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- Ignore a lane advert with a zero base port or a range running past 65535, with a warning, instead of aiming lanes at ports that wrapped. - Warn once when a lane that has never come up misses 3 probes in a row. Until now that was silent above debug, including the common case of a firewall that only opens the base port.
756 lines
29 KiB
Go
756 lines
29 KiB
Go
package nebula
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import (
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"context"
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"hash/fnv"
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"log/slog"
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"net/netip"
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"sync"
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"sync/atomic"
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"time"
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"github.com/flynn/noise"
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"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
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"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
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"github.com/slackhq/nebula/firewall"
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"github.com/slackhq/nebula/handshake"
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"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
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"github.com/slackhq/nebula/noiseutil"
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)
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// Multiport lanes give one tunnel several underlay 5-tuples, so its traffic
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// spreads over ECMP paths, NIC receive queues and per-flow policers instead of
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// funnelling through a single flow. Each inside flow picks a lane by hashing its
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// own 5-tuple, so the spread doesn't depend on how a kernel steers tun queues
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// (see txQueue).
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//
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// A lane is not a second tunnel: it is an extra session on the same HostInfo.
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// Noise leaves us with A.eKey == B.dKey, so both sides expand the same two keys
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// with the same per-lane label and land on a matched pair without exchanging
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// anything. A lane therefore costs no handshake, has no half-established state,
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// and dies exactly when its base tunnel does. Which lane a packet belongs to
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// travels in the nebula header, inside the AEAD's associated data.
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//
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// Lane 0 is the base tunnel itself: HostInfo.ConnectionState, the base port, and
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// the peer's real remote address, and it carries its share of flows like any
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// other. Lane s > 0 egresses a socket on listen.port+s (see laneSock) toward the
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// peer's advertised port range. Receiving on a lane
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// needs no permission — the keys are derivable the moment the base handshake
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// completes — but sending on one needs proof the new 5-tuple actually works,
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// since nothing else would notice a middlebox quietly dropping it. So a lane
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// stays down until a probe on it is acked, and falls back to the base tunnel the
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// moment it stops being acked.
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//
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// Both directions are pay-per-use. A lane session is derived on the first packet
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// that needs it, because how many lanes exist is partly the peer's call: it
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// advertises how many it sends on, and we have to be able to receive all of
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// them. Deriving them all up front would let a peer advertising the maximum cost
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// us a replay window and two cipher states per lane, per tunnel, for lanes it
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// may never send on.
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const (
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// laneKeyInfo is the HKDF label prefix for lane key expansion. Changing it
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// means older builds derive different keys and drop our lane traffic; the
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// base tunnel would keep working, so the failure would be a silent loss of
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// lanes rather than of connectivity.
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laneKeyInfo = "nebula multiport lane v1"
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// laneRetryBase and laneRetryMax bound the backoff between probes of a lane
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// that will not come up, so a peer whose lane ports are firewalled costs one
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// packet a minute rather than one per traffic tick.
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laneRetryBase = 5 * time.Second
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laneRetryMax = 60 * time.Second
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// laneMaxFails caps the failure counter; the backoff saturates well before.
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laneMaxFails = 8
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// laneWarnFails is how many unanswered probes a lane that has never come up
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// takes before it is worth a warning. One or two can be loss; this many in a
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// row is usually a firewall that only opens the base port.
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laneWarnFails = 3
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// laneProbeTimeout is how long a probe may go unacked before it counts as a
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// failure. It is shorter than the connection manager's check interval on
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// purpose: an outstanding probe is judged on the next tick either way, and a
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// longer timeout would only delay that by a whole tick.
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laneProbeTimeout = 2 * time.Second
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// laneKeepalive is how often a lane that is up re-proves its path. Traffic
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// on a lane is not evidence the lane works — that is the whole reason lanes
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// need probing — so a lane that silently breaks is only caught here.
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laneKeepalive = 30 * time.Second
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)
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// laneSet holds a peer's lane sessions and the state deciding which lanes may
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// carry traffic. It is built when the base handshake completes and never
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// resized, so the slices and their lengths are immutable; mu guards the fields
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// under it, and sessions/txAddr/demand are atomics read by the data plane
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// without it.
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type laneSet struct {
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// sessions[s] holds lane s's session once something has needed it, and nil
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// until then. sessions[0] is never populated: lane 0 is the base tunnel's own
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// ConnectionState. The length is immutable, so the data plane bounds-checks
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// and loads with no locking.
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sessions []atomic.Pointer[ConnectionState]
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// material is what a lane session is derived from, kept because sessions are
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// derived lazily and the handshake result is long gone by then.
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material laneMaterial
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// txAddr[s] holds lane s's remote address while the lane is proven usable
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// and nil otherwise. This single atomic is both the TX gate and the
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// destination, so a routine that loads non-nil has everything it needs.
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// Sized txLanes: lanes above that never send.
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txAddr []atomic.Pointer[netip.AddrPort]
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// demand[s] is raised at creation, and again by the TX path whenever a flow
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// hashes onto lane s while it is down. Probing is demand-driven, so a peer we
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// never send to costs nothing beyond its base tunnel no matter how many lanes
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// are configured, and a lane that keeps failing is only retried while
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// something still wants it. Sized txLanes.
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demand []atomic.Bool
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// txLanes is how many lanes we may send on — our lane count clamped to the
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// ports the peer bound — and so the modulus a flow's hash is reduced by.
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// Lanes from txLanes up can only receive, which is how a peer with more
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// routines than us still spreads its own traffic.
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// Immutable, and the length of every TX-side slice here.
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txLanes int
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mu sync.Mutex
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// peerPortCount and peerBasePort are the peer's advertised port range and
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// portOffset is this pair's rotation within it: lane s targets
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// peerBasePort + ((s + portOffset) % peerPortCount).
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peerPortCount uint16
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peerBasePort uint16
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portOffset uint16
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// laneBias rotates the flow hash before it picks a lane, so the two sides of
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// a flow land on lanes that are each other's partner rather than at
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// independent points in the range. See newLaneSet.
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laneBias uint16
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// peerAddr is the address the current lane targets were built from. The
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// peer's lane ports have no derivable relationship to a new NAT mapping, so
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// a roam invalidates every lane rather than moving it.
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peerAddr netip.Addr
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// probe[s] is lane s's probe and backoff state. Sized txLanes.
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probe []laneProbeState
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}
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// laneMaterial is everything a lane session is derived from. The two base keys
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// are the same secret the base tunnel's own cipher states already hold — the
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// noiseutil.CipherState interface just doesn't hand them back, so a lane set
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// keeps its own copy rather than a reference to the session.
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type laneMaterial struct {
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eKey, dKey [32]byte
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cipher noise.CipherFunc
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myCert cert.Certificate
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peerCert *cert.CachedCertificate
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initiator bool
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}
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type laneProbeState struct {
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// gen is the generation of the last probe sent, echoed in the ack so a late
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// ack cannot promote a lane on the strength of a superseded probe.
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gen uint8
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// fails is the consecutive failure count driving retryAt.
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fails uint8
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// sentAt is when the outstanding probe went out, zero when none is pending.
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sentAt time.Time
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// target is where the outstanding probe went, promoted to txAddr on ack. It
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// outlives the probe, which is what lets a demotion log the address that
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// stopped answering.
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target netip.AddrPort
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// lastAck is when the lane was last confirmed usable, driving the keepalive.
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lastAck time.Time
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// retryAt is the earliest we may probe this lane again.
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retryAt time.Time
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}
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// validLaneAdvert reports whether a peer's advertised port range is one we can
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// aim lanes at: a real base port, and every port in the range a valid one.
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func validLaneAdvert(basePort, portCount uint32) bool {
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return basePort != 0 && portCount != 0 && basePort+portCount-1 <= 0xffff
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}
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// newLaneSet sets up the lanes for a freshly completed base handshake. It
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// returns nil when the pair has no lane beyond the base tunnel, which is the
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// normal answer for a peer running without multiport. No session is derived
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// here; each is derived on the first packet that needs it.
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func newLaneSet(r *handshake.Result, myLanes int, myAddr, peerAddr netip.Addr) *laneSet {
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// PeerPortCount and PeerBasePort are already bounded to uint16 by the
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// handshake payload parser. A zero port count is a peer that did not
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// advertise multiport at all, so there is no lane to be had in either
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// direction.
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peerPorts := uint16(r.PeerPortCount)
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if peerPorts == 0 {
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return nil
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}
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// Sessions have to cover both directions: we send on our lanes and receive
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// on the peer's, and one derived session serves both ends of a lane index.
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// Only the session table is sized by the peer's advertised count; the TX-side
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// state is sized by what we will actually send on.
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n := min(max(myLanes, int(r.PeerTxLanes)), header.MaxLane+1)
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if n < 2 {
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return nil
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}
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txLanes := min(myLanes, int(peerPorts), n)
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offset := lanePortOffset(myAddr, peerAddr, peerPorts)
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// A flow picks its lane from a hash both sides compute identically, so with
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// the ranges lined up the two directions of a flow would pick the same lane
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// index — and lane s targets the peer's lane (s + portOffset), not lane s. The
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// high-addressed side rotates its choice by the low side's offset, which is
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// its own negated, so the two directions land on partner lanes and their
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// 4-tuples are exact reverses: each side's traffic then arrives through the
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// conntrack entry the other's probe opened. With mismatched ranges there are
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// no partner lanes to find, so don't pretend: hash straight.
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bias := uint16(0)
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if txLanes == int(peerPorts) && peerAddr.Less(myAddr) {
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bias = (peerPorts - offset) % peerPorts
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}
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ls := &laneSet{
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sessions: make([]atomic.Pointer[ConnectionState], n),
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material: laneMaterial{
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eKey: r.EKey.UnsafeKey(),
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dKey: r.DKey.UnsafeKey(),
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cipher: r.Cipher,
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myCert: r.MyCert,
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peerCert: r.RemoteCert,
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initiator: r.Initiator,
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},
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txAddr: make([]atomic.Pointer[netip.AddrPort], txLanes),
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demand: make([]atomic.Bool, txLanes),
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probe: make([]laneProbeState, txLanes),
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txLanes: txLanes,
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peerPortCount: peerPorts,
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peerBasePort: uint16(r.PeerBasePort),
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portOffset: offset,
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laneBias: bias,
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}
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// Every lane starts out demanded, so the first traffic tick on this tunnel
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// probes all of them at once instead of waiting for a flow to hash onto each.
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// Lanes have to be up *before* the flows are, not after: the peer writes a
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// flow's inbound packets to the tun queue matching the socket they arrived on,
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// and the kernel remembers that for as long as the flow stays busy. A flow that
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// starts while the lanes are still down therefore gets pinned to queue 0 on
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// both hosts for its whole life. This costs one probe per lane on any tunnel
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// with traffic; an idle tunnel is never probed, so it still costs nothing.
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for s := 1; s < txLanes; s++ {
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ls.demand[s].Store(true)
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}
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return ls
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}
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// laneLogAttr summarizes what a tunnel negotiated, for the handshake log lines.
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// It is an empty attr, which slog drops, on a node not running multiport. A peer
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// that negotiated no lanes still logs, with zeros: "we offered and got nothing"
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// is exactly what you want to see when you expected lanes and have none.
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func laneLogAttr(myLanes int, ls *laneSet) slog.Attr {
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if myLanes == 0 {
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return slog.Attr{}
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}
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if ls == nil {
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return slog.Any("lanes", m{"tx": 0, "sessions": 0})
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}
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// Every field read here is immutable once the set is built.
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return slog.Any("lanes", m{
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"tx": ls.txLanes,
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"sessions": len(ls.sessions),
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"peerBasePort": ls.peerBasePort,
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"peerPorts": ls.peerPortCount,
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"portOffset": ls.portOffset,
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})
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}
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// emitLaneStats reports how many lanes are carrying traffic and how many tunnels
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// have any. Both are counted by walking the hostmap, because a counter kept at
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// promotion and demotion would drift upward forever: a tunnel torn down while its
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// lanes are up never demotes them. Only a node running multiport pays for the
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// walk.
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func (f *Interface) emitLaneStats(up, tunnels metrics.Gauge) {
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var nUp, nTunnels int64
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f.hostMap.ForEachIndex(func(hostinfo *HostInfo) {
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ls := hostinfo.lanes
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if ls == nil {
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return
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}
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nTunnels++
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for s := 1; s < ls.txLanes; s++ {
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if ls.txAddr[s].Load() != nil {
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nUp++
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}
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}
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})
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up.Update(nUp)
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tunnels.Update(nTunnels)
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}
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// lanePortOffset returns the rotation applied to this pair's lane target ports,
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// in [0, peerPortCount). Without it every low-routine peer would aim its few
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// lanes at a big peer's first few ports, concentrating the big peer's receive
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// work on a couple of sockets; the hash spreads pairs across the whole range.
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//
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// Both sides hash the same sorted vpn-address pair and the higher address
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// negates the result, so when port counts match the two sides' rotations
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// cancel: our lane s's 4-tuple stays the reverse of the peer's lane s, and each
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// side's probe opens the conntrack entry the other's arrives through. (The one
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// lane a nonzero rotation lands on the peer's base port has no partner lane, so
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// behind a port-restricted NAT it is the one lane that may never come up.)
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func lanePortOffset(myAddr, peerAddr netip.Addr, peerPortCount uint16) uint16 {
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if peerPortCount == 0 {
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return 0
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}
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lo, hi := myAddr, peerAddr
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if hi.Less(lo) {
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lo, hi = hi, lo
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}
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h := fnv.New32a()
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b := lo.As16()
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h.Write(b[:])
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b = hi.As16()
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h.Write(b[:])
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o := uint16(h.Sum32() % uint32(peerPortCount))
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if myAddr == hi {
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o = (peerPortCount - o) % peerPortCount
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}
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return o
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}
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// laneSession returns the session to decrypt a lane s packet with, deriving one
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// if this is the first packet to claim that lane. A nil session with no error
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// means this tunnel has no lane s at all.
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//
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// cached reports whether the session was already in the table. A fresh one is
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// deliberately left out of it: anyone who can spoof this tunnel's local index
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// can name any lane, and installing on sight would let them make us hold a
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// replay window and two cipher states per lane without authenticating anything.
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// The caller must install with installSession once the packet decrypts, which is
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// the first moment the lane is known to be real.
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func (i *HostInfo) laneSession(s uint8) (ci *ConnectionState, cached bool, err error) {
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ls := i.lanes
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if ls == nil || s == 0 || int(s) >= len(ls.sessions) {
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return nil, false, nil
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}
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if cs := ls.sessions[s].Load(); cs != nil {
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return cs, true, nil
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}
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cs, err := newLaneConnectionState(&ls.material, s)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, false, err
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}
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return cs, false, nil
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}
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// installSession publishes a session derived by laneSession, so the next packet
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// on the lane doesn't have to derive it again. cs must have already decrypted the
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// packet at messageCounter.
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//
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// Two routines can race on a lane's first packet and derive a session each. The
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// loser's is dropped, and with it the replay-window entry for the packet it just
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// accepted, so hand that counter to the session that survives — the keys are
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// identical, so it is the same window in every respect that matters.
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func (ls *laneSet) installSession(l *slog.Logger, s uint8, cs *ConnectionState, messageCounter uint64) {
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if ls.sessions[s].CompareAndSwap(nil, cs) {
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return
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}
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ls.sessions[s].Load().noteSeen(l, messageCounter)
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}
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// session returns lane s's session for our own use, deriving and installing it
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// if it doesn't exist yet. Unlike the RX path this needs no proof the lane is
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// real: we only ask for lanes we chose to send on. s must be a lane this set
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// covers.
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func (ls *laneSet) session(s int) (*ConnectionState, error) {
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if cs := ls.sessions[s].Load(); cs != nil {
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return cs, nil
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}
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cs, err := newLaneConnectionState(&ls.material, uint8(s))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if !ls.sessions[s].CompareAndSwap(nil, cs) {
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return ls.sessions[s].Load(), nil
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}
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return cs, nil
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}
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// maxMessageCounter returns the highest counter across the base session and
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// every lane session. Data rides the lanes, so the base counter alone would
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// never reach the rehandshake or exhaustion thresholds and the lane keys would
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// be used past their data-volume margin. Rolling the base tunnel replaces the
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// lane keys with it, since lanes are derived from it.
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func (i *HostInfo) maxMessageCounter() uint64 {
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if i.ConnectionState == nil {
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return 0
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}
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c := i.ConnectionState.messageCounter.Load()
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if ls := i.lanes; ls != nil {
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for s := range ls.sessions {
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cs := ls.sessions[s].Load()
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if cs == nil {
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// Never derived, so it has never sent anything either.
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continue
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}
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if lc := cs.messageCounter.Load(); lc > c {
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c = lc
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}
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}
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}
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return c
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}
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// txLane returns the session and destination for lane s, or a nil session when
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// the lane is down and the caller must use the base tunnel. A miss raises
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// demand, which is what gets a down lane probed again, so we pay for a lane
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// exactly where real traffic wanted one. Callers on the data plane come through
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// txLaneForFlow.
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func (ls *laneSet) txLane(s int) (*ConnectionState, netip.AddrPort) {
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if ls == nil || s <= 0 || s >= ls.txLanes {
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return nil, netip.AddrPort{}
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}
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if addr := ls.txAddr[s].Load(); addr != nil {
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// The lane is only up because a probe was acked on it, and that probe
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// derived the session, so this load cannot miss. Fall back rather than
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// derive here anyway: this is the hot path and a nil is not worth an HKDF.
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if cs := ls.sessions[s].Load(); cs != nil {
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return cs, *addr
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}
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return nil, netip.AddrPort{}
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}
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// Load-guarded so the common case of a lane that will not come up is a
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// plain read and cannot ping-pong the cache line these flags share.
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if !ls.demand[s].Load() {
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ls.demand[s].Store(true)
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}
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return nil, netip.AddrPort{}
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}
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// txLaneForFlow picks the lane a flow rides and returns it with its session and
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// destination, or lane 0 and a nil session when the flow belongs on the base
|
|
// tunnel — either because the hash landed on lane 0 or because the lane it
|
|
// landed on is down.
|
|
//
|
|
// The lane comes from the flow rather than from the sending routine so that lane
|
|
// use doesn't depend on how the kernel steers tun queues; see txQueue. It is a
|
|
// pure function of the 5-tuple, so a flow stays on one lane for its life: no
|
|
// per-packet reordering, and one lane's replay window sees one set of flows.
|
|
func (ls *laneSet) txLaneForFlow(p *firewall.Packet) (int, *ConnectionState, netip.AddrPort) {
|
|
if ls == nil || ls.txLanes < 2 {
|
|
return 0, nil, netip.AddrPort{}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s := int((laneFlowHash(p) + uint32(ls.laneBias)) % uint32(ls.txLanes))
|
|
if s == 0 {
|
|
// Lane 0 is the base tunnel, and a full share of flows belongs on it.
|
|
return 0, nil, netip.AddrPort{}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cs, addr := ls.txLane(s)
|
|
return s, cs, addr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// laneFlowHash hashes a 5-tuple to the same value from either end of the flow,
|
|
// which is what lets both peers pick partner lanes for it (see laneBias). FNV-1a
|
|
// by hand rather than through hash/fnv: this runs per packet, and the interface
|
|
// there would escape the addresses to the heap.
|
|
func laneFlowHash(p *firewall.Packet) uint32 {
|
|
// Order the two endpoints so the direction of travel cannot change the hash.
|
|
aAddr, aPort := p.LocalAddr, p.LocalPort
|
|
bAddr, bPort := p.RemoteAddr, p.RemotePort
|
|
if bAddr.Less(aAddr) || (aAddr == bAddr && bPort < aPort) {
|
|
aAddr, aPort, bAddr, bPort = bAddr, bPort, aAddr, aPort
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const prime = 16777619
|
|
h := uint32(2166136261)
|
|
x, y := aAddr.As16(), bAddr.As16()
|
|
for i := range x {
|
|
h = (h ^ uint32(x[i])) * prime
|
|
h = (h ^ uint32(y[i])) * prime
|
|
}
|
|
for _, b := range [5]byte{byte(aPort >> 8), byte(aPort), byte(bPort >> 8), byte(bPort), p.Protocol} {
|
|
h = (h ^ uint32(b)) * prime
|
|
}
|
|
return h
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// laneTargetPortLocked returns the peer port lane s aims at. Only meaningful
|
|
// when peerPortCount is nonzero, which txLanes > 0 guarantees.
|
|
func (ls *laneSet) laneTargetPortLocked(s int) uint16 {
|
|
return ls.peerBasePort + uint16((s+int(ls.portOffset))%int(ls.peerPortCount))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// laneTargetLocked returns where lane s's probes go: the peer port this lane is
|
|
// paired with, on the peer's current direct address.
|
|
//
|
|
// A lane only ever aims at its own port. There is no fallback to the peer's base
|
|
// port when the lane port doesn't answer — a lane sharing the base port's
|
|
// destination gains only a source port of its own, while costing the peer the
|
|
// receive spread that is the whole point, so a lane that can't reach its port
|
|
// stays down and its traffic rides the base tunnel.
|
|
func (ls *laneSet) laneTargetLocked(s int, addr netip.Addr) netip.AddrPort {
|
|
return netip.AddrPortFrom(addr, ls.laneTargetPortLocked(s))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// laneRetryDelay is the backoff after fails consecutive probe failures.
|
|
func laneRetryDelay(fails uint8) time.Duration {
|
|
d := laneRetryBase << min(fails, 4)
|
|
if d > laneRetryMax {
|
|
d = laneRetryMax
|
|
}
|
|
return d
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// noteAck records an acked probe for lane s, promoting the lane if it was down.
|
|
// gen must match the outstanding probe. Reports the target the lane came up on,
|
|
// and whether this ack is what promoted it.
|
|
func (ls *laneSet) noteAck(s int, gen uint8, now time.Time) (netip.AddrPort, bool) {
|
|
if s <= 0 || s >= len(ls.probe) {
|
|
return netip.AddrPort{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ls.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer ls.mu.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
p := &ls.probe[s]
|
|
if p.sentAt.IsZero() || p.gen != gen {
|
|
// No probe outstanding, or an ack for a probe we have already given up
|
|
// on. Either way it says nothing about the lane's current path.
|
|
return netip.AddrPort{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p.sentAt = time.Time{}
|
|
p.lastAck = now
|
|
p.fails = 0
|
|
p.retryAt = time.Time{}
|
|
|
|
target := p.target
|
|
if ls.txAddr[s].Load() != nil {
|
|
// Keepalive for a lane already up.
|
|
return target, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ls.txAddr[s].Store(&target)
|
|
return target, true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// probeLanes runs one lane maintenance pass for a peer: it demotes lanes whose
|
|
// probe went unanswered, re-proves lanes that have been up a while without one,
|
|
// and probes down lanes the data plane asked for. Driven by the connection
|
|
// manager's per-tunnel traffic tick, which skips a tunnel that is idle in both
|
|
// directions.
|
|
func (f *Interface) probeLanes(hostinfo *HostInfo, now time.Time, nb, out []byte) {
|
|
ls := hostinfo.lanes
|
|
if ls == nil || ls.txLanes < 2 {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
remote := hostinfo.GetRemote()
|
|
|
|
ls.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer ls.mu.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
if !remote.IsValid() {
|
|
// Relayed, or otherwise without a direct path. Lanes are direct-only,
|
|
// so drop them all; a later tick rebuilds if a direct path returns.
|
|
ls.resetLocked()
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ls.peerAddr != remote.Addr() {
|
|
if ls.peerAddr.IsValid() {
|
|
// A roam is a new path, not a failure: forget the lanes built on
|
|
// the old one and let demand re-probe from a clean backoff. On the
|
|
// first pass there is nothing built yet, so just record the address.
|
|
ls.resetLocked()
|
|
}
|
|
ls.peerAddr = remote.Addr()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for s := 1; s < ls.txLanes; s++ {
|
|
p := &ls.probe[s]
|
|
up := ls.txAddr[s].Load() != nil
|
|
|
|
if !p.sentAt.IsZero() {
|
|
if now.Sub(p.sentAt) < laneProbeTimeout {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// An aged-out probe is a failure whether it was bringing the lane
|
|
// up or keeping it up.
|
|
p.sentAt = time.Time{}
|
|
p.fails = min(p.fails+1, laneMaxFails)
|
|
p.retryAt = now.Add(laneRetryDelay(p.fails))
|
|
if up {
|
|
ls.txAddr[s].Store(nil)
|
|
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Info("Multiport lane demoted, probe unanswered", "lane", s, "udpAddr", p.target)
|
|
} else if p.lastAck.IsZero() && p.fails == laneWarnFails {
|
|
// Said once per lane: fails only passes through this value again
|
|
// after an ack or a reset clears it.
|
|
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Warn("Multiport lane not coming up, probes unanswered; check that the peer's lane ports are reachable",
|
|
"lane", s, "udpAddr", p.target, "fails", p.fails)
|
|
}
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if up {
|
|
if now.Sub(p.lastAck) < laneKeepalive {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
} else if now.Before(p.retryAt) || !ls.demand[s].Swap(false) {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p.gen++
|
|
p.target = ls.laneTargetLocked(s, remote.Addr())
|
|
if f.sendLaneProbe(hostinfo, s, p.gen, p.target, nb, out) {
|
|
p.sentAt = now
|
|
} else {
|
|
p.fails = min(p.fails+1, laneMaxFails)
|
|
p.retryAt = now.Add(laneRetryDelay(p.fails))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// resetLocked takes every lane down and clears its probe state, without
|
|
// counting it as a failure.
|
|
//
|
|
// The probe generation survives the reset. Starting it over would let a late ack
|
|
// for a probe sent before the reset match the first probe sent after it, and
|
|
// promote the lane to a target nothing has proven.
|
|
//
|
|
// Demand is deliberately left standing: it records that a routine has real
|
|
// traffic for this peer, which a roam or a relay detour does not change. Keeping
|
|
// it re-probes the lanes that were actually carrying data as soon as a path
|
|
// exists again, while a lane whose routine has gone quiet stays down.
|
|
func (ls *laneSet) resetLocked() {
|
|
for s := 1; s < len(ls.probe); s++ {
|
|
ls.txAddr[s].Store(nil)
|
|
ls.probe[s] = laneProbeState{gen: ls.probe[s].gen}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// isLaneProbe reports whether t/st is a lane probe or its ack. Probing is upkeep
|
|
// the lanes do for themselves, not traffic: counting it would let a lane's own
|
|
// keepalive keep an idle tunnel from ever being dropped.
|
|
func isLaneProbe(t header.MessageType, st header.MessageSubType) bool {
|
|
return t == header.Test && (st == header.LaneProbe || st == header.LaneProbeAck)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// isLaneRemote reports whether addr is the target of one of our up lanes. The
|
|
// peer answers a lane packet from the socket it arrived on, so a recv_error for
|
|
// lane traffic comes from that lane's target rather than the base remote.
|
|
func (ls *laneSet) isLaneRemote(addr netip.AddrPort) bool {
|
|
if ls == nil {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
for s := 1; s < ls.txLanes; s++ {
|
|
if a := ls.txAddr[s].Load(); a != nil && *a == addr {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// sendLaneProbe sends a probe on lane s to addr from a socket on lane s's port.
|
|
// The probe is an ordinary Test packet encrypted with the lane's session, so an
|
|
// ack proves the whole lane: our source port reached the peer, its reply reached
|
|
// us, and the keys we derived for this lane match the ones it derived. Reports
|
|
// whether the probe made it onto the wire.
|
|
//
|
|
// It goes out the first socket on the port, since the connection manager runs
|
|
// this and has no queue of its own; every socket on the port has the same address,
|
|
// so the probe proves the path for whichever one the data plane picks.
|
|
func (f *Interface) sendLaneProbe(hostinfo *HostInfo, s int, gen uint8, addr netip.AddrPort, nb, out []byte) bool {
|
|
// The first probe on a lane is what derives its session.
|
|
ci, err := hostinfo.lanes.session(s)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to derive multiport lane session", "error", err, "lane", s)
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
if ci == nil || ci.eKey == nil {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
|
|
ci.writeLock.Lock()
|
|
}
|
|
c, ok := ci.NextMessageCounter()
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
|
|
ci.writeLock.Unlock()
|
|
}
|
|
f.dropExhausted(hostinfo, c, "Dropping multiport lane probe, lane message counter is exhausted")
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
b := header.EncodeLane(out[:0], header.Version, header.Test, header.LaneProbe, hostinfo.remoteIndexId, c, uint8(s))
|
|
b, err = ci.eKey.EncryptDanger(b, b, []byte{uint8(s), gen}, c, nb)
|
|
if noiseutil.EncryptLockNeeded {
|
|
ci.writeLock.Unlock()
|
|
}
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to encrypt multiport lane probe", "error", err, "lane", s)
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
f.messageMetrics.Tx(header.Test, header.LaneProbe, 1)
|
|
if err := f.writers[f.laneSock(0, s)].WriteTo(b, addr); err != nil {
|
|
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Error("Failed to send multiport lane probe", "error", err, "lane", s, "udpAddr", addr)
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if f.l.Enabled(context.Background(), slog.LevelDebug) {
|
|
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Debug("Multiport lane probe sent", "lane", s, "gen", gen, "udpAddr", addr)
|
|
}
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleLaneProbe answers a peer's lane probe. The ack rides the base tunnel on
|
|
// purpose: a probe proves the peer's lane s works in its send direction, and
|
|
// answering on our own lane s would make the result depend on a second path
|
|
// that may be broken independently.
|
|
func (f *Interface) handleLaneProbe(hostinfo *HostInfo, lane uint8, payload []byte, rxc *rxContext) {
|
|
if lane == 0 || len(payload) < 2 {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Echo the header's lane rather than the payload's, so a peer cannot get us
|
|
// to vouch for a lane it did not actually probe.
|
|
f.send(header.Test, header.LaneProbeAck, hostinfo.ConnectionState, hostinfo,
|
|
[]byte{lane, payload[1]}, rxc.nb, rxc.scratch[:0])
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleLaneProbeAck promotes the lane a peer just acked.
|
|
func (f *Interface) handleLaneProbeAck(hostinfo *HostInfo, payload []byte) {
|
|
ls := hostinfo.lanes
|
|
if ls == nil || len(payload) < 2 {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The target is worth logging next to the demotion that names the same
|
|
// address, so a flapping lane can be read off the logs.
|
|
if target, promoted := ls.noteAck(int(payload[0]), payload[1], time.Now()); promoted {
|
|
hostinfo.logger(f.l).Info("Multiport lane up", "lane", payload[0], "udpAddr", target)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|