "test-group2", "test-group3"},
notBefore: before,
notAfter: after,
publicKey: pubKey,
isCA: false,
issuer: "1234567890abcedfghij1234567890ab",
},
signature: []byte("1234567890abcedfghij1234567890ab"),
}
// This certificate has a pubkey included
certWithPubkey, err := nc.Marshal()
require.NoError(t, err)
// This certificate is missing the pubkey section
certWithoutPubkey, err := nc.MarshalForHandshakes()
require.NoError(t, err)
// Cert has no pubkey and no pubkey passed in must fail to validate
isNil, err := unmarshalCertificateV1(certWithoutPubkey, nil)
require.Error(t, err)
// Cert has different pubkey than one passed in must fail
isNil, err = unmarshalCertificateV1(certWithPubkey, invalidPubkey)
require.Nil(t, isNil)
require.Error(t, err)
// Cert has pubkey and no pubkey argument works ok
_, err = unmarshalCertificateV1(certWithPubkey, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Cert has no pubkey and valid, correctly signed pubkey passed in
nc2, err := unmarshalCertificateV1(certWithoutPubkey, pubKey)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, pubKey, nc2.PublicKey())
}
func TestCertificateV1_PublicKeyPem(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
before := time.Now().Add(time.Second * -60).Round(time.Second)
@@ -155,19 +99,13 @@ func TestCertificateV1_PublicKeyPem(t *testing.T) {
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
-----END NEBULA P256 PUBLIC KEY-----
`)
pubP256KeyPemCA := []byte(`-----BEGIN NEBULA ECDSA P256 PUBLIC KEY-----
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
-----END NEBULA ECDSA P256 PUBLIC KEY-----
`)
pubP256Key, _, _, err := UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(pubP256KeyPem)
require.NoError(t, err)
nc.details.curve = Curve_P256
nc.details.publicKey = pubP256Key
assert.Equal(t, Curve_P256, nc.Curve())
assert.Equal(t, string(nc.MarshalPublicKeyPEM()), string(pubP256KeyPemCA))
assert.Equal(t, string(nc.MarshalPublicKeyPEM()), string(pubP256KeyPem))
assert.True(t, nc.IsCA())
nc.details.isCA = false
+6 -8
View File
@@ -439,7 +439,11 @@ func (c *certificateV2) validate() error {
if !hasV6Networks {
return NewErrInvalidCertificateProperties("IPv6 unsafe networks require an IPv6 address assignment: %s", network)
}
} // as long as we have any IP address, IPv4 UnsafeNetworks are allowed
} else if network.Addr().Is4() {
if !hasV4Networks {
return NewErrInvalidCertificateProperties("IPv4 unsafe networks require an IPv4 address assignment: %s", network)
}
}
}
}
@@ -588,13 +592,7 @@ func unmarshalCertificateV2(b []byte, publicKey []byte, curve Curve) (*certifica
// Maybe grab the public key
var rawPublicKey cryptobyte.String
if len(publicKey) > 0 {
// If a public key is passed in, then the handshake certificate must
// not have a public key present
if input.PeekASN1Tag(TagCertPublicKey) {
return nil, ErrCertPubkeyPresent
}
rawPublicKey = make(cryptobyte.String, len(publicKey))
copy(rawPublicKey, publicKey)
rawPublicKey = publicKey
} else if !input.ReadOptionalASN1(&rawPublicKey, nil, TagCertPublicKey) {
return nil, ErrBadFormat
}
+1 -60
View File
@@ -76,58 +76,6 @@ func TestCertificateV2_Marshal(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, nc.Groups(), nc2.Groups())
}
func TestCertificateV2_Unmarshal(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
before := time.Now().Add(time.Second * -60).Round(time.Second)
after := time.Now().Add(time.Second * 60).Round(time.Second)
pubKey := []byte("1234567890abcedfghij1234567890ab")
nc := certificateV2{
details: detailsV2{
name: "testing",
networks: []netip.Prefix{
mustParsePrefixUnmapped("10.1.1.2/16"),
mustParsePrefixUnmapped("10.1.1.1/24"),
},
unsafeNetworks: []netip.Prefix{
mustParsePrefixUnmapped("9.1.1.3/16"),
mustParsePrefixUnmapped("9.1.1.2/24"),
},
groups: []string{"test-group1", "test-group2", "test-group3"},
notBefore: before,
notAfter: after,
isCA: false,
issuer: "1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef",
},
signature: []byte("1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef"),
publicKey: pubKey,
}
db, err := nc.details.Marshal()
require.NoError(t, err)
nc.rawDetails = db
certWithPubkey, err := nc.Marshal()
require.NoError(t, err)
//t.Log("Cert size:", len(b))
certWithoutPubkey, err := nc.MarshalForHandshakes()
require.NoError(t, err)
// Cert must not have a pubkey if one is passed in as an argument
_, err = unmarshalCertificateV2(certWithPubkey, pubKey, Curve_CURVE25519)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrCertPubkeyPresent)
// Certs must have pubkeys
_, err = unmarshalCertificateV2(certWithoutPubkey, nil, Curve_CURVE25519)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrBadFormat)
// Ensure proper unmarshal if a pubkey is passed in
nc2, err := unmarshalCertificateV2(certWithoutPubkey, pubKey, Curve_CURVE25519)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, nc.PublicKey(), nc2.PublicKey())
}
func TestCertificateV2_PublicKeyPem(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
before := time.Now().Add(time.Second * -60).Round(time.Second)
@@ -166,19 +114,12 @@ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
-----END NEBULA P256 PUBLIC KEY-----
`)
pubP256KeyPemCA := []byte(`-----BEGIN NEBULA ECDSA P256 PUBLIC KEY-----
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
-----END NEBULA ECDSA P256 PUBLIC KEY-----
`)
pubP256Key, _, _, err := UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(pubP256KeyPem)
require.NoError(t, err)
nc.curve = Curve_P256
nc.publicKey = pubP256Key
assert.Equal(t, Curve_P256, nc.Curve())
assert.Equal(t, string(nc.MarshalPublicKeyPEM()), string(pubP256KeyPemCA))
assert.Equal(t, string(nc.MarshalPublicKeyPEM()), string(pubP256KeyPem))
assert.True(t, nc.IsCA())
nc.details.isCA = false
+1 -1
View File
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ qrlJ69wer3ZUHFXA
assert.Nil(t, k)
assert.Equal(t, rest, invalidPem)
// Fail due to invalid PEM format, because
// Fail due to ivalid PEM format, because
// it's missing the requisite pre-encapsulation boundary.
curve, k, rest, err = DecryptAndUnmarshalSigningPrivateKey(passphrase, rest)
require.EqualError(t, err, "input did not contain a valid PEM encoded block")
-1
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ var (
ErrPrivateKeyEncrypted = errors.New("private key must be decrypted")
ErrCaNotFound = errors.New("could not find ca for the certificate")
ErrUnknownVersion = errors.New("certificate version unrecognized")
ErrCertPubkeyPresent = errors.New("certificate has unexpected pubkey present")
ErrInvalidPEMBlock = errors.New("input did not contain a valid PEM encoded block")
ErrInvalidPEMCertificateBanner = errors.New("bytes did not contain a proper certificate banner")
-122
View File
@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
package p256
import (
"crypto/elliptic"
"errors"
"math/big"
"filippo.io/bigmod"
"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1"
)
var halfN = new(big.Int).Rsh(elliptic.P256().Params().N, 1)
var nMod *bigmod.Modulus
func init() {
n, err := bigmod.NewModulus(elliptic.P256().Params().N.Bytes())
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
nMod = n
}
func IsNormalized(sig []byte) (bool, error) {
r, s, err := parseSignature(sig)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
return checkLowS(r, s), nil
}
func checkLowS(_, s []byte) bool {
bigS := new(big.Int).SetBytes(s)
// Check if S <= (N/2), because we want to include the midpoint in the set of low-s
return bigS.Cmp(halfN) <= 0
}
func swap(r, s []byte) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
var err error
bigS, err := bigmod.NewNat().SetBytes(s, nMod)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
sNormalized := nMod.Nat().Sub(bigS, nMod)
return r, sNormalized.Bytes(nMod), nil
}
func Normalize(sig []byte) ([]byte, error) {
r, s, err := parseSignature(sig)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if checkLowS(r, s) {
return sig, nil
}
newR, newS, err := swap(r, s)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return encodeSignature(newR, newS)
}
// Swap will change sig between its current form to the opposite high or low form.
func Swap(sig []byte) ([]byte, error) {
r, s, err := parseSignature(sig)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
newR, newS, err := swap(r, s)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return encodeSignature(newR, newS)
}
// parseSignature taken exactly from crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa.go
func parseSignature(sig []byte) (r, s []byte, err error) {
var inner cryptobyte.String
input := cryptobyte.String(sig)
if !input.ReadASN1(&inner, asn1.SEQUENCE) ||
!input.Empty() ||
!inner.ReadASN1Integer(&r) ||
!inner.ReadASN1Integer(&s) ||
!inner.Empty() {
return nil, nil, errors.New("invalid ASN.1")
}
return r, s, nil
}
func encodeSignature(r, s []byte) ([]byte, error) {
var b cryptobyte.Builder
b.AddASN1(asn1.SEQUENCE, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
addASN1IntBytes(b, r)
addASN1IntBytes(b, s)
})
return b.Bytes()
}
// addASN1IntBytes encodes in ASN.1 a positive integer represented as
// a big-endian byte slice with zero or more leading zeroes.
func addASN1IntBytes(b *cryptobyte.Builder, bytes []byte) {
for len(bytes) > 0 && bytes[0] == 0 {
bytes = bytes[1:]
}
if len(bytes) == 0 {
b.SetError(errors.New("invalid integer"))
return
}
b.AddASN1(asn1.INTEGER, func(c *cryptobyte.Builder) {
if bytes[0]&0x80 != 0 {
c.AddUint8(0)
}
c.AddBytes(bytes)
})
}
-28
View File
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
package p256
import (
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rand"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestFlipping(t *testing.T) {
priv, err1 := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
require.NoError(t, err1)
out, err := ecdsa.SignASN1(rand.Reader, priv, []byte("big chungus"))
require.NoError(t, err)
r, s, err := parseSignature(out)
require.NoError(t, err)
r, s1, err := swap(r, s)
require.NoError(t, err)
r, s2, err := swap(r, s1)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, s, s2)
require.NotEqual(t, s, s1)
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ func MarshalSigningPublicKeyToPEM(curve Curve, b []byte) []byte {
case Curve_CURVE25519:
return pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: Ed25519PublicKeyBanner, Bytes: b})
case Curve_P256:
return pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: ECDSAP256PublicKeyBanner, Bytes: b})
return pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: P256PublicKeyBanner, Bytes: b})
default:
return nil
}
+5 -5
View File
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ bzBEr00kERQxxTzTsH8cpYEgRoipvmExvg8WP8NdAJEYJosB
assert.Equal(t, rest, invalidPem)
require.EqualError(t, err, "bytes did not contain a proper certificate banner")
// Fail due to invalid PEM format, because
// Fail due to ivalid PEM format, because
// it's missing the requisite pre-encapsulation boundary.
cert, rest, err = UnmarshalCertificateFromPEM(rest)
assert.Nil(t, cert)
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
assert.Equal(t, rest, invalidPem)
require.EqualError(t, err, "bytes did not contain a proper Ed25519/ECDSA private key banner")
// Fail due to invalid PEM format, because
// Fail due to ivalid PEM format, because
// it's missing the requisite pre-encapsulation boundary.
k, rest, curve, err = UnmarshalSigningPrivateKeyFromPEM(rest)
assert.Nil(t, k)
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
assert.Equal(t, rest, invalidPem)
require.EqualError(t, err, "bytes did not contain a proper private key banner")
// Fail due to invalid PEM format, because
// Fail due to ivalid PEM format, because
// it's missing the requisite pre-encapsulation boundary.
k, rest, curve, err = UnmarshalPrivateKeyFromPEM(rest)
assert.Nil(t, k)
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
require.EqualError(t, err, "bytes did not contain a proper public key banner")
assert.Equal(t, rest, invalidPem)
// Fail due to invalid PEM format, because
// Fail due to ivalid PEM format, because
// it's missing the requisite pre-encapsulation boundary.
k, rest, curve, err = UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(rest)
assert.Nil(t, k)
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
require.EqualError(t, err, "bytes did not contain a proper public key banner")
assert.Equal(t, rest, invalidPem)
// Fail due to invalid PEM format, because
// Fail due to ivalid PEM format, because
// it's missing the requisite pre-encapsulation boundary.
k, rest, curve, err = UnmarshalPublicKeyFromPEM(rest)
assert.Nil(t, k)
-9
View File
@@ -9,8 +9,6 @@ import (
"fmt"
"net/netip"
"time"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert/p256"
)
// TBSCertificate represents a certificate intended to be signed.
@@ -128,13 +126,6 @@ func (t *TBSCertificate) SignWith(signer Certificate, curve Curve, sp SignerLamb
return nil, err
}
if curve == Curve_P256 {
sig, err = p256.Normalize(sig)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
err = c.setSignature(sig)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
-46
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert/p256"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
@@ -90,48 +89,3 @@ func TestCertificateV1_SignP256(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotNil(t, uc)
}
func TestCertificate_SignP256_AlwaysNormalized(t *testing.T) {
before := time.Now().Add(time.Second * -60).Round(time.Second)
after := time.Now().Add(time.Second * 60).Round(time.Second)
pubKey := []byte("01234567890abcedfghij1234567890ab1234567890abcedfghij1234567890ab")
tbs := TBSCertificate{
Version: Version1,
Name: "testing",
Networks: []netip.Prefix{
mustParsePrefixUnmapped("10.1.1.1/24"),
mustParsePrefixUnmapped("10.1.1.2/16"),
},
UnsafeNetworks: []netip.Prefix{
mustParsePrefixUnmapped("9.1.1.2/24"),
mustParsePrefixUnmapped("9.1.1.3/16"),
},
Groups: []string{"test-group1", "test-group2", "test-group3"},
NotBefore: before,
NotAfter: after,
PublicKey: pubKey,
IsCA: true,
Curve: Curve_P256,
}
priv, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
require.NoError(t, err)
pub := elliptic.Marshal(elliptic.P256(), priv.PublicKey.X, priv.PublicKey.Y)
rawPriv := priv.D.FillBytes(make([]byte, 32))
for i := 0; i < 1000; i++ {
if i&1 == 1 {
tbs.Version = Version1
} else {
tbs.Version = Version2
}
c, err := tbs.Sign(nil, Curve_P256, rawPriv)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotNil(t, c)
assert.True(t, c.CheckSignature(pub))
normie, err := p256.IsNormalized(c.Signature())
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, normie)
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ func Test_ca(t *testing.T) {
assert.Empty(t, b)
assert.Len(t, lKey, 64)
// test when reading password results in an error
// test when reading passsword results in an error
os.Remove(keyF.Name())
os.Remove(crtF.Name())
ob.Reset()
+1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
//go:build e2e_testing
// +build e2e_testing
package nebula
+8 -38
View File
@@ -25,12 +25,11 @@ import (
func BenchmarkHotPath(b *testing.B) {
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me", "10.128.0.1/24", nil)
myControl, myVpnIpNet, _, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me", "10.128.0.1/24", nil)
theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "them", "10.128.0.2/24", nil)
// Put their info in our lighthouse
myControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirUdpAddr)
theirControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myUdpAddr)
// Start the servers
myControl.Start()
@@ -39,9 +38,6 @@ func BenchmarkHotPath(b *testing.B) {
r := router.NewR(b, myControl, theirControl)
r.CancelFlowLogs()
assertTunnel(b, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myControl, theirControl, r)
b.ResetTimer()
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
_ = r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
@@ -51,39 +47,6 @@ func BenchmarkHotPath(b *testing.B) {
theirControl.Stop()
}
func BenchmarkHotPathRelay(b *testing.B) {
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, _, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me ", "10.128.0.1/24", m{"relay": m{"use_relays": true}})
relayControl, relayVpnIpNet, relayUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "relay ", "10.128.0.128/24", m{"relay": m{"am_relay": true}})
theirControl, theirVpnIpNet, theirUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "them ", "10.128.0.2/24", m{"relay": m{"use_relays": true}})
// Teach my how to get to the relay and that their can be reached via the relay
myControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(relayVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), relayUdpAddr)
myControl.InjectRelays(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), []netip.Addr{relayVpnIpNet[0].Addr()})
relayControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirUdpAddr)
// Build a router so we don't have to reason who gets which packet
r := router.NewR(b, myControl, relayControl, theirControl)
r.CancelFlowLogs()
// Start the servers
myControl.Start()
relayControl.Start()
theirControl.Start()
assertTunnel(b, theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), theirControl, myControl, r)
b.ResetTimer()
for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
myControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(theirVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, myVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("Hi from me"))
_ = r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(theirControl)
}
myControl.Stop()
theirControl.Stop()
relayControl.Stop()
}
func TestGoodHandshake(t *testing.T) {
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version1, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServer(cert.Version1, ca, caKey, "me", "10.128.0.1/24", nil)
@@ -1378,6 +1341,13 @@ func TestGoodHandshakeUnsafeDest(t *testing.T) {
"tun": m{
"unsafe_routes": []m{route},
},
"firewall": m{
"unsafe_outbound": []m{{
"port": "any",
"proto": "any",
"host": "any",
}},
},
}
myControl, myVpnIpNet, myUdpAddr, myConfig := newSimpleServer(cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "me", "10.128.0.1/24", myCfg)
t.Logf("my config %v", myConfig)
+9 -7
View File
@@ -85,8 +85,9 @@ func newSimpleServerWithUdpAndUnsafeNetworks(v cert.Version, caCrt cert.Certific
}}
var unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix
var firewallUnsafeInbound []m
if sUnsafeNetworks != "" {
firewallInbound = []m{{
firewallUnsafeInbound = []m{{
"proto": "any",
"port": "any",
"host": "any",
@@ -122,7 +123,8 @@ func newSimpleServerWithUdpAndUnsafeNetworks(v cert.Version, caCrt cert.Certific
"port": "any",
"host": "any",
}},
"inbound": firewallInbound,
"inbound": firewallInbound,
"unsafe_inbound": firewallUnsafeInbound,
},
//"handshakes": m{
// "try_interval": "1s",
@@ -292,7 +294,7 @@ func deadline(t *testing.T, seconds time.Duration) doneCb {
}
}
func assertTunnel(t testing.TB, vpnIpA, vpnIpB netip.Addr, controlA, controlB *nebula.Control, r *router.R) {
func assertTunnel(t *testing.T, vpnIpA, vpnIpB netip.Addr, controlA, controlB *nebula.Control, r *router.R) {
// Send a packet from them to me
controlB.InjectTunUDPPacket(vpnIpA, 80, vpnIpB, 90, []byte("Hi from B"))
bPacket := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(controlA)
@@ -304,7 +306,7 @@ func assertTunnel(t testing.TB, vpnIpA, vpnIpB netip.Addr, controlA, controlB *n
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("Hello from A"), aPacket, vpnIpA, vpnIpB, 90, 80)
}
func assertHostInfoPair(t testing.TB, addrA, addrB netip.AddrPort, vpnNetsA, vpnNetsB []netip.Prefix, controlA, controlB *nebula.Control) {
func assertHostInfoPair(t *testing.T, addrA, addrB netip.AddrPort, vpnNetsA, vpnNetsB []netip.Prefix, controlA, controlB *nebula.Control) {
// Get both host infos
//TODO: CERT-V2 we may want to loop over each vpnAddr and assert all the things
hBinA := controlA.GetHostInfoByVpnAddr(vpnNetsB[0].Addr(), false)
@@ -325,7 +327,7 @@ func assertHostInfoPair(t testing.TB, addrA, addrB netip.AddrPort, vpnNetsA, vpn
assert.Equal(t, hBinA.RemoteIndex, hAinB.LocalIndex, "Host B remote index does not match host A local index")
}
func assertUdpPacket(t testing.TB, expected, b []byte, fromIp, toIp netip.Addr, fromPort, toPort uint16) {
func assertUdpPacket(t *testing.T, expected, b []byte, fromIp, toIp netip.Addr, fromPort, toPort uint16) {
if toIp.Is6() {
assertUdpPacket6(t, expected, b, fromIp, toIp, fromPort, toPort)
} else {
@@ -333,7 +335,7 @@ func assertUdpPacket(t testing.TB, expected, b []byte, fromIp, toIp netip.Addr,
}
}
func assertUdpPacket6(t testing.TB, expected, b []byte, fromIp, toIp netip.Addr, fromPort, toPort uint16) {
func assertUdpPacket6(t *testing.T, expected, b []byte, fromIp, toIp netip.Addr, fromPort, toPort uint16) {
packet := gopacket.NewPacket(b, layers.LayerTypeIPv6, gopacket.Lazy)
v6 := packet.Layer(layers.LayerTypeIPv6).(*layers.IPv6)
assert.NotNil(t, v6, "No ipv6 data found")
@@ -352,7 +354,7 @@ func assertUdpPacket6(t testing.TB, expected, b []byte, fromIp, toIp netip.Addr,
assert.Equal(t, expected, data.Payload(), "Data was incorrect")
}
func assertUdpPacket4(t testing.TB, expected, b []byte, fromIp, toIp netip.Addr, fromPort, toPort uint16) {
func assertUdpPacket4(t *testing.T, expected, b []byte, fromIp, toIp netip.Addr, fromPort, toPort uint16) {
packet := gopacket.NewPacket(b, layers.LayerTypeIPv4, gopacket.Lazy)
v4 := packet.Layer(layers.LayerTypeIPv4).(*layers.IPv4)
assert.NotNil(t, v4, "No ipv4 data found")
-400
View File
@@ -1,400 +0,0 @@
//go:build e2e_testing
// +build e2e_testing
package e2e
import (
"encoding/binary"
"net/netip"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert_test"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/e2e/router"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// parseIPv4UDPPacket extracts source/dest IPs, ports, and payload from an IPv4 UDP packet.
func parseIPv4UDPPacket(t testing.TB, pkt []byte) (srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, srcPort, dstPort uint16, payload []byte) {
t.Helper()
require.True(t, len(pkt) >= 28, "packet too short for IPv4+UDP header")
require.Equal(t, byte(0x45), pkt[0]&0xF0|pkt[0]&0x0F, "not a simple IPv4 packet (IHL!=5)")
srcIP, _ = netip.AddrFromSlice(pkt[12:16])
dstIP, _ = netip.AddrFromSlice(pkt[16:20])
ihl := int(pkt[0]&0x0F) * 4
require.True(t, len(pkt) >= ihl+8, "packet too short for UDP header")
srcPort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[ihl : ihl+2])
dstPort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[ihl+2 : ihl+4])
udpLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(pkt[ihl+4 : ihl+6])
payload = pkt[ihl+8 : ihl+int(udpLen)]
return
}
func TestSNAT_IPv6OnlyPeer_IPv4UnsafeTraffic(t *testing.T) {
// Scenario: Two IPv6-only VPN nodes. The "router" node has unsafe networks
// (192.168.0.0/16) in its cert and a configured SNAT address. The "sender"
// node has an unsafe route for 192.168.0.0/16 via the router.
//
// When sender injects an IPv4 packet destined for the unsafe network, it
// gets tunneled to the router. The router's firewall detects this is IPv4
// from an IPv6-only peer and applies SNAT, rewriting the source IP to the
// SNAT address before delivering it to TUN.
//
// When a reply comes back from TUN addressed to the SNAT address, the
// router un-SNATs it (restoring the original destination) and tunnels it
// back to the sender.
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
unsafePrefix := "192.168.0.0/16"
snatAddr := netip.MustParseAddr("169.254.42.42")
// Router: IPv6-only with unsafe networks and a manual SNAT address.
// Override inbound firewall with local_cidr: "any" so both IPv4 (unsafe)
// and IPv6 (VPN) traffic is accepted.
routerControl, routerVpnIpNet, routerUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServerWithUdpAndUnsafeNetworks(
cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "router", "ff::1/64",
netip.MustParseAddrPort("[beef::1]:4242"),
unsafePrefix,
m{
"firewall": m{
"inbound": []m{{
"proto": "any",
"port": "any",
"host": "any",
"local_cidr": "any",
}},
},
"tun": m{
"snat_address_for_4over6": snatAddr.String(),
},
},
)
// Sender: IPv6-only with an unsafe route via the router
senderControl, _, _, _ := newSimpleServerWithUdp(
cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "sender", "ff::2/64",
netip.MustParseAddrPort("[beef::2]:4242"),
m{
"tun": m{
"unsafe_routes": []m{
{"route": unsafePrefix, "via": routerVpnIpNet[0].Addr().String()},
},
},
},
)
// Tell sender where the router lives
senderControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(routerVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), routerUdpAddr)
// Build the router and start both nodes
r := router.NewR(t, routerControl, senderControl)
defer r.RenderFlow()
routerControl.Start()
senderControl.Start()
// --- Outbound: sender -> IPv4 unsafe dest (via router with SNAT) ---
origSrcIP := netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.1")
unsafeDest := netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1")
var origSrcPort uint16 = 12345
var dstPort uint16 = 80
t.Log("Sender injects an IPv4 packet to the unsafe network")
senderControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(unsafeDest, dstPort, origSrcIP, origSrcPort, []byte("snat me"))
t.Log("Route packets (handshake + data) until the router gets the packet on TUN")
snatPkt := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(routerControl)
t.Log("Verify the packet was SNATted")
gotSrcIP, gotDstIP, gotSrcPort, gotDstPort, gotPayload := parseIPv4UDPPacket(t, snatPkt)
assert.Equal(t, snatAddr, gotSrcIP, "source IP should be rewritten to the SNAT address")
assert.Equal(t, unsafeDest, gotDstIP, "destination IP should be unchanged")
assert.Equal(t, dstPort, gotDstPort, "destination port should be unchanged")
assert.Equal(t, []byte("snat me"), gotPayload, "payload should be unchanged")
// Capture the SNAT port (may differ from original if port was remapped)
snatPort := gotSrcPort
t.Logf("SNAT port: %d (original: %d)", snatPort, origSrcPort)
// --- Return: reply from unsafe dest -> un-SNATted back to sender ---
t.Log("Router injects a reply packet from the unsafe dest to the SNAT address")
routerControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(snatAddr, snatPort, unsafeDest, dstPort, []byte("reply from unsafe"))
t.Log("Route until sender gets the reply on TUN")
replyPkt := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(senderControl)
t.Log("Verify the reply was un-SNATted")
replySrcIP, replyDstIP, replySrcPort, replyDstPort, replyPayload := parseIPv4UDPPacket(t, replyPkt)
assert.Equal(t, unsafeDest, replySrcIP, "reply source should be the unsafe dest")
assert.Equal(t, origSrcIP, replyDstIP, "reply dest should be the original source IP (un-SNATted)")
assert.Equal(t, dstPort, replySrcPort, "reply source port should be the unsafe dest port")
assert.Equal(t, origSrcPort, replyDstPort, "reply dest port should be the original source port (un-SNATted)")
assert.Equal(t, []byte("reply from unsafe"), replyPayload, "payload should be unchanged")
r.RenderHostmaps("Final hostmaps", routerControl, senderControl)
// Also verify normal IPv6 VPN traffic still works between the nodes
t.Log("Verify normal IPv6 VPN tunnel still works")
assertTunnel(t, routerVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), senderControl.GetVpnAddrs()[0], routerControl, senderControl, r)
routerControl.Stop()
senderControl.Stop()
}
func TestSNAT_MultipleFlows(t *testing.T) {
// Test that multiple distinct IPv4 flows from the same IPv6-only peer
// are tracked independently through SNAT.
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
unsafePrefix := "192.168.0.0/16"
snatAddr := netip.MustParseAddr("169.254.42.42")
routerControl, routerVpnIpNet, routerUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServerWithUdpAndUnsafeNetworks(
cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "router", "ff::1/64",
netip.MustParseAddrPort("[beef::1]:4242"),
unsafePrefix,
m{
"firewall": m{
"inbound": []m{{
"proto": "any",
"port": "any",
"host": "any",
"local_cidr": "any",
}},
},
"tun": m{
"snat_address_for_4over6": snatAddr.String(),
},
},
)
senderControl, _, _, _ := newSimpleServerWithUdp(
cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "sender", "ff::2/64",
netip.MustParseAddrPort("[beef::2]:4242"),
m{
"tun": m{
"unsafe_routes": []m{
{"route": unsafePrefix, "via": routerVpnIpNet[0].Addr().String()},
},
},
},
)
senderControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(routerVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), routerUdpAddr)
r := router.NewR(t, routerControl, senderControl)
defer r.RenderFlow()
r.CancelFlowLogs()
routerControl.Start()
senderControl.Start()
unsafeDest := netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1")
// Send first flow
senderControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(unsafeDest, 80, netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.1"), 1111, []byte("flow1"))
pkt1 := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(routerControl)
srcIP1, _, srcPort1, _, payload1 := parseIPv4UDPPacket(t, pkt1)
assert.Equal(t, snatAddr, srcIP1)
assert.Equal(t, []byte("flow1"), payload1)
// Send second flow (different source port)
senderControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(unsafeDest, 80, netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.1"), 2222, []byte("flow2"))
pkt2 := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(routerControl)
srcIP2, _, srcPort2, _, payload2 := parseIPv4UDPPacket(t, pkt2)
assert.Equal(t, snatAddr, srcIP2)
assert.Equal(t, []byte("flow2"), payload2)
// The two flows should have different SNAT ports (since they're different conntracks)
t.Logf("Flow 1 SNAT port: %d, Flow 2 SNAT port: %d", srcPort1, srcPort2)
// Reply to flow 2 first (out of order)
routerControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(snatAddr, srcPort2, unsafeDest, 80, []byte("reply2"))
reply2 := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(senderControl)
_, replyDst2, _, replyDstPort2, replyPayload2 := parseIPv4UDPPacket(t, reply2)
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.1"), replyDst2)
assert.Equal(t, uint16(2222), replyDstPort2, "reply to flow 2 should restore original port 2222")
assert.Equal(t, []byte("reply2"), replyPayload2)
// Reply to flow 1
routerControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(snatAddr, srcPort1, unsafeDest, 80, []byte("reply1"))
reply1 := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(senderControl)
_, replyDst1, _, replyDstPort1, replyPayload1 := parseIPv4UDPPacket(t, reply1)
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.1"), replyDst1)
assert.Equal(t, uint16(1111), replyDstPort1, "reply to flow 1 should restore original port 1111")
assert.Equal(t, []byte("reply1"), replyPayload1)
routerControl.Stop()
senderControl.Stop()
}
// --- Adversarial SNAT E2E Tests ---
func TestSNAT_UnsolicitedReplyDropped(t *testing.T) {
// Without any outbound SNAT traffic, inject a packet from the router's TUN
// addressed to the SNAT address. The sender must never receive it because
// there's no conntrack entry to un-SNAT through.
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
unsafePrefix := "192.168.0.0/16"
snatAddr := netip.MustParseAddr("169.254.42.42")
routerControl, routerVpnIpNet, routerUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServerWithUdpAndUnsafeNetworks(
cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "router", "ff::1/64",
netip.MustParseAddrPort("[beef::1]:4242"),
unsafePrefix,
m{
"firewall": m{
"inbound": []m{{
"proto": "any",
"port": "any",
"host": "any",
"local_cidr": "any",
}},
},
"tun": m{
"snat_address_for_4over6": snatAddr.String(),
},
},
)
senderControl, _, _, _ := newSimpleServerWithUdp(
cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "sender", "ff::2/64",
netip.MustParseAddrPort("[beef::2]:4242"),
m{
"tun": m{
"unsafe_routes": []m{
{"route": unsafePrefix, "via": routerVpnIpNet[0].Addr().String()},
},
},
},
)
senderControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(routerVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), routerUdpAddr)
r := router.NewR(t, routerControl, senderControl)
defer r.RenderFlow()
r.CancelFlowLogs()
routerControl.Start()
senderControl.Start()
// First establish the tunnel with normal IPv6 traffic so handshake completes
assertTunnel(t, routerVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), senderControl.GetVpnAddrs()[0], routerControl, senderControl, r)
// Inject the unsolicited reply from router's TUN to the SNAT address.
// There is NO prior outbound SNAT flow, so no conntrack entry exists.
// The router should silently drop this because unSnat finds no matching conntrack.
routerControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(snatAddr, 55555, netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1"), 80, []byte("unsolicited"))
// Send a canary IPv6 VPN packet after the bad one. Since the router processes
// TUN packets sequentially, the canary arriving proves the bad packet was processed first.
senderVpnAddr := senderControl.GetVpnAddrs()[0]
routerControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(senderVpnAddr, 90, routerVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), 80, []byte("canary"))
canaryPkt := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(senderControl)
assertUdpPacket(t, []byte("canary"), canaryPkt, routerVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), senderVpnAddr, 80, 90)
// The unsolicited packet should have been dropped — nothing else on sender's TUN
got := senderControl.GetFromTun(false)
assert.Nil(t, got, "sender should not receive unsolicited packet to SNAT address with no conntrack entry")
routerControl.Stop()
senderControl.Stop()
}
func TestSNAT_NonUnsafeDestDropped(t *testing.T) {
// An IPv6-only sender sends IPv4 traffic to a destination outside the router's
// unsafe networks (172.16.0.1 when unsafe is 192.168.0.0/16). The router should
// reject this because the local address is not routable. This verifies that
// willingToHandleLocalAddr enforces boundaries on what SNAT traffic can reach.
ca, _, caKey, _ := cert_test.NewTestCaCert(cert.Version2, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, time.Now(), time.Now().Add(10*time.Minute), nil, nil, []string{})
unsafePrefix := "192.168.0.0/16"
snatAddr := netip.MustParseAddr("169.254.42.42")
routerControl, routerVpnIpNet, routerUdpAddr, _ := newSimpleServerWithUdpAndUnsafeNetworks(
cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "router", "ff::1/64",
netip.MustParseAddrPort("[beef::1]:4242"),
unsafePrefix,
m{
"firewall": m{
"inbound": []m{{
"proto": "any",
"port": "any",
"host": "any",
"local_cidr": "any",
}},
},
"tun": m{
"snat_address_for_4over6": snatAddr.String(),
},
},
)
// Sender has unsafe routes for BOTH 192.168.0.0/16 AND 172.16.0.0/12 via router.
// This means the sender will route 172.16.0.1 through the tunnel to the router.
// But the router should reject it because 172.16.0.0/12 is NOT in its unsafe networks.
senderControl, _, _, _ := newSimpleServerWithUdp(
cert.Version2, ca, caKey, "sender", "ff::2/64",
netip.MustParseAddrPort("[beef::2]:4242"),
m{
"tun": m{
"unsafe_routes": []m{
{"route": unsafePrefix, "via": routerVpnIpNet[0].Addr().String()},
{"route": "172.16.0.0/12", "via": routerVpnIpNet[0].Addr().String()},
},
},
},
)
senderControl.InjectLightHouseAddr(routerVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), routerUdpAddr)
r := router.NewR(t, routerControl, senderControl)
defer r.RenderFlow()
r.CancelFlowLogs()
routerControl.Start()
senderControl.Start()
// Establish the tunnel first
assertTunnel(t, routerVpnIpNet[0].Addr(), senderControl.GetVpnAddrs()[0], routerControl, senderControl, r)
// Send to 172.16.0.1 (NOT in router's unsafe networks 192.168.0.0/16).
// The router should reject this at willingToHandleLocalAddr.
senderControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(
netip.MustParseAddr("172.16.0.1"), 80,
netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.1"), 12345,
[]byte("wrong dest"),
)
// Send a canary to a valid unsafe destination to prove the bad packet was processed
senderControl.InjectTunUDPPacket(
netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1"), 80,
netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.1"), 33333,
[]byte("canary"),
)
// Route until the canary arrives — the 172.16.0.1 packet should have been
// processed and dropped before the canary gets through
canaryPkt := r.RouteForAllUntilTxTun(routerControl)
_, canaryDst, _, _, canaryPayload := parseIPv4UDPPacket(t, canaryPkt)
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1"), canaryDst, "canary should arrive at the valid unsafe dest")
assert.Equal(t, []byte("canary"), canaryPayload)
// No more packets — the 172.16.0.1 packet was dropped
got := routerControl.GetFromTun(false)
assert.Nil(t, got, "packet to non-unsafe destination 172.16.0.1 should be dropped by the router")
routerControl.Stop()
senderControl.Stop()
}
+1 -14
View File
@@ -144,10 +144,6 @@ listen:
# valid values: always, never, private
# This setting is reloadable.
#send_recv_error: always
# Similar to send_recv_error, this option lets you configure if you want to accept "recv_error" packets from remote hosts.
# valid values: always, never, private
# This setting is reloadable.
#accept_recv_error: always
# The so_sock option is a Linux-specific feature that allows all outgoing Nebula packets to be tagged with a specific identifier.
# This tagging enables IP rule-based filtering. For example, it supports 0.0.0.0/0 unsafe_routes,
# allowing for more precise routing decisions based on the packet tags. Default is 0 meaning no mark is set.
@@ -283,15 +279,6 @@ tun:
# If using massive routes updates, for example BGP, you may need to increase this value to avoid packet loss.
# SO_RCVBUFFORCE is used to avoid having to raise the system wide max
#use_system_route_table_buffer_size: 0
#
# When using the feature to carry IPv4 unsafe_routes through a IPv6-only overlay network (4over6),
# the system still needs to use IPv4 addresses to pass that traffic.
# By default, they are randomly chosen out of 169.254.0.0/16 at startup, but if you need them to be static, you can set them here.
# Setting these options is not required for use of the 4over6 feature.
# this is the address that a client will use as a source IP for packets sent to the router
#unsafe_origin_address_for_4over6: 169.254.55.96
# this is the IP the router will use internally to hairpin-NAT 4over6 traffic before it hits the operating system.
#snat_address_for_4over6: 169.254.12.34
# Configure logging level
logging:
@@ -391,8 +378,8 @@ firewall:
# Rules are comprised of a protocol, port, and one or more of host, group, or CIDR
# Logical evaluation is roughly: port AND proto AND (ca_sha OR ca_name) AND (host OR group OR groups OR cidr) AND (local cidr)
# - port: Takes `0` or `any` as any, a single number `80`, a range `200-901`, or `fragment` to match second and further fragments of fragmented packets (since there is no port available).
# code: same as port but makes more sense when talking about ICMP, TODO: this is not currently implemented in a way that works, use `any`
# proto: `any`, `tcp`, `udp`, or `icmp`
# a port specification is ignored if proto is `icmp`
# host: `any` or a literal hostname, ie `test-host`
# group: `any` or a literal group name, ie `default-group`
# groups: Same as group but accepts a list of values. Multiple values are AND'd together and a certificate would have to contain all groups to pass
+205 -368
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package nebula
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/binary"
"encoding/hex"
"errors"
"fmt"
@@ -23,54 +22,27 @@ import (
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
)
var ErrCannotSNAT = errors.New("cannot SNAT this packet")
var ErrSNATIdentityMismatch = errors.New("refusing to SNAT for mismatched host")
var ErrSNATAddressCollision = errors.New("refusing to accept an incoming packet with my SNAT address")
const ipv4SourcePosition = 12
const ipv4DestinationPosition = 16
const sourcePortOffset = 0
const destinationPortOffset = 2
type FirewallInterface interface {
AddRule(incoming bool, proto uint8, startPort int32, endPort int32, groups []string, host string, cidr, localCidr string, caName string, caSha string) error
}
type snatInfo struct {
//Src is the source IP+port to write into unsafe-route-bound packet
Src netip.AddrPort
//SrcVpnIp is the overlay IP associated with this flow. It's needed to associate reply traffic so we can get it back to the right host.
SrcVpnIp netip.Addr
//SnatPort is the port to rewrite into an overlay-bound packet
SnatPort uint16
}
func (s *snatInfo) Valid() bool {
if s == nil {
return false
}
return s.Src.IsValid()
AddRule(unsafe, incoming bool, proto uint8, startPort int32, endPort int32, groups []string, host string, cidr, localCidr string, caName string, caSha string) error
}
type conn struct {
Expires time.Time // Time when this conntrack entry will expire
// record why the original connection passed the firewall, so we can re-validate
// after ruleset changes. Note, rulesVersion is a uint16 so that these two
// fields pack for free after the uint32 above
// record why the original connection passed the firewall, so we can re-validate after ruleset changes.
incoming bool
unsafe bool
rulesVersion uint16
//for SNAT support
snat *snatInfo
}
// TODO: need conntrack max tracked connections handling
type Firewall struct {
Conntrack *FirewallConntrack
InRules *FirewallTable
OutRules *FirewallTable
InRules *FirewallTable
OutRules *FirewallTable
UnsafeInRules *FirewallTable
UnsafeOutRules *FirewallTable
InSendReject bool
OutSendReject bool
@@ -83,7 +55,7 @@ type Firewall struct {
// routableNetworks describes the vpn addresses as well as any unsafe networks issued to us in the certificate.
// The vpn addresses are a full bit match while the unsafe networks only match the prefix
routableNetworks *bart.Lite
routableNetworks *bart.Table[NetworkType]
// assignedNetworks is a list of vpn networks assigned to us in the certificate.
assignedNetworks []netip.Prefix
@@ -95,8 +67,6 @@ type Firewall struct {
defaultLocalCIDRAny bool
incomingMetrics firewallMetrics
outgoingMetrics firewallMetrics
unsafeIPv4Origin netip.Addr
snatAddr netip.Addr
l *logrus.Logger
}
@@ -180,17 +150,16 @@ func NewFirewall(l *logrus.Logger, tcpTimeout, UDPTimeout, defaultTimeout time.D
tmax = defaultTimeout
}
routableNetworks := new(bart.Lite)
routableNetworks := new(bart.Table[NetworkType])
var assignedNetworks []netip.Prefix
for _, network := range c.Networks() {
nprefix := netip.PrefixFrom(network.Addr(), network.Addr().BitLen())
routableNetworks.Insert(nprefix)
routableNetworks.Insert(netip.PrefixFrom(network.Addr(), network.Addr().BitLen()), NetworkTypeVPN)
assignedNetworks = append(assignedNetworks, network)
}
hasUnsafeNetworks := false
for _, n := range c.UnsafeNetworks() {
routableNetworks.Insert(n)
routableNetworks.Insert(n, NetworkTypeUnsafe)
hasUnsafeNetworks = true
}
@@ -201,6 +170,8 @@ func NewFirewall(l *logrus.Logger, tcpTimeout, UDPTimeout, defaultTimeout time.D
},
InRules: newFirewallTable(),
OutRules: newFirewallTable(),
UnsafeInRules: newFirewallTable(),
UnsafeOutRules: newFirewallTable(),
TCPTimeout: tcpTimeout,
UDPTimeout: UDPTimeout,
DefaultTimeout: defaultTimeout,
@@ -224,12 +195,12 @@ func NewFirewall(l *logrus.Logger, tcpTimeout, UDPTimeout, defaultTimeout time.D
func NewFirewallFromConfig(l *logrus.Logger, cs *CertState, c *config.C) (*Firewall, error) {
certificate := cs.getCertificate(cert.Version2)
if certificate == nil { //todo if config.initiating_version is set to 1, and unsafe_networks differ, things will suck
if certificate == nil {
certificate = cs.getCertificate(cert.Version1)
}
if certificate == nil {
return nil, errors.New("no certificate available to reconfigure the firewall")
panic("No certificate available to reconfigure the firewall")
}
fw := NewFirewall(
@@ -238,10 +209,12 @@ func NewFirewallFromConfig(l *logrus.Logger, cs *CertState, c *config.C) (*Firew
c.GetDuration("firewall.conntrack.udp_timeout", time.Minute*3),
c.GetDuration("firewall.conntrack.default_timeout", time.Minute*10),
certificate,
//TODO: max_connections
)
fw.defaultLocalCIDRAny = c.GetBool("firewall.default_local_cidr_any", false)
//TODO: do we also need firewall.unsafe_inbound_action and firewall.unsafe_outbound_action?
inboundAction := c.GetString("firewall.inbound_action", "drop")
switch inboundAction {
case "reject":
@@ -264,12 +237,26 @@ func NewFirewallFromConfig(l *logrus.Logger, cs *CertState, c *config.C) (*Firew
fw.OutSendReject = false
}
err := AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, c, fw)
// outbound rules
err := AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, false, c, fw)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
err = AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, true, c, fw)
// unsafe outbound rules
err = AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, true, false, c, fw)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// inbound rules
err = AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, true, c, fw)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// unsafe inbound rules
err = AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, true, true, c, fw)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -278,16 +265,43 @@ func NewFirewallFromConfig(l *logrus.Logger, cs *CertState, c *config.C) (*Firew
}
// AddRule properly creates the in memory rule structure for a firewall table.
func (f *Firewall) AddRule(incoming bool, proto uint8, startPort int32, endPort int32, groups []string, host string, cidr, localCidr, caName string, caSha string) error {
func (f *Firewall) AddRule(unsafe, incoming bool, proto uint8, startPort int32, endPort int32, groups []string, host string, cidr, localCidr, caName string, caSha string) error {
// We need this rule string because we generate a hash. Removing this will break firewall reload.
ruleString := fmt.Sprintf(
"unsafe: %v, incoming: %v, proto: %v, startPort: %v, endPort: %v, groups: %v, host: %v, ip: %v, localIp: %v, caName: %v, caSha: %s",
unsafe, incoming, proto, startPort, endPort, groups, host, cidr, localCidr, caName, caSha,
)
f.rules += ruleString + "\n"
direction := "incoming"
if !incoming {
direction = "outgoing"
}
fields := m{"direction": direction, "proto": proto, "startPort": startPort, "endPort": endPort, "groups": groups, "host": host, "cidr": cidr, "localCidr": localCidr, "caName": caName, "caSha": caSha}
if unsafe {
fields["unsafe"] = true
}
f.l.WithField("firewallRule", fields).Info("Firewall rule added")
var (
ft *FirewallTable
fp firewallPort
)
if incoming {
ft = f.InRules
if unsafe {
ft = f.UnsafeInRules
} else {
ft = f.InRules
}
} else {
ft = f.OutRules
if unsafe {
ft = f.UnsafeOutRules
} else {
ft = f.OutRules
}
}
switch proto {
@@ -296,12 +310,6 @@ func (f *Firewall) AddRule(incoming bool, proto uint8, startPort int32, endPort
case firewall.ProtoUDP:
fp = ft.UDP
case firewall.ProtoICMP, firewall.ProtoICMPv6:
//ICMP traffic doesn't have ports, so we always coerce to "any", even if a value is provided
if startPort != firewall.PortAny {
f.l.WithField("startPort", startPort).Warn("ignoring port specification for ICMP firewall rule")
}
startPort = firewall.PortAny
endPort = firewall.PortAny
fp = ft.ICMP
case firewall.ProtoAny:
fp = ft.AnyProto
@@ -309,20 +317,6 @@ func (f *Firewall) AddRule(incoming bool, proto uint8, startPort int32, endPort
return fmt.Errorf("unknown protocol %v", proto)
}
// We need this rule string because we generate a hash. Removing this will break firewall reload.
ruleString := fmt.Sprintf(
"incoming: %v, proto: %v, startPort: %v, endPort: %v, groups: %v, host: %v, ip: %v, localIp: %v, caName: %v, caSha: %s",
incoming, proto, startPort, endPort, groups, host, cidr, localCidr, caName, caSha,
)
f.rules += ruleString + "\n"
direction := "incoming"
if !incoming {
direction = "outgoing"
}
f.l.WithField("firewallRule", m{"direction": direction, "proto": proto, "startPort": startPort, "endPort": endPort, "groups": groups, "host": host, "cidr": cidr, "localCidr": localCidr, "caName": caName, "caSha": caSha}).
Info("Firewall rule added")
return fp.addRule(f, startPort, endPort, groups, host, cidr, localCidr, caName, caSha)
}
@@ -344,24 +338,21 @@ func (f *Firewall) GetRuleHashes() string {
return "SHA:" + f.GetRuleHash() + ",FNV:" + strconv.FormatUint(uint64(f.GetRuleHashFNV()), 10)
}
func (f *Firewall) SetSNATAddressFromInterface(i *Interface) {
//address-mutation-avoidance is done inside Interface, the firewall doesn't need to care
//todo should snatted conntracks get expired out? Probably not needed until if/when we allow reload
f.snatAddr = i.inside.SNATAddress().Addr()
f.unsafeIPv4Origin = i.inside.UnsafeIPv4OriginAddress().Addr()
}
func (f *Firewall) ShouldUnSNAT(fp *firewall.Packet) bool {
// f.snatAddr is only valid if we're a snat-capable router
return f.snatAddr.IsValid() && fp.RemoteAddr == f.snatAddr
}
func AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l *logrus.Logger, inbound bool, c *config.C, fw FirewallInterface) error {
func AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l *logrus.Logger, unsafe, inbound bool, c *config.C, fw FirewallInterface) error {
var table string
if inbound {
table = "firewall.inbound"
if unsafe {
table = "firewall.unsafe_inbound"
} else {
table = "firewall.inbound"
}
} else {
table = "firewall.outbound"
if unsafe {
table = "firewall.unsafe_outbound"
} else {
table = "firewall.outbound"
}
}
r := c.Get(table)
@@ -397,31 +388,24 @@ func AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l *logrus.Logger, inbound bool, c *config.C, fw
sPort = r.Port
}
startPort, endPort, err := parsePort(sPort)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%s rule #%v; %s %s", table, i, errPort, err)
}
var proto uint8
var startPort, endPort int32
switch r.Proto {
case "any":
proto = firewall.ProtoAny
startPort, endPort, err = parsePort(sPort)
case "tcp":
proto = firewall.ProtoTCP
startPort, endPort, err = parsePort(sPort)
case "udp":
proto = firewall.ProtoUDP
startPort, endPort, err = parsePort(sPort)
case "icmp":
proto = firewall.ProtoICMP
startPort = firewall.PortAny
endPort = firewall.PortAny
if sPort != "" {
l.WithField("port", sPort).Warn("ignoring port specification for ICMP firewall rule")
}
default:
return fmt.Errorf("%s rule #%v; proto was not understood; `%s`", table, i, r.Proto)
}
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%s rule #%v; %s %s", table, i, errPort, err)
}
if r.Cidr != "" && r.Cidr != "any" {
_, err = netip.ParsePrefix(r.Cidr)
@@ -441,7 +425,7 @@ func AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l *logrus.Logger, inbound bool, c *config.C, fw
l.Warnf("%s rule #%v; %s", table, i, warning)
}
err = fw.AddRule(inbound, proto, startPort, endPort, r.Groups, r.Host, r.Cidr, r.LocalCidr, r.CAName, r.CASha)
err = fw.AddRule(unsafe, inbound, proto, startPort, endPort, r.Groups, r.Host, r.Cidr, r.LocalCidr, r.CAName, r.CASha)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%s rule #%v; `%s`", table, i, err)
}
@@ -456,207 +440,67 @@ var ErrInvalidRemoteIP = errors.New("remote address is not in remote certificate
var ErrInvalidLocalIP = errors.New("local address is not in list of handled local addresses")
var ErrNoMatchingRule = errors.New("no matching rule in firewall table")
func (f *Firewall) unSnat(data []byte, fp *firewall.Packet) netip.Addr {
c := f.peek(*fp) //unfortunately this needs to lock. Surely there's a better way.
if c == nil {
return netip.Addr{}
}
if !c.snat.Valid() {
return netip.Addr{}
}
oldIP := netip.AddrPortFrom(f.snatAddr, fp.RemotePort)
rewritePacket(data, fp, oldIP, c.snat.Src, ipv4DestinationPosition, destinationPortOffset)
return c.snat.SrcVpnIp
}
func rewritePacket(data []byte, fp *firewall.Packet, oldIP netip.AddrPort, newIP netip.AddrPort, ipOffset int, portOffset int) {
//change address
copy(data[ipOffset:], newIP.Addr().AsSlice())
recalcIPv4Checksum(data, oldIP.Addr(), newIP.Addr())
ipHeaderLen := int(data[0]&0x0F) * 4
switch fp.Protocol {
case firewall.ProtoICMP:
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(data[ipHeaderLen+4:ipHeaderLen+6], newIP.Port()) //we use the ID field as a "port" for ICMP
icmpCode := uint16(data[ipHeaderLen+1]) //todo not snatting on code yet (but Linux would)
recalcICMPv4Checksum(data, icmpCode, icmpCode, oldIP.Port(), newIP.Port())
case firewall.ProtoUDP:
dstport := ipHeaderLen + portOffset
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(data[dstport:dstport+2], newIP.Port())
recalcUDPv4Checksum(data, oldIP, newIP)
case firewall.ProtoTCP:
dstport := ipHeaderLen + portOffset
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(data[dstport:dstport+2], newIP.Port())
recalcTCPv4Checksum(data, oldIP, newIP)
}
}
func (f *Firewall) findUsableSNATPort(fp *firewall.Packet, c *conn) error {
const halfThePorts = 0x7fff
oldPort := fp.RemotePort
conntrack := f.Conntrack
conntrack.Lock()
defer conntrack.Unlock()
for numPortsChecked := 0; numPortsChecked < halfThePorts; numPortsChecked++ {
_, ok := conntrack.Conns[*fp]
if !ok {
//yay, we can use this port
//track the snatted flow with the same expiration as the unsnatted version
c.snat.SnatPort = fp.RemotePort
conntrack.Conns[*fp] = c
return nil
}
//increment and retry. There's probably better strategies out there
fp.RemotePort++
if fp.RemotePort < halfThePorts {
fp.RemotePort += halfThePorts // keep it ephemeral for now
}
}
//if we made it here, we failed
fp.RemotePort = oldPort
return ErrCannotSNAT
}
func (f *Firewall) applySnat(data []byte, fp *firewall.Packet, c *conn, hostinfo *HostInfo) error {
if !f.snatAddr.IsValid() {
return ErrCannotSNAT
}
if f.snatAddr == fp.LocalAddr { //a packet that came from UDP (incoming) should never ever have our snat address on it
return ErrSNATAddressCollision
}
if c.snat.Valid() {
//old flow: make sure it came from the right place
if !slices.Contains(hostinfo.vpnAddrs, c.snat.SrcVpnIp) {
return ErrSNATIdentityMismatch
}
fp.RemoteAddr = f.snatAddr
fp.RemotePort = c.snat.SnatPort
} else if hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0].Is6() {
//we got a new flow
c.snat = &snatInfo{
Src: netip.AddrPortFrom(fp.RemoteAddr, fp.RemotePort),
SrcVpnIp: hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0],
}
fp.RemoteAddr = f.snatAddr
//find a new port to use, if needed
err := f.findUsableSNATPort(fp, c)
if err != nil {
c.snat = nil
return err
}
} else {
return ErrCannotSNAT
}
newIP := netip.AddrPortFrom(f.snatAddr, c.snat.SnatPort)
rewritePacket(data, fp, c.snat.Src, newIP, ipv4SourcePosition, sourcePortOffset)
return nil
}
func (f *Firewall) identifyRemoteNetworkType(h *HostInfo, fp firewall.Packet) NetworkType {
if h.networks == nil {
// Simple case: Certificate has one address and no unsafe networks
if h.vpnAddrs[0] == fp.RemoteAddr {
return NetworkTypeVPN
} //else, fallthrough
} else if nwType, ok := h.networks.Lookup(fp.RemoteAddr); ok {
return nwType //will return NetworkTypeVPN or NetworkTypeUnsafe
}
//RemoteAddr not in our networks table
if f.snatAddr.IsValid() && fp.IsIPv4() && h.HasOnlyV6Addresses() {
return NetworkTypeUnverifiedSNATPeer
} else {
return NetworkTypeInvalidPeer
}
}
func (f *Firewall) allowRemoteNetworkType(nwType NetworkType, fp firewall.Packet) error {
switch nwType {
case NetworkTypeVPN:
return nil
case NetworkTypeInvalidPeer:
return ErrInvalidRemoteIP
case NetworkTypeVPNPeer:
//one day we might need a specialSnatMode case in here to handle routers with v4 addresses when we don't also have a v4 address?
return ErrPeerRejected // reject for now, one day this may have different FW rules
case NetworkTypeUnsafe:
return nil // nothing special, one day this may have different FW rules
case NetworkTypeUnverifiedSNATPeer:
if f.unsafeIPv4Origin.IsValid() && fp.LocalAddr == f.unsafeIPv4Origin {
return nil //the client case
}
if f.snatAddr.IsValid() {
if fp.RemoteAddr == f.snatAddr {
return ErrInvalidRemoteIP //we should never get a packet with our SNAT addr as the destination, or "from" our SNAT addr
}
return nil
} else {
return ErrInvalidRemoteIP
}
default:
return ErrUnknownNetworkType //should never happen
}
}
func (f *Firewall) willingToHandleLocalAddr(incoming bool, fp firewall.Packet, remoteNwType NetworkType) error {
if f.routableNetworks.Contains(fp.LocalAddr) {
return nil //easy, this should handle NetworkTypeVPN in all cases, and NetworkTypeUnsafe on the router side
}
if incoming { //at least for now, reject all traffic other than what we've already decided is locally routable
return ErrInvalidLocalIP
}
//below this line, all traffic is outgoing. Outgoing traffic to NetworkTypeUnsafe is not required to be considered inbound-routable
if remoteNwType == NetworkTypeUnsafe {
return nil
}
return ErrInvalidLocalIP
}
// Drop returns an error if the packet should be dropped, explaining why. It
// returns nil if the packet should not be dropped.
func (f *Firewall) Drop(fp firewall.Packet, pkt []byte, incoming bool, h *HostInfo, caPool *cert.CAPool, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) error {
table := f.OutRules
if incoming {
table = f.InRules
}
snatmode := fp.IsIPv4() && h.HasOnlyV6Addresses() && f.snatAddr.IsValid()
if snatmode {
//if this is an IPv4 packet from a V6 only host, and we're configured to snat that kind of traffic, it must be snatted,
//so it can never be in the localcache, which lacks SNAT data
//nil out the pointer to avoid ever using it
localCache = nil
}
func (f *Firewall) Drop(fp firewall.Packet, incoming bool, h *HostInfo, caPool *cert.CAPool, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) error {
// Check if we spoke to this tuple, if we did then allow this packet
if localCache != nil {
if _, ok := localCache[fp]; ok {
return nil //packet matched the cache, we're not snatting, we can return early
}
}
c := f.inConns(fp, h, caPool, localCache)
if c != nil {
if incoming && snatmode {
return f.applySnat(pkt, &fp, c, h)
}
if f.inConns(fp, h, caPool, localCache) {
return nil
}
var remoteNetworkType NetworkType
var ok bool
// Make sure remote address matches nebula certificate, and determine how to treat it
remoteNetworkType := f.identifyRemoteNetworkType(h, fp)
if err := f.allowRemoteNetworkType(remoteNetworkType, fp); err != nil {
f.metrics(incoming).droppedRemoteAddr.Inc(1)
return err
if h.networks == nil {
// Simple case: Certificate has one address and no unsafe networks
if h.vpnAddrs[0] != fp.RemoteAddr {
f.metrics(incoming).droppedRemoteAddr.Inc(1)
return ErrInvalidRemoteIP
}
remoteNetworkType = NetworkTypeVPN
} else {
remoteNetworkType, ok = h.networks.Lookup(fp.RemoteAddr)
if !ok {
f.metrics(incoming).droppedRemoteAddr.Inc(1)
return ErrInvalidRemoteIP
}
switch remoteNetworkType {
case NetworkTypeVPN:
break // nothing special
case NetworkTypeVPNPeer:
f.metrics(incoming).droppedRemoteAddr.Inc(1)
return ErrPeerRejected // reject for now, one day this may have different FW rules
case NetworkTypeUnsafe:
break // nothing special, one day this may have different FW rules
default:
f.metrics(incoming).droppedRemoteAddr.Inc(1)
return ErrUnknownNetworkType //should never happen
}
}
// Make sure we are supposed to be handling this local ip address
if err := f.willingToHandleLocalAddr(incoming, fp, remoteNetworkType); err != nil {
localNetworkType, ok := f.routableNetworks.Lookup(fp.LocalAddr)
if !ok {
f.metrics(incoming).droppedLocalAddr.Inc(1)
return err
return ErrInvalidLocalIP
}
useUnsafe := remoteNetworkType == NetworkTypeUnsafe || localNetworkType == NetworkTypeUnsafe
var table *FirewallTable
if incoming {
if useUnsafe {
table = f.UnsafeInRules
} else {
table = f.InRules
}
} else {
if useUnsafe {
table = f.UnsafeOutRules
} else {
table = f.OutRules
}
}
// We now know which firewall table to check against
@@ -666,17 +510,13 @@ func (f *Firewall) Drop(fp firewall.Packet, pkt []byte, incoming bool, h *HostIn
}
// We always want to conntrack since it is a faster operation
c = f.addConn(fp, incoming)
f.addConn(fp, useUnsafe, incoming)
if incoming && remoteNetworkType == NetworkTypeUnverifiedSNATPeer {
return f.applySnat(pkt, &fp, c, h)
} else {
//outgoing snat is handled before this function is called
return nil
}
return nil
}
func (f *Firewall) metrics(incoming bool) firewallMetrics {
//TODO: need unsafe metrics too
if incoming {
return f.incomingMetrics
} else {
@@ -684,7 +524,7 @@ func (f *Firewall) metrics(incoming bool) firewallMetrics {
}
}
// Destroy cleans up any known cyclical references so the object can be freed by GC. This should be called if a new
// Destroy cleans up any known cyclical references so the object can be free'd my GC. This should be called if a new
// firewall object is created
func (f *Firewall) Destroy() {
//TODO: clean references if/when needed
@@ -700,14 +540,12 @@ func (f *Firewall) EmitStats() {
metrics.GetOrRegisterGauge("firewall.rules.hash", nil).Update(int64(f.GetRuleHashFNV()))
}
func (f *Firewall) peek(fp firewall.Packet) *conn {
f.Conntrack.Lock()
c := f.Conntrack.Conns[fp]
f.Conntrack.Unlock()
return c
}
func (f *Firewall) inConns(fp firewall.Packet, h *HostInfo, caPool *cert.CAPool, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) *conn {
func (f *Firewall) inConns(fp firewall.Packet, h *HostInfo, caPool *cert.CAPool, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) bool {
if localCache != nil {
if _, ok := localCache[fp]; ok {
return true
}
}
conntrack := f.Conntrack
conntrack.Lock()
@@ -718,18 +556,27 @@ func (f *Firewall) inConns(fp firewall.Packet, h *HostInfo, caPool *cert.CAPool,
}
c, ok := conntrack.Conns[fp]
if !ok {
conntrack.Unlock()
return nil
return false
}
if c.rulesVersion != f.rulesVersion {
// This conntrack entry was for an older rule set, validate
// it still passes with the current rule set
table := f.OutRules
var table *FirewallTable
if c.incoming {
table = f.InRules
if c.unsafe {
table = f.UnsafeInRules
} else {
table = f.InRules
}
} else {
if c.unsafe {
table = f.UnsafeOutRules
} else {
table = f.OutRules
}
}
// We now know which firewall table to check against
@@ -738,19 +585,21 @@ func (f *Firewall) inConns(fp firewall.Packet, h *HostInfo, caPool *cert.CAPool,
h.logger(f.l).
WithField("fwPacket", fp).
WithField("incoming", c.incoming).
WithField("unsafe", c.unsafe).
WithField("rulesVersion", f.rulesVersion).
WithField("oldRulesVersion", c.rulesVersion).
Debugln("dropping old conntrack entry, does not match new ruleset")
}
delete(conntrack.Conns, fp)
conntrack.Unlock()
return nil
return false
}
if f.l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
h.logger(f.l).
WithField("fwPacket", fp).
WithField("incoming", c.incoming).
WithField("unsafe", c.unsafe).
WithField("rulesVersion", f.rulesVersion).
WithField("oldRulesVersion", c.rulesVersion).
Debugln("keeping old conntrack entry, does match new ruleset")
@@ -774,11 +623,12 @@ func (f *Firewall) inConns(fp firewall.Packet, h *HostInfo, caPool *cert.CAPool,
localCache[fp] = struct{}{}
}
return c
return true
}
func (f *Firewall) packetTimeout(fp firewall.Packet) time.Duration {
func (f *Firewall) addConn(fp firewall.Packet, unsafe, incoming bool) {
var timeout time.Duration
c := &conn{}
switch fp.Protocol {
case firewall.ProtoTCP:
@@ -788,13 +638,7 @@ func (f *Firewall) packetTimeout(fp firewall.Packet) time.Duration {
default:
timeout = f.DefaultTimeout
}
return timeout
}
func (f *Firewall) addConn(fp firewall.Packet, incoming bool) *conn {
c := &conn{}
timeout := f.packetTimeout(fp)
conntrack := f.Conntrack
conntrack.Lock()
if _, ok := conntrack.Conns[fp]; !ok {
@@ -805,12 +649,11 @@ func (f *Firewall) addConn(fp firewall.Packet, incoming bool) *conn {
// Record which rulesVersion allowed this connection, so we can retest after
// firewall reload
c.incoming = incoming
c.unsafe = unsafe
c.rulesVersion = f.rulesVersion
c.Expires = time.Now().Add(timeout)
conntrack.Conns[fp] = c
conntrack.Unlock()
return c
}
// Evict checks if a conntrack entry has expired, if so it is removed, if not it is re-added to the wheel
@@ -886,13 +729,6 @@ func (fp firewallPort) match(p firewall.Packet, incoming bool, c *cert.CachedCer
return false
}
// this branch is here to catch traffic from FirewallTable.Any.match and FirewallTable.ICMP.match
if p.Protocol == firewall.ProtoICMP || p.Protocol == firewall.ProtoICMPv6 {
// port numbers are re-used for connection tracking of ICMP,
// but we don't want to actually filter on them.
return fp[firewall.PortAny].match(p, c, caPool)
}
var port int32
if p.Fragment {
@@ -1037,8 +873,10 @@ func (fr *FirewallRule) isAny(groups []string, host string, cidr string) bool {
return true
}
if slices.Contains(groups, "any") {
return true
for _, group := range groups {
if group == "any" {
return true
}
}
if host == "any" {
@@ -1168,6 +1006,7 @@ func convertRule(l *logrus.Logger, p any, table string, i int) (rule, error) {
r.Code = toString("code", m)
r.Proto = toString("proto", m)
r.Host = toString("host", m)
//TODO: create an alias to remote_cidr and deprecate cidr?
r.Cidr = toString("cidr", m)
r.LocalCidr = toString("local_cidr", m)
r.CAName = toString("ca_name", m)
@@ -1249,56 +1088,54 @@ func (r *rule) sanity() error {
}
}
if r.Code != "" {
return fmt.Errorf("code specified as [%s]. Support for 'code' will be dropped in a future release, as it has never been functional", r.Code)
}
//todo alert on cidr-any
return nil
}
func parsePort(s string) (int32, int32, error) {
var err error
const notAPort int32 = -2
func parsePort(s string) (startPort, endPort int32, err error) {
if s == "any" {
return firewall.PortAny, firewall.PortAny, nil
}
if s == "fragment" {
return firewall.PortFragment, firewall.PortFragment, nil
}
if !strings.Contains(s, `-`) {
startPort = firewall.PortAny
endPort = firewall.PortAny
} else if s == "fragment" {
startPort = firewall.PortFragment
endPort = firewall.PortFragment
} else if strings.Contains(s, `-`) {
sPorts := strings.SplitN(s, `-`, 2)
sPorts[0] = strings.Trim(sPorts[0], " ")
sPorts[1] = strings.Trim(sPorts[1], " ")
if len(sPorts) != 2 || sPorts[0] == "" || sPorts[1] == "" {
return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("appears to be a range but could not be parsed; `%s`", s)
}
rStartPort, err := strconv.Atoi(sPorts[0])
if err != nil {
return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("beginning range was not a number; `%s`", sPorts[0])
}
rEndPort, err := strconv.Atoi(sPorts[1])
if err != nil {
return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("ending range was not a number; `%s`", sPorts[1])
}
startPort = int32(rStartPort)
endPort = int32(rEndPort)
if startPort == firewall.PortAny {
endPort = firewall.PortAny
}
} else {
rPort, err := strconv.Atoi(s)
if err != nil {
return notAPort, notAPort, fmt.Errorf("was not a number; `%s`", s)
return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("was not a number; `%s`", s)
}
return int32(rPort), int32(rPort), nil
startPort = int32(rPort)
endPort = startPort
}
sPorts := strings.SplitN(s, `-`, 2)
for i := range sPorts {
sPorts[i] = strings.Trim(sPorts[i], " ")
}
if len(sPorts) != 2 || sPorts[0] == "" || sPorts[1] == "" {
return notAPort, notAPort, fmt.Errorf("appears to be a range but could not be parsed; `%s`", s)
}
rStartPort, err := strconv.Atoi(sPorts[0])
if err != nil {
return notAPort, notAPort, fmt.Errorf("beginning range was not a number; `%s`", sPorts[0])
}
rEndPort, err := strconv.Atoi(sPorts[1])
if err != nil {
return notAPort, notAPort, fmt.Errorf("ending range was not a number; `%s`", sPorts[1])
}
startPort := int32(rStartPort)
endPort := int32(rEndPort)
if startPort == firewall.PortAny {
endPort = firewall.PortAny
}
return startPort, endPort, nil
return
}
+1 -10
View File
@@ -22,19 +22,12 @@ const (
type Packet struct {
LocalAddr netip.Addr
RemoteAddr netip.Addr
// LocalPort is the destination port for incoming traffic, or the source port for outgoing. Zero for ICMP.
LocalPort uint16
// RemotePort is the source port for incoming traffic, or the destination port for outgoing.
// For ICMP, it's the "identifier". This is only used for connection tracking, actual firewall rules will not filter on ICMP identifier
LocalPort uint16
RemotePort uint16
Protocol uint8
Fragment bool
}
func (fp *Packet) IsIPv4() bool {
return fp.LocalAddr.Is4() && fp.RemoteAddr.Is4()
}
func (fp *Packet) Copy() *Packet {
return &Packet{
LocalAddr: fp.LocalAddr,
@@ -53,8 +46,6 @@ func (fp Packet) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
proto = "tcp"
case ProtoICMP:
proto = "icmp"
case ProtoICMPv6:
proto = "icmpv6"
case ProtoUDP:
proto = "udp"
default:
+108 -332
View File
@@ -73,66 +73,65 @@ func TestFirewall_AddRule(t *testing.T) {
ti6, err := netip.ParsePrefix("fd12::34/128")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoTCP, 1, 1, []string{}, "", "", "", "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoTCP, 1, 1, []string{}, "", "", "", "", ""))
// An empty rule is any
assert.True(t, fw.InRules.TCP[1].Any.Any.Any)
assert.Empty(t, fw.InRules.TCP[1].Any.Groups)
assert.Empty(t, fw.InRules.TCP[1].Any.Hosts)
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoUDP, 1, 1, []string{"g1"}, "", "", "", "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoUDP, 1, 1, []string{"g1"}, "", "", "", "", ""))
assert.Nil(t, fw.InRules.UDP[1].Any.Any)
assert.Contains(t, fw.InRules.UDP[1].Any.Groups[0].Groups, "g1")
assert.Empty(t, fw.InRules.UDP[1].Any.Hosts)
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoICMP, 1, 1, []string{}, "h1", "", "", "", ""))
//no matter what port is given for icmp, it should end up as "any"
assert.Nil(t, fw.InRules.ICMP[firewall.PortAny].Any.Any)
assert.Empty(t, fw.InRules.ICMP[firewall.PortAny].Any.Groups)
assert.Contains(t, fw.InRules.ICMP[firewall.PortAny].Any.Hosts, "h1")
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoICMP, 1, 1, []string{}, "h1", "", "", "", ""))
assert.Nil(t, fw.InRules.ICMP[1].Any.Any)
assert.Empty(t, fw.InRules.ICMP[1].Any.Groups)
assert.Contains(t, fw.InRules.ICMP[1].Any.Hosts, "h1")
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, firewall.ProtoAny, 1, 1, []string{}, "", ti.String(), "", "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, false, firewall.ProtoAny, 1, 1, []string{}, "", ti.String(), "", "", ""))
assert.Nil(t, fw.OutRules.AnyProto[1].Any.Any)
_, ok := fw.OutRules.AnyProto[1].Any.CIDR.Get(ti)
assert.True(t, ok)
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, firewall.ProtoAny, 1, 1, []string{}, "", ti6.String(), "", "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, false, firewall.ProtoAny, 1, 1, []string{}, "", ti6.String(), "", "", ""))
assert.Nil(t, fw.OutRules.AnyProto[1].Any.Any)
_, ok = fw.OutRules.AnyProto[1].Any.CIDR.Get(ti6)
assert.True(t, ok)
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, firewall.ProtoAny, 1, 1, []string{}, "", "", ti.String(), "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, false, firewall.ProtoAny, 1, 1, []string{}, "", "", ti.String(), "", ""))
assert.NotNil(t, fw.OutRules.AnyProto[1].Any.Any)
ok = fw.OutRules.AnyProto[1].Any.Any.LocalCIDR.Get(ti)
assert.True(t, ok)
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, firewall.ProtoAny, 1, 1, []string{}, "", "", ti6.String(), "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, false, firewall.ProtoAny, 1, 1, []string{}, "", "", ti6.String(), "", ""))
assert.NotNil(t, fw.OutRules.AnyProto[1].Any.Any)
ok = fw.OutRules.AnyProto[1].Any.Any.LocalCIDR.Get(ti6)
assert.True(t, ok)
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoUDP, 1, 1, []string{"g1"}, "", "", "", "ca-name", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoUDP, 1, 1, []string{"g1"}, "", "", "", "ca-name", ""))
assert.Contains(t, fw.InRules.UDP[1].CANames, "ca-name")
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoUDP, 1, 1, []string{"g1"}, "", "", "", "", "ca-sha"))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoUDP, 1, 1, []string{"g1"}, "", "", "", "", "ca-sha"))
assert.Contains(t, fw.InRules.UDP[1].CAShas, "ca-sha")
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{}, "any", "", "", "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, false, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{}, "any", "", "", "", ""))
assert.True(t, fw.OutRules.AnyProto[0].Any.Any.Any)
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c)
anyIp, err := netip.ParsePrefix("0.0.0.0/0")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{}, "", anyIp.String(), "", "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, false, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{}, "", anyIp.String(), "", "", ""))
assert.Nil(t, fw.OutRules.AnyProto[0].Any.Any)
table, ok := fw.OutRules.AnyProto[0].Any.CIDR.Lookup(netip.MustParseAddr("1.1.1.1"))
assert.True(t, table.Any)
@@ -143,7 +142,7 @@ func TestFirewall_AddRule(t *testing.T) {
anyIp6, err := netip.ParsePrefix("::/0")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{}, "", anyIp6.String(), "", "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, false, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{}, "", anyIp6.String(), "", "", ""))
assert.Nil(t, fw.OutRules.AnyProto[0].Any.Any)
table, ok = fw.OutRules.AnyProto[0].Any.CIDR.Lookup(netip.MustParseAddr("9::9"))
assert.True(t, table.Any)
@@ -151,29 +150,29 @@ func TestFirewall_AddRule(t *testing.T) {
assert.False(t, ok)
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{}, "", "any", "", "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, false, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{}, "", "any", "", "", ""))
assert.True(t, fw.OutRules.AnyProto[0].Any.Any.Any)
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{}, "", "", anyIp.String(), "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, false, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{}, "", "", anyIp.String(), "", ""))
assert.False(t, fw.OutRules.AnyProto[0].Any.Any.Any)
assert.True(t, fw.OutRules.AnyProto[0].Any.Any.LocalCIDR.Lookup(netip.MustParseAddr("1.1.1.1")))
assert.False(t, fw.OutRules.AnyProto[0].Any.Any.LocalCIDR.Lookup(netip.MustParseAddr("9::9")))
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{}, "", "", anyIp6.String(), "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, false, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{}, "", "", anyIp6.String(), "", ""))
assert.False(t, fw.OutRules.AnyProto[0].Any.Any.Any)
assert.True(t, fw.OutRules.AnyProto[0].Any.Any.LocalCIDR.Lookup(netip.MustParseAddr("9::9")))
assert.False(t, fw.OutRules.AnyProto[0].Any.Any.LocalCIDR.Lookup(netip.MustParseAddr("1.1.1.1")))
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{}, "", "", "any", "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, false, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{}, "", "", "any", "", ""))
assert.True(t, fw.OutRules.AnyProto[0].Any.Any.Any)
// Test error conditions
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c)
require.Error(t, fw.AddRule(true, math.MaxUint8, 0, 0, []string{}, "", "", "", "", ""))
require.Error(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 10, 0, []string{}, "", "", "", "", ""))
require.Error(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, math.MaxUint8, 0, 0, []string{}, "", "", "", "", ""))
require.Error(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoAny, 10, 0, []string{}, "", "", "", "", ""))
}
func TestFirewall_Drop(t *testing.T) {
@@ -209,48 +208,48 @@ func TestFirewall_Drop(t *testing.T) {
h.buildNetworks(myVpnNetworksTable, &c)
fw := NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, &c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"any"}, "", "", "", "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"any"}, "", "", "", "", ""))
cp := cert.NewCAPool()
// Drop outbound
assert.Equal(t, ErrNoMatchingRule, fw.Drop(p, nil, false, &h, cp, nil))
assert.Equal(t, ErrNoMatchingRule, fw.Drop(p, false, &h, cp, nil))
// Allow inbound
resetConntrack(fw)
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, nil, true, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h, cp, nil))
// Allow outbound because conntrack
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, nil, false, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, false, &h, cp, nil))
// test remote mismatch
oldRemote := p.RemoteAddr
p.RemoteAddr = netip.MustParseAddr("1.2.3.10")
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p, nil, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrInvalidRemoteIP)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrInvalidRemoteIP)
p.RemoteAddr = oldRemote
// ensure signer doesn't get in the way of group checks
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, &c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"nope"}, "", "", "", "", "signer-shasum"))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"default-group"}, "", "", "", "", "signer-shasum-bad"))
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p, nil, true, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"nope"}, "", "", "", "", "signer-shasum"))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"default-group"}, "", "", "", "", "signer-shasum-bad"))
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
// test caSha doesn't drop on match
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, &c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"nope"}, "", "", "", "", "signer-shasum-bad"))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"default-group"}, "", "", "", "", "signer-shasum"))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, nil, true, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"nope"}, "", "", "", "", "signer-shasum-bad"))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"default-group"}, "", "", "", "", "signer-shasum"))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h, cp, nil))
// ensure ca name doesn't get in the way of group checks
cp.CAs["signer-shasum"] = &cert.CachedCertificate{Certificate: &dummyCert{name: "ca-good"}}
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, &c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"nope"}, "", "", "", "ca-good", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"default-group"}, "", "", "", "ca-good-bad", ""))
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p, nil, true, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"nope"}, "", "", "", "ca-good", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"default-group"}, "", "", "", "ca-good-bad", ""))
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
// test caName doesn't drop on match
cp.CAs["signer-shasum"] = &cert.CachedCertificate{Certificate: &dummyCert{name: "ca-good"}}
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, &c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"nope"}, "", "", "", "ca-good-bad", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"default-group"}, "", "", "", "ca-good", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, nil, true, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"nope"}, "", "", "", "ca-good-bad", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"default-group"}, "", "", "", "ca-good", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h, cp, nil))
}
func TestFirewall_DropV6(t *testing.T) {
@@ -288,48 +287,48 @@ func TestFirewall_DropV6(t *testing.T) {
h.buildNetworks(myVpnNetworksTable, &c)
fw := NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, &c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"any"}, "", "", "", "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"any"}, "", "", "", "", ""))
cp := cert.NewCAPool()
// Drop outbound
assert.Equal(t, ErrNoMatchingRule, fw.Drop(p, nil, false, &h, cp, nil))
assert.Equal(t, ErrNoMatchingRule, fw.Drop(p, false, &h, cp, nil))
// Allow inbound
resetConntrack(fw)
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, nil, true, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h, cp, nil))
// Allow outbound because conntrack
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, nil, false, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, false, &h, cp, nil))
// test remote mismatch
oldRemote := p.RemoteAddr
p.RemoteAddr = netip.MustParseAddr("fd12::56")
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p, nil, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrInvalidRemoteIP)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrInvalidRemoteIP)
p.RemoteAddr = oldRemote
// ensure signer doesn't get in the way of group checks
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, &c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"nope"}, "", "", "", "", "signer-shasum"))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"default-group"}, "", "", "", "", "signer-shasum-bad"))
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p, nil, true, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"nope"}, "", "", "", "", "signer-shasum"))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"default-group"}, "", "", "", "", "signer-shasum-bad"))
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
// test caSha doesn't drop on match
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, &c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"nope"}, "", "", "", "", "signer-shasum-bad"))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"default-group"}, "", "", "", "", "signer-shasum"))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, nil, true, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"nope"}, "", "", "", "", "signer-shasum-bad"))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"default-group"}, "", "", "", "", "signer-shasum"))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h, cp, nil))
// ensure ca name doesn't get in the way of group checks
cp.CAs["signer-shasum"] = &cert.CachedCertificate{Certificate: &dummyCert{name: "ca-good"}}
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, &c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"nope"}, "", "", "", "ca-good", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"default-group"}, "", "", "", "ca-good-bad", ""))
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p, nil, true, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"nope"}, "", "", "", "ca-good", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"default-group"}, "", "", "", "ca-good-bad", ""))
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
// test caName doesn't drop on match
cp.CAs["signer-shasum"] = &cert.CachedCertificate{Certificate: &dummyCert{name: "ca-good"}}
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, &c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"nope"}, "", "", "", "ca-good-bad", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"default-group"}, "", "", "", "ca-good", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, nil, true, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"nope"}, "", "", "", "ca-good-bad", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"default-group"}, "", "", "", "ca-good", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h, cp, nil))
}
func BenchmarkFirewallTable_match(b *testing.B) {
@@ -533,14 +532,14 @@ func TestFirewall_Drop2(t *testing.T) {
h1.buildNetworks(myVpnNetworksTable, c1.Certificate)
fw := NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c.Certificate)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"default-group", "test-group"}, "", "", "", "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"default-group", "test-group"}, "", "", "", "", ""))
cp := cert.NewCAPool()
// h1/c1 lacks the proper groups
require.ErrorIs(t, fw.Drop(p, nil, true, &h1, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
require.ErrorIs(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h1, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
// c has the proper groups
resetConntrack(fw)
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, nil, true, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h, cp, nil))
}
func TestFirewall_Drop3(t *testing.T) {
@@ -613,23 +612,23 @@ func TestFirewall_Drop3(t *testing.T) {
h3.buildNetworks(myVpnNetworksTable, c3.Certificate)
fw := NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c.Certificate)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 1, 1, []string{}, "host1", "", "", "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 1, 1, []string{}, "", "", "", "", "signer-sha"))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoAny, 1, 1, []string{}, "host1", "", "", "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoAny, 1, 1, []string{}, "", "", "", "", "signer-sha"))
cp := cert.NewCAPool()
// c1 should pass because host match
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, nil, true, &h1, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h1, cp, nil))
// c2 should pass because ca sha match
resetConntrack(fw)
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, nil, true, &h2, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h2, cp, nil))
// c3 should fail because no match
resetConntrack(fw)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p, nil, true, &h3, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h3, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
// Test a remote address match
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c.Certificate)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 1, 1, []string{}, "", "1.2.3.4/24", "", "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, nil, true, &h1, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoAny, 1, 1, []string{}, "", "1.2.3.4/24", "", "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h1, cp, nil))
}
func TestFirewall_Drop3V6(t *testing.T) {
@@ -666,8 +665,8 @@ func TestFirewall_Drop3V6(t *testing.T) {
// Test a remote address match
fw := NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c.Certificate)
cp := cert.NewCAPool()
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 1, 1, []string{}, "", "fd12::34/120", "", "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, nil, true, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoAny, 1, 1, []string{}, "", "fd12::34/120", "", "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h, cp, nil))
}
func TestFirewall_DropConntrackReload(t *testing.T) {
@@ -705,178 +704,34 @@ func TestFirewall_DropConntrackReload(t *testing.T) {
h.buildNetworks(myVpnNetworksTable, c.Certificate)
fw := NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c.Certificate)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"any"}, "", "", "", "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"any"}, "", "", "", "", ""))
cp := cert.NewCAPool()
// Drop outbound
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p, nil, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
// Allow inbound
resetConntrack(fw)
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, nil, true, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h, cp, nil))
// Allow outbound because conntrack
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, nil, false, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, false, &h, cp, nil))
oldFw := fw
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c.Certificate)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 10, 10, []string{"any"}, "", "", "", "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoAny, 10, 10, []string{"any"}, "", "", "", "", ""))
fw.Conntrack = oldFw.Conntrack
fw.rulesVersion = oldFw.rulesVersion + 1
// Allow outbound because conntrack and new rules allow port 10
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, nil, false, &h, cp, nil))
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(p, false, &h, cp, nil))
oldFw = fw
fw = NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c.Certificate)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 11, 11, []string{"any"}, "", "", "", "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoAny, 11, 11, []string{"any"}, "", "", "", "", ""))
fw.Conntrack = oldFw.Conntrack
fw.rulesVersion = oldFw.rulesVersion + 1
// Drop outbound because conntrack doesn't match new ruleset
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p, nil, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
}
func TestFirewall_ICMPPortBehavior(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
ob := &bytes.Buffer{}
l.SetOutput(ob)
myVpnNetworksTable := new(bart.Lite)
myVpnNetworksTable.Insert(netip.MustParsePrefix("1.1.1.1/8"))
network := netip.MustParsePrefix("1.2.3.4/24")
c := cert.CachedCertificate{
Certificate: &dummyCert{
name: "host1",
networks: []netip.Prefix{network},
groups: []string{"default-group"},
issuer: "signer-shasum",
},
InvertedGroups: map[string]struct{}{"default-group": {}},
}
h := HostInfo{
ConnectionState: &ConnectionState{
peerCert: &c,
},
vpnAddrs: []netip.Addr{network.Addr()},
}
h.buildNetworks(myVpnNetworksTable, c.Certificate)
cp := cert.NewCAPool()
templ := firewall.Packet{
LocalAddr: netip.MustParseAddr("1.2.3.4"),
RemoteAddr: netip.MustParseAddr("1.2.3.4"),
Protocol: firewall.ProtoICMP,
Fragment: false,
}
t.Run("ICMP allowed", func(t *testing.T) {
fw := NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c.Certificate)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoICMP, 0, 0, []string{"any"}, "", "", "", "", ""))
t.Run("zero ports", func(t *testing.T) {
p := templ.Copy()
p.LocalPort = 0
p.RemotePort = 0
// Drop outbound
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(*p, nil, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
// Allow inbound
resetConntrack(fw)
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(*p, nil, true, &h, cp, nil))
//now also allow outbound
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(*p, nil, false, &h, cp, nil))
})
t.Run("nonzero ports", func(t *testing.T) {
p := templ.Copy()
p.LocalPort = 0xabcd
p.RemotePort = 0x1234
// Drop outbound
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(*p, nil, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
// Allow inbound
resetConntrack(fw)
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(*p, nil, true, &h, cp, nil))
//now also allow outbound
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(*p, nil, false, &h, cp, nil))
})
})
t.Run("Any proto, some ports allowed", func(t *testing.T) {
fw := NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c.Certificate)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 80, 444, []string{"any"}, "", "", "", "", ""))
t.Run("zero ports, still blocked", func(t *testing.T) {
p := templ.Copy()
p.LocalPort = 0
p.RemotePort = 0
// Drop outbound
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(*p, nil, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
// Allow inbound
resetConntrack(fw)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(*p, nil, true, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
//now also allow outbound
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(*p, nil, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
})
t.Run("nonzero ports, still blocked", func(t *testing.T) {
p := templ.Copy()
p.LocalPort = 0xabcd
p.RemotePort = 0x1234
// Drop outbound
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(*p, nil, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
// Allow inbound
resetConntrack(fw)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(*p, nil, true, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
//now also allow outbound
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(*p, nil, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
})
t.Run("nonzero, matching ports, still blocked", func(t *testing.T) {
p := templ.Copy()
p.LocalPort = 80
p.RemotePort = 80
// Drop outbound
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(*p, nil, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
// Allow inbound
resetConntrack(fw)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(*p, nil, true, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
//now also allow outbound
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(*p, nil, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
})
})
t.Run("Any proto, any port", func(t *testing.T) {
fw := NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c.Certificate)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"any"}, "", "", "", "", ""))
t.Run("zero ports, allowed", func(t *testing.T) {
resetConntrack(fw)
p := templ.Copy()
p.LocalPort = 0
p.RemotePort = 0
// Drop outbound
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(*p, nil, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
// Allow inbound
resetConntrack(fw)
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(*p, nil, true, &h, cp, nil))
//now also allow outbound
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(*p, nil, false, &h, cp, nil))
})
t.Run("nonzero ports, allowed", func(t *testing.T) {
resetConntrack(fw)
p := templ.Copy()
p.LocalPort = 0xabcd
p.RemotePort = 0x1234
// Drop outbound
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(*p, nil, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
// Allow inbound
resetConntrack(fw)
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(*p, nil, true, &h, cp, nil))
//now also allow outbound
require.NoError(t, fw.Drop(*p, nil, false, &h, cp, nil))
//different ID is blocked
p.RemotePort++
require.Equal(t, fw.Drop(*p, nil, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
})
})
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p, false, &h, cp, nil), ErrNoMatchingRule)
}
func TestFirewall_DropIPSpoofing(t *testing.T) {
@@ -910,7 +765,7 @@ func TestFirewall_DropIPSpoofing(t *testing.T) {
fw := NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, c.Certificate)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 1, 1, []string{}, "", "", "", "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoAny, 1, 1, []string{}, "", "", "", "", ""))
cp := cert.NewCAPool()
// Packet spoofed by `c1`. Note that the remote addr is not a valid one.
@@ -922,7 +777,7 @@ func TestFirewall_DropIPSpoofing(t *testing.T) {
Protocol: firewall.ProtoUDP,
Fragment: false,
}
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p, nil, true, &h1, cp, nil), ErrInvalidRemoteIP)
assert.Equal(t, fw.Drop(p, true, &h1, cp, nil), ErrInvalidRemoteIP)
}
func BenchmarkLookup(b *testing.B) {
@@ -1042,7 +897,7 @@ func TestNewFirewallFromConfig(t *testing.T) {
l := test.NewLogger()
// Test a bad rule definition
c := &dummyCert{}
cs, err := newCertState(l, cert.Version2, nil, c, false, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, nil)
cs, err := newCertState(cert.Version2, nil, c, false, cert.Curve_CURVE25519, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
conf := config.NewC(l)
@@ -1064,11 +919,11 @@ func TestNewFirewallFromConfig(t *testing.T) {
// Test code/port error
conf = config.NewC(l)
conf.Settings["firewall"] = map[string]any{"outbound": []any{map[string]any{"code": "a", "host": "testh", "proto": "any"}}}
conf.Settings["firewall"] = map[string]any{"outbound": []any{map[string]any{"code": "a", "host": "testh"}}}
_, err = NewFirewallFromConfig(l, cs, conf)
require.EqualError(t, err, "firewall.outbound rule #0; code was not a number; `a`")
conf.Settings["firewall"] = map[string]any{"outbound": []any{map[string]any{"port": "a", "host": "testh", "proto": "any"}}}
conf.Settings["firewall"] = map[string]any{"outbound": []any{map[string]any{"port": "a", "host": "testh"}}}
_, err = NewFirewallFromConfig(l, cs, conf)
require.EqualError(t, err, "firewall.outbound rule #0; port was not a number; `a`")
@@ -1103,35 +958,28 @@ func TestAddFirewallRulesFromConfig(t *testing.T) {
conf := config.NewC(l)
mf := &mockFirewall{}
conf.Settings["firewall"] = map[string]any{"outbound": []any{map[string]any{"port": "1", "proto": "tcp", "host": "a"}}}
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, conf, mf))
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, false, conf, mf))
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: false, proto: firewall.ProtoTCP, startPort: 1, endPort: 1, groups: nil, host: "a", ip: "", localIp: ""}, mf.lastCall)
// Test adding udp rule
conf = config.NewC(l)
mf = &mockFirewall{}
conf.Settings["firewall"] = map[string]any{"outbound": []any{map[string]any{"port": "1", "proto": "udp", "host": "a"}}}
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, conf, mf))
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, false, conf, mf))
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: false, proto: firewall.ProtoUDP, startPort: 1, endPort: 1, groups: nil, host: "a", ip: "", localIp: ""}, mf.lastCall)
// Test adding icmp rule
conf = config.NewC(l)
mf = &mockFirewall{}
conf.Settings["firewall"] = map[string]any{"outbound": []any{map[string]any{"port": "1", "proto": "icmp", "host": "a"}}}
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, conf, mf))
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: false, proto: firewall.ProtoICMP, startPort: firewall.PortAny, endPort: firewall.PortAny, groups: nil, host: "a", ip: "", localIp: ""}, mf.lastCall)
// Test adding icmp rule no port
conf = config.NewC(l)
mf = &mockFirewall{}
conf.Settings["firewall"] = map[string]any{"outbound": []any{map[string]any{"proto": "icmp", "host": "a"}}}
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, conf, mf))
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: false, proto: firewall.ProtoICMP, startPort: firewall.PortAny, endPort: firewall.PortAny, groups: nil, host: "a", ip: "", localIp: ""}, mf.lastCall)
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, false, conf, mf))
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: false, proto: firewall.ProtoICMP, startPort: 1, endPort: 1, groups: nil, host: "a", ip: "", localIp: ""}, mf.lastCall)
// Test adding any rule
conf = config.NewC(l)
mf = &mockFirewall{}
conf.Settings["firewall"] = map[string]any{"inbound": []any{map[string]any{"port": "1", "proto": "any", "host": "a"}}}
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, true, conf, mf))
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, true, conf, mf))
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: true, proto: firewall.ProtoAny, startPort: 1, endPort: 1, groups: nil, host: "a", ip: "", localIp: ""}, mf.lastCall)
// Test adding rule with cidr
@@ -1139,14 +987,14 @@ func TestAddFirewallRulesFromConfig(t *testing.T) {
conf = config.NewC(l)
mf = &mockFirewall{}
conf.Settings["firewall"] = map[string]any{"inbound": []any{map[string]any{"port": "1", "proto": "any", "cidr": cidr.String()}}}
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, true, conf, mf))
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, true, conf, mf))
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: true, proto: firewall.ProtoAny, startPort: 1, endPort: 1, groups: nil, ip: cidr.String(), localIp: ""}, mf.lastCall)
// Test adding rule with local_cidr
conf = config.NewC(l)
mf = &mockFirewall{}
conf.Settings["firewall"] = map[string]any{"inbound": []any{map[string]any{"port": "1", "proto": "any", "local_cidr": cidr.String()}}}
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, true, conf, mf))
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, true, conf, mf))
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: true, proto: firewall.ProtoAny, startPort: 1, endPort: 1, groups: nil, ip: "", localIp: cidr.String()}, mf.lastCall)
// Test adding rule with cidr ipv6
@@ -1154,75 +1002,75 @@ func TestAddFirewallRulesFromConfig(t *testing.T) {
conf = config.NewC(l)
mf = &mockFirewall{}
conf.Settings["firewall"] = map[string]any{"inbound": []any{map[string]any{"port": "1", "proto": "any", "cidr": cidr6.String()}}}
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, true, conf, mf))
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, true, conf, mf))
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: true, proto: firewall.ProtoAny, startPort: 1, endPort: 1, groups: nil, ip: cidr6.String(), localIp: ""}, mf.lastCall)
// Test adding rule with any cidr
conf = config.NewC(l)
mf = &mockFirewall{}
conf.Settings["firewall"] = map[string]any{"inbound": []any{map[string]any{"port": "1", "proto": "any", "cidr": "any"}}}
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, true, conf, mf))
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, true, conf, mf))
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: true, proto: firewall.ProtoAny, startPort: 1, endPort: 1, groups: nil, ip: "any", localIp: ""}, mf.lastCall)
// Test adding rule with junk cidr
conf = config.NewC(l)
mf = &mockFirewall{}
conf.Settings["firewall"] = map[string]any{"inbound": []any{map[string]any{"port": "1", "proto": "any", "cidr": "junk/junk"}}}
require.EqualError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, true, conf, mf), "firewall.inbound rule #0; cidr did not parse; netip.ParsePrefix(\"junk/junk\"): ParseAddr(\"junk\"): unable to parse IP")
require.EqualError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, true, conf, mf), "firewall.inbound rule #0; cidr did not parse; netip.ParsePrefix(\"junk/junk\"): ParseAddr(\"junk\"): unable to parse IP")
// Test adding rule with local_cidr ipv6
conf = config.NewC(l)
mf = &mockFirewall{}
conf.Settings["firewall"] = map[string]any{"inbound": []any{map[string]any{"port": "1", "proto": "any", "local_cidr": cidr6.String()}}}
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, true, conf, mf))
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, true, conf, mf))
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: true, proto: firewall.ProtoAny, startPort: 1, endPort: 1, groups: nil, ip: "", localIp: cidr6.String()}, mf.lastCall)
// Test adding rule with any local_cidr
conf = config.NewC(l)
mf = &mockFirewall{}
conf.Settings["firewall"] = map[string]any{"inbound": []any{map[string]any{"port": "1", "proto": "any", "local_cidr": "any"}}}
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, true, conf, mf))
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, true, conf, mf))
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: true, proto: firewall.ProtoAny, startPort: 1, endPort: 1, groups: nil, localIp: "any"}, mf.lastCall)
// Test adding rule with junk local_cidr
conf = config.NewC(l)
mf = &mockFirewall{}
conf.Settings["firewall"] = map[string]any{"inbound": []any{map[string]any{"port": "1", "proto": "any", "local_cidr": "junk/junk"}}}
require.EqualError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, true, conf, mf), "firewall.inbound rule #0; local_cidr did not parse; netip.ParsePrefix(\"junk/junk\"): ParseAddr(\"junk\"): unable to parse IP")
require.EqualError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, true, conf, mf), "firewall.inbound rule #0; local_cidr did not parse; netip.ParsePrefix(\"junk/junk\"): ParseAddr(\"junk\"): unable to parse IP")
// Test adding rule with ca_sha
conf = config.NewC(l)
mf = &mockFirewall{}
conf.Settings["firewall"] = map[string]any{"inbound": []any{map[string]any{"port": "1", "proto": "any", "ca_sha": "12312313123"}}}
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, true, conf, mf))
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, true, conf, mf))
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: true, proto: firewall.ProtoAny, startPort: 1, endPort: 1, groups: nil, ip: "", localIp: "", caSha: "12312313123"}, mf.lastCall)
// Test adding rule with ca_name
conf = config.NewC(l)
mf = &mockFirewall{}
conf.Settings["firewall"] = map[string]any{"inbound": []any{map[string]any{"port": "1", "proto": "any", "ca_name": "root01"}}}
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, true, conf, mf))
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, true, conf, mf))
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: true, proto: firewall.ProtoAny, startPort: 1, endPort: 1, groups: nil, ip: "", localIp: "", caName: "root01"}, mf.lastCall)
// Test single group
conf = config.NewC(l)
mf = &mockFirewall{}
conf.Settings["firewall"] = map[string]any{"inbound": []any{map[string]any{"port": "1", "proto": "any", "group": "a"}}}
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, true, conf, mf))
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, true, conf, mf))
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: true, proto: firewall.ProtoAny, startPort: 1, endPort: 1, groups: []string{"a"}, ip: "", localIp: ""}, mf.lastCall)
// Test single groups
conf = config.NewC(l)
mf = &mockFirewall{}
conf.Settings["firewall"] = map[string]any{"inbound": []any{map[string]any{"port": "1", "proto": "any", "groups": "a"}}}
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, true, conf, mf))
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, true, conf, mf))
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: true, proto: firewall.ProtoAny, startPort: 1, endPort: 1, groups: []string{"a"}, ip: "", localIp: ""}, mf.lastCall)
// Test multiple AND groups
conf = config.NewC(l)
mf = &mockFirewall{}
conf.Settings["firewall"] = map[string]any{"inbound": []any{map[string]any{"port": "1", "proto": "any", "groups": []string{"a", "b"}}}}
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, true, conf, mf))
require.NoError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, true, conf, mf))
assert.Equal(t, addRuleCall{incoming: true, proto: firewall.ProtoAny, startPort: 1, endPort: 1, groups: []string{"a", "b"}, ip: "", localIp: ""}, mf.lastCall)
// Test Add error
@@ -1230,7 +1078,7 @@ func TestAddFirewallRulesFromConfig(t *testing.T) {
mf = &mockFirewall{}
mf.nextCallReturn = errors.New("test error")
conf.Settings["firewall"] = map[string]any{"inbound": []any{map[string]any{"port": "1", "proto": "any", "host": "a"}}}
require.EqualError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, true, conf, mf), "firewall.inbound rule #0; `test error`")
require.EqualError(t, AddFirewallRulesFromConfig(l, false, true, conf, mf), "firewall.inbound rule #0; `test error`")
}
func TestFirewall_convertRule(t *testing.T) {
@@ -1336,7 +1184,7 @@ func (c *testcase) Test(t *testing.T, fw *Firewall) {
t.Helper()
cp := cert.NewCAPool()
resetConntrack(fw)
err := fw.Drop(c.p, nil, true, c.h, cp, nil)
err := fw.Drop(c.p, true, c.h, cp, nil)
if c.err == nil {
require.NoError(t, err, "failed to not drop remote address %s", c.p.RemoteAddr)
} else {
@@ -1344,7 +1192,7 @@ func (c *testcase) Test(t *testing.T, fw *Firewall) {
}
}
func buildHostinfo(setup testsetup, theirPrefixes ...netip.Prefix) *HostInfo {
func buildTestCase(setup testsetup, err error, theirPrefixes ...netip.Prefix) testcase {
c1 := dummyCert{
name: "host1",
networks: theirPrefixes,
@@ -1364,11 +1212,6 @@ func buildHostinfo(setup testsetup, theirPrefixes ...netip.Prefix) *HostInfo {
h.vpnAddrs[i] = theirPrefixes[i].Addr()
}
h.buildNetworks(setup.myVpnNetworksTable, &c1)
return &h
}
func buildTestCase(setup testsetup, err error, theirPrefixes ...netip.Prefix) testcase {
h := buildHostinfo(setup, theirPrefixes...)
p := firewall.Packet{
LocalAddr: setup.c.Networks()[0].Addr(), //todo?
RemoteAddr: theirPrefixes[0].Addr(),
@@ -1378,9 +1221,9 @@ func buildTestCase(setup testsetup, err error, theirPrefixes ...netip.Prefix) te
Fragment: false,
}
return testcase{
h: h,
h: &h,
p: p,
c: h.ConnectionState.peerCert.Certificate,
c: &c1,
err: err,
}
}
@@ -1402,26 +1245,13 @@ func newSetup(t *testing.T, l *logrus.Logger, myPrefixes ...netip.Prefix) testse
return newSetupFromCert(t, l, c)
}
func newSnatSetup(t *testing.T, l *logrus.Logger, myPrefix netip.Prefix, snatAddr netip.Addr) testsetup {
c := dummyCert{
name: "me",
networks: []netip.Prefix{myPrefix},
groups: []string{"default-group"},
issuer: "signer-shasum",
}
out := newSetupFromCert(t, l, c)
out.fw.snatAddr = snatAddr
return out
}
func newSetupFromCert(t *testing.T, l *logrus.Logger, c dummyCert) testsetup {
myVpnNetworksTable := new(bart.Lite)
for _, prefix := range c.Networks() {
myVpnNetworksTable.Insert(prefix)
}
fw := NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, &c)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"any"}, "", "", "", "", ""))
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(false, true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"any"}, "", "", "", "", ""))
return testsetup{
c: c,
@@ -1502,13 +1332,14 @@ func TestFirewall_Drop_EnforceIPMatch(t *testing.T) {
tc.p.LocalAddr = netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.0.3")
tc.err = ErrNoMatchingRule
tc.Test(t, unsafeSetup.fw) //should hit firewall and bounce off
require.NoError(t, unsafeSetup.fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"any"}, "", "", unsafePrefix.String(), "", ""))
require.NoError(t, unsafeSetup.fw.AddRule(true, true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"any"}, "", "", unsafePrefix.String(), "", ""))
tc.err = nil
tc.Test(t, unsafeSetup.fw) //should pass
})
}
type addRuleCall struct {
unsafe bool
incoming bool
proto uint8
startPort int32
@@ -1526,8 +1357,9 @@ type mockFirewall struct {
nextCallReturn error
}
func (mf *mockFirewall) AddRule(incoming bool, proto uint8, startPort int32, endPort int32, groups []string, host string, ip, localIp, caName string, caSha string) error {
func (mf *mockFirewall) AddRule(unsafe, incoming bool, proto uint8, startPort int32, endPort int32, groups []string, host string, ip, localIp, caName string, caSha string) error {
mf.lastCall = addRuleCall{
unsafe: unsafe,
incoming: incoming,
proto: proto,
startPort: startPort,
@@ -1550,59 +1382,3 @@ func resetConntrack(fw *Firewall) {
fw.Conntrack.Conns = map[firewall.Packet]*conn{}
fw.Conntrack.Unlock()
}
func TestFirewall_SNAT(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
l := test.NewLogger()
ob := &bytes.Buffer{}
l.SetOutput(ob)
cp := cert.NewCAPool()
myPrefix := netip.MustParsePrefix("1.1.1.1/8")
MyCert := dummyCert{
name: "me",
networks: []netip.Prefix{myPrefix},
groups: []string{"default-group"},
issuer: "signer-shasum",
}
theirPrefix := netip.MustParsePrefix("1.2.2.2/8")
snatAddr := netip.MustParseAddr("169.254.55.96")
t.Run("allow inbound all matching", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
myCert := MyCert.Copy()
setup := newSnatSetup(t, l, myPrefix, snatAddr)
fw := NewFirewall(l, time.Second, time.Minute, time.Hour, myCert)
require.NoError(t, fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"any"}, "", "", "", "", ""))
resetConntrack(setup.fw)
h := buildHostinfo(setup, theirPrefix)
p := firewall.Packet{
LocalAddr: setup.c.Networks()[0].Addr(), //todo?
RemoteAddr: h.vpnAddrs[0],
LocalPort: 10,
RemotePort: 90,
Protocol: firewall.ProtoUDP,
Fragment: false,
}
require.NoError(t, setup.fw.Drop(p, nil, true, h, cp, nil))
})
//t.Run("allow inbound unsafe route", func(t *testing.T) {
// t.Parallel()
// unsafePrefix := netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.0.0/24")
// c := dummyCert{
// name: "me",
// networks: []netip.Prefix{myPrefix},
// unsafeNetworks: []netip.Prefix{unsafePrefix},
// groups: []string{"default-group"},
// issuer: "signer-shasum",
// }
// unsafeSetup := newSetupFromCert(t, l, c)
// tc := buildTestCase(unsafeSetup, nil, twoPrefixes...)
// tc.p.LocalAddr = netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.0.3")
// tc.err = ErrNoMatchingRule
// tc.Test(t, unsafeSetup.fw) //should hit firewall and bounce off
// require.NoError(t, unsafeSetup.fw.AddRule(true, firewall.ProtoAny, 0, 0, []string{"any"}, "", "", unsafePrefix.String(), "", ""))
// tc.err = nil
// tc.Test(t, unsafeSetup.fw) //should pass
//})
}
+10 -11
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ go 1.25
require (
dario.cat/mergo v1.0.2
filippo.io/bigmod v0.1.0
github.com/anmitsu/go-shlex v0.0.0-20200514113438-38f4b401e2be
github.com/armon/go-radix v1.0.0
github.com/cyberdelia/go-metrics-graphite v0.0.0-20161219230853-39f87cc3b432
@@ -13,27 +12,27 @@ require (
github.com/gogo/protobuf v1.3.2
github.com/google/gopacket v1.1.19
github.com/kardianos/service v1.2.4
github.com/miekg/dns v1.1.70
github.com/miekg/dns v1.1.68
github.com/miekg/pkcs11 v1.1.2-0.20231115102856-9078ad6b9d4b
github.com/nbrownus/go-metrics-prometheus v0.0.0-20210712211119-974a6260965f
github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.23.2
github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics v0.0.0-20201227073835-cf1acfcdf475
github.com/sirupsen/logrus v1.9.4
github.com/sirupsen/logrus v1.9.3
github.com/skip2/go-qrcode v0.0.0-20200617195104-da1b6568686e
github.com/stefanberger/go-pkcs11uri v0.0.0-20230803200340-78284954bff6
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1
github.com/vishvananda/netlink v1.3.1
go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.4
golang.org/x/crypto v0.47.0
golang.org/x/crypto v0.45.0
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20230725093048-515e97ebf090
golang.org/x/net v0.49.0
golang.org/x/sync v0.19.0
golang.org/x/sys v0.40.0
golang.org/x/term v0.39.0
golang.org/x/net v0.47.0
golang.org/x/sync v0.18.0
golang.org/x/sys v0.38.0
golang.org/x/term v0.37.0
golang.zx2c4.com/wintun v0.0.0-20230126152724-0fa3db229ce2
golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard v0.0.0-20230325221338-052af4a8072b
golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/windows v0.5.3
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.11
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.10
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1
gvisor.dev/gvisor v0.0.0-20240423190808-9d7a357edefe
)
@@ -50,7 +49,7 @@ require (
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.16.1 // indirect
github.com/vishvananda/netns v0.0.5 // indirect
go.yaml.in/yaml/v2 v2.4.2 // indirect
golang.org/x/mod v0.31.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/mod v0.24.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/time v0.5.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/tools v0.40.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/tools v0.33.0 // indirect
)
+21 -22
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
cloud.google.com/go v0.34.0/go.mod h1:aQUYkXzVsufM+DwF1aE+0xfcU+56JwCaLick0ClmMTw=
dario.cat/mergo v1.0.2 h1:85+piFYR1tMbRrLcDwR18y4UKJ3aH1Tbzi24VRW1TK8=
dario.cat/mergo v1.0.2/go.mod h1:E/hbnu0NxMFBjpMIE34DRGLWqDy0g5FuKDhCb31ngxA=
filippo.io/bigmod v0.1.0 h1:UNzDk7y9ADKST+axd9skUpBQeW7fG2KrTZyOE4uGQy8=
filippo.io/bigmod v0.1.0/go.mod h1:OjOXDNlClLblvXdwgFFOQFJEocLhhtai8vGLy0JCZlI=
github.com/alecthomas/template v0.0.0-20160405071501-a0175ee3bccc/go.mod h1:LOuyumcjzFXgccqObfd/Ljyb9UuFJ6TxHnclSeseNhc=
github.com/alecthomas/template v0.0.0-20190718012654-fb15b899a751/go.mod h1:LOuyumcjzFXgccqObfd/Ljyb9UuFJ6TxHnclSeseNhc=
github.com/alecthomas/units v0.0.0-20151022065526-2efee857e7cf/go.mod h1:ybxpYRFXyAe+OPACYpWeL0wqObRcbAqCMya13uyzqw0=
@@ -85,8 +83,8 @@ github.com/kr/text v0.1.0/go.mod h1:4Jbv+DJW3UT/LiOwJeYQe1efqtUx/iVham/4vfdArNI=
github.com/kylelemons/godebug v1.1.0 h1:RPNrshWIDI6G2gRW9EHilWtl7Z6Sb1BR0xunSBf0SNc=
github.com/kylelemons/godebug v1.1.0/go.mod h1:9/0rRGxNHcop5bhtWyNeEfOS8JIWk580+fNqagV/RAw=
github.com/matttproud/golang_protobuf_extensions v1.0.1/go.mod h1:D8He9yQNgCq6Z5Ld7szi9bcBfOoFv/3dc6xSMkL2PC0=
github.com/miekg/dns v1.1.70 h1:DZ4u2AV35VJxdD9Fo9fIWm119BsQL5cZU1cQ9s0LkqA=
github.com/miekg/dns v1.1.70/go.mod h1:+EuEPhdHOsfk6Wk5TT2CzssZdqkmFhf8r+aVyDEToIs=
github.com/miekg/dns v1.1.68 h1:jsSRkNozw7G/mnmXULynzMNIsgY2dHC8LO6U6Ij2JEA=
github.com/miekg/dns v1.1.68/go.mod h1:fujopn7TB3Pu3JM69XaawiU0wqjpL9/8xGop5UrTPps=
github.com/miekg/pkcs11 v1.1.2-0.20231115102856-9078ad6b9d4b h1:J/AzCvg5z0Hn1rqZUJjpbzALUmkKX0Zwbc/i4fw7Sfk=
github.com/miekg/pkcs11 v1.1.2-0.20231115102856-9078ad6b9d4b/go.mod h1:XsNlhZGX73bx86s2hdc/FuaLm2CPZJemRLMA+WTFxgs=
github.com/modern-go/concurrent v0.0.0-20180228061459-e0a39a4cb421/go.mod h1:6dJC0mAP4ikYIbvyc7fijjWJddQyLn8Ig3JB5CqoB9Q=
@@ -133,8 +131,8 @@ github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.10.0/go.mod h1:UQnix2H7Ngw/k4C5ijL5+65zddjncj
github.com/sirupsen/logrus v1.2.0/go.mod h1:LxeOpSwHxABJmUn/MG1IvRgCAasNZTLOkJPxbbu5VWo=
github.com/sirupsen/logrus v1.4.2/go.mod h1:tLMulIdttU9McNUspp0xgXVQah82FyeX6MwdIuYE2rE=
github.com/sirupsen/logrus v1.6.0/go.mod h1:7uNnSEd1DgxDLC74fIahvMZmmYsHGZGEOFrfsX/uA88=
github.com/sirupsen/logrus v1.9.4 h1:TsZE7l11zFCLZnZ+teH4Umoq5BhEIfIzfRDZ1Uzql2w=
github.com/sirupsen/logrus v1.9.4/go.mod h1:ftWc9WdOfJ0a92nsE2jF5u5ZwH8Bv2zdeOC42RjbV2g=
github.com/sirupsen/logrus v1.9.3 h1:dueUQJ1C2q9oE3F7wvmSGAaVtTmUizReu6fjN8uqzbQ=
github.com/sirupsen/logrus v1.9.3/go.mod h1:naHLuLoDiP4jHNo9R0sCBMtWGeIprob74mVsIT4qYEQ=
github.com/skip2/go-qrcode v0.0.0-20200617195104-da1b6568686e h1:MRM5ITcdelLK2j1vwZ3Je0FKVCfqOLp5zO6trqMLYs0=
github.com/skip2/go-qrcode v0.0.0-20200617195104-da1b6568686e/go.mod h1:XV66xRDqSt+GTGFMVlhk3ULuV0y9ZmzeVGR4mloJI3M=
github.com/stefanberger/go-pkcs11uri v0.0.0-20230803200340-78284954bff6 h1:pnnLyeX7o/5aX8qUQ69P/mLojDqwda8hFOCBTmP/6hw=
@@ -164,16 +162,16 @@ golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190308221718-c2843e01d9a2/go.mod h1:djNgcEr1/C05ACk
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20191011191535-87dc89f01550/go.mod h1:yigFU9vqHzYiE8UmvKecakEJjdnWj3jj499lnFckfCI=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20200622213623-75b288015ac9/go.mod h1:LzIPMQfyMNhhGPhUkYOs5KpL4U8rLKemX1yGLhDgUto=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20210322153248-0c34fe9e7dc2/go.mod h1:T9bdIzuCu7OtxOm1hfPfRQxPLYneinmdGuTeoZ9dtd4=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.47.0 h1:V6e3FRj+n4dbpw86FJ8Fv7XVOql7TEwpHapKoMJ/GO8=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.47.0/go.mod h1:ff3Y9VzzKbwSSEzWqJsJVBnWmRwRSHt/6Op5n9bQc4A=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.45.0 h1:jMBrvKuj23MTlT0bQEOBcAE0mjg8mK9RXFhRH6nyF3Q=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.45.0/go.mod h1:XTGrrkGJve7CYK7J8PEww4aY7gM3qMCElcJQ8n8JdX4=
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20230725093048-515e97ebf090 h1:Di6/M8l0O2lCLc6VVRWhgCiApHV8MnQurBnFSHsQtNY=
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20230725093048-515e97ebf090/go.mod h1:FXUEEKJgO7OQYeo8N01OfiKP8RXMtf6e8aTskBGqWdc=
golang.org/x/lint v0.0.0-20200302205851-738671d3881b/go.mod h1:3xt1FjdF8hUf6vQPIChWIBhFzV8gjjsPE/fR3IyQdNY=
golang.org/x/mod v0.1.1-0.20191105210325-c90efee705ee/go.mod h1:QqPTAvyqsEbceGzBzNggFXnrqF1CaUcvgkdR5Ot7KZg=
golang.org/x/mod v0.2.0/go.mod h1:s0Qsj1ACt9ePp/hMypM3fl4fZqREWJwdYDEqhRiZZUA=
golang.org/x/mod v0.3.0/go.mod h1:s0Qsj1ACt9ePp/hMypM3fl4fZqREWJwdYDEqhRiZZUA=
golang.org/x/mod v0.31.0 h1:HaW9xtz0+kOcWKwli0ZXy79Ix+UW/vOfmWI5QVd2tgI=
golang.org/x/mod v0.31.0/go.mod h1:43JraMp9cGx1Rx3AqioxrbrhNsLl2l/iNAvuBkrezpg=
golang.org/x/mod v0.24.0 h1:ZfthKaKaT4NrhGVZHO1/WDTwGES4De8KtWO0SIbNJMU=
golang.org/x/mod v0.24.0/go.mod h1:IXM97Txy2VM4PJ3gI61r1YEk/gAj6zAHN3AdZt6S9Ww=
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20180724234803-3673e40ba225/go.mod h1:mL1N/T3taQHkDXs73rZJwtUhF3w3ftmwwsq0BUmARs4=
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20181114220301-adae6a3d119a/go.mod h1:mL1N/T3taQHkDXs73rZJwtUhF3w3ftmwwsq0BUmARs4=
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20190108225652-1e06a53dbb7e/go.mod h1:mL1N/T3taQHkDXs73rZJwtUhF3w3ftmwwsq0BUmARs4=
@@ -184,8 +182,8 @@ golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20200226121028-0de0cce0169b/go.mod h1:z5CRVTTTmAJ677TzLL
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20200625001655-4c5254603344/go.mod h1:/O7V0waA8r7cgGh81Ro3o1hOxt32SMVPicZroKQ2sZA=
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20201021035429-f5854403a974/go.mod h1:sp8m0HH+o8qH0wwXwYZr8TS3Oi6o0r6Gce1SSxlDquU=
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20210226172049-e18ecbb05110/go.mod h1:m0MpNAwzfU5UDzcl9v0D8zg8gWTRqZa9RBIspLL5mdg=
golang.org/x/net v0.49.0 h1:eeHFmOGUTtaaPSGNmjBKpbng9MulQsJURQUAfUwY++o=
golang.org/x/net v0.49.0/go.mod h1:/ysNB2EvaqvesRkuLAyjI1ycPZlQHM3q01F02UY/MV8=
golang.org/x/net v0.47.0 h1:Mx+4dIFzqraBXUugkia1OOvlD6LemFo1ALMHjrXDOhY=
golang.org/x/net v0.47.0/go.mod h1:/jNxtkgq5yWUGYkaZGqo27cfGZ1c5Nen03aYrrKpVRU=
golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.0.0-20190226205417-e64efc72b421/go.mod h1:gOpvHmFTYa4IltrdGE7lF6nIHvwfUNPOp7c8zoXwtLw=
golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20181108010431-42b317875d0f/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20181221193216-37e7f081c4d4/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
@@ -193,8 +191,8 @@ golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20190423024810-112230192c58/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJ
golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20190911185100-cd5d95a43a6e/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20201020160332-67f06af15bc9/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20201207232520-09787c993a3a/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
golang.org/x/sync v0.19.0 h1:vV+1eWNmZ5geRlYjzm2adRgW2/mcpevXNg50YZtPCE4=
golang.org/x/sync v0.19.0/go.mod h1:9KTHXmSnoGruLpwFjVSX0lNNA75CykiMECbovNTZqGI=
golang.org/x/sync v0.18.0 h1:kr88TuHDroi+UVf+0hZnirlk8o8T+4MrK6mr60WkH/I=
golang.org/x/sync v0.18.0/go.mod h1:9KTHXmSnoGruLpwFjVSX0lNNA75CykiMECbovNTZqGI=
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20180905080454-ebe1bf3edb33/go.mod h1:STP8DvDyc/dI5b8T5hshtkjS+E42TnysNCUPdjciGhY=
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20181116152217-5ac8a444bdc5/go.mod h1:STP8DvDyc/dI5b8T5hshtkjS+E42TnysNCUPdjciGhY=
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20190215142949-d0b11bdaac8a/go.mod h1:STP8DvDyc/dI5b8T5hshtkjS+E42TnysNCUPdjciGhY=
@@ -208,13 +206,14 @@ golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20200930185726-fdedc70b468f/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7w
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20201119102817-f84b799fce68/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7wpKNCjG9DtNlClVuFLEZdDNbEs=
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20210124154548-22da62e12c0c/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7wpKNCjG9DtNlClVuFLEZdDNbEs=
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20210603081109-ebe580a85c40/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20220715151400-c0bba94af5f8/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
golang.org/x/sys v0.2.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
golang.org/x/sys v0.10.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
golang.org/x/sys v0.40.0 h1:DBZZqJ2Rkml6QMQsZywtnjnnGvHza6BTfYFWY9kjEWQ=
golang.org/x/sys v0.40.0/go.mod h1:OgkHotnGiDImocRcuBABYBEXf8A9a87e/uXjp9XT3ks=
golang.org/x/sys v0.38.0 h1:3yZWxaJjBmCWXqhN1qh02AkOnCQ1poK6oF+a7xWL6Gc=
golang.org/x/sys v0.38.0/go.mod h1:OgkHotnGiDImocRcuBABYBEXf8A9a87e/uXjp9XT3ks=
golang.org/x/term v0.0.0-20201126162022-7de9c90e9dd1/go.mod h1:bj7SfCRtBDWHUb9snDiAeCFNEtKQo2Wmx5Cou7ajbmo=
golang.org/x/term v0.39.0 h1:RclSuaJf32jOqZz74CkPA9qFuVTX7vhLlpfj/IGWlqY=
golang.org/x/term v0.39.0/go.mod h1:yxzUCTP/U+FzoxfdKmLaA0RV1WgE0VY7hXBwKtY/4ww=
golang.org/x/term v0.37.0 h1:8EGAD0qCmHYZg6J17DvsMy9/wJ7/D/4pV/wfnld5lTU=
golang.org/x/term v0.37.0/go.mod h1:5pB4lxRNYYVZuTLmy8oR2BH8dflOR+IbTYFD8fi3254=
golang.org/x/text v0.3.0/go.mod h1:NqM8EUOU14njkJ3fqMW+pc6Ldnwhi/IjpwHt7yyuwOQ=
golang.org/x/text v0.3.2/go.mod h1:bEr9sfX3Q8Zfm5fL9x+3itogRgK3+ptLWKqgva+5dAk=
golang.org/x/text v0.3.3/go.mod h1:5Zoc/QRtKVWzQhOtBMvqHzDpF6irO9z98xDceosuGiQ=
@@ -225,8 +224,8 @@ golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20191119224855-298f0cb1881e/go.mod h1:b+2E5dAYhXwXZwtn
golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20200130002326-2f3ba24bd6e7/go.mod h1:TB2adYChydJhpapKDTa4BR/hXlZSLoq2Wpct/0txZ28=
golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20200619180055-7c47624df98f/go.mod h1:EkVYQZoAsY45+roYkvgYkIh4xh/qjgUK9TdY2XT94GE=
golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20210106214847-113979e3529a/go.mod h1:emZCQorbCU4vsT4fOWvOPXz4eW1wZW4PmDk9uLelYpA=
golang.org/x/tools v0.40.0 h1:yLkxfA+Qnul4cs9QA3KnlFu0lVmd8JJfoq+E41uSutA=
golang.org/x/tools v0.40.0/go.mod h1:Ik/tzLRlbscWpqqMRjyWYDisX8bG13FrdXp3o4Sr9lc=
golang.org/x/tools v0.33.0 h1:4qz2S3zmRxbGIhDIAgjxvFutSvH5EfnsYrRBj0UI0bc=
golang.org/x/tools v0.33.0/go.mod h1:CIJMaWEY88juyUfo7UbgPqbC8rU2OqfAV1h2Qp0oMYI=
golang.org/x/xerrors v0.0.0-20190717185122-a985d3407aa7/go.mod h1:I/5z698sn9Ka8TeJc9MKroUUfqBBauWjQqLJ2OPfmY0=
golang.org/x/xerrors v0.0.0-20191011141410-1b5146add898/go.mod h1:I/5z698sn9Ka8TeJc9MKroUUfqBBauWjQqLJ2OPfmY0=
golang.org/x/xerrors v0.0.0-20191204190536-9bdfabe68543/go.mod h1:I/5z698sn9Ka8TeJc9MKroUUfqBBauWjQqLJ2OPfmY0=
@@ -245,8 +244,8 @@ google.golang.org/protobuf v1.20.1-0.20200309200217-e05f789c0967/go.mod h1:A+miE
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.21.0/go.mod h1:47Nbq4nVaFHyn7ilMalzfO3qCViNmqZ2kzikPIcrTAo=
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.23.0/go.mod h1:EGpADcykh3NcUnDUJcl1+ZksZNG86OlYog2l/sGQquU=
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.26.0-rc.1/go.mod h1:jlhhOSvTdKEhbULTjvd4ARK9grFBp09yW+WbY/TyQbw=
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.11 h1:fV6ZwhNocDyBLK0dj+fg8ektcVegBBuEolpbTQyBNVE=
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.11/go.mod h1:HTf+CrKn2C3g5S8VImy6tdcUvCska2kB7j23XfzDpco=
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.10 h1:AYd7cD/uASjIL6Q9LiTjz8JLcrh/88q5UObnmY3aOOE=
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.10/go.mod h1:HTf+CrKn2C3g5S8VImy6tdcUvCska2kB7j23XfzDpco=
gopkg.in/alecthomas/kingpin.v2 v2.2.6/go.mod h1:FMv+mEhP44yOT+4EoQTLFTRgOQ1FBLkstjWtayDeSgw=
gopkg.in/check.v1 v0.0.0-20161208181325-20d25e280405/go.mod h1:Co6ibVJAznAaIkqp8huTwlJQCZ016jof/cbN4VW5Yz0=
gopkg.in/check.v1 v1.0.0-20190902080502-41f04d3bba15/go.mod h1:Co6ibVJAznAaIkqp8huTwlJQCZ016jof/cbN4VW5Yz0=
+65 -74
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
package nebula
import (
"bytes"
"net/netip"
"time"
@@ -100,11 +99,11 @@ func ixHandshakeStage0(f *Interface, hh *HandshakeHostInfo) bool {
return true
}
func ixHandshakeStage1(f *Interface, via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H) {
func ixHandshakeStage1(f *Interface, addr netip.AddrPort, via *ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H) {
cs := f.pki.getCertState()
crt := cs.GetDefaultCertificate()
if crt == nil {
f.l.WithField("from", via).
f.l.WithField("udpAddr", addr).
WithField("handshake", m{"stage": 0, "style": "ix_psk0"}).
WithField("certVersion", cs.initiatingVersion).
Error("Unable to handshake with host because no certificate is available")
@@ -113,7 +112,7 @@ func ixHandshakeStage1(f *Interface, via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H)
ci, err := NewConnectionState(f.l, cs, crt, false, noise.HandshakeIX)
if err != nil {
f.l.WithError(err).WithField("from", via).
f.l.WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
WithField("handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"}).
Error("Failed to create connection state")
return
@@ -124,7 +123,7 @@ func ixHandshakeStage1(f *Interface, via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H)
msg, _, _, err := ci.H.ReadMessage(nil, packet[header.Len:])
if err != nil {
f.l.WithError(err).WithField("from", via).
f.l.WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
WithField("handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"}).
Error("Failed to call noise.ReadMessage")
return
@@ -133,7 +132,7 @@ func ixHandshakeStage1(f *Interface, via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H)
hs := &NebulaHandshake{}
err = hs.Unmarshal(msg)
if err != nil || hs.Details == nil {
f.l.WithError(err).WithField("from", via).
f.l.WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
WithField("handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"}).
Error("Failed unmarshal handshake message")
return
@@ -141,7 +140,7 @@ func ixHandshakeStage1(f *Interface, via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H)
rc, err := cert.Recombine(cert.Version(hs.Details.CertVersion), hs.Details.Cert, ci.H.PeerStatic(), ci.Curve())
if err != nil {
f.l.WithError(err).WithField("from", via).
f.l.WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
WithField("handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"}).
Info("Handshake did not contain a certificate")
return
@@ -154,7 +153,7 @@ func ixHandshakeStage1(f *Interface, via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H)
fp = "<error generating certificate fingerprint>"
}
e := f.l.WithError(err).WithField("from", via).
e := f.l.WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
WithField("handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"}).
WithField("certVpnNetworks", rc.Networks()).
WithField("certFingerprint", fp)
@@ -167,20 +166,13 @@ func ixHandshakeStage1(f *Interface, via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H)
return
}
if !bytes.Equal(remoteCert.Certificate.PublicKey(), ci.H.PeerStatic()) {
f.l.WithField("from", via).
WithField("handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"}).
WithField("cert", remoteCert).Info("public key mismatch between certificate and handshake")
return
}
if remoteCert.Certificate.Version() != ci.myCert.Version() {
// We started off using the wrong certificate version, lets see if we can match the version that was sent to us
myCertOtherVersion := cs.getCertificate(remoteCert.Certificate.Version())
if myCertOtherVersion == nil {
if f.l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
f.l.WithError(err).WithFields(m{
"from": via,
"udpAddr": addr,
"handshake": m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"},
"cert": remoteCert,
}).Debug("Might be unable to handshake with host due to missing certificate version")
@@ -192,7 +184,7 @@ func ixHandshakeStage1(f *Interface, via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H)
}
if len(remoteCert.Certificate.Networks()) == 0 {
f.l.WithError(err).WithField("from", via).
f.l.WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
WithField("cert", remoteCert).
WithField("handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"}).
Info("No networks in certificate")
@@ -209,7 +201,7 @@ func ixHandshakeStage1(f *Interface, via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H)
vpnAddrs := make([]netip.Addr, len(vpnNetworks))
for i, network := range vpnNetworks {
if f.myVpnAddrsTable.Contains(network.Addr()) {
f.l.WithField("vpnNetworks", vpnNetworks).WithField("from", via).
f.l.WithField("vpnNetworks", vpnNetworks).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
WithField("certName", certName).
WithField("certVersion", certVersion).
WithField("fingerprint", fingerprint).
@@ -223,18 +215,18 @@ func ixHandshakeStage1(f *Interface, via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H)
}
}
if !via.IsRelayed {
if addr.IsValid() {
// addr can be invalid when the tunnel is being relayed.
// We only want to apply the remote allow list for direct tunnels here
if !f.lightHouse.GetRemoteAllowList().AllowAll(vpnAddrs, via.UdpAddr.Addr()) {
f.l.WithField("vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs).WithField("from", via).
Debug("lighthouse.remote_allow_list denied incoming handshake")
if !f.lightHouse.GetRemoteAllowList().AllowAll(vpnAddrs, addr.Addr()) {
f.l.WithField("vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs).WithField("udpAddr", addr).Debug("lighthouse.remote_allow_list denied incoming handshake")
return
}
}
myIndex, err := generateIndex(f.l)
if err != nil {
f.l.WithError(err).WithField("vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs).WithField("from", via).
f.l.WithError(err).WithField("vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
WithField("certName", certName).
WithField("certVersion", certVersion).
WithField("fingerprint", fingerprint).
@@ -259,7 +251,7 @@ func ixHandshakeStage1(f *Interface, via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H)
msgRxL := f.l.WithFields(m{
"vpnAddrs": vpnAddrs,
"from": via,
"udpAddr": addr,
"certName": certName,
"certVersion": certVersion,
"fingerprint": fingerprint,
@@ -291,7 +283,7 @@ func ixHandshakeStage1(f *Interface, via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H)
hsBytes, err := hs.Marshal()
if err != nil {
f.l.WithError(err).WithField("vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs).WithField("from", via).
f.l.WithError(err).WithField("vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
WithField("certName", certName).
WithField("certVersion", certVersion).
WithField("fingerprint", fingerprint).
@@ -303,7 +295,7 @@ func ixHandshakeStage1(f *Interface, via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H)
nh := header.Encode(make([]byte, header.Len), header.Version, header.Handshake, header.HandshakeIXPSK0, hs.Details.InitiatorIndex, 2)
msg, dKey, eKey, err := ci.H.WriteMessage(nh, hsBytes)
if err != nil {
f.l.WithError(err).WithField("vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs).WithField("from", via).
f.l.WithError(err).WithField("vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
WithField("certName", certName).
WithField("certVersion", certVersion).
WithField("fingerprint", fingerprint).
@@ -311,7 +303,7 @@ func ixHandshakeStage1(f *Interface, via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H)
WithField("handshake", m{"stage": 1, "style": "ix_psk0"}).Error("Failed to call noise.WriteMessage")
return
} else if dKey == nil || eKey == nil {
f.l.WithField("vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs).WithField("from", via).
f.l.WithField("vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
WithField("certName", certName).
WithField("certVersion", certVersion).
WithField("fingerprint", fingerprint).
@@ -337,9 +329,7 @@ func ixHandshakeStage1(f *Interface, via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H)
ci.eKey = NewNebulaCipherState(eKey)
hostinfo.remotes = f.lightHouse.QueryCache(vpnAddrs)
if !via.IsRelayed {
hostinfo.SetRemote(via.UdpAddr)
}
hostinfo.SetRemote(addr)
hostinfo.buildNetworks(f.myVpnNetworksTable, remoteCert.Certificate)
existing, err := f.handshakeManager.CheckAndComplete(hostinfo, 0, f)
@@ -347,7 +337,7 @@ func ixHandshakeStage1(f *Interface, via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H)
switch err {
case ErrAlreadySeen:
// Update remote if preferred
if existing.SetRemoteIfPreferred(f.hostMap, via) {
if existing.SetRemoteIfPreferred(f.hostMap, addr) {
// Send a test packet to ensure the other side has also switched to
// the preferred remote
f.SendMessageToVpnAddr(header.Test, header.TestRequest, vpnAddrs[0], []byte(""), make([]byte, 12, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
@@ -355,21 +345,21 @@ func ixHandshakeStage1(f *Interface, via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H)
msg = existing.HandshakePacket[2]
f.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Handshake, header.MessageSubType(msg[1]), 1)
if !via.IsRelayed {
err := f.outside.WriteTo(msg, via.UdpAddr)
if addr.IsValid() {
err := f.outside.WriteTo(msg, addr)
if err != nil {
f.l.WithField("vpnAddrs", existing.vpnAddrs).WithField("from", via).
f.l.WithField("vpnAddrs", existing.vpnAddrs).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
WithField("handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"}).WithField("cached", true).
WithError(err).Error("Failed to send handshake message")
} else {
f.l.WithField("vpnAddrs", existing.vpnAddrs).WithField("from", via).
f.l.WithField("vpnAddrs", existing.vpnAddrs).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
WithField("handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"}).WithField("cached", true).
Info("Handshake message sent")
}
return
} else {
if via.relay == nil {
f.l.Error("Handshake send failed: both addr and via.relay are nil.")
if via == nil {
f.l.Error("Handshake send failed: both addr and via are nil.")
return
}
hostinfo.relayState.InsertRelayTo(via.relayHI.vpnAddrs[0])
@@ -381,7 +371,7 @@ func ixHandshakeStage1(f *Interface, via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H)
}
case ErrExistingHostInfo:
// This means there was an existing tunnel and this handshake was older than the one we are currently based on
f.l.WithField("vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs).WithField("from", via).
f.l.WithField("vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
WithField("certName", certName).
WithField("certVersion", certVersion).
WithField("oldHandshakeTime", existing.lastHandshakeTime).
@@ -397,7 +387,7 @@ func ixHandshakeStage1(f *Interface, via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H)
return
case ErrLocalIndexCollision:
// This means we failed to insert because of collision on localIndexId. Just let the next handshake packet retry
f.l.WithField("vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs).WithField("from", via).
f.l.WithField("vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
WithField("certName", certName).
WithField("certVersion", certVersion).
WithField("fingerprint", fingerprint).
@@ -410,7 +400,7 @@ func ixHandshakeStage1(f *Interface, via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H)
default:
// Shouldn't happen, but just in case someone adds a new error type to CheckAndComplete
// And we forget to update it here
f.l.WithError(err).WithField("vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs).WithField("from", via).
f.l.WithError(err).WithField("vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
WithField("certName", certName).
WithField("certVersion", certVersion).
WithField("fingerprint", fingerprint).
@@ -424,23 +414,30 @@ func ixHandshakeStage1(f *Interface, via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H)
// Do the send
f.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Handshake, header.MessageSubType(msg[1]), 1)
if !via.IsRelayed {
err = f.outside.WriteTo(msg, via.UdpAddr)
log := f.l.WithField("vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs).WithField("from", via).
WithField("certName", certName).
WithField("certVersion", certVersion).
WithField("fingerprint", fingerprint).
WithField("issuer", issuer).
WithField("initiatorIndex", hs.Details.InitiatorIndex).WithField("responderIndex", hs.Details.ResponderIndex).
WithField("remoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex).WithField("handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"})
if addr.IsValid() {
err = f.outside.WriteTo(msg, addr)
if err != nil {
log.WithError(err).Error("Failed to send handshake")
f.l.WithField("vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
WithField("certName", certName).
WithField("certVersion", certVersion).
WithField("fingerprint", fingerprint).
WithField("issuer", issuer).
WithField("initiatorIndex", hs.Details.InitiatorIndex).WithField("responderIndex", hs.Details.ResponderIndex).
WithField("remoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex).WithField("handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"}).
WithError(err).Error("Failed to send handshake")
} else {
log.Info("Handshake message sent")
f.l.WithField("vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
WithField("certName", certName).
WithField("certVersion", certVersion).
WithField("fingerprint", fingerprint).
WithField("issuer", issuer).
WithField("initiatorIndex", hs.Details.InitiatorIndex).WithField("responderIndex", hs.Details.ResponderIndex).
WithField("remoteIndex", h.RemoteIndex).WithField("handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"}).
Info("Handshake message sent")
}
} else {
if via.relay == nil {
f.l.Error("Handshake send failed: both addr and via.relay are nil.")
if via == nil {
f.l.Error("Handshake send failed: both addr and via are nil.")
return
}
hostinfo.relayState.InsertRelayTo(via.relayHI.vpnAddrs[0])
@@ -465,7 +462,7 @@ func ixHandshakeStage1(f *Interface, via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H)
return
}
func ixHandshakeStage2(f *Interface, via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostInfo, packet []byte, h *header.H) bool {
func ixHandshakeStage2(f *Interface, addr netip.AddrPort, via *ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostInfo, packet []byte, h *header.H) bool {
if hh == nil {
// Nothing here to tear down, got a bogus stage 2 packet
return true
@@ -475,10 +472,10 @@ func ixHandshakeStage2(f *Interface, via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostInfo, packe
defer hh.Unlock()
hostinfo := hh.hostinfo
if !via.IsRelayed {
if addr.IsValid() {
// The vpnAddr we know about is the one we tried to handshake with, use it to apply the remote allow list.
if !f.lightHouse.GetRemoteAllowList().AllowAll(hostinfo.vpnAddrs, via.UdpAddr.Addr()) {
f.l.WithField("vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs).WithField("from", via).Debug("lighthouse.remote_allow_list denied incoming handshake")
if !f.lightHouse.GetRemoteAllowList().AllowAll(hostinfo.vpnAddrs, addr.Addr()) {
f.l.WithField("vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs).WithField("udpAddr", addr).Debug("lighthouse.remote_allow_list denied incoming handshake")
return false
}
}
@@ -486,7 +483,7 @@ func ixHandshakeStage2(f *Interface, via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostInfo, packe
ci := hostinfo.ConnectionState
msg, eKey, dKey, err := ci.H.ReadMessage(nil, packet[header.Len:])
if err != nil {
f.l.WithError(err).WithField("vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs).WithField("from", via).
f.l.WithError(err).WithField("vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
WithField("handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"}).WithField("header", h).
Error("Failed to call noise.ReadMessage")
@@ -495,7 +492,7 @@ func ixHandshakeStage2(f *Interface, via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostInfo, packe
// near future
return false
} else if dKey == nil || eKey == nil {
f.l.WithField("vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs).WithField("from", via).
f.l.WithField("vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
WithField("handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"}).
Error("Noise did not arrive at a key")
@@ -507,7 +504,7 @@ func ixHandshakeStage2(f *Interface, via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostInfo, packe
hs := &NebulaHandshake{}
err = hs.Unmarshal(msg)
if err != nil || hs.Details == nil {
f.l.WithError(err).WithField("vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs).WithField("from", via).
f.l.WithError(err).WithField("vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
WithField("handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"}).Error("Failed unmarshal handshake message")
// The handshake state machine is complete, if things break now there is no chance to recover. Tear down and start again
@@ -516,7 +513,7 @@ func ixHandshakeStage2(f *Interface, via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostInfo, packe
rc, err := cert.Recombine(cert.Version(hs.Details.CertVersion), hs.Details.Cert, ci.H.PeerStatic(), ci.Curve())
if err != nil {
f.l.WithError(err).WithField("from", via).
f.l.WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
WithField("vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs).
WithField("handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"}).
Info("Handshake did not contain a certificate")
@@ -530,7 +527,7 @@ func ixHandshakeStage2(f *Interface, via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostInfo, packe
fp = "<error generating certificate fingerprint>"
}
e := f.l.WithError(err).WithField("from", via).
e := f.l.WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
WithField("vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs).
WithField("handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"}).
WithField("certFingerprint", fp).
@@ -543,15 +540,9 @@ func ixHandshakeStage2(f *Interface, via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostInfo, packe
e.Info("Invalid certificate from host")
return true
}
if !bytes.Equal(remoteCert.Certificate.PublicKey(), ci.H.PeerStatic()) {
f.l.WithField("from", via).
WithField("handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"}).
WithField("cert", remoteCert).Info("public key mismatch between certificate and handshake")
return true
}
if len(remoteCert.Certificate.Networks()) == 0 {
f.l.WithError(err).WithField("from", via).
f.l.WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
WithField("vpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs).
WithField("cert", remoteCert).
WithField("handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"}).
@@ -574,8 +565,8 @@ func ixHandshakeStage2(f *Interface, via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostInfo, packe
ci.eKey = NewNebulaCipherState(eKey)
// Make sure the current udpAddr being used is set for responding
if !via.IsRelayed {
hostinfo.SetRemote(via.UdpAddr)
if addr.IsValid() {
hostinfo.SetRemote(addr)
} else {
hostinfo.relayState.InsertRelayTo(via.relayHI.vpnAddrs[0])
}
@@ -597,7 +588,7 @@ func ixHandshakeStage2(f *Interface, via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostInfo, packe
// Ensure the right host responded
if !correctHostResponded {
f.l.WithField("intendedVpnAddrs", hostinfo.vpnAddrs).WithField("haveVpnNetworks", vpnNetworks).
WithField("from", via).
WithField("udpAddr", addr).
WithField("certName", certName).
WithField("certVersion", certVersion).
WithField("handshake", m{"stage": 2, "style": "ix_psk0"}).
@@ -611,7 +602,7 @@ func ixHandshakeStage2(f *Interface, via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostInfo, packe
f.handshakeManager.StartHandshake(hostinfo.vpnAddrs[0], func(newHH *HandshakeHostInfo) {
// Block the current used address
newHH.hostinfo.remotes = hostinfo.remotes
newHH.hostinfo.remotes.BlockRemote(via)
newHH.hostinfo.remotes.BlockRemote(addr)
f.l.WithField("blockedUdpAddrs", newHH.hostinfo.remotes.CopyBlockedRemotes()).
WithField("vpnNetworks", vpnNetworks).
@@ -634,7 +625,7 @@ func ixHandshakeStage2(f *Interface, via ViaSender, hh *HandshakeHostInfo, packe
ci.window.Update(f.l, 2)
duration := time.Since(hh.startTime).Nanoseconds()
msgRxL := f.l.WithField("vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs).WithField("from", via).
msgRxL := f.l.WithField("vpnAddrs", vpnAddrs).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
WithField("certName", certName).
WithField("certVersion", certVersion).
WithField("fingerprint", fingerprint).
+7 -7
View File
@@ -136,11 +136,11 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) Run(ctx context.Context) {
}
}
func (hm *HandshakeManager) HandleIncoming(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H) {
func (hm *HandshakeManager) HandleIncoming(addr netip.AddrPort, via *ViaSender, packet []byte, h *header.H) {
// First remote allow list check before we know the vpnIp
if !via.IsRelayed {
if !hm.lightHouse.GetRemoteAllowList().AllowUnknownVpnAddr(via.UdpAddr.Addr()) {
hm.l.WithField("from", via).Debug("lighthouse.remote_allow_list denied incoming handshake")
if addr.IsValid() {
if !hm.lightHouse.GetRemoteAllowList().AllowUnknownVpnAddr(addr.Addr()) {
hm.l.WithField("udpAddr", addr).Debug("lighthouse.remote_allow_list denied incoming handshake")
return
}
}
@@ -149,11 +149,11 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) HandleIncoming(via ViaSender, packet []byte, h *head
case header.HandshakeIXPSK0:
switch h.MessageCounter {
case 1:
ixHandshakeStage1(hm.f, via, packet, h)
ixHandshakeStage1(hm.f, addr, via, packet, h)
case 2:
newHostinfo := hm.queryIndex(h.RemoteIndex)
tearDown := ixHandshakeStage2(hm.f, via, newHostinfo, packet, h)
tearDown := ixHandshakeStage2(hm.f, addr, via, newHostinfo, packet, h)
if tearDown && newHostinfo != nil {
hm.DeleteHostInfo(newHostinfo.hostinfo)
}
@@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ func (hm *HandshakeManager) allocateIndex(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) error {
hm.Lock()
defer hm.Unlock()
for range 32 {
for i := 0; i < 32; i++ {
index, err := generateIndex(hm.l)
if err != nil {
return err
+6 -37
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,7 @@
package nebula
import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/netip"
"slices"
@@ -224,9 +222,6 @@ const (
NetworkTypeVPNPeer
// NetworkTypeUnsafe is a network from Certificate.UnsafeNetworks()
NetworkTypeUnsafe
// NetworkTypeUnverifiedSNATPeer is used to indicate traffic we're willing to route, but never deliver to a NetworkTypeVPN
NetworkTypeUnverifiedSNATPeer
NetworkTypeInvalidPeer
)
type HostInfo struct {
@@ -280,35 +275,10 @@ type HostInfo struct {
lastUsed time.Time
}
func (i *HostInfo) HasOnlyV6Addresses() bool {
for _, vpnIp := range i.vpnAddrs {
if !vpnIp.Is6() {
return false
}
}
return true
}
type ViaSender struct {
UdpAddr netip.AddrPort
relayHI *HostInfo // relayHI is the host info object of the relay
remoteIdx uint32 // remoteIdx is the index included in the header of the received packet
relay *Relay // relay contains the rest of the relay information, including the PeerIP of the host trying to communicate with us.
IsRelayed bool // IsRelayed is true if the packet was sent through a relay
}
func (v ViaSender) String() string {
if v.IsRelayed {
return fmt.Sprintf("%s (relayed)", v.UdpAddr)
}
return v.UdpAddr.String()
}
func (v ViaSender) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
if v.IsRelayed {
return json.Marshal(m{"relay": v.UdpAddr})
}
return json.Marshal(m{"direct": v.UdpAddr})
}
type cachedPacket struct {
@@ -724,7 +694,6 @@ func (i *HostInfo) GetCert() *cert.CachedCertificate {
return nil
}
// TODO: Maybe use ViaSender here?
func (i *HostInfo) SetRemote(remote netip.AddrPort) {
// We copy here because we likely got this remote from a source that reuses the object
if i.remote != remote {
@@ -735,14 +704,14 @@ func (i *HostInfo) SetRemote(remote netip.AddrPort) {
// SetRemoteIfPreferred returns true if the remote was changed. The lastRoam
// time on the HostInfo will also be updated.
func (i *HostInfo) SetRemoteIfPreferred(hm *HostMap, via ViaSender) bool {
if via.IsRelayed {
func (i *HostInfo) SetRemoteIfPreferred(hm *HostMap, newRemote netip.AddrPort) bool {
if !newRemote.IsValid() {
// relays have nil udp Addrs
return false
}
currentRemote := i.remote
if !currentRemote.IsValid() {
i.SetRemote(via.UdpAddr)
i.SetRemote(newRemote)
return true
}
@@ -755,7 +724,7 @@ func (i *HostInfo) SetRemoteIfPreferred(hm *HostMap, via ViaSender) bool {
return false
}
if l.Contains(via.UdpAddr.Addr()) {
if l.Contains(newRemote.Addr()) {
newIsPreferred = true
}
}
@@ -765,7 +734,7 @@ func (i *HostInfo) SetRemoteIfPreferred(hm *HostMap, via ViaSender) bool {
i.lastRoam = time.Now()
i.lastRoamRemote = currentRemote
i.SetRemote(via.UdpAddr)
i.SetRemote(newRemote)
return true
}
+1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
//go:build e2e_testing
// +build e2e_testing
package nebula
+6 -23
View File
@@ -48,7 +48,9 @@ func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(packet []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet
return
}
hostinfo, ready := f.getHostinfo(packet, fwPacket)
hostinfo, ready := f.getOrHandshakeConsiderRouting(fwPacket, func(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) {
hh.cachePacket(f.l, header.Message, 0, packet, f.sendMessageNow, f.cachedPacketMetrics)
})
if hostinfo == nil {
f.rejectInside(packet, out, q)
@@ -64,9 +66,10 @@ func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(packet []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet
return
}
dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(*fwPacket, packet, false, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), localCache)
dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(*fwPacket, false, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), localCache)
if dropReason == nil {
f.sendNoMetrics(header.Message, 0, hostinfo.ConnectionState, hostinfo, netip.AddrPort{}, packet, nb, out, q)
} else {
f.rejectInside(packet, out, q)
if f.l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
@@ -78,26 +81,6 @@ func (f *Interface) consumeInsidePacket(packet []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet
}
}
func (f *Interface) getHostinfo(packet []byte, fwPacket *firewall.Packet) (*HostInfo, bool) {
if f.firewall.ShouldUnSNAT(fwPacket) {
//unsnat packet re-writing also happens here, would be nice to not,
//but we need to do the unsnat lookup to find the hostinfo so we can run the firewall checks
destVpnAddr := f.firewall.unSnat(packet, fwPacket)
if destVpnAddr.IsValid() {
//because this was a snatted packet, we know it has an on-overlay destination, so no routing should be required.
return f.getOrHandshakeNoRouting(destVpnAddr, func(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) {
hh.cachePacket(f.l, header.Message, 0, packet, f.sendMessageNow, f.cachedPacketMetrics)
})
} else {
return nil, false
}
} else { //if we didn't need to unsnat
return f.getOrHandshakeConsiderRouting(fwPacket, func(hh *HandshakeHostInfo) {
hh.cachePacket(f.l, header.Message, 0, packet, f.sendMessageNow, f.cachedPacketMetrics)
})
}
}
func (f *Interface) rejectInside(packet []byte, out []byte, q int) {
if !f.firewall.InSendReject {
return
@@ -235,7 +218,7 @@ func (f *Interface) sendMessageNow(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubTyp
}
// check if packet is in outbound fw rules
dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(*fp, p, false, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), nil)
dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(*fp, false, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), nil)
if dropReason != nil {
if f.l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
f.l.WithField("fwPacket", fp).
+1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
//go:build darwin || dragonfly || freebsd || netbsd || openbsd
// +build darwin dragonfly freebsd netbsd openbsd
package nebula
+1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
//go:build !darwin && !dragonfly && !freebsd && !netbsd && !openbsd
// +build !darwin,!dragonfly,!freebsd,!netbsd,!openbsd
package nebula
+20 -56
View File
@@ -77,8 +77,7 @@ type Interface struct {
reQueryEvery atomic.Uint32
reQueryWait atomic.Int64
sendRecvErrorConfig recvErrorConfig
acceptRecvErrorConfig recvErrorConfig
sendRecvErrorConfig sendRecvErrorConfig
// rebindCount is used to decide if an active tunnel should trigger a punch notification through a lighthouse
rebindCount int8
@@ -111,34 +110,34 @@ type EncWriter interface {
GetCertState() *CertState
}
type recvErrorConfig uint8
type sendRecvErrorConfig uint8
const (
recvErrorAlways recvErrorConfig = iota
recvErrorNever
recvErrorPrivate
sendRecvErrorAlways sendRecvErrorConfig = iota
sendRecvErrorNever
sendRecvErrorPrivate
)
func (s recvErrorConfig) ShouldRecvError(endpoint netip.AddrPort) bool {
func (s sendRecvErrorConfig) ShouldSendRecvError(endpoint netip.AddrPort) bool {
switch s {
case recvErrorPrivate:
case sendRecvErrorPrivate:
return endpoint.Addr().IsPrivate()
case recvErrorAlways:
case sendRecvErrorAlways:
return true
case recvErrorNever:
case sendRecvErrorNever:
return false
default:
panic(fmt.Errorf("invalid recvErrorConfig value: %d", s))
panic(fmt.Errorf("invalid sendRecvErrorConfig value: %d", s))
}
}
func (s recvErrorConfig) String() string {
func (s sendRecvErrorConfig) String() string {
switch s {
case recvErrorAlways:
case sendRecvErrorAlways:
return "always"
case recvErrorNever:
case sendRecvErrorNever:
return "never"
case recvErrorPrivate:
case sendRecvErrorPrivate:
return "private"
default:
return fmt.Sprintf("invalid(%d)", s)
@@ -248,7 +247,6 @@ func (f *Interface) activate() {
f.inside.Close()
f.l.Fatal(err)
}
f.firewall.SetSNATAddressFromInterface(f)
}
func (f *Interface) run() {
@@ -281,7 +279,7 @@ func (f *Interface) listenOut(i int) {
nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
li.ListenOut(func(fromUdpAddr netip.AddrPort, payload []byte) {
f.readOutsidePackets(ViaSender{UdpAddr: fromUdpAddr}, plaintext[:0], payload, h, fwPacket, lhh, nb, i, ctCache.Get(f.l))
f.readOutsidePackets(fromUdpAddr, nil, plaintext[:0], payload, h, fwPacket, lhh, nb, i, ctCache.Get(f.l))
})
}
@@ -314,7 +312,6 @@ func (f *Interface) listenIn(reader io.ReadWriteCloser, i int) {
func (f *Interface) RegisterConfigChangeCallbacks(c *config.C) {
c.RegisterReloadCallback(f.reloadFirewall)
c.RegisterReloadCallback(f.reloadSendRecvError)
c.RegisterReloadCallback(f.reloadAcceptRecvError)
c.RegisterReloadCallback(f.reloadDisconnectInvalid)
c.RegisterReloadCallback(f.reloadMisc)
@@ -345,7 +342,6 @@ func (f *Interface) reloadFirewall(c *config.C) {
f.l.WithError(err).Error("Error while creating firewall during reload")
return
}
fw.SetSNATAddressFromInterface(f)
oldFw := f.firewall
conntrack := oldFw.Conntrack
@@ -379,16 +375,16 @@ func (f *Interface) reloadSendRecvError(c *config.C) {
switch stringValue {
case "always":
f.sendRecvErrorConfig = recvErrorAlways
f.sendRecvErrorConfig = sendRecvErrorAlways
case "never":
f.sendRecvErrorConfig = recvErrorNever
f.sendRecvErrorConfig = sendRecvErrorNever
case "private":
f.sendRecvErrorConfig = recvErrorPrivate
f.sendRecvErrorConfig = sendRecvErrorPrivate
default:
if c.GetBool("listen.send_recv_error", true) {
f.sendRecvErrorConfig = recvErrorAlways
f.sendRecvErrorConfig = sendRecvErrorAlways
} else {
f.sendRecvErrorConfig = recvErrorNever
f.sendRecvErrorConfig = sendRecvErrorNever
}
}
@@ -397,30 +393,6 @@ func (f *Interface) reloadSendRecvError(c *config.C) {
}
}
func (f *Interface) reloadAcceptRecvError(c *config.C) {
if c.InitialLoad() || c.HasChanged("listen.accept_recv_error") {
stringValue := c.GetString("listen.accept_recv_error", "always")
switch stringValue {
case "always":
f.acceptRecvErrorConfig = recvErrorAlways
case "never":
f.acceptRecvErrorConfig = recvErrorNever
case "private":
f.acceptRecvErrorConfig = recvErrorPrivate
default:
if c.GetBool("listen.accept_recv_error", true) {
f.acceptRecvErrorConfig = recvErrorAlways
} else {
f.acceptRecvErrorConfig = recvErrorNever
}
}
f.l.WithField("acceptRecvError", f.acceptRecvErrorConfig.String()).
Info("Loaded accept_recv_error config")
}
}
func (f *Interface) reloadMisc(c *config.C) {
if c.HasChanged("counters.try_promote") {
n := c.GetUint32("counters.try_promote", defaultPromoteEvery)
@@ -492,14 +464,6 @@ func (f *Interface) Close() error {
f.l.WithError(err).Error("Error while closing udp socket")
}
}
for i, r := range f.readers {
if i == 0 {
continue // f.readers[0] is f.inside, which we want to save for last
}
if err := r.Close(); err != nil {
f.l.WithError(err).Error("Error while closing tun reader")
}
}
// Release the tun device
return f.inside.Close()
+10 -3
View File
@@ -713,14 +713,21 @@ func (lh *LightHouse) unlockedShouldAddV6(vpnAddr netip.Addr, to *V6AddrPort) bo
func (lh *LightHouse) IsLighthouseAddr(vpnAddr netip.Addr) bool {
l := lh.GetLighthouses()
return slices.Contains(l, vpnAddr)
for i := range l {
if l[i] == vpnAddr {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func (lh *LightHouse) IsAnyLighthouseAddr(vpnAddrs []netip.Addr) bool {
l := lh.GetLighthouses()
for i := range vpnAddrs {
if slices.Contains(l, vpnAddrs[i]) {
return true
for j := range l {
if l[j] == vpnAddrs[i] {
return true
}
}
}
return false
+9 -8
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
package nebula
import (
"context"
"encoding/binary"
"fmt"
"net/netip"
@@ -41,14 +42,14 @@ func Test_lhStaticMapping(t *testing.T) {
c := config.NewC(l)
c.Settings["lighthouse"] = map[string]any{"hosts": []any{lh1}}
c.Settings["static_host_map"] = map[string]any{lh1: []any{"1.1.1.1:4242"}}
_, err := NewLightHouseFromConfig(t.Context(), l, c, cs, nil, nil)
_, err := NewLightHouseFromConfig(context.Background(), l, c, cs, nil, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
lh2 := "10.128.0.3"
c = config.NewC(l)
c.Settings["lighthouse"] = map[string]any{"hosts": []any{lh1, lh2}}
c.Settings["static_host_map"] = map[string]any{lh1: []any{"100.1.1.1:4242"}}
_, err = NewLightHouseFromConfig(t.Context(), l, c, cs, nil, nil)
_, err = NewLightHouseFromConfig(context.Background(), l, c, cs, nil, nil)
require.EqualError(t, err, "lighthouse 10.128.0.3 does not have a static_host_map entry")
}
@@ -70,7 +71,7 @@ func TestReloadLighthouseInterval(t *testing.T) {
}
c.Settings["static_host_map"] = map[string]any{lh1: []any{"1.1.1.1:4242"}}
lh, err := NewLightHouseFromConfig(t.Context(), l, c, cs, nil, nil)
lh, err := NewLightHouseFromConfig(context.Background(), l, c, cs, nil, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
lh.ifce = &mockEncWriter{}
@@ -98,7 +99,7 @@ func BenchmarkLighthouseHandleRequest(b *testing.B) {
}
c := config.NewC(l)
lh, err := NewLightHouseFromConfig(b.Context(), l, c, cs, nil, nil)
lh, err := NewLightHouseFromConfig(context.Background(), l, c, cs, nil, nil)
require.NoError(b, err)
hAddr := netip.MustParseAddrPort("4.5.6.7:12345")
@@ -201,7 +202,7 @@ func TestLighthouse_Memory(t *testing.T) {
myVpnNetworks: []netip.Prefix{myVpnNet},
myVpnNetworksTable: nt,
}
lh, err := NewLightHouseFromConfig(t.Context(), l, c, cs, nil, nil)
lh, err := NewLightHouseFromConfig(context.Background(), l, c, cs, nil, nil)
lh.ifce = &mockEncWriter{}
require.NoError(t, err)
lhh := lh.NewRequestHandler()
@@ -287,7 +288,7 @@ func TestLighthouse_reload(t *testing.T) {
myVpnNetworksTable: nt,
}
lh, err := NewLightHouseFromConfig(t.Context(), l, c, cs, nil, nil)
lh, err := NewLightHouseFromConfig(context.Background(), l, c, cs, nil, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
nc := map[string]any{
@@ -522,7 +523,7 @@ func TestLighthouse_Dont_Delete_Static_Hosts(t *testing.T) {
myVpnNetworks: []netip.Prefix{myVpnNet},
myVpnNetworksTable: nt,
}
lh, err := NewLightHouseFromConfig(t.Context(), l, c, cs, nil, nil)
lh, err := NewLightHouseFromConfig(context.Background(), l, c, cs, nil, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
lh.ifce = &mockEncWriter{}
@@ -588,7 +589,7 @@ func TestLighthouse_DeletesWork(t *testing.T) {
myVpnNetworks: []netip.Prefix{myVpnNet},
myVpnNetworksTable: nt,
}
lh, err := NewLightHouseFromConfig(t.Context(), l, c, cs, nil, nil)
lh, err := NewLightHouseFromConfig(context.Background(), l, c, cs, nil, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
lh.ifce = &mockEncWriter{}
+6 -4
View File
@@ -105,7 +105,11 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, logger *logrus.Logg
// deprecated and undocumented
tunQueues := c.GetInt("tun.routines", 1)
udpQueues := c.GetInt("listen.routines", 1)
routines = max(tunQueues, udpQueues)
if tunQueues > udpQueues {
routines = tunQueues
} else {
routines = udpQueues
}
if routines != 1 {
l.WithField("routines", routines).Warn("Setting tun.routines and listen.routines is deprecated. Use `routines` instead")
}
@@ -131,8 +135,7 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, logger *logrus.Logg
deviceFactory = overlay.NewDeviceFromConfig
}
cs := pki.getCertState()
tun, err = deviceFactory(c, l, cs.myVpnNetworks, cs.GetDefaultCertificate().UnsafeNetworks(), routines)
tun, err = deviceFactory(c, l, pki.getCertState().myVpnNetworks, routines)
if err != nil {
return nil, util.ContextualizeIfNeeded("Failed to get a tun/tap device", err)
}
@@ -262,7 +265,6 @@ func Main(c *config.C, configTest bool, buildVersion string, logger *logrus.Logg
ifce.RegisterConfigChangeCallbacks(c)
ifce.reloadDisconnectInvalid(c)
ifce.reloadSendRecvError(c)
ifce.reloadAcceptRecvError(c)
handshakeManager.f = ifce
go handshakeManager.Run(ctx)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ const EncryptLockNeeded = true
// NewGCMTLS is no longer exposed in go1.19+, so we need to link it in
// See: https://github.com/golang/go/issues/56326
//
// NewGCMTLS is the internal method used with boringcrypto that provides a
// NewGCMTLS is the internal method used with boringcrypto that provices a
// validated mode of AES-GCM which enforces the nonce is strictly
// monotonically increasing. This is the TLS 1.2 specification for nonce
// generation (which also matches the method used by the Noise Protocol)
+1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
//go:build !boringcrypto
// +build !boringcrypto
package nebula
+55 -89
View File
@@ -19,21 +19,21 @@ const (
minFwPacketLen = 4
)
func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte, h *header.H, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, lhf *LightHouseHandler, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(ip netip.AddrPort, via *ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte, h *header.H, fwPacket *firewall.Packet, lhf *LightHouseHandler, nb []byte, q int, localCache firewall.ConntrackCache) {
err := h.Parse(packet)
if err != nil {
// Hole punch packets are 0 or 1 byte big, so lets ignore printing those errors
if len(packet) > 1 {
f.l.WithField("packet", packet).Infof("Error while parsing inbound packet from %s: %s", via, err)
f.l.WithField("packet", packet).Infof("Error while parsing inbound packet from %s: %s", ip, err)
}
return
}
//l.Error("in packet ", header, packet[HeaderLen:])
if !via.IsRelayed {
if f.myVpnNetworksTable.Contains(via.UdpAddr.Addr()) {
if ip.IsValid() {
if f.myVpnNetworksTable.Contains(ip.Addr()) {
if f.l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
f.l.WithField("from", via).Debug("Refusing to process double encrypted packet")
f.l.WithField("udpAddr", ip).Debug("Refusing to process double encrypted packet")
}
return
}
@@ -54,7 +54,8 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte,
switch h.Type {
case header.Message:
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, via, h) {
// TODO handleEncrypted sends directly to addr on error. Handle this in the tunneling case.
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, ip, h) {
return
}
@@ -78,7 +79,7 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte,
// Successfully validated the thing. Get rid of the Relay header.
signedPayload = signedPayload[header.Len:]
// Pull the Roaming parts up here, and return in all call paths.
f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, via)
f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, ip)
// Track usage of both the HostInfo and the Relay for the received & authenticated packet
f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo)
f.connectionManager.RelayUsed(h.RemoteIndex)
@@ -95,14 +96,7 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte,
case TerminalType:
// If I am the target of this relay, process the unwrapped packet
// From this recursive point, all these variables are 'burned'. We shouldn't rely on them again.
via = ViaSender{
UdpAddr: via.UdpAddr,
relayHI: hostinfo,
remoteIdx: relay.RemoteIndex,
relay: relay,
IsRelayed: true,
}
f.readOutsidePackets(via, out[:0], signedPayload, h, fwPacket, lhf, nb, q, localCache)
f.readOutsidePackets(netip.AddrPort{}, &ViaSender{relayHI: hostinfo, remoteIdx: relay.RemoteIndex, relay: relay}, out[:0], signedPayload, h, fwPacket, lhf, nb, q, localCache)
return
case ForwardingType:
// Find the target HostInfo relay object
@@ -132,32 +126,31 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte,
case header.LightHouse:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, via, h) {
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, ip, h) {
return
}
d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out, packet, h, nb)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithError(err).WithField("from", via).
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", ip).
WithField("packet", packet).
Error("Failed to decrypt lighthouse packet")
return
}
//TODO: assert via is not relayed
lhf.HandleRequest(via.UdpAddr, hostinfo.vpnAddrs, d, f)
lhf.HandleRequest(ip, hostinfo.vpnAddrs, d, f)
// Fallthrough to the bottom to record incoming traffic
case header.Test:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, via, h) {
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, ip, h) {
return
}
d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out, packet, h, nb)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithError(err).WithField("from", via).
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", ip).
WithField("packet", packet).
Error("Failed to decrypt test packet")
return
@@ -166,7 +159,7 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte,
if h.Subtype == header.TestRequest {
// This testRequest might be from TryPromoteBest, so we should roam
// to the new IP address before responding
f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, via)
f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, ip)
f.send(header.Test, header.TestReply, ci, hostinfo, d, nb, out)
}
@@ -177,34 +170,34 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte,
case header.Handshake:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
f.handshakeManager.HandleIncoming(via, packet, h)
f.handshakeManager.HandleIncoming(ip, via, packet, h)
return
case header.RecvError:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
f.handleRecvError(via.UdpAddr, h)
f.handleRecvError(ip, h)
return
case header.CloseTunnel:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, via, h) {
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, ip, h) {
return
}
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("from", via).
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("udpAddr", ip).
Info("Close tunnel received, tearing down.")
f.closeTunnel(hostinfo)
return
case header.Control:
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, via, h) {
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, ip, h) {
return
}
d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, h.MessageCounter, out, packet, h, nb)
if err != nil {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithError(err).WithField("from", via).
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", ip).
WithField("packet", packet).
Error("Failed to decrypt Control packet")
return
@@ -214,11 +207,11 @@ func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(via ViaSender, out []byte, packet []byte,
default:
f.messageMetrics.Rx(h.Type, h.Subtype, 1)
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debugf("Unexpected packet received from %s", via)
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debugf("Unexpected packet received from %s", ip)
return
}
f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, via)
f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, ip)
f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo)
}
@@ -237,36 +230,36 @@ func (f *Interface) sendCloseTunnel(h *HostInfo) {
f.send(header.CloseTunnel, 0, h.ConnectionState, h, []byte{}, make([]byte, 12, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
}
func (f *Interface) handleHostRoaming(hostinfo *HostInfo, via ViaSender) {
if !via.IsRelayed && hostinfo.remote != via.UdpAddr {
if !f.lightHouse.GetRemoteAllowList().AllowAll(hostinfo.vpnAddrs, via.UdpAddr.Addr()) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("newAddr", via.UdpAddr).Debug("lighthouse.remote_allow_list denied roaming")
func (f *Interface) handleHostRoaming(hostinfo *HostInfo, udpAddr netip.AddrPort) {
if udpAddr.IsValid() && hostinfo.remote != udpAddr {
if !f.lightHouse.GetRemoteAllowList().AllowAll(hostinfo.vpnAddrs, udpAddr.Addr()) {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("newAddr", udpAddr).Debug("lighthouse.remote_allow_list denied roaming")
return
}
if !hostinfo.lastRoam.IsZero() && via.UdpAddr == hostinfo.lastRoamRemote && time.Since(hostinfo.lastRoam) < RoamingSuppressSeconds*time.Second {
if !hostinfo.lastRoam.IsZero() && udpAddr == hostinfo.lastRoamRemote && time.Since(hostinfo.lastRoam) < RoamingSuppressSeconds*time.Second {
if f.l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("udpAddr", hostinfo.remote).WithField("newAddr", via.UdpAddr).
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("udpAddr", hostinfo.remote).WithField("newAddr", udpAddr).
Debugf("Suppressing roam back to previous remote for %d seconds", RoamingSuppressSeconds)
}
return
}
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("udpAddr", hostinfo.remote).WithField("newAddr", via.UdpAddr).
hostinfo.logger(f.l).WithField("udpAddr", hostinfo.remote).WithField("newAddr", udpAddr).
Info("Host roamed to new udp ip/port.")
hostinfo.lastRoam = time.Now()
hostinfo.lastRoamRemote = hostinfo.remote
hostinfo.SetRemote(via.UdpAddr)
hostinfo.SetRemote(udpAddr)
}
}
// handleEncrypted returns true if a packet should be processed, false otherwise
func (f *Interface) handleEncrypted(ci *ConnectionState, via ViaSender, h *header.H) bool {
func (f *Interface) handleEncrypted(ci *ConnectionState, addr netip.AddrPort, h *header.H) bool {
// If connectionstate does not exist, send a recv error, if possible, to encourage a fast reconnect
if ci == nil {
if !via.IsRelayed {
f.maybeSendRecvError(via.UdpAddr, h.RemoteIndex)
if addr.IsValid() {
f.maybeSendRecvError(addr, h.RemoteIndex)
}
return false
}
@@ -327,29 +320,13 @@ func parseV6(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.Packet) error {
proto := layers.IPProtocol(data[protoAt])
switch proto {
case layers.IPProtocolESP, layers.IPProtocolNoNextHeader:
case layers.IPProtocolICMPv6, layers.IPProtocolESP, layers.IPProtocolNoNextHeader:
fp.Protocol = uint8(proto)
fp.RemotePort = 0
fp.LocalPort = 0
fp.Fragment = false
return nil
case layers.IPProtocolICMPv6:
if dataLen < offset+6 {
return ErrIPv6PacketTooShort
}
fp.Protocol = uint8(proto)
fp.LocalPort = 0 //incoming vs outgoing doesn't matter for icmpv6
icmptype := data[offset+1]
switch icmptype {
case layers.ICMPv6TypeEchoRequest, layers.ICMPv6TypeEchoReply:
fp.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[offset+4 : offset+6]) //identifier
default:
fp.RemotePort = 0
}
fp.Fragment = false
return nil
case layers.IPProtocolTCP, layers.IPProtocolUDP:
if dataLen < offset+4 {
return ErrIPv6PacketTooShort
@@ -439,38 +416,34 @@ func parseV4(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *firewall.Packet) error {
// Accounting for a variable header length, do we have enough data for our src/dst tuples?
minLen := ihl
if !fp.Fragment {
if fp.Protocol == firewall.ProtoICMP {
minLen += minFwPacketLen + 2
} else {
minLen += minFwPacketLen
}
if !fp.Fragment && fp.Protocol != firewall.ProtoICMP {
minLen += minFwPacketLen
}
if len(data) < minLen {
return ErrIPv4InvalidHeaderLength
}
if incoming { // Firewall packets are locally oriented
// Firewall packets are locally oriented
if incoming {
fp.RemoteAddr, _ = netip.AddrFromSlice(data[12:16])
fp.LocalAddr, _ = netip.AddrFromSlice(data[16:20])
if fp.Fragment || fp.Protocol == firewall.ProtoICMP {
fp.RemotePort = 0
fp.LocalPort = 0
} else {
fp.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[ihl : ihl+2])
fp.LocalPort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[ihl+2 : ihl+4])
}
} else {
fp.LocalAddr, _ = netip.AddrFromSlice(data[12:16])
fp.RemoteAddr, _ = netip.AddrFromSlice(data[16:20])
}
if fp.Fragment {
fp.RemotePort = 0
fp.LocalPort = 0
} else if fp.Protocol == firewall.ProtoICMP { //note that orientation doesn't matter on ICMP
fp.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[ihl+4 : ihl+6]) //identifier
fp.LocalPort = 0 //code would be uint16(data[ihl+1])
} else if incoming {
fp.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[ihl : ihl+2]) //src port
fp.LocalPort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[ihl+2 : ihl+4]) //dst port
} else {
fp.LocalPort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[ihl : ihl+2]) //src port
fp.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[ihl+2 : ihl+4]) //dst port
if fp.Fragment || fp.Protocol == firewall.ProtoICMP {
fp.RemotePort = 0
fp.LocalPort = 0
} else {
fp.LocalPort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[ihl : ihl+2])
fp.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[ihl+2 : ihl+4])
}
}
return nil
@@ -514,7 +487,7 @@ func (f *Interface) decryptToTun(hostinfo *HostInfo, messageCounter uint64, out
return false
}
dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(*fwPacket, out, true, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), localCache)
dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(*fwPacket, true, hostinfo, f.pki.GetCAPool(), localCache)
if dropReason != nil {
// NOTE: We give `packet` as the `out` here since we already decrypted from it and we don't need it anymore
// This gives us a buffer to build the reject packet in
@@ -536,7 +509,7 @@ func (f *Interface) decryptToTun(hostinfo *HostInfo, messageCounter uint64, out
}
func (f *Interface) maybeSendRecvError(endpoint netip.AddrPort, index uint32) {
if f.sendRecvErrorConfig.ShouldRecvError(endpoint) {
if f.sendRecvErrorConfig.ShouldSendRecvError(endpoint) {
f.sendRecvError(endpoint, index)
}
}
@@ -554,13 +527,6 @@ func (f *Interface) sendRecvError(endpoint netip.AddrPort, index uint32) {
}
func (f *Interface) handleRecvError(addr netip.AddrPort, h *header.H) {
if !f.acceptRecvErrorConfig.ShouldRecvError(addr) {
f.l.WithField("index", h.RemoteIndex).
WithField("udpAddr", addr).
Debug("Recv error received, ignoring")
return
}
if f.l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
f.l.WithField("index", h.RemoteIndex).
WithField("udpAddr", addr).
+9 -16
View File
@@ -155,7 +155,6 @@ func Test_newPacket_v6(t *testing.T) {
// next layer, missing length byte
err = newPacket(buffer.Bytes()[:49], true, p)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrIPv6CouldNotFindPayload)
err = nil
// A good ICMP packet
ip = layers.IPv6{
@@ -166,26 +165,20 @@ func Test_newPacket_v6(t *testing.T) {
DstIP: net.IPv6linklocalallnodes,
}
icmp := layers.ICMPv6{
TypeCode: layers.ICMPv6TypeEchoRequest,
Checksum: 0x1234,
}
icmp := layers.ICMPv6{}
buffer.Clear()
require.NoError(t, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buffer, opt, &ip, &icmp))
require.Error(t, newPacket(buffer.Bytes(), true, p))
buffer.Clear()
echo := layers.ICMPv6Echo{
Identifier: 0xabcd,
SeqNumber: 1234,
err = gopacket.SerializeLayers(buffer, opt, &ip, &icmp)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
require.NoError(t, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buffer, opt, &ip, &icmp, &echo))
require.NoError(t, newPacket(buffer.Bytes(), true, p))
err = newPacket(buffer.Bytes(), true, p)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, uint8(layers.IPProtocolICMPv6), p.Protocol)
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("ff02::2"), p.RemoteAddr)
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("ff02::1"), p.LocalAddr)
assert.Equal(t, uint16(0xabcd), p.RemotePort)
assert.Equal(t, uint16(0), p.RemotePort)
assert.Equal(t, uint16(0), p.LocalPort)
assert.False(t, p.Fragment)
@@ -581,7 +574,7 @@ func BenchmarkParseV6(b *testing.B) {
}
evilBytes := buffer.Bytes()
for range 200 {
for i := 0; i < 200; i++ {
evilBytes = append(evilBytes, hopHeader...)
}
evilBytes = append(evilBytes, lastHopHeader...)
-3
View File
@@ -11,9 +11,6 @@ type Device interface {
io.ReadWriteCloser
Activate() error
Networks() []netip.Prefix
UnsafeNetworks() []netip.Prefix
UnsafeIPv4OriginAddress() netip.Prefix
SNATAddress() netip.Prefix
Name() string
RoutesFor(netip.Addr) routing.Gateways
SupportsMultiqueue() bool
+5 -98
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,7 @@
package overlay
import (
"crypto/rand"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"net/netip"
@@ -14,32 +12,23 @@ import (
const DefaultMTU = 1300
type NameError struct {
Name string
Underlying error
}
func (e *NameError) Error() string {
return fmt.Sprintf("could not set tun device name: %s because %s", e.Name, e.Underlying)
}
// TODO: We may be able to remove routines
type DeviceFactory func(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix, routines int) (Device, error)
type DeviceFactory func(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, routines int) (Device, error)
func NewDeviceFromConfig(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix, routines int) (Device, error) {
func NewDeviceFromConfig(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, routines int) (Device, error) {
switch {
case c.GetBool("tun.disabled", false):
tun := newDisabledTun(vpnNetworks, c.GetInt("tun.tx_queue", 500), c.GetBool("stats.message_metrics", false), l)
return tun, nil
default:
return newTun(c, l, vpnNetworks, unsafeNetworks, routines > 1)
return newTun(c, l, vpnNetworks, routines > 1)
}
}
func NewFdDeviceFromConfig(fd *int) DeviceFactory {
return func(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix, routines int) (Device, error) {
return newTunFromFd(c, l, *fd, vpnNetworks, unsafeNetworks)
return func(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, routines int) (Device, error) {
return newTunFromFd(c, l, *fd, vpnNetworks)
}
}
@@ -131,85 +120,3 @@ func selectGateway(dest netip.Prefix, gateways []netip.Prefix) (netip.Prefix, er
return netip.Prefix{}, fmt.Errorf("no gateway found for %v in the list of vpn networks", dest)
}
// genLinkLocal generates a random IPv4 link-local address.
// If randomizer is nil, it uses rand.Reader to find two random bytes
func genLinkLocal(randomizer io.Reader) netip.Prefix {
if randomizer == nil {
randomizer = rand.Reader
}
octets := []byte{169, 254, 0, 0}
_, _ = randomizer.Read(octets[2:4])
return coerceLinkLocal(octets)
}
func coerceLinkLocal(octets []byte) netip.Prefix {
if octets[3] == 0 {
octets[3] = 1 //please no .0 addresses
} else if octets[2] == 255 && octets[3] == 255 {
octets[3] = 254 //please no broadcast addresses
}
out, _ := netip.AddrFromSlice(octets)
return netip.PrefixFrom(out, 32)
}
// prepareUnsafeOriginAddr provides the IPv4 address used on IPv6-only clients that need to access IPv4 unsafe routes
func prepareUnsafeOriginAddr(d Device, l *logrus.Logger, c *config.C, routes []Route) netip.Prefix {
if !d.Networks()[0].Addr().Is6() {
return netip.Prefix{} //if we have an IPv4 assignment within the overlay, we don't need an unsafe origin address
}
needed := false
for _, route := range routes { //or if we have a route defined into an IPv4 range
if route.Cidr.Addr().Is4() {
needed = true //todo should this only apply to unsafe routes? almost certainly
break
}
}
if !needed {
return netip.Prefix{}
}
//todo better config name for sure
if a := c.GetString("tun.unsafe_origin_address_for_4over6", ""); a != "" {
out, err := netip.ParseAddr(a)
if err != nil {
l.WithField("value", a).WithError(err).Warn("failed to parse tun.unsafe_origin_address_for_4over6, will use a random value")
} else if !out.Is4() || !out.IsLinkLocalUnicast() {
l.WithField("value", out).Warn("tun.unsafe_origin_address_for_4over6 must be an IPv4 address")
} else if out.IsValid() {
return netip.PrefixFrom(out, 32)
}
}
return genLinkLocal(nil)
}
// prepareSnatAddr provides the address that an IPv6-only unsafe router should use to SNAT traffic before handing it to the operating system
func prepareSnatAddr(d Device, l *logrus.Logger, c *config.C) netip.Prefix {
if !d.Networks()[0].Addr().Is6() {
return netip.Prefix{} //if we have an IPv4 assignment within the overlay, we don't need a snat address
}
needed := false
for _, un := range d.UnsafeNetworks() { //if we are an unsafe router for an IPv4 range
if un.Addr().Is4() {
needed = true
break
}
}
if !needed {
return netip.Prefix{}
}
if a := c.GetString("tun.snat_address_for_4over6", ""); a != "" {
out, err := netip.ParseAddr(a)
if err != nil {
l.WithField("value", a).WithError(err).Warn("failed to parse tun.snat_address_for_4over6, will use a random value")
} else if !out.Is4() || !out.IsLinkLocalUnicast() {
l.WithField("value", out).Warn("tun.snat_address_for_4over6 must be an IPv4 address")
} else if out.IsValid() {
return netip.PrefixFrom(out, 32)
}
}
return genLinkLocal(nil)
}
+7 -24
View File
@@ -19,16 +19,14 @@ import (
type tun struct {
io.ReadWriteCloser
fd int
vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix
unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix
unsafeIPv4Origin netip.Prefix
Routes atomic.Pointer[[]Route]
routeTree atomic.Pointer[bart.Table[routing.Gateways]]
l *logrus.Logger
fd int
vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix
Routes atomic.Pointer[[]Route]
routeTree atomic.Pointer[bart.Table[routing.Gateways]]
l *logrus.Logger
}
func newTunFromFd(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, deviceFd int, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix) (*tun, error) {
func newTunFromFd(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, deviceFd int, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix) (*tun, error) {
// XXX Android returns an fd in non-blocking mode which is necessary for shutdown to work properly.
// Be sure not to call file.Fd() as it will set the fd to blocking mode.
file := os.NewFile(uintptr(deviceFd), "/dev/net/tun")
@@ -37,7 +35,6 @@ func newTunFromFd(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, deviceFd int, vpnNetworks []net
ReadWriteCloser: file,
fd: deviceFd,
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
unsafeNetworks: unsafeNetworks,
l: l,
}
@@ -56,7 +53,7 @@ func newTunFromFd(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, deviceFd int, vpnNetworks []net
return t, nil
}
func newTun(_ *config.C, _ *logrus.Logger, _ []netip.Prefix, _ []netip.Prefix, _ bool) (*tun, error) {
func newTun(_ *config.C, _ *logrus.Logger, _ []netip.Prefix, _ bool) (*tun, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("newTun not supported in Android")
}
@@ -79,8 +76,6 @@ func (t *tun) reload(c *config.C, initial bool) error {
return nil
}
t.unsafeIPv4Origin = prepareUnsafeOriginAddr(t, t.l, c, routes)
routeTree, err := makeRouteTree(t.l, routes, false)
if err != nil {
return err
@@ -96,18 +91,6 @@ func (t *tun) Networks() []netip.Prefix {
return t.vpnNetworks
}
func (t *tun) UnsafeNetworks() []netip.Prefix {
return t.unsafeNetworks
}
func (t *tun) UnsafeIPv4OriginAddress() netip.Prefix {
return t.unsafeIPv4Origin
}
func (t *tun) SNATAddress() netip.Prefix {
return netip.Prefix{}
}
func (t *tun) Name() string {
return "android"
}
+9 -33
View File
@@ -24,15 +24,13 @@ import (
type tun struct {
io.ReadWriteCloser
Device string
vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix
unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix
unsafeIPv4Origin netip.Prefix
DefaultMTU int
Routes atomic.Pointer[[]Route]
routeTree atomic.Pointer[bart.Table[routing.Gateways]]
linkAddr *netroute.LinkAddr
l *logrus.Logger
Device string
vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix
DefaultMTU int
Routes atomic.Pointer[[]Route]
routeTree atomic.Pointer[bart.Table[routing.Gateways]]
linkAddr *netroute.LinkAddr
l *logrus.Logger
// cache out buffer since we need to prepend 4 bytes for tun metadata
out []byte
@@ -81,7 +79,7 @@ type ifreqAlias6 struct {
Lifetime addrLifetime
}
func newTun(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix, _ bool) (*tun, error) {
func newTun(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, _ bool) (*tun, error) {
name := c.GetString("tun.dev", "")
ifIndex := -1
if name != "" && name != "utun" {
@@ -129,7 +127,6 @@ func newTun(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, unsafeNet
ReadWriteCloser: os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), ""),
Device: name,
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
unsafeNetworks: unsafeNetworks,
DefaultMTU: c.GetInt("tun.mtu", DefaultMTU),
l: l,
}
@@ -156,7 +153,7 @@ func (t *tun) deviceBytes() (o [16]byte) {
return
}
func newTunFromFd(_ *config.C, _ *logrus.Logger, _ int, _ []netip.Prefix, _ []netip.Prefix) (*tun, error) {
func newTunFromFd(_ *config.C, _ *logrus.Logger, _ int, _ []netip.Prefix) (*tun, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("newTunFromFd not supported in Darwin")
}
@@ -216,11 +213,6 @@ func (t *tun) Activate() error {
}
}
}
if t.unsafeIPv4Origin.IsValid() && t.unsafeIPv4Origin.Addr().Is4() {
if err = t.activate4(t.unsafeIPv4Origin); err != nil {
return err
}
}
// Run the interface
ifrf.Flags = ifrf.Flags | unix.IFF_UP | unix.IFF_RUNNING
@@ -322,10 +314,6 @@ func (t *tun) reload(c *config.C, initial bool) error {
return nil
}
if initial {
t.unsafeIPv4Origin = prepareUnsafeOriginAddr(t, t.l, c, routes)
}
routeTree, err := makeRouteTree(t.l, routes, false)
if err != nil {
return err
@@ -557,18 +545,6 @@ func (t *tun) Networks() []netip.Prefix {
return t.vpnNetworks
}
func (t *tun) UnsafeNetworks() []netip.Prefix {
return t.unsafeNetworks
}
func (t *tun) UnsafeIPv4OriginAddress() netip.Prefix {
return t.unsafeIPv4Origin
}
func (t *tun) SNATAddress() netip.Prefix {
return netip.Prefix{}
}
func (t *tun) Name() string {
return t.Device
}
-11
View File
@@ -52,17 +52,6 @@ func (t *disabledTun) Networks() []netip.Prefix {
return t.vpnNetworks
}
func (*disabledTun) UnsafeNetworks() []netip.Prefix {
return nil
}
func (*disabledTun) SNATAddress() netip.Prefix {
return netip.Prefix{}
}
func (*disabledTun) UnsafeIPv4OriginAddress() netip.Prefix {
return netip.Prefix{}
}
func (*disabledTun) Name() string {
return "disabled"
}
+16 -35
View File
@@ -86,16 +86,14 @@ type ifreqAlias6 struct {
}
type tun struct {
Device string
vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix
unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix
unsafeIPv4Origin netip.Prefix
MTU int
Routes atomic.Pointer[[]Route]
routeTree atomic.Pointer[bart.Table[routing.Gateways]]
linkAddr *netroute.LinkAddr
l *logrus.Logger
devFd int
Device string
vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix
MTU int
Routes atomic.Pointer[[]Route]
routeTree atomic.Pointer[bart.Table[routing.Gateways]]
linkAddr *netroute.LinkAddr
l *logrus.Logger
devFd int
}
func (t *tun) Read(to []byte) (int, error) {
@@ -201,11 +199,11 @@ func (t *tun) Close() error {
return nil
}
func newTunFromFd(_ *config.C, _ *logrus.Logger, _ int, _ []netip.Prefix, _ []netip.Prefix) (*tun, error) {
func newTunFromFd(_ *config.C, _ *logrus.Logger, _ int, _ []netip.Prefix) (*tun, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("newTunFromFd not supported in FreeBSD")
}
func newTun(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix, _ bool) (*tun, error) {
func newTun(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, _ bool) (*tun, error) {
// Try to open existing tun device
var fd int
var err error
@@ -268,16 +266,15 @@ func newTun(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, unsafeNet
}
// Set the device name
_ = ioctl(fd, syscall.SIOCSIFNAME, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&ifrr)))
ioctl(fd, syscall.SIOCSIFNAME, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&ifrr)))
}
t := &tun{
Device: deviceName,
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
unsafeNetworks: unsafeNetworks,
MTU: c.GetInt("tun.mtu", DefaultMTU),
l: l,
devFd: fd,
Device: deviceName,
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
MTU: c.GetInt("tun.mtu", DefaultMTU),
l: l,
devFd: fd,
}
err = t.reload(c, true)
@@ -413,10 +410,6 @@ func (t *tun) reload(c *config.C, initial bool) error {
return nil
}
if initial {
t.unsafeIPv4Origin = prepareUnsafeOriginAddr(t, t.l, c, routes)
}
routeTree, err := makeRouteTree(t.l, routes, false)
if err != nil {
return err
@@ -453,18 +446,6 @@ func (t *tun) Networks() []netip.Prefix {
return t.vpnNetworks
}
func (t *tun) UnsafeNetworks() []netip.Prefix {
return t.unsafeNetworks
}
func (t *tun) UnsafeIPv4OriginAddress() netip.Prefix {
return t.unsafeIPv4Origin
}
func (t *tun) SNATAddress() netip.Prefix {
return netip.Prefix{}
}
func (t *tun) Name() string {
return t.Device
}
+6 -23
View File
@@ -22,23 +22,20 @@ import (
type tun struct {
io.ReadWriteCloser
vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix
unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix
unsafeIPv4Origin netip.Prefix
Routes atomic.Pointer[[]Route]
routeTree atomic.Pointer[bart.Table[routing.Gateways]]
l *logrus.Logger
vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix
Routes atomic.Pointer[[]Route]
routeTree atomic.Pointer[bart.Table[routing.Gateways]]
l *logrus.Logger
}
func newTun(_ *config.C, _ *logrus.Logger, _ []netip.Prefix, _ []netip.Prefix, _ bool) (*tun, error) {
func newTun(_ *config.C, _ *logrus.Logger, _ []netip.Prefix, _ bool) (*tun, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("newTun not supported in iOS")
}
func newTunFromFd(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, deviceFd int, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix) (*tun, error) {
func newTunFromFd(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, deviceFd int, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix) (*tun, error) {
file := os.NewFile(uintptr(deviceFd), "/dev/tun")
t := &tun{
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
unsafeNetworks: unsafeNetworks,
ReadWriteCloser: &tunReadCloser{f: file},
l: l,
}
@@ -72,8 +69,6 @@ func (t *tun) reload(c *config.C, initial bool) error {
return nil
}
t.unsafeIPv4Origin = prepareUnsafeOriginAddr(t, t.l, c, routes)
routeTree, err := makeRouteTree(t.l, routes, false)
if err != nil {
return err
@@ -152,18 +147,6 @@ func (t *tun) Networks() []netip.Prefix {
return t.vpnNetworks
}
func (t *tun) UnsafeNetworks() []netip.Prefix {
return t.unsafeNetworks
}
func (t *tun) UnsafeIPv4OriginAddress() netip.Prefix {
return t.unsafeIPv4Origin
}
func (t *tun) SNATAddress() netip.Prefix {
return netip.Prefix{}
}
func (t *tun) Name() string {
return "iOS"
}
+16 -102
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ import (
"net/netip"
"os"
"strings"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"unsafe"
@@ -26,15 +25,14 @@ import (
type tun struct {
io.ReadWriteCloser
fd int
Device string
vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix
unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix
MaxMTU int
DefaultMTU int
TXQueueLen int
deviceIndex int
ioctlFd uintptr
fd int
Device string
vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix
MaxMTU int
DefaultMTU int
TXQueueLen int
deviceIndex int
ioctlFd uintptr
Routes atomic.Pointer[[]Route]
routeTree atomic.Pointer[bart.Table[routing.Gateways]]
@@ -42,14 +40,6 @@ type tun struct {
useSystemRoutes bool
useSystemRoutesBufferSize int
// These are routes learned from `tun.use_system_route_table`
// stored here to make it easier to restore them after a reload
routesFromSystem map[netip.Prefix]routing.Gateways
routesFromSystemLock sync.Mutex
snatAddr netip.Prefix
unsafeIPv4Origin netip.Prefix
l *logrus.Logger
}
@@ -57,18 +47,6 @@ func (t *tun) Networks() []netip.Prefix {
return t.vpnNetworks
}
func (t *tun) UnsafeNetworks() []netip.Prefix {
return t.unsafeNetworks
}
func (t *tun) UnsafeIPv4OriginAddress() netip.Prefix {
return t.unsafeIPv4Origin
}
func (t *tun) SNATAddress() netip.Prefix {
return t.snatAddr
}
type ifReq struct {
Name [16]byte
Flags uint16
@@ -87,10 +65,10 @@ type ifreqQLEN struct {
pad [8]byte
}
func newTunFromFd(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, deviceFd int, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix) (*tun, error) {
func newTunFromFd(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, deviceFd int, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix) (*tun, error) {
file := os.NewFile(uintptr(deviceFd), "/dev/net/tun")
t, err := newTunGeneric(c, l, file, vpnNetworks, unsafeNetworks)
t, err := newTunGeneric(c, l, file, vpnNetworks)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -100,7 +78,7 @@ func newTunFromFd(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, deviceFd int, vpnNetworks []net
return t, nil
}
func newTun(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix, multiqueue bool) (*tun, error) {
func newTun(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, multiqueue bool) (*tun, error) {
fd, err := unix.Open("/dev/net/tun", os.O_RDWR, 0)
if err != nil {
// If /dev/net/tun doesn't exist, try to create it (will happen in docker)
@@ -128,18 +106,14 @@ func newTun(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, unsafeNet
if multiqueue {
req.Flags |= unix.IFF_MULTI_QUEUE
}
nameStr := c.GetString("tun.dev", "")
copy(req.Name[:], nameStr)
copy(req.Name[:], c.GetString("tun.dev", ""))
if err = ioctl(uintptr(fd), uintptr(unix.TUNSETIFF), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&req))); err != nil {
return nil, &NameError{
Name: nameStr,
Underlying: err,
}
return nil, err
}
name := strings.Trim(string(req.Name[:]), "\x00")
file := os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), "/dev/net/tun")
t, err := newTunGeneric(c, l, file, vpnNetworks, unsafeNetworks)
t, err := newTunGeneric(c, l, file, vpnNetworks)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -149,16 +123,14 @@ func newTun(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, unsafeNet
return t, nil
}
func newTunGeneric(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, file *os.File, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix) (*tun, error) {
func newTunGeneric(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, file *os.File, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix) (*tun, error) {
t := &tun{
ReadWriteCloser: file,
fd: int(file.Fd()),
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
unsafeNetworks: unsafeNetworks,
TXQueueLen: c.GetInt("tun.tx_queue", 500),
useSystemRoutes: c.GetBool("tun.use_system_route_table", false),
useSystemRoutesBufferSize: c.GetInt("tun.use_system_route_table_buffer_size", 0),
routesFromSystem: map[netip.Prefix]routing.Gateways{},
l: l,
}
@@ -187,23 +159,11 @@ func (t *tun) reload(c *config.C, initial bool) error {
return nil
}
if initial {
t.unsafeIPv4Origin = prepareUnsafeOriginAddr(t, t.l, c, routes) //todo MUST be different from t.snatAddr!
t.snatAddr = prepareSnatAddr(t, t.l, c)
}
routeTree, err := makeRouteTree(t.l, routes, true)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Bring along any routes learned from the system route table on reload
t.routesFromSystemLock.Lock()
for dst, gw := range t.routesFromSystem {
routeTree.Insert(dst, gw)
}
t.routesFromSystemLock.Unlock()
oldDefaultMTU := t.DefaultMTU
oldMaxMTU := t.MaxMTU
newDefaultMTU := c.GetInt("tun.mtu", DefaultMTU)
@@ -335,17 +295,6 @@ func (t *tun) addIPs(link netlink.Link) error {
}
}
if t.unsafeIPv4Origin.IsValid() {
newAddrs = append(newAddrs, &netlink.Addr{
IPNet: &net.IPNet{
IP: t.unsafeIPv4Origin.Addr().AsSlice(),
Mask: net.CIDRMask(t.unsafeIPv4Origin.Bits(), t.unsafeIPv4Origin.Addr().BitLen()),
},
Label: t.unsafeIPv4Origin.Addr().Zone(),
})
t.l.WithField("address", t.unsafeIPv4Origin).Info("Adding origin address for IPv4 unsafe_routes")
}
//add all new addresses
for i := range newAddrs {
//AddrReplace still adds new IPs, but if their properties change it will change them as well
@@ -433,13 +382,7 @@ func (t *tun) Activate() error {
//set route MTU
for i := range t.vpnNetworks {
if err = t.setDefaultRoute(t.vpnNetworks[i]); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to set default route MTU for %s: %w", t.vpnNetworks[i], err)
}
}
if t.unsafeIPv4Origin.IsValid() {
if err = t.setDefaultRoute(t.unsafeIPv4Origin); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to set default route MTU for %s: %w", t.unsafeIPv4Origin, err)
return fmt.Errorf("failed to set default route MTU: %w", err)
}
}
@@ -466,23 +409,6 @@ func (t *tun) setMTU() {
}
}
func (t *tun) setSnatRoute() error {
dr := &net.IPNet{
IP: t.snatAddr.Masked().Addr().AsSlice(),
Mask: net.CIDRMask(t.snatAddr.Bits(), t.snatAddr.Addr().BitLen()),
}
nr := netlink.Route{
LinkIndex: t.deviceIndex,
Dst: dr,
Scope: unix.RT_SCOPE_LINK,
//Protocol: unix.RTPROT_KERNEL,
Table: unix.RT_TABLE_MAIN,
Type: unix.RTN_UNICAST,
}
return netlink.RouteReplace(&nr)
}
func (t *tun) setDefaultRoute(cidr netip.Prefix) error {
dr := &net.IPNet{
IP: cidr.Masked().Addr().AsSlice(),
@@ -559,13 +485,6 @@ func (t *tun) addRoutes(logErrors bool) error {
}
}
if t.snatAddr.IsValid() {
//at least for Linux, we need to set a return route for the SNATted traffic in order to satisfy the reverse-path filter,
//and to help the kernel deliver our reply traffic to the tun device.
//however, it is important that we do not actually /assign/ the SNAT address,
//since link-local addresses will not be routed between interfaces without significant trickery.
return t.setSnatRoute()
}
return nil
}
@@ -754,18 +673,14 @@ func (t *tun) updateRoutes(r netlink.RouteUpdate) {
newTree := t.routeTree.Load().Clone()
t.routesFromSystemLock.Lock()
if r.Type == unix.RTM_NEWROUTE {
t.l.WithField("destination", dst).WithField("via", gateways).Info("Adding route")
t.routesFromSystem[dst] = gateways
newTree.Insert(dst, gateways)
} else {
t.l.WithField("destination", dst).WithField("via", gateways).Info("Removing route")
delete(t.routesFromSystem, dst)
newTree.Delete(dst)
}
t.routesFromSystemLock.Unlock()
t.routeTree.Store(newTree)
}
@@ -780,7 +695,6 @@ func (t *tun) Close() error {
if t.ioctlFd > 0 {
_ = os.NewFile(t.ioctlFd, "ioctlFd").Close()
t.ioctlFd = 0
}
return nil
+10 -28
View File
@@ -58,25 +58,23 @@ type addrLifetime struct {
}
type tun struct {
Device string
vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix
unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix
unsafeIPv4Origin netip.Prefix
MTU int
Routes atomic.Pointer[[]Route]
routeTree atomic.Pointer[bart.Table[routing.Gateways]]
l *logrus.Logger
f *os.File
fd int
Device string
vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix
MTU int
Routes atomic.Pointer[[]Route]
routeTree atomic.Pointer[bart.Table[routing.Gateways]]
l *logrus.Logger
f *os.File
fd int
}
var deviceNameRE = regexp.MustCompile(`^tun[0-9]+$`)
func newTunFromFd(_ *config.C, _ *logrus.Logger, _ int, _ []netip.Prefix, _ []netip.Prefix) (*tun, error) {
func newTunFromFd(_ *config.C, _ *logrus.Logger, _ int, _ []netip.Prefix) (*tun, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("newTunFromFd not supported in NetBSD")
}
func newTun(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix, _ bool) (*tun, error) {
func newTun(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, _ bool) (*tun, error) {
// Try to open tun device
var err error
deviceName := c.GetString("tun.dev", "")
@@ -352,10 +350,6 @@ func (t *tun) reload(c *config.C, initial bool) error {
return nil
}
if initial {
t.unsafeIPv4Origin = prepareUnsafeOriginAddr(t, t.l, c, routes)
}
routeTree, err := makeRouteTree(t.l, routes, false)
if err != nil {
return err
@@ -392,18 +386,6 @@ func (t *tun) Networks() []netip.Prefix {
return t.vpnNetworks
}
func (t *tun) UnsafeNetworks() []netip.Prefix {
return t.unsafeNetworks
}
func (t *tun) UnsafeIPv4OriginAddress() netip.Prefix {
return t.unsafeIPv4Origin
}
func (t *tun) SNATAddress() netip.Prefix {
return netip.Prefix{}
}
func (t *tun) Name() string {
return t.Device
}
+16 -35
View File
@@ -49,27 +49,25 @@ type ifreq struct {
}
type tun struct {
Device string
vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix
unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix
unsafeIPv4Origin netip.Prefix
MTU int
Routes atomic.Pointer[[]Route]
routeTree atomic.Pointer[bart.Table[routing.Gateways]]
l *logrus.Logger
f *os.File
fd int
Device string
vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix
MTU int
Routes atomic.Pointer[[]Route]
routeTree atomic.Pointer[bart.Table[routing.Gateways]]
l *logrus.Logger
f *os.File
fd int
// cache out buffer since we need to prepend 4 bytes for tun metadata
out []byte
}
var deviceNameRE = regexp.MustCompile(`^tun[0-9]+$`)
func newTunFromFd(_ *config.C, _ *logrus.Logger, _ int, _ []netip.Prefix, _ []netip.Prefix) (*tun, error) {
func newTunFromFd(_ *config.C, _ *logrus.Logger, _ int, _ []netip.Prefix) (*tun, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("newTunFromFd not supported in openbsd")
}
func newTun(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix, _ bool) (*tun, error) {
func newTun(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, _ bool) (*tun, error) {
// Try to open tun device
var err error
deviceName := c.GetString("tun.dev", "")
@@ -91,13 +89,12 @@ func newTun(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, unsafeNet
}
t := &tun{
f: os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), ""),
fd: fd,
Device: deviceName,
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
unsafeNetworks: unsafeNetworks,
MTU: c.GetInt("tun.mtu", DefaultMTU),
l: l,
f: os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), ""),
fd: fd,
Device: deviceName,
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
MTU: c.GetInt("tun.mtu", DefaultMTU),
l: l,
}
err = t.reload(c, true)
@@ -273,10 +270,6 @@ func (t *tun) reload(c *config.C, initial bool) error {
return nil
}
if initial {
t.unsafeIPv4Origin = prepareUnsafeOriginAddr(t, t.l, c, routes)
}
routeTree, err := makeRouteTree(t.l, routes, false)
if err != nil {
return err
@@ -313,18 +306,6 @@ func (t *tun) Networks() []netip.Prefix {
return t.vpnNetworks
}
func (t *tun) UnsafeNetworks() []netip.Prefix {
return t.unsafeNetworks
}
func (t *tun) UnsafeIPv4OriginAddress() netip.Prefix {
return t.unsafeIPv4Origin
}
func (t *tun) SNATAddress() netip.Prefix {
return netip.Prefix{}
}
func (t *tun) Name() string {
return t.Device
}
-179
View File
@@ -1,179 +0,0 @@
package overlay
import (
"io"
"net/netip"
"testing"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// mockDevice is a minimal Device implementation for testing prepareUnsafeOriginAddr.
type mockDevice struct {
networks []netip.Prefix
unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix
snatAddr netip.Prefix
unsafeSnatAddr netip.Prefix
}
func (d *mockDevice) Read([]byte) (int, error) { return 0, nil }
func (d *mockDevice) Write([]byte) (int, error) { return 0, nil }
func (d *mockDevice) Close() error { return nil }
func (d *mockDevice) Activate() error { return nil }
func (d *mockDevice) Networks() []netip.Prefix { return d.networks }
func (d *mockDevice) UnsafeNetworks() []netip.Prefix { return d.unsafeNetworks }
func (d *mockDevice) SNATAddress() netip.Prefix { return d.snatAddr }
func (d *mockDevice) UnsafeIPv4OriginAddress() netip.Prefix { return d.unsafeSnatAddr }
func (d *mockDevice) Name() string { return "mock" }
func (d *mockDevice) RoutesFor(netip.Addr) routing.Gateways { return routing.Gateways{} }
func (d *mockDevice) SupportsMultiqueue() bool { return false }
func (d *mockDevice) NewMultiQueueReader() (io.ReadWriteCloser, error) { return nil, nil }
func TestPrepareSnatAddr_V4Primary_NoSnat(t *testing.T) {
l := logrus.New()
l.SetLevel(logrus.PanicLevel)
c := config.NewC(l)
// If the device has an IPv4 primary address, no SNAT needed
d := &mockDevice{
networks: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.1/24")},
}
result := prepareUnsafeOriginAddr(d, l, c, nil)
assert.Equal(t, netip.Prefix{}, result, "should not assign SNAT addr when device has IPv4 primary")
}
func TestPrepareSnatAddr_V6Primary_NoUnsafeOrRoutes(t *testing.T) {
l := logrus.New()
l.SetLevel(logrus.PanicLevel)
c := config.NewC(l)
// IPv6 primary but no unsafe networks or IPv4 routes
d := &mockDevice{
networks: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("fd00::1/128")},
}
result := prepareUnsafeOriginAddr(d, l, c, nil)
assert.Equal(t, netip.Prefix{}, result, "should not assign SNAT addr without IPv4 unsafe networks or routes")
}
func TestPrepareSnatAddr_V6Primary_WithV4Unsafe(t *testing.T) {
l := logrus.New()
l.SetLevel(logrus.PanicLevel)
c := config.NewC(l)
// IPv6 primary with IPv4 unsafe network -> should get SNAT addr
d := &mockDevice{
networks: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("fd00::1/128")},
unsafeNetworks: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.0.0/16")},
}
result := prepareSnatAddr(d, l, c)
require.True(t, result.IsValid(), "should assign SNAT addr")
assert.True(t, result.Addr().Is4(), "SNAT addr should be IPv4")
assert.True(t, result.Addr().IsLinkLocalUnicast(), "SNAT addr should be link-local")
assert.Equal(t, 32, result.Bits(), "SNAT addr should be /32")
result = prepareUnsafeOriginAddr(d, l, c, nil)
require.False(t, result.IsValid(), "no routes = no origin addr needed")
}
func TestPrepareUnsafeOriginAddr_V6Primary_WithV4Route(t *testing.T) {
l := logrus.New()
l.SetLevel(logrus.PanicLevel)
c := config.NewC(l)
// IPv6 primary with IPv4 route -> should get SNAT addr
d := &mockDevice{
networks: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("fd00::1/128")},
}
routes := []Route{
{Cidr: netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8")},
}
result := prepareUnsafeOriginAddr(d, l, c, routes)
require.True(t, result.IsValid(), "should assign SNAT addr when IPv4 route exists")
assert.True(t, result.Addr().Is4())
assert.True(t, result.Addr().IsLinkLocalUnicast())
result = prepareSnatAddr(d, l, c)
require.False(t, result.IsValid(), "no UnsafeNetworks = no snat addr needed")
}
func TestPrepareSnatAddr_V6Primary_V6UnsafeOnly(t *testing.T) {
l := logrus.New()
l.SetLevel(logrus.PanicLevel)
c := config.NewC(l)
// IPv6 primary with only IPv6 unsafe network -> no SNAT needed
d := &mockDevice{
networks: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("fd00::1/128")},
unsafeNetworks: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("fd01::/64")},
}
result := prepareUnsafeOriginAddr(d, l, c, nil)
assert.Equal(t, netip.Prefix{}, result, "should not assign SNAT addr for IPv6-only unsafe networks")
}
func TestPrepareSnatAddr_ManualAddress(t *testing.T) {
l := logrus.New()
l.SetLevel(logrus.PanicLevel)
c := config.NewC(l)
c.Settings["tun"] = map[string]any{
"snat_address_for_4over6": "169.254.42.42",
}
d := &mockDevice{
networks: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("fd00::1/128")},
unsafeNetworks: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.0.0/16")},
}
result := prepareSnatAddr(d, l, c)
require.True(t, result.IsValid())
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("169.254.42.42"), result.Addr())
assert.Equal(t, 32, result.Bits())
}
func TestPrepareSnatAddr_InvalidManualAddress_Fallback(t *testing.T) {
l := logrus.New()
l.SetLevel(logrus.PanicLevel)
c := config.NewC(l)
c.Settings["tun"] = map[string]any{
"snat_address_for_4over6": "not-an-ip",
}
d := &mockDevice{
networks: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("fd00::1/128")},
unsafeNetworks: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.0.0/16")},
}
result := prepareSnatAddr(d, l, c)
// Should fall back to auto-assignment
require.True(t, result.IsValid(), "should fall back to auto-assigned address")
assert.True(t, result.Addr().Is4())
assert.True(t, result.Addr().IsLinkLocalUnicast())
}
func TestPrepareSnatAddr_AutoGenerated_Range(t *testing.T) {
l := logrus.New()
l.SetLevel(logrus.PanicLevel)
c := config.NewC(l)
d := &mockDevice{
networks: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("fd00::1/128")},
unsafeNetworks: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.0.0/16")},
}
// Generate several addresses and verify they're all in the expected range
for i := 0; i < 100; i++ {
result := prepareSnatAddr(d, l, c)
require.True(t, result.IsValid())
addr := result.Addr()
octets := addr.As4()
assert.Equal(t, byte(169), octets[0], "first octet should be 169")
assert.Equal(t, byte(254), octets[1], "second octet should be 254")
// Should not have .0 in the last octet
assert.NotEqual(t, byte(0), octets[3], "last octet should not be 0")
// Should not be 169.254.255.255 (broadcast)
if octets[2] == 255 {
assert.NotEqual(t, byte(255), octets[3], "should not be broadcast address")
}
}
}
-37
View File
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
package overlay
import (
"bytes"
"net/netip"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
)
func TestLinkLocal(t *testing.T) {
r := bytes.NewReader([]byte{42, 99})
result := genLinkLocal(r)
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParsePrefix("169.254.42.99/32"), result, "genLinkLocal with a deterministic randomizer")
result = genLinkLocal(nil)
assert.True(t, result.IsValid(), "genLinkLocal with nil randomizer should be valid")
assert.True(t, result.Addr().IsLinkLocalUnicast(), "genLinkLocal with nil randomizer should be link-local")
result = coerceLinkLocal([]byte{169, 254, 100, 50})
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParsePrefix("169.254.100.50/32"), result, "coerceLinkLocal should pass through normal values")
result = coerceLinkLocal([]byte{169, 254, 0, 0})
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParsePrefix("169.254.0.1/32"), result, "coerceLinkLocal should bump .0 last octet to .1")
result = coerceLinkLocal([]byte{169, 254, 255, 255})
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParsePrefix("169.254.255.254/32"), result, "coerceLinkLocal should bump broadcast 255.255 to 255.254")
result = coerceLinkLocal([]byte{169, 254, 0, 1})
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParsePrefix("169.254.0.1/32"), result, "coerceLinkLocal should leave .1 last octet unchanged")
result = coerceLinkLocal([]byte{169, 254, 255, 254})
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParsePrefix("169.254.255.254/32"), result, "coerceLinkLocal should leave 255.254 unchanged")
result = coerceLinkLocal([]byte{169, 254, 255, 100})
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParsePrefix("169.254.255.100/32"), result, "coerceLinkLocal should leave 255.100 unchanged")
}
+16 -35
View File
@@ -17,21 +17,18 @@ import (
)
type TestTun struct {
Device string
vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix
unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix
snatAddr netip.Prefix
unsafeIPv4Origin netip.Prefix
Routes []Route
routeTree *bart.Table[routing.Gateways]
l *logrus.Logger
Device string
vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix
Routes []Route
routeTree *bart.Table[routing.Gateways]
l *logrus.Logger
closed atomic.Bool
rxPackets chan []byte // Packets to receive into nebula
TxPackets chan []byte // Packets transmitted outside by nebula
}
func newTun(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix, _ bool) (*TestTun, error) {
func newTun(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, _ bool) (*TestTun, error) {
_, routes, err := getAllRoutesFromConfig(c, vpnNetworks, true)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -41,22 +38,18 @@ func newTun(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, unsafeNet
return nil, err
}
tt := &TestTun{
Device: c.GetString("tun.dev", ""),
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
unsafeNetworks: unsafeNetworks,
Routes: routes,
routeTree: routeTree,
l: l,
rxPackets: make(chan []byte, 10),
TxPackets: make(chan []byte, 10),
}
tt.unsafeIPv4Origin = prepareUnsafeOriginAddr(tt, l, c, routes)
tt.snatAddr = prepareSnatAddr(tt, tt.l, c)
return tt, nil
return &TestTun{
Device: c.GetString("tun.dev", ""),
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
Routes: routes,
routeTree: routeTree,
l: l,
rxPackets: make(chan []byte, 10),
TxPackets: make(chan []byte, 10),
}, nil
}
func newTunFromFd(_ *config.C, _ *logrus.Logger, _ int, _ []netip.Prefix, _ []netip.Prefix) (*TestTun, error) {
func newTunFromFd(_ *config.C, _ *logrus.Logger, _ int, _ []netip.Prefix) (*TestTun, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("newTunFromFd not supported")
}
@@ -146,15 +139,3 @@ func (t *TestTun) SupportsMultiqueue() bool {
func (t *TestTun) NewMultiQueueReader() (io.ReadWriteCloser, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("TODO: multiqueue not implemented")
}
func (t *TestTun) UnsafeNetworks() []netip.Prefix {
return t.unsafeNetworks
}
func (t *TestTun) UnsafeIPv4OriginAddress() netip.Prefix {
return t.unsafeIPv4Origin
}
func (t *TestTun) SNATAddress() netip.Prefix {
return t.snatAddr
}
+14 -41
View File
@@ -28,23 +28,21 @@ import (
const tunGUIDLabel = "Fixed Nebula Windows GUID v1"
type winTun struct {
Device string
vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix
unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix
unsafeIPv4Origin netip.Prefix
MTU int
Routes atomic.Pointer[[]Route]
routeTree atomic.Pointer[bart.Table[routing.Gateways]]
l *logrus.Logger
Device string
vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix
MTU int
Routes atomic.Pointer[[]Route]
routeTree atomic.Pointer[bart.Table[routing.Gateways]]
l *logrus.Logger
tun *wintun.NativeTun
}
func newTunFromFd(_ *config.C, _ *logrus.Logger, _ int, _ []netip.Prefix, _ []netip.Prefix) (Device, error) {
func newTunFromFd(_ *config.C, _ *logrus.Logger, _ int, _ []netip.Prefix) (Device, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("newTunFromFd not supported in Windows")
}
func newTun(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix, _ bool) (*winTun, error) {
func newTun(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, _ bool) (*winTun, error) {
err := checkWinTunExists()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("can not load the wintun driver: %w", err)
@@ -57,11 +55,10 @@ func newTun(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, unsafeNet
}
t := &winTun{
Device: deviceName,
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
unsafeNetworks: unsafeNetworks,
MTU: c.GetInt("tun.mtu", DefaultMTU),
l: l,
Device: deviceName,
vpnNetworks: vpnNetworks,
MTU: c.GetInt("tun.mtu", DefaultMTU),
l: l,
}
err = t.reload(c, true)
@@ -77,10 +74,7 @@ func newTun(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, unsafeNet
l.WithError(err).Debug("Failed to create wintun device, retrying")
tunDevice, err = wintun.CreateTUNWithRequestedGUID(deviceName, guid, t.MTU)
if err != nil {
return nil, &NameError{
Name: deviceName,
Underlying: fmt.Errorf("create TUN device failed: %w", err),
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("create TUN device failed: %w", err)
}
}
t.tun = tunDevice.(*wintun.NativeTun)
@@ -105,10 +99,6 @@ func (t *winTun) reload(c *config.C, initial bool) error {
return nil
}
if initial {
t.unsafeIPv4Origin = prepareUnsafeOriginAddr(t, t.l, c, routes)
}
routeTree, err := makeRouteTree(t.l, routes, false)
if err != nil {
return err
@@ -139,12 +129,7 @@ func (t *winTun) reload(c *config.C, initial bool) error {
func (t *winTun) Activate() error {
luid := winipcfg.LUID(t.tun.LUID())
prefixes := t.vpnNetworks
if t.unsafeIPv4Origin.IsValid() {
prefixes = append(prefixes, t.unsafeIPv4Origin)
}
err := luid.SetIPAddresses(prefixes)
err := luid.SetIPAddresses(t.vpnNetworks)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to set address: %w", err)
}
@@ -237,18 +222,6 @@ func (t *winTun) Networks() []netip.Prefix {
return t.vpnNetworks
}
func (t *winTun) UnsafeNetworks() []netip.Prefix {
return t.unsafeNetworks
}
func (t *winTun) UnsafeIPv4OriginAddress() netip.Prefix {
return t.unsafeIPv4Origin
}
func (t *winTun) SNATAddress() netip.Prefix {
return netip.Prefix{}
}
func (t *winTun) Name() string {
return t.Device
}
+1 -12
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import (
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/routing"
)
func NewUserDeviceFromConfig(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, unsafeNetworks []netip.Prefix, routines int) (Device, error) {
func NewUserDeviceFromConfig(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger, vpnNetworks []netip.Prefix, routines int) (Device, error) {
return NewUserDevice(vpnNetworks)
}
@@ -36,17 +36,6 @@ type UserDevice struct {
inboundWriter *io.PipeWriter
}
func (d *UserDevice) UnsafeNetworks() []netip.Prefix {
return nil
}
func (d *UserDevice) SNATAddress() netip.Prefix {
return netip.Prefix{}
}
func (d *UserDevice) UnsafeIPv4OriginAddress() netip.Prefix {
return netip.Prefix{}
}
func (d *UserDevice) Activate() error {
return nil
}
+5 -42
View File
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ func (p *PKI) reload(c *config.C, initial bool) error {
}
func (p *PKI) reloadCerts(c *config.C, initial bool) *util.ContextualError {
newState, err := newCertStateFromConfig(c, p.l)
newState, err := newCertStateFromConfig(c)
if err != nil {
return util.NewContextualError("Could not load client cert", nil, err)
}
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ func (p *PKI) reloadCerts(c *config.C, initial bool) *util.ContextualError {
if currentState.v1Cert == nil {
//adding certs is fine, actually. Networks-in-common confirmed in newCertState().
} else {
// did IP in cert change? if so, don't set. If we ever allow this, need to set p.firewallReloadNeeded
// did IP in cert change? if so, don't set
if !slices.Equal(currentState.v1Cert.Networks(), newState.v1Cert.Networks()) {
return util.NewContextualError(
"Networks in new cert was different from old",
@@ -158,14 +158,6 @@ func (p *PKI) reloadCerts(c *config.C, initial bool) *util.ContextualError {
}
}
newUN := newState.GetDefaultCertificate().UnsafeNetworks()
oldUN := currentState.GetDefaultCertificate().UnsafeNetworks()
if !slices.Equal(newUN, oldUN) {
//todo I don't love this, because other clients will see the new assignments and act on them, but we will not be able to.
//I think we need to wire this into the firewall reload.
p.l.WithFields(m{"previous": oldUN, "new": newUN}).Warning("UnsafeNetworks assignments differ. A restart is required in order for this to take effect.")
}
// Cipher cant be hot swapped so just leave it at what it was before
newState.cipher = currentState.cipher
@@ -268,7 +260,7 @@ func (cs *CertState) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
return json.Marshal(msg)
}
func newCertStateFromConfig(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger) (*CertState, error) {
func newCertStateFromConfig(c *config.C) (*CertState, error) {
var err error
privPathOrPEM := c.GetString("pki.key", "")
@@ -352,33 +344,10 @@ func newCertStateFromConfig(c *config.C, l *logrus.Logger) (*CertState, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unknown pki.initiating_version: %v", rawInitiatingVersion)
}
return newCertState(l, initiatingVersion, v1, v2, isPkcs11, curve, rawKey)
return newCertState(initiatingVersion, v1, v2, isPkcs11, curve, rawKey)
}
func compareUnsafeNetworksAcrossCertVersions(v1, v2 cert.Certificate) error {
if v1 == nil || v2 == nil {
return nil //can't be a problem if we don't have one of the kinds of cert
}
v4UnsafeNets := 0
for _, n := range v2.UnsafeNetworks() {
if n.Addr().Is6() {
continue // V1 certs can't have IPv6 unsafe networks
} else {
v4UnsafeNets++
}
if !slices.Contains(v1.UnsafeNetworks(), n) {
return errors.New("UnsafeNetworks mismatch")
}
}
if len(v1.UnsafeNetworks()) != v4UnsafeNets {
return errors.New("UnsafeNetworks mismatch")
}
return nil
}
func newCertState(l *logrus.Logger, dv cert.Version, v1, v2 cert.Certificate, pkcs11backed bool, privateKeyCurve cert.Curve, privateKey []byte) (*CertState, error) {
func newCertState(dv cert.Version, v1, v2 cert.Certificate, pkcs11backed bool, privateKeyCurve cert.Curve, privateKey []byte) (*CertState, error) {
cs := CertState{
privateKey: privateKey,
pkcs11Backed: pkcs11backed,
@@ -401,12 +370,6 @@ func newCertState(l *logrus.Logger, dv cert.Version, v1, v2 cert.Certificate, pk
}
cs.initiatingVersion = dv
warn := compareUnsafeNetworksAcrossCertVersions(v1, v2)
if warn != nil {
l.WithFields(m{"UnsafeNetworksV1": v1.UnsafeNetworks(), "UnsafeNetworksV2": v2.UnsafeNetworks()}).
Warning("the IPv4 UnsafeNetworks assigned in the V1 certificate do not match the ones in V2")
}
}
if v1 != nil {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ func (rm *relayManager) setAmRelay(v bool) {
func AddRelay(l *logrus.Logger, relayHostInfo *HostInfo, hm *HostMap, vpnIp netip.Addr, remoteIdx *uint32, relayType int, state int) (uint32, error) {
hm.Lock()
defer hm.Unlock()
for range 32 {
for i := 0; i < 32; i++ {
index, err := generateIndex(l)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
+11 -6
View File
@@ -338,21 +338,21 @@ func (r *RemoteList) CopyCache() *CacheMap {
}
// BlockRemote locks and records the address as bad, it will be excluded from the deduplicated address list
func (r *RemoteList) BlockRemote(bad ViaSender) {
if bad.IsRelayed {
func (r *RemoteList) BlockRemote(bad netip.AddrPort) {
if !bad.IsValid() {
// relays can have nil udp Addrs
return
}
r.Lock()
defer r.Unlock()
// Check if we already blocked this addr
if r.unlockedIsBad(bad.UdpAddr) {
if r.unlockedIsBad(bad) {
return
}
// We copy here because we are taking something else's memory and we can't trust everything
r.badRemotes = append(r.badRemotes, bad.UdpAddr)
r.badRemotes = append(r.badRemotes, bad)
// Mark the next interaction must recollect/dedupe
r.shouldRebuild = true
@@ -404,7 +404,12 @@ func (r *RemoteList) Rebuild(preferredRanges []netip.Prefix) {
// unlockedIsBad assumes you have the write lock and checks if the remote matches any entry in the blocked address list
func (r *RemoteList) unlockedIsBad(remote netip.AddrPort) bool {
return slices.Contains(r.badRemotes, remote)
for _, v := range r.badRemotes {
if v == remote {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// unlockedSetLearnedV4 assumes you have the write lock and sets the current learned address for this owner and marks the
+1 -1
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import (
)
const (
// Sentinel value
// Sentinal value
BucketNotCalculated = -1
)
-91
View File
@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
package nebula
import (
"encoding/binary"
"net/netip"
)
func recalcIPv4Checksum(data []byte, oldSrcIP netip.Addr, newSrcIP netip.Addr) {
oldChecksum := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[10:12])
//because of how checksums work, we can re-use this function
checksum := calcNewTransportChecksum(oldChecksum, oldSrcIP, 0, newSrcIP, 0)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(data[10:12], checksum)
}
func calcNewTransportChecksum(oldChecksum uint16, oldSrcIP netip.Addr, oldSrcPort uint16, newSrcIP netip.Addr, newSrcPort uint16) uint16 {
oldIP := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(oldSrcIP.AsSlice())
newIP := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(newSrcIP.AsSlice())
// Start with inverted checksum
checksum := uint32(^oldChecksum)
// Subtract old IP (as two 16-bit words)
checksum += uint32(^uint16(oldIP >> 16))
checksum += uint32(^uint16(oldIP & 0xFFFF))
// Subtract old port
checksum += uint32(^oldSrcPort)
// Add new IP (as two 16-bit words)
checksum += uint32(newIP >> 16)
checksum += uint32(newIP & 0xFFFF)
// Add new port
checksum += uint32(newSrcPort)
// Fold carries
for checksum > 0xFFFF {
checksum = (checksum & 0xFFFF) + (checksum >> 16)
}
// Return ones' complement
return ^uint16(checksum)
}
func recalcV4TransportChecksum(offsetInsideHeader int, data []byte, oldSrcIP netip.AddrPort, newSrcIP netip.AddrPort) {
ipHeaderOffset := int(data[0]&0x0F) * 4
offset := ipHeaderOffset + offsetInsideHeader
oldcsum := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[offset : offset+2])
checksum := calcNewTransportChecksum(oldcsum, oldSrcIP.Addr(), oldSrcIP.Port(), newSrcIP.Addr(), newSrcIP.Port())
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(data[offset:offset+2], checksum)
}
func recalcUDPv4Checksum(data []byte, oldSrcIP netip.AddrPort, newSrcIP netip.AddrPort) {
const offsetInsideHeader = 6
recalcV4TransportChecksum(offsetInsideHeader, data, oldSrcIP, newSrcIP)
}
func recalcTCPv4Checksum(data []byte, oldSrcIP netip.AddrPort, newSrcIP netip.AddrPort) {
const offsetInsideHeader = 16
recalcV4TransportChecksum(offsetInsideHeader, data, oldSrcIP, newSrcIP)
}
func calcNewICMPChecksum(oldChecksum uint16, oldCode uint16, newCode uint16, oldID uint16, newID uint16) uint16 {
// Start with inverted checksum
checksum := uint32(^oldChecksum)
// Subtract old stuff
checksum += uint32(^oldCode)
checksum += uint32(^oldID)
// Add new stuff
checksum += uint32(newCode)
checksum += uint32(newID)
// Fold carries
for checksum > 0xFFFF {
checksum = (checksum & 0xFFFF) + (checksum >> 16)
}
// Return ones' complement
return ^uint16(checksum)
}
func recalcICMPv4Checksum(data []byte, oldCode uint16, newCode uint16, oldID uint16, newID uint16) {
const offsetInsideHeader = 2
ipHeaderOffset := int(data[0]&0x0F) * 4
offset := ipHeaderOffset + offsetInsideHeader
oldChecksum := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[offset : offset+2])
checksum := calcNewICMPChecksum(oldChecksum, oldCode, newCode, oldID, newID)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(data[offset:offset+2], checksum)
}
-1310
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+3 -2
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
"errors"
"flag"
"fmt"
"maps"
"net"
"net/netip"
"os"
@@ -832,7 +831,9 @@ func sshPrintRelays(ifce *Interface, fs any, a []string, w sshd.StringWriter) er
relays := map[uint32]*HostInfo{}
ifce.hostMap.Lock()
maps.Copy(relays, ifce.hostMap.Relays)
for k, v := range ifce.hostMap.Relays {
relays[k] = v
}
ifce.hostMap.Unlock()
type RelayFor struct {
-12
View File
@@ -10,18 +10,6 @@ import (
type NoopTun struct{}
func (NoopTun) UnsafeNetworks() []netip.Prefix {
return nil
}
func (NoopTun) SNATAddress() netip.Prefix {
return netip.Prefix{}
}
func (NoopTun) UnsafeIPv4OriginAddress() netip.Prefix {
return netip.Prefix{}
}
func (NoopTun) RoutesFor(addr netip.Addr) routing.Gateways {
return routing.Gateways{}
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ func TestTimerWheel_Purge(t *testing.T) {
assert.True(t, tw.lastTick.After(lastTick))
// Make sure we get all 4 packets back
for i := range 4 {
for i := 0; i < 4; i++ {
p, has := tw.Purge()
assert.True(t, has)
assert.Equal(t, fps[i], p)
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ func TestTimerWheel_Purge(t *testing.T) {
// Make sure we cached the free'd items
assert.Equal(t, 4, tw.itemsCached)
ci := tw.itemCache
for range 4 {
for i := 0; i < 4; i++ {
assert.NotNil(t, ci)
ci = ci.Next
}
+2 -14
View File
@@ -10,11 +10,9 @@ package udp
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/netip"
"time"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
@@ -76,22 +74,12 @@ type rawMessage struct {
func (u *GenericConn) ListenOut(r EncReader) {
buffer := make([]byte, MTU)
var lastRecvErr time.Time
for {
// Just read one packet at a time
n, rua, err := u.ReadFromUDPAddrPort(buffer)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, net.ErrClosed) {
u.l.WithError(err).Debug("udp socket is closed, exiting read loop")
return
}
// Dampen unexpected message warns to once per minute
if lastRecvErr.IsZero() || time.Since(lastRecvErr) > time.Minute {
lastRecvErr = time.Now()
u.l.WithError(err).Warn("unexpected udp socket receive error")
}
continue
u.l.WithError(err).Debug("udp socket is closed, exiting read loop")
return
}
r(netip.AddrPortFrom(rua.Addr().Unmap(), rua.Port()), buffer[:n])
+10 -23
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ import (
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"syscall"
"time"
"unsafe"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
@@ -67,7 +66,7 @@ func NewRIOListener(l *logrus.Logger, addr netip.Addr, port int) (*RIOConn, erro
u := &RIOConn{l: l}
err := u.bind(l, &windows.SockaddrInet6{Addr: addr.As16(), Port: port})
err := u.bind(&windows.SockaddrInet6{Addr: addr.As16(), Port: port})
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("bind: %w", err)
}
@@ -83,11 +82,11 @@ func NewRIOListener(l *logrus.Logger, addr netip.Addr, port int) (*RIOConn, erro
return u, nil
}
func (u *RIOConn) bind(l *logrus.Logger, sa windows.Sockaddr) error {
func (u *RIOConn) bind(sa windows.Sockaddr) error {
var err error
u.sock, err = winrio.Socket(windows.AF_INET6, windows.SOCK_DGRAM, windows.IPPROTO_UDP)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("winrio.Socket error: %w", err)
return err
}
// Enable v4 for this socket
@@ -101,40 +100,35 @@ func (u *RIOConn) bind(l *logrus.Logger, sa windows.Sockaddr) error {
size := uint32(unsafe.Sizeof(flag))
err = syscall.WSAIoctl(syscall.Handle(u.sock), syscall.SIO_UDP_CONNRESET, (*byte)(unsafe.Pointer(&flag)), size, nil, 0, &ret, nil, 0)
if err != nil {
// This is a best-effort to prevent errors from being returned by the udp recv operation.
// Quietly log a failure and continue.
l.WithError(err).Debug("failed to set UDP_CONNRESET ioctl")
return err
}
ret = 0
flag = 0
size = uint32(unsafe.Sizeof(flag))
SIO_UDP_NETRESET := uint32(syscall.IOC_IN | syscall.IOC_VENDOR | 15)
err = syscall.WSAIoctl(syscall.Handle(u.sock), SIO_UDP_NETRESET, (*byte)(unsafe.Pointer(&flag)), size, nil, 0, &ret, nil, 0)
if err != nil {
// This is a best-effort to prevent errors from being returned by the udp recv operation.
// Quietly log a failure and continue.
l.WithError(err).Debug("failed to set UDP_NETRESET ioctl")
return err
}
err = u.rx.Open()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error rx.Open(): %w", err)
return err
}
err = u.tx.Open()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error tx.Open(): %w", err)
return err
}
u.rq, err = winrio.CreateRequestQueue(u.sock, packetsPerRing, 1, packetsPerRing, 1, u.rx.cq, u.tx.cq, 0)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error CreateRequestQueue: %w", err)
return err
}
err = windows.Bind(u.sock, sa)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error windows.Bind(): %w", err)
return err
}
return nil
@@ -143,22 +137,15 @@ func (u *RIOConn) bind(l *logrus.Logger, sa windows.Sockaddr) error {
func (u *RIOConn) ListenOut(r EncReader) {
buffer := make([]byte, MTU)
var lastRecvErr time.Time
for {
// Just read one packet at a time
n, rua, err := u.receive(buffer)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, net.ErrClosed) {
u.l.WithError(err).Debug("udp socket is closed, exiting read loop")
return
}
// Dampen unexpected message warns to once per minute
if lastRecvErr.IsZero() || time.Since(lastRecvErr) > time.Minute {
lastRecvErr = time.Now()
u.l.WithError(err).Warn("unexpected udp socket receive error")
}
u.l.WithError(err).Error("unexpected udp socket receive error")
continue
}