mirror of
https://github.com/slackhq/nebula.git
synced 2026-08-15 08:56:59 +02:00
1170 lines
36 KiB
Go
1170 lines
36 KiB
Go
package nebula
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"hash/fnv"
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"log/slog"
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"net"
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"net/netip"
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"slices"
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"sync"
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"sync/atomic"
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"time"
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"github.com/gaissmai/bart"
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"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
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"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
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"github.com/slackhq/nebula/config"
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"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
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"github.com/slackhq/nebula/logging"
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)
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const defaultPromoteEvery = 1000 // Count of packets sent before we try moving a tunnel to a preferred underlay ip address
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const defaultReQueryEvery = 5000 // Count of packets sent before re-querying a hostinfo to the lighthouse
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const defaultReQueryWait = time.Minute // Minimum amount of seconds to wait before re-querying a hostinfo the lighthouse. Evaluated every ReQueryEvery
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const MaxRemotes = 10
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// MaxHostInfosPerVpnIp is the max number of hostinfos we will track for a given vpn ip
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// 5 allows for an initial handshake and each host pair re-handshaking twice
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const MaxHostInfosPerVpnIp = 5
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// How long we should prevent roaming back to the previous IP.
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// This helps prevent flapping due to packets already in flight
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const RoamingSuppressSeconds = 2
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const (
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Requested = iota
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PeerRequested
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Established
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Disestablished
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)
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const (
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Unknowntype = iota
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ForwardingType
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TerminalType
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)
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type Relay struct {
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Type int
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State int
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LocalIndex uint32
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RemoteIndex uint32
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PeerAddr netip.Addr
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}
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type HostMap struct {
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sync.RWMutex //Because we concurrently read and write to our maps
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Indexes map[uint32]*HostInfo
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Relays map[uint32]*HostInfo // Maps a Relay IDX to a Relay HostInfo object
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RemoteIndexes map[uint32]*HostInfo
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// Hosts maps a vpn address to its primary hostinfo, one entry per address we hold a tunnel
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// for. moreHosts only has an entry while an address is held by 2 or more hostinfos and stores
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// the full most-recent-first list; moreHosts[a][0] is always the same hostinfo as Hosts[a].
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// Each address gets its own independent list, so a hostinfo owning multiple addresses can
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// never corrupt another address's ordering the way the old shared next/prev chain could.
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// Entries in moreHosts are only ever written by unlockedSetHostsForAddr; Hosts is written
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// directly only in the single-hostinfo fast paths where moreHosts is known to have no entry,
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// and unlockedDeleteHostInfo swaps either map for a fresh one when it fully drains.
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Hosts map[netip.Addr]*HostInfo
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moreHosts map[netip.Addr][]*HostInfo
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preferredRanges atomic.Pointer[[]netip.Prefix]
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l *slog.Logger
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}
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// For synchronization, treat the pointed-to Relay struct as immutable. To edit the Relay
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// struct, make a copy of an existing value, edit the fileds in the copy, and
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// then store a pointer to the new copy in both realyForBy* maps.
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type RelayState struct {
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sync.RWMutex
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relays []netip.Addr // Ordered set of VpnAddrs of Hosts to use as relays to access this peer
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// For data race avoidance, the contents of a *Relay are treated immutably. To update a *Relay, copy the existing data,
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// modify what needs to be updated, and store the new modified copy in the relayForByIp and relayForByIdx maps (with
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// the RelayState Lock held)
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relayForByAddr map[netip.Addr]*Relay // Maps vpnAddr of peers for which this HostInfo is a relay to some Relay info
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relayForByIdx map[uint32]*Relay // Maps a local index to some Relay info
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}
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func (rs *RelayState) DeleteRelay(ip netip.Addr) {
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rs.Lock()
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defer rs.Unlock()
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for idx, val := range rs.relays {
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if val == ip {
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rs.relays = append(rs.relays[:idx], rs.relays[idx+1:]...)
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return
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}
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}
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}
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func (rs *RelayState) UpdateRelayForByIpState(vpnIp netip.Addr, state int) {
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rs.Lock()
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defer rs.Unlock()
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if r, ok := rs.relayForByAddr[vpnIp]; ok {
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newRelay := *r
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newRelay.State = state
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rs.relayForByAddr[newRelay.PeerAddr] = &newRelay
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rs.relayForByIdx[newRelay.LocalIndex] = &newRelay
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}
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}
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func (rs *RelayState) UpdateRelayForByIdxState(idx uint32, state int) {
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rs.Lock()
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defer rs.Unlock()
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if r, ok := rs.relayForByIdx[idx]; ok {
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newRelay := *r
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newRelay.State = state
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rs.relayForByAddr[newRelay.PeerAddr] = &newRelay
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rs.relayForByIdx[newRelay.LocalIndex] = &newRelay
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}
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}
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func (rs *RelayState) CopyAllRelayFor() []*Relay {
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rs.RLock()
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defer rs.RUnlock()
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ret := make([]*Relay, 0, len(rs.relayForByIdx))
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for _, r := range rs.relayForByIdx {
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ret = append(ret, r)
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}
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return ret
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}
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func (rs *RelayState) GetRelayForByAddr(addr netip.Addr) (*Relay, bool) {
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rs.RLock()
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defer rs.RUnlock()
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r, ok := rs.relayForByAddr[addr]
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return r, ok
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}
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func (rs *RelayState) InsertRelayTo(ip netip.Addr) {
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rs.Lock()
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defer rs.Unlock()
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if !slices.Contains(rs.relays, ip) {
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rs.relays = append(rs.relays, ip)
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}
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}
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func (rs *RelayState) CopyRelayIps() []netip.Addr {
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rs.RLock()
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defer rs.RUnlock()
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ret := make([]netip.Addr, len(rs.relays))
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copy(ret, rs.relays)
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return ret
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}
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func (rs *RelayState) CopyRelayForIps() []netip.Addr {
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rs.RLock()
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defer rs.RUnlock()
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currentRelays := make([]netip.Addr, 0, len(rs.relayForByAddr))
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for relayIp := range rs.relayForByAddr {
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currentRelays = append(currentRelays, relayIp)
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}
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return currentRelays
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}
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func (rs *RelayState) CopyRelayForIdxs() []uint32 {
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rs.RLock()
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defer rs.RUnlock()
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ret := make([]uint32, 0, len(rs.relayForByIdx))
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for i := range rs.relayForByIdx {
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ret = append(ret, i)
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}
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return ret
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}
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func (rs *RelayState) CompleteRelayByIP(vpnIp netip.Addr, remoteIdx uint32) bool {
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rs.Lock()
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defer rs.Unlock()
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r, ok := rs.relayForByAddr[vpnIp]
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if !ok {
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return false
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}
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newRelay := *r
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newRelay.State = Established
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newRelay.RemoteIndex = remoteIdx
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rs.relayForByIdx[r.LocalIndex] = &newRelay
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rs.relayForByAddr[r.PeerAddr] = &newRelay
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return true
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}
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func (rs *RelayState) CompleteRelayByIdx(localIdx uint32, remoteIdx uint32) (*Relay, bool) {
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rs.Lock()
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defer rs.Unlock()
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r, ok := rs.relayForByIdx[localIdx]
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if !ok {
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return nil, false
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}
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newRelay := *r
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newRelay.State = Established
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newRelay.RemoteIndex = remoteIdx
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rs.relayForByIdx[r.LocalIndex] = &newRelay
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rs.relayForByAddr[r.PeerAddr] = &newRelay
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return &newRelay, true
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}
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func (rs *RelayState) QueryRelayForByIp(vpnIp netip.Addr) (*Relay, bool) {
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rs.RLock()
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defer rs.RUnlock()
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r, ok := rs.relayForByAddr[vpnIp]
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return r, ok
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}
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func (rs *RelayState) QueryRelayForByIdx(idx uint32) (*Relay, bool) {
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rs.RLock()
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defer rs.RUnlock()
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r, ok := rs.relayForByIdx[idx]
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return r, ok
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}
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func (rs *RelayState) InsertRelay(ip netip.Addr, idx uint32, r *Relay) {
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rs.Lock()
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defer rs.Unlock()
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rs.relayForByAddr[ip] = r
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rs.relayForByIdx[idx] = r
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}
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type NetworkType uint8
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const (
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NetworkTypeUnknown NetworkType = iota
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// NetworkTypeVPN is a network that overlaps one or more of the vpnNetworks in our certificate
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NetworkTypeVPN
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// NetworkTypeVPNPeer is a network that does not overlap one of our networks
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NetworkTypeVPNPeer
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// NetworkTypeUnsafe is a network from Certificate.UnsafeNetworks()
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NetworkTypeUnsafe
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)
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type HostInfo struct {
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remote atomic.Pointer[netip.AddrPort]
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remotes *RemoteList
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promoteCounter atomic.Uint32
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ConnectionState *ConnectionState
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remoteIndexId uint32
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localIndexId uint32
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// vpnAddrs is a list of vpn addresses assigned to this host that are within our own vpn networks
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// The host may have other vpn addresses that are outside our
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// vpn networks but were removed because they are not usable
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vpnAddrs []netip.Addr
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// networks is a combination of specific vpn addresses (not prefixes!) and full unsafe networks assigned to this host.
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networks *bart.Table[NetworkType]
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relayState RelayState
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// HandshakePacket records the packets used to create this hostinfo
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// We need these to avoid replayed handshake packets creating new hostinfos which causes churn
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HandshakePacket map[uint8][]byte
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// nextLHQuery is the earliest we can ask the lighthouse for new information.
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// This is used to limit lighthouse re-queries in chatty clients
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nextLHQuery atomic.Int64
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// lastRebindCount is the other side of Interface.rebindCount, if these values don't match then we need to ask LH
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// for a punch from the remote end of this tunnel. The goal being to prime their conntrack for our traffic just like
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// with a handshake
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lastRebindCount int8
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// lastHandshakeTime records the time the remote side told us about at the stage when the handshake was completed locally
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// Stage 1 packet will contain it if I am a responder, stage 2 packet if I am an initiator
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// This is used to avoid an attack where a handshake packet is replayed after some time
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lastHandshakeTime uint64
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lastRoam time.Time
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lastRoamRemote netip.AddrPort
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//TODO: in, out, and others might benefit from being an atomic.Int32. We could collapse connectionManager pendingDeletion, relayUsed, and in/out into this 1 thing
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in, out, pendingDeletion atomic.Bool
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// lastUsed tracks the last time ConnectionManager checked the tunnel and it was in use.
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// This value will be behind against actual tunnel utilization in the hot path.
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// This should only be used by the ConnectionManagers ticker routine.
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lastUsed time.Time
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// sockIdx is the index into Interface.writers of the socket every packet
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// on this tunnel egresses from (and, for lanes, arrives on). 0 for base
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// and vanilla tunnels — the zero value preserves stock behavior.
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sockIdx int
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// laneIndex is the owner's lane number for a lane tunnel; 0 for base.
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laneIndex uint16
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// laneOwned is true when we initiated this lane (it carries our TX data).
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laneOwned bool
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// parent points at the base tunnel a lane hangs off of; nil for base and
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// vanilla tunnels. Set before the lane is registered in hostmap.Indexes.
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parent *HostInfo
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// lanes is allocated on a base tunnel when multiport is enabled and the
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// peer advertised lane support; nil otherwise.
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lanes *laneState
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}
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// isLane reports whether this HostInfo is a lane tunnel rather than a base
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// (or vanilla) tunnel.
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func (i *HostInfo) isLane() bool {
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return i.parent != nil
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}
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// laneState hangs off a base HostInfo and tracks the multiport lane tunnels
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// associated with it. txLanes is read lock-free on the TX hot path; the Mutex
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// guards everything else.
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type laneState struct {
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sync.Mutex
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// peerPortCount/peerBasePort are the peer's advert from the base
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// handshake; portOffset is the per-pair rotation from lanePortOffset.
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// Lane i targets peerBasePort + ((i + portOffset) % peerPortCount).
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peerPortCount uint16
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peerBasePort uint16
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portOffset uint16
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// txLanes[i] is our established, initiator-owned lane for routine i, or
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// nil. Index 0 is always nil — the base tunnel is lane 0. A pointer is
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// only Stored once the lane's ConnectionState is fully populated, so a
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// data-plane routine that Loads non-nil always sees a usable tunnel.
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txLanes []atomic.Pointer[HostInfo]
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// Under Mutex: per-slot handshake-in-flight flag, consecutive failure
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// count, and earliest next attempt, driving ensureLanes' backoff.
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txPending []bool
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txFails []uint8
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txRetryAt []time.Time
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// Under Mutex: responder-side records of peer-owned lanes, capped by
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// same-laneIndex replacement.
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peerLanes []*HostInfo
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}
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func newLaneState(laneCount int, peerPortCount, peerBasePort, portOffset uint16) *laneState {
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return &laneState{
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peerPortCount: peerPortCount,
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peerBasePort: peerBasePort,
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portOffset: portOffset,
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txLanes: make([]atomic.Pointer[HostInfo], laneCount),
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txPending: make([]bool, laneCount),
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txFails: make([]uint8, laneCount),
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txRetryAt: make([]time.Time, laneCount),
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}
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}
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// laneTargetPort returns the peer port that owned lane i handshakes to and
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// egresses toward. The caller must ensure peerPortCount != 0.
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func (ls *laneState) laneTargetPort(i int) uint16 {
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return ls.peerBasePort + uint16((i+int(ls.portOffset))%int(ls.peerPortCount))
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}
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// lanePortOffset returns the rotation applied to this pair's lane target
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// ports, in [0, peerPortCount). Without it every low-routine peer would aim
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// its few lanes at a big peer's first few ports, concentrating the big
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// peer's receive work on a couple of sockets; the hash spreads pairs across
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// the whole advertised range.
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//
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// Both sides hash the same sorted vpn-address pair and the higher address
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// negates the result, so when port counts match the two sides' rotations
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// cancel: our lane i's 4-tuple is still the reverse of a peer-owned lane's,
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// and each outbound lane handshake opens the conntrack entry its partner
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// arrives through. (The one lane a nonzero rotation lands on the peer's base
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// port has no partner lane; behind a port-restricted NAT it may not form and
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// its routine rides the base tunnel — the standard lane fallback.)
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func lanePortOffset(myAddr, peerAddr netip.Addr, peerPortCount uint16) uint16 {
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if peerPortCount == 0 {
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return 0
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}
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lo, hi := myAddr, peerAddr
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if hi.Less(lo) {
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lo, hi = hi, lo
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}
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h := fnv.New32a()
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b := lo.As16()
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h.Write(b[:])
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b = hi.As16()
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h.Write(b[:])
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o := uint16(h.Sum32() % uint32(peerPortCount))
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if myAddr == hi {
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o = (peerPortCount - o) % peerPortCount
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}
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return o
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}
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const (
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laneRetryBase = 5 * time.Second
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laneRetryMax = 60 * time.Second
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)
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// noteLaneFailure marks lane slot i as empty and pushes the next attempt out
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// with exponential backoff. Called when an owned lane dies or its handshake
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// times out.
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func (ls *laneState) noteLaneFailure(i int) {
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if i < 0 || i >= len(ls.txPending) {
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return
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}
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ls.Lock()
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ls.txPending[i] = false
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if ls.txFails[i] < 200 { // just avoid wrapping; the delay caps far earlier
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ls.txFails[i]++
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}
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d := laneRetryBase << min(ls.txFails[i], 4)
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if d > laneRetryMax {
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d = laneRetryMax
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}
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ls.txRetryAt[i] = time.Now().Add(d)
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ls.Unlock()
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}
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// noteOwnedLaneDeath detaches an established owned lane from its slot
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// (identity-checked, so a raced re-establishment is never clobbered) and
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// applies failure backoff.
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func (ls *laneState) noteOwnedLaneDeath(lane *HostInfo) {
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i := int(lane.laneIndex)
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if i >= len(ls.txLanes) {
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return
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}
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ls.txLanes[i].CompareAndSwap(lane, nil)
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ls.noteLaneFailure(i)
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}
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|
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// removePeerLane drops a responder-side lane record by identity.
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func (ls *laneState) removePeerLane(lane *HostInfo) {
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ls.Lock()
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for n, h := range ls.peerLanes {
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if h == lane {
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ls.peerLanes = append(ls.peerLanes[:n], ls.peerLanes[n+1:]...)
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break
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}
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}
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ls.Unlock()
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}
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|
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// snapshotLanes returns every lane hostinfo currently attached, used by the
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// base-delete cascade. Taken under the lock and returned as a copy so the
|
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// caller can delete without holding it.
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func (ls *laneState) snapshotLanes() []*HostInfo {
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ls.Lock()
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defer ls.Unlock()
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out := make([]*HostInfo, 0, len(ls.txLanes)+len(ls.peerLanes))
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for n := range ls.txLanes {
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if h := ls.txLanes[n].Load(); h != nil {
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out = append(out, h)
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}
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}
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out = append(out, ls.peerLanes...)
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return out
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}
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|
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type ViaSender struct {
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UdpAddr netip.AddrPort
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relayHI *HostInfo // relayHI is the host info object of the relay
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|
relay *Relay // relay contains the rest of the relay information, including the PeerIP of the host trying to communicate with us.
|
|
IsRelayed bool // IsRelayed is true if the packet was sent through a relay
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|
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// SockIdx is the local socket (Interface.writers index) the packet
|
|
// arrived on. Replies that must originate from the same 4-tuple egress
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// f.writers[SockIdx].
|
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SockIdx int
|
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}
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|
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func (v ViaSender) String() string {
|
|
if v.IsRelayed {
|
|
return fmt.Sprintf("%s (relayed)", v.UdpAddr)
|
|
}
|
|
return v.UdpAddr.String()
|
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}
|
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|
|
func (v ViaSender) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
|
|
if v.IsRelayed {
|
|
return json.Marshal(m{"relay": v.UdpAddr})
|
|
}
|
|
return json.Marshal(m{"direct": v.UdpAddr})
|
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}
|
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|
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type cachedPacket struct {
|
|
messageType header.MessageType
|
|
messageSubType header.MessageSubType
|
|
callback packetCallback
|
|
packet []byte
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type packetCallback func(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType, h *HostInfo, p, nb, out []byte)
|
|
|
|
type cachedPacketMetrics struct {
|
|
sent metrics.Counter
|
|
dropped metrics.Counter
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func NewHostMapFromConfig(l *slog.Logger, c *config.C) *HostMap {
|
|
hm := newHostMap(l)
|
|
|
|
hm.reload(c, true)
|
|
c.RegisterReloadCallback(func(c *config.C) {
|
|
hm.reload(c, false)
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
l.Info("Main HostMap created", "preferredRanges", hm.GetPreferredRanges())
|
|
|
|
return hm
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func newHostMap(l *slog.Logger) *HostMap {
|
|
return &HostMap{
|
|
Indexes: map[uint32]*HostInfo{},
|
|
Relays: map[uint32]*HostInfo{},
|
|
RemoteIndexes: map[uint32]*HostInfo{},
|
|
Hosts: map[netip.Addr]*HostInfo{},
|
|
moreHosts: map[netip.Addr][]*HostInfo{},
|
|
l: l,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hm *HostMap) reload(c *config.C, initial bool) {
|
|
if initial || c.HasChanged("preferred_ranges") {
|
|
var preferredRanges []netip.Prefix
|
|
rawPreferredRanges := c.GetStringSlice("preferred_ranges", []string{})
|
|
|
|
for _, rawPreferredRange := range rawPreferredRanges {
|
|
preferredRange, err := netip.ParsePrefix(rawPreferredRange)
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
hm.l.Warn("Failed to parse preferred ranges, ignoring",
|
|
"error", err,
|
|
"range", rawPreferredRanges,
|
|
)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
preferredRanges = append(preferredRanges, preferredRange)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
oldRanges := hm.preferredRanges.Swap(&preferredRanges)
|
|
if !initial {
|
|
hm.l.Info("preferred_ranges changed",
|
|
"oldPreferredRanges", *oldRanges,
|
|
"newPreferredRanges", preferredRanges,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// EmitStats reports host, index, and relay counts to the stats collection system
|
|
func (hm *HostMap) EmitStats() {
|
|
hm.RLock()
|
|
hostLen := len(hm.Hosts)
|
|
indexLen := len(hm.Indexes)
|
|
remoteIndexLen := len(hm.RemoteIndexes)
|
|
relaysLen := len(hm.Relays)
|
|
hm.RUnlock()
|
|
|
|
metrics.GetOrRegisterGauge("hostmap.main.hosts", nil).Update(int64(hostLen))
|
|
metrics.GetOrRegisterGauge("hostmap.main.indexes", nil).Update(int64(indexLen))
|
|
metrics.GetOrRegisterGauge("hostmap.main.remoteIndexes", nil).Update(int64(remoteIndexLen))
|
|
metrics.GetOrRegisterGauge("hostmap.main.relayIndexes", nil).Update(int64(relaysLen))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// unlockedSetHostsForAddr stores the per-address hostinfo list (list[0] is the primary). An empty
|
|
// list removes the address. This is the one place Hosts and moreHosts are written together, keep
|
|
// it that way. Callers must hold the write lock.
|
|
func (hm *HostMap) unlockedSetHostsForAddr(addr netip.Addr, list []*HostInfo) {
|
|
if len(list) == 0 {
|
|
delete(hm.Hosts, addr)
|
|
delete(hm.moreHosts, addr)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
hm.Hosts[addr] = list[0]
|
|
if len(list) > 1 {
|
|
hm.moreHosts[addr] = list
|
|
} else {
|
|
delete(hm.moreHosts, addr)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// unlockedGetHostList returns every hostinfo holding addr, primary first, or nil if we have no
|
|
// tunnel for addr. The common single-hostinfo case builds a fresh one element list, so keep this
|
|
// off the packet hot path; the primary is a direct Hosts read. Callers must hold the lock (read
|
|
// or write).
|
|
func (hm *HostMap) unlockedGetHostList(addr netip.Addr) []*HostInfo {
|
|
if list, ok := hm.moreHosts[addr]; ok {
|
|
return list
|
|
}
|
|
if h, ok := hm.Hosts[addr]; ok {
|
|
return []*HostInfo{h}
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// removeHostInfo returns list with hi removed (order preserved), or list unchanged if hi is
|
|
// absent. It deletes in place: every mutator holds the hostmap write lock and no reader ever
|
|
// retains a slice across a mutation (readers iterate under RLock), so there is no snapshot to
|
|
// invalidate.
|
|
func removeHostInfo(list []*HostInfo, hi *HostInfo) []*HostInfo {
|
|
idx := slices.Index(list, hi)
|
|
if idx < 0 {
|
|
return list
|
|
}
|
|
return slices.Delete(list, idx, idx+1)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// DeleteHostInfo will fully unlink the hostinfo and return true if no other hostinfo still holds
|
|
// any of its vpn addrs, meaning we no longer have a tunnel to the peer
|
|
func (hm *HostMap) DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo *HostInfo) bool {
|
|
// Delete the host itself, ensuring it's not modified anymore
|
|
hm.Lock()
|
|
final := hm.unlockedDeleteHostInfo(hostinfo)
|
|
hm.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
return final
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hm *HostMap) MakePrimary(hostinfo *HostInfo) {
|
|
hm.Lock()
|
|
defer hm.Unlock()
|
|
hm.unlockedMakePrimary(hostinfo)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// unlockedMakePrimary reports whether hostinfo is (now) the primary for each of its addresses,
|
|
// false only when it is no longer in the hostmap at all.
|
|
func (hm *HostMap) unlockedMakePrimary(hostinfo *HostInfo) bool {
|
|
// A lane must never become a Hosts primary: it would start carrying all
|
|
// traffic for the peer and become a relay candidate.
|
|
if hostinfo.isLane() {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A hostinfo that is no longer in the hostmap must not be re-inserted here. Callers can race
|
|
// tunnel teardown, deciding to promote under the read lock and only taking the write lock
|
|
// after a delete fully unlinked the hostinfo (connection manager swapPrimary, AddRelay). Every
|
|
// live hostinfo is registered in Indexes by unlockedAddHostInfo, so this is a membership test.
|
|
if hm.Indexes[hostinfo.localIndexId] != hostinfo {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Move hostinfo to the front (primary) of each of its address lists. The lists are
|
|
// independent per address, so this can never leave a dangling entry the way promoting
|
|
// against a single shared chain could.
|
|
for _, addr := range hostinfo.vpnAddrs {
|
|
if hm.Hosts[addr] == hostinfo {
|
|
// Already primary for this address, the list is already in the right order
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
list := removeHostInfo(hm.unlockedGetHostList(addr), hostinfo)
|
|
list = append([]*HostInfo{hostinfo}, list...)
|
|
hm.unlockedSetHostsForAddr(addr, list)
|
|
}
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// unlockedDeleteHostInfo removes hostinfo from every one of its address lists and from the index
|
|
// maps. It returns true if this was the last hostinfo for all of its addresses (we no longer have
|
|
// any tunnel to the peer), which the caller uses to decide whether to clear learned lighthouse
|
|
// state and disestablish relays.
|
|
func (hm *HostMap) unlockedDeleteHostInfo(hostinfo *HostInfo) bool {
|
|
if hostinfo.isLane() {
|
|
return hm.unlockedDeleteLane(hostinfo)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A dying base takes its lanes with it. The peer converges symmetrically
|
|
// when it processes the base's CloseTunnel, so lanes need no signaling of
|
|
// their own. Depth-1 recursion: lanes have no children.
|
|
if hostinfo.lanes != nil {
|
|
for _, lane := range hostinfo.lanes.snapshotLanes() {
|
|
hm.unlockedDeleteLane(lane)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Remove this hostinfo from each of its address lists. The lists are independent, so a
|
|
// sibling is never promoted to an address it does not own and no other list is touched.
|
|
final := true
|
|
for _, addr := range hostinfo.vpnAddrs {
|
|
if list, ok := hm.moreHosts[addr]; ok {
|
|
list = removeHostInfo(list, hostinfo)
|
|
hm.unlockedSetHostsForAddr(addr, list)
|
|
if len(list) > 0 {
|
|
final = false
|
|
}
|
|
} else if existing, ok := hm.Hosts[addr]; ok {
|
|
if existing == hostinfo {
|
|
// Common case, the only hostinfo for this address. moreHosts has no entry to clean up.
|
|
delete(hm.Hosts, addr)
|
|
} else {
|
|
// We don't hold this address but another hostinfo does, we still have a tunnel to the peer
|
|
final = false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Go maps never shrink their buckets, replace fully drained maps so a node that churned
|
|
// through a large peer count gives the memory back. Same idiom as the index maps below.
|
|
if len(hm.Hosts) == 0 {
|
|
hm.Hosts = map[netip.Addr]*HostInfo{}
|
|
}
|
|
if len(hm.moreHosts) == 0 {
|
|
hm.moreHosts = map[netip.Addr][]*HostInfo{}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The remote index uses index ids outside our control so lets make sure we are only removing
|
|
// the remote index pointer here if it points to the hostinfo we are deleting
|
|
hostinfo2, ok := hm.RemoteIndexes[hostinfo.remoteIndexId]
|
|
if ok && hostinfo2 == hostinfo {
|
|
delete(hm.RemoteIndexes, hostinfo.remoteIndexId)
|
|
if len(hm.RemoteIndexes) == 0 {
|
|
hm.RemoteIndexes = map[uint32]*HostInfo{}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
delete(hm.Indexes, hostinfo.localIndexId)
|
|
if len(hm.Indexes) == 0 {
|
|
hm.Indexes = map[uint32]*HostInfo{}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if hm.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
|
|
hm.l.Debug("Hostmap hostInfo deleted",
|
|
"hostMap", m{"mapTotalSize": len(hm.Hosts),
|
|
"vpnAddrs": hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "indexNumber": hostinfo.localIndexId, "remoteIndexNumber": hostinfo.remoteIndexId},
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if final {
|
|
// I have lost connectivity to my peers. My relay tunnel is likely broken. Mark the next
|
|
// hops as 'Requested' so that new relay tunnels are created in the future.
|
|
hm.unlockedDisestablishVpnAddrRelayFor(hostinfo)
|
|
}
|
|
// Clean up any local relay indexes for which I am acting as a relay hop
|
|
for _, localRelayIdx := range hostinfo.relayState.CopyRelayForIdxs() {
|
|
delete(hm.Relays, localRelayIdx)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return final
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// unlockedDeleteLane removes a lane tunnel from the index maps and detaches it
|
|
// from its base. Lanes never live in Hosts and their death never means "no
|
|
// tunnel to the peer", so the return is always false (the lighthouse cache and
|
|
// relays stay untouched). Idempotent: every step is identity-checked.
|
|
func (hm *HostMap) unlockedDeleteLane(lane *HostInfo) bool {
|
|
if ls := lane.parent.lanes; ls != nil {
|
|
if lane.laneOwned {
|
|
ls.noteOwnedLaneDeath(lane)
|
|
} else {
|
|
ls.removePeerLane(lane)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if hostinfo2, ok := hm.RemoteIndexes[lane.remoteIndexId]; ok && hostinfo2 == lane {
|
|
delete(hm.RemoteIndexes, lane.remoteIndexId)
|
|
}
|
|
if hostinfo2, ok := hm.Indexes[lane.localIndexId]; ok && hostinfo2 == lane {
|
|
delete(hm.Indexes, lane.localIndexId)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if hm.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
|
|
hm.l.Debug("Hostmap lane deleted",
|
|
"hostMap", m{"vpnAddrs": lane.vpnAddrs, "laneIndex": lane.laneIndex,
|
|
"indexNumber": lane.localIndexId, "remoteIndexNumber": lane.remoteIndexId},
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hm *HostMap) QueryIndex(index uint32) *HostInfo {
|
|
hm.RLock()
|
|
if h, ok := hm.Indexes[index]; ok {
|
|
hm.RUnlock()
|
|
return h
|
|
} else {
|
|
hm.RUnlock()
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hm *HostMap) QueryRelayIndex(index uint32) *HostInfo {
|
|
hm.RLock()
|
|
if h, ok := hm.Relays[index]; ok {
|
|
hm.RUnlock()
|
|
return h
|
|
} else {
|
|
hm.RUnlock()
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hm *HostMap) QueryReverseIndex(index uint32) *HostInfo {
|
|
hm.RLock()
|
|
if h, ok := hm.RemoteIndexes[index]; ok {
|
|
hm.RUnlock()
|
|
return h
|
|
} else {
|
|
hm.RUnlock()
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hm *HostMap) QueryVpnAddr(vpnIp netip.Addr) *HostInfo {
|
|
return hm.queryVpnAddr(vpnIp, nil)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hm *HostMap) QueryVpnAddrsRelayFor(targetIps []netip.Addr, relayHostIp netip.Addr) (*HostInfo, *Relay, error) {
|
|
hm.RLock()
|
|
defer hm.RUnlock()
|
|
|
|
// This runs per relayed packet, so check the primary with a single map probe and only consult
|
|
// moreHosts when the primary can't relay for us.
|
|
h, ok := hm.Hosts[relayHostIp]
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil, nil, errors.New("unable to find host")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, targetIp := range targetIps {
|
|
r, ok := h.relayState.QueryRelayForByIp(targetIp)
|
|
if ok && r.State == Established {
|
|
return h, r, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if list, ok := hm.moreHosts[relayHostIp]; ok {
|
|
// list[0] is the primary we already checked
|
|
for _, h := range list[1:] {
|
|
for _, targetIp := range targetIps {
|
|
r, ok := h.relayState.QueryRelayForByIp(targetIp)
|
|
if ok && r.State == Established {
|
|
return h, r, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil, nil, errors.New("unable to find host with relay")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hm *HostMap) unlockedDisestablishVpnAddrRelayFor(hi *HostInfo) {
|
|
for _, relayHostIp := range hi.relayState.CopyRelayIps() {
|
|
for _, h := range hm.unlockedGetHostList(relayHostIp) {
|
|
h.relayState.UpdateRelayForByIpState(hi.vpnAddrs[0], Disestablished)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
for _, rs := range hi.relayState.CopyAllRelayFor() {
|
|
if rs.Type == ForwardingType {
|
|
for _, h := range hm.unlockedGetHostList(rs.PeerAddr) {
|
|
h.relayState.UpdateRelayForByIpState(hi.vpnAddrs[0], Disestablished)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hm *HostMap) queryVpnAddr(vpnIp netip.Addr, promoteIfce *Interface) *HostInfo {
|
|
hm.RLock()
|
|
if h, ok := hm.Hosts[vpnIp]; ok {
|
|
hm.RUnlock()
|
|
// Do not attempt promotion if you are a lighthouse
|
|
if promoteIfce != nil && !promoteIfce.lightHouse.amLighthouse {
|
|
h.TryPromoteBest(hm.GetPreferredRanges(), promoteIfce)
|
|
}
|
|
return h
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hm.RUnlock()
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// unlockedAddHostInfo assumes you have a write-lock and will add a hostinfo object to the hostmap Indexes and RemoteIndexes maps.
|
|
// If an entry exists for the Hosts table (vpnIp -> hostinfo) then the provided hostinfo will be made primary
|
|
func (hm *HostMap) unlockedAddHostInfo(hostinfo *HostInfo, f *Interface) {
|
|
if f.dnsServer != nil {
|
|
remoteCert := hostinfo.ConnectionState.peerCert
|
|
f.dnsServer.Add(remoteCert.Certificate.Name()+".", hostinfo.vpnAddrs)
|
|
}
|
|
for _, addr := range hostinfo.vpnAddrs {
|
|
hm.unlockedInnerAddHostInfo(addr, hostinfo, f)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hm.Indexes[hostinfo.localIndexId] = hostinfo
|
|
hm.RemoteIndexes[hostinfo.remoteIndexId] = hostinfo
|
|
|
|
hostinfo.out.Store(true)
|
|
if f.connectionManager != nil { // f.connectionManager is only nil in some unit tests
|
|
f.connectionManager.trafficTimer.Add(hostinfo.localIndexId, f.connectionManager.checkInterval)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if hm.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
|
|
hm.l.Debug("Hostmap vpnIp added",
|
|
"hostMap", m{"vpnAddrs": hostinfo.vpnAddrs, "mapTotalSize": len(hm.Hosts),
|
|
"hostinfo": m{"existing": true, "localIndexId": hostinfo.localIndexId, "vpnAddrs": hostinfo.vpnAddrs}},
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// unlockedAddLane registers a lane tunnel in the index maps (RX demux and
|
|
// recv_error need it there) without touching Hosts: lanes are never primary,
|
|
// never dns-visible, and never subject to the MaxHostInfosPerVpnIp eviction.
|
|
// The connection manager still tracks it for keepalive/death.
|
|
func (hm *HostMap) unlockedAddLane(lane *HostInfo, f *Interface) {
|
|
hm.Indexes[lane.localIndexId] = lane
|
|
hm.RemoteIndexes[lane.remoteIndexId] = lane
|
|
|
|
lane.out.Store(true)
|
|
if f.connectionManager != nil { // f.connectionManager is only nil in some unit tests
|
|
f.connectionManager.trafficTimer.Add(lane.localIndexId, f.connectionManager.checkInterval)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if hm.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
|
|
hm.l.Debug("Hostmap lane added",
|
|
"hostMap", m{"vpnAddrs": lane.vpnAddrs, "laneIndex": lane.laneIndex,
|
|
"indexNumber": lane.localIndexId, "remoteIndexNumber": lane.remoteIndexId},
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hm *HostMap) unlockedInnerAddHostInfo(vpnAddr netip.Addr, hostinfo *HostInfo, f *Interface) {
|
|
existing, ok := hm.Hosts[vpnAddr]
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
// Common case, the first hostinfo for this address. moreHosts stays empty.
|
|
hm.Hosts[vpnAddr] = hostinfo
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The new hostinfo becomes the primary for this address. Remove any stale copy of it first so
|
|
// we never hold a duplicate, then prepend.
|
|
list, ok := hm.moreHosts[vpnAddr]
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
list = []*HostInfo{existing}
|
|
}
|
|
list = removeHostInfo(list, hostinfo)
|
|
list = append([]*HostInfo{hostinfo}, list...)
|
|
hm.unlockedSetHostsForAddr(vpnAddr, list)
|
|
|
|
// Enforce the per-address cap by fully retiring the oldest hostinfo once we exceed it.
|
|
// Deleting it removes it from all of its addresses and the index maps, matching prior behavior.
|
|
if len(list) > MaxHostInfosPerVpnIp {
|
|
hm.unlockedDeleteHostInfo(list[len(list)-1])
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hm *HostMap) GetPreferredRanges() []netip.Prefix {
|
|
//NOTE: if preferredRanges is ever not stored before a load this will fail to dereference a nil pointer
|
|
return *hm.preferredRanges.Load()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hm *HostMap) ForEachVpnAddr(f controlEach) {
|
|
hm.RLock()
|
|
defer hm.RUnlock()
|
|
|
|
for _, v := range hm.Hosts {
|
|
f(v)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hm *HostMap) ForEachIndex(f controlEach) {
|
|
hm.RLock()
|
|
defer hm.RUnlock()
|
|
|
|
for _, v := range hm.Indexes {
|
|
f(v)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TryPromoteBest handles re-querying lighthouses and probing for better paths
|
|
// NOTE: It is an error to call this if you are a lighthouse since they should not roam clients!
|
|
func (i *HostInfo) TryPromoteBest(preferredRanges []netip.Prefix, ifce *Interface) {
|
|
c := i.promoteCounter.Add(1)
|
|
if c%ifce.tryPromoteEvery.Load() == 0 {
|
|
remote := i.GetRemote()
|
|
|
|
// return early if we are already on a preferred remote
|
|
if remote.IsValid() {
|
|
rIP := remote.Addr()
|
|
for _, l := range preferredRanges {
|
|
if l.Contains(rIP) {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
i.remotes.ForEach(preferredRanges, func(addr netip.AddrPort, preferred bool) {
|
|
if remote.IsValid() && (!addr.IsValid() || !preferred) {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Try to send a test packet to that host, this should
|
|
// cause it to detect a roaming event and switch remotes
|
|
ifce.sendTo(header.Test, header.TestRequest, i.ConnectionState, i, addr, []byte(""), make([]byte, 12, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Re query our lighthouses for new remotes occasionally
|
|
if c%ifce.reQueryEvery.Load() == 0 && ifce.lightHouse != nil {
|
|
now := time.Now().UnixNano()
|
|
if now < i.nextLHQuery.Load() {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
i.nextLHQuery.Store(now + ifce.reQueryWait.Load())
|
|
ifce.lightHouse.QueryServer(i.vpnAddrs[0])
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (i *HostInfo) GetCert() *cert.CachedCertificate {
|
|
if i.ConnectionState != nil {
|
|
return i.ConnectionState.peerCert
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (i *HostInfo) GetRemote() netip.AddrPort {
|
|
if p := i.remote.Load(); p != nil {
|
|
return *p
|
|
}
|
|
return netip.AddrPort{}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TODO: Maybe use ViaSender here?
|
|
func (i *HostInfo) SetRemote(remote netip.AddrPort) {
|
|
// We copy here because we likely got this remote from a source that reuses the object
|
|
if i.GetRemote() != remote {
|
|
i.remote.Store(&remote)
|
|
i.remotes.LearnRemote(i.vpnAddrs[0], remote)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SetRemoteIfPreferred returns true if the remote was changed. The lastRoam
|
|
// time on the HostInfo will also be updated.
|
|
func (i *HostInfo) SetRemoteIfPreferred(hm *HostMap, via ViaSender) bool {
|
|
if via.IsRelayed {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
currentRemote := i.GetRemote()
|
|
if !currentRemote.IsValid() {
|
|
i.SetRemote(via.UdpAddr)
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// NOTE: We do this loop here instead of calling `isPreferred` in
|
|
// remote_list.go so that we only have to loop over preferredRanges once.
|
|
newIsPreferred := false
|
|
for _, l := range hm.GetPreferredRanges() {
|
|
// return early if we are already on a preferred remote
|
|
if l.Contains(currentRemote.Addr()) {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if l.Contains(via.UdpAddr.Addr()) {
|
|
newIsPreferred = true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if newIsPreferred {
|
|
// Consider this a roaming event
|
|
i.lastRoam = time.Now()
|
|
i.lastRoamRemote = currentRemote
|
|
|
|
i.SetRemote(via.UdpAddr)
|
|
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// buildNetworks fills in the networks field of HostInfo. It accepts a cert.Certificate so you never ever mix the network types up.
|
|
func (i *HostInfo) buildNetworks(myVpnNetworksTable *bart.Lite, c cert.Certificate) {
|
|
if len(c.Networks()) == 1 && len(c.UnsafeNetworks()) == 0 {
|
|
if myVpnNetworksTable.Contains(c.Networks()[0].Addr()) {
|
|
return // Simple case, no BART needed
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
i.networks = new(bart.Table[NetworkType])
|
|
for _, network := range c.Networks() {
|
|
nprefix := netip.PrefixFrom(network.Addr(), network.Addr().BitLen())
|
|
if myVpnNetworksTable.Contains(network.Addr()) {
|
|
i.networks.Insert(nprefix, NetworkTypeVPN)
|
|
} else {
|
|
i.networks.Insert(nprefix, NetworkTypeVPNPeer)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, network := range c.UnsafeNetworks() {
|
|
i.networks.Insert(network, NetworkTypeUnsafe)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// logger returns a derived slog.Logger with per-hostinfo fields pre-bound.
|
|
func (i *HostInfo) logger(l *slog.Logger) *slog.Logger {
|
|
if i == nil {
|
|
return l
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
li := l.With(
|
|
"vpnAddrs", i.vpnAddrs,
|
|
"localIndex", i.localIndexId,
|
|
"remoteIndex", i.remoteIndexId,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
if connState := i.ConnectionState; connState != nil {
|
|
if peerCert := connState.peerCert; peerCert != nil {
|
|
li = li.With("certName", peerCert.Certificate.Name())
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return li
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Utility functions
|
|
|
|
func localAddrs(l *slog.Logger, allowList *LocalAllowList) []netip.Addr {
|
|
//FIXME: This function is pretty garbage
|
|
var finalAddrs []netip.Addr
|
|
ifaces, _ := net.Interfaces()
|
|
for _, i := range ifaces {
|
|
allow := allowList.AllowName(i.Name)
|
|
if l.Enabled(context.Background(), logging.LevelTrace) {
|
|
l.Log(context.Background(), logging.LevelTrace, "localAllowList.AllowName",
|
|
"interfaceName", i.Name,
|
|
"allow", allow,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !allow {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
addrs, _ := i.Addrs()
|
|
for _, rawAddr := range addrs {
|
|
var addr netip.Addr
|
|
switch v := rawAddr.(type) {
|
|
case *net.IPNet:
|
|
//continue
|
|
addr, _ = netip.AddrFromSlice(v.IP)
|
|
case *net.IPAddr:
|
|
addr, _ = netip.AddrFromSlice(v.IP)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !addr.IsValid() {
|
|
if l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
|
|
l.Debug("addr was invalid", "localAddr", rawAddr)
|
|
}
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
addr = addr.Unmap()
|
|
|
|
if addr.IsLoopback() == false && addr.IsLinkLocalUnicast() == false {
|
|
isAllowed := allowList.Allow(addr)
|
|
if l.Enabled(context.Background(), logging.LevelTrace) {
|
|
l.Log(context.Background(), logging.LevelTrace, "localAllowList.Allow",
|
|
"localAddr", addr,
|
|
"allowed", isAllowed,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
if !isAllowed {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
finalAddrs = append(finalAddrs, addr)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return finalAddrs
|
|
}
|